Not only that, but colour is far more complicated than your simple description. Our eyes are never receiving one simple wavelength of radiation from an object. there is always a mixture to be discerned. Mixing is the art of the artist. A red object is not simply an object emitting or reflecting light photons only at some specific point between 650 and 700 nanometers. And the dress is a fine example of the problems we may encounter dealing with the mixing of radiation.

Take a look around your field of vision, and notice all the different colours, flowers are great and may make you wonder how evolution produced such an array of beauty, The human eye is capable of discerning millions of different colours, and this is not a matter of there being an infinite number of points between 400 and 700 on the number line, it is a matter of mixing. On top of all that mixing of photons with different wavelengths (if "photons with different wavelengths" makes any logical sense), there is the matter of non-mixing, the boundaries we see.

At the edge of each object there is a boundary, and there is background radiation, foreground radiation, radiation coming from the right and from the left, with an endless number of boundaries in a common field of vision. The capacity to perceive boundaries is the most fascinating aspect of the sense of vision. Because we can discern such a huge number of differences in the various mixtures, a slight change to that mixture is evident as a boundary. The boundaries give us the impression of objects. But what exactly is a boundary? A non-dimensional point of difference? A one-dimensional line of difference? A two-dimensional angle, or three-dimensional corner of difference? Of course it's not an angle or corner at all, it's curved in some way. And what lies behind that boundary, to the inside of the object, where light doesn't seem to be able to penetrate?

I really think this discussion would go smoother if you read more of the primer I wrote to begin with. — Dan

I have made it through to the end of the primer now.

The issue is with deciding how to balance different people's freedom to do different things against each other. — Dan

I don't understand how this could be an issue. You have already claimed to restrict "freedom" to those choices which belong to the person. If the choice involves doing something "against" another, how could that choice belong to the person?

Perhaps I misunderstand, but a person making a decision must use one's own thoughts, therefore one's own principles (whether they are common principles or not), so a person can only make one's own choice, and if another influences that choice, we'd have to question whether the choice made, truly belongs to the person. So we really cannot balance one person's freedom in relation to another's because freedom only relates to choice which belong to oneself. Don't you think so?

I'm not sure what you mean by finding either strength or weakness in belonging or how we would find that. Also, I'm not sure why how often people's freedom is restricted would determine the extent to which that choice belongs to them. — Dan

The problem here is that you have introduced me to this concept, of a choice which "belongs" to a person. It is entirely new to me, and you have really not made it very clear. For example, what exactly are the criteria which determines that the choice belongs to the person? Because you haven't provided me with clear meaning on that concept, I'm sort of playing a guessing game as to what constitutes a choice that belongs to the person.

It seems that you focus on the sensory aspect of pain, and I focus on the affective aspect of pain. I did this to argue that pain is not simply sensory, as you claim. Since "pain" in its scientific representation, is understood to consist of both of these aspects, we must be very careful if we try to assert that it is one or the other.

Do you agree that it is wrong to say that pain is simply a specific type of touch sensation? Unpleasantness is a defining aspect of "pain", and this makes the experience referred to by this word more than a simple sensory experience, there is also an emotional aspect of the experience called "pain". For comparison consider the tase known as "sweet". This is a basic taste which most people enjoy. However, "enjoyment" is not inherent within the definition of "sweet", like "unpleasantness" inheres within the definition of "pain".

That example demonstrates the following conceptual difference. It is understood that whether or not sweetness is enjoyable, is dependent on the conditions of the subject experiencing the sweetness, and so this emotional "affect" of enjoyment, is said to be "subjective". In the case of pain, unpleasantness is a defining feature, so one cannot feel pain without the unpleasantness, and so this emotional aspect is an "objective" aspect of pain, it is a necessary condition.

Therefore the emotional aspect of the taste, sweet, is separable from the sensory experience of sweetness, so that we can talk about the sensory experience without considering the emotional aspect. However, in the case of "pain", unpleasantness is the defining feature of that concept, and so we cannot separate the emotional aspect to talk about the sensory experience of pain, as if it is not necessarily unpleasant. We can though, separate the sensory aspect and talk about "pain" as an emotionally based concept, representing unpleasantness, without the necessity of any sensory input. And, the fact that "pain" as an emotional concept, is a true representation of the reality of pain, is evident from experiences such as phantom pain, and some forms of chronic pain.

Yeah, I agree that it is very easy to resolve conflicts between choices that don't belong to someone and those that do, but this isn't the problem I outlined in the initial primer. I was concerned with how to weigh different amounts of freedom (over those choices that beong to people) against each other. For example, how many people's eyesight is worth one person's life if we are in a position to only save group or the other. — Dan

If the choice truly "belongs" to the person, as you have been using this term, then the person is free to use whatever method of deciding which on wants to use. Therefore you cannot say objectively which is the better, or more highly valued choice, because that is a matter for the person who is in that particular situation, whom the choice actually "belongs to", to decide. In other words, if the choice truly belongs to the person, and the person is truly free to choose, then which choice is the correct choice is completely subjective, as being a conjunction of the person's freedom of choice, and the fact that the choice belongs to the person. If you tell the person that they must follow X hierarchical system in deciding, then the choice no longer belongs to the person, it belongs to you telling them what they must choose, and that's what I've been arguing is a restriction on the person's freedom of choice.

Further, I'm not sure how you tell which choices people have a "more absolute right" to. — Dan

That a choice "belongs" to a person is your principle. And I do not understand your need for it, nor do I accept it. But if you apply the principles whereby you determine whether a choice belongs to a person or not, you will find that in the various situations there is either strength or weakness in that "belonging". This will tell you whether the person has a more or less "absolute right" to make that choice.

We might think that people have "more of a right" to live than to see, but that doesn't tell us how many of one is worth how many of the other. — Dan

No, this is not a good analogy. We are talking about a person's right to make a specific choice. When you say that a certain choice does not belong to the person, so the person is not free to make that choice, I interpret it as the person does not have the right to make that choice. So when you take a look at some of the rights which exist, you'll see that some are more universally accepted, and are therefore higher than others. For instance, compare the right to live, to the right to speak freely, to the right to move freely around the globe. The first has almost no restriction (only the death sentence), the second has some restrictions, and the third has many restrictions. So the first is the highest freedom, having almost no restrictions, while the others are placed lower in the scale, depending on the strength of the right.

Pain is a sensation of touch with varying degrees to it - high-enough, and you experience a sensation. — AmadeusD

I don't think we can say this. There are many internal pains, sore muscles, stiffness, headaches, stomach aches, and pains of other organs. I don't think it's proper to call such pains a sensation of touch.

The one exception here would be "emotional pain" which I think is incorrectly labelled pain rather than discomfort - which can, acceptably, be left very vague and subjective — AmadeusD

I also do not think this proposed distinction between pain and discomfort is useful. What one person calls discomfort, another would call pain. What is subjective is the proposed distinction.

but it seems pretty obvious that a "bodily" sensation must be a the result of the senses. — AmadeusD

Do you not have internal pains? These are not the result of any of the five known senses. You are not touching your stomach when you feel a stomach ache.

I don't think this is right, but I do think that this does happen, wrongly. The above responses go some way as to why. Emotions often conflict with the sensation of pain. I believe pain is, like vision, a result of sense perception but is simply open to the all the aberrations vision is open to, being that we never "view" the actual object in the visual field on this account. Pain is rightly not conceptualised as something 'taken in' from without, via the senses, but something produced by the sense-data of touch interacting with the sense organ (in this case, pain receptors/skin variously described as such under particular conditions of intensity, locality etc.. receiving pressure, angle, surface coverage, angle-of-motion etc.. to inform the signal to be sent). All senses are indirect in this way as I understand them both on the empirical, process related information, and the conceptual coherence (or, incoherence, really) involved. And they are all open to being wrong. I think holding a 1:1 concept of the internal representation of sensory data is probably wrong. — AmadeusD

I think this is all wrong. You start with the faulty assumption that pain is produced from the sense of touch, and you proceed from that false premise. Pain is not produced from the sense of touch, as internal pains demonstrate. If you knew some of the science about how pain is supposed to be an interaction between the brain and the inflicted part of the body, through the medium of the nervous system, you would recognize that your proposition is very likely false. There is no sense of touch involved in pain, there is an inflicted part of the body, and a nervous system with a brain involved. If I remember correctly, it is commonly believed, in the field of medicine, that the brain actually sends the pain signal to the inflicted part, not vise versa. This is how Tylenol is thought to work, by affecting the part of the brain which sends the pain signal.

Can you see something (relatively simple 'something') that could be a difference between pain and colour as sensations? Or a way in whcih one is not a sensation the way the other is and therefore supporting Witty's endless assurances that our language is hte problem, and not hte problems. LOL. — AmadeusD

It's questionable whether pain is properly a sensation rather than a sort of idea. This is because pain crosses all the sense types. Generally we think of pain as a type of touch, but sharp sounds can be painful, bright lights can be painful, even the tastes and smells which we judge as very bad can be painful.

When I look at my OED dictionary definitions, the first definition is "the consciousness of perceiving or seeming to perceive some state or condition of the body or its parts or senses or of one's mind or its emotions;..." and this is the most common use. Notice the use of "or" which allows ambiguity. The second definition is "a stirring of emotions or intense interest esp. among a large group of people (the news caused a sensation)".

Notice that neither definition refers directly to what is produced by a sense organ, what we might call the sense image, or the percept. Both definitions of "sensation" refer to the conscious awareness of something, which may or may not be classed as a percept. In the case of pain, there is no percept. So what happens with the conscious awareness of pain. and consequentially the use of the word "pain", is that it becomes a concept which we use to refer to a type of "sensation" which is emotionally based, rather than being based in sense perception. This creates a distinguishable difference between types of sensation, which is more formally exposed in the distinction between types of "feelings". We can use "feeling" to refer to the activity of using the sense of touch, and we can also use "feeling" to refer to things produced by the emotions. In the case of "feeling" the difference between having a percept and not having a percept is very evident from the very distinct uses of the word.

The fact that "pain" in its common usage refers to an emotion based concept, rather than a percept based concept becomes very evident in Plato's work. Pain is commonly contrasted with pleasure, and such contrasting is a conceptual function which cannot be done with percept based sensations. There is no opposite to red. Plato shows that such contrasting in itself is a faulty way of analyzing emotion based concepts, by showing why pleasure is not truly contrasted with pain. From here he moves toward an "objective" way of looking at pleasure and pain, where "objective", and "the object" of emotionally based concepts are a good, a goal. In this way, the emotionally based feeling, or sensation, has a causal object, but the object is a good, as a goal or objective, rather than a sense percept.

I suspect the role of pain to Wittgenstein is being misunderstood. — Hanover

I think that's right. Pain is presented by Wittgenstein as an example of a sensation. He probably chose pain because it produced a special example, in the sense that unlike many other sensations, which he could have chosen, pain may be purely internal, without an external "cause". Nevertheless, he presented "pain" as a specific type of the more general, "sensation". Whether or not "sensation" in the sense of pain, is the same word as "sensation" in the sense of colour, so as to avoid equivocation, is another question. But Wittgenstein enthralled himself with ambiguity. That's why it's so difficult to find agreement on his "complex philosophy".

Also, to be clear, I'm not saying that people aren't allowed to make any choices that don't belong to them, simply that their ability to do so does not require protection. — Dan

Then it should be very clear to you, that you are not seeking to protect freedom of choice. Likewise, you are not seeking to protect freedom to act. Nor are you seeking to protect freedom to speak, freedom to assemble, or any other supposed "type of freedom", because some choices made within each of these categories might turn out not to "belong" to the person. What you are seeking to protect is the right of people to make certain types of choices.

To put this in context, you ought to be able to see now, that your op proposes a false dilemma. You are asking for a way to evaluate, or prioritize "freedom over different things", but you've already provided your own answer. Choices which "belong" to a person, in the most complete and absolute way, are of the highest value, while choices which do not belong to the person, in the most complete and absolute way, are of the least value. And all choices can be judged as to the degree that they truly "belong" to the person.

Further, if you replace "freedom" with "right" and acknowledge that what you are seeking to protect is rights rather than freedoms, the solution becomes even more obvious. In making a choice, the thing which the person has the most complete and absolute right to, is of the highest value, while the thing which one, in the most complete and absolute way, does not have a right to, is the least valuable. And every choice falls in between, and can be judged as to what degree the person has the right to make that choice.

Notice though, that this does not address the real problem of "freedom consequentialism, and that is that freedom and consequentialism are incompatible. Once you come to notice this, you might instead try to figure out how to make a value system based in rights compatible with a consequentialist value system. That problem is difficult enough, without even referencing freedom.

It is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for, I don't think I have ever been less than clear about that. — Dan

I think we are at a standstill here. Neither of us will budge. I strongly believe that when you say "it is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for", this is not any type of freedom at all. What you are saying is that one ought to be allowed to make this choice and that choice, but not any other choices. That is actually to tell people what choices they are allowed to make. To say that this is a type of freedom is nothing other than deception.

If you wish to call the thing I am promoting schmeedom, then that's fine. — Dan

Yes, I think that would be much better. The concept you are presenting as what you are advocating for is not freedom at all, so it's better if you choose another word for it. This would avail you in avoiding the charge of deception.

Should we leave it at that?

And now we have Meta claiming maps have height, but mountains do not, — Banno

By definition, "height" is a measurement. You just like to use words in a realist way, and claim that since you can use them in this way, it makes what you say true. You do the same with "change", claiming that since you can use "change" in a way which doesn't imply the passage of time, then it is true that "change" doesn't imply the passage of time. I can do the same with "arsehole", claiming that if I use "arsehole" to describe Banno, this means it's true that Banno is an arsehole. This is the failure of "meaning is use". It only accounts for one side of meaning. the using, it doesn't account for the other side, the interpreting.

Being able to "understand' one's choices is a fairly low bar to clear, but it can be affected by deception in some cases. — Dan

This supposed "bar to clear" is extremely problematic. For the person who is "understanding", there is no difference between understanding and misunderstanding, it all appears like understanding. So, I "understand" my choice, but it later turns out that it really was a misunderstanding, due to deception. Then we can see that misunderstanding seeps into our thoughts in all sorts of different ways, in various aspects of thought, and various degrees. Therefore to "understand" one's own choice is not a practical bar at all, because within the various aspects which enter into any particular complex decision, there is likely to be some degree of misunderstanding.

This is where "habit" is very influential. When it becomes habitual, the misunderstanding passes as understanding without any further consideration, and the decision is immediate despite the presence of misunderstanding. The person believes oneself to "understand" one's own choices, but really misunderstands. That is a feature of the attitude known as certitude, and it allows misunderstanding to be abundant within one's own assumed understanding of one's own choices. On the other hand, the person who is of the skeptical mindset who is keenly aware of the possibility of misunderstanding, will deliberate, analyzing every aspect of the complex choice, to determine any possible spot where misunderstanding may lie hidden. That is why "habit" robs us of our freedom, by making misunderstanding appear to be understanding. So if you insist that to "understand" is the bar to freedom, then it is clear that habit restricts freedom in this way.

Your examples do not really serve the intended purpose. Decisions are in general, very complex, involving many aspects, so the effects of deception may be far reaching. If you make dinner for the supposed guitar player, isn't that fraud? What if you buy the person dinner, or buy tickets to their show? You seem to be trying to set a boundary which cannot be upheld. Deception is intentional, and if the intent is to take advantage of the other, then isn't that fraud? Some deception might be for entertainment, a joke or something, but don't you think that laying a trap for a person with the intent of laughing at them, is a case of restricting their freedom?

I mean, I am not sure how to be more clear about this. I contend that a specific type of freedom should be protected, specfically that of persons over those choices that belong to them. — Dan

And I don't know how to demonstrate more clearly, that your course here is deeply flawed. We cannot restrict the meaning of "freedom" to the point of having a specific "type of freedom" which is to be protected, because then it is not "freedom" at all which is being protected. "Freedom" means unrestricted. So all you are really doing is proposing a slew of restrictions which ought to be enforced, in order to produce the concept of "types of freedom". Then you use convoluted (and deceptive, as shown in the last post) language to make it appear like you are talking about "types of freedom" rather than what you are really talking about, types of restrictions.

It appears like the two of us are simply set in our own ways "determined" you might say, by our respective habits, to see things in a way opposed to how the other sees things. I could argue that you misunderstand, and that restricts your freedom, and you could argue that I misunderstand, but this sort of choice is extremely complex with abundant misunderstanding on both sides.

What you do or don't have in your possession isn't at issue, what matters is what belongs to you, what choices you (for lack of a better phrase) have a right to make. — Dan

This statement is very indicative of what I am arguing. By referring to the "choices you have a right to make", all you are really talking about is specific restrictions being applied to my freedom of choice. So the "right to make" this choice, and not that choice, is not at all a feature of my freedom of choice, it is a feature of a structured set of restrictions being applied to my freedom of choice.

(assuming that people have such a right) — Dan

This is an ontological proposition, to assume that rights have an ontological status independent from the human beings which determine those rights. That's a sort of platonic realism, which assumes independent existence of rights, known as "natural rights". But that ontology would need to be supported with principles and evidence.

I am not sure what you think I have reversed. — Dan

You have reversed the logical priority of "freedom" over restrictions, to make restrictions logically prior to "types of freedom". In reality, "restrictions" imply "freedom", as what is restricted, meaning that freedom is logically prior to restrictions. But you refuse to talk about "freedom" in the general sense, in its true definition of "unrestricted". Instead, you choose as your subject of discussion "types of freedom", which implies necessarily restrictions, such that restrictions are logically prior to "types of freedom".

From this reversal, it appears to you, like rights are what protects a person's freedom, the person's freedom existing only as types of freedom. But in reality, from the perspective of "freedom" in the general sense, meaning unrestricted, rights are what restrict one's freedom. So you do not tie rights to "freedom", as you claim, that is your deceptive proposition. You tie rights to "types of freedom". But "types of freedom" implies that one's freedom is already restricted.

So, as I've been saying, if we want to start with the assumption that one's freedom is already restricted, we need to look truthfully at the manner in which it is restricted. That is why I proposed that we look at the nature of time, and determine how temporal existence restricts one's freedom, to provide a foundation for that assumption.

Of course. It just seems to me that if one sets out to measure the height of a mountain, one already presumes it has a height to be measured. — Banno

That is a faulty assumption. When one sets out to measure a mountain, they assume that the mountain is likely measurable. You are making the cliche mistake of confusing the map with the territory. The "height" is what is on the map, it's not a part of the territory.

"Height" is defined as "the measurement from base to top". "The measurement" is a product of the act of measuring. The height of a mountain simply does not exist prior to the measurement of the mountain, it is a value, a number which is produced from the measurement. Are you not familiar with Wittgenstein's "standard metre"?

Incidentally, physicist John Bell had some interesting things to say about this common mistake. The common misunderstanding of "measurement", expressed by Banno in the statement above, misleads many people in their interpretation of quantum mechanics. To properly understand quantum mechanics it is necessary to recognize that a measurement is something produced by the act of measuring, and it does not precede the act of measuring.

Nevertheless, after having been taught this numerous times, Banno will continue to make similar statements, indicating that the ignore function in Banno's brain is often turned on.

You seem to be talking about notions of the continuum which would be a small part of Peirce’s semiotics. — apokrisis

You should read the article I referred, it's quite interesting. The subject is how Peirce dealt with "the problem of induction", and how this relates to Wittgenstein. Peirce's distinction between corollarial (habitual) proofs and theorematic (creative) proofs, is argued to be influential to Wittgenstein's middle work, and this work of Peirce is shown to have a relation to inferentialism in general. The question is whether all conclusions derivable from a set of premises or axioms are already predetermined, or do proofs produce something new. Peirce's Theorematic proofs are creative, producing new knowledge.

However, as already Peirce pointed out, theorematic reasoning involves
“foreign ideas”, concept formation or transformation over and above the
theorem’s formulation, and the background knowledge. The nature of these
new concepts is suggested by his examples, and is made explicit in modern semantic information theory. They manifest in the construction and/or
recognition of new patterns, auxiliary figures in geometry, composite structures in set theory, or compound predicates and propositional formulae in
formal systems (D’Agostino, 2016, p.170). One defines new objects, and/or
finds new ways to describe their properties and interrelations with other
objects, old and new. Many previously proved properties are turned into
new definitions. Conceptual omniscience is problematic because much of
mathematicians’ effort goes into crafting definitions, and few theorems are
proved about objects introduced already in the axioms. Skeletal semantics
of the model theory, that parses formulae down to basic elements, is not
the semantics of informal proofs (Azzouni, 2009, p.18). To use Dummett’s
own example, the concept of ellipse does not appear in either planimetric or
stereometric axioms, and it is only one among an infinite variety of objects
they give room for. That theorems about ellipses should be proved at all is
not determined by the formalism.
Of course, ellipses are strongly motivated by common observations, but
this suggests exactly the empirically mediated “determinacy” that Wittgenstein describes. In the practice of mathematics, definitions do more than
single out formal patterns. Newly formed concepts are linked to concepts
from other formalisms, informal intuitions, and applications outside of mathematics. When conceptual resources are specified in advance, the interpretational labor required to make proofs and theorems meaningful can not
be captured by them. And “without an interpretation of the language of
the formal system the end-formula of the derivation says nothing; and so
nothing is proved” (Giaquinto, 2008, p.26). The meaning of unproved theorems is not determined because, after all, we may not be smart enough to
deduce them, let alone anticipate concepts to be introduced in their proofs,
or statements. The appearance of elliptic curves and modular forms in the
Wiles’s proof of the Last Fermat theorem gives an idea of just how much
new concept formation can be involved. — p9-10

I never waste time on the dross. — apokrisis

Hmm, I guess that's a matter of opinion.

But what then did he add? — apokrisis

A slightly different way of looking at the same problem is what he added. Neither proposed a solution, in my opinion, merely pointing out weaknesses which others could then see and abuse. The abuse persists and the weakening of mathematics, and logic in general continues. And it will continue until people start to see the need to get rid of the weaknesses rather than to use them for their advantage.

Well, there are red tomatoes, and one way of saying that is that some tomatoes have the property of being red. Not sure what what it means to further ask if they really have the property of being red... — Banno

It seems we have the habit of attaching a "shadowy entity" to the word "red", a meaning. In reality though, the word has a different meaning each time it's used, depending on context. Things don't really have "the property of being red", it's just that things are commonly said to be red.

Science understands this aspect of the human psyche. We have social psychology that can tell us exactly how it all works. — apokrisis

Come on apokrisis, how can such a gigantic exaggeration just roll off your keyboard as if you were stating common fact?

The exaggeration is twofold. First, it's still debated to this day, whether psychology qualifies as a science. Many compromise and call it a "soft science". Second, it's highly doubtful that even hard sciences tell us "exactly how" anything works. The hard sciences seem to be able to use mathematics to make awesome predictions, but they really are incapable of telling us exactly how anything works.

So if that giant double exaggeration is the premise which the following part of your post is based on, it might as well just be ignored. But, being the faithful philosopher which I am, I can't resist a poke or two.

Whereas Peircean semiotics would be precisely a good place to start. It was highly influential to the development of social constructionism in the early 20th C and had become equally as relevant to the neurobiology by the late 20th C. — apokrisis

Better put, Peircian philosophy was influential in allowing ambiguity, vagueness, and imprecision to infiltrate all sciences, not just the soft sciences mentioned, by making such vagueness appear to be unavoidable and acceptable even in the mathematics employed by the hard sciences.

You criticize Wittgenstein, and praise Peirce, but it has been argued that Wittgenstein was very much influenced by Peirce, in his criticism of the supposed rigour of mathematics. Like Peirce, he pointed out how vagueness, as ambiguity, infiltrates even to the core of mathematics.

A proof alters a formalism by turning a string of symbols into a usable
proposition, it is the proof, or its blueprint, at least, that enables its use
and makes it meaningful. Hence, it remains meaningless in the absence of
a proof. Another proof of the “same” proposition will alter the meaning
yet further, will link the sentence to different groups of axioms and/or in
different ways, hence the proposition proved will not be the same. It is
only our habit of attaching “shadowy entities”, meanings, to all well-formed
sentences, even those that do not have any use, that leads us to believe in
the sameness. — Wittgenstein, Peirce, and paradoxes of mathematical proof, Sergiy Koshkin

https://philarchive.org/archive/KOSWPA

No, I don't think deception is a restriction on free thinking... most of the time. As I've said, there are some cases where it is, such as fraud. But most of the time, no. And, for the same reason, education is not a restriction on freedom in the way you describe. Hate speech can indeed incite violence, and it is possible that in some circumstances there is an argument for restricting it, but it does not itself violate anyone's freedom, so restricting it is (if and when it is ever appropriate) a case of doing something bad to prevent something worse from happening. — Dan

I don't understand how you can think that you could take a specific type of actiion, like deception for example, and say that most times it is not a restriction to freedom, but sometimes it is. If we take the act itself, which is to intentionally mislead a person, and we assume that in each case the deception is successful, how is it that sometimes misleading a person restricts one's freedom of choice, and sometimes it doesn't?

I believe you are not judging by consequences, because in each case the consequence is the same, the person is misled. Therefore you must be seeking to distinguish different types of the act itself, different types of deception. This means that there must be something within the intent of the deceiver, which makes the specific type of deception qualify as a restriction of freedom. You mentioned "fraud". Am I correct to assume that by "fraud" you mean when a person falsely represents oneself in an attempt to wrongly extract gain, financial, property, or whatever type of gain, from another. Is it this, the intent to attempt to take another's property, which constitutes a restriction of the other's freedom of choice?

If so, I do not understand how taking one's property restricts one's freedom. In actuality, owning property is itself a restriction to one's freedom, because the person is constrained to take extra measures to protect one's property from theft. It is commonly said that people are tied to their property, because owning property produces the responsibility of maintaining, servicing and taking care of that property. Ownership of property is actually a burden to one's freedom, as a weight to be carried.

It is for reasons like this, that I do not understand how you can take a specific type of act (deception in that example), and say that in some cases it restricts freedom and others it does not. This seems to me, to be a totally arbitrary distinction, not based in any real description of what it means to restrict a person's freedom. Can you give me such a description? Describe to me, what it means to you, to have your freedom of choice restricted.

I'm not totally sure what you are talking about regarding childhood, but I will attempt to answer what appears to be the core question. Specifically, I would quite happily say that there are all sorts of things that restrict a person's choices, their "freedom" if you like, but don't restrict the kind of freedom I have identified as morally relevant. For example, my lack of a private plane "restricts" my choice to take my private plane when traveling. But this isn't a choice that belongs to me, so the fact it is "restricted" in this way isn't morally relevant. — Dan

So, in explaining what it means to have "one's freedom of choice restricted", you fall back on this idea of "morally relevant", which seems incoherent to me. Notice, you allow that things which I call restrictions to one's freedom of choice (and this extends to all instances of deception, and even honest education) actually do restrict one's freedom, and you say you'd happily admit to this, but this type of restricting freedom is not in a "morally relevant" way.

This implies that the distinction you make is not a distinction between restricting one's freedom, and not restricting one's freedom, it's a distinction between restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way, and restricting one's freedom in a way which is not morally relevant. The problem is that the name you attach, what you call these instances, "not restricting one's freedom", is not properly representative of what you believe, that these instance do restrict one's freedom, but not in a morally relevant way. And, when what you say does not properly represent what you believe, you leave yourself open to the charge of deception, yourself.

Keeping this in mind, take a look at your example. Your principle of discrimination is "a choice that belongs to me". Then all possible choices which you designate as not belonging to a person, if they are restricted from that person's freedom of choice, you insist that such a restriction is not morally relevant, and from this principle, you proceed to assert that this is not a restriction of one's freedom of choice. So, from my example, we can start with the fixedness of the past, and the forces expressed by the laws of nature, and I say that these are fundamental restrictions to one's freedom, while you claim that they are not restrictions because they are not morally relevant. And we can look at your example in the same way, not having a private plane restricts your freedom of choice to travel in your private plane, but you say that this is nor morally relevant because that choice does not belong to you, so you dismiss it as not a restriction to the "type of freedom" which you are concerned with.

Remember my objection though, the reason why I think this is incoherent, which you still haven't adequately cleared up for me. You could choose to steal a plane, then you would have a plane in your possession, and therefore the choice to travel in your private plane would belong to you. So it seems very clear to me, that the choice to travel in your private plane, when you do not have a private plane, if it inclines you to steal a plane, is very much "morally relevant", even if we can say that the "choice does not belong to you". And so it appears to me like your principle, by which you determine which choices are morally relevant, and which are not, upon which you base the distinction, and naming of, "restricting one's freedom" and "not restricting one's freedom", is fundamentally flawed, and incoherent. Choices which 'do not belong to you" are clearly morally relevant because they are the type of choices which incline one to do something bad.

No, a right is not very different from freedom. I think, properly understood, rights are ultimately about the kind of freedom I have been discussing. To have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing. For example, a right to life entails a right to die, a right to speak entails a right to stay silent. I'm very happy have any future discussions without the language of rights. — Dan

This demonstrates very clearly the problem with your proposal of "a kind of freedom". To have a right to something is not to have a choice about that thing, it is to have your choice protected by legal principles. The thing is, we make choices about all sorts of things, and only some of those choices are protected by rights. So "rights" refers only to particular types of choices, and freedom of choice extends far beyond those choices which we have a right to make. Your proposal, to restrict the concept of "freedom of choice" to those choices which we have a right to make, is simply not representative of reality. It is a false proposition, and ought to be rejected as such. The following is that false proposition.
"to have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing." See, people freely choose to do things which they have no right to do.

I should say now that doing so wouldn't quite be accurate, as I would say my theory aims to protect the thing at the core of rights theories, rather than rights themselves, and there is some baggage associated with rights that isn't applicable, such as rights being trumps and each right being kind of seperate from each other one, rather than a single underlying value as I would suggest. But, bearing that in mind, we can talk about freedom consequentialism as a consequentialism of rights from now on. — Dan

I still think you have things reversed. Freedom is logically prior to rights. Rights follow from freedom, and we only have rights because we have freedom. This means that freedom is fundamentally independent from rights, and not determined by rights. You can tie rights to freedom but you cannot tie freedom to rights.

It's utterly insane that cyclists are legally allowed in bus lanes. — AmadeusD

Why not let them ride the train tracks as well?

Thin particulars do not have properties. Rather, a "thin particular" is a constituent of a state of affairs. Everything that exists in the world(as opposed to mental abstractions) is a SOA. Every SOA has 3 constituents (thin particular, a set of intrinsic properties, a set of relations). — Relativist

Does a thin particular exist? If so, it is an SOA. And if it is an SOA it must have thinner particulars as constituent parts. That leads to infinite regress. If it is not an SOA, then it is a mental abstraction, along with the sets of intrinsic and extrinsic properties which describe it, making the entire SOA a mental abstraction. Which is the case, the infinite regress, or is the entire world just mental abstractions? See, there's something missing from this ontology.

Thin particulars are not composed of thinner particulars. Refer back to the mental exercise of conceptualizing the term: ignore the properties and relations and consider what remains. What remains is not further decomposable. — Relativist

If it is not further decomposable it is not an SOA, therefore not something which exists in the world, and it's simply a mental abstraction. Then the SOA, being composed of mental abstractions is also a mental abstraction.

The wave itself is an entity that actually exists at every point in space: — Relativist

The wave is not an entity though. By accepted theories, there is no medium (ether), therefore no real wave, just particles without any location, and a mathematical abstraction (wave function) which describes the particles. The supposed "wave" is an SOA without any thin particulars, relations without any substance, because the wave function really describes particles, not waves.

His handlers are desperately trying to get him to sound like he knows what he’s doing, to no avail. — Wayfarer

The more the handlers try to control the wild beast, the more it rebels.

There’s a chance that he will actually become pathetic — Wayfarer

If the dangerous beast escapes the handlers and flees in a final flailing effort at freedom, sympathy may prevent it from being shot.

But it's also part of.this theory that a particular (i.e. an SOA) has 3 types of constuents: thin particular, intrinsic properties, and relations (AKA extrinsic properties). None of these constituents exist in the real world independently of the others. — Relativist

So, how does Armstrong avoid the infinite regress I referred to? A particular (SOA) is made up of thin particulars. A thin particular, having intrinsic properties, is made up of thinner particulars. A thinner particular, having intrinsic properties, is made up of even thinner particular, and so on ad infinitum.

I don't think that's true. Can you point me at a source that says this? — Relativist

I suppose it may be a matter of interpretation, but according to The Copenhagen Interpretation, quantum mechanics is indeterministic, meaning that elementary particles have no determinable location.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation

The SOA model could be applied to quantum fields, directly. Each field exists at every point in space, so each point could be treated as an SOA. — Relativist

A "quantum field" does not represent particulars with intrinsic and extrinsic properties, it represent probabilities of particulars. This is what Aristotle showed as the failure of such an ontology. To avoid the infinite regress there must be posited a base or fundamental particular. However, such a particular cannot be understood as a "particular" (SOA in this case) because it must be indivisible and without intrinsic properties. So it is unintelligible, being designated "a particular" but not fulfilling the criteria of "a particular". Therefore we must look for something other than particulars, or thin particulars, as that which constitutes an SOA.

Trouble! That's something which materializes out of thin air, don't blame it on the CIA.

The sense of freedom it gives is powerful. — T Clark

Far beyond freedom, the car provides a person with power to exercise one's freedom. A car is much more than a private container, it gets one here, there, everywhere, in a very fast way, with much less care required than a horse. When a person is provided with this kind of power it may be best not to interfere, even unintentionally. As road rage demonstrates, good feelings turn to bad feelings. Motonormativity is inevitable because having power naturally makes people happy, and we don't want that happiness to turn to anger.

It materializes out of thin air... — Fire Ologist

Do you really think so? I don't. That's like spontaneous generation, no one believes that hokey stuff anymore.

“I’m a lot of things, but weird I’m not.” — Donald Trump :lol: — Mikie

That's a weird thing to say.

A "thin particular" is not a "true particular" - it isn't a thing that can exist wholly and independently. Here's how to conceive of a "thin particular": think about an object. Like all objects, it has intrinsic properties, and relations to other things. Now mentally subtract those properties and relations. What's left is the "thin particular". — Relativist

This doesn't make sense, because you said an SOA is made of (thin) particulars, their intrinsic properties and their extrinsic properties. Now you say that I have to subtract those properties to understand what a thin particular is. A particular without any intrinsic or extrinsic properties is not a particular at all, nor is it a constituent of an SOA, which is made up of thin particulars which have intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It's not a real thing. So your description makes no sense.

A "base particular" is an "Atomic State of Affairs". It's analogous to an elematary particle in physics. It exists at a specific set of spatio-temporal coordinates with it's specific set of properties and relations. — Relativist

But quantum physics shows that elementary particles do not exist at any specific spatio-temporal coordinates. So if you are proposing a "base particular" which exists at "a specific set of spatio-temporal coordinates", this is not consistent with elementary particles in physics. Furthermore, this runs into the problems which Aristotle brought against the atomist. To begin with, a "base particular" cannot have any intrinsic properties, or else it would not be the "base". This means it cannot have any form, therefore no identity, and it is fundamentally unintelligible.

It was this that I was taking issue with. Hence pointing out that being free to act in some specific way is a perfectly sensible thing to say, and doesn't require freedom to act in all possible contrary ways or that freedom be completely unrestrained by anything. — Dan

What I meant is that it is meaningless without a definition of "free"'. If "free" is defined as unrestricted, then "you are free to leave" is meaningful, as you will be unrestricted in the act of leaving. But if we try to define free from the context of the statement "free to leave", then "to leave" is a restriction on the concept of freedom expressed. By that expression, freedom is allowing you only that one named act, "to leave". That is why I said this way of looking at things is oxymoronic. You are proposing "freedom" but only to do one specific thing.

If you insist, that this is what freedom is, this entity, capacity, or whatever, which allows you to leave, in that instance, and then proceed to propose different types of freedom, "free to run", free to hide", "free to speak", "free to choose" "free to go to the moon", etc., then "freedom" becomes totally meaningless, because you just name any activity and say that there is a different type of freedom which is designed to capacitate that specific activity. In reality though, this is not the way that we use "freedom". We use it to mean "unrestricted", and then we name the restrictions which are lifted in application

This is why I say your approach is backward. In real practise we name the types of restrictions which are applied to freedom, not the types of freedom. So "free to leave" names a specific restriction, that was placed on you leaving, and signifies a lifting of that restriction. This allows that all the other things which one is naturally free to do, or not do, are irrelevant and not mentioned. What happens in theory though, is that we name specific activities which we want to protect, as being allowed in a sort of unrestricted sense, and call those "freedoms" as if they are specific types of freedom. These are things like freedom of thought and belief, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of property ownership, etc..

In these cases, we name the type of restriction which we desire to to prevent, and in In doing this we create what in theory might be called "a type of freedom". But that's really just a simple name which represents a complex conceptual structure, intended to facilitate communication with those people uneducated in this type of complex conception. The name "freedom of speech" appears to represent a type of freedom, as do "freedom of belief", and "freedom of association", but that is not what is really the case in the conceptual structure which these words refer to. What is really meant if the theory states that "freedom of speech ought to be protected", or, "you ought to have the freedom of speech", is that restrictions against speaking should not be applied. Notice that what's really referred to is not one's freedom to speak, which is also one's freedom to be silent, and one's freedom to do whatever else is desired at that time, but the restrictions against speaking. What is referred to is that specific restriction. So "freedom of speech ought to be protected" says nothing about freedom itself, or any supposed "type of freedom", it says something about a specific type of restriction, the restriction against speaking, which it claims ought not be applied. This is the same way that "you are free to leave" refers to a specific restriction which is lifted, a restriction against you leaving, but it says nothing about the meaning of "free" or "freedom" or any "type of freedom". To know what "free" or "freedom" means in this context, we must refer to a definition, or a preconception.

I agree that there are... some cases where we might need to constrain what someone is saying. Generally threats, fraud, and incitement to violence. Quite a lot of other things, like just deception generally or hate speech, needs no constraint as it doesn't restrict others freedom. — Dan

But don't you think that hate speech incites violence? And don't you think that deception is a restriction on a person's free thinking. This is the issue I described, how communication in general, which extends from learning right through to general discussions about solving problems, restricts free thinking. How would you draw a line between threats (restricting one's freedom) and hate speech (not restricting), and how would you draw a line between fraud (restricting) and deception (not restricting)?

This is why I say that what is really the case is that all instances of influencing one's thinking through communication, from education right through to simple day to day conversation, are instances of restricting one's freedom of thought. Then we need to distinguish good restrictions from bad restrictions, and perhaps even indifferent restrictions. It makes no sense to say that the same type of communication, deception for example, in some instance restricts ones freedom, as fraud, but in other cases it does not, when what deception actually does to a person's free thinking is the same thing (some kind of causal change to a person's thinking) in each case. Instead we ought to look at under what conditions is deception (as a restriction to one's freedom) good (Plato's royal lie possibly?), under what conditions is it bad, and under what conditions is it amoral.

I believe that this is much more consistent with the reality of the situation. Restricting one's freedom of thought is what is done to a person throughout the person's life. It is most significant when the person is young, and the person slowly grows into a position where one is allowed more and more freedom of thought, but laws, bosses, and families, still impose significant restrictions.

Once we understand that having our freedom restricted, is a basic fact of life, then it is much easier to understand and accept all the aspects of society which actually restrict our freedom. That is why I suggested that we start with the basic restriction, that we cannot change the past, and also the restrictions which the past imposes on us through the laws of nature. When we start by taking these very significant restrictions for granted, such that they are not considered to be restrictions, instead of understanding the way that they restrict us, then we have no coherent approach toward understanding the way that restrictions actually work to restrict us.

To simply say restrictions are bad, and claim to protect freedom, then go through all the real restrictions classifying some as restrictions and others as not restrictions, because you want "freedom" to be good, and something to be protected, is to totally ignore the true human condition which is to be restricted. This "true human condition" of restricted is what I replied to Amadeus as represented in many religions as the result of original sin. Following from original sin is "knowledge", and knowledge restricts us in a new way which is completely different from the way that the past restricts us, as it contains a view toward the future, which we become respectful of. We can reject religion, as fundamentally outdated, and reject the representation which it gives us, but the true human condition, which is represented in that way, as fundamentally restricted, cannot be rejected, as Amadeus pointed out, it is self-evident.

Without getting back into why habits aren't restrictions on the will, I'm not really sure what kind of restrictions you are concerned about. A person's free will is not diminished by being locked in a cell, so being unable to change the past just doesn't seem like a concern. — Dan

The issue is what I was going through with Amadeus, was that the free will can choose to do what is physically impossible to do. That is a simple representation of "mistake". The "mistake" in its fundamental character is a misjudgement of the restrictions in the circumstances. If we do not class restrictions as restrictions, saying that they have no influence of one's "freedom" (in this odd sense of "freedom" you are proposing as deserving to be protected) then we do not have the principles required to avoid mistake. If you say that one's past (childhood experiences, habits, etc.) actually do restrict the person, but they just do not restrict one's freedom, then what principles can you propose to establish consistency? Is there one type of restriction which restricts freedom, and another type of restriction which restricts something else, something other than a person's freedom? What would be restricted by this type of restriction?

An alternative way of thinking about the kind of freedom that freedom consequentialism seeks to protect is that it is plausibly the same thing protected by some rights theories. Would conceptualizing it as a consequentialism of rights help you? — Dan

This might help. Representing what you call "freedom", as "rights" instead, would probably help me to explain to you that in your principles you are not at all proposing to protect freedom. A "right" is very different from "freedom".

Huh? A subject in the philosophy I read is a conscious observer. You are saying that the subject is the object observed, and then use those words in the same way. I can't make sense of this. Are you saying the predication is made "of" the subject or "by" the subject? — Gregory

Are you familiar with "predication"?

predication, in logic, the attributing of characteristics to a subject to produce a meaningful statement combining verbal and nominal elements. Thus, a characteristic such as “warm” (conventionally symbolized by a capital letter W) may be predicated of some singular subject, for example, a dish—symbolized by a small letter d, often called the “argument.” The resulting statement is “This dish is warm”; i.e., Wd. Using ∼ to symbolize “not,” the denial ∼Wd can also be predicated.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/predication

He was saying necessary and sufficient refers to what makes a thing a thing in itself. — Gregory

The point I made though, is that it doesn't. By the law of identity a thing is unique, and what makes a thing unique, i.e. the thing that it is instead of something else of the same type, is the accidentals. "Necessary and sufficient" are what is used as the criteria to judge that a thing is of a specific type.

You seem focused on semantics, whereas Armstrong is focused on ontology. So I wonder if you're just treating individual identity as some semantical convention. That seems a defensible position, but it's not ontology - and it is ontology that Armstrong is dealing with. — Relativist

It is ontology, it's called "nominalism", the ontology that holds that only particular things exist. Armstrong obviously has a different ontology, but if he believes that properties have independent existence, not being simply what we say about things, then I do not think his ontology is nominalism

Again, I have not said the car has "things" as "properties". Rather, at a point in time, the car has a specific set of components. A swap in parts absolutely implies the resulting vehicle is not strictly identical to the car before the swap. I hope that is clear. — Relativist

But to say "the car has x. y. z components is to attribute those named properties to the named subject "the car". This is predication. And, as I said already, a thing changes as time passes, without loosing its identity. So we can predicate this set of components at one time, and another set of components at another time, and it is still the very same car.

The issue here is that you are using "identical" in a way which is not consistent with "identity" in the law of identity. You say "identical" means having all the same properties, but identity in the law of identity means being the same thing. This makes the properties which a thing is said to have, completely irrelevant, because a thing is the same as itself regardless of its properties. This is how a thing can be constantly changing, yet maintain its identity, because it is always the same as itself no matter what changes it undergoes.

You claim that it makes no difference to the car's identity if some parts are replaced, but you haven't explained how that car's identity endures despite a change of parts. — Relativist

How a thing remains the thing which it is through all sorts of changes as time passes, is unknown, as a mystery of the universe. Asking to have this explained is like asking how there are laws of physics. Some would answer that God made the universe this way, it's God's Will that this is the case, but that doesn't provide a very good answer.

The principal alternative ontology. which you seem to be promoting, holds that every time a thing changes, it cannot still be the same thing because it is no longer 'identical" to the way it was before. From this perspective, each object must be created anew at each moment of passing time, to account for all the minute changes as time passes. Since it is impossible that an object maintains its identity as the same object, as time passes (by your principle of "identical"), because aspects are always changing, then we have to conclude that everything in the universe is newly created at each moment of passing time. This is a fine ontology, but then we have to account for the reality of similarity from one moment to the next. If things are created anew every moment, why do they remain so similar. And again this is often answered with reference to God. Something must create the new universe at each moment of passing time, and ensure that there is intelligible consistency from one moment to the next, and this is claimed to be God.

This statement doesn't account for identity over time. What makes the car (or you) the same identity from one day to the next, or from one decade to the next? If you aren't accounting for it through essentialism, then how DO you account for it? — Relativist

As stated above, it's simply unknown. No one understands temporal continuity, and there is often an appeal to God. But this does not provide a good answer so it's better just to say that it's unknown.

Remember that every thing that exists (i.e. a particular) is a State of Affairs (SOA), and every SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular*, (intrinsic) properties, and relations to other SOAs (AKA extrinsic properties). Properties, relations, and "thin particulars"* do not exist independently; they exist only as constituents in a state of affairs. Strict identity means the exact same set of constituents. — Relativist

You say first, that every particular is an SOA. But then you say that an SOA consists of 3 type of things, and a particular is one of the three. So which is the true particular, the SOA, or the part of the SOA. Or do you have two very distinct types of particulars, one being an SOA, and one being a part of an SOA?

*Thin particular: Armstrong denies that SOAs (AKA existents; AKA particulars) are nothing more than bundles of properties. There is also particularity to which properties attach in a SOA. When we abstractly consider the constituents of an SOA, we therefore need to include "particular" as one of these constituents (the particular considered without the attached properties & relations). To distinguish the SOA's constituent particular from an SOA (also called a particular), he labels the constituent as a "thin" particular. — Relativist

This does not resolve the issue of which is the true particular, it simply creates an infinite regress. Each particular is composed of "thin" particulars, but those particulars, to fulfill what it means to be "a particular" under Armstrong's description, must also be composed of "thinner" particulars, and so on ad infinitum. This is the problem which the ancient Greek materialists known as the atomists were addressing when they posited a fundamental, base particle (the atom). I see no difference here. A rock is an SOA and its thin particulars are molecules. A molecule is an SOA and its thin particulars are atoms. Etc.. To avoid infinite regress, a base particular needs to be posited. But this assumption has all sorts of problems which Aristotle exposed, they cannot have any form, being indivisible, and without form they cannot have identity, making them all unintelligible.

Armstrong next defines a "State of Affairs Type (SOAT) - SOAs that have one of more properties/relations in common are the same SOAT. Electron is a SOAT. A specific electron located at some exact location is an SOA. Every SOAT is a universal: it can be instantiated multiple times. An SOAT can be a single property, or a set of properties+relations. As in the case of an electron, all electrons have the same exact properties (excluding location) - but they are different particulars (with distinct "thin particulars"). — Relativist

The problem though, is that when you get to the base particulars (particles), which are necessary to assume to avoid infinite regress, identity is completely lost. One cannot be distinguished from another, and they are moving as time passes, so location is of not help. At this point, "strict identity" turns into no identity, and the entire ontology falls apart by proposing a fundamentally unintelligible universe.

Identity over time is a loose identity (as opposed to the strict identity I've been discussing): it is a SOAT; it is a universal. An individual identity has "temporal parts": the actual SOA at each point of time. Each of these SOAs is temporally/causally connected to each other (directly or indirectly). — Relativist

This is exactly opposite of what is actually the case. Identity over time grants identity to the particular, "a thing is the same as itself. The SOA is a universal, a type. Because the base particular cannot have any thin particulars, to avoid infinite regress, the whole structure is undermined and all SOAs are fundamentally universals, because spatial temporal positioning loses its validity.

OK, then what does identify a specific personal identity, if it's not some subset of its properties that it holds throughout its existence? — Relativist

As stated above, this is an unknown. It's why metaphysicians, and philosophers in general, still have work to do

Are you, perhaps, referring to haecceity - treating identity as a primitive? *edit* or are you just treating individual identity as a semantic convention? — Relativist

What's the difference? "Semantic convention" and "primitive" are the same, aren't they?

You need to distinguish between parts as understood philosophically and parts of an object seen as geometry. In the latter an object has infinite parts. In the former, well it is debatable. That is why Aristotle failed to refute Zeno. Zeno made a mathematical point with philosophical implications,and Aristotle responded simply with his philosophy — Gregory

I don't see the relevance, we were talking about identity, which refers to things, not geometrical conceptions.

Ooh this feels very much in the discussions of the Speculative Realists like Graham Harmon’s Object-Oriented Ontology: — schopenhauer1

I think that's a similar point. Properties are what we attribute, what we say about things. But in logic the object is represented as a subject, and we predicate. The predication is made of the subject, not the object, and there remains a separation between the subject with its predications, and any possible object which is represented in this way. This separation, makes the object completely separate from anything we say about it, even spatial-temporal location, it's reality is a possibility. This is what allows for the reality of mistake.

I partially disagree: the parts of the car are still things, and can be a subject of discussion. I can refer to "my car's engine/steering wheel/tires" etc. — Relativist

These are predications though, your car is the subject, and you are saying that it has these things, as properties. At any time, such predications may be true or false. Therefore at sometime your car may not have any tires, then afterwards it might have tires which are different from the tires before. The swap in parts makes no difference to the identity of the car.

I was only trying to show that "enduring indentity" is a problematic concept - one that depends on essentialism: the notion that there is something that is both necessary and sufficient to an individual identity. — Relativist

The point though is that there is nothing necessary and sufficient, because identity is the thing itself.

I probably clouded the matter by referring to "my car"; the real question is whether it can be considered the "same car" (an enduring identity). — Relativist

When you say "same car", you are designating a type of thing, "car", and that causes a problem because we might think that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for being "a car". I think the important point of the law of identity is that it makes identity distinct from anything we say about a thing, making it the thing itself.

My point is that it's arbitrary, and not of much ontological signficance- it's more of a semantic convention, that is justifiable under this ontology. Consider this snapshot from one day to the next:

Day 1: I purchase a car and park it in my driveway (=Car1)
Day 2: I replace a tire on that car (=Car2)

Car1 is not strictly identical to Car2, but there is a temporal/causal link between Car1 and Car2: Car1 is a material cause of Car2. — Relativist

You are using "identical" in a different way. This is not the law of identity. It allows that the thing which you refer to as Car 1, and Car2, are the very same thing, a changing thing with different properties at different times. You have just taken different time frames, saying that the thing does not have the same properties at one time as it does at another, so you want to designate them as two distinct things. It's a different way of looking at things, a different ontology.

There is no identifiable set of necessary & sufficient conditions that you share with infant-you - so what would your basis be for claiming you're the same person as infant-you? This is the problem with endurantism: it requires essentialism, the notion that there is some core of you that endures throughout your existence. If you're a theist, you might consider this your "soul", a substance that is assumed to never change -but good luck on proving such a thing exists. — Relativist

I think your association of the law of identity with "essentialism", and "the notion that there is some "core of you" that endures throughout your existence" is mistaken. What is simply assumed is temporal continuity. This means that form one moment of time to the next, there is some continuity in what we observe, a certain persistence of things. So changes are not random, they are consistent with what we've observed already. That's what allows for prediction. That is the temporal continuity which we assume the reality of, because we've observed it. This allows us to say that a thing has an identity. The assumed "identity" is not supposed to be some essential conditions, nor is it assume to be "some core" of the person, it is simply the temporal continuity of the thing, which we observe as time passes.

2) you're referring to something being "essential", while seemingly ignoring the fact that nothing can be identified as essential (both necessary and sufficient). — Relativist

No, I said it is "never an essential property", not that it is essential. You seem to have misunderstood.

I am referring to the conjunction of:
(the identity of indiscernibles) & (the indiscernibility of identicals). Some refer to this conjunction as "Leibniz law" (see this). But whether or not it's a correct label is moot. The point is that strict identity entails an identical set of properties. — Relativist

Your idea of "strict identity" is completely different from mine. I am trying to adhere to the law of identity, you have a different set of principles which you are calling "strict identity".

The temporal continuity of the car depends on each version of the car being a material cause of the next version. That is warranted. Compare the completed process of gradually swapping car parts to simply swapping complete cars on day 1. The latter provides no basis for claiming the car I now possess is the same car as before. — Relativist

As I said, changing parts does not change the thing's identity, that's a matter of properties coming and going, what we express by having one subject with different predications at different times. Clearly two distinct things in the same place at different times, does not provide the temporal continuity required that it be one subject.

Again, you seem to be defining "free" in a very strange way. It seems entirely reasonable for the police for example to say of someone "you are free to leave". It is clear what this means: there are not restrictions being placed on you leaving. It doesn't require that it also be true that the person is free to go to the moon. — Dan

Look at your statement "free to leave" means "no restriction being placed on you leaving". "Free" is interpreted as "no restrictions being placed on", "to leave" is interpreted as "you leaving". Remember my definition for freedom? It was "without restrictions, no constraint". Why would you think that if "freedom" is defined as without restriction or constraint, then "you are free to leave" which clearly means that no restrictions or constraints are being placed on you leaving, by that definition, would also mean "you are free to go to the moon"?

If someone said "you are free", that appears to imply an absolute sense of "free" and this would mean that you are not restricted or constrained at all. But statements like this are often dependent on context to derive the true meaning, and are also often metaphorical. No one would say "you are free", meaning that the person is capable of doing things beyond the natural constraints of the physical world, these restrictions are accepted as implied.

But in a philosophical inquiry we ought to be very clear about what we are saying, and leave nothing like that as taken for granted. So we might start with the most common definition of "freedom" as without restriction (as you seem to agree now), then proceed to clarify exactly how a human being is not free, what restrictions are in place, which makes a person less than free. First we have the natural restrictions, starting with the fact that we cannot change the past, then the restrictions of our physical bodies and the physical world around us, and also the artificial restrictions like laws and codes of ethics. All these various types of restrictions make a person less than free.

What conflicts in the public sphere are you concerned about? — Dan

There are a number I can think of. The right to speak is a matter of freedom over one's own body, but threats and hate speech need to be controlled. This problem extends into lying, deception, brainwashing, and some cases of preaching ideologies. Immoral use of language is a significant problem. A person's freedom to use one's body to communicate (to speak), conflicts another's freedom over one's own mind, and that's simply the basic nature of communication. It's very evident in children, as the mode of education. We can say that children don't really have freedom over their minds, because their minds must be constrained through education, but we still don't ever get to the point of having our minds free from the influence of others.

And the other categories can be seen to overlap negatively as well. Freedom to do what I want with my property can restrict your freedom to do what you want with your body, like if I hit you with my car, And problems like these are extensive.

Having free will definitely doesn't mean being free of will. I had assumed that you were familar with the term "free will", but I will clarify it for you if you like. There are a lot of ways one might define free will, and I suspect there are those who think my definition is claiming too much, but I would say that to have free will is to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent, not determined by preceding events or scripted responses, and not in-principle predictable ahead of time. — Dan

I couldn't understand this, so I looked at my posting and saw a typo. I didn't mean to say free is "predicted" of will, I meant it is "predicated" of will. So, what you say here is consistent with what I meant You would say that "free will" means that the will is not restricted in the way of determinism, so it is free in that way. When you say "to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent". you mean that the will is "free" (as in unrestricted), up to the point of the restrictions which are natural to "the agent" referred to. From my perspective then, those restrictions cannot be taken for granted, and must be understood as limiting or restricting the agent, so that it's freedom is qualified. "The will is free" uses "free" in the same type of qualified sense as "you are free to go". In this case freedom is qualified by the nature of the agent referred to as the free agent. A human being is restricted in natural ways (such as unable to change the past). But this is where habits may also enter the picture, as natural restrictions. And habits may come about from training as well, like when a child is educated.

The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices is exactly how I use "freedom". I agree that I do only want to protect certain choices, specifically persons' own choices. The choices that belong to them. I am not being inconsistent at all. — Dan

For a rational agent to constrain one's own choices such that one only makes choices which belongs to oneself, is not "freedom", but moral restraint. You can call it 'freedom", and define "freedom" in that way, but what you describe is better known as moral restraint. This would be the capacity to restrict one's choices to "choices that belong to them". Since you are explicitly wanting to protect the capacity to make certain choices, those which belong to the agent, and not wanting to protect the agent's freedom to make other choices, what you describe is moral restraint.

So be it. Take care my friend :) I shall not engage this one further, I don't think. — AmadeusD

This is the only part of your post worth replying to Amadeus. I think you've made a fine decision, something I can readily agree with you on.

So long as people are being clear about what they mean, equivocation doesn't seem to come into it. I agree that freedom certainly has something to do with being unconstrained, but there are lots of types of freedom, lots of ways of being unconstrained from various things, that we might want to discuss. It seems that we could simply specify what we mean (which I have, numerous times) and then discuss whether that type of freedom is important or not, rather than getting hung up on linguistics. — Dan

Ambiguity, and the possibility of equivocation is only the tip of the iceberg. The problem is much more extensive. Suppose we identify a number of different types of freedom, and we agree that these are all types of freedom which ought to be protected. However, there is a possibility that having the freedom of one type may cause people to restrict other people's freedom of another type. This would be where the different types of freedom overlap. Sorting this out would require reference to higher principles, and then "freedom" would not be our principal value anymore, because all the various types of freedom would need to be restricted according to the higher principles.

Look at what Plato said about justice in The Republic, for example. After questioning all the different participants in the discussion, about the nature of justice, Socrates offered a sort of definition. Justice he said is having ones own place in society, to do one's own thing as determined by oneself (freedom), but not interfering with another in the other's position of doing one's own thing. Notice, that under this description, the members of society are not working together, as "parts" of a cohesive whole, working toward a common goal, or common good, each person is working on one's own goals or goods. This I think, is where we find "freedom", the person is allowed to choose one's own ends, one's own activities, and is not at all persuaded to work toward an ideological "common good", or the good of the community, the good of the state, or anything like that, but still may choose this freely. "Freedom" inherently involves the capacity to choose ones own goods, ends, objectives, or goals.

Now look at the other half of the proposal. a person ought not interfere with another's freedom to choose one's own goods, ends, objectives or goals. This implies that there is, inherent within the nature of "freedom", the potential for conflict. This cannot be avoided, one person's freedom will conflict with another's My contention is that identifying different types of freedom cannot remove this potential for conflict.

No, in my examples, "free" can be used to two ways. To say that some agent is free to act in some way is using "free" to refer to the person having freedom to act in that way. To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will. By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. I offered to use a different word, but you offered "moral constraint" which is so far divorced from how either of those words are used as to be completely inappropriate. — Dan

I perceive this passage to be faulty in a couple ways. To "be free to act in some way" is completely meaningless if not oxymoronic. Say we name a specific type of activity, as the specified "some way", and say that the agent is free to act in this way. This means that we allow this option. But the agent being free, may choose not to act in that way, but to act in a contrary way. In that sense, "to be free to act in that specific way" is completely meaningless, because the agent is also free to act in any way. And if we impose constraints to ensure that the person does not act in the contrary way, then the statement becomes oxymoronic. The person is not "free" to act in that way, but is constrained so as to act that way.

Furthermore, if we are all free rational agents, with the ability to make our own choices, as you say here, there will very clearly be conflict amongst us, as I pointed out already. So then you earlier defined one's "own choices" as choices concerning property which belongs to the person. Limiting freedom in this way still does not remove conflict because there would be conflicts concerning rights and actions in public spaces rather than concerning properties. You might insist that "rational agent" means one who reasons morally, but then you actually would be adopting "moral constraint" as a principle, not freedom.

I have clearly defined how I am using the word "freedom" and why I am using that word rather than another. — Dan

You really have not defined how you are using "freedom". Look, you define "free" like this: "To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will." When you say that agent has "free will" you predicate "free" of "will". But this doesn't say what "free" means. And when you define "freedom" you say: "By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices." But this is clearly not how you use "freedom" when you talk about protecting freedom. You only want to protect certain types of choices, and you claim that this is protecting the person's freedom. Obviously, the "freedom" you claim to be desiring to protect is not "the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices", but the ability to understand and make certain types of choices. That is why I said what you are trying to protect looks a lot more like moral restraint than freedom.

Why don't you just come around to admitting it. It is not "freedom" you are trying to protect, but moral restraint. Moral restraint is the means by which a person is said to freely make choices consistent with moral principles. It supposedly involves no restrictions to the person's freedom because the person supposedly chooses freely, the moral choice.

As I've pointed out already, your use of "freedom" appears to be self-contradicting. And, as I've shown above, the only way to make it not self-contradictory is to remove all meaning from it. So now I think I have the proper understanding of how you use that word. It's just a word that you like to throw around because it looks good, having positive connotations, but your use of it really shows that it has absolutely no meaning for you. You allow that "to will something" has meaning, but predicting "free" to the will does absolutely nothing. And, concerning the choices people do make you, only want to protect a certain type, so "freedom" as the ability of a rational agent to make one's own choices is not what you want to protect. So the "freedom" you claim to be protecting has no meaning either, being divorced from your definition.

I assume my car has an individual identity. Suppose my neighbor has a identical make and model, and we gradually start swapping parts. Eventually, the car in my driveway has none of its original parts and all of my neighbors parts. Is it now the neighbor's car? If so, how many parts had to be replaced to constitute the transformation? — Relativist

When you speak of the identity of a part, then you are not talking about the identity of the whole, and vise versa. So, I think you have produced an example which shows that these two are incompatible. If "my car" is the object referred to, then the supposed individual parts cannot have a distinct identity, because the part's identity is subsumed as it is "a part" of the whole.

This can be understood as a matter of what is our subject here, the part or the whole. If the car (the whole) is the subject, then the part is a property of that subject. When the part is removed, that property is negated from that subject, and the subject maintains its status as the subject, without that property. So it's just a matter of affirming and negating properties It really does not matter which properties come and go.

On the other hand, if the part is the subject, then being in X relation with other parts, or wholes, are properties of that part. Then the part can be moved around accordingly, and whatever relations it is in, will define its position as "a part".

The important thing to notice is that whether a thing is a "part of" something else, is never an essential property, neither to the identity of the thing said to be "a part" (giving it an identity as a thing denies its status as a part), or the identity of the whole. Therefore "part" is a name we assign when the thing is in a specific type of relation, the relation is what is essential to the determination of "part", and if we give that thing which is said to be "a part" an identity as an independent thing, we deny that this relation is essential to the thing's identity, so we can no longer speak of it as "a part".

Leibniz's law:
if, for every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y.

This means identity implies identical in every way. — Relativist

Lebniz' law is not the same as the law of identity. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. To make your statement representative of the law of identity, we would have to say that object named x is the same object as the object named y. The point to consider is that then "x" and "y" are symbols which both refer to the same object, and it is not the case that "x" and "y" refer to two different objects which are "identical". The latter is what is impossible by the law of identity, that two distinct objects could be "identical".

Any other definition of identity depends on an arbitary set of necessary and sufficient properties that persist over time - or the assumption that identity is some metaphysical thing that could take on any form (your identity could exist as a cat, a stone, a quark, or a gust of wind.) — Relativist

By the law of identity a thing's identity is itself. This means your identity is not a symbol, idea (such as stone, cat, etc.), or anything else which a human being might assign to you (even your name). Your identity is you, yourself.

Under strict identity, the car in my driveway today is causally connected to the car that was there yesterday so I can claim it as my car from day to day. — Relativist

I believe that "causally connected" is an unwarranted assumption here, which only complicates things. We can simply say that there is temporal continuity between the thing in your driveway yesterday, and the thing in your driveway today, which would allow us to represent it as a subject for predications, and "causation" is left as a distinct and unnecessary conception.

I'm not really sure what an "objective definition" would even be. The definitions of words are either explicitly stated within specific contexts (such as within a particular discipline, or even within a particular conversation) or they are determined by usage. — Dan

"Freedom" is a noun, so we need to treat the word as if it refers to a thing, even if that supposed thing is an abstraction. In this case it is an abstraction, and that's why I referred to it as an ideal, it's like other ideals, "circle", "square", "triangle", etc.. When we recognize "freedom" as an ideal thing, an abstraction, then we see that in order to understand it and use it as a premise for logical proceeding, it needs a definition. That would be what I called the "objective definition". And I propose the very simple ideal definition, "without restriction".

What you appear to be doing is proceeding from the assumption of different "types of freedom" without a definition of "freedom" itself. To me, that's like talking about different types of triangles without a definition of "triangle" itself. See, if we did this, the meaning of "triangle" could vary, meaning something different in each different type of triangle being talked about. That's what I think happens when people talk about different "types of freedom", The meaning of "freedom" changes according to the proposed t type of freedom. It's not a matter of a different type of freedom, rather a matter of a different meaning for "freedom". This makes logical consistency and coherency impossible.

So what I've been trying to tell you is that if you took a good look at how "freedom" is used by most standard conventions, you'll see that it is similar to, and consistent with, what I propose, "without restriction". Furthermore, I think you'll also see, as I've been explaining, that the defined thing, that abstraction or ideal, is not the type of thing itself, which could be divided into types. Divisibility into types would imply that there are restrictions which inhere within the thing defined as "without restriction".

You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom). — Dan

Sure, "freedom" can have lots of different meanings, and that is evidence of the freedom which we have in using words. However, for coherency and consistency in logical proceedings it is imperative that we adhere to one definition, or else we allow ambiguity and equivocation to produce fallacy.

Is the fact that the past can't be changed self-evident? Even if it were, what does that have to do with anything? — Dan

That's what Amadeus suggested, that the past cannot be changed is self-evident. So I went along with it, as a principle or premise which we could agree on. What it has "to do with anything" is where we disagreed. I think that as what "cannot be changed" it forms the foundation for the concept "impossible", and this provides the basic principle of "restriction", which is what is contrary to "freedom" (by my definition). Amadeus would not agree, insisting that this sense of "impossible" is not at all related to "freedom", referring to something which one could never have freedom in relation to in the first place. So Amadeus takes the sense of "impossible" for granted, and since it is taken for granted it is not allowed to have any bearing on Amadeus' sense of "freedom".

However, I showed Amadeus how the past relates to the present and the future, in determinist principles, and as such has the greatest restriction on our freedom, by completely denying it. So this is another type of abstraction, ideal, the conceptual structure which relates all events in the world through cause and effect, saying that even future events are predetermined by past events. From this conceptual structure, the "impossible" which we associate with the past as "what cannot be changed", has the greatest possible relevance to "freedom", by completely denying the possibility of any freedom, all future events being predetermined by what cannot be changed. Amadeus simply dismissed such cause/effect relations with reference to Hume, but I pointed out that even if such relations are not real, our capacity to predict is real. Notice also that such a dismissal would incapacitate consequentialism.

To "have" something doesn't just mean to have it as a property. I have a red car, but a red car isn't a property of me. Also, even if I have a property, then the conditions that allow me to have that property do not have to be inherent in me. For example, I might have the property of iridescence, but only under specific lighting. The lighting conditions would be a restriction on my having that property, but they aren't a part of me. — Dan

Are you proposing that you "have freedom" in the same way that you "have a car"? Or are you just trying to produce ambiguity, confusion, and equivocation with this proposal for the meaning of "property"?

You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom). — Dan

I know, "freedom" can mean lots of things. But allowing "freedom" to mean many different things is not conducive to valid logic, or good philosophy. It is one thing to look at many different proposals for definition, then decide on one, as the method of Platonic dialectic, but if we don't ever decide on one, we don't ever make any progress.

Notice how this position you've taken, actually supports what I've been arguing, that not choosing, provides the most freedom. By not choosing a definition of "freedom", we can consider all the different ways "freedom" is used, and actually have all that freedom of choice, but once we choose a definition, we must adhere to it in the logical process which follows or else we equivocate, therefore we are restricted in that sense. If in the logical process our chosen definition of "freedom" is shown to produce a problem, as Plato demonstrates with "knowledge" in The Theaetetus, then we might be inclined to look for a better definition.

So, in your examples, "free" means the same thing for an agent with "free will", and also when that free agent has one's "freedom" constrained by chains. The agent with free will has specific restrictions on one's freedom implied by "will" (including the nature of time etc.). Also the agent has specific restrictions implied with "constrained by chains". These do not imply different meanings for "free", if "freedom" is the subject of our logical investigation, they imply different ways that freedom is restricted.

This supposed contradiction seems to be predicated on you not allowing people to use words differently from how you want them to be used. — Dan

It is not a matter of using specific words differently from how I want then to be used. It is a matter of consistency and coherency, so that we can proceed with logic, and avoid equivocation. So it is a matter of the overall way that words are used in general, which I am concerned with. I want "freedom" to be used in a way which supports valid logic, rather than equivocation. If you do not like my proposal for a definition of "freedom", then be my guest and propose your own. But for the reasons explained, we cannot proceed logically toward an understanding of freedom, when "freedom" means something different in the various different contexts, such that each different time "freedom" is used it refers to a different type of freedom (a different meaning of "freedom").

Identity (i.e. true identity, consistent with Leibniz' law) doesn't endure over time. Rather, we can identify a perduring identity, as a causally connected series of temporal parts. — Relativist

By Aristotle's law of identity, identity is proper to the thing itself. "A thing is the same as itself". This allows that a thing may be changing as time passes, and yet remain the same thing. This is an important aspect of the law of identity, it allows for the temporal extension of a thing maintaining its identity as the thing which it is, despite incurring changes. Also, Aristotle insists that the identity of a thing is its form. This means that a thing has a changing form. This is shown to be inconsistent with a form being a "state of affairs", by the following argument.

If at the time known as t1, what exists is state A, and at t2 what exists is state B, and the two states are different, then change must have occurred between the two. Now we need to account for what happened between t1 and t2. If we posit state C as a state different from A and B, to account for that change, then there must be a change which occurred between A and C, and also between C and B. Then we would need to posit states D and E to account for the change between A and C and C and B. But now we need to account for the changes between A and D, D and C, C and E, and E and B. As you can see, this leads to an infinite regress, and the use of "states" to represent change is shown to be incapable of fulfilling that purpose.

So, we can talk about a series of different states which are "causally connected", but this does not provide us with a representation of what happens as time passes. Each state is static, so no time can be passing. Between one state and another, when time is passing, there is causation. But what does that mean? The representation you offer is very inadequate because it provides nothing to represent what occurs with the passing of time, which is what is really happening in the world.

'll add that there IS a bit of arbitrariness to what we identify as a "state of affairs" (i.e. an existent) in terms of what we choose to consider. — Relativist

Since time is always passing, and there is a lot of energy exchange making for a very rapid rate of change, how does an ontology based in "state of affairs" make any sense?

I'm discussing an ontological theory: they are truly different, irrespective of what we perceive. — Relativist

So you're not claiming anything about angles, you are making a statement about differences? I thought you were saying something about the "90 degree angle". My mistake then.

Because Plato's philosophy has had influence in our culture, that doesn't mean that our culture has platonist elements (what does that even mean?), that is wrong. For the tenth time, platonism is not the same as Plato's philosophy. — Lionino

What are you saying, that it's just by random chance that the words "platonism" and "Platonism" are extremely similar? Are you saying that it's wrong to assume some sort of relationship between the meanings of these two words, even though they don't both mean the exact same thing?

These conventions are semantics, and do not erase the fact that there is a ontic relation. An object with the relation labled 90 degrees is logically and ontologically different from an object that we label 45 degrees (under the same set of conventions) - and they are different irrespective of how we choose to abstractly divide a circle. — Relativist

Do you mean that we perceive these as different, our perceptions of such objects are different? I mean science tells us that what we perceive as an object is really a bunch of molecules, which are a bunch of atoms, which are some other particles. So we perceive an edge, a boundary of some sort to those bunches of moving particles, and we measure the edge to be curving (angling?) at the specific degrees. That these angles of degrees are an accurate description of what is really the object, is highly doubtful, so we're best off to just recognize that these are descriptions of what we perceive.

We "start" with a lot of different understandings of what people are free or should be free to do or be, and what they should be free from, and we make sense of that so we can have a sensible conversation. — Dan

Then you have no objective definition of freedom, just a lot of different understandings. Conversation between people with a lot of different understandings inevitably produces misunderstanding, unless you have some objective principles to start with.

This is why I suggested to Amadeus, that we start with something which we both agree on as self-evident truth, the fact that the past cannot be changed. This would have provided us with a fundamental principle as a base determination of "impossible", which we could agree to as the most basic restriction to freedom. Instead, Amadeus insisted that this 'type of impossibility' is irrelevant to freedom. This is very similar to you insisting that only some 'types of freedom' are morally relevant.

Second, constraints and restrictions are not properly understood as only the properties of an agent's environment. — Dan

If you start with an objective definition of "freedom", and protect the concept of "a free agent", you will find that it is contradictory to say that constraints or restrictions belong to the agent, if the agent is truly free.

I totally agree, that a human being is not "free" in the absolute sense of "a free agent" as defined, but the objective ideal concept of "a free agent", being absolutely free, provides a definitional starting point to make judgements concerning the different types of restrictions. Notice that from this perspective, of starting from an objective definition of freedom, "type" belongs to the restrictions, not freedom itself.

Third, there is absolutely not any requirement for constraints to be a part of the agent in order for them to have a type of freedom. — Dan

You say it right there, for the agent "to have a type of freedom". "To have" means it is a property of the thing which has it. If the agent has one type of freedom, and not another type of freedom, as properties, then the restrictions which make the type of freedom this type instead of that type, are also property of the agent. For example, if a thing is red and not green, then the restrictions which make the thing this type of colour rather than that type, inhere within the thing, as property of the thing which has this colour rather than that colour. Likewise, if an agent has this type of freedom and not that type, then the restrictions which make it have this property rather than that property, inhere within the thing.

You are approaching the issue from a backward direction. Instead of assuming "a free agent", as a base "ideal", and then proceeding to look at the different types of restrictions which make a real living human agent's freedom less than ideal, you start with a less than ideal concept of "freedom", and wrongly call this a "type of freedom", when there is no real "type" here to be understood. This is because "type" properly belongs to the restrictions, and by assigning it to "freedom" instead, you have no principles to understand the true types of restrictions. You only have a whole lot of different understandings from different people about "different types of freedom" which are essentially arbitrary, with corresponding arbitrary restrictions. If instead, you started with a pure absolute freedom, as your objective ideal, then you could look at the true, real, natural and artificial restrictions, and understand their different types accordingly.

However, it may be a literature you could benefit from examining, because I think you are mistaken about the issues you are raising regarding types of freedom. — Dan

I already see right through the principles supporting that literature, to recognize the inherent contradiction underlying them, the mistake which I've pointed out to you. There would be no point in me reading it unless I wanted to decisively refute it. However, I'm fairly certain that it is upheld by people similar to you, who would not recognize the refutation when thy saw it. So that would be a much bigger waste of my time than what I am doing here

Are you saying the relation of 90 degrees, that we measure, does not describe an objective fact? Of course, we define "degree" and "90", but the relation we identify as such is not mere opinion - it describes an ontological relation (setting aside the inherent error of making measurements). — Relativist

You can divide a circle into four equal angles, but the convention, that each of these angles is 90 degrees is completely arbitrary. The circle could have had 400 degrees, then the right angle would be 100. Or, we could say that there is an infinite number of degrees within the circle, and within the right angle as well. The issue is with the nature of "a degree". It's not something within the object, but designated by the subject, in a completely arbitrary way (other than that there is a conventional standard). This excludes the possibility of "the four equal angles of a circle are 90 degrees" being an objective fact.