I wonder if the dialects of Norway are more diverse than the dialects of the average country. Norway is a large country, and with a geography that tends to isolate communities. Therefore, I think there's a greater diversity of dialects in Norway than in most countries. In any case, the degree of dialectical diversity is why a programme like Nynorsk is doomed from the get-go. — Ø implies everything

Judging by your reaction, I think I see part of the reason for the degree of dialectical diversity in Norway. When individual people are fiercely independent in their attitude, as you seem to be, then this will be reflected in their language. imagine if every individual insisted "I will only use my language" and each time two people met there was a lot of resistance toward compromise. This would produce extremely localized dialects. So the degree of dialectical diversity is not only dependent on geographical features, but also on the disposition of the people. A person with a different kind of attitude might accept Nynorsk as a welcomed change, inclined to give up the old with a view toward improvement..

Is there's a boil-down source to understand the concept? Im not seeing any necessity beyond trying to support the idea that time doesn't require change, which im not on board with quite yet. Would love to see something about that concept of whcih i have no knowledge — AmadeusD

The issue, as I described, is that time without physical change is logically possible, and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. How could there be?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/869814
Further, we find that if we do not posit a principle, "an Ideal" which is outside of, and capable of encompassing all physical change, then physical change will be inherently unintelligible. The primary intuition is to posit space as the Ideal outside of physical change, and this produces the idea of physical objects existing in a static 'absolute' space. However, physical evidence (wave-function, space-time activity, spatial expansion etc.) has shown that this idea is incorrect, because it cannot properly account for the reality of moving objects. Therefore, to fully understand the reality of physical change we need to turn to another principle which could be outside of it, and this logically is time.

So Trump is fascist and anyone who thinks that's nonsense is a Trump supporter and trying to gaslight you? — Tzeentch

Why jump to conclusion without reading the post? Didn't schopy actually say:

I would quibble about Trump as actually fascist though. Fascists generally have an ideology. His is just narcissistic self-serving agenda for himself, co-opting the right for this agenda. — schopenhauer1

I think what schopenhaur1 implies, rather than that Trump himself is fascist, is that many Trump supporters are fascist, and they see his actions as an opening of the door, inviting them in. In reality he's just using them for his own personal gain, what schop describes as narcissistic. And, it appears like the number of fascists is sufficient to make opening the door to fascism worthwhile for him.

I think you misunderstood, my opinion is that the notion of subject isn't tied to the notion of consciousness. — Skalidris

I think that this is a false proposition. The subject has operative control over the entire space which constitutes the body, and the consciousness assumes responsibility for the actions of that body. If one consciousness assumed many different bodies as a single unity, it would have to assume responsibility for the activities within the entire space between these bodies, as if this was all part of one body.

What is important here is the unity of the body which is the subject, and the fact that the consciousness can only exercise control over, and responsibility for, the activities within the space occupied by the body because of the strength of this unity. The "balls of energy" thought experiment of the op fails fundamentally, from the outset, because it suffers from the relativity of simultaneity which makes distinct subjects into distinct frames of reference, thereby lacking the unity required for consciousness to pervade. In other words, anytime a "ball of energy", supposedly a consciousness, passed from one subject to another, it would find itself completely disoriented, being in a completely different frame of reference, sort of like if you went to sleep in Tokyo and woke up in London, except much more extreme. The discontinuity would be much more severe because there would be nothing apparent to the senses to connect the two, and no one able to provide the story. Even the intellect itself would be completely lost, having applied no transformation formula to change from one frame of reference to another to recognize the new frame of reference. And if such a formula was applied, then this would indicate that the one individual consciousness is changing location, not encompassing the whole space.

Furthermore, all the space in between the distinct bodily subjects would still be apprehended as external to the subjects, being perceive through the senses. However, the consciousness, as one consciousness for many subjects, would have to apprehend this space as internal space. This would produce all sorts of irreconcilable confusion for the consciousness because it would not be able to distinguish forces of change coming from the inside, from forces coming from the outside, leaving it incapable of intentional activity.

If time consists in either the changes described, or the relation between them, I don't see how that couldn't be happening prior to humans conceiving time in a particular order, to unify perceptions. Though, maybe i'm missing a trick but it seems to be that your suggestion presupposes an 'actual' time, independent of objects passing, rather than time being a description, or set of relations between objects. — AmadeusD

I was replying to the following statement you made: "I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway,". So if time only exists in the mind, how could you think that it would be happening prior to humans conceiving it?

i conceive that the universe, as a whole, does not undergo 'time'.
...
So, prior to sentient minds, there would be the continually changing material of the universe, — AmadeusD

How can there be consistency between these two statements? If the universe does not undergo time, how can anything change?

It is a Kantian conception of time, and i do not believe it results in any of these logical issues. Do absolutely feel free to set me right, if that Kantian thought has been dealt with over the centuries. It almost certainly has, and I am, as I try to make clear, very naive :) — AmadeusD

You don't see how the premise "time only exists in the mind" leads to the conclusion that time could not have been passing before there was minds? I don't see how I need to say more.

"Time" as described by Kant is the abstract notion, not the thing itself. I discussed the difference in this reply to Philosophim a couple days ago:

I like Aristotle's way of describing this. In one way, "time" refers to a tool which we use for making measurements. This is the concept of "time", the abstraction. It is derived from our observations of change, comparing changes to each other, as explained above, to establish a rate of change. In this way the abstraction "time" is the concept by which we measure the rate of change. On the other hand, "time" refers to something measured, and this is what you call time "itself". So for example, when we use a clock, and say what time it is, or use dates like January 8 to refer to today, and say yesterday was January 7, and tomorrow is January 9, etc., we use numbers in a way which is meant to measure the passing of time itself, as far as we are able to, with our limited understanding of what the passing of time really is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Currently, I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway, so i was just probing for curiosity/philosophy sake. — AmadeusD

You ought to see that if the passage of time was something that only exists in the mind, and that since this is what defines "the present", then there would be no "present" independent of minds, and this premise would create all sorts of logical problems for how we understand the reality of the universe. First, the whole temporal extension of the universe, as we know it, would exist all at once, and that makes no sense. Also, when we date things, as having happened millions or billions of years ago, before there were human minds, this would be totally invalidated if time wasn't passing to account for that time which we conclude had passed between now and then.

How do properties of objects change? And i do not mean, 'by what cause', i mean by why 'mechanism', metaphysically, could change occur... How can there be difference between two states? — AmadeusD

This is what I answer with "the passage of time". That has been stipulated to be the requirement for two contradictory states, that they are at a different time, and it has to my mind, been satisfactorily demonstrated. But, we don't know much more about time than that, so many people like Philosophim will argue that time is nothing other than physical change, producing an equality, Time is necessary for change, and change is necessary for time. However, the explanations I have given show why it is logically necessary to premise that the passage of time is a type of change other than physical change, as the answer to "how can there be physical change".

I find this unhelpful. This would seem an intuitive truism, but it explains nought about what's actually happening between A and B, other than the changes. — AmadeusD

Yes, it is a generalization, that it is unhelpful is regretful. The specifics of what "A" and "B" signify has not been stated, they simply stand for the general notion of two different states, and what occurs between these two is described by the general notion of "change". To even begin describing "what's actually happening between A and B" would require a description of the specific features of these two states.

And this is what I'm asking about... — AmadeusD

Yes, as I said it's called "change", and in the ancient days, "becoming". We might use other temporally based terms like "activity" "motion", "transformation of energy", etc..

But that is epistemology. God would know what is good, but He doesn't decide what is good, just like He doesn't decide that 1 + 1 = 2, or that square circles can't exist. — Walter

I think most theologians would argue that God does decide what is good. They clearly claim that human actions are good only insofar as they are consistent with what God wants. So God is above humans in the decision of good. And, if it wasn't God who determines what is good, we'd have to look for a principle higher than God to validate whether a human action is truly good or not, because the higher principle might be inconsistent with what God wants. But theologians would not accept this. So I think it must be God who decides what is good. Why don't you think that God would decide 1+1=2, and that square circles do not exist. Isn't that exactly what God's job is, to ensure that the world is consistent with logic? Otherwise God would not see it as good, and not create it in that way.

I see. If 'time' is the rate, what is the medium of change? As in, what actually represents the change (given the causal order requirement, such as 'cause' can be used here), as opposed to it's ratio compared to ...other changes? — AmadeusD

The statement you quoted said, "or at the very least it is the order, event A is prior to event B". Does that not already answer your question about causal order?

You asked me about the "traverse" between A and B, so I described the measurement of that traversal, and the temporal aspect provides for the rate of traversal. But if we ignore the traversal, and reduce the change to simply A is before B, which is generally what the concept of "causation" does, then we are simply not interested in the time between A and B, the traversal or change itself. However, time is still essential to the description in the sense of before and after.

To say something happens 'more quickly' than something else seems to infer that there's a ratio OF something.. 'change' isn't an actual thing, so just wondering what is being referred to there. — AmadeusD

Exactly, "time" in its conceptual form, abstract form, the tool for measurement, as distinct from time itself (the difference described above), is a sort of ratio. Simple order of before and after does not suffice to account for the change itself, as what occurs between state A and state B. So to measure the temporal aspect of the change we compare it to a standardized change (the traditional standard being the motion of the earth relative to the sun as years, days, hours, and minutes, etc., the modern standard being the vibration of an atom or something like that). The ratio is expressed as a description of the physical change "over time", where "over time" means the standardized change. The other features which make up the description of the physical change are the material elements and their spatial description.

Most usages do require time to complete, but if one thinks of "to change" is "to differ", then time need not be a factor. — jgill

This equates "change" with "difference", which is a mistaken notion. Change is commonly understood as the intermediary between two different things, as how one state becomes another. The standard definition is "the act or an instance of making or becoming different". If we define "change" simply as different, then we have no word, or concept to refer to the act of becoming different, i.e. what happens between two distinct describable states, and this produces a serious logical problem described by Aristotle.

The problem is the incompatibility between being and becoming which was elucidated by Plato, after learning from Socrates' discussions of the riddles of the Eleatics who include Zeno. Here's a brief explanation and simplification of what Aristotle showed. If a state of being "B", is different from a prior state of being "A", then something must happened in between, to account for this difference. What happens in between is known as "change" or "becoming". If we explain this change or becoming, with another descriptive state of being, "C", then a becomes B by passing through C. Now we have state A which is different from state C which is different from state B. Therefore something must happen between A and C, and between C and B, to account for these differences. We could proceed in that form of description, and assume a state of being in between each, such that we would have a series of states like A,D,C,E,B. Since each of these states is different, we need something between each of them to account for the change.

As you can see, this is heading for an infinite regress, where we never get a true understanding of what happens between two different describable states of being. What happens in between, is becoming, or change. This indicates a fundamental incompatibility between static states of being, as represented by unchanging descriptions at a point in time, and the activity, becoming, which occurs between these assumed points in time.

If an act is good because it is what God chooses, "goodness" is meaningless.
So, I think one act can be intrinsically better than another. But perhaps there are acts that are intrinsically equally good. So God actualizing A would be just as good as God actualizing B. — Walter

Hmm, I see things in the opposite way. Since God has the most knowledge possible, if there is supposed to be something beyond God which determines "good", then "good" would be meaningless as absolutely indefinite, or undeterminable, impossible to know.

And, since two acts are distinct and unique, each having a different effect, (and the two possible acts we are talking about are necessarily so, having been stipulated as incompatible), and if all things are taken into account by the supreme knower, it is impossible that two such acts are judged as equally good.

This leaves your final statement meaningless. God, of necessity would choose one or the other, A or B, knowing the effects that each would have, and knowing which is the better choice.

I don't think so. Time is the rate at which state A changes to state B, or at the very least it is the order, state A is prior to state. It is a feature of the change, but not the change itself.

I am begging the question. What is time if not related to the change between objects? :D — Philosophim

From my perspective, time is related to change. It's just that we cannot say that time is change because we understand time as the means by which we relate one change to another. That is why no single change constitutes time, but a multitude of changes. And since all change requires time, we can see that time is logically prior to change as prerequisite. I might even go further to propose that the passing of time is the cause of the change we observe.

Its easy in the first case because time is change between entities. That's why it becomes more difficult in the second case. If time exists apart from the change between two entities, then what is it at its fundamental? If its not an observer, and everything exists without change, what is time? — Philosophim

I think this is wrong for a couple reasons. First, you neglect the internal changing of one object. You can describe internal change as parts moving relative to each other, but this results in the need to assume a fundamental immutable element, not composed of parts, as proposed by the atomists. The fundamental "atom" is required to avoid an infinite regress of divisibility, but I think modern physics shows that the fundamental element is not consistent with observation. This implies that the foundation is something other, like wave motion for example.

The second problem is that whenever an object changes place relative to another, there is nothing there which can be called "time". There is simply change. It is only when we have at least two different changes, that by comparing one to the other, we establish a rate of change, and this constitutes "time" as a measurement tool.

Let me give you another example. In fiction, sometimes a character will have the ability to stop time for everyone but themselves. In such a scenario, nothing changes in relation to one another except for the character. Time itself didn't freeze, but only because there was something that was not frozen, the character. Imagine a universe as a completely frozen still shot where there is no comparative change. Do we not say its a universe frozen in time? I think you answer this in the next quotes I pull from you. — Philosophim

The problem I see here is that we need to figure out a way to get outside of the universe, to see how it comes into being, if we want a complete understanding of it. When we look at what is prior to the universe, if there is no time, then your scenario works inversely, there is only things not moving, apparently frozen in time, because there is no time. But then there is no way to understand how things could suddenly start moving. If we allow that there is time outside our universe, then there could also be activity outside our universe, and this could cause the activity of things within our universe.

So if I understand it right, you believe time is a 'thing in itself'. And by this I mean it is something that exists which we attempt to capture in a meaningful way. For us, that meaningful way is change. But like all 'things-in-themselves' our attempt to grasp it is merely the most logical way we can understand it, not necessarily a full understanding of it as it exists in itself.

Thus if I understand it right, we measure and understand time through observance of change, but that measurement is an approximation and doesn't really capture the idea of 'the present becoming the future'. Change is a convenient way to measure time, but not necessary for it to exist, as time is its own unobservable entity.

This is what I was looking for in your answer. If I understand you correctly, its not a bad take. It leaves itself open to people who state, "How can we know what is unobservable/time is an illusion" people, but I think its acceptable for anyone else. — Philosophim

I like Aristotle's way of describing this. In one way, "time" refers to a tool which we use for making measurements. This is the concept of "time", the abstraction. It is derived from our observations of change, comparing changes to each other, as explained above, to establish a rate of change. In this way the abstraction "time" is the concept by which we measure the rate of change. On the other hand, "time" refers to something measured, and this is what you call time "itself". So for example, when we use a clock, and say what time it is, or use dates like January 8 to refer to today, and say yesterday was January 7, and tomorrow is January 9, etc., we use numbers in a way which is meant to measure the passing of time itself, as far as we are able to, with our limited understanding of what the passing of time really is.

Unless if course, doing B is just as good as doing A. — Walter

Ever read Plato's Euthyphro? The question would be whether an act is good because it is what God chooses, or whether God chooses it because it is good. The former implies that intrinsically A is no better than B, but God choosing it is what makes it good. The latter would imply that one act is intrinsically better that the other, and that is why God chooses it. Which do you think would be the case?

This reflects what Minkowski spacetime infers. This is referred to as being at rest in a particular frame of reference. — jgill

Rest frames are artificial creations. Scientists produce them as required, so they will have some degree of arbitrariness. However, they do demonstrate the logical possibility of time passing without any change occurring. Such a thing is not only logically possible, but as the use of rest frames demonstrates, also extremely useful. I would proceed one step further, to argue that since rest frames are actually necessary for scientists to produce a real model of anything real in the world of real time passage, then in order for the real world of time passage to be understood, we need to replicate, or represent the real rest frame. This implies pre-Einsteinian absolute time.

The issue is that conceiving of all motion as relative greatly facilitates the representation of motions. We can model distinct things as moving relative to each other, without worrying about how they are moving relative to other things, by arbitrarily producing the required rest frame. If the model were to be based on absolute time, then the true rest frame would be required as the ground for modeling all motions.

However, the universe is extremely complex, with all sorts of different motions, so we do not know the true rest frame of the universe. (As analogy, consider that the ancients did not know the sun as the rest frame for the solar system, so they modeled the sun and planets as orbiting the earth in a relativistic way.) Since we do not know the true rest frame of absolute time, special relativity uses the motion of light as a constant, for an alternative to true rest.

This alternative suffices for many applications, but its arbitrariness sets an artificial boundary which limits our capacity to understand. Any motions in the universe which are not consistent with the principles developed as general relativity, (such as spatial expansion, the effects of dark matter, dark energy, and wave/particle duality), fall outside that artificial boundary which the theory imposes on our understanding.

So, as I said in the preceding post, I believe the only way to provide a basis for understanding all types of motions, is to have a model of time passing with no physical change occurring. This would be the true rest frame, absolute time. The passing of time would be grounded in, or modeled according to changes which are not physical, or material changes. Then all physical changes could be plotted against this model of time which would serve as a backdrop.

Ok I see the problem clearly now. From God's perspective, to do A is necessary, needed as good, and God cannot be wrong. From our perspective. we do not know the premises which produced the necessity for the decision, therefore it appears to be contingent, as is the case for us, our choices are contingent. In the case of human beings, we can see what is good, yet choose not to do it for some reason, but God must do only what is good. So God really did not have any choice at all, being omniscient He had to choose one thing, the good, and He could not choose otherwise, not be mistaken, therefore "the will to do A" was necessary. Does that look correct?

The modern understanding of causation as used by the sciences, might involve inductive reasoning, but isn't reducible to inductive reasoning. For example , if all ravens are black, then it must be the case that a sampled raven is black, but one wouldn't want to say that all ravens being black was the "cause" of a raven to be black. So induced hypotheses aren't causes per-se. — sime

What I'm talking about is when events follow each other in time, and the same types are observed to do so consistently, then through inductive reasoning we make a conclusion about a relationship, i.e. we infer causation. So for example, if we apply heat to water and then it boils, and we observe this many times, we make the inductive conclusion that the heat causes the water to boil.

Nowadays, an instance of a 'causal' relation between a particular cause A and a particular cause B, is understood to be relation which asserts that B occurs if and only if A occurs, assuming that nothing else could be the cause of B. This is what is meant by saying that causation involves "counterfactuals". — sime

This is not an acceptable explanation of causation. An assignment of causation does not exclude the possibility of other things having the same effect. So in the example above, saying that heat causes water to boil does not exclude the possibility that something else as well, such as a drop in pressure, could also cause water to boil. That A is judged to cause B does not exclude the possibility that something else might also cause B as well.

Your explanation seems to make a category mistake, switching from the particular to the general. In a particular instance, we will say that A caused B only if we think that other possibilities have been ruled out. So in a particular instance of water boiling we would say that the application of heat caused this, because we've ruled out other possibilities. But then you make A and B into something general, and you make the general statement "B occurs if and only if A occurs". That's a logical fallacy, because in other situations something else could cause B to occur. So in the example, when the application of heat is judged to be the cause of the water boiling in that particular instance, and even if we make the general statement that the application of heat causes water to boil, we do not have the required premise to say that only the application of heat could cause water to boil.

I just mean that they never move. There is no outside observer, there's no beginning, no end. Yes, if there was an observer there that would be a third existence monitoring change relative to themselves. But if there is no observer and no change in any existence, what's the difference between that and no time at all? This isn't a proof, its just a thought experiment to get us to think about the abstract nature of time without an observer. Is 'time' an actual thing? — Philosophim

As I said, the thought experiment is useless, because you have to stipulate whether or not time is passing, to get anywhere, but then you're begging the question. Look, you say that there is two particles, and they are not moving relative to each other. That's all you say. Time could be passing, or time might not be passing, we have no way, from the premises of the thought experiment to determine whether time is passing or not. Therefore it's useless as an effort to try and understand whether time could be passing without any physical change happening.

A universe where two thing exist that have no change, then suddenly there is change. Was there time before the change? Do we retroactively put time before the change? Can there be time if there is no change at all? These are the general questions we're thinking on. — Philosophim

Yes, by the way you phrased the question, there was time before the change. You say "then suddenly there is change". This implies that there is "before" the change, and there must be time for before to become after. Therefore there must have been time before the change, in order for there to have been a "before" the change, and a time when the two things were not moving. Otherwise you could not even talk about the two things existing before the change.

I can imagine time passing, but only because I'm observing it. — Philosophim

Now, I ask you to use logic, and see with your mind, logically, that it is possible for there to be time passing without change occurring.

I'm trying to ask what time is beyond a tool. How do can you realistically measure time in a world without change? If you can't, does it exist? Is the nature of time something more fundamental than a tool of an observer and change? Is it its own existence? — Philosophim

Things do not need to be measured by a human being, to exist.

This is me asking you a simple question. How does time exist in a hypothetical world without any change? — Philosophim

And I'm telling you, it's very simple. Let me try your own thought experiment, maybe that will help. Imagine two things not moving relative to each other, and time is passing. Easy so far, right? Now add your special premise, these two things are the only things in the universe. Where's the difficulty? See, the concept of time passing does not require that anything is moving relative to each other.

We're inventing a half-plank length. And clearly though we can invent infinite time, infinite time doesn't happen in between plank tics. — Philosophim

Right, now you're catching own. We can "invent" half-Planck, quarter-Planck, one tenth-Planck, whatever we want. These are all logically possible. And, at these short time periods, it has been demonstrated that there cannot be any physical change. Therefore it's very easy, and also very logical to conceive of time passing with no physical change occurring.

Sure, I'm not trying to disallow anything though. I'm just trying to understand what the fundamental of time is without an observer. If its not change, what is it? — Philosophim

Notice that I am talking about "physical change", "observable change", and I say that time could pass without any of this occurring. However, I do not intend to exclude "change" in an absolute sense. I described time itself as a sort of change, the process of the future becoming past. The point though, is that this, itself. is not observable. We don't observe the future becoming the past, we observe particular, specific physical changes, and from this we can infer that time is passing. However, time passing, itself, is not observed. And, we must maintain this principle, that time passing is not any specific type of observable change, but a general type of change which encompasses all observable physical changes, in order that we will be able to measure all types of physical changes, through a theory which provides a non-physical, unobservable change, "time", to provide the measurement tool.

I think the intention to do A is clearly a property of the creator.
Now if that intention is necessary, we are stuch with a modal collapse. — Walter

The intention to do A is not necessary, it is a freely made choice. We've been through this already. God's will, is a necessary part of God, but the particular choice, "the intention to do A" is not necessary from God's perspective.

I don't see how we can separate God's Will simpliciter from God's Will to do A. — Walter

Why not? It's actually very simple. Do you agree that human beings have a capacity called will, and this allows them to choose? Do you also recognize that no specific choice is necessitated by that capacity, it is free to make different choices as required according to differing circumstance. So the capacity to choose (the will) and the choice made, the intention to do A, are not the same thing. They must be separate and different types of thing, or else the person would have to always choose the exact same thing when using one's will, and that's not what is the case, we make many different choices. Therefore we must conclude that the capacity to choose, as a property of a human being (or God in this case), which is called "the will", is distinct and different from any particular thing willed, the will to do A, or the will to do B, etc..

OK, by your definition of "contingent", from God's perspective, the thing He creates is contingent. But God's Will, as an essential property of God is necessary. As explained earlier, we must be careful to distinguish between the properties of the creation, and the properties of the creator, or else we produce a pantheist God. Does that make sense to you, and how does it bear on your argument?

Let me give you the thought experiment I'm thinking of so you can see what I mean. Lets say that only two particles exist in the entire universe. They stay exactly 1 meter away from each other for eternity. Is there time?

To me, if there is an observer, then there is a third existence that is changing. But we're talking about two particles that do not move relative to one another at all. Now, lets say that they move in one inch closer. Suddenly, we now have time, even without an observer. The thought experiment is that there has to be at least one change between two existences for time to exist. How would you approach it? — Philosophim

The thought experiment is unhelpful, and that's the point I'm making. We don't know enough about time to answer the question. So the answer simply depends on what you mean by "eternity". If by "eternity", you mean time passing endlessly, then clearly time passes in the thought experiment. If by "eternity" you mean something completely outside of time, then no time passes. But both of these senses of "eternity" are arguably unreal and irrelevant to the real world, so the whole thought experiment is useless for understanding the real nature of time.

Furthermore, the second part is completely illogical from accepted self-evident premises. If there is only two particles unmoving relative to each other, in the entire universe, it is impossible that they could suddenly move closer to each other, because this would require a cause, meaning something else in existence is necessary.

So the proposed thought experiment is entirely useless for two distinct reasons. The first part uses an ambiguous word "eternity" for a key premise. The word can be used in a way which would mean that time passes endlessly, or in a way that time does not pass at all, implying outside of time. Both are unreal possibilities anyway, so disambiguation would not help. One would imply an infinite amount of time while the other would imply material objects without time. Then the second part proposes something unintelligible, illogical for the reasons I've already explained in earlier posts. Material objects beginning to move without a cause is contrary to fundamental laws of induction, self-evident principles.

I gave you a much better thought experiment already. Can you imagine two material objects not moving relative to each other, while some time passes? If so, then you ought to accept the proposition that movement of material objects relative to each other is not logically necessary for time to be passing.

As I explained, you are trying to base your conception of "time" in the observable effects of time passing (the movement of material objects), instead of looking directly at what time is, to produce a much more accurate understanding of it. As indicates, premises concerning what we know about the physical universe, in conjunction with good logical practise, indicates that time could pass without physical change. That is a completely logical possibility which we would be foolish to exclude.

This becomes very evident at the Planck scale. It has become clear that there is a limit to the amount of time required for observable physical change. This is the shortest period of time required for observable change. However, this restriction, this boundary of "shortest period of time", is the product of observation, and it dictates the shortest period of time required for observable change, not the shortest period of time logically possible. Since time in theory, is infinitely divisible (and we have found no real points of division in the continuity of time), then In theory we can still proceed to an even shorter period of time. Within that shorter period of time could occur unobservable change, immaterial change, which could act as the cause of the observable change, which requires the longer period of time. The obvious problem with this proposal is that physicalist tendencies incline people to disallow the possibility of unobservable change, and the entire immaterial realm.

I do believe there need to be at least two 'pieces' of existence for time to occur as it would be the change relative to each other. — Philosophim

I don't see the need for these two existents. The change relative to each other requires the passing of time, so it is evidence to an observer that time has passed, but time could also pass without any change of these two, relative to each other. That time passing is required for observable change, and change is evidence of time passing, does not necessitate logically, that observable change is required for time to pass. And, we do observe that things may exist with no observable change relative to each other, yet time still may have passed. Therefore there is no reason two believe that a multitude of existents is required for time to be passing.

Since the change relative to each other, of two things, is the observable effect of time passing, yet it is not what time itself actually is, I still think you are, in a different way, making time observer-dependent. It is not that you make the passing of time require an actual observer, but you make the passing of time dependent on an observable effect. So you are basing it in principles of observation. This denies the possibility that the passing of time itself might be completely unobservable, and what we do observe is just the effects of the passing of time. That the passing of time itself, is something which is completely unobservable, is a very real and logical possibility, which we ought not exclude in the way that you do.

As Russell observed, a temporal order per-se does not imply causation. — sime

The point I was arguing is that cosmologists employ knowledge of causation to produce a temporal order. Since relativity theory provides no basic way to distinguish spatial separation from temporal separation, and therefore no way to create a proper temporal order for events which are separated, they need to refer to causation to produce a "proper time". In other words they know that A must have occurred before B, when creating their temporal order, because A is commonly known to be the cause of B.

The concept of causation is actually a metaphysical interpretation of counterfactual logic, as extensively used in the design of double blind experiments. — sime

I've never seen the concept of causation described as being an interpretation of counterfactual logic. I've always seen it described as the product of inductive reasoning. You know "causation" extends to ancient Greece, and was discussed extensively by Aristotle. Therefore, I would appreciate it if you could explain this claim of yours, so I can understand what you are talking about.

One of the ironies of the super-determinism interpretation of QM, is that it implies the non-existence of causality, since if reality is fully determined such that there are no counterfactual outcomes, then the resulting super-determined reality is merely a true story whose course of events is absurd. — sime

There are some extraordinary interpretations of QM. However, since there are many interpretations, and none can be said to be the correct one, then whatever anyone of them says about reality, cannot be taken seriously as "reliable".

This issue I have encountered in this line of thinking is 1. Does potential have the potential to violate its own ability to be potential? Ie can it cancel itself out. I imagine not as it wouldn't be very potent if it immediately self annihilated.
2. Why does it seem to follow a logical stepwise emergence in a particular order or sequence? — Benj96

.The issue I've come across is Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument. He demonstrates why it is illogical to think that any sort of pure potential could actualize itself. Any sort of potential, requires an act, as cause to actualize it. So, "The ability to bring about existent things" is not a property of potential itself. Potential is always the potential for a multitude of possibilities, and whichever of the possibilities gets actualized is dependent on the efficient cause, which is an actuality. Therefore an efficient cause, something other than potential, something actual, is required to bring about an existent thing.

Contingent means neiher necessary nor impossible.. — Walter

In theology, in the sense of "contingent being", contingent means requiring causation. Any existent which is dependent on something else, as cause for its existence, is said to be contingent. "Contingent" has a number of different uses, we need to adhere to the relevant meaning.

So, if God van have different intentions, those intentions are Parts of Him. — Walter

Nothing I said implies that God would have differing intentions. And I see no logic in your statement: "If the intention is not determined, it can be different". God's intention is "not determined" in the sense that it is not caused, just like the free will is not determined by causation.

The fact that there were many possibilities open to God does not imply that God had differing intentions. And the fact that God only wills what is good implies that He does not have differing intentions.

I believe I noted that time was registered change between entities. That's not very specific of course. Do you have a definition of time that you like to use? — Philosophim

I think yours is an inadequate definition of time because "registered change" implies observation, judgement. This would mean that prior to living beings which are capable of making such a judgment, no time could be passing unless we invoke some sort of God to make the registry.

So I would describe time in reference to the passing of time, which we know to have been occurring prior to living beings noticing it as occurring. What I see in my experience, is that time passes at the present, and "the present" marks a distinction between past and future. Also, I see that future time, such as tomorrow, January 7, will become past time, yesterday, as the time passes by. Therefore I like to define time as the process whereby the future becomes the past. The moment in front of you in the future, is always becoming the moment behind you, in the past, as time goes by.

We were just having a discussion as to whether causation should be removed from discussions of ontology because it "doesn't exist in physics." This was Russell's argument circa 1910 or so. "If physics doesn't use cause then it is anti-scientific and incoherent." Of course, Russell's premise is simply wrong today, physics does talk about cause, just not the "law of cause," he successfully attacks. It's actually not clear that Russell's premise was remotely true when he made his argument either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, physicists are actually heavily invested in the use of "causation". Take a look at the concepts of "lightcone", "timelike & spacelike", "worldline", "propertime", for example. They use knowledge of the temporal order of events (causation) to establish timelines in relativity based observations.

So, my 'intention' is a contingent part of me. — Walter

I think this displays a misunderstanding of "intention". Contingent means dependent on a preceding cause, but the will (intention) is understood to be free from such determination. Therefore your intention is not a contingent part of you.

You are not "absolutely simple" because this part of you is combined with the contingent part (known as dualism). In the case of God, there is said to be no contingent part. All contingent existence is derived from, as created by, the Will of God, which is prior.

Time doesn't exist if nothing exists, that's true. — Philosophim

Until we come up with a clear description of what time is, this statement cannot be justified

Circular motion is a very strange sort.

The velocity of the patch in contact with the ground is zero with respect to the ground, unless you've lost traction. — wonderer1

Traction is often less than a hundred percent, so the motion of that point on the wheel, relative to the ground, would often be in the direction opposite to the intended direction of the vehicle. That produces unpredictability, making it so much fun to hit the gas pedal hard on a slick surface.

If you are asking if I know what God's intentions were, the answer is no I do not. Otherwise, the answer is in the way that I've already described, a way similar to the way that you or I might decide in taking action, we are free to choose according to intention.

A reasonable person could go to a transcript of his speech, pick out one of the twenty-odd times he uses the word “fight”, and show how he is being literal, that he’s talking about actually fighting, like everyone who quotes “fight like hell” wants you to believe. — NOS4A2

Twenty-odd times? Wow. It seems the mentioned time, "fight like hell", suffices for what you ask. Why not accept it?

The “fight like hell” canard is stupid because each time he uses the word in that speech he does so metaphorically. For some reason they take this one, and only this one, as literal. — NOS4A2

So this is your mode of interpretation? Every time the word "fight" is used it is metaphorical, and not meant to conjure up any notions of physical aggression. And if the word "peacefully" happened to be uttered this was meant to quell any such mistaken notions of physical aggression aroused by repeated use of the "fight" word.

OK, I see very clearly why Trump followers like yourself, are so gullible. You have no capacity to see the true intentions behind deceptive speech.

If the universe is actually eternal, that solves the problem. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Determining that something is infinite (such as eternal time) solves no problem. It just means that the theory being applied toward understanding the thing is inadequate for actual understanding. Application of the theory produces the appearance of infinity and the thing cannot be understood with that theory. Thus the thing appears to be infinite, and therefore unintelligible. Explained here in the first cause thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/868259
To some, this may appear as a resolution to the problem, because we would just say that the thing which led to the appearance of infinity in our attempts to understand it, is fundamentally unintelligible, therefore we can forget about trying to understand it, and move along. But we know that putting a problem aside because it appears to have no solution, thereby forgetting about it, does not actually solve the problem.

No, that's why I was clear to differentiate between two senses of "necessary". It was necessary in the sense of needed. For example, if I want to walk it is necessary for me to move my legs. But moving my legs is not necessary in the absolute sense of "cannot be otherwise", because I might decide not to walk.

Right, from our perspective it is "necessary" in the sense of 'what we have is what we got, and things are not otherwise'. From God's perspective, prior to creation, it was what is "necessary" in the sense of needed or wanted.

Yes, which is to say that the base and the peak do not occupy the same position in space. The space between them is called distance. — Michael

This is a very misleading statement. To say there is distance between two objects is completely different from saying that there is space between two objects, yet you imply that the two are the same with "the space between them is called distance". What is between two objects, as the medium, could be air, water, or in the case of the example, the mountain; the mountain itself is between the base and the peak. Your use of "space" here is vulgar and improper for a philosophical discussion. Unless one is thinking of two objects separated by void, which is not the case in the mountain example, we would not consider that the distance between two objects consists of space. And what else could you mean with "The space between them is called distance"? Clearly what is between the base and the peak is the mountain itself, and not "space".

That there is distance between the base and the peak is measurement-independent. It's certainly not the case that the base and the peak are touching until we look at the mountain.

That this distance is described as being "8,000m" or as being "26,246.72 feet" is measurement- and language-dependent.

I'm not sure why you felt the need to explain the latter fact. I'm not sure how it's exactly relevant. — Michael

Do you see that "distance" in the first statement has a distinctly different meaning from "distance" in the second statement, so that when you say "this distance" in the second statement, suggesting that it is the same "distance" as the first statement, you equivocate? Of course "distance" must have two distinct meanings because the unmeasured "distance" is measurement-independent yet the measured "distance" is measurement-dependent.

The first use of "distance" is to signify that there is separation, remoteness between the two named things. They are not contiguous. The second use of "distance" indicates the measured length of this separation. Will you agree that "distance" refers to two distinct things, 1) the separation, and 2) the measured length of the separation. You've already stated that one is measurement- independent, and the other is measurement-dependent. So surely you will see that it is impossible that "distance" refers to the same thing in each case. Will you also recognize that if you say that "this distance" has a specific measured value of 8000m, you would equivocate? Therefore when you say "this distance is described as being '8,000m'" you equivocate. It is the measurement-dependent sense of "distance" which is said to be 8,000m, not the measurement-independent sense of "distance" which cannot be described as having a specific value.

"Distance" as a specific measured value (as in "the distance" or "a distance" for example), has not the same meaning as "distance" in the case of a general separation. So when you say "this distance is..." you equivocate because you give a specific measured value to the general use of "there is difference...".

To avoid the equivocation, I suggest we alter the first statement to read "there is a distance between the base and the peak". This would signify a specific measured value. However, we could not say then, that this distance is mind-independent. To refer to what is between the base and the peak we would have to use other terminology.

Did you read the next part of my comment where I said "that the distance of one mountain is given the label '8,849 m' is a consequence of our measurement"? — Michael

Yes I read that, and it is why I accused you of being ambiguous with "distance". In the first sentence you said there is a distance "even if we never measure it". In the following statement you gave the distance a number. The number you designate as the "label" of the "distance", but this is only produced as a consequence of measurement, as you agree. The ambiguity is that in the first sentence "distance" as referring to something which exists independent of measurement, refers to something extremely vague and general. In the second use, the "label" refers to a specific value, which requires measurement. The thing labeled as the "distance" is a specific value, whereas the "distance" in the first instance is a general unspecified separation. This ambiguity invites equivocation, such that one might think that "distance" is used in the same way both times, so that "distance" as the specific value which is dependent on measurement is the same as "distance" in the sense of the vague and general separation between the two things which is supposed to be independent from measurement.

It's certainly not "obvious". Space is often thought of as being mind-independent, notably by scientific realists, and I suspect also most laymen. Idealists, scientific instrumentalists, and Kantians may think differently, but such positions are not self-evident. — Michael

I have to disagree with this. I believe the idea that "space" as independent came about from the union of space and time, in the concept of space-time. So the mind-independent substance believed in by scientific realists is not "space" per se, but "space-time".

This is an important distinction to make, because classically "space" was a static medium designated by the coordinate system employed by geometers. Since it was logically necessarily to think of space as static, to prevent the principles of geometry from changing randomly, it was known by geometers to be separate, distinct from the real world within which things are continually changing. It was an eternal ideal. So it was clear and obvious to the scientifically minded, that space was a mind-dependent ideal.

However, extending way back to ancient times there was significant difficulty in understanding the reality of motion. Ancient Greeks, I believe the atomists, demonstrated logically that unless there was some sort of empty space, "void", motion would be impossible. Every piece of matter would be contiguous with other matter and nothing could move anywhere. This produced the need to assume an independent "space". But since this "space" is independent of the mental constructs which describe the "space" that makes up the volume of an object, describing instead the space between objects, an incompatibility between the two senses of "space" was created. The "space" of an object which accounted for the static unchangingness of the object, and the "space" between an object which accounted for the activities of things.

The conclusion we can draw, is that what is referred to as "space-time", as the supposedly real and independent substance, (the concept which supports the real motion of objects), is fundamentally incompatible with our conceptions of "space", which is an ideal constructed and used in coordinate systems. This is why fundamental axioms of "space", like Euclid's parallel postulate are found to be inconsistent with the concept of "space-time", and those realists you refer to turn to non-Euclidian space. "Space-time" is what is supposed to be real, not "space".

I should note that I use "materialism" and "physicalism" interchangeably, and that physicalism "encompasses matter, but also energy, physical laws, space, time, structure, physical processes, information, state, and forces, among other things." — Michael

Notice, that by including "energy" "time", "physical processes", you are no longer talking about "space". You are talking about "space-time" which is fundamentally different, and as explained above, incompatible with "space". So when you make an argument concerning "space", and you allow that "space" refers to what is known as space-time, you produce significant ambiguity, most likely resulting in an equivocal conclusion.

My question is simply, how can something which is necessary' and simple 'want' different things. — Walter

I don't see any evidence that God wanted anything other than what He created. We are agreeing that it is logically possible that God could have created something other than He did, because He is deemed to have had the capacity to do such, but nothing indicates that He wanted to create something other than He did. And, since God is deemed to have the highest possible degree of intelligence, and also deemed to want only what is good, then I do not see why you would even consider the possibility that God would have wanted something other. Don't you find that to be illogical?

Here is an example which may be analogous. You and I are capable of doing many things, not nearly to the degree of God, but still at any moment each one of us has the capacity for a wide assortment of activities. We have many possibilities in front of us. But this in no way implies that we "want" all those things. In making a decision we would consider different things which we want, and this presents us with a very much narrowed field of possibilities, in comparison with what is actually possible to each one of us. Then, we judge and choose from this field of possibilities which is present to our minds, but is very much narrowed from the overall field of what is possible.

In the case of God, He only wants what is good, the absolute best in fact. This means that God narrowed His own field of possibilities to one thing, the absolute best. The narrowing of possibilities is not due to the non-existence of the infinity of other possibilities, they were all still available to Him. The narrowing was due to Him only wanting one thing, the best thing.

If you want to argue that God actually did not create the absolute best thing, then that's a different argument.

Sorry, but there is no willful misunderstanding. What you said simply makes not sense.

It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere...

Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary".... — 180 Proof

I ask you, how can you demonstrate that beginnings are not logically necessary, when you start from the premise that it is logically necessary to begin counting somewhere? Counting is an activity. If this activity requires a beginning, then by what premise do you conclude that other activities might occur without a beginning?

You have absolutely no logic which supports your stated conclusion ("Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology [topology or cosmology] though, of course, they are possible.). In fact, your premise contradicts your conclusion.

This is very ambiguous.

There is a distance between the base of a mountain and its peak even if we never measure it. — Michael

It is you who is being ambiguous, with your use of "distance". If the word is meant to signify that there is a separation between the base of the mountain and the peak, that is self-evident. But if the word is meant to signify that this separation has a specific value, number of feet, meters, or whatever, without being measured, then this cannot be true. How do you think it is possible that there is a specific value attached to this separation if no one has actually done the work of assigning that value?

Unless you want to argue that space itself is some sort of "mental fabrication"? An idealist might agree with you. A materialist (or dualist) won't. — Michael

Obviously, "space" is a "mental fabrication". What do you think space is, something we can stick a tape measure beside and say how long it is, or that we can weigh and say how heavy it is? I am dualist, and that space is a mental fabrication is indubitable. Also, a materialist would have to say the same, because "space" could not refer to any type of material, and the materialist thinks that any thing which is not imaginary is material. So your statement makes no sense.

It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere in a beginning-less sequence just as it is to be standing somewhere on the Earth's surface. Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology (topology or cosmology) though, of course, they are possible. — 180 Proof

How is this not contradictory to your mind? You say first, a beginning is necessary, it is logically necessary to begin somewhere, but then you proceed to say that beginnings are not logically necessary, they are possible. Can you explain to me what you mean, in a way which would make the apparent contradiction between 'it is logically necessary to begin somewhere', and 'beginnings are not logically necessary' disappear?

You'd have to be more specific in your question for me to give a reply, but off the cuff, I'd say that possible world semantics is inappropriate for discussing God as the assumed "necessary Being". Perhaps this is why I am not getting anywhere with Walter. Walter seems to want to apply the terms of possibility to something which is necessary, and that opens a gap of incompatibility. So we just continue to talk past each other.

I think a more appropriate consideration is a first counted number. Counting has to start somewhere, and each second of passed time is a type of counting. — Michael

This is why, in metaphysics, it is important to understand that a thing must have actually been measured in order to have a measurement. As in the examples above, the mountain is commonly assumed to have a "height" prior to being measured, and the jar full of marbles is commonly assumed to have a "quantity" prior to being counted. But both of these, the height and the quantity are actually products of the act of measurement, therefore it is incorrect to assume that they exist prior to being determined by that act which determines them. Common assumptions are produced to facilitate common mundane actions, and are therefore not necessarily consistent with good metaphysics.

The reason why it is important to understand this is that metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology, meaning that principles of epistemology are supported by principles of metaphysics. And if we do not properly account for the fact that the quantitative value assigned to the physical world is a product of the act of measurement rather than something which inheres within an independent physical reality, we lose the required principles for understanding the true nature of mistake.

It appears like we, as human beings have become so confident in our techniques of measurement, that when we correctly determine the measured value, we believe that we are correct in the sense of having determined something which inheres within the thing itself, and therefore a correct judgement could not possibly be other than the value determined. But this attitude toward the measurement practice conceals the fact that the technique which produces the correct answer, according to the rules of the system applied, may not be the best possible technique. "Correctness" is determined by properly applying the rules of the measurement system to the thing being measured. However, if the measurement system is in some way inadequate for measurement of the thing it is being applied to, the correct measurement would still be in that way, a mistaken measurement.

If we turn to the classical distinction between theory and practise, this is the difference between mistakes in practise, and mistakes in theory. Mistaken practise is relatively easy to determine, being a matter of following rules. Mistaken theory is much more difficult to determine because we must allow our minds to go beyond the rules of correctness, and find further principles to support our judgements. That's why the scientific method was developed, as a sort of direction for testing theory.

In relation to the op, the type of theory which produces an infinite regress, infinity in the act of measurement, has been demonstrated to be a defective type of theory. It is defective because it designates the independent thing which we are trying to measure as unmeasurable (the thing we are trying to count is designated as uncountable). Any theory of measurement which designates the thing which it is trying to measure as unmeasurable is a self-defeating theory, and by that principle it is a defective theory. In other words, the measurement system which produces an infinite regress in its application, is inadequate for measuring the thing which it is being applied to.