Did you explain what "the meaning of the meaning" means during the last week or so of discussion? If so, I must have missed it. Please provide a quote. — Luke

I am now fully convinced that trying to explain anything to you will always be a hopeless effort.

Define ‘good’. It may seem pedantic to insist on ‘intra-action’, but for me it’s about being honest, acknowledging the involvement and variability of all aspects of the measurement setup in the process. The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities - despite what Newton assumes to be the case. — Possibility

The explanation of intra-action provided for me, by you from Barad, was incoherent by self-contradiction, as I explained. If agents emerge from their "intra-action" then the intra-action must be prior to, and cause the existence of the agents. This leaves the problem of what is acting in the intra-action. Barad called it "their" intra-action, but the activity cannot be "theirs" because it is prior to their existence.

What you describe here is nothing but interaction between the people measuring and the thing being measured, and is not representative of what Barad was referring to in the quote you produced for me. So I am beginning to think that your understanding of "intra-action" is not the same as Barad's

You cannot tell time from the spatial presence of a quartz crystal. Each of these three ‘objects’ provides a different set of values as its relative temporal stability, and where the quartz crystal and caesium electron differ from the sun is that there is no human being ‘doing the measurement’ at the level of the ‘object’. Once the timepiece is set up, we ignore the fact that we have created elaborate conditions for a particular, stable and recurring temporal measurement. — Possibility

I don't see you point. Even with the atomic clock, someone still has to read the clock, just like someone has to read the sun, in order that the passage of time is actually measured. There is no such difference as you claim. The parts of the clock must be precisely arranged in order that it can properly "keep time", but so must the sun and the earth be "precisely arranged" in order to keep time. But the "keeping of time" is not really done by the precisely arranged parts, it is done by the person who observes them.

We call these measurements of ‘time’ by ignoring the variability inherent within the measurement process, including the variability of the very ‘object’ being used to provide temporal stability. — Possibility

All you are saying is that measurements of time are inevitably imprecise. You and I agree here, and it appears that the reason for this imprecision is that the stability of the object, is not as perfect or ideal as we assume it to be. We ought to take this as an indication that Newton's first law, which takes the stability of the object for granted is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, "the variability inherent within the measurement process" is a feature of the principles , the theory, being applied in the measurement process. There is a model of the world, a representation, or map, the Newtonian representation which assumes as a fundamental principle the stability of an object, but this model is fundamentally flawed. However, our measurements of time are based in the Newtonian representation.

But it does allow for it. Spacetime fuses the three dimensions of space and one of time, not into a 3+1 structure, but into a four-dimensional continuum. — Possibility

Any sort of "dimensional continuum" is problematic from the outset. From what it means to be continuous, a continuum cannot have distinct dimensions. So the dimensions of space are arbitrary to begin with. And that this dimensional model cannot adequately represent space is indicated by the irrational nature of pi and of the square root of two. It appears like it might require an infinite number of spatial dimensions to properly represent space as dimensional, but this would be equally problematic. Making time another dimension just magnifies the failures of the dimensional model.

So there is no set or assumed configuration of dimensional structure in spacetime, and that’s the point. — Possibility

This is exactly why the dimensional representation fails. It is completely arbitrary, therefore it is based on nothing real. It is not based in, or does not start in any real aspects of space or time. And of course, space and time must have very real properties as quantum physics demonstrates. So this type of dimensional representation is not based in anything real, and does not capture the real nature of space and time.

Except that mass is not really as stable or inert as it appears. Look closer, and you’ll find activity. The capacity to measure time with a caesium electron is dependent on measuring momentum regardless of its position (as above). Yet the macroscopic state of an atomic clock presents as apparent inertia, with one particular variable having the characteristics of time. — Possibility

Momentum is a Newtonian principle, tied up with mass and inertia. This is why our measurements of time are based in Newtonian physics, which assumes the continuous existence of the massive object, as per the first law.

To emerge’ means to become apparent or visible - there is no temporal order or actual separation implied. It is entirely possible for the emergence, the ‘object’, and the activity to BE or even become simultaneously. — Possibility

This cannot be true. "To become" implies a coming into being, which is a temporal order of not being then being. If the object emerges from the activity, as described by Barad, then there is activity temporally prior to the being of the object, as it becomes during the activity.

We speak about ‘generations’ as events in time, but there is no point in time where one generation ends and another begins for everyone - only between two family members. — Possibility

A generality is not an event, which is a particular. When you refer to "generations" here, you are not referring to events, but to a generalized notion of "a generation". When we speak of the relations between family members we speak of events.

An event, by definition, is something that occurs in time - has temporality - but that doesn’t mean all events fit into some universal linear order. It seems nice and logical, but doesn’t correspond to reality. — Possibility

No, your use of "generations" as if "generation X" is an event, is what does not correspond with reality. This is very similar to the issue above with four dimensional spacetime. It's a useful principle, but its usefulness is derived from the fact that it may be arbitrarily applied, and this is what means that it does not correspond with reality.

I can't agree because I don't know what "the meaning of the meaning" means. You did not explain it. — Luke

And the last week or so of discussion was not absorbed by you at all? The childishness never ceases to amaze me.

If the meaning is the definition, then the meaning of the definition is what? - the meaning of the meaning? — Luke

Yes, that's quite obvious and I don't see why you can't agree. The word has meaning, the definition of the word (the phrase) has meaning, the words used to explain the definition (the interpretation of the definition) have meaning, etc., and none of these 'meanings' is the same as any other. That's why I mentioned earlier that some philosophers like Wittgenstein got very concerned about an infinite regress of meaning. So they like to claim that there is some sort of foundational beliefs, bedrock presuppositions, or something like that, which ground all the meaning by being supported by something other than meaning.

I would agree that a definition is (typically) a phrase, but the meaning of that phrase is not distinct from the definition. There is not the definition on one hand and the meaning of the definition on the other. As I said in my first response to your accusation of conflation that started all this: — Luke

How can you say that the meaning of a word is different from the word. And, that the definition is a "phrase", which is a group of words, yet you claim that the meaning of the phrase is not different from the phrase? Why do you think that the meaning of a word is different from the word, yet the meaning of a group of words is not different from the group of words?

See, you separate the word from its meaning, as two distinct things, yet you combine the phrase, which is the definition, with its meaning, as one and the same thing. You are not consistent. Do you honestly believe that the phrase, which is a group of words, and the meaning of that group of words is one and the same thing, yet also believe that the meaning of a single word is distinct from that word? What is it about a group of words which makes it the same as its meaning?

Here's a suggestion, a way which we might be able to get past this problem. Maybe we should consider that the definition is not really the meaning, even though we've both already agreed that it is. The definition is just a group of words, the phrase, and the meaning of the word is something completely different from this group of words, which is the definition.

You have not always said that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word. Our disagreement over this matter began when you accused me of "conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation". You asserted that meanings and definitions "are separate", with the distinction between them being that meanings are always understood by a reference to examples while definitions are not. — Luke

Your childish behaviour is very frustrating Luke. I definitely differentiated between the definition of the word, which is the meaning of the word, and the meaning of the definition, which is the interpretation of the definition. Based on this distinction, I accused you of "conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation". If you still do not recognize this distinction then there is probably no point to picking up where we left off.

You strongly imply here that "the meaning of the phrase" is the definition, and you have already said that the meaning of the definition is the meaning of the word. — Luke

When I state explicitly, "there is a difference between the meaning of 'past', as 'what has happened', and the meaning of that phrase, the definition", how can you state with any credibility, that I strongly imply that the meaning of the phrase is the definition. You are saying that I "strongly imply" the exact opposite of what I explicitly state, that the meaning of the definition is distinct and different from the meaning of the word (which is the definition).

This is the point I've been trying to get you to recognize. If the meaning of the phrase which is the definition ("what has happened" in this case) is the same as the meaning of the defined word (which is "past" in this case), then definitions would be circular, and defining would be absolutely pointless and meaningless. However, the real purpose of defining is to put the word into a wider context, so that it can be understood in its relations with other words. If the meaning of the word is the definition, and the meaning of the definition is the word, such that the two are one and the same, there would be no such "wider context", only a vicious circle. Therefore, we must respect the fact that the meaning of the word which is said to be the definition, and the meaning of the definition which is the wider context, are two, distinct, and not the same. Then the definition actually serves a purpose toward understanding the word.

Let's start from the top, and see if we can get some agreement. Do you agree that there is a difference between a word, and the meaning of a word? If so, do you also agree that there is a difference between a definition, which is a group of words, and the meaning of the definition? And, if we were to state the meaning of the definition, we ought not state the original word as that meaning, or else we'd have a vicious circle which would get us nowhere fast.

I disagree that "past" means "the type of thing which might be remembered". It's not a different "type" of meaning (i.e. the meaning of a phrase that is the definition) or whatever you are arguing; it just simply doesn't mean that. — Luke

Whether or not you agree with the definitions is not the point here. I already know that you disagree with my definitions, you have made it very clear that you do not believe that these words can be adequately defined without reference to "time". So your disagreement is evident and paramount. But please do not let that subjective bias interfere with your honest and objective judgement of the issue of whether it is possible to do what you currently believe is impossible.

Consider yourself to be a child, as your behaviour demonstrates, with very little knowledge obtained yet. Someone is claiming to be able to do, what you in your childish state of ignorance, believe is impossible. Why not relinquish your subjective opinion, which might just be an ignorance based prejudice, to let that person proceed, and have the opportunity to lead you out of that ignorant state, if that is indeed what it is. After the demonstration is made, you will have ample opportunity to judge the success or failure of the effort. But to deny and ignore the demonstration because what the person is trying to show you is inconsistent with what you currently believe, only serves to perpetuate your childish ignorance.

Newton’s first law makes a claim about the existence of an object that is assumed to not be interacting, but there are, in fact, measurement interactions going on. — Possibility

I think that Newton's claim is supposed to state something independent of measurement. It is what is supposed to be given, without any measurement. To verify, or to apply this law would require measurements, but the law is supposed to represent what is the case regardless of whether the object is measured. That's why It's taken as a given.

Therefore, if we’re honest, each measurement of the ‘object’ is necessarily an intra-action involving an observer or measurement apparatus in a localised yet never isolated spacetime. — Possibility

You still have not provided me with a good explanation as to what "intra-action" means, so why can't we just call the measurement process Interaction?

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. — Possibility

I don't think that this is the case. The independent existence of the objects, which provide the basis for the measurement of time is taken for granted, as a given, like I explained is the case with Newton's first law. So it does not matter if it's the earth and sun, quartz crystal, or cesium atoms which provide the basis for measurement, they are all objects whose spatial presence is taken for granted.

And again, I do not see the need for "intra-action" here. Why not just describe the measurement of time as an interaction between the human beings doing the measurement, and the object (sun, quartz crystal, cesium atom) which is being used to provide the temporal stability.

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. This is not Newton’s ‘object’-in-time assumed as a pre-existing individual entity with inherent boundaries and properties. — Possibility

But these objects which we use for the measurement of time are Newtonian objects. I don't think that this can be denied. It is the stability of mass, in its temporal extension (inertia), which gives us the capacity to measure time. I don't think we can pretend that it is anything other than this.

Barad’s ‘object’-in-its-becoming is never separate from the activity through which it emerges. An intra-action is not prior to, but rather constitutive of, the existence of its physical ‘objects’. — Possibility

This appears self-contradicting to me. If the object emerges from the activity then the activity is necessarily prior to the object. That's what "emerges" means.

We need to recognise that ‘activity’ occurs within spacetime - how one activity relates to another. — Possibility

I disagree. As I explained, we need to understand activity as prior to space. And since activity requires time, time must be prior to space as well. And, since the concept of "spacetime" does not allow for this conception, it must be dismissed as inadequate.

“At the fundamental level, the world is a collection of events not ordered in time. — Possibility

As I explained, this is incoherent. "An event" is itself necessarily ordered in time, that's what "an event" is. It's incoherent to speak of events which are not ordered in time.

Time is not an attribute of space - both ‘time’ and ‘space’ are attributes of spacetime. When you’re speaking of ‘time’ here, you’re referring to a linear conception of time. Yet time is localised not just in space, but in spacetime. There is no evidence that space is prior to time, and plenty of evidence that events in nature occur without first being attributed to boundaried and propertied objects. — Possibility

This, that time is an attribute of "spacetime" is what I am saying is the problem. Time must be prior to space, in order to understand the reality of "events" (which are necessarily temporally ordered) which are not "propertied to objects" (consequentially not propertied to space which is the property of objects). So in other words, we need to conceive of time as prior to objects and space, in order to allow for the reality of events which occur without any objects or space, and the current conception of spacetime does not provide for this. It doesn't provide for this because the passing of time is understood, and measurable, only in relation to the movement of objects in space.

As a ‘logical’ sequence these numbered dimensions correspond to how WE construct our representations of space and time - not how spacetime exists, or even how we come to distinguish ‘dimensions’ as such. — Possibility

I really think that you need to consider that "spacetime" is a faulty concept in the way that it limits time to the constraints of objects moving in space. Once you recognize that spacetime is a faulty concept, you'll see that there is no such thing as "how spacetime exists", because there is no such thing as "spacetime". This word just represents a misunderstanding.

I've always said that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word. And, I've also maintained that there is a difference between the meaning of the word defined, and the meaning of the phrase which is the definition.

Since you seem to be extraordinarily obsessed with this issue, I suggest you go back and reread the thread from the point where this came up, I was making a distinction between what the words "past" and "future" mean, as per their definitions, ("what has happened" and "what is possible to happen" ), and what those definitions mean. You had asked me what do the definitions mean, and I explained them by talking about the type of thing that the definition indicated. Then you would not respect the fact that there is a difference between what the word means, i.e. its definition, ("what has happened") , and what the definition means (the type of thing that might be remembered).

I asked what the phrases "has happened" and "to happen" mean. It is unclear whether you are providing the meanings of these phrases - what you think they mean - or whether you are telling me "what gives meaning to" these phrases. I don't think these are the same. — Luke

If you reread from that point to the present, keeping in mind, that what I meant all along, and the distinction I was discussing is the distinction between the meaning of a word (its definition), and the meaning of the definition of the word (the phrase that defines the word). it ought to become very clear to you how you kept misrepresenting me (straw man). You might also see how you childishly insisted that I answer questions which were a product of your misunderstanding and therefore not relevant to what I was saying. Hopefully you might also see how this childish behaviour, this self-righteousness supported only by a lack of understanding, borders on disrespect when you start insisting that you know better than I, what I meant, and refuse to accept your misrepresentation as such.

After you reread, and recognize that there is a difference between the meaning of "past", as "what has happened", and the meaning of that phrase, the definition, which I explained as the type of thing which might be remembered, then we might be prepared to proceed with the discussion.

You appear to be saying that the definition of a word has two different meanings:
(i) the meaning of the word defined, and
(ii) the definition's meaning. — Luke

Luke, please inform yourself of what I've been saying, and quit with the straw men. All you are demonstrating is a lack of understanding which at times plunges into disrespect.

The definition of the word is the meaning of the word. The meaning of the definition is something different from the meaning of the word.

If the meaning of the word, and the meaning of the definition of the word, were both exactly the same, then the definition would tell us nothing meaningful, and it would be absolutely useless. The meaning of the word would be the definition, and the meaning of the definition would be the word, and this would be a vicious circle. Do you agree with me on this? If you agree then we can get back on topic.

What’s the difference between a definition and its meaning? In other words, what is the difference between the definition of a word and the meaning of a word? You are speaking of a definition as though it has no meaning. How can a definition have no meaning? — Luke

Luke, the definition of a word is the meaning of the word defined. The definition itself , also has meaning. Therefore, there is a difference between "the definition", which is the meaning of the word defined, and the definition's meaning, which is the meaning of the definition, and something other than the meaning of the word defined. So, you have the answer to your question "what is the difference between a definition and it's meaning". And please, do not be childish and disrespectful, and insist that I must have meant something other than that.

The definition of a word is the meaning of the word. Then of course, the definition itself has meaning. And, the meaning of the definition is not the same as the meaning of the word defined. Why is this so difficult for you? It's very obvious and straight forward, and also the reason why many philosophers like Wittgenstein in "On Certainty" get concerned about an infinite regress of meaning. Words are used to define words, but then those words need to be defined, etc., without circling back.

If definitions were as you imagine them to be, they would have no meaning at all.

Let's define a "bachelor" as "an unmarried man".
The definition of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".
The meaning of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".

The problem (your confusion) here is that you seem to think that nobody is allowed to now ask what "unmarried" means. — Luke

Why are you now trying to turn the table? This is what you insisted, That the meaning of the word, its definition, and the meaning of the definition must be one and the same. I'm the one one trying to talk sense into you. and it appears like you are now coming to respect the difference between the definition "unmarried man", in your example, and the meaning of that definition.

Does this mean that you are starting to understand? The meaning of "bachelor" is not the same as the meaning of "unmarried man", or else there'd be a vicious circle of meaning. If so, we can go back to my definitions. Do you accept that the meaning of "what has happened", which was my definition of "past", is not the same as "what might be remembered"? The latter phrase, "what might be remembered" is meant to explain the meaning of "what has happened".

Your initial distinction was between a definition and its meaning: — Luke

Yes, I made a distinction between the meaning of a word, (its definition), and the meaning of the definition. If there was not a difference between these two, the definition would mean the exact same thing as the word itself means. Consequently, there would be a vicious circle of meaning, if this were the case, and definitions would be completely useless. Definitions, if they were actually like this, would do nothing yo help us understand the meaning of the word.

I got an inkling of this way of thinking, a bit earlier, when you started misrepresenting my defining words as "synonymous" with the words being defined. Definitions are never intended to have the very same meaning as the word defined, that's why dictionaries use numerous definitions for the same word, and ambiguity is a real aspect of language use.

Therefore your representation of my definitions are misrepresentations. You misrepresent what is intended (the meaning of) the definitions. You represent the definitions as being intended to have the very same meaning as the words being defined, when my intent is not to create a vicious circle like that, with the definition, but to put the word into a wider context of meaning, and intentionally act to avoid such a vicious circle. This is the norm with definitions, and your insistence that the two ought to mean the very same thing, demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of "definition", and meaning in general.

Furthermore, your continued behaviour of insisting that you know better than myself, what I meant by a statement, and therefore rejecting my explanation as being inconsistent with the meaning which you apprehended, is nothing but childishness. Explanations are meant to demonstrate how to understand the statement, how to put it into the wider context which the author has in mind.

When you receive a statement, apprehend and understand that statement according to the wider context of meaning provided by your own mind, and the author tells you that this wider context of meaning provided by your mind is inconsistent with the one intended by the author, then you must adapt and try to put that statement into the wider context of meaning provided by the author's explanations if you want to properly understand. This is in contrast to insisting that the statement must be understood according to your own wider context of meaning, and completely ignore the author's explanation. The latter is misunderstanding, plain and simple. And to insist that your misunderstanding is the proper understanding, with complete disregard for the author's explanations, is not only childish, but completely disrespectful.

Look Luke, I was talking about the difference between the stated meaning of the defined word, which is "the definition" (also represented by me as "what the defined word means"), and the meaning of the words which make up the definition (represented by me as "what the defining words mean). The difference referred to therefore is the difference between "what the defined word means" and "what the defining words mean"

Your misrepresentation, "the difference between “what the defined word means” and “its meaning”" is nothing but a straw man. I now understand more clearly the reason why we had that little problem earlier, and the reason for your childish behaviour of claiming that you knew better what I meant by a particular passage which I wrote, than I did. You do not accept that there can be a difference in meaning between the meaning of a statement, and the meaning of the explanation of that statement. Since my explanation of the original statement was not exactly as the meaning you apprehended in the original statement, you concluded that my explanation must be wrong.

Therefore you continue to reinforce my belief that trying to explain anything to you will be a fruitless effort.

Those guys were banned six years ago, I wonder what aliases they had between then and now, and how many other times they were banned.

Straw man, as usual.

You asked for definitions. Then you asked what do the words within the definition mean. In other words you asked me to define the words which were used to define the primary words. Now you insist that there is no difference between the meaning of the primary word, and the meaning of the defining words.

Sorry Luke, but if the defining words meant exactly the same thing as the word defined then defining would be rendered as a completely useless procedure. Since you seem intent on insisting that there is no difference between a definition (what the defined word means), and its meaning (what the defining words mean) I can only say that your obtuseness has left further discussion of these terms as absolutely pointless. The explaining phrases mean exactly the same thing as the phrases explained, to you. .

If the "primary condition" of your definition of "present" is to make reference "solely to conscious experience", then how can "present" refer to anything outside of conscious experience? — Luke

in the way that I explained, with the use of "might", and the example of "sound", through extrapolation.

If the present is not limited to conscious experience, and if the past is not limited to what is actually remembered and if the future is not limited to what is actually anticipated, then there must be something outside of conscious experience or these mental events that determines and helps to define what you mean by "past", "present" and "future". What is it? — Luke

I don't know. That is perhaps the greatest problem of philosophy, described by Kant as the thing-in-itself. Kant claimed we cannot know what it is.

If your definition of "sound" allows "that there are things of that type which have not necessarily been perceived, judged, and categorized as being that type", then your definition of "sound" allows for "what might not be heard". Your definition of "sound" is basically "what might be heard or what might not be heard". — Luke

Sure, I see no problem here. That it might or might not actually be heard is irrelevant, as what is relevant is description of the type.

It indicates that "sound" refers to something external to conscious experience. If (a) sound is something that might not be heard, then it must exist independently of anyone's conscious experience. — Luke

Yes, that is the extrapolation which I used to take "the past" outside of personal experience, giving it a position of objectivity, allowing it to be effectively employed as demonstrated with "sound".

Therefore, I don't see how you can maintain that your definitions of "past", "present" and "future" make reference solely to conscious experience, while you also speak about "the reality of things of that type" which do not make reference solely to conscious experience (i.e. which are not remembered or not anticipated). — Luke

It was "the present" which I claimed ought to be defined solely with reference to conscious experience. This was "what is happening". Then we moved to "past" and "future" which I said ought to be defined in reference to the present. These were " what has happened", and "what is possible to happen". You asked me how were you supposed to understand these two definitions, and I said with reference to the conscious experience of the present, what is happening. And within our conscious experience of what is happening we have memories and anticipations, to help us understand the meaning of those definitions, "what has happened" and "what is possible to happen".

It appears like you are conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation. These are separate. We refer to things, like examples, to understand meaning, while the definition does not explicitly refer to those examples. So, for example "human being" might be defined as "rational animal". Then we could point to a number of people, as examples, to demonstrate the meaning of "rational animal". Or, we could give examples of what it means to be "animal" and what it means to be "rational". In both of these cases, the examples are referred to in demonstrating or interpreting the meaning, they are not referred to by the definition.

So your objection is not really relevant, just demonstrating that you are mixing up the definitions with the explanation of the meaning of the definitions. The definition of "present" refers to conscious experience. The definitions of "past" and "future" refer to the present. In the explanation, or interpretation of the meaning of the definitions I refers to something other.

My choice is beside the point. I have already stated my view that these terms are conventionally defined with reference to time, It is your view and your unconventional definitions of these terms that is presently under discussion. Your view - that these terms are defined solely in terms of conscious experience - clearly implies the radical skeptic position which must lead you to "deny the reality of anything independent". Otherwise, I fail to understand how these terms can be defined solely in terms of conscious experience. — Luke

You do not seem to understand. Defining terms while remaining entirely within a logical structure, does not make the terms inapplicable to things outside the logical system. Actually the opposite is true, and that's why mathematics, a purely logical system, is so highly applicable in the physical sciences. The most purely logical structure of definitions is the most applicable to the world of independent things. The logical structure of a system of definitions, does not deny the reality of independent things, that judgement is based on other assumptions

What do you mean by ‘pre-exist’? Do you mean outside of time? What is being criticised is the notion of distinct entities ‘pre-existing’ their material-discursive involvement in reality. Intra-actions are causal but non-deterministic - the entities only ever exist as such within intra-actions. The assumption that potential and actual must exist as temporally ordered notions is false. — Possibility

What I mean by pre-exist is to exist before, prior in time. So, for instance, two objects can exist without interacting if there is the required spatial-temporal separation between them. These objects would pre-exist any interaction which later developed. Common conceptions of "interaction" assume that objects pre-exist their interactions, in this way. That's expressed by Newton's laws. The first law makes a claim about the existence of an object which is not interacting, then the other laws bring in interaction. So non-interacting is assumed as the pre-existing condition.

Barad suggests that objects "emerge" from intra-action, therefore intra-action is the cause of existence of an object. This claim requires a description of intra-action, which could replace Newton's first law. The problem which I explained in the last post, is that you provide no description of intra-action, just an incoherent mention of quantum events in the "absence of time", by Rovelli.

To restate the problem in a different way, "intra-action" as described by Barad, suggests activity which is prior in time to the objects which are engaged in the activity. This is why it is not "interactivity", it is proposed as some sort of activity from which the objects which are described by Newton's laws, come into existence (emerge). The exact problem is that the passage of time is understood and measured relative to the physical objects which are supposed to come into existence through intra-activity, and whose interactions are understood by Newton's laws. Therefore this proposed activity is incoherent because there is no time in which it takes place. The Newtonian movements of physical objects, in conjubction with the boundary, or limit of electromagnetism are the principles by which time is understood and measured, so prior to physical objects there is not time.

Now, if intra-action is proposed as an activity which is prior to, as cause of , the existence of physical objects, then we have np principles to understand this causal force, this supposed type of activity, because it is a type of activity which is outside of time, by our current conceptions of time, hence Rovelli's description of "the absence of time" as "a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events". What Rovelli means, is exactly as I say above, prior to the existence of physical objects there is an absence of time (by the precepts of our current conception of time) and this renders all activity, or events as unintelligible, "boundless and disorderly".

Clearly, what this indicates is that our current conception of time is inadequate for understanding this realm of activity which has been dubbed as "intra-action". It leaves this activity as appearing to be occurring in the absence of time, activity from which time emerges along with physical objects, therefore the activity appears as boundless and disorderly, completely unintelligible to us as "activity", activity being something we understand as occurring within time.

Naming time as the ‘fourth dimension’ is not a sequential ordering. — Possibility

It is in a way, a sequential ordering, because it makes time an attribute of space. So conceptually, time follows from space as space is logically prior to time. That is why time is understood as an attribute of space, and space cannot be understood as an attribute of time, by the conventional conception of space-time.

My own understanding of physics suggests that spacetime emerged through differentiation or diffraction, rather than as a geometric rendering. That is, in a 4-3-2-1 progression. But if you refuse to discuss physics, then I’m at a loss as to how to present evidence of this. — Possibility

I have no idea what you mean by "a 4-3-2-1 progression" but if you explain, I will pay attention.

Kant does not include the human, experiencing ‘agent’, within the phenomenon - which is also a necessary condition for the existence of phenomena. This is an important distinction. — Possibility

Phenomena are a product of the human experiencing agent. Therefore the human agent is implied necessarily by "phenomenon", and "human agent" is included within the concept of "phenomenon".

I’m beginning to wonder if your avoidance of quantum mechanical aspects of this discussion is deliberate…? — Possibility

Of course it's deliberate. I am a philosopher, not a physicist. I am here to discuss philosophy not physics.

If you look at Whitehead’s philosophy in terms of relational quantum mechanics, it’s not so problematic. First of all, there is no ‘division of reality into distinct events’ - this is a misunderstanding of the structure of spacetime. If you’ve ever watched the interaction of ocean waves, you might have some understanding as to why this notion of ‘distinct events’ is the wrong way to even begin to explain the relational structure of four-dimensional reality. — Possibility

Your analogy of waves does not work. Wave action in water is a feature of particles, water molecules. So wave activity assumes objects, entities, as fundamental, the particles which produce the wave motion. Since you are talking about events as fundamental, rather than objects such as water molecules or other particles, then you need some principles whereby you can talk about "events", in the plural, rather than all of reality as one event. Sure, it's fine to say that distinct events are not real, but then you are being hypocritical when you talk about waves and other distinct distinct events.

‘Intra’ as opposed to ‘inter’ action implies that the action happens within, rather than between.

But it’s Barad neologism, so I’ll let them explain it:

In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the ‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglements, they don’t exist as individual elements.
— Karen Barad — Possibility

As I explained in my last post, this way of looking at things blurs the reality of temporal priority, leaving causation, and therefore a large part of reality as unintelligible. Consider the following "the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action".

What is being criticized by Barad here, is the notion of distinct entities interacting. This would imply that the entities preexist the activities which are described as interactions. So Barad replaces interaction with intra-action, and says that "intra-action" is responsible for, or the cause of existence of the entities. But where does that leave "intra-action"? It cannot be an activity which involves the mentioned entities, because it is prior to them, as the cause of their existence. So what kind of activity is this? It cannot be within the objects, because it's prior to the objects' very existence. Therefore it must be activity of some other sort, which is the cause of the existence of the entities.

This is why I recommended Rovelli. It’s not a deficient understanding of reality at all - it’s just not a global, externally imposed order. It’s a local, internal one. And there is no aspect of reality that is entirely ‘passive’. — Possibility

I agree that the idea of "global, externally imposed order" is not sufficient. However, I believe that the "local internal one" as described, is also deficient. I agree with many of the principles here, but there is a difficulty with language, and also a difficulty with the concept of space-time.

The existing concept of space does not allow that there is anything internal to a non-dimensional point. and this is what denies the reality of the concept of a local, internally imposed order. By our current spatial-temporal conceptions, all activity must be within space-time. This is because time is conceived of as logically posterior to space, it is the fourth dimension, and time is required for activity. So all activity is represented as spatial activity because time, which is essential to activity, follows from spatial existence.

What is required in order to understand any proposed "internal order", is to allow that time is prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, because this allows for temporal activity which is non-spatial, as prior to spatial activity. Then we can conceive of activity within the non-dimensional point.

The absence of time does not mean… that everything is frozen and unmoving. It means that the incessant happening that wearies the world is not ordered along a timeline, is not measured by a gigantic tick-ticking. It does not even form a four-dimensional geometry. It is a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events. The world is more like Naples than Singapore.
If by ‘time’ we mean nothing more than happening, then everything is time. There is only that which exists in time…. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

This is evidence that Rovelli's perspective is backward, and leaves a vast part of reality as unintelligible. Instead of putting time as prior to space, in which case there could be activity prior to spatial activity, and this activity could be understood as the cause of spatial activity, Rovelli uses the traditional conception of space-time, which puts space as prior to time. This leaves the origin of spatial existence as fundamentally unintelligible. This paragraph is completely contradictory, because "the absence of time" (which is the origin, the beginning) is described as disorderly "quantum events" happening without a timeline . But any event requires time, that's what "an event" is, temporal extension. So this whole paragraph is self-contradicting, and demonstrates the problem with the common metaphysical proposition, that time emerges.

Instead, we need to position time as prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, so that there is true activity within the non-dimensional, (what is known traditionally as the immaterial), then the emergence of space and its attributes, material objects, can become intelligible.

To describe the world, the time variable is not required. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

Again, this is more evidence that the perspective is mistaken. Without the time variable we cannot understand the cause of the world. And without this our understanding of the world is incomplete.

If I accept your definition of the present as "what is happening", then how do "what is possible to happen" and "what has happened" differ from "what is happening" in a way that is not in relation to time? — Luke

I told you, "what has happened" refers to memory, and "what is possible to happen" refers to anticipation. "What is happening" refers to a combination of both There is not need for "time" here.

Memory and anticipation are mental events. Do you also consider "what is happening" to be a mental event? — Luke

Yes, of course. The primary condition of the definition of "present" was to make reference solely to conscious experience. To fulfil this condition "what is happening" must be be understood in the context of what you call a "mental event".

If memory grounds the difference, then the only events that have happened are limited to what humans remember. — Luke

This is not true, as I explained. We can define "past" in reference to what "might be remembered". This is to name the criteria of a type, as I said already. It is how we move toward objectivity. As in the example of "sound", which I mentioned. When the tree falls it makes a "sound" even if no one hears it, if we define "sound" as "what might be heard". By defining in this way, we make "sound" the name of a type, and allow that there are things of that type which have not necessarily been perceived, judged, and categorized as being that type. Likewise, "might be remembered" characterizes a type, and we can allow for things of that type which have not actually been remembered.

Of course the radical skeptic can deny the reality of anything independent, and insist that to be is to be perceived. If you like to take that position of radical skepticism, that is your choice.

Likewise (presumably), the only events that might possibly happen are limited to what humans anticipate. — Luke

Again "what might be anticipated" describes a type, and we can allow for the reality of things of that type which are not actually anticipated.

But if you're telling me that none of these terms is defined in relation to time, then you have some work to do to explain their meanings and the differences between them that are not in relation to time. — Luke

I don't think that this "work" I have to do ought to be very difficult. We all have memories and anticipations, so just try thinking of past and future in terms of memories and anticipations rather than in terms of time. It's very easy, if you dismiss your prejudice, that "past" and "future" can only be defined in reference to time. If my work is difficult, you and your prejudice are to blame for that.

It is unclear to me just how these differ, if at all, when they have no relation to time. — Luke

I told you very clearly how they differ. I even gave the analogy of how "water" differs from "solution". One is pure, the other is a mixture of that thing which is pure in that case, along with something else. That is how they differ. It is only difficult for you to understand, because your preconceived prejudice makes you expect a different type of difference between past and present.

Maybe, just maybe, Trump has gotten himself in over his head this time. We might need a new phrase to describe his upcoming position, 'real bankruptcy', meaning that you actually suffer the effects of having no money, as opposed to Trump's usual position, 'fake bankruptcy', meaning that you declare bankruptcy to avoid paying your creditors, and they suffer the effects of having no money.

I asked what the phrases "has happened" and "to happen" mean. It is unclear whether you are providing the meanings of these phrases - what you think they mean - or whether you are telling me "what gives meaning to" these phrases. I don't think these are the same. — Luke

You asked me for 'my definitions', so this is exclusively what these words mean within the context of 'my definitions'.

o be clear, are you saying that what "has happened" means what "might be remembered", and that what is "to happen" means "what might be anticipated"? — Luke

You are taking "to happen" out of context. The definition is "what is possible to happen".

To be clear, are you saying that what "has happened" means what "might be remembered", and that what is "to happen" means "what might be anticipated"? Does this imply that if something is not remembered then it has not happened and if something is not anticipated then it will not happen? That is, is what has happened or what might happen limited to only what can be remembered or anticipated? In other words, is it impossible that there are events that have happened that we don't remember and events that might happen that we don't anticipate? — Luke

No, this is not a solipsist definition. Just because I do not remember it doesn't mean it has not happened. Someone else might remember it. So "memory" and "anticipation" describe these categories, but the use of "might" indicates that these qualifiers are not necessary conditions. They indicate the type of property being referred to. For example, "sound" could be defined as a wave pattern which "might be heard". Then the tree falling in the forest makes a "sound", even though no one hears it, under this definition.

This does not explain the difference between "what is happening" and "what has happened".

To say that "what is happening" (present) consists of some of "what has happened" (past) and some of "what is possible to happen" (future) does not explain the difference between "what is happening" (present) and "what has happened" (past).

This only says that the present consists of some past and some future. I asked for the difference between the present and the past. — Luke

Yes it does tell you the difference between past and present. The present is not solely past, as past is, it consists also of some future. I am informing you of the type of difference I am talking about. Why can't you accept this? If you asked me what is the difference between water and a solution, I would say that the solution consists of both water and something else dissolved within it. It informs you of the type of difference I am talking about. Why can't you accept this?

Federal prosecutors revealed on Friday that they intend to soon release to Trump's defense team 11.6 million pages and records of evidence, in addition to a hard drive containing images extracted from electronic devices. — Michael

So Trump could hire a team of 1,000 lawyers, and each would have 11,600 pages to mull over. I think there is going to be a request for more time to prepare.

What meaning do you give to the past tense phrase "has happened"? What meaning do you give to the future tense phrase "to happen"? — Luke

As I said, meaning is given to these terms from the human experience of memory and anticipation. What has happened, "past", consists of things which might be remembered. What is possible to happen, "future" consists of things which might be anticipated.

What is the difference between "what is happening" and "what has happened"? Memory may "ground the difference", but what is the difference? — Luke

As I said earlier, I believe that "the present", as what is happening, consists of a unity of what has happened (past), and "what is possible to happen" (future). The difference between "what has happened" and "what is happening", therefore, would be that "what is happening" consists not only of "what has happened" but it also contains some "what is possible to happen", as well.

Bohr’s phenomena is more complex than Kant’s phenomena (‘sense appearances’), in that they include ‘all relevant features of the experimental arrangement’. That is, phenomena as I’m referring to here would also incorporate ‘the agent’, their ‘processes’ and ‘systems’ as you’ve described here, as well as the ‘object’ of their sensibility. — Possibility

In my interpretation of Kant, the agent is incorporated into the phenomena though the means of the pure a priori intuitions of space and time. These are necessary conditions for the existence of phenomena. The exact status of any 'object' might be somewhat ambiguous, because there is a distinction between the object as phenomenal, and the thing in itself.

Agency is not a property of certain ‘agents’ to varying degrees. The inherent dynamism of a reality that consists not of objects in time but of interrelating events (Rovelli) / intra-acting phenomena (Barad) IS agency. — Possibility

"Interrelating events" is the terminology of process philosophy. What Whitehead demonstrated with his process philosophy is that this perspective runs into a very real problem with the issue of how events are related to one another. To begin with, the division of reality into distinct events is somewhat problematic, because the divisions are to a degree arbitrary. But if there is real distinctions, then "an event" takes the place of an object, as a distinct entity, but such assumed "occasions" require relational principles for their existential reality and presentation as phenomena. So Whitehead uses the concepts of prehension, and concrescence to explain relations between events.

The relevant point here is that if reality is broken down into events, then the need for relations between events, to produce a model of continuity as we experience in phenomena, causes the positing of subjective principles (agential activities of creation) to account for the reality of these relations. The result is a panpsychism, because these subjective principles are a requirement for reality as we experience it.

The issue I believe, is that the "event" incorporates space and time into its conception as necessary preconditions for its reality. So, while Kant places space and time as intuitions proper to the human agent, here space and time are already presumed as inherent within the fabric of the universe, as necessary conditions for the fundament feature, the event. Now space and time are external to the human agent, but external agential concepts are now required to explain the reality of phenomenal appearances. This is why Whitehead ultimately turned to God, having no other way to account for the existence of the panpsychic elements which he found necessary to posit, in order to hold his reality together, in the unified form which we experience..

I’m not saying there can be no meaningful distinction, only that there is no inherent one. We make meaningful distinctions all the time, whenever we intra-act within phenomena. But I wonder how necessary is a distinction between active and passive ‘things’, if reality is found to consist of interrelating events, rather than objects in time? Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is worth a read in terms of our hope of understanding temporal reality. — Possibility

As I said, I think that the passive/active distinction is necessary in order to understand causation, and this is necessary in order to understand temporal reality. Without this, two distinct events cannot be ordered in time, because it is necessary to understand how one acts one the other, to produce a causal understanding, and therefore a temporal order. Without this distinction, events would be interacting, but there would be no way to order them temporally without determining what part of which event is causing what part of the other event. There is just interaction, and this provides no information for temporal order therefore a deficient understanding of reality..

It enables us to focus on the precision of the intra-action, rather than how we describe it, by recognising ourselves as necessarily involved. — Possibility

Can you explain to me in clear and unambiguous terms, just what "intra-action" means?

You are missing the point Luke. Obviously defining the terms without reference to time is not a problem, because a person can define terms any way one likes, even contradictory, or whatever. The issue is getting agreement on the definitions, consensus that the definitions are acceptable. If I could stipulate the definitions as dogma, and force your mind to understand and follow them in an unwavering manner, even if they were contradictory, then the problem would be solved. Right? That particular problem might be solved, but a much bigger problem would be created.

Now, you've demonstrated to me that it would be impossible for me to define the terms the way that I like, i.e. without reference to time, and solely referencing human experience, in a way which is acceptable to you. After many days of discussion, you have shown me that such definitions would be fundamentally contrary to your beliefs, and you are not willing to relinquish these beliefs, even for the sake of discussion. The discussion always turns to you equivocating your meanings of the terms with mine, in your attempt to say that mine are self-contradicting, or have some similar problem of incoherency. Therefore you have shown that it is impossible for you to dismiss your understanding of what these terms mean, to proceed solely from my premises, for the sake of discussion. Consequently, discussion cannot proceed.

Here's an example. I will propose the following definitions. I will define "present" as what is happening, activity which is occurring. Then, past gets defined as what has happened, activity which has occurred, and future is defined as what is possible to happen, activity which is possible. You will say "what has happened", in relation to "what is happening" implies temporal separation, and cannot be understood without reference to "time". Therefore you will insist that this does not define the terms without referencing time. But this would be your misunderstanding, your failure to dismiss your preconceived need to refer to time.

I will insist there is no need to refer to time, because I am keeping the definitions within the context of human experience, so we refer to memory, not time, to ground the difference between "what is happening" and "what has happened". Then you will say 'but "memory" is not synonymous with "past"'. And this would only demonstrate your misunderstanding of how definitions work. Defining terms are not necessarily synonymous with the terms defined. In most cases the more specific is defined through reference to the more general ("human being" is defined with reference to "animal"). And you will continue to make ridiculous objections to my definitions, based on your preconceived meanings to those terms, without relinquishing those prejudices to start from new premises.

All I have asked is for you to provide some examples of such definitions. You have failed to provide any examples and then blamed me for not helping you find some. — Luke

Luke, do you not even try to read my posts?

So now we're getting to the heart of the matter, your question of what does "present" mean, in the context of the conscious experience of being present. I would say that it means to be experiencing activity, things happening. And so this ought to be the defining feature of "the present", activity, things happening. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if you cannot dispel this idea, that "the present" must be defined in reference to "the time when...", instead of being defined with direct reference to the conscious experience of being present, then we will not be able to agree on anything here, nor could we make any progress in this discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've given you the starting point, the way I would define "the present" with direct reference to the conscious experience of being. I defined it as "activity, things happening". I thought you might agree with this because you had already said "the present is what is happening, occurring". But now I see that you think we need to qualify this with "the time" at which things are happening. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, you have my stated definition of "the present", and as I also stated earlier, definitions of "past" and "future" ought to be produced in reference to "the present".

However, we clearly have no point of agreement concerning "the present", so I cannot make reference to a word which "we" do not have a consistent understanding of. Therefore any attempts to define "future" and "past" would be wasted effort. I'm sorry to say that unless you can accept "the present" as defined, the attempt at discourse has proven fruitless.

I can see that, and I will try to clarify. The important point is that this differentiation occurs within phenomena - the separability is agential, not inherent. — Possibility

The differentiation might be "agential" in the sense that it is a feature of the agent's sensibility, and carried out through the process of sensation combined with other agential processes, memory anticipation, etc., therefore be inherent within the phenomena, or, it might be performed by the agent's application of logical processes. The application of logic to the sense appearances (phenomena) produces a differentiation which is distinct from the differentiation which inheres within the phenomena, produced by the agent's pre-conscious systems. The application of logic toward understanding any phenomenon as actually different from how it appears in sense perception is what Plato strongly argued for when he insisted that the senses deceive us.

Because of this, the proposed agential separation must be understood as complex and multi-faceted. Consequently, restrictions to differentiation, which are fundamentally within the phenomena, making some aspects of separability of the phenomena appear to be impossible, are not really impossible with the appropriate application of logic.

What I’m describing is two setups, two phenomena: one in which the embodied present (inseparable from the future) unambiguously differentiates from ‘the past’, and one in which the embodied present (inseparable from the past) unambiguously differentiates from ‘the future’. There are no inherent boundaries or properties to speak of here, no outside observer, and no way to describe the entire system. The description always occurs from within. — Possibility

These "setups" you describe would be logical separations. They are not separations which are within the phenomena itself. These are propositions for logical proceedings. The problem here is that because there are "no inherent boundaries or properties to speak of here", as you say, within the phenomena, which is how the present appears to us, then such distinctions are somewhat arbitrary, and not necessarily in correspondence with reality. This implies that we need to determine a reality which is beyond, or transcends, phenomenal reality, in order to ground such distinctions in something real.

From the perspective of phenomenal reality, i.e. empirical evidence,and what appears by way of sensation as 'reality', no clear boundary between past and future can be supported. Therefore the unambiguous differentiations you propose, between past and present, and future and present, cannot actually be made without reference to a transcendental reality. Without this, "the present" remains vague, and so do any differentiations proposed.

So when I state that there is no unambiguous way to differentiate between the past and the future, I’m viewing both phenomena from ‘outside’, within a new phenomenon, in which case both ‘the past’ and ‘the future’ are treated not as these previously defined ‘objects-within-phenomena’, but as entanglements inseparable from their respective embodied intra-actions. — Possibility

According to what I stated above, you need reference to a transcendental reality in order to justify the perspective of "outside". The "new phenomenon" which you propose is not a phenomenon at all, being independent, or "outside" all sense appearances, and simply the basis for propositions or premises for logical proceedings. But unless the propositions can be justified, they are nothing other than imaginary, fictitious fantasies. We might consider the axioms of pure mathematics as an example. These axioms are not "new phenomenon", nor are they grounded in any sort of phenomenon, they are taken to be prior to phenomenon, and this is the way that mathematics gets "outside" phenomena.

Are you suggesting there is a mode of description, observation or measurement that does objectively determine ‘the past’? This is my point: that regardless of intentionality, language or other human exceptionalism, there is no referring to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects, except under Newtonian assumptions that have since been scientifically disproven, over and over. It is more accurate that the past, the future, whatever matters “is substance in its intra-active becoming - not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency... phenomena in their ongoing materialisation.” — Possibility

What I am suggesting is that there are strong indications that it must be possible to objectively determine 'the past'. And, the reason why we cannot, at the current position of human evolution is that we have not established the necessary logical premises. I would also propose that the only way to "objectively determine 'the past'" is to establish a very clear and unambiguous understanding of "the present". "The present" is where the future and past meet. The required principles (premises) are not as you propose, a clear distinction between past and present, and future and present, because this would leave the entirety of "the present" as inconsistent with both the past and the future, rendering "the present" as completely unintelligible from any temporal, empirically derived principles. This sense of "the present" gives us eternal immutable Platonic Forms, along with the so-called "interaction problem", and it validates the realm of imaginary, fictitious and fantastic mathematical axioms So the required principles are not as such, but I propose that they are those which establish a clear distinction between past and future.

So the problem which is now arising, is that Newtonian physics, and the physics of "objects" in general are based in a faulty understanding of "the present". The object is represented by Newton's first law as a static continuity of being, staying the same through time, eternally, unless caused by a force to change. The object is then represented by its past existence, and the cause of change to it, is generally represented as the past existence of another object which exerts a force. The consequence of this model is determinism.

The problem which I mentioned is that this is not a proper representation of the object's past existence, because it is actually produced with a view toward the future. The purpose or intent is to model the continued existence of the the object, into the future, for the sake of prediction. Generally speaking, this is the purpose of the conception of "mass" to show a continuity of the object from past into future through inertia. The issue is that this supposed continuity between past and future, is not real. It has been created just for that purpose of prediction. And this presupposes that eternal continuous existence of the object, at the present, unless caused to change. That is temporal continuity.

So there’s a paradigm shift required in how we describe reality. Our physical representations and models of temporal continuity are largely inaccurate, and have been proven so. To continue shoe-horning our ontology to fit these assumptions seems to me an ignorant and dishonest way to do philosophy. I’ve been working my way out of this, and have lately found Barad to be helpful in articulating the connections I’ve been seeing. — Possibility

Clearly I agree with this. The issue with temporal continuity is mentioned above. The problem is the assumed continuity of inertia, taken for granted by Newton's first law. Phenomena gives us the appearance of objects, and these objects are apprehended as a continuity of sameness. That continuity of sameness is expressed in Newton's first law. The problem is that this observed continuity and the ensuing proposition, as that law, is not supported by necessity. This lack of necessity is accounted for by change, and in Newton's laws, the concept of force, which is the cause of change. So the eternal continuity is not a necessity, but this is qualified with "a force is required to alter it". And so long as we can understand the cause of change, and model the forces involved, the lack of necessity doesn't not present us with a problem. We model the causes of change as other temporally continuous objects, and we get the illusion of a determinist world. But when we get to the finer aspects of the universe, free will for example, and some aspects of particle physics, the forces involved are not well understood. Then we reach the limits of capacity for this type of representation, that of temporal continuity, and much of reality remains as unintelligible. So, we must accept that it is required to dismiss this type of representation in order to go further in our understanding.

You asserted that we can "define these terms "past" "future", and "present", and understand them without any reference to a concept of time". I've asked you several times to produce such definitions. Until you produce them, there is nothing to reject. Unless you produce them, there is no support for your assertion. — Luke

I've explained very clearly how "we" can define and understand these terms without reference to time. Obviously though, you will never be able to understand these terms without reference to time. Therefore I was wrong, and "we" cannot understand and define these terms without reference to time.

Don't blame me for your failure to support your argument. — Luke

I firmly believe that the blame is to be directed at you,. You have a very strong propensity toward willful misunderstanding. Denial and misrepresentation, which results in misunderstanding, without any real attempt to understand, is your modus operandi.

Any description of the past OR the future is always in relation to a particularly embodied present. It seems to me that what you’re referring to is the difference between a living being’s relation to the past and their relation to the future, in terms of what is possible and what is impossible for them, in that moment. There is no unambiguous way to differentiate between ‘the past’ and ‘the future’ - an embodied intra-action (observation/measurement) occurs with one OR the other, but not both simultaneously. — Possibility

This seems contradictory to me. If an embodied intra-action occurs with one or the other, but not both, then this implies that there is an unambiguous way to distinguish between past and future. The embodied intra-action, as described clearly provides the means for an unambiguous differentiation, because it must occur with one or the other and not both. And to say that "there is no unambiguous way to differentiate" contradicts what is implied by the description of the embodied intra-action.

But the important point is that all of this separability occurs within the phenomenon of one’s unique temporality. “No inherent subject-object distinction exists.” So the past as we describe it is only relatively ‘determined’ - Newtonian physics justifies ignoring this relativity by presuming that one can always reduce the effect of measurement interactions to the point where they are negligible. Quantum physics has demonstrated this presumption to be false. — Possibility

The reason why "the past as we describe it is only relatively 'determined'", is because of our mode of description. There is always intent, purpose behind any use of language, therefore any type of description. Intent, or purpose is a view toward the future, therefore "the past as we describe it" is always conditioned by the future as we anticipate it, as the description is conditioned by intent. But the future we know is full of possibility, and so this possibility is allowed to be reflected into the past which we describe. Therefore we allow that the past is only relatively determined, in our descriptions, because this allows the past to be more consistent with the future which we know as undetermined, thereby supporting our physical representations, or models of temporal continuity.

By changing material-discursive practices, measurements and observations of ‘the past’ (marks on bodies) change, which can alter ‘the facts’ of what happened. — Possibility

I really don't understand what you are saying with this statement. Things change, marks on bodies change such that a measurement of the marks might be different in a remeasurement than in the original measurement. But these changes do not happen in the past, they happen at the present, while time is passing. So I do not see how changing material-discursive practices can cause the past to change.

What I’m referring to has nothing to do with counterfactuals or intentionally choosing to ‘change things in the past’ according to the classical ideal of causality. It isn’t that the past or the future consist of possibilities, but that intra-actions “change the very possibilities for change and the nature of change”. In this sense, how we may intra-act in the future with ‘the past’ (through techno-scientific practices, for instance) remains full of possibilities in gaining new information about the past, while other information becomes irrelevant to the future. To paraphrase Barad, since there is no inherent distinction between object and instrument, these ‘possibilities’ cannot meaningfully be attributed to either abstract object (the past) or abstract measuring instrument (the future). — Possibility

There very clearly is a meaningful distinction to be made between the object and instrument, as there clearly is a distinction to be made between the act of operating, and the thing being operated on. To deny this distinction is simply to deny the reality of the distinction between active and passive. And if we deny this then all things become equally active and passive, such that we rob ourselves of any principles of causation, along with any hope of understanding temporal reality.

I've offered many propositions as to how to proceed in making these definitions. I've gotten no agreement from you concerning this procedure. To offer a definition which would undoubtably be rejected because you've shown very clearly that you disagree with the direction I am taking, would only be foolish. Therefore I have no definitions to offer.

If you think this is a cop out then so be it. I think it's simply a recognition that productive discourse is impossible without some agreement, which we have none of. In other words, if we cannot work together to produce the required definitions (which we clearly cannot do), then any proposed definitions would be useless, because I cannot force you to accept what you've demonstrated you will willfully reject.

You've missed my point here. I was countering your assertion that "Time cannot be described or defined without these references" to McTaggart's A-series relations of "past", "present" and "future". The B-series relations are an alternative to the A-series relations. Therefore, time can be described using the B-series instead of the A-series, which refutes your assertion that time cannot be described without reference to the A-series. — Luke

That point is irrelevant. Of course one can define "time" however one wants, but if it's not recognizable as time, then the proposition would be unacceptable, and the definition would be pointless and irrelevant. So really all you've demonstrated is that you misunderstood what I meant.

You might say that this is all that I am doing, seeking to define terms like "present", "past", and "future" in new ways which render them as unrecognizable. But that's why I am taking the time to explain why the things which we know, that bear those names, ought to be understood in this way.

The purpose was to refute your assertion that time cannot be described or defined without reference to the A-series. — Luke

You could have done that simply by stating that one can define a word in any way one desires. It would have the same effect, you would just demonstrate that you misunderstood me.

There's an easy way to settle this dispute which is to provide your definitions of these terms without any reference to a concept of time. I've asked you for these definitions several times now. Are you ever going to provide them? — Luke

I've given you the starting point, the way I would define "the present" with direct reference to the conscious experience of being. I defined it as "activity, things happening". I thought you might agree with this because you had already said "the present is what is happening, occurring". But now I see that you think we need to qualify this with "the time" at which things are happening.

I really do not think that such a qualification would be useful, because "time" is a very misunderstood term, and referring directly to a term which bears a high level of uncertainty would produce a very unstable foundation for any following definitions. That is why I've been seeking to avoid the use of "time" in these definitions.

Unless we can agree on the starting definition, which would be the reference point for the following definitions, there is really no point in proceeding. You would simply say that I am using my free will to define terms however I please, and I am rendering these terms as unrecognizable. There is no point to that. Propositions are proposals, and proposals are useless unless accepted. So unless we can agree on the initial step, the principal proposition, there is no point to me pointing toward the higher steps. You need to accept the truth of the principal premise on its own merits, not by looking at what it might lead to.

My use of tense in "what did happen" (past) and in "what will happen" (future) in contrast to "what is happening" (present) clearly indicates that time is involved here. — Luke

You are demonstrating equivocation here. You switch from B-series "time" to A-series "time" when you make this equivalence, and that is equivocation. That's the usefulness of McTaggart's distinction, we cannot exchange these designators "what did happen", and "what will happen" with "past" and "future", and say that they both, equally imply "time", without an equivocation in the term "time". It requires two very distinct and incompatible conceptions of "time" to make this equivalence.

Therefore rather than indicating that time is involved, you are indicating that what you say is incoherent, relying on an equivocal notion of "time".

Furthermore, as I pointed out it is fundamentally unacceptable to exchange "future" with "what will happen". And, I believe that this difference is at the root of McTaggart's perception of the need to distinguish between A-series and B-series.

This ambiguity in "time" is the reason why we ought to avoid using "time" in our principal proposition. This will allow us to build up a conceptual structure based on the conscious experience of being present. Then we can produce a conception of time which is consistent, and unambiguous, rather than the equivocal use which you promote.

Time is not objectively linear - there is no inherent temporal separability between past and present. Rather, we enact this cut within the phenomenon of experiencing temporality, and the boundaries and properties of ‘the past’ and ‘the present, living being’ remain dynamic, ever-changing in relation to each other, whenever and however they intra-act (as opposed to interact which implies pre-determined boundaries/properties). — Possibility

But what about the future though? Isn't it necessary to have a "cut" between future and past, to distinguish between what is possible and what is impossible. Perhaps you don't believe this?

The apparent determinacy of the past is inseparable from its present intra-action, enacting a particular embodied cut within such intra-action that delineates ‘the past’ from agencies of observation, including ‘the present’. Any difference between one such agential cut and another may not be obvious, but it is NOT zero.

Both the past and the future are full of possibilities in which we can ‘partake’. We are continually reconfiguring, reworking and re-articulating ‘the past’, including what we have previously considered to be ‘determined’ or ‘actual’. — Possibility

Do you really believe this? The possibilities of the past are known as counterfactuals, and that's completely different from the possibilities of the future. If you really believe what you say here, can you explain to me how the past, which we've previously considered to be determined, could consist of real possibilities which we could choose from, to actualize through our actions, just like we do with future possibilities. I mean, aren't you saying we can choose to change things in the past?

Not true. According to John McTaggart's widely referenced classification, "past", "present" and "future" are used to order (or describe) events in time; they are the ordering relations of McTaggart's A-series. Alternatively, events in time can be ordered (or described) using the ordering relations of McTaggart's B-series: "earlier than", "simultaneous with", and "later than". See here. — Luke

The use which you describe here is a way of describing time, just like I argued. This supports what I said, "past", "future", and "present" are used to order events and describe the flow of time. The B-series does not provide us with a conception of "time" in any conventional sense. It is a conception produced by McTaggart and offered as an alternative to the conventional conception of "time". That is similar to what I am doing here, except I am doing it with "the present", offering two distinct ways of conceiving of "the present".

You, however, seem to be having great difficulty recognizing what is "conventional". Since there are many conventions, as I said, we should perhaps use a different word. Maybe "traditional" would be a better word. Instead of talking about what is "conventional", I will use "traditional". The traditional way is the way that our modern usage is grounded, and permeates through the usage of classical physics. The usage of the B-series, since it was just proposed by McTaggart, is limited to modern speculative philosophy and metaphysics, the B-series conception of time is not the traditional conception of time, and so I would argue it is not conventional either.

The rest of your post demonstrates that we did not really agree on how to produce a definition of "the present", when I thought we did. I was assuming something like the following.

I've already answered this. The present is what is happening or occurring;... — Luke

Now I see you do not accept this, and what you really meant was that the present is the time when things are happening or occurring. This means that you think we cannot define or understand "the present" without putting that term into the context of a conception of time.

That is exactly what I am arguing is the mistaken approach. I believe that we need to understand and define "the present" first, with reference directly to conscious experience, independent from any potentially misleading concept of "time". Then we might produce a concept of "time" accordingly. See, the concept of "time" ought to be derived from the concept of "present", rather than vise versa.

So if you cannot dispel this idea, that "the present" must be defined in reference to "the time when...", instead of being defined with direct reference to the conscious experience of being present, then we will not be able to agree on anything here, nor could we make any progress in this discussion.

Perhaps by understanding that ‘the past’ is determined only within phenomenon, and has agential, rather than temporal, separability from either ‘the future’ or ‘the present’. The ‘living being’ does not simply partake, but, like all material bodies, acquires specific boundaries and properties through open-ended dynamics of intra-activity - as Barad says, “humans are part of the world-body space in its dynamic structuration”. — Possibility

I really can't understand this. Could you try to explicate? What does it mean to say that the past has agential separability, for example? And what does "open-ended dynamics of intra-activity" mean?

How does "time" imply the descriptions of past, present and future?
Why do the descriptions of past, present and future not imply time?
What do the descriptions of past, present and future describe, if not time? — Luke

We use "past", "future", "present" to describe and even define "time". Time cannot be described or defined without these references. But we can also use these without referencing time, as I've been demonstrating. We can discuss these concepts, and define these terms "past" "future", and "present", and understand them without any reference to a concept of time. We can refer solely to human experiences, being present, memories and anticipations, and understand those terms without consulting the further abstraction which is the concept of time.

We weren't discussing this. I had been using the words "past", "present" and "future" in accordance with their conventional usage, where they refer to periods of time. Until very recently, I was unaware that you were trying to create new meanings for these words from scratch in order to accommodate your metaphysical theory. — Luke

You were questioning me, on my usage, and my definitions. I was talking about (1) defining "past and future" with reference to the present, and (2) defining "the present" with reference to past and future. Although there was earlier discussion of the present consisting of duration, when we moved on to discussing definitions of these terms, there was no indication that time would be a defining feature.

That you think the convention is that these terms refer to periods of time, is what I believe is your mistake. This is your hidden premise, which made us incapable of agreeing on what the convention is. I thought the convention is to define "present" in reference to past and future, but you thought the convention is to define "past and future" in reference to the present. It now appears like you hold this opinion because of your hidden premise, that all three of these refer to periods of time.

Until very recently, I was unaware that you were trying to create new meanings for these words from scratch in order to accommodate your metaphysical theory. — Luke

I think this is blatant BS. No matter how many times I tell you, that I am making distinctions between the way these words are actually defined in conventional usage, and the way that I think they ought to be defined, you still continue to deny that I am doing this. After I've told you this many times, and you continue to insist that you never knew that this is what i was doing, you must expect the accusation of BS to arise sometime.

Regarding what you say here, what does the word "present" mean when you say "the experience we discussed, being present"? Does it mean the same as when you refer to "the present", as in "past, present and future"? It seems like only moments ago that you were accusing me of conflating the present with one's conscious experience, but it looks like that's exactly what you have done here. — Luke

This is the issue we've been discussing. Does "present" mean the separation between past and future, (past being defined by reference to memories, and future being defined by reference to anticipations), or does "present" mean something derived from the conscious experience of being. I think the former is the convention, and the latter is the way it ought to be.

So now we're getting to the heart of the matter, your question of what does "present" mean, in the context of the conscious experience of being present. I would say that it means to be experiencing activity, things happening. And so this ought to be the defining feature of "the present", activity, things happening.

If there is a difference between "the present" and the experience of "being present", then what is that difference? — Luke

This is the difference I stated earlier, the difference between what is experiencing, and what is being experienced. So if the present is defined by activity, then "experiencing activity", is different from "activity" by that qualification. So "experiencing" is itself a special type of activity which occurs at the present, and that is how it is different from the more general "activity" which is what defines the present. In other words, "present" encompasses all activity, while "the experience of being present" refers to one specific type of activity.

Furthermore, you already acknowledged earlier that the past is not synonymous with memories and the future is not synonymous with anticipations. Here, you say that memories and anticipations "are implied by these terms". But if "past" and "future" are not synonymous with "memories" and "anticipations", and if "past" and "future" are not in reference to time, then how do you define "past" and "future"? — Luke

Do you not recognize a difference between the meaning of "implied by" and "synonymous with"? If "past" and "future" are defined with reference to memories and anticipations, this does not mean that these are synonymous.

According to this logic, you (and everybody else) must have the same hidden premise.

The meanings of the terms "past", "present" and "future" that I have argued for is consistent with their conventional definitions. Look at these and you will see that they are in reference to time. I'm not offering an idiosyncratic metaphysical theory; I'm demonstrating that your theory either relies on the conventional definitions of these terms or else becomes nonsensical.

Now, please explain what any of the terms "past", "present" or "future" mean if they are not in reference to time, as I asked you to in my previous post. Your inability to do so demonstrates that your theory is nonsense. — Luke

This is irrelevant. We agreed to start from a definition of "the present" whereby "the present" is defined with reference to the conscious experience of being present. We both agreed to that. There was no mention of "time" in that agreement. Therefore your mode of referring to "conventional definitions" and "time" is only misleading you, preventing you from looking directly at the conscious experience to provide the definition. Your presupposition, or prejudice, is that the convention is to define "the present" with reference to the conscious experience of being present. Therefore you believe that convention will provide this definition of "the present" for us which refers directly to the conscious experience of being present. But then you resort to the convention of referring to "time".

Now, I've been telling you over and over, that convention has a completely different definition of "the present", which is not at all consistent with the conscious experience of being present. So the truth of the matter is coming out. You desire to define "the present" with reference to the abstract concept, "time", rather than with reference to the conscious experience. But this is contrary to what we agreed on, as the way that "the present" ought to be defined.

Use your capacity to think Luke. None of those terms imply time. "Time" implies the descriptive terms of past present and future, but not vise versa.

As we've been discussing, past, future, and present are defined in reference to each other, and there is no necessity of "time", only the experience we discussed, being present, memories, and anticipations are implied by these terms. "Time" refers to a concept created by a synthesis of these three. And, depending on how they are synthesized the concept varies. hence there are differing concepts of "time".

I suggest that the reason why our discussion has failed to progress is that you have a preconceived idea of "time", and this preconceived idea of "time" requires a specific relationship of past , future, and present. This is your "hidden premise".

Is there only one Trump supporter on this whole forum? — RogueAI

I think that says something about the quality of the forum.

When I say thought, I mean linguistic thought. Love begins in caring and nurture, you know nests, sitting on eggs, wagging your tail when the human looks at you. — unenlightened

Right, that's why I said love is prior to thought, and thought requires love, in the sense that love is necessary for thought. This is evident in human beings, as thoughtfulness is the result of love, and thoughtlessness is what results from a lack of love.

Thought is derived from love, as a necessary precondition. So love is even deeper within the internal than thoughts are.

Being unfolds in time. But thought is unimportant, in the sense that it does nothing to complete us and fill the void, only love can do that. — unenlightened

I would agree that love fills the void, and love is expressed in actions rather than thoughts, but I think thought is still required in a secondary way, as a cause of loving acts. Isn't it true that thoughtfulness is an indication of love, even if love does not actually require thoughtfulness for its existence? I don't see how thoughtlessness could be consistent with "love". This relationship between thoughtfulness and love demonstrates that thoughtfulness is dependent on love, such that love is essential to, or necessary for thoughtfulness. And loving acts are dependent on thoughtfulness in much the same way, such that thoughtfulness is necessary for loving acts. And loving acts are necessary to fill the void.

We might say that love comes from somewhere deeper than thought, and is prior to thought, therefore does not require thought, but the outward actions which express love require thought. So thought is like a filter between love and the actions it produces, it attempts to constrain the actions to be truly consistent with what is needed. Loving acts, though they may succeed in filling the gap of what is lacking, and what is needed, are really just an outward expression, or representation, of the true love which is deep within, as the cause of action. And love itself is even deeper within than thought is, as prior to (cause of) the thoughtfulness which itself is prior to the loving acts as the cause of conformity; that is conforming to what appears to fill the void.

But it's all a backward representation, because the true "void" which needs to be filled, is deepest within,
inherent within the thoughts, inherent within the love itself, whose lacking and need produces the inclination for action in the first place.

But for the rest, it looks to me that you have simply swapped interior and exterior and repeated the Cartesian dualism. — unenlightened

I really cannot understand how dualism is avoidable in an accurate understanding of reality. This is due to the nature of time. The problem is that the future is indeterminate, consisting of possibilities, while the past consists of what actually is determined. Being unfolds in time, as you say, and this is at the present, so the living being partakes in both the undetermined future, full of possibilities, and the determined past, full of actualities. How can we understand this two-fold reality without a dualist framework?

I think - I cannot doubt that I think because to doubt is to think, therefore I am certain of my existence as thought. — unenlightened

What thought signifies to me is need, lacking. We think because we are in need. So when Descartes put thinking in relation to being, he should have recognized that we think because we are lacking in our being. We are, each of us, incomplete. So I think, not because I am, but because I want to be.

Sounds a bit like the internet. But I think you are continuing the Cartesian split and trying to account subjectively for objectivity which must result in the same kind of contradiction - here we are sharing ideas through physical means, are we not? Interior requires an inexplicable exterior and neither can account for the other that it rejects. Can we not reject the split, except as a methodological tool for understanding one aspect of a single world? And then characterise that aspect that our scientific method brackets off, not as another world, and not as ideas, but as the meaning and the caring of the world. — unenlightened

I am not actually denying the exterior. It is what it is, and that is what I described as a faulty representation. That does not make it unreal, as a representation it is real, but faulty. Likewise, "the physical" is very real, as a representation, it is just lacking in its capacity to accurately model how the universe actually behaves. So we can go to the "single world" scenario, but only by recognizing that the scientific method is not properly modeling the single world.

So here's the point. It seems like we share ideas through the external world, speaking writing, radio, internet, etc.. This is what you call physical means. In a basic sense, we reach outward, touch things, and move them around. But these supposed outward movements all come from an inner source, supposedly moving outward, and they end by altering the inner aspects somewhere else.. The supposed outward movement changes the supposed external world, in a way which other people can sense, perceive, and interpret for meaning. But this may be a complete misunderstanding.

Now imagine that there is nothing out there, nothing external, and all this activity is really happening in the internal aspects of bodies, and through the relations of inner space. There must be a boundary between the inner space, and the external nothingness. So each time that it seems like I reach out with my hand to touch something I am really hitting that external boundary behind which is nothing. The activity which you, or anyone else might see, and interpret as me reaching outward and touching an object is really all occurring within internal space, and you're actually seeing it through inner space. Though we model this interaction as occurring through external space, and as the external boundaries of objects hitting and moving each other, the real activity is occurring within the inner space of the objects, and their internal relations to each other. So when I reach out and move the object with my hand, we model it as the external part of my body exerting a force against the external part of the object, and this moves the object. In reality, I am moving it by means of the internal aspects of my body affecting the internal aspects of the object, through inner space, and it simply appears like the external part of my body exerts force on the external part of the object. through external space.

Talk of being penetrated is a little unmanly, and that might explain why philosophers prefer to think that it is no worldly thing, but ghostly phenomena that enters "the mind". — unenlightened

I, am an impenetrable fortress. Nothing, I repeat nothing, from that "external world" can infiltrate my defenses, and move me. All which exists within my mind comes from the inside. Thus is my reality.

There is however, a sense in which ideas come to my mind from somewhere other than my mind. Since they cannot penetrate through my fortress, and enter from the external, and "ghostly phenomena" is silly talk, I conclude that they enter my mind through "inner space". And since the ideas which enter my mind through inner space seem to be very similar to the ideas which enter your mind through inner space, I can conclude that we are very well connected through inner space.

Scare quotes for "the mind" because it seems to imply a universal generalised 'realm of ideas' in which your mind and my mind float ethereally in a universe of ideas, supping on the nourishing philosophies that abide there and remaining essentially disembodied. — unenlightened

Yes, it's good to understand "inner space" in terms of disembodiment because there cannot be any spatial extension, which is a requirement for bodies, in the intensional realm.

"A mind" might better be imagined as the emergent will of the population of cells that constitute a body in interpenetrative relation to an environment. Where 'will' can be understood as the action of the organism, in terms of a discriminating response. Air is taken in, oxygen is preferentially absorbed and CO2 is preferentially released in exhalation, and that discrimination continues until the organism dies. These cells always knew the difference that science has lately named. — unenlightened

Now you've lost me. You're talking about the internal "mind" in terms of external bodies and movements, and things penetrating the impenetrable fortress. I suggest you go back to the drawing board, and refigure your ideas from the inside. Don't let that thing you call "science" penetrate your soul from the outside inward, thereby corrupting the entirety of your mind.

Science is then an aspect of the emergent (constructed) will of a social species, emerging from a 'method' or practice of interaction with the distinguished social and physical environments. The method in turn being distinguished from more varied (chaotic) practices that did not make the hard distinction between the social and the physical as religions and polities. — unenlightened

Science was a mistaken venture from its outset. The human beings thought that they could proceed outward from the inner space, and find freedom in a supposed vast expanse of the assumed outer realm. But they are now finding out that there is really no way to escape the penitentiary to the outside, as there really is no outside, no such thing as an external world, or "outer space". The humans have found out that everything which happens happens through the inside, and we just misrepresent these happenings, and mistakenly misunderstand them through three dimensional or four dimensional geometry which portrays, or models, all this activity as outside.

Until we recognize that true freedom can only be found through inner space, we'll be continually banging our heads against that impenetrable wall to the external; a process which prevents us from the freedom of disembodiment. Why bang our heads endlessly against a barrier which we know from experience has real substantial existence, instead of turning around and finding true freedom through the interrelations of inner space?

Thus a crude physicalism in outline. — unenlightened

Physicalism is dead. The scientific method which kept knocking itself silly by banging its head on the impenetrable boundary has finally given up the ghost, which has retreated to the inner space.