The nothing did not occur, that's the point of the argument. If nothing did occur then there would still be nothing today. But if everything is contingent nothing would have occurred. Hence the conclusion of necessary being.

If all things are contingent then there would have been nothing at some time in the past (by the principle of plenitude). If there was nothing at some time in the past there would still be nothing now. There is not nothing now, there is contingent being. Therefore the proposition "all things are contingent is incoherent", and there is necessary being.

Then the implications are clear when other politicians, like Biden, use the exact same words. — NOS4A2

That's right. But of course the context is different, and that's what's important.

The problem for the principle of plenitude is not when nothing is prior to now; the principle handles that objection well. The problem is when nothing will occur (or may occur) after now. That's the objection I am stating. Do you see why I think it is a problem for the argument you stated? — NotAristotle

No, I don't see how it could be a problem. Since "all being is contingent being" implies an infinite regress of causation, therefore an infinite amount of time prior to now, nothing would have already occurred, prior to now, by the principle of plenitude. This makes your reference to "after now" irrelevant.

But in context it was blatantly clear that the bloodbath Trump was speaking about was a figurative one, an economic one. — NOS4A2

Any use of "bloodbath", whether literal or metaphorical, implies violent aggression. It's similar to his use of "fight" on Jan 6. You can downplay it as "figurative" all you want, but the implications are clear. And, there is consistency in his way of speaking like that. The 'enemy', is the American political system and the goal is to smash it down.

But that is the problem isn't it; Aquinas' argument as you have stated it does not go through if there could be nothing posterior to "now." If there could be nothing posterior to "now" it could be the case that everything is merely contingent. — NotAristotle

I don't think that's relevant. If everything is contingent, then there would be an infinite regress of contingent beings prior to now, implying infinite time prior to now. However, "all being is contingent" implies the possibility of nothing. And, by the principle of plenitude there would have been a time of nothing. If there was a time of nothing prior to now, there would still be nothing. Therefore "all beings are contingent" is incoherent.

But (1) does not explicitly say there could have been nothing in the past; it says "if everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past." It's a conditional statement, that is it. And that is basically what Aquinas is doing too, he is entertaining, in the same way a conditional does, the possibility that "everything is contingent." — NotAristotle

Right, and by the principle pf plenitude, if everything is contingent there would have been a time in the past with nothing. And, since "contingent being" implies that a prior cause is necessary for the being's existence, if there ever was nothing, there would always be nothing after that time. Therefore "everything is contingent" is incoherent.

How is the proposed hypothetical possibility impossible by being incoherent? — NotAristotle

By the nature of "contingent being", it is shown that it is impossible that "all being is contingent" by Aquinas' argument. Therefore the hypothesis "everything is contingent only" is rendered incoherent.

Okay fine, let's forget about "now" and say instead that any moment in the past must have been. I will reformulate my argument:

1. If everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past.
2. But there couldn't have been nothing in the past, something having already existed in the past.
3. Therefore (by modus tollens) it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore there must be a necessary being. — NotAristotle

I don't see how the necessity of the premise (2) "something existed in the past" is supported, when (1) explicitly says there could have been nothing in the past. That is the point of Aquinas' layout, it shows how (2) which contradicts (1), rendering the primary hypothesis "everything is contingent", as incoherent, is derived.

Although I really do think Aquinas meant "now" as I do, in the colloquial sense, not in the technical sense you have described. Otherwise, wouldn't the objection you stated concerning "now" be a problem for Aquinas too? — NotAristotle

There is no need for Aquinas to elaborate or clarify his use of "now" because he does not use it to distinguish between past and future. You made that distinction in your argument, so this left you open to that criticism.

The problem is that there will be or may be nothing posterior to "now," that is, if we are still operating on the hypothetical assumption that everything is contingent only. — NotAristotle

That issue becomes irrelevant when we consider what is prior to now, as Aquinas did. By considering what is prior to now we see that it is impossible that everything is contingent only. Therefore the "hypothetical assumption" has already been ruled out as incoherent in the way I described, through reference to what has occurred in the past. So applying that hypothetical assumption toward the future is pointless because it's already ruled out as incoherent through a proper understanding of the terms. When you say "there will be or may be nothing posterior to 'now,'" you are just carrying on with a proposed possibility which has already been proven to actually be impossible by being incoherent.

Fortunately, I am not appealing to the law of identity; rather, I am appealing to the law of noncontradiction. In particular, I am appealing to what Aristotle says in De Interpretatione. The first sentence of Part 9 especially: "In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false." In other words, it must be true or false that something exists now, it cannot be both true and false. — NotAristotle

I really do not think you will make any progress in this direction. Aristotle showed how it is the case that when potential is a part of the thing we are talking about, we must allow a violation to the law of excluded middle with respect to that potential. This is in relation to the future, things not yet decided. In the case of material things, their "matter" is that potential, so as Aquinas says, these things are possible to be and not to be, and this provides for "change", generation and corruption. So instead of violating the law of noncontradiction to deal with the possibility to be and not to be, under Aristotelian principles, matter, as potential, violates the law of excluded middle, because it neither is, nor is not.

You'll see that modern dialectical materialists (and dialetheists), following Hegel who actually rejected the law of identity, allow that the nature of matter defies the law of non-contradiction. This is a resolution to the problem of "potential" which Aristotle considered, but rejected, insisting that the law of noncontradiction must be maintained, and opting for a violation of the law of excluded middle instead, to allow for the reality of potential.

I am not using now in a purely indexical sense. By "now" I mean this exact present moment. Which, in a few seconds will have become "then." Still, something must have existed in "that" moment. — NotAristotle

This does not resolve the issue with "now". By this description, any proposed "exact present moment" as "now", is really a moment in the past, because by the time it is proposed as "now", it has passed. If you propose a future now, then it is not present, but future. The "now", as a point in time is not real because in reality, time is passing, and any proposed point in time will always be future or past. You could propose an extended period, or duration of time as your "now", but this duration of time would consist of change, and this destroys our capacity to truthfully say that there is such a thing (notice the static fixity of "thing") as what exists now.

So, when we look at "now", we are stuck with a duration of time. And, that duration of time consists of change, "becoming". Aristotle showed that becoming is fundamentally incompatible with the logical contraries of "being" and "not being", "is" and "is not". If we have state A (what is) at time 1, and state B at time 2, and change occurs between these two proposed points in time, then we need to describe this intermediary time, in order to understand change. If we propose a state C (what is) at time 1.5 as the intermediary, then we are left with having to describe the change between the initial state and the intermediary state, and between the intermediary state and the final state. If we propose more states of what is, in between, we just head for an infinite regress of states of being, without ever describing the actual "change" which occurs between the states of being.

This is the problem with "now". We like to represent it as a point in time, with a particular, describable "what is" which corresponds with that point of time. However, when the point in time is properly analyzed we find that it cannot ever adequately represent "now", as we know and understand "now" in lived experience, as it always ends up being in the past, or a projected point in the future. So we find out that "now" really consists of a duration of time. The duration cannot be entirely in the past, or else it would be past time, nor can it be entirely in the future. Therefore the duration which we call "now" must consist of both past and future. Furthermore, there is a substantial difference between past (as what is fixed, determined, and necessary), and future (what is indeterminate, not fixed, and possible). Since both of these somewhat opposed. and incompatible aspects of reality exist at the very same time, "now", the question of "what exists now?" is itself incoherent.

Yeah! That is essentially the argument. I would amend it just by adding "...and what exists now must exist [now]..." — NotAristotle

This is sort of like Aristotle's law of identity. Whatever exists [now] must be what it is, and not something else. This is expressed as the following necessity: "A thing is the same as itself". Notice though, that this relates to a thing's essence, what the thing is, which cannot be other than the thing's essence, what the thing is. But this principle has not been extended to a thing's existence, as you propose, and I believe it cannot be, for the following reason.

I believe that this is because the intelligible part of a thing, what we know of the thing, is its form, its essence, and "existence" is not understood as being part of the thing's form. In other words, we do not know what your statement means, to "exist now", it is unintelligible to us. In fact, the "now" changes as we speak. Therefore we cannot make the proposed statement, "it is necessary that what exists now exists now", because time has past between the first "now" and the second "now" such that they refer to different times which accordingly have different existents.

You might recognize that Aquinas described God as a being whose essence is His existence, and by that principle essence and existence are equated, even made to be the same, in God only. It is only in this special case that a thing's identity, what the thing is, (which is necessary in the sense that the thing cannot be something other than the thing which it is), is assumed to be the very same as the thing's existence. And this transfers the necessity of the thing's form, expressed by the law of identity, that it must be what it is, to the thing's existence, what it is, is that it is. And this makes "that it is" necessary by the law of identity. But that's only in the special case of God.

I am not sure that my objection about "now" being at the time of contingents is fully met. The possibility remains that "now" is within the time span of an infinite sequence of contingents, and that the time of "nothing" will occur sometime after "now." — NotAristotle

The contingents which you propose as occurring posterior to the time of now, in the future, have no existence. They are not real, and cannot be called beings, they are merely possibility. Therefore what you call "an infinite sequence of contingents" is not truly an infinite sequence, unless there is no beginning to it. If there is no beginning, then there is an infinite amount of time prior to now, and the principle of plenitude applies. If there is a beginning to the sequence, then there is not an infinite sequence, because it is limited by the beginning on one end, and now on the other end. In this case, the "necessary being" accounts for the cause of the first contingent being. It is "necessary", known by logical necessity, rather than being known as contingent.

But if that is the case then the infinite sequence of beings can all being contingent and there needn't be a necessary being; that is a problem for the argument and that is essentially the objection. — NotAristotle

You are proposing that the sequence of contingent beings has a beginning, in order to avoid the infinite time prior to now, and the principle of plenitude, which would indicate that in that infinite time there would be a time of nothing. But contingent beings must have a cause. If there is a first contingent being, one which is prior to all other contingent beings, it cannot have a contingent being as its cause, then its cause is necessary, and this is necessary being as distinct from contingent being.

But there's another sense of final causality, the end to which things are directed, and that applies to biology in a way that it does not for physics. — Wayfarer

One thing to keep in mind is that the ancients did not have the separation between living and inanimate, which has since been developed and is fundamental to us. So the common understanding was that "natural" things are all things other than those created by humans. It's interesting to recognize that in Plato's "Symposium" the Idea of "Beauty" is understood through reference to artificial things only. This provided the relation between beauty and good, the fact that the beauty of human artifacts and human institutions is related to their purpose. That grounded "beauty" in something real. But in modern days we completely dissociate beauty from purpose, and this has been developed as a fundamental metaphysical division, the division between "good" (for the sake of something else) and "beauty" (for the sake of itself). In ancient times, since both the artificial and the natural, were products of activity (becoming), they each required soul as the source of activity. The separation we have today was initiated by Aristotle.

But you'll notice in Aristotle's "Physics" there is significant discussion of final cause. And when he makes a comparison between artificial things and natural things, to demonstrate how the form of a thing comes to be within the thing itself, his choice of a natural thing is an acorn, which is a living thing. So in that sort of "natural thing" we can see clearly how the matter of the seed provides the potential for the thing which will come into being, and how that form is put into the material potential (the seed) from a prior being the parent tree.

Now we separate the inanimate, and the activities of the inanimate are the subject of "physics" proper, while the animated "beings" are the subject of biology. You'll notice that the defining activities of the living beings (biological) are internal to the being, so the being is animated. within. On the other hand, the defining activities of the inanimate (physical) things are in the external space, which surrounds the active things. These are the two distinct types of activity outlined by Aristotle in his "Physics", internal activity which is "change" proper, and change of place (locomotion), which is relative change.

Physicalists will insist that all change is reducible to the relative motion known as change of place, which is studied by physics. However, modern (quantum) physics demonstrates very clearly the incompatibility between the two through the problems with the principle of locality.

Second, I have the same objection that I voiced to Wayfarer; namely, Aquinas says: "Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence." If what you are saying about his argument is correct, surely he would have said "...then at one time there must have been nothing in existence." Yet that is not what he says. — NotAristotle

Well, continue in the context. He then says: "Now, if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd."

So, he moves from "there could have been nothing" to "if at one time nothing was in existence... even now nothing would be in existence". Therefore he has demonstrated, as I said, that "nothing" is impossible, given the current conditions of contingent beings.

Additionally, if your interpretation is correct, then the principle of plenitide is not actually doing any work. That is because by definition, according to your definition, all contingent things require a cause. In that case it doesn't matter how much time is involved. — NotAristotle

I believe this is incorrect. There could be an infinite regress of contingent beings. That means an infinite amount of time with contingent beings causing the existence of other contingent beings. Isn't this the objection you made in the op, in the following passage?

An objection to Aquinas' argument, in my opinion, is that, while there could have been a time when nothing was in existence, there also could have been "possible beings" in existence at all times. In that case, the absurdity that Aquinas is suggesting need not occur. In other words, there is nothing absurd about all beings being "merely possible" beings. And in other words there need not be a necessary being. — NotAristotle

That is why the principle of plenitude is required. The principle of plenitude is not stated by Aquinas, and I don't think there even was a formalized version of it at the time, I believe it was just something which was taken for granted at the time, like a self-evident truth, outlined first by Plato. However, if you do some online research, you will see that analyses of the third way argument have determined that the principle is a requirement, for Aquinas to make the conclusion of necessary being.

This is because of objections similar to the one which you made in the op. There could have always been contingent beings, and never nothing, if "nothing" is only a possibility. So, the principle of plenitude is required to move from possible beings, and the possibility of nothing, to: there actually would have been nothing at some time, and so now there would also be nothing, therefore providing what we need to conclude necessary being.

Furthermore, I disagree with the definition of contingent you have deployed. I would define contingent here as "possible to be or not to be." If everything is contingent, then according to your definition nothing is contingent because nothing is possible to be (if everything is contingent). That seems contradictory. — NotAristotle

I don't know, I can't follow this at all.

the contingent things existing now must exist now — NotAristotle

I don't see how you derive this premise, and it isn't part of Aquinas' argument. Notice that Aquinas doesn't use "contingent" in the argument. So maybe we should leave that word out, as a distraction. What he says is that what we find are things which are possible to be, and possible not to be, because "they are found to be generated and to corrupt". Notice the temporal extension, of "generated" in the past, and "to corrupt" in the future. So your use of "now" is uncalled for.

It appears like what you are proposing is something like: "we notice that there are beings now, and what exists now must exist, therefore being is necessary. That's a nice simple argument, but it isn't Aquinas' argument.

That Mind decides what is good or bad; [that such a process is ultimately artificial--square bracketed because I almost dare not repeat that]; and that accordingly on issues like the one at hand, we have no business bring natural into the equation. — ENOAH

The problem I am pointing to is that we cannot designate this, judging good and bad, as something "artificial". This is because artificial is contrasted with natural, and if human beings are natural beings, it may also be natural for them to make this type of judgement.

So what I am saying is that just like we have no business bringing "natural" into the equation, we also have no business bringing "artificial" into the equation, because we are talking about a type of judgement which transcends the judgement of natural or artificial. That's why I proposed "supernatural".

However, I am not sure that that is Aquinas' argument in the 3rd Way. — NotAristotle

I'm quite sure that this is what he is talking about. If you read his expression of the third way you'll see that he says that what begins to exist only does so by being caused by something already existing. This is efficient causation, which we know as the active, or actual cause of existence of contingent beings.

-- unless nothing occurred at a time after now. — NotAristotle

This is incoherent, "occurred" indicates past time, so future is not relevant here.

To your point about the incompatibility of nothing and contingents, allow me to rephrase.. how about "if there is nothing at any time (or even at all times) there could not be a necessary being; any beings that exist, if they exist at all, would have to be contingent beings." — NotAristotle

I don't see how this is relevant. What Aquinas says is that we notice there is not nothing, we notice contingent beings. And, he concludes that it is impossible that there ever was nothing. So, by the observed existence of contingent beings, "nothing" is ruled out as impossible.

And I think I am claiming the possibility of nothing in the same way that Aquinas does; that is, if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing. The possibility of nothing is asserted within a conditional; I do not know enough about logic to know whether that makes it a logical possibility or not. — NotAristotle

What Aquinas does is entertain the idea of "nothing" as what we would call a "logical possibility". We could say that Aquinas mentions "nothing" as a logical possibility, just like any suggestion which is not incoherent by self-contradiction could be said to be logically possible. But then he rules out "nothing" as ontologically impossible, and actually self-contradicting through reference to the material existence which we know and are familiar with.

In fact, what he shows is that your statement "if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing" is incoherent, as self-contradicting. This is because he shows that if there ever was nothing there would always be nothing. therefore there would be no contingent beings. So, the existence of contingent beings appears to validate the possibility of "nothing", as Aquinas shows. However, this apparent validation is really nothing more than an illusion because if there actually ever was nothing there could be no contingent beings. So what he does here is demonstrate that "if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing" is incoherent, as self-contradicting when all the terms are understood properly.

What I am claiming is that, were all beings contingent, it would be possible for there to be nothing at some (or all) times; and in particular, it would be possible for there to be nothing now (if everything were contingent). But, I contend that it is impossible for there to be nothing now. Therefore, by modus tollens, it cannot be the case that all beings are contingent. And therefore, there must be a necessary being. — NotAristotle

Yes, I think this is correct. If all beings are contingent, then nothing appears to be "logically possible". However, ontological reality shows us that there is something now, and this means, as you contend, "it is impossible for there to be nothing now". But you still need the rest of Aquinas' argument, to make your conclusion. You need to show that because the beings we notice now are contingent beings, it is therefore impossible that there was ever nothing. So "nothing" is impossible in a more absolute way. That is the impossibility which leads to the conclusion of "necessary being".

I might add that the third way extends beyond this point to show how an infinite regress of necessary beings is not possible, and finally this leads to the conclusion of "a necessary being".

I see no reason to doubt it. The basic facts of arithmetic and logic are not made up but discerned. — Wayfarer

The problem is that all such "facts" require symbols, or signs. The symbol is essential, as necessary to the existence of an individuated fact. And the symbol is "made up". Therefore at the foundation, the basis of all such "facts of arithmetic" is the application of symbols, and this is something which is made up. The key to the usefulness of the sign, as discussed by Derrida in the section of "Voice and Phenomena" which I referred to earlier in this thread, is the capacity for repetition. And this as the "repeatable results", referred to by @Astrophel above, is fundamental to science.

Repetition is a temporal concept, and repeatability is displayed to us through sensation as a continuity of sameness. The usefulness of the sign is found in a repetition of the sameness within the supposed independent reality, as time passes. The repetition is simplified into a continuity by epistemic, because that is how we apprehend it through sensation. When things are reversed, and priority is assigned to the continuity of sense data, instead of the individuated facts represented by the signs, misunderstanding results.

This is interesting. Assuming that what I'm really getting it is that Nature is (ultimately) Real, and Mind is artificial (formerly Fictional) [this part I am not elaborating on at this moment]. In that case, then Mind is Super natural. But you don't mean supernatural in the conventional understanding. You mean "exterior to" Nature, right? And yet, throughout the history of metaphysics, and one of the things I grapple with, Mind has been associated with spirit or soul--for dualists, at least. — ENOAH

I think that the issue which arises from your op, is that ultimately it is the mind which decides what is good or bad, needed or not needed, morally or socially acceptable or not, and the judgement of "natural" need not be relevant to the judgement of "good". So a natural activity might be just as likely to be bad as an unnatural activity. For example, it's natural to pollute the environment, as creatures naturally dispense their waste in a convenient and efficient way. This occurs generation after generation, until the waste builds up to a point of being detrimental to the species. It's very clear that a judgement of "natural" is not an adequate indication as to whether the activity ought to be classed as good.

Since we cannot distinguish morally good from morally bad on the basis of a judgement of natural or artificial (fictional in your words), this is why I suggested something supernatural, as outside of those categories, to be the basis of such a judgement. I propose that the mind is supernatural, and here's the reason why I say this. Some would say that mind is natural being a part of a natural being, but as you can see from the discussion in this thread, it's really the case that the mind is what decides whether something is natural or not. So "natural" is actually just a category created by the mind. Because it is the mind which makes this category, along with its criteria and all similar judgements, we must allow that the mind is outside of this category which it is judging, in order to ensure that it makes a fair and unbiased judgement. So we need another category which is neither natural nor unnatural, to place the mind in, to make sure that the mind can make a fair and unbiased judgement about things, when placing them in these categories. This third category is supernatural.

The Body responds to certain natural drives which are tied to procreation. The soul, a thing, we think of as -unique to humans*-has displaced Body's procreation with its multifarious made-up forms. Some individual souls believe their made-up forms to be Natural to the Body, and accordingly "right." But they are the workings of the soul, supernatural, made-up. Their form has no better claim to natural than those of other souls. — ENOAH

According to the above, these multifarious forms which are property of the mind, are neither natural nor artificial, they are supernatural, as attributes of the supernatural mind. And, what the mind has learned is that natural/unnatural does not provide appropriate grounding for the required distinction between what ought to be sought, and what ought to be avoided, as explained above. So the mind uses a more appropriate distinction, good and bad. Further, I would propose that a judgement of truth or falsity is the principal tool for determining good or bad. This leaves the judgement of natural and unnatural as completely irrelevant to this issue, because the mind is dealing completely with forms which are supernatural, neither natural nor unnatural.

No: I'm stating that artifice is an attribute of creatures whose intelligence and imagination enable them to build complex structures from simple materials. The creatures are natural; what they do is in their nature to do; the things they produce are artifacts. Artificial means "made by human beings" as distinct from things that occur naturally. (Nobody, finding a pocket-watch on the forest floor, would mistake it for a pine-cone, and nobody except a theist already pledged to a particular mythology, would think either was created by a supernatural being: one grew; one was made. ) — Vera Mont

I don't see how you can maintain this distinction between natural and artificial, if you insist that human beings are natural. Don't human beings actually make other human beings when they procreate? But if that type of "making" is supposed to be natural, then what about making knowledge through teaching, and making ethics, norms, and social conventions? I think you need another category "supernatural", to account for the existence of human beings who can create some things by artifice, and some things by nature.

You can still divide the natural from the artificial - in fact, you'd better, when it comes to fruit, or another person's sincerity, or your own behaviour. — Vera Mont

What's your point here? Why would it be necessary to distinguish between a natural fruit and a synthetic one? If they both taste good and provide nutrition, why would it be necessary for me to distinguish?

But the whole purpose of using either artificial or Fictional is to contrast it with Natural, and therefore, according to my submission at least, Real. — ENOAH

Well, you can't say that artificial things are not real.

Someone please explain, can artificial be natural? And I don't accept that because it arises out of the activities of a natural species, therefore it is. If artificial can be natural, then to hell with that, I'm reverting to Fictional. — ENOAH

This is the issue i took up with Vera Mont above. I think that to maintain the distinction between natural and artificial, we need a third category, supernatural, to provide for the separation between them. Maybe it's the supernatural which ought to be described as fictional.

I am going to be a bit argumentative here, and say, well whether you admit of an infinite sequence of contingents or not, we still have the problem that "now" is in the midst of those contingents. Get what I mean? Like, even if the contingents are not infinite in duration through time, "now" could be within the timespan of those contingents. That seems like a problem and it is a problem even if we only have a finite duration of contingents. It seems like a problem whether the principle of plentitude is recognized or not. — NotAristotle

I don't see the problem. The time referred to as "now" is in the midst of the contingents, that is described as what we observe, contingent beings. But it's not a problem to the argument, because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now, because contingents require a cause, and nothing could not ever be a cause. That's what a contingent being is, one which requires a cause for its existence. So, the possibility of nothing is ruled out in this way.

That is why I prefer an alternative interpretation of the argument. Instead of saying, "by the principle of plentitude there would be nothing now, therefore there must not be only contingents," I am saying, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents...but this isn't a possibility...therefore there must be a necessary being." — NotAristotle

I don't think your statement, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents" is a coherent proposition. If there is nothing, then there is no contingents. So the possibility of nothing rules out the possibility of contingents, that's the point of the argument. "Nothing" and "contingents" are incompatible. That's what the third way demonstrates, but you make them compatible by saying that the possibility of nothing requires contingents.

This is because you've made "possibility" into a logical possibility, saying that nothing is logically possible because what we observe is contingent beings. But the argument denies the possibility of nothing, if there ever was nothing there would not be contingent beings now, so nothing is impossible. Aquinas is dealing with ontological possibility, as in Aristotle's "potential", like what Wayfarer mentions above. This is a sense of "possible" which is distinct from the modern usage of logically "possible".

As I said a contingent being is one whose existence is dependent on causation, it is caused to be. So prior to its existence it is merely "possible". It only comes into being if the appropriate efficient causes, the ones required to bring it into being, are initiated. In this way it is said to be a "possible" being, but this is an ontological possibility, meaning that the existent circumstances support the possibility of that being. This is other than logical possibility which just requires self-consistency.

Metaphysician Undercover, I have in mind by "possible being" something more like a "contingent being" rather than a being that is merely possible but not actual. Based on what I read, the reading of "possible" as meaning "contingent" that is "as what could have or could not have occurred/ existed" is consistent with Aquinas' use of the term "possible."

To summarize and condense, the argument I am suggesting as an interpretation of Aquinas' Third Way is as follows:

1. If everything is contingent, then it is possible for there to be nothing now.
2. But it is not possible for there to be nothing now.
3. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore, there must be a necessary being.

To say a bit more, I think that Aquinas is not only rejecting that "there is nothing now." rather, he is in addition rejecting even the possibility that there is nothing now.

Thoughts? — NotAristotle

I would say that's a pretty simple, yet a fair representation. I think you are correct in your assumption that Aquinas rejects the possibility that there is nothing now. That proposition would not even make sense. What I said earlier, was that empirical evidence denies this possibility, but we also have arguments like Descartes'. So he starts with what we observe, contingent being (which excludes the possibility of nothing), and concludes that there must be also "necessary being".

I believe the point of the argument is that we observe the reality of contingent beings. The things we observe are contingent, and "contingent" in this context means dependent on something else, requiring a cause for its existence. The next point is that if there ever was a time when there was absolutely nothing, then there would still be nothing because there would be no cause as required to bring into reality these contingent things we observe.

The other necessary premise, which is not well stated is known as the principle of plenitude, sometimes exemplified by the infinite monkeys typing. The principle of plenitude states that if anything is possible, then if given enough time (the proposal of infinite time) it will become a reality. So Aquinas denies an infinite past with an infinite regression of contingent things, by applying this principle of plenitude, and assuming that if everything is contingent, then there is the possibility that at some time in the past there would be nothing, and by the principle of plenitude, there would have to have been such a time. These are the premises required to imply that not all existence is contingent.

1. We observe contingent beings.
2. if there ever was a time with nothing there would always be nothing.
3. By the principle of plenitude, if all beings are contingent beings then there would have been a time with absolutely nothing.

All human society as we know it is artificial. And yet it's natural that an intelligent, imaginative species should elaborate on its social organization, and it's natural for such a species to evolve complex regulatory systems as its numbers grow. — Vera Mont

So I assume that you are saying that "artificial" is just a special type of "natural". Then I suggest to @ENOAH that the "fictional" is a subdivision of the artificial, which is a subdivision of the natural. And, it makes no sense to try and divide the artificial into natural and unnatural because it's all natural.

It's a matter of keeping the descriptive categories most accurately representative. When we use natural/artificial we are referring to types of things in the world, which we can class by that distinction. When we use fact/fiction we refer exclusively to a narrative, or propositions, about the world. A narrative or a proposition is a very specific type of artificial thing in the world. So that classification, fact/fiction, has a very narrow range of applicability, and "natural" has already been excluded as impossible, because the type of thing judged by that distinction can only be an artificial ting.

If you oppose natural with fictional you mix up the categories making understanding impossible. This is because you have no place now for "factual", as the non-natural, which is also non-fictional.

Also, "Fictional" might be too strong a word, but it is effective at contrasting these processes described differently by you and I, with what I am proposing to be the NonFiction, Nature. — ENOAH

I think a properly formed dichotomy would oppose "artificial" (instead of "fictional") with "natural". So you're mixing up categories here. This becomes a problem because then only natural things are non-fiction, and you have no real grounding for truth, since "fact", or "truth", is normally opposed with fiction, rather than "natural".

This allows you to create a narrative without any respect for truth. The narrative you have chosen to create states that our Narrative has strayed far from Reality (I assume this is truth). Since you have done a very good job of demonstrating the point you are making, (the idea that we can remove truth from our narrative, and use that narrative to exemplify principles, morals, values, and social norms, which are created for reasons other than following truth), I commend you on providing a very fine op.

From our perspective, there are things existing. From the perspective of us "now" those things must exist; there existence is necessary. Therefore, it is false that it is possible for the things that exist "now" to not exist (as they would if everything ceased to exist at the time of "now" or earlier). Since the things existing in nature now are merely possible beings, the necessity of their existence must derive from another, that is, from a necessary being. — NotAristotle

What we observe through empirical evidence, sensation, is activity, actual being. This proves that not all being is "possible being". So there is something absurd about the notion that all beings are possible beings. Understanding this requires understanding Aristotle's categories of potential and actual.

That a thing, time in this case, does not occupy space, does not imply that it is not related to space. So if time does not occupy space, as stated, this does not mean that time is irrelevant to space. Nor can we say that time is irrelevant to things which occupy space, massive things, which the concept of "matter" applies to. So the premises required to conclude that time is irrelevant to matter, are not there.

Where, I wonder, does Derrida do this? — Astrophel

Check out "Voice and Phenomena". We did a reading group on it here at TPF, a few years ago. It is a critique of some work by Husserl.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/512/reading-group-derridas-voice-and-phenomenon/p1

You'll find that by Ch. 4 he develops the concept of "repetition" which is an essential aspect of the nature of a "sign". It is a sort of recurrence of sameness. This is supported by the idea of "presence", as defined by present. The "present" grounds the presence of being, and the self in general as "I", it is an eternal sameness which transcends the individual.

Of course, this analysis goes way back to Augustine in his Confessions. I was trying to read paul riquer's Time and Narrative, but found out I had to read more Aristotle for this, and so I quit, but the point I will make is that a truly important concept to have in mind in trying to understand what happens when I see and recognize the cow is the concept of time. Brentano, Kierkegaard, Husserl and of course Heidegger are very enlightening. — Astrophel

What you refer to as the "3" of Heidegger's description of artist, art, and relation between these, can be found in Aquinas' description of the Holy Trinity. His description refers to father, son, and the relation between these two, represented in the Holy Trinity as Holy Spirit. I believe this specific trinity, the Holy Trinity, was first described by Augustine, but the derivation of trinities in general may be traced back to Plato's tripartite soul. In Augustine the Holy Trinity is described by the analogy of memory, reason (or understanding), and will.

An in depth understanding will reveal the temporal reference of Augustine's trinity, "memory" associated with past, "will" associated with future, and "reasoning or understanding" as what occurs at present. So the overarching trinity which all these different representations have in common, is the temporal trinity of past, future, and the present as that which relates the other two. Heidegger has a very unique way of dealing with this tripartite reality of time, and some modern phenomenologists, Derrida in particular, bring the temporal nature of being to the forefront. The representation of how we as humans experience being present in time becomes the most important principle toward understanding the other aspects of our being.

It makes sense that people who make their living off their ability to act effectively in the heat of the moment are used to being able to go with their intuitions successfully, and tend to do so even when critical thinking might serve them better. — wonderer1

The point though, is that there is often no time for critical thinking. Decisions made on the fly in a rapidly evolving situation, such as the middle of a hockey game, cannot be pondered. So anything (including items of superstition) which might possibly be helpful toward ensuring the right decisions are made, and that things go smoothly, are welcomed into this lifestyle.

https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/09/sport/nhl-superstition-ice-hockey-spt-intl/index.html

Superstition is related to the unpredictable, so it has a real place in our being in the moment, living the passing of time. The huge, massive aspects of temporal continuity, such as the sun rising the next day, are so highly predictable that superstition has no place in those thoughts. However, in the tiny moments, and tiny spaces of temporal passage, much appears to be left to chance. Here, superstition has a role to play.

Those who live on the edge of time, in a rapidly evolving environment, such as a high risk occupation, or a professional athlete in a fast sport, are usually the ones who find the most purpose for superstition. In these situations a large part of a person's professional environment is completely unpredictable, and many of the happenings appear to be at the hands of fate, or chance. Since we really do not know what actually tips the scale (breaks the symmetry) in these circumstances, superstition is as good as anything else. You might say that superstition provides us with an appealing approach to superposition.

Thanks for showing me that

Actually the concept of "matter" was constructed by Aristotle to account for the reality of temporal continuity. What persists unchanged, as time passes, despite changes to a thing's form, is the thing's matter. So matter provides the basis for a thing's extension in time.

hen the post modern madness hits the fan: if a statement is true, it mirrors a fact (as you say), but facts themselves are statements that are true — Astrophel

I think you're wasting your time with these people. They think that "a fact" is a statable state of affairs which is not necessarily stated. But you recognize how the proposition of an "unstated statement" is nonsensical, even self-contradicting. So I advise you to leave those people in their own world of nonsense, as there is no benefit for you to enter it.

Further, isn't it the case that the cows can be over there even if it is not the case that you, I or anyone else knows that they are over there, or has justification for claiming that they are over there. — Banno

Who would determine that the situation meets the criteria for being described with those words, if no one knows that the cows are over there? Are you arguing that the words automatically correspond with the scenario, without the requirement of having to be judged as corresponding? Isn't that hard core Platonism? Aren't you assuming that there is an independent idea signified by "the cows are over there", which the situation corresponds with in order for you to avoid the requirement of judgement?

If you are not assuming Platonism, how else do you conclude that such a statement could be true without a mind of some sort to determine the meaning of the words? Isn't it a requirement for "truth", that the words have a specific meaning which corresponds with the situation? If the requirement is simply words, and a situation, then any words could be true of any situation. So how could those specific words be true of that particular situation unless there is a meaning for the words? And if the meaning is not within a human mind who knows, or existing as an independent Platonic meaning, where is that meaning?

The point is duration t3 can have an effect on t1. — Mark Nyquist

How, unless the boxes overlap?

If you think of a time line with a duration of time (instead of an instant) moving with the arrow of time then the backward propagation only exists in the duration....moving backward. — Mark Nyquist

Ok, this makes more sense. That is known as two dimensional time, I call it the breadth of the present. There is no need to call it a backward flow though, only a requirement to understand that somethings move from future into past before other things. "Before" here is determined by the traditional timeline. Activity occurs at the present which divides future from past. Some aspects of reality would cross the divide, therefore be active, prior to others, and would have a special form of causal power because of this.

Try this,

Take a sheet of lined paper and write t1 to t10 down the left side.

Draw a box next to t1. It represents a duration of physical matter during the T1 duration

Draw a box next to t2 shifted to the right by say a third the duration of t1. Same size.

And so on down the page.

Think of the boxes as matter progressing through time in 3D. — Mark Nyquist

Do you men to place the boxes as overlapping?

I've learned that the concept of relativistic mass is deemed troublesome and dubious by some. Can you elaborate how it falsifies E=mc2
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2
? — ucarr

I'll give you something simple, but a highfalutin physics know it all type is likely to tell you how wrong I am.

I believe the formula applies to a body at rest, so it assumes a rest frame for the mass. But in relativity theory bodies are not at rest, they are moving relative to other bodies. So an adjustment needs to be made to account for the movement of the body with mass.

There is a solution to this in the form of back propagation of energy. — Mark Nyquist

What's back propagation?

If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then e=mc2
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2
is false? — ucarr

"e=mc2
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=
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2"
is false. This fact is demonstrated by the need for what is called "relativistic mass".

That would be tough, to set the rule as to what qualifies as a punishable offence. What it I told you your mother wears army boots? Or what if I told you your interpretation of Aristotle is pure shit? Would one or both of these be subject to the rule?

he unity, and hence the identity and the being, of a non-living thing is little more than the contiguity of its parts. If a rock, for example, is divided, we simply have two smaller rocks. In a living thing, on the other hand, the members of its body constitute an organic whole, such that each part both conditions and is conditioned by the other parts and the whole. A living thing is thus one being to a far greater extent than a non-living thing. — Eric D Perl Thinking Being - Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition

I don't think Perl portrays this very well, and he seems to oversimplify a very complex issue. The temporal continuity of material substance, which is what we tend to associate with the existence of an object with mass, is not well understood by human beings in general. The unity of a rock is far more complicated than simply an existence of smaller parts, with all the characteristics of the larger rock, consisting in a contiguous manner. That description could be called an ignorance.

Scientists have found multiple levels of unifying principles which dictate the possibilities of dividing a whole body with mass. These levels include molecular binding, chemical bonding, and the strong force of the atomic nucleus. Since the strong force is responsible for the existence of mass, in general, and it is not at all understood, statements like Perl's are not well founded.

Having said that, I do agree that the unity which constitutes a living being is quite different from the unity which constitutes an inanimate object, and this difference is mainly attributed by scientists to the organization of the parts. The chemical bonding of organic matter is extremely complex and unstable, and this allows for the capacity for all sorts of activities performed by the living being. However, since we do not understand the strong force which unites the mass of an atom's nucleus, and how this force relates to the forces of chemical bonding, we really have no understanding of the difference between the unity of a living thing and the unity of an inanimate thing.

It appears to me, that it is very possible, and likely, that the unity of the atomic nucleus which constitutes the existence of temporal mass, extends deeper than the unity which is associated with living beings. This would mean that mass in general is prior in time to life, and that would account for the reason why the activities of living beings is limited by mass, and free will is not unbounded. Accordingly, contrary to Perl's portrayal, the inanimate unity which constitutes the fundamental existence of mass, produces a deeper and more substantial "whole" than the "organic whole". And of course we observe this throughout the universe, whole's like the solar system, the galaxy, etc., which are far more substantial than the organic wholes found on earth.

Aristotle certainly put the active principle above the elements being acted upon. I am not aware of any passage that expresses a ratio of the sort Perl is putting forth. — Paine

In Aristotle form is prior to matter in everything. The "what-it-is", or "whatness" of a thing constitutes the thing's identity. The layering, or levels, referred to, mark the different types, from the most general to the most specific, right down to the particulars of the unique individual. So for instance, the layering of form in a particular individual such as the one identified as "Socrates" would include living being, animal, mammal, man, snub-nose, and all the various accidentals which make up this individual's unique identity.

What Aristotle argues in his Metaphysics is that the form of the thing (any thing, and every thing) must be prior in time to the material existence of the thing. This is because when a thing comes into being, it must be the thing which it is, and not something else, and that's known as the law of identity. And when it comes into existence, it necessarily has a form, which is an intelligible whatness. If the intelligible whatness, or form, did not predetermine the material existence of the thing, it would not necessarily be the thing which it is, producing a random unintelligible formlessness, or non-thing.

The "soul" provides a very good example of how the intelligible whatness, the form, precedes the material existence of the thing. A living body is a very special type of body with a very special type of organization. When that special type of body comes into being it must be organized in that special way. Therefore the form which determines this special type of organization must be prior to the material body, to ensure that when the material body comes into existence it has that special type of organization. Without the preceding form, "the soul", the special type of organization would not occur, and there would be no living body.

Might be interesting to be informed as to what you think scepticism actually is, and therefrom, where in transcendental philosophy it resides, as a flaw in it. — Mww

What I meant, is that skepticism (best represented by the Socratic and Platonic methods) is itself beneficial. It is good and useful to any philosopher. So a philosophy which excludes skepticism is flawed, for that reason.

I think I’ve mentioned the tension several times. It’s important to distinguish between (a) a priori concepts and forms of intuition, and (b) inner/outer experience. Although Kant is obviously stuck in a cognitivist and Cartesian paradigm, he is pushing against it in exactly the way I described. Flipping the priority of inner and outer experience is an important aspect of the CPR, expressed first (in A) in the fourth paralogism, and then (in B) in the “Refutation of idealism”. The latter especially is a paradigmatic case of Kant’s transcendental arguments. — Jamal

I believe the priority is flipped due to a switching from ontology to epistemology. When ontology (metaphysics) is the priority, being and existence, the temporal continuity of sameness in general, is the subject matter. When epistemology is the priority the subject matter turns to activity, change, what things are doing in the world. The necessary condition for an understanding of activity is the external, space to move in, while time is only incidental, as the speed of change in relation to other changes. But the necessary condition for being is time, temporal extension, and in this perspective space becomes incidental. Notice that Kant identified "time" as the internal pure intuition, and "space" as the external pure intuition.

The so-called flip of priority is a function of which of the two is assigned the overall priority, the epistemological approach to the external (space), or the ontological (metaphysical) approach to the internal (time). The "flip" is due to the switch between one prioritizing time, and the other prioritizing space. You'll notice that in relativistic spacetime mathematical representations, time becomes a sort of inversion of space. This is analogous with the distinction between looking inward, and looking outward, and turning around in general. When you turn around what was on your right becomes on your left, and we can assume a similar inversion between looking inward an looking outward.

Despite the fact that we see external objects as existing, and displaying a temporal continuity of sameness, we still cannot derive from observation, the principles required to understand this temporal continuity. And, we do not really need to provide these principles, because we can just take the temporal continuity for granted, as the laws of nature. Newton's first law stipulates the continuity we know as inertia. This, taking it for granted, creates an illusion of necessity, which is not a true logical necessity, as Hume argued.

So when we look inward we see the reality of possibility, through an understanding of freedom of choice, intention, etc., and this effectively annihilates the "necessity" derived from what is taken for granted, as the laws of nature, exposing it as less than a true necessity. This produces a completely different (and what I would call true) understanding of time. In any case the difference is significant. The outward epistemological approach takes temporal continuity as demonstrated to us through sensation, for granted, and this renders what lies beneath that necessity, the substance of it, as something we cannot talk about, it just is, as it is demonstrated to us. To question it would be to deny its necessity. The inward ontological (metaphysical) approach recognizes that to get beyond this wall which is created by the assumed epistemological necessity, we need to employ the principles of possibility which are derived form the internal self.

Kant, I believe, set up the conditions for the division, (the epistemological/phenomenological divide) by distinguishing the internal intuition from the external intuition. Wittgenstein fixated himself on the incompatibility between the two. So Wittgenstein is extremely difficult to understand because all he is doing is pointing to a multitude of little problems which are arising due to this incompatibility.

I returned to this post from a few days ago, because it seems to provide the substance of the thread.

I take the important and controversial question to be how Wittgenstein’s late philosophy can be transcendental given that it’s significantly anthropological and seemingly empirical, and given that he specifically cautions against the identification of, and the search for, necessity and universality (and by implication, the a priori). — Jamal

Do you agree that the a priori pure intuitions of space and time provide the basis for Kant's transcendental idealism? As the conditions required for the possibility of sense experience, these ideas (if they can even be called ideas) are prior to, and therefore transcend all such experience. This I believe is the essence of transcendental idealism.

The question which arises, is where do these transcendental intuitions come from, where are they seated. We cannot look at them as concepts or ideas learned through education, because then they would be posterior to the sense experience which constitutes learning. So they must be innate, perhaps a part of, or arising from the physiological nature of the human being. In any case, the transcendent here is the internal, what comes to the individual from an internal source, the a priori.

On the other hand, I believe Wittgenstein shows the opposing perspective. What transcends the individual, and is the source of all knowledge, is language and the individual's communion with others. Wittgenstein downplays the internal, as mystical, and not a true source of knowledge in any way. So knowledge is a product of the interactions of human beings, and this makes knowledge dependent on language as the means of interaction, such that language is transcendental in the sense of transcending knowledge.

This can be compared to the traditional realist/nominalist debate. Kant holds the realist perspective, and the pure a priori intuitions transcend internally, like eternal ideas, in the way of Plato's theory of recollection. Wittgenstein takes the nominalist approach, claiming that conceptions and knowledge are a feature of language. The problem Wittgenstein comes up against is that he cannot ever account for the capacity to learn, what precedes the learning process in the human being, as required for learning, because it lies outside his terms for "knowledge", as internal to the human being, and prior to knowledge. This give him all sorts of problems for dealing with skepticism, because the base for knowledge is not itself knowledge. "Certainty" is fundamentally an attitude. So he proposes some sort of bottom, a foundation, bedrock, or something like that, which provides the required attitude, and is supposed to ground certainty. But this cannot quell the skeptic.

Crucially too, the transcendental is anti-sceptical, and not just as a pleasant side-effect. This is seen at various points in the CPR (the Transcendental Deduction of the categories, the Refutation of Idealism, and the fourth Paralogism in the first edition). Generally what we get is the idea that it doesn't make sense to say that objects as we perceive and know them are such apart from those conditions (there is a sense in which Kant's transcendental idealism is almost a tautology: you cannot experience something except in the way you must experience it). Since I'm more familiar with OC than PI, I wouldn't mind pursuing this angle ("Here we see that the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application."). — Jamal

I think there is no real place for skepticism within the transcendental idealism, and I take this to be one of its flaws. If for example, the intuitions of space and time are the required conditions for sense experience, it makes no sense to doubt them. That would require doubting the entire sense experience, leaving one with nothing reliable. All we can do is doubt that idea, that these are the required conditions, but this is to doubt transcendental idealism, forcing us outside it. Again, it's similar to Platonic realism, we cannot doubt any Ideas if we accept them as eternal truths.

Similar to Wittgenstein (and Davidson's "triangulation"), Kant transcendentally flipped inner and outer experience to give primacy to the latter, i.e., to the experience of the "external world" as opposed to self-knowledge and self-consciousness. Descartes and his followers, both rationalist and empiricist, assumed that... — Jamal

I don't agree with this, because the a priori intuitions are necessarily "inner" as the conditions for the experience of the outer. The concept of a priori pure intuitions gives primacy to the inner, as the conditions required for the possibility of an experience of an outer.