I disagree with your depiction of the Eleatics as sophists. Plato wrote the Sophist having a student of Parmenides overturning a critical tenet of his teacher. Aristotle (almost reluctantly) confirms Plato's descriptions of sophistry as a way to "say what is not." Pretty darn Parmenidean. — Paine

I don't understand what you are saying here. Parmenides is Eleatic. And then you say "Pretty darn Parmenidean", as if you are confirming that Parmenides was sophistic.

Anyway, I agree that we ought not classify the Eleatics altogether as sophists, nor do I think Plato or Socrates was doing such. That's why there was such a long discussion about how exactly to identify the sophist, so that we might separate the sophist from the philosopher, by reference to the individual, not to the type. Within the Eleatics, Zeno stands out as sophistic, using logic to prove things like motion is impossible.

Your version of 'being' and 'becoming' gives a place for "potential" to hang out in between times of actuality. That does not fit well with Aristotle speaking of potential as something we can only apply by analogy. We need experience to use the idea. In a parallel fashion, I read the tension created in Metaphysics Zeta 13 to point to the complexity of causes beyond being able to recognize "kinds" (genos). — Paine

There is much said about "potential", and "potency" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially Bk.9, and most is not said by analogy. So I do not know where you get that idea from. It is a concept which is developed by use, and he uses it in relation to actual. So "potential" is a word which derives its meaning in relation to the meaning of actual. Since "actual" has two distinct senses, just like "form" and "substance" each have two distinct senses, this allows potential to be the concept which relates these two. This is how "matter" provides the relation between "form" as universal, and "form" as particular, which is also the difference between "primary substance" as the individual, and "secondary substance" as the species. Matter partakes of one, but not the other.

But the choice which belongs to you is the choice to take a walk, not to take a walk in that specific park. Though any exercise of that choice might involve a specific destination, the destination is not the thing that belongs to you, and no particular destination (as opposed to any other) is required for you to exercise that choice. — Dan

I don't agree with your description of "choice", as I explained. I choose to take a walk in a specific place, the specific place is an essential part of the choice. Without it, I would not walk anywhere because i would not have decided on a place to walk. Since I would not walk anywhere, this cannot be a choice to take a walk. What you call "the choice to take a walk" is not a choice at all, it's just a general desire, the desire to take a walk, which does not become a choice until a specific place to walk is chosen. Only when I have a specific place chosen to walk, do I have a choice to take a walk, because without choosing a direction, a walk will not follow.

but I think I have been fairly consistent that your own choices are those regarding what happens to your own mind, body and property — Dan

The issue is as I've shown, that not every choice regarding what happens to one's own mind, body and property, is one's own choice. In many cases (examples I have provided), you have said that a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, will have an effect on others, which makes you judge the choice as not one's own, due to that effect. So you negate your own definition, with a whole slew of exceptions, principally if the choice restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, then the choice does not belong to the person. You really do override your own definition. How does it make sense to you, to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body and property, and then proceed to dismiss a whole bunch of choices regarding one's own mind, body and property, as not qualifying to be one's own choice, for some other reason.

It might be more accurate to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, which does not interfere with another's choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property. But this would be very problematic, because most choices interfere with others, in some way or another. That would leave "one's own choice" as a rather useless principle. So you have described a special type of interference, and this becomes the base of your exceptions. The problem which you and I have, is that we do not agree on when the named boundary, outlining the exceptions, has been crossed. And, there can be no clear solution here due to the issue of self-reference. Therefore we will likely always disagree and there will be no principles available to resolve the disagreement.

It is only contrary when the person is decieved about the nature of the choice they have to make. Decieving them about other things (even things that might influence what choice they make) does not reduce this ability. There's quite a good paper by Hallie Liberto regarding sexual consent that could potentially help clarify this discussion a bit if you don't mind some homework. — Dan

We clearly disagree about the nature of deception. I think that you do not understand it at all, trying to belittle its effect. I don't think homework on my part will resolve this, I think you need to look more closely at what deception really is, rather than just considering one very uncommon type, being "deceived about the nature of the choice they have to make". This doesn't even make sense. Convincing a person that they "have to make" a specific choice, is an act of deception itself.

This is a fine example of deception being wrong. The person thinks they are making one kind of choice but they are actually making another. That's fine. I have no issue with deception sometimes being wrong, I'm just pointing out that it often isn't. — Dan

The issue is not whether deception is "wrong". The issue is whether it restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. And, regardless of the fact that your refuse to recognize this, the answer is yes, it does. Deception creates misunderstanding therefore it restricts a persons capacity to understand and make one's own choices. On the contrary, education increases one's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, but faulty education, even if it's not intentional deception, restricts that capacity by creating misunderstanding.

You lying to me about your reasons does not reduce my ability to understand and make the choice to accept the car. — Dan

Of course it does. Can't you see that? Me lying to you about the car caused you to misunderstand the gift, which you accepted, but you may not have accepted it if you knew the truth. You had a lack of understanding within your own choice to accept the gift

This does not reduce their ability to understand or make their choice to spend time with you — Dan

Of course it reduces their ability to understand and make their own choice. When they believe the lie, their choice is based in a misunderstanding. This explicitly means that their understanding has been reduced. How can you think otherwise?

I wouldn't categorize choosing to try to decieve as a choice regarding what to do with someone else's mind. It might affect them, but it isn't a choice of what to do with them. Same for education. For example, I might continually tell you that I don't value property more highly than mind or body, but I can't make you learn that. — Dan

You are flatly denying what is obvious. A choice to educate another person is a choice to do something with that person's mind, just as much as a choice to steal another's car is a choice to do something with another's property. That it must makes sense to the person to be able to teach it to the person, does not imply that teaching isn't doing something with another's mind. It's just a condition, like in order for me to steal your car I need to be in the proximity of it.

I'm not switching the definition, I'm talking about two different things. Whether a choice belongs to someone is about whether it is a choice of what to do with their mind, body, or property. Whether a choice is right or wrong (or good or bad) is about whether it reduces or protects (or neither) someone's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. Same definitions as always. — Dan

This is incorrect. You very clearly said that when I use my own mind, body, and tools, to take your car, this is not a choice which belongs to me, even though I am using my own mind, body, and property. But when using my own property has an effect on your property which is morally irrelevant, then you allow that it is my own choice. Clearly you allow whether you believe that a choice is right or wrong, to influence your judgement as to whether the choice belongs to the person.

Given what you are inferring from everything I say, I don't doubt it. What I would ask is to read what I've written with the assumptions that I am being consistent and am at least moderately intelligent. This will likely lead to fewer misunderstandings. — Dan

I always assume consistency until I encounter what appears to be inconsistency. Then I ask the author to clarify. If the author cannot clarify, I conclude inconsistency. What I've discovered with you is that you have proposed a concept "one's own choice", with specific precepts. However, the concept is not viable under the precepts you assume ought to constitute it. So the proposed concept gets lost and is not viable.

No, I don't think your version is in error, more like incomplete. So I'll address specifically some aspects of your post with suggestions as to how I think it can be filled out better.

The authors of the article make some reasonable arguments to resolve the issue. I tend to look at it as an ongoing issue of how to understand the role of all the causes needed for particular creatures to come into being. Since the forms don't have their own real estate outside the convergence of causes, a new concept of the soul is needed. — Paine

The "new concept of the soul" is the one Aristotle proposes as a form which is the first actuality of a living body. The powers of a living being were understood as potencies, and this would lend itself to the idea of the soul as a power, or potency. But Aristotle showed that since the potencies of the living body are not always active, there is a need to assume an actuality which activates them when they become active. This is the soul, instead of a potency, it is an actuality.

Further study of his metaphysics reveals that this form, or actuality, "soul", must be prior to the body, as the cause of it being the particular body which it is, and not something else. By the law of identity, a thing must be what it is. However, it being what it is, is still contingent on a cause, and this is the prior form. In the case of a living body, it's the soul. Simply put, potencies are possibilities, and something must select (acting as cause) which possibilities will become actual (making the body, the body which it is rather than something else). This cannot be random chance, because the body is an organized body, so the cause is that form, (actuality), which is prior to the body.

There is a parallel consideration taking place in Plato's Sophist, where the sharp division between Being and Becoming is brought into question. It is interesting that Aristotle's Physics (nature) spends so much time and effort into pressing a thumb into the eye of the Eleatics. — Paine

The Greeks were principally scientists, focused on becoming, while the Eleatics were more like philosophers, considering the nature of being. The incompatibility between being and becoming is strongly discussed in Plato's Theatetus, I believe. In my interpretation of The Sophist, the Eleatics are treated as sophists by Plato. But Plato is very careful to explain that it is a fine line, even an undistinguishable line, between a sophist and a philosopher. That seems to be a main point in the dialogue, to determine how to distinguish a sophist from a philosopher or vise versa. So Socrates claims high respect for the Eleatics, but also demonstrates that their philosophy is sophistry.

I think It's pretty clear that Aristotle treats the Eleatics as sophists, especially Zeno. At one point he explains how sophists, by adhering rigidly to the law of excluded middle, in cases of becoming, can prove absurdities. This is why there is a need for the concept of "potential" which violates the law of excluded middle (as what may or may not be), to account for the reality of becoming.

That being and becoming are incompatible is demonstrated by Aristotle in the following way. Suppose there is a change form state-of-being A to state-of-being B, between these two is a case of becoming. If we posit a further state-of-being, C, as the intermediary between A and B, to account for A becoming B, then we have a succession of the following states-of-being, A, C, and B. But now there is a case of becoming between A and C, and also between C and B. Therefore we would need to posit further states of being here, and this becomes and infinite regress of states-of-being without ever accounting for the reality of change, or "becoming", which is supposed to happen between two distinct states-of-being.

It's very similar to the question of real numbers, and the number line. The real number is a point, and there is assumed to be a line between two points. There is always more points, (real numbers), to an infinite regress, and we never account for what the line is, which supposedly exists between points.

The reason why Aristotle is so dismissive of the Eleatics ought to be evident. Zeno for instance, describes motion and change with states-of-being (the arrow is at point A at t1, and point B at t2 for example), and then proceeds from those premises to demonstrate that motion, is impossible. That's Zeno's mode of argumentation, to proceed from assumed states-of-being to show that things like motion and becoming are impossible.

The problem is that there is something very intuitive about states-of-being, so we cannot simply dismiss the concept as unreal. That's why dualism becomes necessary, to account for the reality of both. Then, from dualist premises, becoming and change, being supported by empirical evidence, (sense observation), is subject to skepticism. So we go around, and the inquiry is never ending.

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

I find that the way to resolve this apparent problem is to understand that in Aristotle there is two distinct senses of "form", just like there is "substance" in the primary sense and in the secondary sense. Notice, if substance is form, and there are two distinct senses of "substance" then there must be two distinct senses of form to correspond. This is what allows for two distinct types of actuality, and what makes Aristotle the dualist who resolved the interaction problem, following Plato's revelations concerning the deficiencies of "participation" theory.

It's a matter of what constitutes reducing your ability to make a choice. Your choice is to take a walk, so stopping you taking a walk would take that choice away from you. Your choice is not to take a walk in that park, so that park not being there does not reduce your ability to make a choice that belongs to you. — Dan

I don't agree with this. I think choices are very specific, while desires may be more general. I believe the proper representation is that my desire is to take a walk (something general), and my choice is to take a walk in that specific park. The choice is what inclines one to act, and it is always specific, never general. For example, hunger manifests as a general desire to eat, but when a person decides to eat, it always must be a specific thing which they chose to eat.

I believe this difference between the general desire, and the specific choice is very important to moral philosophy. Since desire is general, and choice is specific, this allows us to mitigate the effects of desire, because we can entertain numerous possibilities as to the specific thing which will fulfil the desire. So, in the example of taking a walk in the park, the general desire is to take a walk, but it is not a choice until I choose an actual pace to walk. In the meantime, between desiring to walk, and actually choosing to walk (which requires a specific place to walk), I can consider the moral consequences of the different specific possibilities.

I'm not changing any definitions. Again, you seem to be interpreting me in a very strange way. When I say "Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them" I mean that none of the actions you have mentioned reduce the person's ability to understand or make their own choices. — Dan

You're obviously not understanding my criticism, so let me put it in another way. When judging whether a choice is one's own or not, you often refer to how the choice affects another's capacity to make one's own choices. This is an overriding principle, it overrides your definition of one's own choice, as a choice which involve one's own mind, body and property. It overrides your definition, because many examples I have given you, of choices which concern my own mind, body, and property, you reject them as my own, on the basis that such a choice would restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. So do you agree, that the true definition of one's own choice, the one which you are actually applying, is a choice which does not limit another's capacity to make one's own choices? But that definition suffers the problem of being self-referential

Again, no new definition. The choices one can make are not only their own choices (choices that belong to them). Rather, only one's ability to understand and make one's own choices (choices that belong to them) needs to be protected. You seem to be bulling past this distinction and it is causing confusion. Neither of the things you have mentioned involve taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices, so they aren't morally problematic. — Dan

It is you who is continually ignoring the fact that lying and deception actually do take away peoples' ability to understand and make their own choices. Lying and deception creates misunderstanding which is clearly contrary to someone's ability to understand and make their own choices.

so lying to someone does not reduce their ability to understand or make their own choices (by itself, obviously it could in some circumstances). — Dan

This is obviously wrong. That's exactly what lying and deception does do, reduces their ability to understand and make their own choices, through the means of misunderstanding. How is it possible that misunderstanding does not reduce a person's ability to understand one's choices? To put it in terms of property (which seems to be the only terms you understand), imagine if I give you a car, and I say here, I bought this for you. So you drive it and it turns out that you are driving a stolen car. Doesn't this "misunderstanding" demonstrate clearly to you, how lying and deception reduces the ability to understand one's own choices? And it isn't just in some cases, it's in all cases, because that's what deception is, the creation of misunderstanding for the purpose of manipulating the person's choices.

The case of the park is not a case of choices over property trumping choices over one's body, it is simply a case of the choice to do something being different from the choice to do something with a specific thing that isn't yours. — Dan

You are ignoring the comparison. Choosing to deceive, and choosing to educate are both choices concerning doing something with something that isn't yours. You are doing something with the mind of another. Yet you allow that choosing to do these things with the minds of others are choices which belong to a person. However, when it's something like walking in the park, you say that it is not a choice which belongs to the person because it involves property which does not belong to the person. Clearly, "property" is valued higher than "minds". To do something with property which does not belong to you is not your own choice, but to do something with a mind which doesn't belong to you is your own choice.

An effect is not what is at issue. What is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not. In both the case of not providing a park and the case of lying to someone, it is not. — Dan

See, there you go, switching definition. What is important, according to your definition, is whether the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. Now you say, "what is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not". Which is the defining feature? They are not the same. You simply switch back and forth, as convenient, and in this way you avoid the criticism. When it suits you, one's own choice is a choice concerning one's own mind, body and property, but then other times it serves you better to say that one's own choice is a choice which doesn't reduce another's ability to make one's own choices. The latter is a self-referential definition.

No, much like choosing to go for a walk is a choice that belongs to a person, choosing to speak also is a choice that belongs to someone. Choosing to speak into that specific air isn't a choice that belongs to someone. If a wind blew past and they were suddenly speaking into different air, that wouldn't wrong them, just like choosing to walk in that specific park is not a choice that belongs to them such that they would not be wronged were that park not there. Seriously, you would find it much easier to understand what I'm saying if you stopped assuming I was suggesting something lunatic. I'm not. I am saying that the choice to walk in a specific park is not one that belongs to you, but the choice to go for a walk is. — Dan

I'm starting to think you really are suggesting lunacy.

I didn't say choosing to take a walk isn't a choice that belongs to you, but choosing to take a walk in a specific park, as opposed to somewhere else, does not belong to you. — Dan

This makes no sense to me. Choosing to take a walk, is a choice of what to do with my own body, how does choosing a specific place to walk change this? Don't we always choose a specific place to walk?

Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them. — Dan

This is a fine example of the problem you create by discarding your stated definition of one's own choice, and taking up a new problematic self-referential definition. Now, all of a sudden, "one's own mind, body, and property" has no definitional bearing, because you've replaced it with not "taking someone's choice about their mind away from them". But in doing this you negate the original definition as inapplicable, so I have no idea what "someone's choice about their mind" actually means, just a self-referential definition.

simply lying to someone, or teaching them something, does not take away their choices about their mind. — Dan

See, now you've gone completely to the new definition, if the choice one makes "does not take away their choices about their mind", then it does not rob them of the capacity to make their own choices, and therefore it is a choice one can make. However, you've negated the original definition "choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property", so that we cannot even refer to it in our judgement as to whether the choice is truly one's own (by the original definition).

Clearly, by the original definition, the choice to teach someone, just like the choice to deceive someone, is a choice about what to do with another person's mind. But we cannot discuss this, because "one's own choice" has been given a new definition, "does not take away another's capacity to make one's own choice", Furthermore, "another's capacity to make one's own choice" is strictly qualified with "one's own property", such that another's choice always concerns one's property, and one's mind is completely irrelevant, as your attitude toward teaching and deceiving reveals.

but that doesn't mean I don't value the choices a person has over their minds as much as I do those over their property. — Dan

It's very clear, that in your judgement, as to which choices qualify as "one's own", property is valued higher than one's mind and body. Look at the example of taking a walk. That's a choice concerning one's own body. However, as soon as we determine the specific property upon which the walk will be taken, the nature of that property takes precedence and becomes the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. And this is the case in all of your examples, stealing etc., as soon as there is property involved in the choice, ownership of the property overrides all other features of the choice, becoming the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. But, things involving another's mind, like teaching and deceiving, have no such determining influence.

Again, this is just incorrect. The choice to take a walk in a specific park very much relies on that specific park. The person doesn't own that park, so that choice does not belong to them. — Dan

See, very clear evidence that you prioritize property ownership. The person doesn't own the park so the choice automatically does not belong to them, no exceptions. However, in the case of teaching or deceiving, where the choice clearly involves an intentional effect on another's mind, there is an exception imposed, it is judged as not morally relevant. Why is the choice to use the public park not provided the same exception of not morally relevant?

By the principle you demonstrate here, the choice to speak is not a choice which belongs to a person. The air we breathe is public, just like the park, and choosing to speak into it is not a choice which belongs to the person, just like choosing to walk in the public park does not belong to a person. This is the problem you've caused yourself by giving priority to property as a principle for judgement as to what constitutes one's own choice. Much property is public, and if people have no ownership over their choices to use public property, then the middle category of neither one's own choice, nor not one's own choice, becomes extremely inflated, to the point where the principle "one's own choice" becomes useless.

It isn't about property mattering more than one's body or mind, it is about being specific about what choices belong to a person and which don't. — Dan

This is exactly the problem you have created by replacing the definition of one's own choice, "choices concerning ones own mind, body, and property", with the self-referential definition of not interfering with another's capacity to make one's own choices. Now, it is impossible to be specific about which choices are one's own, because there is no definition. So the judgement is just based in arbitrary, subjective principles and prejudice. You say that having an effect on property which is not your own makes it so the choice does not belong to you, but having an effect on a mind which does not belong to you does not bring about the same judgement call, because you provide an exception. There is no rule, because there is no longer a definition.

Mind and body are not at all accidental. Choices about what to happens to do with your own mind, body, and property, are yours. Choices which aren't about that aren't yours. Unless someone has built a park around you such that you can't go for a walk at all without crossing it, then yes walking in the park is a choice about how to use some public property, not about what to do with your body. A choice about what to do with your body might be, for example, whether you want your arm amputated. I would be inclined to agree that one's mind and body are more important than one's property (though exactly how that works I'm not sure, hence the original post). — Dan

This makes no sense at all to me. How is it that choosing to amputate my arm is a choice of what to do with my own body, but choosing to take a walk is not? Is it only choices to injure myself which qualify as choices of what to do with my own body? How can it not be the case that choosing to take a walk is choosing to do something with my own body?

I don't 'value property higher than an individual's mind' at all. — Dan

Your principles clearly demonstrate that you value an individual's property higher than an individual's mind. As we discussed, by your principles, stealing another's property is a choice we do not get to make, it's not one's own choice, but teaching, or corrupting, another's mind is a choice we get to make, as one's own. See, another's property is considered in the judgement, but another's mind is not considered. You argued that teaching is irrelevant, so I assume that giving false information, and lying are also not morally relevant. You argued that making someone angry has no moral relevance.

The latest thing you said, to indicate that you value property higher than body and mind is that a walk in the park is not a choice about the health of one's own mind and body, it's a choice about the public property, the park. You prove this by saying that the choice is no one's because the property is public, even though the choice is about doing something with one's own mind and body. You continually demonstrate this, judging whether a choice is one's own or not, by reference to property, and with complete disregard for what the person is doing with one's mind and body, and how the choice will affect the minds of others. It's very clear evidence that you value property over minds.

Luckily, in English we have "power" and "potency" to (sort of) distinguish what Eriugena terms "nothing through excellence," (pure, immutable power beyond any defining actuality) and the nothing of prime matter (a "nothing on account of privation"). Or at least, translators seem to use "power" more for Plotinus, which I think works better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea of pure immutable power, is what Aristotle took issue with. Such a power would not have the capacity to actualize anything. If absolutely anything is possible, then there is nothing actual to cause anything, and the situation will always remain the same, as absolutely anything is possible. That is why Aristotle assumed an actuality which is prior to all potential, and the logical need to assume this actuality negates the possibility of pure immutable power. The prior actuality is the cause which accounts for the reality of this particular existence, which consists of limited possibility, rather than an endless existence of infinite possibility, or power.

Plotinus sort of grasped this problem and tried to deal with it by portraying the pure power, the One, as something other than a cause. So the reality which we know emanates from the One, rather than being caused by the One. But this description fails in the capacity to explain how any particular thing could come into being from a pure potency, or power. We need something to account for this existence rather than some other existence, a choice, and this is an actuality such as a will.

(This is also how Aristotle's Prime Mover(s) or Plotinus' One cannot be said to suffer from any privation through being pure act). — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Plotinus' "One" is pure potency rather than pure act. This is the principal metaphysical difference between Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism.

This is an issue where Aristotle's argument about the inseparability of form and matter comes into play. — Paine

This claimed "inseparability" needs to be qualified as unidirectional. Matter cannot be separated from form, to produce "prime matter", but form is separable from matter. In principle this is how sensing, and abstraction is explained. The human mind receives the form of the object without the matter.

This understanding of abstraction created a problem for the ancients (exposed by Plato and Aristotle), because the form in the mind (the abstraction) is not precisely the same as the form in the material object. Aristotle explained this difference with the concept of "accidents", the form which the material object has is complete with accidents, while the abstracted form consists only of the essence of the object. The problem, well demonstrated by Plato in The Timaeus, is that if the form which comes to be in the human mind is an abstraction, an essence, it is categorized as a universal, yet the individual material object has a "form" which is particular to itself, complete with the accidentals which makes it a unique thing. Now, the question was, how does an object come to have a unique form, when "forms" as they are known to the human mind, are universals. So Plato grappled with the question of how universals produce particulars.

The solution presented by Aristotle, with reference to a further premise, the law of identity, is that the form of a material object must preexist the object's material existence. So in BK 7 of Metaphysics Aristotle discusses how an artist gives matter the particular form which it has, in the case of a work of art, by putting the form into the matter. He then proceeds to explain why natural objects must be generated in a similar way, the form preexists the material object, and is put into the matter.

This principle validates the separation of form from matter, in the sense that pure form is prior in time to matter. That is the principle which Aquinas and other Christian theologians exploit, claiming God to be pure Form, pure act, and Creator of matter. This representation is derived from Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument, which shows that since it is necessary that the form of an object preexists its material presence, there must be a form which preexists all material presence. Then we must conclude that matter comes into existence from this primordial Act, and must always have form, making matter inseparable from form.

The choice to say, write your name on the moon, does not belong to anyone. Nobody has a "right" to do so, so we not need to protect anyone's ability to make that choice. — Dan

I really don't think I am understanding what you are saying, but maybe this is the key to why I am having difficulty. Are you proposing a third category of choice here, those which belong to no one? And, any choices made which concern "public property" are choices which belong to no one?

So I conclude that when you say "one's own choice" is a choice which concerns one's own mind, body, and property, "property" is really the defining feature. So if I choose to write my name on the moon (as your example), or just to take a walk in the park, this concerns public property, and so it is no one's choice to make. I would have thought, that walking in the park, or going to the moon, since it concerns doing something with my own body, is my own choice to make. However, I'm now starting to understand that "my own mind and body" are accidentals in the judgement of whether the choice is mine, and property is the essential determining factor. So regardless of the fact that I am using my own body to walk in the park, the property is public, therefore it is a choice I make which does not belong to anyone.

Now, when you say that we need to protect the ability of people to make their own choices, what it means to people like me (who value their mind more than their property), is that you want to protect their rights to do what they want with their own property. To me, this is very problematic, because "one's property is not something static, and we need principles by which one can come to own property, and accumulate it.

I didn't say people don't have common goals. I said I take issue with the idea there is a goal or end that all of humanity is aimed at. Big difference. — Dan

Sure it's different, but the difference is insignificant. Instead of having individuals divided by distinct goals, as I described, your proposal divides by distinct groups, sects of humanity. Individuals cannot cooperate without common goals, and distinct groups or sects cannot cooperate without common goals. So the very same problem persists, but instead of consisting of individuals who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals, it consists of groups pf people who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals.

Again, in brief (and heavily simplified) I think Hume is broadly right that we should consider rationality more in terms of means-ends, rather than specificying rational goals. — Dan

Oh, that's very problematic. Means are deemed as "good" in relation to goals. If there is no system for judging ends then differing ends will produce inconsistent and conflicting "goods". If we couple this with the principle you propose, of no common goals for all humanity, then humanity becomes disunited, unable to resolve the question of who\s goods are the real goods.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you taking issue with me disagreeing with this assumption, or are you claiming that I'm making this assumption? — Dan

Sorry, the double negative threw me off. We may agree here. I disagree that it is irrational to treat your own ends as more valuable than others, but I think this is consistent with traditional moral principles. I do not think it is consistent with your principles. Since, as described above, you value property higher than an individual's mind, you restrict one's choices (and ends) according to property based principles (what we get to do in relation to property). And property based principles require an assumed equality of individuals. Equality of individuals reduces to an equality of ends, what I desire is equal to what you desire, therefore we have equal access to ownership of property.

Notice I used the naming of "God" and "soul" as examples. I would propose something like "the immaterial".

What do you mean about dropping the Platonia-type thing"? The whole point is that we need to account for the reality of the Platonia-type thing, and as I said it's better just to name it than to describe it, because our descriptions rely on empirical based terms. So when a name for the "Platonia-type thing" is employed, over time specific descriptions (you might call this the connotations) become associated with the name, as in the examples of "God" and "soul". Then the best thing to do is to choose a new name to avoid the implied description which has accumulated over the years.

You've made a category mistake. Making someone else's choice for them, taking it away from them, is bad. It might not always be wrong (for example, killing one to save five) but it is always bad. It always counts against the action. There are lots of choices that aren't yours that would be good and/or right to make, but not belonging to you is not the same as belonging to someone else. — Dan

You're really losing me Dan. How can there be a choice which does not belong to me , and yet does not belong to someone else? Who's choice is it? What type of existence does this choice have? I can see how it might be considered as a possibility, but how is it a choice?

In briefest of brief, moral philosophy tends to rest on assumptions that I think are either incorrect or at least unfounded. — Dan

Wow, you do have strange beliefs, don't you?

That there is some end that all humanity is aimed at or some goal that all humanity pursues — Dan

How could you justify cooperation without common goals?

* That it is rational to do what is moral (and sometimes vice versa) — Dan

Since human beings are rational animals, how could they be inclined to do what is moral, if it is not rational to do what is moral. Your claim makes not sense.

* That is is irrational to make an exception of yourself or treat your own ends as more valuable than those of others (this one can be a bit more complicated than this and the extent to which I have an issue with it depends a lot on how this is fleshed out) — Dan

This is the issue I took up with you already. I do not see how your position could be justified. When one decides that another's end is as valuable as one's own, this is just to make another's end one's own. It is logically impossible to make the ends of others as valuable as one's own, because all this means is to adopt another's as one's own. So only the ones judged as being valuable enough to be adopted as one's own are truly seen to be as valuable as one's own, and this is only by way of actually making them one's own. Therefore to keep moral principles aligned with truth, we must hold that one's own ends are always the most valuable to the person.

Cooperation is derived from common ends. But there is a big difference between taking another's end as one\s own, in cooperation, and allowing that there is no difference of importance in any goals of all others, like the principle you propose. The former (holding one's own as the most important) encourages rational judgement of any ends before passing judgement on importance on them. The latter (what you propose), provides no basis for judgement of the ends of others, because they already must be assumed to be just as important as one's own.

I think we all know, the "God" commonly referred to, is dead.

No. I am not claiming any such mechanism. I meant "you don't get to" in the sense that it is morally bad for you to make my choices for me. — Dan

But it isn't morally bad to make another's choice. That's what we already went through. It is generally good to save a person's life, for example. That's where your theory ran into problems, and you had to make all sorts of exceptions to allow that making another's choice is sometimes good. So, you do "get to" make choices which are not your own. Then this whole distinction (choices which do belong, and do not belong to the person) falls apart as meaningless, because what you are really trying to protect is choices which are morally good.

If you would like me to explain why I think why much of moral philosophy is barking up the wrong tree, I can do it, but that might be getting rather off topic. — Dan

Actually, I think that might be very helpful if we are to get anywhere in this discussion, because it might help me to understand why we are so far apart. On the other hand, you seem firmly attached to your beliefs, and I to mine, so it's unlikely we will get anywhere anyway.

This is the word use issue I was discussing with Patterner. It doesn't make sense to talk about Intelligence outside of time, because "intelligence" as we know and use the word, refers to a property of material beings which are temporal. However this does not invalidate the logic which indicates that there is a cause of intelligence, which is outside of time. We just do not know how to describe this immaterial cause which is outside of time. But rather than use descriptive terms like "intelligence", it is far better just to name it, as we do with "soul", and "God".

It would be interesting, and I'm sure we'd think of ways to block the subjective activity, so a person would only detect like a machine. — Patterner

I don't think so, and that is the problem I've been describing to you in the inverse form, (separating the pure immaterial subjective agent, sometimes called soul, or mind, or intellect) from the material object is not possible. We learn from logic, that the two are separable in theory, but in practise they are not. This is because "practise" necessarily involves both.

So our theories about the pure immaterial active agent end up involving material representations (eternal circular motions for example), and our practises, (the experiments meant to represent "machine sensing" for example) incorporate the immaterial aspect of human intention, and the two are never properly separated.

This is the nature of "attention". It incorporates both of the two aspects. The "detection" aspect serves to assist in the synthesis of information 'after-the-fact'. The 'intention' aspect serves to direct the attention, in the role of anticipation, based on a 'prior-to' analysis. The two are separable in principle, as memory of the past, and anticipation of the future, but not in pracise, because separation would annihilate the conscious experience which the separation is a representation of. And so we have all sorts of theories about the prior and the posterior, to account for the reality of this distinction, which cannot be supported by empirical science which relies on the posterior.

You say material had to have been preceded by immaterial, and organized had to have been preceded by un organized. If not, the current would not have been preceded; it would simply be a continuation of. Perhaps I have that right? — Patterner

Generally speaking, yes that's about right. The "continuation" is commonly known as infinite regress.

First of all, I don't know why that is the assumption. It could be the current is a continuation. if there was anything prior to the Big Bang, the Big Bang erased any empirical evidence of it. So we just don't know. — Patterner

I do believe that understanding causes requires that we move beyond simple "empirical evidence" to the employment of logic.

There was no material or organization prior, but there was life? — Patterner

That. I believe, is where the logic leads.

What Is unorganized life? — Patterner

I don't know.

And why assume this particular quality of the current existed in the prior, when no others could have? — Patterner

Now that is a good question, and I believe the answer is approached in Aristotle's "On the Soul". For him it was called "the soul", we tend to just call it "life". What happens is that logic leads us toward the need to assume an agential cause of living organisms. Then we put a name to it, "the soul", or "life". Notice that the name does not refer to a "particular quality" at all, it's a name that philosophers have used, as referring to the cause of a body being alive.

The interesting thing is that it doesn't really have a place in our empirical understanding of the organized living body. That is, there is nothing we can point to as life", or "the soul", there is just the living body. There is no property we can attribute to the living body, as "life". So "life" really has no meaning to the physicalist and that is why they can talk about non-living matter becoming living matter, there is no real distinction between the two. And so "life" is not really a "quality of the current". It only really makes sense to talk about "life" as the cause of the body being alive. Even though we commonly talk of "life" as if it is a quality, it really makes no sense because it's not anything we can describe.

Again, the goalposts are where they always are. I'm not sure what you think I am turning around here. Is it "you get to choose" that you are taking issue with? What do you take that to mean that is different? I think you may be reading something different than what I am writing as I have been saying the same thing (though sometimes in different ways in order to clear up any confusion) from the off. — Dan

Before, you were qualifying types of choices. The choice to steal your car was a choice which does not belong to me, and this judgement was made based on principles of "one's own mind, body, and property". Now you seem to be saying that there is something to prevent me from making such a choice; I do not get to make a choice which does not belong to me.

It's a "turn around" because at first you were just distinguishing between choices which belong to a person and those which do not, and claiming to protect the ability to make the one type. Now you imply that there is a mechanism in place which would restrict one's decision (therefore one's mind), to only make choices which one gets to make. So instead of looking forward to the future "I want to promote the ability to make one's own choices', you are now looking back at the past 'there is a mechanism which has been put in place which prevents one from making choices which are not one's own'.

This seems to be to be the fallacy of appeal to tradition. Also, on a related note I'm not sure I would consider saying something is wrong to be "complete disrespect" — Dan

Now it's my turn to say that you misunderstand me. Saying that a specific approach is "wrong", and dismissing it without demonstrating why it is wrong, is showing complete disrespect for it. However, you may actually understand it very well, and have very good reasons for saying it's wrong, and therefore actually have respect for it. But dismissing it as wrong, without showing these reasons, is to show complete disrespect.

The same principle goes the other way to claim tradition is correct, without showing why, is apprehended as an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is not that tradition is necessarily correct, so I am not making an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is that there is much information to be learned from the study of traditional principles, and your off-hand rejection of tradition as wrong, instead of demonstrating the faults in tradition, indicates that you have probably not taken the time to understand these principles. And this inclines me to think that you really do not have a good grasp of the principles which your theory attempts to deal with.

You've lost me. Care to explain what you're asking?

What you say makes sense, and was what I was expecting you to say. But I'm thinking, we know a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized, and b) the material that the immaterial caused is organized. Don't these two things present a good case for thinking the immaterial that caused the material was, itself, organized? — Patterner

No, I do not agree. "Organized" is the outcome, the effect. It does not make sense to use the same word to describe the cause, as is used to describe the effect. This tends toward annihilating the separation, or distinction between the two, making them one and the same thing.

That is the problem I referred to above, what happens when we describe the immaterial in words which are used to describe material things. "Immaterial" is distinctly not material. So describing the immaterial with the same words that we use to describe the material, cannot be correct. That is what has happened to quantum physics. If "the wave function" refers to something immaterial, and "the particle" refers to something material, then when they start describing "particles" as a feature of the wave function they come up with something incoherent.

So I can question the truth of "a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized". Depending on how we relate "immaterial" to "material" it may not be possible for the immaterial to be organized. If we say that the two are absolutely opposite, then clearly it would not be possible for the two to have any shared properties. But that is rather extreme, and it is representative of the interaction problem. For example, temporal and eternal are absolutely opposite.

So the better way is to make them separate categories. As separate categories they might share some properties, and this allows for "a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized". However, b) fails to make the case. That the effect is organized, does not provide the logical necessity required to conclude that it is likely that the cause is organized. We must not allow ourselves to get trapped in this type of word usage because it can be very misleading

I doesn't imply that at all. Motivation is not important in FC. — Dan

Motivation is a large aspect of "one's mind". If it is not important to FC, then your principle, "one's own choice", defined by you as a choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property is not consistent with FC.

It isn't my definition. It is your definition. Again I did not define it this way. I am not overriding anything, I was never suggesting that anything you do that in some way involves your mind, body, and property is your choice. I was suggesting that you get to choose what happens with your own mind, body, and property, and not what happens to the minds, bodies, and property of others. — Dan

You are changing the goal post. You spoke about protecting a person's ability to make one's own choices. When I suggest that stealing your car is a choice I might make, you said it is not my own choice to make, because it concerns your property. Then you defined "one's own choice" as a choice about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property.

Now you have turned things completely around, saying "you get to choose what happens...and not what happens to...". You are now not talking about "one's own choice" in any stretch of the imagination. You are now telling everyone what they must and must not choose, so you are imposing your own choice onto the minds of others, "you get to choose...". How could this be a choice which belongs to you, to impose such restrictions on the choices of others?

There are quite a few effects on one's mind that one could have which would be morally relevant. But someone being upset is not one of them. — Dan

As discussed, I strongly disagree with this. And it is things like this, and your complete disrespect for conventional moral philosophy, (saying that it is wrong), which make me realize that you truly are way off track.

I'm not talking about the act of putting marbles into a jar. I'm talking about the marbles are stacked up in an organized way. There's no organizer that stacked up the marbles on top of each other so that they'll stacked up in an organized manner. — night912

You are not making sense. If the marbles are in a jar, and you are talking about whether or not there is an organizer who cause them to be in this position, then obviously we must look at "the act of putting marbles into a jar". Or, are you assuming that they've been in that position forever?

Why are immaterial things we deal with all the time that are organized not relevant? Logic and mathematics, for example. — Patterner

This is why the subject is difficult. I believe that if we adhere to a strict definition of "immaterial", and do a thorough analysis of these examples, logic and mathematics, we will find that they are not actually immaterial things. All sorts of logic and mathematics rely on symbols, and symbols are not immaterial. What I think, is that in reality, the purely immaterial does not actually enter into what we call "our experience", or "our consciousness". The purely immaterial has a causal relation to what is consciously present to us, but it is not actually present within the content of our consciousness. What is present within our conscious experience is already a unified material/immaterial dualism, (Aristotelian matter/form), and this is due to the living being's dependence on a body.

So, this is why there is so much disagreement amongst different people, as to whether or not the immaterial is real, and even amongst those who believe it is real, as to how, or what type of existence it has. We only know about the reality of the immaterial through the dual nature (dualist representations) of what is present to us. This is not a pure "immaterial" existence because it is already contaminated by material aspects, so the dual nature of things serves only to demonstrate to us, the reality of the immaterial, but the purely "immaterial" remains unrevealed to us. This is what Aquinas says about God, we know God through His effects, but so long as the human being remains united to a body [and its intellect relies on that body] the human being can never truly know God, as purely immaterial.

Aristotle took up a related issue with the Pythagorean idealists, and certain "Platonists". There had been proposed a divine realm, of eternal circles of the heavenly bodies. The heavens were considered to be aethereal, divine, and eternal. Aristotle showed in "On The Heavens", that a circular motion necessarily involves something moving in that motion, and this thing moving in the circular motion must be material, bodily, and therefore not eternal. Then, in "On the Soul", he criticized these same idealists for saying that the soul, and intellect are immaterial and eternal, but they provide a representation of the soul (eternal circles) which include material aspects.

This is the problem we have with "the immaterial". We have very good evidence and logic to support the reality of the immaterial. However, whenever we produce representations of how the immaterial works within the material world, we assume material elements within our models of the immaterial. This is because that is how the immaterial appears to us, in the combined form of hylomorphism. And if we try to distance the immaterial from the material, we end up with the interaction problem. The subject is extremely difficult, and many are inclined to dismiss the reality of the immaterial altogether, and happily live in Plato's cave of denial. The fact is that we do not well enough understand the nature of time, to properly model the role of the immaterial within our world.

I thought I understood. But I had a typo. I meant "immaterial." I just wanted to verify that you are saying only material things can be organized. — Patterner

That is what I meant. I don't see how we could assign any type of order to something which is completely immaterial. It's a difficult subject to discuss though

the point was that mind is temporal/process-like, come and go, occurs, is interruptible, has a more clear temporal demarcation than spatial, ... Where does intelligence fit in? — jorndoe

My point was that being-like, or static-like, is just as much temporal as process-like is. But both involve spatial and temporal aspects. So I do not agree that "process-like" has "a more clear temporal demarcation than spatial". Spatial elements are just as necessary to "process" as temporal elements are.

Evenly sized marbles inside a jar are organizedly stacked on top of each other, but there is/was no organizer that stacked up those marbles on top of each other. — night912

What do you mean? How did the marbles get into the jar? Isn't putting marbles into a jar an act of organizing them?

I do not think that the "spatial/object-like", " temporal/process-like" distinction is very useful in this context. The issue is that "object" itself implies a temporal duration, a temporal continuity of sameness. To be an "object" is to have a temporal duration. This means that within the proposed concept "spatial/object-like", there is already an implied temporal dependence. The distinction then is reduced to sameness over duration, and change over duration.

Both of these have a temporal aspect, "duration", and a spatial aspect, "same" in one case, "difference" in the other case. "Simultaneity" is a more complex temporal conception, because it is a comparison. This means that there is a necessity of more than one "duration" involved in "simultaneity". And, since temporal duration is already qualified in two distinct ways, sameness over time, and difference over time, "simultaneity" becomes very difficult to grasp. To simplify "simultaneity", and make it a useful concept, we assume "a point in time", and designate the "state-of-being" at that point. All things within that "state-of-being" are simultaneous, as being "at the same time".

Mind isn't in atemporal's vocabulary. If you're talking atemporal, then you're not talking sentience; if you're talking sentience, then you're not talking atemporal. Isn't intelligence something that mind can do (or possess, be capable of)? — jorndoe

The "point in time", is the basis of the concept of "atemporality". "Time" in its natural existence, as what is passing, (secondary sense, in the prior post), is continuous. The imposition of "a point" is artificial, and since time is not passing at the point, the point is atemporal. This make "simultaneity", and all of the other conceptions which rely on a "point in time" fundamentally atemporal.

So, I don't know what you mean here with "Mind isn't in atemporal's vocabulary". The inverse is what is the case, "atemporal is in mind's vocabulary". It doesn't even make sense to attribute vocabulary to atemporal, rather than to mind, so this paragraph appears extremely confused.

Material things cannot be organized? — Patterner

I suggest you reread that. I said "organized" refers to material things. The cause of existence of material things is cannot be material (is immaterial) and therefore cannot be called "organized". "Organized" refers to a spatial ordering, a concept which cannot be applied to the immaterial.

Sure, not very useful until well defined. Still, I don't see how you could not be talking about an uncaused cause. Immaterial and uncaused. No? — Patterner

This is a complex issue due to the difference in types of causation. "Efficient cause" refers to physical activities and how they produce effects. If we assume a chain of efficient causes, in time, and look backward in time some will conclude that there is a need for a "first cause". The "first cause" would necessarily be an "uncaused cause" if we maintain consistency in the meaning of "cause", as efficient cause. However, since there are other senses of "cause", such as "final cause", we can say that the "first [efficient] cause" was caused by a different type of cause, i.e. final cause.

This is the way that we understand free will causation. A free will choice sets up a chain of efficient causes designed to produce the desired end. There is a beginning (or end, looking backward in time) to that chain of efficient causes, which we know as the "final cause". The final cause is the intention of the intentional being, the end which is aimed at.

Is the agent not organized, therefore needing it's own agent/organizer? — Patterner

"Organized" refers to material existents. The term therefore is not applicable to the cause of material existence which, being prior to material existence, is necessarily immaterial. And the terminology of "uncaused cause" is not very useful unless well defined, due to the multitude of distinct ways that "cause" is used.

The problem with the question as posed in the thread title, is that ‘pre-existing’ is a temporal description, referring to something that existed before everything else existed in time. Whereas classical theism, as a model, has the ‘ground of being’ as omnipresent and eternal, meaning, outside of time altogether. It’s ‘before’ the existing world not in the sense of temporal order, but in terms of ontological priority as first principle or ground of being. — Wayfarer

There is a relatively simple way around this problem. First, the recognition that "eternal" in classical theism means "outside of time", as you state. Second, we recognize that "time" in the conventional conception is derived from change. "Time" is a concept abstracted from observations of material, or physical, change. As such, the concept "time" is dependent on physical change. This places the eternal, as outside of this conception of time, which is an abstraction produced from, and dependent on, change. That conception of time is the one which Aristotle described in his Physics as the principal meaning for "time", a number which is the measure of change.

However, Aristotle also described a secondary meaning for "time", as something which is measured. This is what we know, and experience as the passing of time. It is what we measure by keeping track of the sun and moon, or the oscillations of a cesium atom.

So in the primary sense of "time", the clock gives us seconds and minutes, and we apply this to perform measurements of change. In the secondary sense of "time", there is a real aspect of nature, which we measure as the passing of time, with the use of observations, or a tool, the clock.

In the secondary sense, the logical priority of the relation between change and time, is reversed from the primary sense. In the primary sense, "time" as the abstraction is logically dependent on the existence of change. In the secondary sense, change, as the activities of physical things, is dependent on the existence of time. The passing of time is logically necessary for physical change to occur.

Now when we understand "time" in the secondary sense, we allow for the possibility of time passing with no physical change occurring, because time is necessary for change, but change is not necessary for time, due to the logical priority of time. This allows for the reality of activity (activity logically requires the passing of time, secondary sense), which is outside of "time" in the primary sense. That is the actuality of the immaterial. Simply put, it is the restriction of the meaning of "time" to the conventional conception of "time", as tied to, or dependent on, physical change, which drives the need to assume an actuality which is "outside of time. When the conception of "time" is rectified to allow for an actuality which is truly immaterial, transcending material change, then we no longer need to think of this actuality as "eternal". It is now within the reality of "time" in the secondary sense, but transcending material change.

It's called "logic", from basic premises which are very well supported by empirical evidence.. Here, look at my first post on this thread, for a start. We can use that as the basis for discussion if you are interested.

The argument from Aristotle is that a body is an organized existence, and an agent is required for any type of organization, as the organizer. Therefore the agent as organizer, is prior in time to the existence of the body. Of course abiogenesis is the basis for a denial of the secondary premise, but as the op points out, it's not a justified denial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am demonstrating "being an asshole" by flagging this thread to be put in the lounge.

I'm not jumping on board for any hypothesis or theory of how non-living matter became living, because, even though we can stack the deck any way we want, we haven't managed it. — Patterner

Your phrasing ("how non-living matter became living") betrays an underlying misunderstanding of the problem. Classical ontology premises immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence. In this ontology, there is no issue of non-living matter becoming living matter, there is an immaterial form of life, which became a material form of life.

So your phrasing, instead of questioning whether immaterial forms became material forms, or, non-living matter became living matter, already excludes the former, and assumes the latter as a starting point. However, there is no science which supports this exclusion.

Now I've challenged you to come up with some other kind of purported knowledge, and to explain how it is that you know that it is knowledge. — Janus

I've been trying to tell you that this is an extremely unproductive restriction to place on "knowledge". The criteria you suggest, that one must know how one knows what one knows, in order for the person to "know" what one knows, is completely unrealistic. People know all sorts of things without any idea as to how they know them. That is what Socrates demonstrated. He went to all sorts of people with different types of knowledge, and requested of them, that they demonstrate how they know what they know. He stumped them all, in every field he approached. That is a fundamental and also very important aspect of "knowledge", which one must understand, in order to understand the nature of knowledge.

Knowing is clearly prior to knowing how we know, as the temporal priority demonstrates that it is impossible to know how we know prior to knowing. Therefore to dismiss knowledge, just because the person does not know how they know what they know, or to insist that they must know how they know, in order for that knowledge to be relevant, is an illogical thing for you to do.

The fact is, that no one truly knows how they know what they know. Your claims that we can easily explain how we know some types of things, is completely false, stemming from a confidence induced illusion. For example, claiming "I witnessed X" in no way explains how you know X. This is because "witnessed" does not equate with "know". And, in the case of logic and mathematics, epistemologists really cannot say how logic works. How do you know that 2+2=4? Is it because your teacher said so? Proofs serve no purpose here because they do not demonstrate that one knows how the proof proves.

You’re misconstruing what abiogenesis is, it is the emergence of life from non-life via natural processes not spontaneous generation. Therefore it remains a valid hypothesis though it may not have all the answers we are looking for. — kindred

If it was an actual hypothesis, then those "natural processes" which account for the emergence of life from non-life would be named, and the hypothesis could be tested. But there is no named natural processes which are hypothesized to lead to from non-life to life, and no real hypothesis. Instead it is assumed that life just sprang into existence, through some sort of spontaneous generation.

What hypothesis of the origin of life is better than abiogenesis? Genuinely asking, — Patterner

As far as I'm concerned, any hypothesis about the origin of life on earth is better than abiogenesis, because abiogenesis is really nothing other than the lack of an hypothesis. It basically says that since we have no idea where life came from, or how life came about, let's just assume that it sprang from nothing (spontaneous generation). See, it's really a lack of hypothesis, more than anything else. The flying spaghetti monster is a better hypothesis, because at least it hypothesizes something

No, I apply the word 'knowledge' only to those cases where we can clearly explain how it is that we know. It is obvious that we know things propositionally via observation and via logic. If you can point to another mode of knowing (other than know-how and the knowing of acquaintance or recognition, because those are not the subjects at issue) then do so. — Janus

Propositional knowledge is a form of know-how. So your dismissal of "know-how" is unjustified. And, as I said, you want to reduce "knowledge" in general, (which would include all forms of know-how) to one specific type, knowing how to explain things through the use of propositions, to serve your purpose. That's not productive, we need to go the other way, to see what all the different types of knowledge have in common, if we want to understand "knowledge".

You are confusing the motivation for the act with the act itself. Your stealing my car is very much about what happens to my car. — Dan

Your principle, "one's own choice" states that the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. This implies that the motivation for the act, as that which concerns one's "mind" is just as much a determining factor as one's property. The car thief uses one's own mind, one's own body, and one's own tools, to achieve one's own ends. As I said, most all choices ought to be considered "one's own choices", by the dictates of your primary definition.

However, you do not accept your own definition. You realize that such a definition would require a multitude of exceptions to produce the result which you desire. The example above, of a thief using one's own tools, is one such exception. This is because 'what you desire', is to make how one's own choice affects other people, as the true defining feature of what constitute "one's own choice". So, when I make my own choice (according to your definition), to use my own mind, body, and property, to steal your car, you override your definition, to produce a new defining feature, how one's own choice affects the ability of another to make one's own choice. Accordingly, this overriding definition becomes the true definition which you utilize. The definition of "one's own choice" is no longer a choice which concerns ones' own mind, body, and property, it is now, "a choice which does not limit the ability of another to make one's own choice". However, this new definition suffers the problem of being self-referential.

Furthermore, you then place undue restrictions on your judgement as to which ways that one's choice affects others, are to be prioritized, to match the prejudice of your preference. You dismiss affects on one's mind as not morally relevant, and emphasize affects one one's property, as morally relevant. So your guiding principle of "one's own mind, body, and property" is thrown right out the window. It is now replace with how one's choice affects another's property, body sometimes, and never the affects on one's mind. Affects to one's mind being dismissed as not morally relevant.

Abiogenesis is simply a theory of how life came from non-life, what’s woo-woo about that ? It’s just a word for a type of process(es) that occurred 3.5 billions of years ago during the inception of life. How can it be supported by science when we’re not privy to the conditions and events that transformed non living matter to living one 3.5 billions of years ago. — kindred

In my understanding "woo-woo" means unscientific. A theory, such as abiogenesis, which is completely unsupported by any science, is, by that definition, woo-woo.

You may dismiss it as woo-woo but it still remains a valid theory... — kindred

Right, it's valid as "a theory", just not valid as a "scientific theory". Therefore we may, and ought to, dismiss it as woo-woo.

Anyway, know-how has not been the focus of my part in the discussion, but rather 'knowing that' or what is called 'propositional knowledge'. We can warrant that we know things via empirical observation and logic. We cannot warrant that we know anything propositional in any other way I can think of. If you can think of an example that involves and demonstrates another way of knowing-that then why not present it for scrutiny? — Janus

See, this is a very clear example of exactly the epistemological problem I pointed to. You narrow down the definition of "knowledge", to make the word refer only to one specific type of what is commonly called "knowledge", to produce an argument which supports your prejudice. That is what Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations, called creating boundaries in the use of a word, for a purpose. As I said, it's "super unproductive" in a philosophical argument, because it's nothing other than the fallacy of begging the question.

Thanks wonderer that makes more sense, although abiogenesis is unsatisfactory at this time in terms of providing answers or conclusive explanation of how non-life to life happened it at least gives us something to work on. — kindred

The point though, is that as an hypothesis, it has been around for quite some time, and as your quoted paragraph indicates, scientists have been unsuccessful in their attempts to provide the science required to support it. Failure to prove an hypothesis, after many attempts, is evidence that the hypothesis is incorrect. Compare abiogenesis with the concept of "spontaneous generation". This was once a very popular hypothesis, which scientists failed to prove. It is through recognition that the pervading hypothesis is incorrect, and through examining the evidence of those failures, that we move along to better hypothesis.

When someone such as yourself claims that abiogenesis is how life came about, that is nothing but woo-woo. Then to add that it\s a scientific theory, is nothing but to use falsity to support your woo-woo. It is not a scientific theory because it is not supported by science, meaning it is not supported by empirical evidence. That there are scientists who have sought to support abiogenesis with science, but have proven to be unsuccessful, is simply evidence that abiogenesis is nothing but woo-woo.

Slime molds arguably have know-how. — Janus

OK, so you support what I said then. Your use of "arguably" indicates exactly my point, we really have no consensus on what warrants "knowing".

The burden would be on you to explain how such claims to knowledge could possibly be warranted. — Janus

Why ask me this? I am the one claiming that we cannot answer the question of what warrants "knowing". I'll repeat myself:

From my perspective no one can ever answer the question of what it is about any experience which warrants calling it "knowing", so this comment is super unproductive. — Metaphysician Undercover

ave correctly said that the poster is ignorant and confused about mathematics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

MO of the supreme sophist, Tones in the Deep Freeze.

Notice the paragraph says "aims", "attempts", and concludes with "Any successful theory of abiogenesis must explain the origins and interactions of these classes of molecules". The point very clearly made is that there is no successful theory of abiogenesis. Therefore it's nothing but "woo-woo".

It's not science. Science is supported by empirical evidence. It's just woo-woo magical thinking.

Yes we don’t but we’ve given that process a name called Abiogenesis, the alternative would be woo-woo as to how life came about and we don’t want that. — kindred

Actually, abiogenesis is what is best described as "woo-woo".

It is not hard to say what warrants as knowledge the basic forms of knowing—about what it is that we experience, the empirical and what is self-evident to us, the logical. Know-how is also easy to demonstrate. — Janus

You can make such statements all you want, but it doesn't resolve the problem. It just indicates that you have a hard and fast prejudice as to what qualifies as "knowledge". Does a slime mold have "knowledge" for example?

I'm fairly sure I didn't propose any of that. I think I pointed out that choosing to steal my car is a choice of what to do with my car, not your body. It's a choice that belongs to me, not you. — Dan

We're very far apart on this. What I pointed out to you, is that to steal your car is a choice of what I want to do with my own body. That it is your car being stolen, is completely accidental. I want to get myself from A to B, so I grab a car, or I want to make some quick cash, so I grab a car, and sell it. Whatever the case, what I want, and what I am doing with my own body, is the primary motivation here. Theft is fundamentally a selfish act. That it is your car which enters into my plans and not some other thing, or things, is purely accidental. There is no essential relation between my choice and your car, so my choice to steal your car is not at all "about your car", it is about my own selfish wants and desires, what I want, for myself. The choice shows complete disregard for you and your property, rather than your representation of it, as a choice about what to do with your property.

I have of course considered that I might be wrong, but I think we have good reason to think this is our current best bet. Certainly you misunderstanding me is not good reason for me to change my mind. — Dan

You are simply in denial, refusing to accept that I completely understand you, after weeks of quizzing you, but I also completely disagree with you. You have demonstrated very clearly that the concept of "one's own choice" which you propose, cannot be made to be coherent. That you insist it to be coherent, when I've demonstrated its incoherency, shows not a misunderstanding on my part, but denial on your part.

And I don't know if I agree that such insights are 'unique' in the sense of only pertaining to one individual. — Wayfarer

Here is another way of looking at the difference between subjective uniqueness, and objective uniqueness.

Consider that we general distinguish between subjects with principles of spatial form and spatial separation. These distinctions constitute what we call our uniqueness, unique features, properties, and unique spatial positioning. This is what I would call subjective uniqueness.

Objective uniqueness is the uniqueness of the moment in time, what we call "now". Notice that as time passes there is at every moment, a new and unique "now", never a repetition, such that the entire universe is new and unique at each passing moment. Now, that each and every part of the universe partakes of this same unique moment, in its own way, is a brute fact concerning the nature of the universe. Plato, makes an interesting comment in "The Sophist" (I believe, perhaps it "Parmenides"), where Socrates compares the existence of the Idea, or Form, to the existence of the day. No matter how many different places partake of "the day", the day is no more, or no less "the day". In other words, the way that the various different things partake in that unique moment in time known as "today", this in no way alters the uniqueness of "today" itself.

Relativity theory annihilates this "brute fact", the uniqueness of the moment in time, which we know as "now". Consequently relativity theory, which is a very useful principle for relating and measuring very distinct types of motions, annihilates "objective uniqueness". This leaves us with only "subjective uniqueness" as the means for understanding the reality of uniqueness. However, subjective uniqueness, by which we distinguish one subject from another subject, by reference to spatial principles, is only an appearance of uniqueness, because every subject has a real, underlying connection to each other, by partaking in the same unique moment in time. So, rather than understanding the true uniqueness of objective uniqueness, which renders us all in another sense "the same", such an "understanding" of subjective uniqueness, which assumes a spatial separation between us instead of a temporal unity within an objective uniqueness, will always be a misunderstanding.

f I experience a revelation or a "higher' insight, what is it about the experience that warrants it as knowledge? This is the question that proponents of "direct knowing" can never answer. — Janus

I don't see how this is relevant. There is no consensus amongst epistemologists as to what warrants anything as "knowledge". So this type of attack on "insight" as a form of "direct knowing", is just the expression of a subjective opinion base in one's personal preference as to what constitutes "knowing".

We consistently encounter this sort of problem, in this type of thread, with many similar terms, "intelligence", "consciousness", "experience", "intention", etc.. The problem is that how one understands terms like these is dependent on the philosophy which the person has read or discussed previously. And amongst the participants here, there is a wide variance.

So from your perspective, the proponents of "direct knowing" can never answer the question of what it is about the experience, which warrants calling it "knowing". From my perspective no one can ever answer the question of what it is about any experience which warrants calling it "knowing", so this comment is super unproductive.

Self reference does not, in-itself make for circularity. Eg, the moral relativist might coherently say that there are no objective normative truths and no objective metaethical truths except this one. That references itself but is clearly not circular. Likewise, it isn't circular to say that one's freedom of movement does not include blocking someone else in such that they cannot move. Especially given that other people's choices are not the extent of what defines what choices belong to a person. — Dan

The problem I pointed out involved using self-reference in a definition. What happened was that you first defined "one's own choices" as a choice relating what to do with one's own mind, body and property. Then I pointed out that every choice which a person makes, relates to what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. And, what is really at issue is how one's choice to do something with one's own body, affects others. You moved to define "one's own choice" based on how a person's choice of what to do with one's body, affects others. So you came up with, if the choice doesn't limit another's ability to make one's own choice, then it is one's own choice.

Clearly, what you have proposed is a self-referential definition. I prefer to characterize it as infinite regress rather than circular. Q. How do we know if the choice is one's own? A. if it does not limit another's ability to make one's own choice. Q. How do we know if another's ability to make one's own choices has been limited if we do not know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it is a choice which does not limit this ability of another? See, we cannot ever get anywhere because we do not know what it means to make one's own choices, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice. But we cannot make that judgement as to whether it affects another in this way, because we don't know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice.

They are not aribitrary, they are based on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It is certainly true that I am going against accepted moral philosophy but accepted moral philosophy is wrong. — Dan

You have been unable to even adequately define your primary principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". Your attempts have been reduced to a meaningless self-referential definition.

Anyway, I don't think we are making any progress. I've come to see that what qualifies as "morally relevant" to you, is very different from what qualifies as "morally relevant" to me, and we seem to be completely incapable of bridging this gap. This is probably due to the attitude you disclose here, "accepted moral philosophy is wrong".

According to the op, you have spent the better part of ten years trying to resolve the issues of your moral theory. You have become so stymied that you now offer $10,000 to anyone who can resolve the problems with your theory. I suggest that it is high time for you to consider that the reason why you cannot solve the problems is that your theory is simply wrong, therefore there are issues which are impossible to resolve.