Indeed it does, but a being's own form/actuality cannot be a prior cause because nothing is actual until it exists. What is prior is a being's matter, its efficient cause, and its telos or end. Thus, the efficient cause, working on specific matter for a specific end produces a specific form or actuality. — Dfpolis

The telos or end as the intent of the designer, is actual, and prior to the material existence of the thing. This is Wayfarer's principle, or blueprint. The blueprint, or design of the thing, as a form, is actual and prior to the individual material thing. Further, there must be continuity between the form as design, and the form in the individual thing, to avoid the interaction problem. These must be one and the same form, or else we have the so-called interaction problem.

The artist who is "working on specific matter for a specific end" with the means of efficient causation, must actually put the form into the matter. Otherwise there is a separation, a gap, between the form as design and the form within the individual object. This gap denies the possibility of the telos or end being causal. If there is a gap between the form as desired end, and the form as individual object (outcome), there is no causation between the two, and the telos or end is not causal.

So the gap is filled with "efficient cause". The efficient causes are the means. But still there appears to be a difference between the form as design, and the form within the individual, the material object as outcome. The difference is attributed to accidents, and the accidents are the influence of the matter which is chosen by the artist.

Now the question is whether the influence of matter, and the resulting accidents, renders the form of the individual as a distinct form, or is it just a change of form, allowing the form to maintain its identity as the same form, in the way that a changing object maintains its identity as the same object, by the law of identity. I believe that we must allow for the temporal continuity of "the same form", or else there is an interaction problem, a gap between the form as intent, and the form as outcome. But when we allow for this continuity which I am describing, we also admit to independent forms, as the form is then prior to its material existence, therefore independent.

To defend your position, you need to explain how a thing can be actual before it is. I think you are confusing two meanings of "form." An artisan has a "form" in mind before she produces her work, but that "form" is not the "form" (actuality) of the finished product, but her intention, i.e. an end (final cause). In the same way, the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, act on prior states produce final states. — Dfpolis

As I said above, if we do not allow that the form in the artist's mind, and the form of the artist's finished work, are one and the same form, there is a gap between the two which produces an interaction problem. So, in common understanding, we say that the form is brought from the artist's mind, and put into the medium, through the means of efficient causes. Therefore, the intermediary, efficient causation, solves any interaction problem. However, if we deny the continuity between the form in the artist's mind, and the form in the work of art, then we cannot say that the artist takes the form from one's mind and puts it into the medium, through the means of efficient causation. And then we have an implied interaction problem between the form in the mind, and the form in the work of art.

Every creature has a prior creative intention in the mind of God. But, that is a metaphysical, not a physical, explanation. Physically, the form of an acorn is the foundation for the form of the oak into which it may sprout, but, being the foundation for a form is not being the form. It is being a potential. — Dfpolis

The problem here is that physics does not deal with telos, ends, and intention, but metaphysics does. So if the reality of the situation is that telos and intention are causal, and you reject the explanation as metaphysical rather than physical, you are going in the wrong direction. Physics cannot give an explanation for this, but metaphysics can. Therefore you ought to consider the metaphysical explanation , and forget about your desire for a physical explanation.

This is confused. What is ontologically, not temporally, prior is God's creative intent. — Dfpolis

What I am saying is that the oak tree has creative intent when it produces the acorn. It must, because the purpose of the acorn is to produce another oak tree, and intent is defined as purpose. So there is no need to refer to "God's creative intent" at this point, we need only look at the oak tree's creative intent. However, there will be a problem of infinite regress, or a first living being, and at this point we might be inclined to turn to God.

Quite blustery, but demonstration of more accurate understanding of Special Relativity is what I was hoping to see. So like I said, if you can provide that, get back to me. — wonderer1

I demonstrated a very accurate understanding. But you requested math, which is not necessary for an accurate understanding of the principles involved. Therefore you demonstrated an inaccurate understanding, thinking that math was a requirement. And still you refuse to state your argument. Please state your argument.

No actuality can be prior to the existent of which it is the actuality. — Dfpolis

This is inconsistent with Aristotle's Metaphysics. A thing is necessarily the thing which it is and cannot not be the thing it is, by the law of identity. And "a thing" is not a random disorderly existence. So when a thing comes into existence it necessarily has a cause of being the thing it is, and not something else. This cause is the form of the thing, which pre-exists in time, the material existence of the thing. Therefore the form of a thing (its actuality, as what it actually will be) must be prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as cause of it being the very thing that it is, and not something else.

If it were a separate entity, we would have dualism. It is not. A "principle" is the source (arche) of a concept. Consider the actuality and potential of an acorn. Its actuality (eidos = form) is being a kind of nut. Its potential (hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") is to be an oak tree. These are not two substances joined in some way, but one thing considered in two ways. So, human souls are actual human beings, while human "matter" is our potential to be planting soil for daisies. — Dfpolis

I think you misrepresent "potential" here. The potential of an acorn is not "to be an oak tree", because "an oak tree" is a form. Potential is better represented as the capacity to be or not be. And since potential encompasses many possibilities, it cannot be restricted by one specific thing, such as your statement, "an oak tree". What restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn in this way, such that we might say it may either become or not become an oak tree, rather than a maple or something else, is the form of the acorn. So your statement "to be an oak tree" does not represent the matter of the acorn, it represents the form of the acorn, as that which restricts the matter to specific possibilities.

Furthermore, this form which is put into the acorn, which restricts its potential in that way, is prior to the material existence of the acorn, as Wayfairer indicated with, "a principle of organization, or blueprint". So it is very clear that the form of the acorn "a kind of nut", which restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn so that the possibilities for what it may become are limited, pre-exists the material existence of the acorn. This form is derived from the parent oak tree which produces the nut.

Therefore the form of the acorn pre-exists the material existence of the acorn, and acts (as an actuality) to direct the coming into being of the material acorn such that the potential (matter) of the acorn is limited in the particular way that it is. This pre-existence of the form of the acorn, as prior in time to the acorn, therefore separate from the acorn, is what we need to deal with as implying the requirement for dualism.

But you won't find out why I think as I do, until you study special relativity well enough to know what you are talking about. So get back to me if that happens. — wonderer1

If you think one has to do the math to understand special relativity, you clearly haven't read Einstein's book. This is a ridiculous conversation. But you're making it fun for me, so carry on please.

If the "principle" has a separate existence can't we call it a "thing"?

But to the point of the op, @Dfpolis, doesn't this separate existence, whether its called a principle or a thing, necessitate dualism? I mean we are saying that the soul is prior to, and therefore separate from the body, how we categorize it, as "substance", "principle", or "thing", doesn't seem very relevant to the point that this separation seems to necessitate a dualism. And how this separate "principle" or whatever we call it, the soul, manages to produce an organized body would be the interaction problem in a nutshell.

It's not called relativity for nothing. Yet it isn't hard to determine that a lot of thing are at rest with respect to my initertial reference frame and I can discuss the shape of many such things as they are in my inertial reference frame. If I, for some reason, need to calculate how they might look from a different inertial reference frame I could do so. It's not a big deal. — wonderer1

But the question is whether those things have a real or true shape, independent from a frame of reference. That you can provide a measurement, and a representation of the shape of many objects, from a specific frame of reference indicates nothing about whether they have a shape independent from a frame of reference.

Anyway, why would I bother providing an argument to someone who wants to argue about something he doesn't understand? I don't see the point in doing so. — wonderer1

Well, it seems like you took objection to something I said, not vise versa. So if you cannot provide an argument to support your objection, then please be still. But I really wish you would provide such an argument, so I could find out why you think as you do, concerning this matter.

I've learned that hylomorphic dualism offers a different perspective. The soul is not a separate "thing" or "substance" in the way Cartesian dualism conceives it. Instead, it is the form of the body—a principle of organization, a blueprint. — Wayfarer

If the soul, as the form of the body, is the blueprint, or principle of organization, and the living body comes into existence as an organized body, then the soul must be prior to the living body, as cause of it, and therefore a separate thing.

Have you ever done the math? — wonderer1

You haven't provided an argument. The fact is that depending on the frame of reference, measurement of the same thing will be different, and not any one of the measurements can be said to be the objectively real or true measurement That a frame of reference can be produced which represents the object as "at rest", and this frame is said to provide the object's "proper length" is irrelevant, because that designation is completely arbitrary. By the precepts of relativity theory no object is truly, or really at rest, so "proper length" makes no assumption about a true or real length of the object.

You are mistaking the appearance of shape from different reference frames with each other.

It is similar to saying a pencil isn't straight because when dropped into a glass of water the pencil appears bent. — wonderer1

No it is not "appearance" only. That is the whole point of relativity theory, it is what is really the case if e adhere to relativity theory. Just like the simultaneity of two events is actually different depending on frame of reference, and the passage of time is actually different (time dilation) depending on the frame of reference, the shape of the object is actually different (length contraction) depending on the frame of reference. When it is the case that from two distinct frames of reference, the shape of the object is different, we cannot say that one is the real, or true shape. That is the whole point of relativity theory in general.

Each of these two concepts serves to account for the temporal continuity of sameness of objects, in its own way, with its own history, but in reality each is just a different place holder for the unknown; each having its own connotations and extensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

To further understand this difference, it manifests as the difference between transcendent and immanent in the understanding of divinity, as well as the difference between local and non-local in quantum mechanics.

Simply put, the difference is in the way that we understand temporal continuity in relation to spatial existence. If temporal continuity is proper, and unique to each point in space, then each point has its own inherent maintenance as immanence, but if temporal continuity is universal, and the temporal continuity of all points everywhere, is related, this is transcendence.

What Berkeley actually denied was the existence of material substance that exists independently of being perceived. — Wayfarer

To be more precise, Berkeley described how the existence of matter is an unnecessary assumption. He provided very good arguments, and demonstrated how "matter" is just a concept employed by us to account for the inferred temporal continuity of bodies, objects. This supposed temporal continuity (which is inferred from observations) makes an object identifiable at different times as the same object, supporting Aristotle's law of identity. The inferred continuous existence of the same object which is derived from observations of sameness (similarity) at different times, is commonly justified as caused by, or the result of the "matter" which inheres within the object.

Notice that I used "inheres within the object", because this is what I explained is a place holder for the unknown. So "matter" is just a place holder for the unknown. The real cause of the temporal continuity of sameness, which people attribute to "the matter" of the object is unknown.

So Berkeley demonstrates that "matter" as a concept of something which exists independently of human minds is no more justified, nor even better than the concept of "the Mind of God". Each of these two concepts serves to account for the temporal continuity of sameness of objects, in its own way, with its own history, but in reality each is just a different place holder for the unknown; each having its own connotations and extensions. Analysis of the connotations, extensions and history of usage is how we find out that each involves a different perspective toward the unknown.

But it is basically the same argument, with the difference that instead of appealing to the stone's hardness, you're appealing to its shape. — Wayfarer

That the boulder truly does not have a shape is supported by Einsteinian relativity, as shape is dependent on the frame of reference. This is understood under the concept of length contraction which is related to time dilation.

Well, we fix flaws in concrete acts of understanding, but not foundational flaws in the faculty of understanding (the intellect). — Leontiskos

I believe that foundational flaws are flaws of the ends rather flaws of the means which are methodological flaws or flaws of technique, according to this difference which I described in my last post. Methodological flaws (flaws of the means) are epistemological, while flaws of the ends are metaphysical flaws. This is why pragmaticism is a form of epistemology and it provides no acceptable metaphysical approach. It can provide no real principles for judging ends and determining foundational flaws (flaws of the ends).

So I believe that we actually can address foundational flaws in the faculty of understanding itself (the intellect), through metaphysics. And, I believe that change in these foundational elements (ends) is a form of evolution which is evidenced by the history of metaphysics and theology. Evolution is very real and the intellectual limitations of one species are not the same as those of another, so we need to be able to account for the reality of real substantial changes to the faculty of understanding (the intellect).

Sure. My point was only that if one accepts the premise that the faculty of the intellect itself is inherently incapable of knowing reality as it is in itself, then no amount of self-reflection or epistemological work will change that fact. I think we are in agreement. — Leontiskos

As stated above, we are not in agreement here. One thing I tried to explain in the last post, is the point of |the ideal", as the highest possible perfection which is not ever actually obtainable. If we set an obtainable goal, then our efforts to better ourselves cease when that goal is reached. Therefore if we want to forever better ourselves, we need to set a goal of perfection, the ideal, unobtainable goal.

So when it is said "that the faculty of the intellect itself is inherently incapable of knowing reality as it is in itself", what is meant, is that there is an ideal, perfect knowledge of reality (God's knowledge for example), which we recognize that we will never achieve. However, this does not preclude the possibility of greatly improving our knowledge of reality. So it's not like we can never know anything about the independent reality, because clearly we make all sorts of statements, and pretend to know all sorts of things about the supposed independent reality, and many of these things are acceptable as true knowledge. However, such knowledge will always be fallible, and never of the sort of perfect certainty which some epistemologists who exclude fallibility from knowledge would request. Therefore it's only by excluding fallibility from knowledge, and forcing that requirement of perfect certainty, that "knowing" gets defined in such a way which produces the conclusion that we cannot "know" anything about the external reality.

Accordingly, we can accept the premise that "knowing reality", in this sort of perfect sense of "knowing" which excludes fallibility, this ideal knowledge, is impossible for the human intellect. But this need not stimy our attempts to produce such perfect knowledge through good metaphysics. To conclude then, I, as a human being, recognize that I will never obtain this ideal knowledge, but I do not exclude the possibility of another being reaching that level, so I will do what I can to help in that effort.

Your argument is well-made, but I actually disagree. I actually have a thread drafted on why epistemology is always posterior to metaphysics, but I don't know if it will ever see the light of day. — Leontiskos

I agree that epistemology is always posterior to metaphysics, so perhaps you have drawn the wrong conclusion from my argument. In your glass analogy, metaphysics would be the discipline by which we understand the glass, which is "being" in general, and of which perspective is a feature. This would lay the grounds for epistemology.

The extremely truncated argument is that it comes down to which of the two is more known: 1) That we know things (as they are), or 2) That there is a glassy perspective. Whichever is less-known must be funneled through that which is more-known, and the modern assumption is that (2) is more-known and that we must therefore begin with epistemology. I don't think that will work. Will I ever get around to addressing this more fully in its own thread? I don't know. :sweat: — Leontiskos

The problem though, which I tried to describe, is that we need principles by which we can make the judgement, 1) or 2), and these are metaphysical principles, derived from the philosophy of being. If we premise either 1) or 2), we proceed with an epistemology accordingly, but whatever is your argument for choosing one over the other is a metaphysical argument.

(Another argument is that if our understanding is 'flawed', then our understanding of our understanding will also be 'flawed'. We can't fix (or necessarily perceive) the flaw in our understanding by reflexively applying our understanding to our understanding. Any uncertainty deriving from the faculty of the intellect will color both internal and external objects.) — Leontiskos

You say that we cannot "fix" the flaw by understanding our understanding, but this is exactly what we do in practise, to improve ourselves, we repair flaws in our understanding. That understanding of understanding would be an analysis of our methods, procedures and techniques. The method is the means, the goal is the end. The analysis reveals the relation between means and ends.

Initially, the end shapes the means, such that the means are designed to produce the end. However, the means can then be characterized as becoming habits, and the propensity to follow habits produces a special relationship between the agent and the end, whereby the specific end which the means are designed for is "locked in" as the desired end. In habituation the relevance, importance, or even necessity of the end, is completely neglected because satisfaction is guaranteed by the means. In this way, (habituation), the means now determine the ends by crippling our capacity to freely choose our goals. We act in the habitual way, we are satisfied, therefore we do not question the ends and the forms of satisfaction which the habits provide for us.

Notice though, that I referred to a special type of goal, the ideal, as perfection. I said that it was the ideal, perfection as a goal, which cannot be obtained by the human intellect. So the goal then is not to "fix" the understanding, but to improve upon it, in relation to the ideal, which is perfection. This is a big difference, because "fix" implies to put the system in an unchanging state of best operation, while leaving the system open to improvement implies something completely different. So the ideal, the perfect condition, as a goal, takes a position higher than any possible real condition, allowing that the goals, or ends, do not become fixed by habituation, in the manner described above. This allows that the goals or ends which our methods of understanding conform to, can always be reassessed, in relation to an ideal which will always stand higher than the end which the means currently provide for, and the ends will not get "locked in" by a habit which was once good, but is now bad, due to changing circumstances.

Well for Aristotle and Aquinas the intellect is immaterial for precisely the reason you are outlining. But on the other hand, matter qua matter (or qua singular) is not intelligible on Aristotelianism, but only matter qua property (or qua universal). So Aristotle would not be surprised that something like the quantum realm begins to approach unintelligibility. — Leontiskos

I agree, "matter" is posited by Aristotle for the purpose of accounting for that feature of reality which we cannot grasp, the part of reality which appears as unintelligible. This is derived from Plato's Timaeus. The "form" of a thing, being the universal for Plato, what the thing is, must necessarily be prior to the existence of the thing as the determining factor of what type of thing the thing will be, when the thing comes into existence. But each corporeal thing, each particular, or individual (primary substance in Aristotle's terms), is unique and peculiar as represented by the law of identity. So the reality of those "accidents" which make the individual unique and peculiar, must be accounted for. The "accidents" are fundamentally unintelligible to us, or else they could be accounted for by our understanding of the "form" of the thing. So the accidents are what escape our grasp, our apprehension of the thing, and "matter" is assigned as that which is responsible for this unintelligibility.

I don't begrudge you your conclusion, because it is a reasonable inference. Yet recall that for Aquinas we will know God "perfectly" (as perfectly as we can) not only in the intermediate state, but also in the resurrected state. And in the resurrected state we will have a body of some kind. — Leontiskos

I disagree that Aquinas believed we would "have a body of some kind" in the resurrected state. But of course there would be ambiguity providing different interpretations on this matter because Aquinas often had to stretch his ontology to appear consistent with Church dogma. Paul had insisted on personal resurrection, which would imply a material body to account for individuality. Aquinas also held that each spiritual incorporeal being, each angel, had providence over a corporeal body, so "will have a body of some kind" could also be interpreted as an incorporeal being having providence over a body.

Let's consider the case of bona fide COVID vaccines vs quack cures such as hydroxychloroquine. Scientific studies show that the former are effective and the latter not. That is because of the inherent properties of the real vaccines, which the quack cures do not possess. — Wayfarer

I think you are stretching the meaning of "inherent properties" here. When you say that the vaccines are effective because of the inherent properties of these vaccines, that is only half the story. The other half is the inherent properties of the virus itself. Now we might say that the vaccines are effective because there is a relationship between the inherent properties of the vaccine, in relation to the inherent properties of the virus.

However, notice that this is just a sort of assumption we make, that if two things react, there is a relationship between their "inherent properties". But it doesn't require that we know anything about their so-called inherent properties, nor does it even require that we really know what "inherent property" refers to. In reality, "inherent property" just stands to signify what we do not know. The two react, and you as the narrator do not know why or how, so you simply employ that place holder, "inherent properties" to talk about what you do not know. The scientists would not use that place holder, they would talk about mRNA and proteins, immune system, etc., because they have more knowledge about this than us.

The scientific studies show that the vaccines are effective, and the quack cures are not. They also show a whole lot about the interaction between the vaccines and the virus. But notice that the human immune system is the medium between these two, the arena or theatre where this interaction plays out. And in reality the human immune system is the principal role player here. This means that my proposal above, that there is a special relation between the inherent properties of the vaccine and the inherent properties of the virus, is completely wrong, because it totally neglects the agency of the immune system. And so we have an open door for the placebo effect and such things. Therefore it appears like it is this procedure, of using terms like "inherent properties" to cover over what is unknown, and create an illusion of knowledge which is really detrimental and misleading.

So none of this open and shut. As the closing quote says in the essay ''Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.’ — Wayfarer

This is very good and well-written. But ultimately it comes down to a question of what is implied by "re-presentation" here. Notice the difference of intent implied by the difference between "representation" and "re-presentation". The former implies correspondence, the latter implies a presentation with intent. This marks the difference between holding truth as your guiding principle (ideal), and having pragmatics as your guide. Notice that pragmaticism removes the need for an ideal, perfection. If it serves the purpose at hand, it is good, and there is no need, or inspiration, to better it. But when we are looking for "truth", it becomes an ideal perfection, so the inspiration to improve is ever present, regardless of whether we think the absolute will ever be obtained.

It is objective to all intents and purposes (i.e. empirically) but also ultimately requires that there is a subject who judges (transcendentally ideal). — Wayfarer

It is not "objective" when the intent and purpose is to maintain consistency with the definition you provided, "inheres within the object". What you are saying is that the judgement, "it is cold", or "it is hot", is objective, so that the objectivity is a property of the judgement, not a property of the object. Therefore this use of "objectivity" is not consistent with your definition. The objectivity is something which inheres within the judgement, not within the object.

Suppose there were an argument about a piece of glass. One person says that anything perceived through the glass has "an inextricably glassy aspect." Another person disagrees, holding that this piece of glass is perfectly translucent. As far as I can tell, that's analogous to the argument over the intellect between Realists and Anti-Realists. If the former person is right, then nothing viewed through the glass can be seen as it is in itself. If the latter person is right, then things viewed through glass need not have a glassy aspect. — Leontiskos

The point to this analogy, better known as the tinted glass analogy, is that to settle this question it must be determined whether or not the glass adds a "glassy aspect" to the perception. If the glass is supposed to represent the human body, through which our perceptions of the world are made, then it is impossible to remove the glass to make a glass-free comparison. Therefore the only way to proceed is to produce a thorough understanding of the glass itself, to be able to determine whether or not it adds a "glassy aspect".

Because of this, the only way that we can achieve with certainty any understanding of the external world, is to first produce a thorough understanding of the perceiving body. That is to say that we cannot know with certainty, the nature of the supposed independent world without first knowing with certainty the nature of the perceiving body.

(The point is not that the power of the intellect is entirely unrelated to the body, but rather that it has an operation which is apart from the body.)

Note that modern philosophers would presumably just disagree with Aquinas that "by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things," but if his point is granted then I believe his conclusion follows, and scientists are liable to grant his point (especially to the degree that they are ignorant of modern philosophy). — Leontiskos

I come to a slightly different conclusion. It has become evident to me that the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things. That is where the problems of quantum physics have led us, there are corporeal things which we as human beings, will never be able to understand. The reason why the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things is that as Aristotle indicates, the human intellect is dependent on a corporeal thing, the human body, and this in conjunction with the premise given by Aquinas, that to know all corporeal things requires that the intellect be free from corporeal influence, produces the conclusion that the human intellect cannot know all corporeal things.

The point now, is that the human intellect, as an intellect, is deficient in the sense that it can never know all corporeal things. It is deficient because it is dependent on a corporeal body. Aquinas also argues this point when he discusses man's ability to obtain the knowledge of God. The same problem arises in that a man's intellect cannot properly know God while the man's soul is united to a body.

I don't say 'the mind has no access to what is inherent in the object'. Plainly if my shower is too hot, I won't get in it, if my meal is cold, I won't eat it. They are objective judgements. — Wayfarer

I can't see how you understand this as consistent with your definition of "objective" as "inherent in the object". Clearly any judgement similar to the ones mentioned, "hot" and "cold", are proper to the subject, and so these judgements are not "inherent in the object".

It seems like you are not distinguishing between the judgement itself, and what the judgement is about. Yes, the judgement is about an object, and it may be a judgement about what inheres within the object, but the judgement is not inherent in the object, and therefore cannot be "objective" by the definition you provided.

I believe that this is a very significant and important point to respect because it is the justification for, as the reason for, the idealist/phenomenologist assertion that even an "object" is a creation of the perceptual system of the living being. We sense the existence of "objects" surrounding us, as constitutive of our environment, but even this act of perception, by which things are perceived as objects, is a sort of judgement made by the sensing being, the subject. Therefore even the judgement of "object" which is an inherent part of the perceptual system, the very act of perceiving, which presents "objects" to the mind of the conscious subject, and which inclines us to take the existence of "objects" for granted, is itself a subjective judgement.

This is what Manuel points to:

Whatever is out there, strictly speaking, cannot be called "objects" - there no good neutral word for it that comes to mind, unfortunately. — Manuel

When we understand as fact, that apprehending the environment as consisting of distinct entities, unities, which we call "objects", is common to all human beings, and also most likely the case for many different types of animals, we need to respect that there must be a reason for this. So we might accept as reality, that there is something about the mind independent "stuff", which makes it appear to us, and influences us to accept as a fundamental ontological principle, that there is "objects" out there.

There is a selective response to the environment even at the simplest level... — unenlightened

I believe this is a very important point which needs much more respect than it is commonly given. When there is a multitude of possibilities present, what some call "potential", and something "selects" from that multitude of possibilities, or simple potential, then we need to account for the reality of this selection process. The type of words we currently employ to refer to such selections are consistent with the concept of free will, words like "choice", and "judgement".

So this is a good example of that boundary some refer to, as the area of that which we cannot speak of, or where words fail us. If we talk about simple organisms, like the single celled amoeba making judgements, we get ridiculed. This in clearly nonconventional, simple organism do not make "judgements", by conventional use of the term. But if this is not form of "judgement", then on what principles are we going to attempt to understand this "selective response"?

I take the term 'objective' at face value, that is, 'inherent in the object'. Seems to me that estimation of objectivity as the main criterion for truth parallels the emergence of science, which really is kind of obvious. Remember Carl Sagan's 'Cosmos is all there is'? By that he means, I think, the Cosmos qua object of science. So the overestimation of objectivity in questions of philosophy amounts to a bias of sorts (per Kierkegaard 'Concluding Non-scientific Postscript'.) At any rate, as far as today's popular wisdom is concerned, as the domain of the transcendent is generally discounted, objectivity is presumptively the only remaining criteria. I don't hold to relativism, I think objectivity is extremely important in many domains but that there are vital questions the answer to which may not necessarily be sought in solely objective terms. So anything to be considered real has to be 'out there somewhere', existing in time and space. (This shows up in debates of platonic realism.) The ways-of-thought that accomodate the transcendent realm have by and large been abandoned in secular philosophy. — Wayfarer

I cannot follow your use of "objective" here. You define it as "inherent in the object". But according to the article of the op, the human mind has no access to what is "inherent in the object". As per Kant, the mind only has access to how the object appears to it, through the medium of sensation and intuition. But then you go on to discuss the objectivity of science, as if "the objectivity of science" is a valid concept by that definition, which it is not. Science cannot provide for us "objectivity" by that definition, what is inherent within the object, due to the problem elucidated by Kant.

So you have demonstrated an inconsistent use of "objective" which needs to be sorted out. Either we adhere to your definition, and recognize that it is beyond the capacity of science to actually be "objective", and say that this is just an ideal which science strives for (an "objective" used as 'goal'), like a guiding light which will never actually be reached, or we must look to a different, a compromised definition of "objective".

The latter appear to be what most participants in this thread opt for. They would prefer to define "objective" as "consistent with convention". But this definition is extremely problematic. First, and principally, it removes the necessity of "the object" from "objectivity", by basing "objectivity" in a sort of inter-subjective agreement. This means that "objective" is defined by what is agreeable rather than by "inherent within the object". This effectively circumvents the necessity of correspondence with observations, "truth" in that sense, as an essential feature of objectivity, by replacing "within the object" with what is agreeable. That actually allows for other, chiefly pragmatic, principles to take priority over "truth" as the defining feature of "objective". And when pragmaticism takes hold of "objective", the definition is more closely aligned with "the goal" than with "inheres within the object".

We follow a convention and accept a taken-for-granted everyday world. But that world is not created by anyone since it doesn't actually exist. — Janus

"The world" as abstract theoretical construct exists, and it is mind created.

What do you mean by "put back the subjectivity"? — wonderer1

It was actually @unenlightened's phrase. It was meant to express what the op was about. The issue is that to get a true representation of reality we must include the subjective aspect, which is an essential part of any such representation. So in other words "objective reality" is a sort of falsity because it is an attempt to remove the subjective aspect, which cannot possibly be done. Therefore, in creating a representation of reality we need to "put back the subjectivity" which the misguided attempt to produce an objective reality has removed. This I believe is the point of the op, we cannot produce a true "objective reality" because subjectivity is an essential aspect of any representation of reality.

o, the everyday world is convention-created, I would say, rather than mind-created; there are collective conventions, but there does not seem to be any collective mind. — Janus

I don't think that this is very accurate. Conventions do not create anything, they are passive, inactive, and minds, which are active, may follow them like rules. It is minds which create rather than conventions.

I think this is what the thread is suggesting; that the objective world is an abstract theoretical construct, and to arrive at the real, one has 'to put' back the subjectivity that has been discounted. — unenlightened

I agree with this, and I think the issue is the question of how we can arrive at a "correct way" to put back the subjectivity. If we define "correct way" as the way that follows the conventions, and these conventions are the ones which are consistent with the abstract theoretical construct, then any application of the "correct way" will not put back the subjectivity, as desired, because it will just create a new aspect of the same old "objective world". To "put back the subjectivity" requires including the features of subjectivity which are outside the boundaries of convention.

The interesting aspect of this type of thread, is that there is a significant number of hard realists who flatly refuse to acknowledge this need to put back the subjectivity, as required to have an honest approach to reality. Since these people think that "the real" can be arrived at simply by following the conventions, they are in great agreement with each other, and you'll see them on these threads, slapping each other on the back, giving thumbs up and high fives etc.. On the other hand, those who apprehend and agree with this need, "to put back the subjectivity" as a requirement for an approach to "the real", can never agree with each other as to how this ought to be done. This is because the very thing that they are arguing for, the need to respect the concrete base of subjectivity, as very real, and a very essential and true part of reality, is also the very same thing which manifests as the differences between us, which make agreement between us into a very difficult matter.

So we are broken into two groups. The first group agrees with each other, and commits to an ontology which denies the significance or importance of perspectival difference. The "objective world" is the one we understand through certain conventions of abstract theoretical thought, and those who see "the world" in a different way are by definition "wrong", therefore we can exclude them, and their absurd perspectives, as irrelevant to our objective reality. This first group has explicit terms of agreement supported by the conventions of language, so there is great conformity and unity amongst them. The second group, which supports the real, essential, and significant nature of difference, is pushed further and further away from the first, by the first, so that the first can apply terms of mental illness and things like that, to the second, as required to support the illusion of the reality of their "objective world" construct.

Now the second group, by the very nature of what they are arguing for, lacks unity. Because of this lack of unity, they will always be "wrong", and even my act of classing them together as one group is wrong. They are better characterized as wayward individuals lacking what is required for categorization. And even if some of them find points of agreement, that small group will still be in the minority compared to the first group, and therefore wrong. This ought to serve as a demonstration of how the first group is always "correct", but correct by their own theoretical constructs of what is true and real, and not "correct" by the true reality of honest subjectivity.

Here's an evolutionary example which may or may not be helpful to some. Imagine a species appears on earth, and flourishes greatly, to the point where it overruns and inhabits every space of the entire plane. The species does not understand the toxicity of its own waste, such that its own annihilation from the effects of its own waste becomes imminent. At this point individuals come into existence amidst the toxicity of "the species", demonstrating various differences, perhaps mutations caused by the toxic elements of the waste. Each individual separates from "the species" in its own way, with an instinctual form of knowledge, knowing that the species is toxic and that there is a need to separate from it. Not one of these individuals is "normal" by the conventions of "the species", and not one of them has the characteristics required to be called a new species. Each one is a monstrosity or deformity relative to "the species" They are all within some intermediate condition not covered by the norms of our "objective world" so they are simply mutations. However, these differences are essential and necessary for the continuation of all the features of that life form, which have been progressively building for millions of years, producing the necessary conditions for its extreme flourishment, and this would all be completely lost if the species proceeded to annihilate itself prior to the individuals establishing something new.

The subjectivist camp is right that the world is always given perspectively, but they don't squeeze enough juice from the fact that it's the world, our world that is so given. Logic is ours not mine. We always intend the one and only 'landscape.' — plaque flag

This is very good evidence of the problem I discuss above. In reality, the assumption of "the world" is only supported by the truth of "our world". And "our world" implies an inter-subjectivity, of agreements and conventions. So long as agreement holds, there is such a thing as "the world". But as more and more people see faults and defects in "our world", and those who cling to "our world" refuse to address these faults because they automatically reject those people as simply "wrong", insignificant and irrelevant, the foundation of "our world" gets shakier and shakier as the concrete which supports it, is that very agreement which is not being properly maintained.

One can do something close to that. It's called a map. From the map, if it is a contour map, one can construct elevations along a sightline and thus reconstruct the perspective at any point in any direction.

I therefore conclude that perspective is not personal (as Banno points out if we swap places, we swap perspectives), but a feature of topography. — unenlightened

The problem though is that not all aspects of a human perspective can be reconstructed in the way you describe. And a human perspective, as @wonderer1 pointed out, is very complex. So the fact that one, or even a number of aspects of a perspective can be reconstructed, does not produce the conclusion that a human perspective can be reconstructed. That's a composition fallacy.

Quite simply, swapping places does not imply swapping perspectives, because the unique particularities of the being brings a lot to the perspective. If swapping perspectives was just a matter of swapping places, you could take a dog's perspective, or a cat's perspective, by taking that creature's place. But this is all wrong. And that is why "walking in someone else's shoes" is a matter of understanding the other person, not a matter of swapping physical positions.

Well, not really. Physics, with one of its principal subjects being the relations of one thing to another, motions, is actually designed for understanding complexity. So all you are saying is that physics is not sufficient for the task which it is designed for, understanding complexity, because there is a complexity which is too immense for its capacity.

Saying that there is a physical complexity which physics cannot understand, when physics was designed to understand physical complexities, is like saying that despite the fact that the natural numbers are designed to be able to count anything, by being designated as infinite, there is a number which is greater than the capacity of the natural numbers to count. It's simply defeatist.

Instead of addressing the issue, which is the reason why, and proceed toward a real solution, it is to accept defeat.

It's trying to talk about stuff about which we cannot talk... — Banno

This assumption that there are things which we cannot talk about is unequivocally defeatist. That shows a very similar attitude to the judgement that there are aspects of reality which are fundamentally unintelligible. Succinctly, it is unphilosophical, and when it's allowed to fester it becomes anti-philosophical.

If we instead said that physics talks about matter and energy and stuff like that, we wouldn't be surprised to find that physics tells us little about jealousy and democracy and stuff like that. A different area of study, with different concerns. Folk who claim love is nothing but oxytocin don't have much of a grasp of love. — Banno

Those with the philosophical mindset, the wonder and desire to know, will inquire as to why it is the case that physics tells us little if anything at all, about things like jealousy and love.

It's one thing to recognize the reality of fundamental differences in the various aspects of reality, and the need to employ completely distinct disciplinary methods to acquire an understanding of these very different aspects, but some of us want to know why such differences are very real.

I'm attempting a philosophical critique of why it doesn't. — Wayfarer

Banno appears to have the attitude that this is something which cannot be talked about, so shut up because you're proving me wrong by talking about it.

I forget, please remind me. The distance from my bureau to my desk is four feet. What is between them? — tim wood

Air. How could you forget, you just asked about the possibility of removing the air?

And it is possible we simply understand two - at least two - different things in our respective usages of "space." Perhaps you could offer your definition or if you claim there's no such thing, then so state. — tim wood

It appears you are having difficulty remembering simple things tim. You already asked me for a definition of "space".

So, from my OED, the first definition of "space" reads like this: "a continuous unlimited area or expanse which may or may not contain objects etc." — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I went on to say that this supposed "continuous unlimited area or expanse" is just an ideal, there is no such thing independent of the human minds which employ this ideal in there activities..

What I've been telling you, is that this does not refer to anything real, independent, in the world. It is an ideal which facilitates all sorts of human activities of conceptualizing, measuring, etc.. Take your example of movement now. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mine is too simple: it is that which remains when every thing is removed: the space, e.g., between my bureau and my desk. And when things are present, what they occupy. — tim wood

This provides another example of why I say "space" is just an ideal which does not refer to anything real. It is impossible to remove everything from any area. We are always left with something in that area, gravity, whatever is represented by various fields, etc.. It seems like all normal usage of "space" renders it as something ideal which cannot actually be obtained in the real physical world.

It's a fact that the term 'idealism' is itself a product of the modern period - first came into use with Leibniz, I think. Plato would not have known the word. We can retrospectively assess Platonism as idealist but it needs careful interpretation. — Wayfarer

I've given this statement further consideration. The idealism presented by Plato (though it was not explicitly called "idealism") was the ontology held by the Pythagoreans. They believed that the cosmos was made up of ideals, as represented by mathematics and geometry. The Pythagoreans put forward the idea of eternal circular motions, an ideal, to represent the motions of the heavenly bodies, each being itself a sort of perfect unity, One. Further, it was assumed that each perfect circle was related to each other through a system of ratios, like musical notes are related through principles of division.

In interpreting Plato, I believe it is very important to understand that Plato was actually very skeptical and critical of the ontology of Pythagorean idealism, but these ideas were highly respected in the philosophical (scientific?) community, so Plato had to tread carefully. The issue is the relationship between the perfect and eternal Ideals (circular motions), which as observable (orbits of the heavenly bodies), must have a real connection with the mundane. (In modern terms this is the interaction problem). This relationship was understood within the precepts of idealism, as the theory of participation, demonstrated in principle in The Symposium. By the time Plato wrote dialogues like The Parmenides, The Sophist, and The Timaeus, he had greatly developed the logical problems with the theory of participation.

What Plato exposed is the need to assume an intermediary, a medium between the Ideas which are conceived as eternal, perfect ideals, and the real existence of particular things. The medium was called "matter", and proposed in The Timaeus as a sort of receptacle which would receive the ideal form. The particular thing could only participate in the Ideal Form (as per the theory of participation) through the intermediary "matter"; and the matter of the particular thing would be the reason for individual differences and deficiencies. "Participation" therefore was compromised as matter would necessarily come between.

The introduction of "matter", and its essential nature, as logically necessary to account for the interaction problem, greatly enhanced Aristotle's capacity to attack Pythagorean Idealism. He showed for example, in On the Heavens, how a supposedly "eternal circular motion" must consist of a material body which is moving, and therefore could not truly be "eternal". This completely collapsed Pythagorean idealism because it became clear that the cosmos was not composed of perfect, eternal Ideals, but was actually composed of material objects engaged in motions which were somewhat other than they were being represented through the perfect ideals of mathematics and geometry.

I believe we ought to recognize two very distinct sorts of relations between the ideals of mathematics and the reality of material objects. This distinction is based in a distinction of two sorts of material objects, natural and artificial. In the case of artificial material objects, we can produce such objects which very closely resemble the ideals of the mathematics which produces them. In the case of natural objects however, we use the same mathematical ideals to represent them, but there is great discrepancy, or difference between the ideal representation, and what actually exists naturally. The problem here is that since we can create artificial things, in a lab or in a factory, which very closely resemble the mathematical ideals which produce them, we tend to conclude that the mathematical ideals which are being employed are very accurate representations of what exists in nature. This conclusion of course, is the product of disrespect for the difference between artificial things and natural things. Recognition of this difference I believe is very important to understanding the activities of high energy physics and the production of so-called "elementary particles" in laboratories.

No, this is a misrepresentation of metaphysics such as Descartes's meditation. It's not the senses that mislead you, it's the thought that ideas come out of nothing. No one is deceiving us. The world out there does not deceive. — L'éléphant

You use "the world out there does not deceive" to justify "it's not the senses that mislead you". But you have provided no premise to connect those two.

Do you agree with the following? The mind creates an idea of "the world out there". And it uses information received from the senses. The various different senses often provide the mind with inconsistent and even conflicting information. Therefore we can conclude that the senses can, and do, mislead the mind in its creation of an idea of "the world out there".

We have to acknowledge that MU is narrowly correct.. — tim wood

What does this mean, "narrowly correct"?

But he would deny space per se. If what separates my desk and bed is four feet of air, and there is no space, then removing the air is removing the medium in/of which the measurement is made, and thus my bed and desk then touching, Yes? — tim wood

How would you remove the air between them, if not by either pushing them together, or displacing it with something else? Anyway, I don't see how this is relevant, because as I explained already, there is necessarily a medium even between air molecules. So even if you could remove all the air molecules this would still leave a medium.

Hate to butt in but it wasn't logic that demonstrated it, so much as the empirical science of Kepler and Galileo et al. — Wayfarer

Of course there is empirical evidence involved, but it is the application of logic to the discrepancies found in the empirical evidence, which produces the new theories. Empirical evidence shows the sun and all the planets appearing to orbit the earth. However, there were discrepancies in the observations like retrograde motions, which for the longest time could not be figured out.

Even mapping the planets as perfect circular orbits around the sun,(the idea passed on through Aristotle) did not render the correct results as Copernicus showed. That was the stumbling point of the ancient Greek scientists, they assumed the orbits to be eternal therefore they must be perfect circles. It was a simplistic principle which enabled much science, (very similar to today's "symmetries"), but a principle which is fundamentally wrong, because such "ideals" are not consistent with reality.

Aristotle pointed to the problem with this idea of eternal circular orbits. Copernicus laid out the model, perfect circular orbits, and the discrepancies between it and observations were clearly exposed. But further application of logic produced Kepler's elliptical orbits.

With our sense-perception, we can't help but view the world the way we do. Only the silly observers would not use the mind, the common sense, and logic to think about the world. How does one perceive without logic? — L'éléphant

The problem is that the senses often give us confusing and misleading information, i.e. they deceive us. For example, it looks to me, like there is nothing between me and the far wall of the room, but I know there is air in between. Logic has figured out that air is a substance even though it is unseen.

We do not see air, but we can feel the wind, and see its effects. So sight in this instance gives us confusing and misleading information. The mind acts to synthesize the information received from the various senses, and in doing this it must resolve such issues of misleading and confusing information.

So if you block out and disable all your senses, then what knowledge of the world would you get? — Corvus

I was not the one proposing the separation between mind produced world and sense produced world. To me, the world created by the mind, and the world created by sense perception are one and the same world. But we need to be aware of the cases where the senses mislead us. And I think your proposal to separate these two is not warranted. So the problem you present here with your question, is just an indication that your proposal is unacceptable.

There are imagined world, perceived world and the world itself. If you are an idealist, you would be believing the perceived world as the real world? If you say, the world is created by your mind, I feel your world is likely to be very much in illusion. A perceived world sounds more accurate. — Corvus

I think you have this backward. What the ancients, like Plato, demonstrated is that the senses deceive, and we ought to trust the mind with logic, over the senses, as capable of producing a more reliable and accurate "world". The evidence of this reality is that the senses show us the sun rising and setting, when logic has demonstrated that in reality the earth is spinning. And modern science has demonstrated that substance in general is not at all like it appears to us through sensation.

So if you propose a separation between the perceived world (world created by sensation), and a mind created world, the perceived world is demonstrably less accurate.

Your position is, then, that air, water, jello, whatever, as media, simply exist, but not anywhere because there is not any where for them to be? — tim wood

Location is relative, so where each thing exists is relative to other things. "Space" is a complex concept which human beings use to describe and measure these relations, it is not where these things exist, unless the premise is that "things" are purely conceptual.

But you mentioned measurement, as the representation of what was measured. If my desk is four feet from my bookcase, that is four feet of what? Air? And the air being withdrawn, which is possible, or replaced with water, which is possible, does that alter the distance between desk and case? — tim wood

I don't see how replacing four feet of air with four feet of water would alter the distance, unless it affected the measuring technique. The question of withdrawing the air to create a vacuum is a more complex issue. And this is the same question as the issue of all the supposed "void space" which is inside a solid substance: it's supposedly inside molecules, and inside atoms, between the parts of these things. But this is not really "void space", as there is things like electromagnetism and gravity there. So this reality serves to help demonstrate the need for an "aether" which was discussed earlier in this thread, as the medium within which these things are active.

Isn't the created world in your mind more prone to be illusive than the perceived world? — Corvus

I think you're missing the point. There is no such thing as the perceived world. A world, or the world, is something created by the mind. As such it doesn't make any sense to talk about "the perceived world". To assume that what is out there as the object of perception is even remotely similar to the world which is what is created within the mind, is to make a big mistake. So when you start off by calling it "the perceived world" you are already on the road of misunderstanding.

And this same wind blows through his other arguments. There is no space, but there are all sorts of media through which things move. So if there is not space, what is the account for media - I'd say "presence of" but even that can't be, absent space. And so it goes. — tim wood

I don't understand. The medium through which a body moves is what it is, whether it be air. water, aether, or whatever. Why do you require "space" to account for the media? It seems to me, like you're just setting the conditions for infinite regress. The moving body evidently exists in something, the medium. But then you insist that the medium must exist in something, "space". If we follow your logic, we'll see that space must exist in something further, and on and on, ad infinitum. You can nip it in the bud by apprehending that space is not required to account for the media.

If space and time cannot be measured then why do they exist? Or are you saying they don't really exist? — Richard Townsend

Space and time exist as concepts produced for the purpose of facilitating measurement, and representation of what is measured, just like a coordinate system, which I mentioned above.

We can somewhat account for such influences, and to a relatively high degree of accuracy in specific cases. Without our ability to choreograph ballets of bits, on a timescale much smaller than we can consciously perceive, we wouldn't be communicating on TPF. — wonderer1

Oh yes I agree, we can "account" for some such influences, that's how we know they are somewhat real. But look at the way in which that is currently done, through statistics and probabilities, not through understanding. So our representation of reality does not show this level of causation at all, only the probable effects of it, derived through statistical analysis. This is very similar to the way that classical theologians understood God. We know that God exists through an analysis of His effects on the "reality" which we know, as created through our sense organs and minds. But all we know is His effects, and we do not know God Himself as the cause of these effects.

One of the thought-experiments I sometimes consider is imagine having the perspective of a mountain (were a mountain to have senses). As the lifespan of a mountain is hundreds of millions of years, you wouldn't even notice humans and animals, as their appearances and dissappearances would be so ephemeral so as to be beneath your threshold of awareness. Rivers, you'd notice, because they'd stay around long enough to actually carve into you. But people and animals would be ephemera. At the other end of the scale, from the perspective of micro-organisms, humans and animals would be like solar systems or entire worlds. — Wayfarer

That's a good example. I like to make a comparison between an atom with its orbiting electrons, and the solar system with its orbiting planets. Our temporal experience of the present is such that the electrons appear to orbit the nucleus so fast, that their locations just appear as a cloud of probabilities. In other words we do not have the required "present" to properly locate them. However, we are capable of locating the planets relative to the sun, using empirical data, because the present we experience allows us to do this.

But even to correctly locate the sun and planets required that we dismiss much empirical data (the appearance of these bodies orbiting the earth) as misleading and deceptive. This allowed that the application of logic could produce a more true model. From this we derived a basic understanding of "gravity", as an invisible force of causation which acts over a huge expanse of space.

Now, if our temporal experience of the present was an extremely long period of time, millions or billions of years, the planets would orbit the sun so fast from this perspective, just like the electrons orbiting the nucleus of the atom, so that we could not properly locate the planets, and we'd have to employ probabilities as to where they might be at a given "moment" (a moment from that perspective would consist of numerous years).

What I think we can take away from this, is that it makes no sense at all to think about reality without a perspective, the supposed independent reality. The true nature of time makes it impossible that "reality" as we conceive of it could be independent from a perspective. If, in a thought experiment, we attempt to remove the temporal perspective of the present, then the entire temporal duration of the reality which we are trying to conceptualize must exist 'at the same time'. We'd have no principle whereby we could speak of the state of things at this time, or the state of things at that time, because this or that time is completely perspectival. And since things are actively moving and changing, reality becomes completely unintelligible if we try to talk about the state of things all the time.

Could we postulate that as space and time are things we can measure, therefore, they exist? — Richard Townsend

Space is not something which we measure. We measure attributes like size, volume, and various relations (distance for example) between things. And by the conventions of modern physics we do not measure time either. Time is the measurement, and it is a product of the act of relating movements, or actions, one to another. When Newtonian "absolute time" was replaced with Einsteinian "relative time", time was no longer conceptualized as something measured, and then became only the measurement. The duration of time is completely dependent on the frame of reference, which is artificial.

But that is my point. By this means I am making clear the sense in which perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists — even if what we’re discussing is understood to exist in the absence of an observer, be that an alpine meadow, or the Universe prior to the evolution of h. sapiens. The mind brings an order to any such imaginary scene, even while you attempt to describe it or picture it as it appears to exist independently of the observer. — Wayfarer

What I find to be the crucial aspect of understanding the essential nature of "perspective", is to consider the temporal perspective of the human experience of being at the present, now. Suggestions as to how long "now" is from the human perspective, range from a couple hundred milliseconds to a couple of seconds, depending on the purpose of the estimate. In any case, if this perspective was radically different, like a few picoseconds on one extreme, or a few billion years to the other extreme, then the way that we perceive the universe would be completely different.

So the issue is not simply a matter of how mental processes shape the "reality" which we know, but how the very basic living processes of the living being shape this "reality" . The living processes are organized so as to perceive the universe from what is probably best described as a "mid-way" temporal perspective. We do not perceive extremely fast occurrences, nor do we perceive extremely slow processes, we rely on logic to figure these out. The reliability of our models of the very fast aspects of reality, and the very slow aspects of reality, are dependent on the soundness of our logic.

The "reality" which we know and respect is produced from empirical observation, sense information, and this is the reality of the mid-way temporal perspective. The senses provide us with the reality of the mid-way temporal perspective. But even things within this mid-way reality are affected by the aspects of reality which are outside of it, in the extremes, so these influences are invisible to us and therefore do not enter into our representation of reality. This makes our reality, the one produced from our mid-way temporal perspective, not very accurate as a true representation, because we cannot account for these influences.

You are allowing yourself to be fooled by your invented grammar. Mathematics, and the logic it is based on, rests on a peculiar way humans decided at a certain point in their history ( actually, as a gradual process of development) to formulate the idea of the persistingly present, self-identical object. Doing so led to subsequent assumptions such as the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, geometrical forms such as lines and magnitudes, and propositional statements binding or separating a subject and predicate. Mathematical structures are only ‘embedded’ in the world to the extent that we force the world into such odd forms. But such processes of objectivation are derived modes of thinking which hide within themselves what gives them their sense and intelligibly. Put differently, a persisting object only persists for us in its meaning by continuing to be the same differently. — Joshs

The problem though is that mathematicians do not adhere to the law of identity, they actual violate it. By affirming that whatever is referred to by the symbols on the right side of the "=" symbol is "the same" as whatever is referred to by the symbols on the left side, they use "same" in a way which violates the law of identity.

Dawkins often states that a 'creator' must be 'more complex' than what it creates... — Wayfarer

Human creations such as AI are rapidly moving toward disproving this principle. Once they get the quantum computers figured out, watch out!

2) Not fitting in isn’t comfortable, and often brings bad feelings. — Skalidris

You seem to be missing out on the feelings of the trend-setter. The trend-setter intentionally does not fit in, is very comfortable with this position, and does not have bad feelings about it.

Now imagine that this person would present their ideas to philosophers: it's quite certain they would reject it, since this new method is incompatible and could therefore discredit their lifetime work. They could present it to the other disciplines related to the new method, sciences for example. — Skalidris

Contrary to what you say here, the trend-setter is highly respected for one's differences. We might not know exactly why the trend-setter is highly respected, and therefore is capable of setting the trend, but it may have to do with the confidence which one displays in one's unique choices. But of course the trend-setter would have to have the capacity of making choices which actually have some merit to be respectable.

There's air and water, possibly jello, all kinds of other media. And in as much as there is no such thing as space, in which these are, they must each itself be uniquely primordial. And how does that work? Whence cometh; where situated? And as to what is in physics, I advert back to the cow in the book, which isn't. — tim wood

I don't get it. Why do you think there must be something "primordial"? There's all these different substances, water, air, jello, etc., how does "primordial" enter the scene?

And movement isn't necessarily through; but it is "with respect to" or relative to. — tim wood

Sure, I agree with that, but you are the one who implied that movement was through space when you said: "Seems pretty real to me when I have to go anywhere.". So I was simply pointing out that if movement is through something, it isn't through space. Or what were you trying to say when you said that?

We do not. Sunrise is a well-understood phenomenon. And the location of sunrise equally well-understood, and can for given parameters be marked with a stone. Which, come to think of it, has been a world-wide practice since pre-history. — tim wood

I don't think the location of sunrise is well understood at all. It is completely subjective, dependent on perspective, and "perspective" is not very well understood.

So I really don't understand how you could mark the location of sunrise with a stone. Are you saying that if you put a stone on the ground, and I went and stood there, I would experience the sun rising through me? That's rhetorical, because I know you said "for given parameters". What do you think is added by giving parameters?

But maybe relsolve it this way. Let's ask the scientists on TPF. Space, time, real? Existing? Or unreal, not existing? — tim wood

Oh great idea, go ahead, start a thread, I'll read it.