However it appears to reinforce the idea of reversibility of the essential idea from a intensive sentiment, that always appears as a tentative presentation, never able to catch its faith Ian’s confidence of running out of air up ahead. — Bella fekete

Sorry Bella, I just can't make out the principle of reversibility which you are proposing.

On the other hand, if the object I see is not at all like a swan, then I won't be tempted to modify my generalization, so it isn't problematic. — Ludwig V

It cannot be true that it isn't problematic because you've already labeled it as "swan Z". So you are clearly seeing it as a swan, despite it being the wrong colour. If you did not see something about it which made it look like a swan, despite being the wrong colour, you would never have called it "swan Z". Then that black thing would be irrelevant, and you would not even have the example you gave me, because the naming it as a swan was essential to the example.

Well, it's a bit more complicated than that. Generalizations are indeed like a rule, and every application is a new decision. But they are subject to inter-subjective agreement. So, if I want to communicate with others, in unusual circumstances, I need to carry their agreement with me.

Your representation of the relationship between me, the rule and the case is a bit odd, but I'm not a Platonist so it is not worth arguing about. — Ludwig V

The way that I represented generalizations as tools, used in our lives of relating to particulars, makes the fact that they are subject to intersubjective agreement irrelevant. What is important is that the individual's relation with particulars is direct. That the generalizations require intersubjective agreement only reinforces the idea that they are secondary, or posterior to that primary relation (the individuals of the intersubjective relations are themselves particulars).

I think I'll just skip this issue. You are clearly speaking a language different from mine, so there's not prospect of mutual understanding. — Ludwig V

What I think is that "Platonism" in its modern form, what is understood by, and referred to by, that term, is not a good representation of the actual philosophy of Plato. So I disagree with "Platonism" in its modern representation, but I find within the philosophy of Plato, the ways and means to get beyond the problems associated with what is known today as Platonism. The modern conception of Platonism, if intended to represent the philosophy of Plato, is a straw man.

You have a point. But then, you don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, so I don't know what's going on. — Ludwig V

It's not that I don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, intuition strongly tells me that I ought not believe that the chair does any type of interpreting at all. However, I do not see the principles required to exclude the chair, and that is why I argued that we cannot exclude the chair. That would not make sound logic, to simply adopt the propositions which you desire.

The problem is, as I explained, that we do not have a clear and accurate understanding of what it means to interpret. So, despite the fact that you provided the principles of what you called a standard model of interpretation, that model I found to be extremely deficient because it provided no description of the interpreter. Since interpretation is the act of an interpreter, I do not see how one could ever claim to have a model of interpretation which has no reference to the interpreter. So until we know what an "interpreter" is, we cannot exclude the chair as a possible interpreter.

Well, you can't. Since we are talking about an internal relationship that is deduced from elements of an object that differs in its identity from the mind. That is, in order to reduce it to a psychological act you would have to express the internal relationship in terms of a relationship of psychic elements. For example, if we assume that the psyche is nothing more than synaptic processes between neurons, your claim would have to be represented in the form: "this synapse is the relationship of equality between two elements, and it is also an incommensurability." Which is obviously doomed to failure. — JuanZu

I do not reduce the psyche to synaptic processes, so I do not see how this reply is relevant at all. You have in no way addressed the points I made.

It is for this reason that you cannot reduce knowledge to a creation of human genius, even if it has no other origin than humanity. Because knowledge is something like the relationship with something objective. In no case can it justify the objectivity of knowledge based on the particular psychological movements of, in this case, Pythagoras. You may say, “but logic is the condition of objectivity” Well, what you say about geometry (its reduction to psychological acts) you say a fortiori about logic. — JuanZu

Furthermore, as I indicated, you have in no way justified your claim of objectivity in knowledge. And now you simply repeat your unjustified assertion that knowledge is "objective", and use this unsound premise to support your insistence that knowledge cannot be an artificial creation.

If the meaning is nothing more than psychological acts... how can you say that it is the same meaning in each case if they are two different psychic phenomena? — JuanZu

I do not claim that you and I ever associate the very same meaning with the same words. In fact, I think the evidence that different people associate different meaning with the same words is overwhelming, and ought not even need to be discussed. Simply hand two people the same sentence, or the same word, and ask them to write a very inclusive statement as to what it means to them, and compare the reports. You will see that even with very simple concepts like "circle", "square", or "triangle", they will produce a variance. The only time the reports will be the same is if the two people have memorized the same definition. But then they would just write a different interpretation of that same definition anyway. Two people referring to the same definition is the result of learning, which I addressed in the last post, and you seem to have completely ignored for some reason.

The particularity of each case denies its universal formulation, and is not able to justify why it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds, different languages, different cultures, etc. — JuanZu

The point is that this idea, that "it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds" is simply false. Each mind relates to the same words in ways exclusive, and unique to that mind. We might say that it is "essentially the same", but we cannot ignore the accidentals which actually make it not the same.

So am I entitled to conclude from your last sentence that "all swans are white" is only as reliable as the induction that created it in the first place? Fair enough. So "Swan A is white" and "Swan B is white" etc are the premises of the induction? Fair enough. So now I reason that "all swans are white" Then I discover that Swan Z is black. So my generalization and the preceding induction is not reliable. So I need to do one of three things: a) abandon the generalization b) modify the generalization ("swans are white, except in Australia") c) change my definition of a swan ("A swan may be black or which" or the quantifier ("Most swans are white".) — Ludwig V

Another possibility you have not considered, the black thing you saw is not a swan. This is a real possibility, and it is the bigger problem with "seeing" things according to essential properties produced from induction. If swans are known as necessarily white, then your eyes may be closed to many other properties when judging things as a swan. When you see a black thing you would not see it as a swan. And so, if someone suggests that it is a swan, this proposal must be justified by reference to something else, other than colour. That is a real problem with "essential properties".

The swan example is very simple, and so it might not elucidate the principle I'm trying to express, about how the way we see things, is greatly influenced by the way that we learn to see essential properties. We might find better examples in the way that science looks at dividing things into parts, each part having essential properties which make it the part which it is, and that guides us in the way that we divide the thing into parts. The thing must be divided so that the parts have the essential properties which we've expressed as necessary. So for example, an electron is negative and a proton is positive, and we cannot divide the atom in any other way because we've created these categories of essential properties of the parts. However, adhering to these principles produces the need to assume "anti-matter". This should indicate a problem with the restrictions we have dictated.

True, the new generalization is also subject to the same hazards. But what am I supposed to do - abandon all generalizations? I don't think so. There's no pretence involved at any stage. — Ludwig V

You don't seem to have grasped the "pretense" I referred to. Let me try to explain in a different way. The pretense is in the claim that the generalization has provided us a relation with the particular thing. The generalization guides the acting, thinking human being, in one's relation to the particular. So the human being who applies the generalization, as a tool, is really between the generalization and the particular. The relation with the particular, is between the person and the particular, and the generalization is something outside this relation, created for the purpose of enhancing this relation.

Look critically at the way you presented your swan example please. First, you produced the inductive premise, "all swans are white". Then, you proposed "swan Z is black". Surely you see that the proposition of a black swan is contradictory to your inductive premise. What does this indicate? It indicates that you have allowed a relation to the particulars of the world which is distinct from, and not controlled by, nor dependent on those universals, those inductive generalizations. This relationship with the world which you have, allows you to say "Z is a swan" regardless of what the generalizations (rules and regulations) dictate. Therefore we ought to consider that the person's real relationship with the particulars of the world is direct, and the universal, or generalization, is a sort of tool which the individual can use or not use, as one wills.

That is why I said that this idea, that the person relates to the particulars of the world through the generalizations is just a pretense. But that's an ambiguous and finnicky kind of statement because we actually do relate to the particulars through the means of the universals. However, the universals can be looked at as tools, and they are not essential to that relationship, as the direct relationship is prior to, and precedes the existence of the tool, which is created by the desire to enhance or augment the relationship. It is the idea that the universal is prior to, and fundamental to the relationship (as in Platonic idealism), as the medium between the individual person and the particular, which is the pretense.

If my chair does not interpret ("produce interpretations") what I say, there are two possibilities: a) that it produces interpretations of some other thing(s) or (b) causes me to produce interpretations. I deduce that you meant the latter. My mistake. But that does not give any ground for supposing that the chair has a mind or is conscious. — Ludwig V

No, I meant a). Even if we can produce conclusive evidence that your chair does not interpret the words that you say, we cannot exclude the possibility that it is interpreting some other things. We really do not know many aspects of the world, like at the quantum level. So we cannot claim to know exactly what the chair is doing in the basic activity it is engaged in, especially in relation to "interpretation" which is not a clearly defined term with clearly expressed essential properties.

You do represent the prior judgement as intentional, so how do you avoid the infinite regress? — Ludwig V

The infinite regress is avoided in the way outlined by Plato, by assuming the reality of "the good". As explained by Plato, "the good" as the fundamental base for action, activity, or actuality, is unknowable to us human beings, though it is in its essence highly intelligible. That it is essentially intelligible indicates that there is no infinite regress. The appearance of infinite regress is produced by a misrepresentation of what is unknowable to human beings as unknowable in general, or absolutely, like infinite regress.

You are missing the cognitive element in most? all? emotions. If I am afraid of snakes, I have made a judgement about snakes and that judgement is an important part of the judgement about what is needed. Prejudices may be erroneous or ill-founded, but they are nevertheless judgements about what is appropriate in various circumstances - even if I am not aware of them. — Ludwig V

I am not "missing the cognitive element" within the cause of action, I am downplaying it as inessential. This is evident in involuntary acts, reflex, etc.. It is simply not true that you must have made a cognitive judgement to be afraid of snakes. Creatures are born with many such innate fears, prior to the capacity of making cognitive judgements.

1. Something before the interpretation, a text, a picture - something that means something. Call it the original. "Interpretation of...." — Ludwig V

What I am talking about as prior to the interpretation is the condition of the interpreter, before the interpretation. The individual must be capable of interpreting, attentive, and motivated, as interpretation is an act carried out by the thing which interprets. How can you have a "standard model of interpretation" without a representation of what constitutes an interpreter? It is only by properly modeling "the interpreter" that we might exclude the chair as an interpreter.

I've given myself permission to be quite rude in this comment, which I'm hesitant to do in a forum where I'm pretty new, but the points you are holding fast to are so flawed that they're almost actively anti-intellectual. And that's the main reason I'm responding at all. — Jaded Scholar

This is "The Lounge", rudeness is accepted and expected. I understand that it's all good hearted and meant for improvement, self and other, and I hope you do too.

But your last comment has clarified things for me: you obviously just don't understand anything about modern or classical physics and are just parroting random critiques of physics and maths from throughout the ages, which were all valid at the time, but have been turned into jibberish by your comprehensive ignorance of the actual contexts they apply to. — Jaded Scholar

Sound criticism can never be turned into gibberish. It seems you haven't studied philosophy and therefore have no understanding "of the actual contexts they apply to". I have, and do understand the context. Sorry jaded, but it is you whose talk is gibberish in this context.

I literally just detailed in my last response that you are describing a problem that existed in pre-Newtonian classical physics which was solved by Newtonian physics. — Jaded Scholar

The problem was never solved, as is clear from the evidence I cited, the time/frequency uncertainty of the Fourier transform. As I've told others already on this forum, calculus provided a "workaround" for the problem, which was sufficient in the context of the physical problems of the time period, but it was not long before the physicists reached the limits of the applicability of that workaround, and so, the same problem reappeared.

Yeah, thanks for (again) confirming that you don't know what you're talking about. Within Fourier transforms, there is intrinsic uncertainty within first-order terms between time and frequency for the exact same reason that any other integral transformation has an intrinsic uncertainty between conjugate variables, be it time/frequency, position/momentum, gravitational potential/mass density, voltage/charge, etc. There is nothing remotely unique to time itself in this line of argument. — Jaded Scholar

I see you have yet to produce a good response to this issue, only to say that the problem which is derived from a failure in our representation of time is not limited to time. The so-called "discipline" of physics has managed to spread the problem around to all sorts of spatial concepts, producing a more general "uncertainty principle", through its conventional ways of relating space and time.

I don't agree with your definition of "sophistication", which seems to be equivalent to "complexity". My meaning of it in this context was more like "advanced"/"accurate"/etc. — Jaded Scholar

Are you aware of the history of the term "sophistic"? Why are you intent on portraying sophistry as "advanced", "accurate". In reality, sophistication is the oldest form of deception. Add as many slights of the hand as possible, to make things appear to be advanced and accurate, in order to hide the trickery which is really going on underneath. Simply put, "sophisticated" does not imply "advanced" or "accurate", and you definition is a hope filled fantasy, to portray sophistication as advanced and accurate, instead of as an affront to Occam's razor.

What you are saying is a collection of truth-adjacent things, which you have combined into something that is just not true. And you could easily have avoided asserting something this ridiculous if you were interested enough in what you're talking about to spend 30 seconds looking it up online. — Jaded Scholar

Come on Mr. Scholar, what the fuck are you even talking about here? What the hell is a "truth-adjacent thing? (Excuse the rudeness please, but this is The Lounge.) Either it's true or it's false, or would you prefer that we sink ourselves into a world of probabilities, with nothing to ground what is actually the case?

I do slightly object to the value label of "good" maths systems being those which are better tools for modelling our specific reality, but then again, that's the whole point of maths, so it's probably not worth quibbling about here. — Jaded Scholar

Excellent! We almost have agreement on something, except you would overrule my "good" with something "better". What if I overrule your "better" with "The Greatest" (that would be God).

But in keeping with the theme of my rebuttals, both maths itself and our scientific culture have changed a bit since then! — Jaded Scholar

Yes, math has changed "a bit". Unfortunately the fundamentals of circles and angles remain the same, and the glaring contradiction of discrete units within a continuity, just does not want to go away.

Moreover, one of the reasons for modern mathematics no longer being merged with the field of physics is that - as I also mentioned previously - assumptions and value judgements about physicality or "reality" are outside the field of mathematics, which is now primarily directed with finding and fleshing out any and every mathematical system we can think of. This is closest to an actual reason for the abundance of complexity and axioms that you lament: the field is not defined by or limited by an attempt to describe our perceived reality. It seeks to describe all possible mathematical systems. Each of which require axioms to define. — Jaded Scholar

Here we go... Instead of grounding the mathematical principles (axioms) in what is actually the case, truth, as philosophers do with "self-evident" truths, you'd prefer to waste time looking at an infinite number of "possible mathematical systems". Good luck with that endeavour, you can find me in The Lounge sipping some whisky, and from time to time some whiskey.

If you feel the need to reply again, then I challenge you to point out one such problem that has been labelled, and is not something that modern mathematicians want solved (or have already solved). — Jaded Scholar

That's not the issue. You said:

if we could label them, we could have fixed them by now. — Jaded Scholar

Now you're changing your tune to say that the ones which are labeled, "mathematicians want solved". I would urge you to take another step further, if you're truly a scholar who is jaded, and make a critical inspection of all those problems which have been labeled and which you seem to think mathematicians "have already solved". Creating a sophisticated workaround, which is useful in a multitude of situations, but then fails when physics needs a more precise approach to the relation between space and time is not a true solution. And when the mathemagicians use smoke and mirrors in an attempt to demonstrate that the workaround is a true resolution, that is nothing but sophistry.

I think mathematics and science are not perfect tools for modelling the real world. And nailing down the exact nature of their problems is both important and difficult. And I think it does a great disservice to these very valuable pursuits if we pretend that the long-solved problems of their forebears are some kind of inescapable black mark upon them. It can be highly useful to learn from the problems of the past, but the most instructive part of that kind of analysis is how they were solved - another reason it's counterproductive to ignore the fact that those solutions exist. — Jaded Scholar

You are jumping to conclusion. You approach with prejudice, a preconceive bias, that these problems have been "solved". That is what you state "they were solved". But when you approach these problems, Zeno's paradoxes for example, and the irrationality of pi and the square root of 2, with the attitude that these problems have already been solved, you do not look at them as real problems, they are pseudo-problems, because you have presupposed that they are solved.

Instead, you need to approach the problems as they are expressed, exactly as presented at the time, as real problems, and come to understand them as real problems. Then you are in a position to look at the proposed solutions, and judge them as to whether they are real solutions, or just convenient workarounds. You clearly approach from the preconceived idea that the problems have been resolved, and therefore do not understand them as real problems. Newton's law prohibits infinite acceleration, but prohibiting a problem does not resolve the problem.

It's like pretending that all criticisms of horse-drawn carriages are equally valid criticisms of cars. You're not accomplishing anything worthwhile when you muddy the debate by saying that cars are good, but all of the horse dung is a real problem. That's the problem with you doubling down on arguments like "Oh, the problems are clear - they just can't get over [method of thinking they got over a millennia ago]." — Jaded Scholar

This makes no sense. Both cars and carriages have wheels and bearings, so they share the same fundamental problems of friction and inefficiency. Also, cars pollute at least as much as horses do, so the mention of "horse dung" is just a sophistic trick. You might argue that the car is "better" because the very specific issue of "horse dung" is avoided, but the more general problem of "pollution" remains, as the specific "horse dung" is replaced with other forms of the same problem "pollution".

Of course, I'm probably wasting my time by spelling out the problems with your approach. All of the arguments you have doubled down on by basically just repeating yourself and ignoring my refutations (and any other easily accessible information on them) are a series of data points suggesting that you don't actually care about the truth or falsehood of the arguments you are summoning and, for some reason, are primarily motivated by a desire to disagree, and not remotely motivated by any desire to seek out actual truths. — Jaded Scholar

I haven't seen any refutation from you yet, only false premises, and a refusal to accept the truth, through a veiled appeal to possible worlds as somehow more real that actual truth.

When I started writing this response, I was intending to liken your responses to that of a LLM like Chat GPT-4 - nominally referencing a rich variety of information sources, but demonstrating no contextual understanding of any of them - but after a more thorough read of your commentary, I'm quite confident of your humanity. LLMs haven't yet got the exact register we see in humans with nothing to say and a determination to say it as loudly as possible. — Jaded Scholar

Jesus Christ! Likening my work to GPT-4, or LLMs in general, that's the highest compliment you could give anyone. Then you even go one step further, in saying that I actually add a touch of humanity. Thank you very much Jaded Scholar, you live up to your name very well, and welcome to the ideology of skepticism. You are ready to roll.

In my opinion the term "Real" has no place in the discussion because a thing like that, a thing like a triangle simply "gives itself" and presents itself to us as an object of study, without being able to be reduced to a psychological act. — JuanZu

This is what i disagree with. I think that any instance of the conception of a triangle actually does reduce to a purely psychological act. If you assume that it "presents itself" to us, you need to ask how it does this. Then you see that it is a matter of learning, the concept must be learned, and learning is a psychological act.

So, you might ask where did it first come from. There cannot be an infinite regress in time, of human beings teaching each other the concept, it must have come from somewhere in the first place. This is easily understood as a matter of creative genius. As is evident in all axioms of mathematics, they are clearly thought up by human beings, created by them. With modern math, we see a clear history of who created what, the history is very well documented. In ancient conceptions such as the right angle, the documentation is not there, but there is no reason to think that the process was any different in principle.

To say that there is an incommensurability in its being does not add to or take away anything from the fact that it is presented and given to our knowledge and has effects on it. That is why it is objective, since an internal relationship can be established, whether one of incommensurability, which tells us what a triangle like this – is. — JuanZu

This claim of "objective" is unjustified. That the triangle is "presented and given to our knowledge" is supported only by the evidence of learning. And inter-subjectivity does not objectify. Furthermore, there obviously cannot be an infinite regress of learning. This is why Plato investigated the theory of recollection in The Meno. But this theory has its own problems, which Aristotle expounded on. Aristotle's solution was that the geometrical constructions only exist potentially, prior to being actualized by the mind of the geometer. But something which exists only potentially cannot be an "object", and potential cannot be said to be "objective".

If the specifics don't conform to the generalization, it's a problem for the generalization, not for the specific. — Ludwig V

This is not true. The issue is the way that the specific is related to the generalization, and whether the relationship assumed is logical or illogical. Your example assumed a relation between the specific and the generalization which was not implied by the generalization. This fallacious or illogical relation produced a claim that there is a problem with the generalization, when the real problem was with misapplication of the generalization.. Andt since this supposed problem with the generalization is only produced through the means of an illogical relation with the specific, the claim that it indicates a problem with the generalization is not justified.

Here's an example which is analogous to the mistake you made. Suppose I make the proposition that we see electromagnetic waves as colour. Then you mention some specific wavelengths like ultraviolet, and infrared, which are outside the visible range, claiming that this is evidence that my proposition is false. The specifics do not conform therefore there is a problem with the generalization. But my proposition does not state that we see "all" electromagnetic waves, so the relation which that claim relies on is not justified by logic, it is illogical. What would really be the case in this instance is that you misunderstood, and therefore misapplied the generalization.

That is the same sort of illogical relation between the specific and the generalization, which your other argument relied on. I make the proposition that a chair produces interpretations. You say that a chair does not interpret what I say, therefore a chair does not produce interpretations.

How do you know that? Surely, if we can know that their perceptions of the world are different from ours, we can "relate" to them. — Ludwig V

This is a common epistemological problem. It is commonly represented in the form of 'We can know causes from their effects, without establishing a direct relation with the cause itself'. We do this through the means of generalization, principally inductive reasoning. But inductive reasoning does not have precise rules and therefore does not provide the level of certainty which some epistemologists require for "knowledge" so they expose problems like Hume did.

The issue you point to here is ambiguity in the use of the term "relate". There is a vast multitude of different ways which "relations" may be made, implying a multitude of types of "relations". Sometimes we do not properly distinguish between different types of relations, and ignore the fact that certain types produce a much higher degree of certainty than other types.

So you are correct to say that if we can know that other animals have perceptions, we can "relate" to these perceptions, but what happens with this type of reasoning is that the former, "animals have perceptions" is a generalization, while the latter "we can relate to these perceptions" expresses a proposition about some specifics. The relationship with the mentioned specifics, "perceptions" is established through the means of the generalization which is naturally lacking in certainty. The relation is not direct between the subject and the particular. This type of relation inverts the true order of necessity, so it is a completely different type of relation, i.e. it lacks in necessity due to the inversion.

Here's an example "all grass is green" is a generalization. We can say that this proposition provides a relation to individual blades of grass, that each one must be green, but it's really just a pretend relation to individual blades of grass. And because it's just a pretense, despite the fact that you may call it a relation, the knowledge derived here is only as reliable as the inductive reasoning which created the generalization in the first place. So if I tell you that I have a blade of grass in my hand, and you think that the generalization provides you with a relation to that blade of grass, you'll conclude that the blade of grass in my hand is green. But it might actually be brown, or some other colour, because the generalization is faulty. And that's why I say that this type of relation. though it is correct to call it a relation, is a sort of pretend relation, because it's not direct, it goes through the intermediary of a generalization and therefore is only as reliable as the generalization. Further analysis shows that the relation is not with actual individuals, but possible individuals.

I would say that this is the case with the generalizations I provided, first that other animals have perceptions, and second, that they are different from ours. These generalizations are to some extent unreliable as produced from a sort of inductive reasoning. Now you say that if we know that the perceptions are different from ours, then obviously we relate to them, but this is what I called a pretend relation, through the intermediary of the generalizations. My principle was that different people have different perceptions, and I extrapolated to other animals having different perceptions.

So if I talk about a person on the other side of the world, whom I know has different perceptions from me, through that generalization, this does not mean that I have established a relation with the perceptions of a person on the other side of the world. It's purely fictional, just a pretense, created by the generalization, but the generalization creates the illusion that I am actually saying something real about a real person's perceptions, and I actually have a relation with those perceptions.

So we formulate a judgement, which is not an interpretation, and then promote it to an interpretation and then decide whether it is correct or not? At first sight, it would resolve my problem. But what is this promotion process? — Ludwig V

No, I think what I said is the inverse of that. We form an interpretation, but the interpretation is not a judgement at all. Then afterwards the interpretation is judged as correct or not. I might have confused you though, because I then said that the interpretation is itself is purposeful, intentional, and therefore aimed or directed by some form of good. So I would not characterize the interpretation itself as a judgement, but an action which is the product of this more base form of intention, which may be called a form of judgement. Interpretation is more like a tool of intentionality which lies between two distinct forms of judgement, the judgement which directs its production, and the judgement which judges the correctness of it, afterwards. The judgement which is prior to the interpretation is a judgement of what is needed, the interpretation itself is the act deemed as required to fulfil the need, and the posterior judgement determines successfulness. The process of trial and error can be understood in this way. Far too often though, the judgement made prior to the trial and error action is represented as non-intentional, to avoid an infinite regress of intentional acts.

To put the point another way, surely to make a judgement is normally to evaluate it as correct? — Ludwig V

I think we really need to recognize two very distinct forms of judgement, the prior and the posterior, in relation to the act. The prior judgement, as a judgement of what is needed, the act required, or means to the end, cannot really be characterized as a judgement of correctness. It can sometimes be seen as a judgement of "the correct act" but most often it cannot. If we start to characterize the prior judgement as a judgement of correctness, we start to portray all intentional act as a matter of following rules. The act would be determined by a rule, and this rule would produce a judgement of the correct act for the circumstances. But this is not how we think and act in real situations. The need to act is influenced by emotions and all sorts of subconscious things which cannot be described as judgements of correctness.

Some interpretations seem to be based on a process that we are not subjectively aware of. The usual term for that is unconscious, which is distinct from non-conscious. Non-conscious beings neither have nor lack an unconscious. — Ludwig V

Yes, this is the point. If interpretation is a form of action, then the judgement which is prior to the action, which brings the action into existence, must be subconscious (I don't understand the distinction between unconscious and non-conscious which you point to). This produces the need to consider distinct forms of judgement, the prior and posterior, as explained above.

I'm not trying to disassociate it. I'm trying to understand it. I'm arguing that there is a problem with the standard model of interpretation. — Ludwig V

I don't believe there is a standard model of interpretation.

This value of the square root of the sum of the squares of the legs would be closer –closer than anything– to X, with X being an irrational number. — JuanZu

In my opinion you have this inverted. The value of the square root of the sum of the legs is something indeterminate, a number which cannot be expressed. We might signify this with X, but X then signifies a value which is impossible to determine, and therefore impossible to express numerically. That's probably why pi is called "pi" rather than expressed as a number. It cannot be expressed as a number. The irrational number is our attempt to express this value, which is close to what is signified by X, but not X.

On the other hand, you call a real object one that is logically consistent. I, however, regarding the case, would speak of a qualitative incompatibility in the objective nature of the right triangle as an object. Adding the term "Real" or "not real" would not make much sense once we consider it this way. — JuanZu

It was not a matter of adding the word "real", it was a matter of describing what makes an object real what constitutes "realness", or "objectiveness". The issue was how do we get from stated properties, to the conclusion that the thing with those properties has real, objective existence. My proposal was that to be a real object the stated properties must be logically consistent. So the "qualitative incompatibility" you speak of would exclude the "objective nature" of the triangle, leaving it as something other than a real object.

Yes, but the sense-datum is supposed to be what is left when all assumptions are set aside. — Ludwig V

I know, and that's why it's incoherent to say that the sense-datum is what is seen, because seeing necessarily involves what you call "assumptions". What is seen includes "assumptions".

So the chair you are sitting on might understand what you are saying, and your dustbin might understand that to-day is the day it gets emptied? — Ludwig V

You are citing specifics again, and that is a problem. If the chair is capable of making an interpretation, this does not imply that the chair is capable of understanding what I am saying. What the chair is interpreting might be something that we have no idea of. The dustbin example suffers the same problem.

That's the complexity of "interpretation". I am not necessarily capable of interpreting the same thing with meaning that you are capable of interpreting. And, I might not even recognize as meaningful, something which you are capable of interpreting the meaning of. Furthermore, all these difficulties make it so that we cannot even understand exactly what the act of interpreting actually consists of, so we can't even say for sure whether a chair is interpreting or not. We'll say that the chair does not interpret in the way that human beings do, but since other animals interpret in other ways which we really cannot relate to, we can't rule out the possibility that plants and even inanimate objects might themselves have different modes of interpretation.

. Something that is not conscious cannot understand or misunderstand, so your argument does not "break the link". — Ludwig V

The argument holds, because neither understanding nor misunderstanding can be implied by "interpretation" itself. These are judgements made as to correct or incorrect interpretation. Therefore understanding and misunderstanding are not things intrinsic to the interpretation, but are determinations attributed to the interpretations post hoc, often by a third party. The interpreter does not necessarily assume to understand, nor to misunderstand, in the act of interpretation. Nor does the interpreter necessarily believe that the interpretation must be one or the other of these two. What is done is merely interpretation, a judgement of meaning. So the non-conscious cannot be excluded from interpretation through the requirement of understanding or misunderstanding. However, there is necessarily some underlying inclination toward a good, or intention, purpose, which drives the act as an act of judgement. But acting with purpose, intention, is not restricted to consciousness.

So we learn pretty quickly what works and what doesn't. That's the basis for how we see something. Interpretation can play a role sometimes, but I'm not sure it's meaningful to suppose that it always plays a role. — Ludwig V

"What works and what doesn't" implies purpose, and purpose implies intention. And any act with intention has meaning, as what was meant. So I do not think you can disassociate interpretation from seeing in this way. If learning to see is a matter of learning "what works and what doesn't", then it is directed by intention and judgements of value and meaning are involved, therefore interpretation is involved.

But isn't that just for the case where the length of each leg is 1? — JuanZu

That is the proposed equality. When the two legs are proposed as equal, the problem of incommensurability arises. Therefore I propose that we ought to conclude that they cannot actually be equal.

On the other hand, I would like to know what you mean by "Real Object." — JuanZu

Let's say that a real object is something which has a description which is logically consistent. If a logical problem in the description of the object, such as contradiction, is evident, then the described object cannot be a real object. So the logical problem with the right angled object is the incommensurability of the two sides, as explained above. This logical inconsistency indicates that the object described cannot be a real object.

We find a very similar problem with "the circle". The square and the circle are two very distinct ways of representing two dimensional "objects", two straight lines at an angle, or a curved line. Both have a very similar logical problem. There is also another similar problem which arises from the distinction between a one dimensional line, and a zero dimensional point. What I propose is that what we ought to conclude is that the "dimensional" representation of objects is logically flawed, and therefore does not accurately represent "real objects".

So now I ask whether "those differences result from differences in what is seen, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear." — Ludwig V

It makes no sense to ask that question. Memories and anticipations inhere within, and are necessary to, the act of seeing. Therefore differences in what is remembered or anticipated manifest as differences in what is seen. The distinction you ask for cannot be made.

If a plant produced interpretations of its world, it would be conscious. If an AI produced some sort of interpretation, it would have some sort of consciousness. — Ludwig V

All you are doing is unnecessarily restricting the meaning of "interpretation" in a way so that only consciousness can perform the act which produces an interpretation. The problem is that I do not see the reason for this restriction. I see very little in any conventional definition, or use of the word, to support your requested restriction.

The word is generally used to signify an act which presents the meaning of something, and "an interpretation" would be an instance of what is produced by this act. There is nothing to indicate to me that this type of act could only be carried out by a consciousness. There is however, an implication of "understanding" in some usage, but this is somewhat problematic. Nothing necessitates that the interpretation consists of understanding rather than misunderstanding. Since the interpretation might equally be misunderstanding as well as understanding, we cannot say that "understanding" is implied by "interpretation", so the link between consciousness and interpretation may be denied in that way.

But that is only my, very subjective, interpretation of "interpretation". And of course, I admit that it may be a misunderstanding. But this leaves me with no principles to distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect. Therefore the principles which distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect, or in general, good from bad, cannot be derived from sense-data, which would require interpretation. A judgement of this kind must be prior to, and active in the production of the interpretation. That makes the perspective of "sense-data" ontologically problematic because our innate sense of good and bad must be derived in some means other than through the senses, because it must have an active role in the process of interpretation.

You seem to have a restricted concept of a “real object.” It is also not clear to me how you deny that the Pythagorean theorem tells us anything about right triangles. — JuanZu

I did not deny that the Pythagorean theorem tells us anything about right angle triangles. What I clearly said is that it demonstrates to us is that this type of triangle is not a real object. If you do not agree with the reasons I gave for this conclusion, then you could have simply said so.

"Something about X" means that we are pointing out a property of X. In this case, an equality between the parts that constitute the object called "Right Triangle". — JuanZu

The problem is that there is no such equality between the parts, hence the irrational ratio between the two legs. This irrational ratio is known as the square root of two. If the proposition states that the two legs are equal then the straight distance between the two defined points, known as the hypotenuse, is an indefinite distance, unmeasurable. It is said to be irrational. This indicates that in actuality there is an incommensurability between the two legs which are assumed to be equal, such that they cannot actually be equal. The proposition that they are equal, forces the logical conclusion that the hypotenuse is indefinite, irrational, therefore the proposition that they could be equal must be rejected as illogical.

Different interpretations of a picture presuppose a picture that is the original and mediates between interpretations. — Ludwig V

You're missing the point. You are assuming "a picture". But if some of the different interpretations of the supposed "same thing", do include "a picture", there is nothing to suppose as the original except the assumption of "the same thing". But if the interpretations are different, where's the logic in assuming that they are interpretations of the same thing in the first place?

I'm not clear whether those differences result from differences in what is seen (unlikely, but possible) or differences in what they notice or attend to, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear. — Ludwig V

This is the problem, "seeing" requires noticing and attending to. This mental activity constitutes a basic part of seeing, such that there is no seeing without it. Therefore, premising that the difference is due to a difference in attention does not imply that the difference is not also a difference in what is seen, because attention plays an active role in determining what is seen.

I understand what speculation means in ordinary life, but in cases like this, I lose my bearings. How do you manage? — Ludwig V

I have no problem with this, it seems to come naturally for me. See, you and I have very distinct modes of interpretation. Can you imagine that a plant might produce interpretations of its world? We can go far beyond "consciousness", in our speculations about interpretations. What about a non-conscious machine, an AI or something, couldn't that thing being doing some sort of interpretations?

Well, in both cases it doesn't add anything that we can say is a property of this type of triangle. With this example we can deduce that the objective properties of things, the being of things, is not reducible to subjective experience, whether understood as perspective. A judgment, therefore, if it hopes to be true, must exceed the order of perception and perspective. — JuanZu

The Pythagorean theorem makes the two perpendicular lines of a square as in commensurable. This is known as the fact that the square root of two is irrational. Because of this irrationality we cannot conceive of "this type of triangle" as a real object, with real "objective properties". There is inherent within this supposed object, "this type of triangle", a fundamental irrationality.

"Translation" here is an idea that came up earlier in the discussion. It treat the idea of sense-data as a question of language than of metaphysics. — Ludwig V

I think this is very good, and it is an important aspect of the "sense-data" perspective. We need to look at all acts of sensing as acts of interpreting. The tendency is to think that all human beings sense things in the same way, due to similar physical constitution. But just like we each interpret the same proposition in a unique, slightly different way from others, so we also interpret sense-data in a unique way. The difference becomes evident and very significant when one undergoes certain illnesses, toxins, hallucinogens, etc.. But simple experiments can demonstrate the magnitude of the fundamental differences unique to each being. For example, line up a group of people facing a particular direction, tell them to take mental note of what they see, then have them turn around and write it down.

But it is difficult to imagine a different way of interpreting the world which was completely incomprehensible to human beings - we couldn't even identify it as an interpretation of the world. (That's a vey brief gesture towards how the argument might go.) — Ludwig V

I would say that such a thing is not difficult at all. Consider the human being's temporal perspective, one's "present" in time. The average person's "present" is said by psychologists to be about two to three seconds. This time period, the temporal frame of reference, grounds what we know as the present state, "what is", the base for interpretation of the world. Now imagine if one's temporal frame of reference was a couple billion years, or just a couple nanoseconds. Each of these would give us a completely different grounding for "what is", at the present time. The extremely long frame of reference would have billions of years of celestial motions all blurred into one "now", while the extremely short frame of reference would show precise positioning of tiny fundamental particles. To me, when the temporal frame of reference is considered, it is not at all difficult to imagine that there would be ways of interpreting the world which would be completely incomprehensible to human beings.

Is there not in all philosophy and science an intention of truth, of objectivity, of universality of discourse? Therefore, isn't the skeptic's doubt a gesture in a certain sense that is anti-philosophical and anti-scientific? Doesn't it necessarily fall into the liar's paradox? Doubting the world would be like cutting the branch on which I am sitting, waiting for the tree to fall and not the branch. — JuanZu

No, the skeptic's doubt is the way toward truth. This is because we tend to accept statements propositions, etc., as true without proper scrutiny. We often accept conditions such as authority, convention, usefulness, efficiency, as indications of truth. Then these ideas, which we accept not because they've been shown to be true, but for some other pragmatic purpose, become entrenched into our methods, techniques, etc., as habits. The skeptic sees the need to inquire into all these principles which form the basis of these habits, to distinguish good from bad.

Doubting the world is not like cutting the branch which one is sitting on, it is to question whether it is correct to assume that I am sitting on a branch. The difference is that doubting precedes action, and therefore it is very useful in preventing mistaken action, but you portray it as a mistaken action. That's a false representation of the skeptic's doubt.

You don't seem to understand the difference between a closed and an isolated system. — Lionino

I am ready for a descriptive explanation, if you care to give it a go.

Whether a closed or isolated system are physically possible is irrelevant as it is a concept, not a theory, which, like in everything in physics, makes an approximation of reality. — Lionino

So we agree on this, except maybe terminology, you say "concept", I say "theory". Whatever. Now, my point was that if we get swayed by the idea (which is proposed in some metaphysics) that this "approximation of reality", is a representation of what really exists, we will be misled.

The inside of an average-sized black hole may be treated as a closed system when no matter is entering the event horizon, as the Hawking radiation emitted every second or even year is nothing compared to the billions of billions of tons of mass the BH has. — Lionino

Didn't you just say that a closed system is a concept which "makes an approximation of reality"? Why would you now say that a black hole ought to be treated in this way? Do you understand why it was so difficult for ancient astronomers to figure out the true nature of the solar system? It was because they were treating the orbits of the planets as perfect circles rather than as ellipses. This is how the ideals mislead us, and modern science has numerous examples, black bodies, white bodies, etc..

What? Isn't a lab part of nature? — Lionino

No, a lab is not natural, it is artificial, and "natural" is defined as not artificial.

When we need to calculate the voltage a heater/boiler must take, should we not treat the heater as a closed system because supposedly it is not natural? — Lionino

There are energy loses, therefore the system is not truly closed. This is understood under the concept of efficiency.

What energy is lost to entropy? Entropy and energy are different measurements. — Lionino

No system has 100% efficiency, therefore energy is always lost from a system.

2 - closed or isolated system are not theories. There is no theory in physics where it says "there is a (true) closed system", physics does not make existential statements even though it relies on them. Open, closed, isolated system are abstract concepts used to specify the conditions of a system. You could replace those words by ΔE = 0, Δm > 0, Δm = 0, if it helps you solve the exercise faster. — Lionino

So, as I said there is no such thing as a truly closed system. A "closed system" is an ideal which represents nothing natural or artificial, it is a theory only. Not only that, but as I explained, it is impossible for a closed system to actually exist, either naturally or artificially, such a thing is actually impossible. So we must respect this fact, and not allow ourselves to be misled by the idea that a closed system could actually exist.

o? Your inability to see is not my problem. Tell me the illogic. What is wrong with proposing the Universe is created by conscious observation of probability waves? — ken2esq

Let me put it this way. How would a person know oneself to be observing "probability waves"? What are the identifying features of these, so that I can find them in the universe and observe some?

I look out and I see a universe, and I observe this universe. You say, that the universe which I observe has been created by some other consciousness observing probability waves. But you seem to be incapable of telling me what a probability wave is, and how a consciousness could observe one, or a bunch of them.

Tell you what: Google Schroedinger's cat, read up on the concept of probability waves being intrinsic to reality. You seem to be bereft of basic science to claim probability waves are "magic." — ken2esq

It's your theory, so I want to see it explained by you. What type of existence do you think that a probability wave has, and how do you think that a consciousness could observe probability waves? This type of explanation is required so that I can judge the logic of your theory.

It seems to me that there is a confusion about what "measurement" means. When we measure [for our case in the process of wave function collapse] we are not “Becoming aware” of a phenomenon, but rather we are physically intervening in the state of quantum coherence, which causes the collapse of the wave function. Introducing consciousness as the cause of quantum decoherence or wave function collapse is a very common error in interpretations of quantum physics: Transcategorical Error. This error consists of introducing notions and concepts that in fact do not and cannot operate in scientific practice.

That is why, taking the above into consideration, instead of using the notions of consciousness and the like, which are rather confusing, we should prefer to describe the phenomenon as the moment in which an isolated or closed system opens up for the environment to intervene. . This frees us from believing that the physical world is in a state of permanent decoherence waiting to be "perceived" so that it acquires the classical properties of physics. In a certain sense it is like saying that the universe measures itself, but this measurement is nothing more than the moment in which the environment intervenes in a closed and coherent system. — JuanZu

With reference to the title of this thread, "science" in its modern form creates, rather than discovers reality. With this context in mind, we ought to properly respect the fact that the supposed "isolated or closed system" which the physicist produces in some form of laboratory, is completely artificial. This artificial situation is not at all natural, because such closed systems do not actually exist naturally. Furthermore, the assumed closedness of the supposed "closed system" is not real, or a true closure, because there is an issue of how, or where, does the energy which is lost to entropy escape the parameters of "the closed system".

So we can see that the use of this type of assumption, "an isolated or closed system" is problematic in two distinct ways. First, the so-called "closed system" is an artificial arrangement which does not at all represent anything natural. Second, our failed attempts to create such a "closed system" demonstrate to us, through the use of the scientific method and inductive reasoning, that such a theory, that there is a thing which could be known as "an isolated or closed system" has actually been demonstrated to be false. It is impossible within the real physical world that we inhabit, to have a fully "closed system". Therefore we need to be very wary when interpreting observations which reference "an isolated or closed system", because we can be absolutely certain that this is a faulty and untrue concept, the use of which may significantly mislead us.

It is not the creation of novel particles it is just normal light waves such as are all around us, and seeing how the electrons that comprise the light waves exist in a state of uncertainty as probability waves until observed / detected. — ken2esq

You keep referring to "probability waves", but you give absolutely no explanation as to what a probability wave is. So you claim to have a grand theory which employs a mystical substance, "probability waves", along with the self-evident reality of "consciousness", to magically solve all the problems of physics. That's fine, but it really doesn't do anything for metaphysics unless you can show how this mystical substance, which your mind attributes magical powers to in your fantasies, has any real existence.

Bottom line is, this is the only explanation that resolves Fermi's Paradox. — ken2esq

You insist that this theory of a magical mystical substance called "probability waves", along with an equally obscure conception of "consciousness", is "the only" explanation which resolves "Fermi's paradox". And this is how you justify the credibility of your theory. Perhaps you ought to explain how you understand Fermi's paradox, and what leads you to believe that your theory is the only theory which could explain it.

All I see is a very naive form of Cartesian dualism in which "matter" is replaced by "probability waves" and "mind" is replaced by "consciousness".

All the particles created in labs are just that, particles created in labs. There is no necessity that anything like these particles might actually exist in a supposed independent reality. We know that human beings have created many substances, even elements. They also create supposed fundamental particles.

What the wave function represents might be claimed to be some sort of independent reality, but those conceptions are so deficient and insufficient, that true reality remains completely unknown.

One has to choose whenever roads diverge. And in order to make a choice, one has to believe one can freely choose, and has to choose or else remain forever in the wood. It is always some other philosopher or poet who claims that one's choice is not free but predetermined, but for oneself, as for that other herself, one has to make the choice whatever one believes just as if one were free to choose. — unenlightened

This is exactly the point Aristotle made. We can can ask about whether or not the truth about a chosen act precedes the act itself, as if whatever happens will happen necessarily, and even claim that it does (determinism), but we cannot live this way.

So, to avoid the hypocrisy of living our lives in a way other than what we claim to believe, we ought to admit to ourselves that we do not believe in determinism.

@Corvus
Check this reading group: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13614/reading-group-humes-of-skepticism-with-regard-to-the-senses

Hume displays a slightly faulty way of understanding sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Any relevant quotes from Hume? — Corvus

What do you want me to do, quote all the places where Hume is wrong?

Look at his Treatise of Human Understanding Bk 1, Sec 4, part 2 where he discusses the skepticism in regard to the existence of body, for example. The issue is stated as the continued and distinct existence of body. He proceeds from his earlier described premise, that sensation produces "impressions", and says "...they convey to us nothing but a single perception... ", p189. What I argued is that this is a simple misrepresentation. The senses do not provide us with any individual impressions like that. There is a multitude of senses active all at the same time, and time involves duration, so what the senses are sensing is itself activity, not single perceptions. The 'activity' which the senses are actually directed toward, then gets misrepresented by Hume, as what occurs in between the distinct instances of single perceptions, making a temporal succession of instances of perceptions, the sensations of single perceptions.

The problem is that Hume has actually reversed the roles of sense and mind here. The senses actually provide us with a continuity of activity, extended in time, which is only broken by turning one's attention away from the world being sensed. But Hume represents the senses as producing "single", distinct and individual impressions, which are already divided into discrete units, instead of properly representing the senses as providing the fundamental continuity of activity, which is only broken by the mind imposing interruptions to the continuous act of sensing. Notice in the following quote, how he begins from the assumption of a multitude of individual "impressions" provided by the senses, rather than the continuous activity which the senses actually provide us with.

First, That, properly speaking, ’tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses ; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present. — Hume, Treatise of Human Understanding, p191

And according to Hume, reason keeps asking and tries to ensure more accuracy and certainty on the knowledge it is inspecting, but the more it reflects, the less accurate, and less certain the knowledge and beliefs becomes due to the nature of the external world - changing and fleeting. But that is the nature of human reasoning, so why does he deny the point of reasoning for justification of the beliefs on the existence of the world? Doesn't it sound like a contradiction?
Should he not have said that for more accuracy and certainty of the belief on the existence of the world, on-going reasoning is needed accompanied by new up-to-date sensory perception on the world when and wherever possible, which will provide us with more justified belief on the existence? — Corvus

Hume displays a slightly faulty way of understanding sensation. He thought that we sense the world to be in a specific condition (like a state of existence) at one time, then we sense another condition at a later time, but in reality sensation always occurs over a period of time, and we sense activity in that time, a world of change rather than a state of existence. The 'state of existence' or the specific condition of the world at a point in time, is a conceptual product derived by the mind, not the senses.

This is an important difference because if one looks at an area at one time, then looks away, and looks back in the same direction later, all the sameness which one sees must be a product of the mind rather than a product of the senses which are sensing activity, change, and not unchangingness. Our conception of "the world", or "a world" is therefore based in this idea of the temporal continuity of sameness and not directly supported by sensation. It is only the mind reviewing empirical information which produces this idea of "the world".

Because of this way that "the world" is produced, it is logically impossible to deny that the world exists when one is not looking at it, or sensing it, because this would be self-contradictory. "The world" itself, as a concept, is a concept of something not sensed in the first place, so it has no reliance on sensation. And, since the concept is produced to account for the reality of the unchangingness which is not sensed, and is understood to continue through time while not being sensed, it would be contradictory to say that this unchangingness which is not actually sensed in the first place, requires being sensed to be real.

The proper approach then, to deny the reality of "the world" is to demonstrate that the idea is flawed. This would mean showing that the temporal continuity of sameness which the mind projects onto the world is somehow a flawed principle. Hume takes the reverse perspective, assuming that we sense the sameness (when we really sense activity), and then he argues that change to the world must be justified by the mind. But in reality a temporal duration of change is what is directly sensed, so it need not be justified, and the idea that there is "a world", something which remains the same with an identity of being the same thing, "the world" over a period of time during which change is being sensed, is what needs to be justified.

When I say "t=0" in this case, I'm using it as a shorthand for the much more difficult-to-characterise hypothetical boundary where our mathematical models interpolate the existence of spacetime itself, as we know it, to exist on this side, and to not be able to exist on the other side. This is very different from what you are talking about; the arbitrary assignment of t=0 on a number line to define the subset of a Cartesian plane that we care about. Though I admit that I did not communicate that at all (in fact, I deliberately avoided it). — Jaded Scholar

What I\m talking about is better understood through principles of calculus. The "t=0" represents the limit, and the problem is in approaching the limit. We use a t=0 for any type of temporal measurement, so any measurement made very close to t=0, i.e. a short period of time, has that problem.

This claim about Newtonian mechanics does not make sense. It confused me so much that I honestly think you can't be as wrong as I think and you are more likely to be referring to something I'm not getting. One of the biggest benefits of Newtonian mechanics over pre-Newtonian classical mechanics was that the second law eliminated the artefact of infinite acceleration (except for massless particles). — Jaded Scholar

Suppose something is at rest. Then it is moving because it has been subjected to a force. There is a point in time, when it changes from being at rest, to being in motion. At this point in time, its rate of acceleration must be infinite.

But I am confident that in your next line you really are just misinterpreting the nature of wave mechanics and/or Fourier transformation. The temporal uncertainty you refer to here has nothing to do with time itself, and is a straightforward result of transformation between any given noncommutative dimensions - none of which are *necessarily* time. — Jaded Scholar

I believe the uncertainty is based in a time/frequency relation.

Again, I agree, but do not think this is actually meaningful here, and comes across as actively un-meaningful. Along the lines of: "Sure, we don't understand the Big Bang, but like, do we really understand ANYTHING, man?". — Jaded Scholar

Exactly, our understanding of anything is incomplete, therefore deficient, lacking,

So I'm incredibly confident that the problem of Platonic idealism has been solved, as far as it applies to our mathematical and scientific culture. — Jaded Scholar

I don't think so. Set theory in general, presupposes that numbers are objects, Platonic Idealism. This results in numerous problems starting with the empty set, and the infinite set, and stuff like Russel's paradox. Set theory is relatively modern, the problems have not been solved only made more complex by attempts to cover them up through the introduction of more and more axioms.

I think it is both safe and responsible to assume that one of the fundamental barriers to our full understanding of the universe is that mathematics itself may not yet be sophisticated enough. — Jaded Scholar

I agree with this to an extent. But I do not think that it is sophistication which makes good math, I think the opposite. Good math is based in simple principles with universal applicability. When the principles are lacking in universal applicability, instead of throwing them away and starting at the bottom with more applicable ones, the tendency is just to adapt the old, add a few new axioms to make things work in the difficult areas. This works for a while, until new problems present themselves, so new axioms are added. The mathematics gets more and more sophisticated, but the sophistication is not evidence of good principles, but the contrary, it is evidence of basic principles which are faulty, not universally applicable. So they require addendums to work in different areas.

Whatever the gaps are, they are not what you described - if we could label them, we could have fixed them by now. — Jaded Scholar

The problem is that no one wants to fix them. The principles work in most situations, so they do not need fixing. Then for the places where they do not work, keep using them and add some more principles to make them sort of work. Look, thousands of years ago Pythagoras label pi and the diagonal of a square as "irrational". To me, this indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the dimensional representation of space. But who cares, the principles work, and when it turns out that real circles in the real world are not actually circular, but ellipses and things like that, we just adapt "the circle" and pi principles to make them work in the real world. But you cannot say that these problems haven't been labeled.

Understanding is inherently tied to reason, which serves as an explanation or justification. If something cannot be articulated in a logically consistent manner, it implies a lack of understanding. Reason and mathematics are effective precisely because the universe operates fundamentally on principles of reason and mathematics, which leads to determinism. "In the beginning was the Logos", the fundamental logic behind the universe, underlying the natural order of things. — punos

Of course you recognize that there is an agent involved in such understanding and reasoning. All logic is an activity carried out by an agent. Generally we say that human beings perform this activity. So when you say "the universe operates fundamentally on principles of reason", I assume you mean that the universe operates in a way which can be understood through reasoning.

There is a slight problem here because until we actually understand the fundamental operations of the universe, we have no proof of that, and this is just speculation on your part. Problems with quantum mechanics, and the uncertainty principle in general, indicate that maybe the fundamentals might not be understandable by human reason.

This primordial logic, while maximally simple, serves as the dynamo of the universe, perpetually executing its function. Primordial time can be likened to a unitary logical NOT operator, representing the creative and destructive force of time, while space is dualistic and represented by binary logical operators [AND, OR]. The logic of being and determinism in our universe is intertwined with these temporal and binary spatial operators, likening the universe to a literal computer with time as the processor and space as the working memory. This perspective views fundamental particles and numbers as essentially the same, and 'quantum mechanics' can be reframed as 'number mechanics' or 'number logic,' emphasizing the fundamental connection between math and logic and the way the universe works. — punos

Since only an intelligent being can act to create things according to reason, or logic, I assume that you are saying that God is the agent who employed "primordial logic" and created the universe and also created "primordial time" according to some principles of reason.

According to the principle of causality which i have no reason or evidence to deny, every event is caused by a preceding event or set of circumstances. — punos

I gave you very good reason why there is very significant problems with "the principle of causation" as you state it. If every event is caused by a preceding event, then this would mean that there is an infinite regress of events extending backward in time, with no possibility of a first event. This would make aspects of the universe fundamentally unintelligible, as I explained. That contradicts what you say above, that there is a " fundamental logic behind the universe". Therefore your believe in "the principle of causation" contradicts your belief in a "fundamental logic behind the universe".

The idea of an event in the present not being caused by a past event but still causing an effect in the future seems to defy this principle. — punos

Yes, the idea of an event in the present not being caused by a past event but still causing an effect in the future does defy "the principle of causation". However, this principle is defective as I explained, because it denies the possibility of a beginning to time, a first event, and it renders the universe as unintelligible because it makes "initial conditions" which are required for understanding any system, impossible. Consider, that when time started to roll, there was a future but no past. An event at this time would be at the present, and it would have an effect in the future, but not an event in its past.

When you realize that it is necessary to include this type of event, the event with no prior event as its cause, in any complete understanding of the universe, as a very reasonable proposition, then you will see that there is no reason to exclude this type of event from occurring at any moment of the present, as time passes. The inclusion of this type of event, an event which starts at any point in time, a zero point, with no preceding event linkable to it causally, makes issues of free will, and quantum uncertainty very reasonable.

You can characterize this type of event in a number of different ways, but what is required is to understand "time" in a way which is unconventional. We tend to characterize "the universe" as everything which fits within a space-time representation. From this perspective we'd have to place these acts as coming from outside the universe, as not fitting into the space-time representation because of the need for a true "zero time" at each moment of the present, as time passes, marking the time when the uncaused event starts. The common practice of calling such events "random" assumes that the universe is fundamentally unintelligible, instead of moving to recognize such events as still in some way "reasonable".

No, i do not believe that time had a beginning, because time itself is the measure of beginnings and endings, and thus to ask if time had a beginning is like asking at what time did time start? If you are speaking of entropic or thermodynamic time then yes it did have a beginning, but primordial time never did. You should think about this: If there were ever a 'time' before time where time was not, then why would time decide to start all of a sudden? Notice how incoherent the question is, like asking what's north of the north pole?. If time were ever not, then nothing could have ever happened to make anything happen ever. Nothing would change since there is no time to change it. That is why primordial time necessarily must have always been and will always be. Primordial time was active before our universe, and will be way after our universe is long gone. — punos

Inquiring about the beginning of time does not necessarily mean asking what time did time start. That is already self evident in the question, it is the "zero point" of time. What is required is simply to put "time" into the context of something larger, just like when we ask about the relations of any particular thing. We put that thing into a larger context. That is what you do with "the universe" in your concept of "primordial time", you tie "time" to something larger than the universe, and allow that the universe had a beginning in time, primordial time.

The problem with your approach is that you propose nothing real to tie the concept of "primordial time", prior to the universe, to. You assert that time is something bigger, a wider context than "the universe", such that the universe can have a beginning and ending in "primordial time", but primordial time is just a purely imaginary thing, providing no link to our universe, whereby we could apply some principles of reasoning or logic, to bring the concept into our fold of intelligibility. My perspective is based in real observed empirical principles (free will acts which appear to be random), and logic (the need for a true "zero time", and therefore provides a real perspective for relating the smaller context (inside time or the universe) with the larger perspective (outside time or the universe).

Every force in the universe including gravity manifests as a result of some broken symmetry. The topology of space is such that it is repelled by matter or mass (like opposite charges), and as a result causing a rarification or thinning of spacial energy in the vicinity of that matter. Matter which is the inversion of space, is attracted (not repelled) towards gravity wells simply as the universe's attempt to "fill the hole" so to say, and repair the broken symmetry of space. — punos

A break of symmetry is fundamentally unintelligible, as random, and outside the governance of logic or reason. That is the problem with this approach, we start to see at the fundamental level, that all forces derive from outside the realm of intelligibility. This is completely at odds with your claim of a primordial logic at the base. I propose to you, that the reason why this basic uncertainty and unintelligibility arises in our representations or models, is our failure to be able to determine a true "zero point" in time. When time is passing, we cannot adequately determine "a point" from which measurement might be made. We might assume an infinitesimal, but this does not give us a proper point. Then all things that start to happen, and all measurements we try to make, get enveloped by uncertainty.

I should then clarify here that i myself do not preclude the possibility of non-deterministic events either, but these events do not count as free will, simply random. Never the less i am still somewhat skeptical as to the veracity of true randomness. — punos

You should see, that "randomness" is contrary to your opening statements about "the fundamental logic behind the universe". To say that an event is "random", is to say that no logic can explain it. When we allow randomness into our explanations, and do not distinguish between "appears like it's random" from "it truly is random", then we allow that the reason for the event cannot possibly be understood. This becomes a problem for the philosophically inclined person, who wants to be able to understand everything, and therefore is inclined to think that there must be a reason for everything (principle of sufficient reason). If we keep a philosophical mind we keep looking for the reason, if we designate "random" we do not even look for the reason. A free will event is not random. Nor is it deterministically caused, because it has a cause which is not consistent with "deterministically caused".

I've already stated that i'm not convinced that quantum fluctuations are random; they are most likely caused. The only thing that does not have a cause in my book is time, since in my view, time (primordial time) is the first cause of all things that exist in time, but it has nothing to do with free will because it did not choose to cause anything, it is forced to cause, it has no choice to cause, and the only thing it can cause is the manifestation of simple and fundamental virtual particles in the quantum foam. The rest is up to determinism to work out. — punos

If we posit time as "the first cause" of all things in time, as you propose, then when time acts as the first cause, isn't it true that time would be just like an absolutely free will, having infinite freedom as to what it chooses to bring into existence. Consider this, there is nothing except primordial time, then primordial time brings something into existence. Doesn't this imply that in its capacity of "first cause", primordial time is just like "free will", only having an infinite capacity of freedom to cause the existence of absolutely anything. There would be no prior existents, therefore no events in the sense of physical events which could act as determining causes of what comes into being, because there is nothing but time.

So I think that you are completely wrong in saying that primordial time must cause, is forced to cause, and does not choose to cause. Clearly, as "first cause" there is nothing to force it to be a cause in the determinist sense, because there is nothing prior to this first act which could cause the first existents. How can you conceive this first act, which brings existents from nothing, a forced act? In reality, your concept of "primordial time" if you think it through logically, is nothing but an infinitely free act of will.

"Once you allow the reality that 2 + 2 = 17, then it would be reasonable for of course 2 + 2 to equal 17, since you decide. This is true because 17 is not caused by 2 + 2, but the free will of the person doing the calculation to freely choose the answer. — punos

I don't understand your analogy. Things like "2", and "17" are just symbols, and we assign meaning to the symbols freely. We could make "2+2=17" correct, simply by changing the meaning of the symbols. However, we already have a different convention, so convincing people to make the switch would be difficult.

In my understanding there is only really one kind of time, and if it was completely up to me i would never mention a second kind of time (entropic). Most people it seems are not able to perceive or comprehend what i mean by primordial time (except you apparently), and insist that thermodynamics is actually time. For me thermodynamics or the entropic or thermodynamic state is not time, but simply the arrow of time. Time and the arrow of time are not the same thing. Thermodynamics emerges only in the context of extended space or dimensions where things have the probability of being in different states, and are constantly changing their relationships to each other. — punos

We probably really need to say what each of us think "time" actually is. I would describe it as a process, the process by which the future becomes the past. Also, since we apprehend the future as possibilities, and the past as actualities, the present is when this process occurs, and the activity we observe at the present is the result of this process. Free will fits in because something must select which possibilities will be actualized. We tend to think that the inertia of being, from the past, necessitates which possibilities will be actualized, in a deterministic way, but this is not realistic because an intelligent creature with a will can step up at any moment, and break this supposed necessity.

That is why we need to allow for acts which are derived directly out of the present. So if we apprehend the passing of time as a process, there is necessarily a force involved with this process. This means that some future possibilities must be actualized due to the very nature of passing time (entropy perhaps). The being with free will can make use of this force to direct it toward the various possibilities it selects for.

choose: pick out or select (someone or something) as being the best or most appropriate of two or more alternatives.

carefully: in a way that deliberately avoids harm or errors

I've already stated that i believe that every part of the universe has agency of some kind, including the universe as a whole. Consider how electro-magnetism works and how careful it is to never move towards a charge equal to itself (or move away from an opposite complimentary charge to itself) since this would be an error and harmful for the overall purpose of the universe. Electro-magnetism picks out or selects the charge it will move towards as being the best or most appropriate of two or more alternatives. It is so deliberate that it never makes a mistake... that is how careful it is. — punos

Ok, so you think that electro-magnetism "deliberately" avoids harm and errors. I think that's ridiculous, "deliberate" implies intentionality, and careful thinking, which I do not think is an appropriate description for electro-magnetism.

An agent, like the definition says is a person or thing. That it mentions 'person' is redundant since if a thing can do something, then obviously a person can too. So the definition is not making a distinction between something or someone, it means anything can be an agent. — punos

That's right, an "agent" is anything active causally, it may be animate, inanimate, or inconclusive. However, inanimate agents are observed to act causally in a way consistent with determinism, while living things are known to make choices and act in ways not consistent with determinism. Therefore we have two distinct types of "agents", and we ought not equivocate between the two.

The Wikipedia article about 'threshold potentials' should have been enough to answer your question, and the video was just supplementary. — punos

The "threshold potentials" article mentions a "threshold" for action, so similar stimulation would always cause action, being above the threshold, and similar below the threshold stimulation would not cause action. So it really doesn't indicate that the neuron can decide to fire or not fire, in equal cases of stimulation.

Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin. — Banno

Incorrigible! I thought you'd never notice. I happen to have a strong aversion to certain words, and some names can be even worse for me.

I would prefer to use the null hypothesis in a situation like this since it seems more reasonable to assume nothing outside the box until what is in the box has been investigated thoroughly. — punos

I explained why what's "in the box" is insufficient to account for the complete reality of human experience, and why it is logically necessary to conclude something outside the box. But if you're happy to be constrained within the box, that's your choice. However, I see that your appeal to "primordial time" show that you are in some way inclined to step outside of the box. But it looks more like a falling out of the box to me.

If it is free should it not be free from reason as well? — punos

The thing discussed, the will, is free from reason in it's activity, as not determined by reason, but this does not imply that it cannot be understood by reason (i.e. that it is random). There are many things in the world which are understood by reason, but not controlled or determined by reason.

The statement that "an event at the present which was not caused by an event in the past, but which will still cause an effect in the future" does not make sense. — punos

You have not explained why this does not make sense to you. Yes, the event which is uncaused becomes a past event, but it remains as an event which was not caused by an event prior to it in time. Why does it not make sense to you that there are events in the past which do not have a cause which is prior to them. The alternative implies an infinite regress of events. Do you not believe that there was a beginning to time? If you do, then you ought to conclude the logical necessity that there was at least one event without an event prior to it in time, as cause of it. And if you recognize the logical necessity of one such event, why would you exclude the possibility of others?

Like i said it wasn't an explanation. It was a claim without a justification, i presume because according to you free will doesn't need a justification even though you claim it does have a reason. — punos

Yes, as I explained above, we recognize the reality of many events in the world which have a reason, but are not justified. Take the effects of gravity for example. Something falling has a reason for falling, the effect of gravity, but that activity, falling, is not justified. Likewise, a freely willed act may have a reason for occurring, the effects of free will, but the act might still not be justifiable.

This says nothing because i can restate it like this: "The free willy however, allows only free willy principles to be the reason for an event, and therefore excludes the possibility of a deterministically willed event as an unreasonable proposition." — punos

That's not a fair analogy. It is a false representation, a straw man, because the free willy allows also that there are events which can be explained by determinist principles. Therefore this part of the statement "the free willy however, allows only free willy principles to be the reason for an event" is a false representation. So, as I explained, the principles which underlie determinism, such as Newton's first law, must be accounted for within the context of a reality which also allows for free will. This inclines many, such as Newton himself, to state that Newton's laws are upheld by God's Will. Therefore, contrary to your claim, "a deterministically willed event" is actually very reasonable.

Neither you, nor i can understand or predict something that is experienced as random, so it makes no difference between free will and determinism. My suspicions are that there is no such thing as true randomness. Randomness is a word that we have applied to describe our ignorance while saving face. Scientists used to wonder why particles and dust would move or jitter apparently randomly, until they discovered Brownian motion and random motions suddenly became deterministic (determined by Brownian motion). — punos

Right, at least we agree on the nature of "randomness". Now, the next step for you, in understanding free will, is to understand that an event which appears to be a random event, might actually have a cause which is not prior to it in time. So you replace "Brownian motion" in your example with "free will cause", and suddenly events which appear to be random, have a cause. The difference is that the cause is not deterministic, because it is not prior to the event in time. This type of causation will account for many events which are often spoken of as if they are random. To begin with, we have the first event in time, mentioned above. This is often called a random quantum fluctuation or something like that. And quantum physics is full of such "random" symmetry-breaking, and that sort of thing, where an event simply flies out of the present, as purely uncaused by an event in the past, so it is said to be "random". Then in the field of biology there are many other events which are often said to be "random"; the first living being, genetic mutations, etc., and of course our topic here, a freely willed decision.

Once you allow for the reality of such causation, an act at the present which is not caused by anything in the past, then many such events which are "called" random will be reasonable, instead of being random. Then you can understand what Aristotle called "final cause", as completely distinct from what we call "efficient cause". Efficient causation is central to determinism, and it is always understood as requiring a cause which is prior to it in time. This produces a problem of infinite regress in causation because there is always required a prior time. That is a very real logical problem, because any current state of existence can only be understood as the logical result of the initial conditions, which constitute the boundary conditions. But the infinite regress renders true initial conditions as impossible, and this renders any state at any time as fundamentally unintelligible.

So that's a real logical problem which "final cause" resolves. Not only does it resolve that problem, but it is completely consistent with observed experience of intentional actions. However.it is a completely different type of causation, which does not require that there is a further cause prior to it in time, putting an end to the infinite regress, hence the designator "final". Once we see that it is a real logical necessity to include the reality of such a type of cause, it becomes a "first" cause in relation to chains of efficient causation, not requiring a cause prior to it in time. Then we can see evidence of this type of causation everywhere in reality, such as freely willed acts, and we escape "the box" of determinist thinking.

This is precisely what free will does; not determinism. Free will is the claim that some external force to the universe impinges on the present moment to cause an action that would violate a deterministic path. Determinism does no such thing because determinism is simply what the universe is doing and what it will do free from external influence. It can be argued that the definition of free will is the freedom of determinism to do its will without interference from an external will to the universe, including personal free will. — punos

Yes, if "universe" is restricted in that way, such that the entire universe is deterministic, then the free will act must come from outside the universe. As explained above, it is logically necessary to assume such a type of act to break the infinite regress of "the universe". That infinite regress renders the universe at anytime as unintelligible because it makes the current state of the universe dependent on initial conditions, but also denies the possibility of initial conditions with the infinite regress. Therefore to bring "the universe" into the realm of intelligibility we must assume another sort of cause, which has been named "final cause".

The continuity is caused because of previous effects which is the reason why existence suddenly doesn't collapse into chaos. — punos

This way of thinking produces the infinite regress, by always requiring "previous effects" when looking backward in time, and that produces the logical problem of no initial conditions, explained above.

Entropic time is deterministic as opposed to primordial time which is not. This concept that you're describing is what i call primordial time which is what keeps an object persistent through multiple moments of existence. Without it the universe would at most be a virtual soup of virtual particles that never exist past one Planck moment. Entropic time is dependent on and emerges from primordial time. — punos

See, here you propose two types of time, coexisting at the present moment, primordial time which keeps an objects persistent, and entropic time, which allows for deterministic change. But you propose nothing to establish a relationship between these two "times". So the fact that you insist on determinism forces you (logically), to propose a completely different type of time. In other words your clinging to determinism has rendered the universe as unintelligible, in the way I described above. Then, in your resistance to the traditional and conventional way of dealing with this problem "final cause", you instead propose something completely irrational and ridiculous, two types of time coexisting with no principles for interacting with each other, only the implication that they must interact because things both persist through time, yet also change through time. This is nothing but an extremely unintelligible form of dualism.

There is no implication that selection must be performed by an agent... — punos

Are you kidding? "Carefully chose" signifies an activity as a verb, and the phrase implies an agent acting with care. How can you interpret this otherwise? Is there an effect of this act of carefully choosing? If so, there is necessarily an agent by your definition, "a person or thing that takes an active role or produces a specified effect". You could deny the need for an agent by denying that there is an effect from the act of choosing, but that would leave selection as irrelevant to our discussion of causation.

This video may also help, the relevant part to your question is addressed between 1:50 and 4:00. — punos

There is nothing there that supports your claim, only an indication that "a neuron" cannot be sufficiently isolated from its environment to test what you claim. In other words you have made a very simplistic claim about something which is much more complex and that complexity invalidates your claim.

Would you say that one should believe in the existence of the world, when one is dead or in deep sleep? — Corvus

No, I think that believing in the existence of the world, during deep sleep, is what turns pleasant dreams into nightmares. And believing in the world when one is dead seems to be impossible.

Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? The traditional view, as I understand it, is that he believes that the Forms are in some sense superior to the ordinary world. How would you describe that difference? — Ludwig V

The Forms are prior to what you call "the ordinary world", and it is this priority which makes them more real. The "priority" in this sense, is the sense of a temporal priority, such that the Forms are causal. Being the cause of the things of the ordinary world is what makes them as you say "superior". The "ordinary world" would mean how we perceive things to be, through sensation.

So the people in the cave see the world of artificial, ordinary things. 'Ordinary things' we can describe as temporal things, coming into existence and going out of existence in time having a temporal beginning and end. The people in the cave do not understand that these artificial ordinary (temporal) things are just a copy, representation, or "shadow" of the idea or form from which they are created. An ordinary bed is made as a copy of an idea of what a bed is. "The good" is the purpose for which the thing is created, and in the allegory it is the source of light, the fire. The good, along with the idea, cause the existence of artificial, temporal things. Once a philosopher comes to understand how this is the cause of existence of these temporal things, one can go beyond the existence of artificial things (leave the cave) and understand that the cause of all natural temporal things must be a similar causal process.

I'm afraid the question is whether it is us or Plato who is being misled. — Ludwig V

That is a good question, and with some effort of philosophical inquiry it can be answered. First, we'd have to address the scenario in the cave. Is it true that the idea, or form, of an artificial thing is prior to, and along with the purpose, is in some way a cause of existence of the material thing in the ordinary world.

If we decide that Plato is correct in this representation, i.e. not being misled, or misleading us, then we proceed to the second step, as Aristotle did in his Metaphysics. This is the question of in what ways is the coming into being of natural things similar to that of artificial things. And this is a much more difficult question which requires education in metaphysical principles.

Simpler cells than neurons make decisions all the time like moving towards food or away from toxins, fungus as well. Just because they are not complex decisions like we make doesn't mean they are not making decisions. One neuron can only make very simple decisions, but when connected to a vast network of other neurons 'talking' to each other you get the emergence of swarm intelligence capable of more complex decision making. — punos

I'll put my reply to the last part of your post first punos, just so you can have a better understanding of my position before reading the rest. I think that it is necessary to conclude that free will underlies all activities of living things. They all make use of the features of temporal existence which cannot be understood by determinism which I discuss below. Any "self" motivated activity like "self-subsistence", "self-nourishment", "self-movement", etc., must be supported by a type of causation known by the concept of "free will". This is best called "intentional" activity, or purposeful activity.

Is there a reason why an agent might select one option over another? If there is a reason then it's determined, and if it has no reason then it's random. — punos

We discussed this already on this thread, when the principle of sufficient reason was mentioned. That there is a reason for the choice does not imply that the choice was determined. To be determined, the choice must be consistent with determinist principles. Determinist principles dictate that there is a direct causal relation between past events and future events. This excludes the possibility of a free will event. This is an event at the present which was not caused by an event in the past, but which will still cause an effect in the future.

Such an event, the freely willed event, is not unintelligible (as it is explained above), and it is not without reason. The determinist however, allows only determinist principles to be the reason for an event, and therefore excludes the possibility of a freely willed event as an unreasonable proposition. The determinist then argues that any event which cannot be understood under the precepts of determinism must be "random". Here, "random" really means a cause, or reason for the event which cannot be understood by determinist principles. This allows for the reality of causes and reasons for events which the determinist classifies as "random" simply because they are not able to be understood by determinist principles. Examples might be random mutation to genes in evolutionary theory, and random occurrence of life on the planet, to begin with.

The free willy may argue as I have, that this is because the determinist misunderstands the nature of time. The misunderstanding of time inclines the determinist to deny the possibility of an event at the present which does not have a cause in the past. The determinist understands time in terms of a temporal continuity of necessity between past and future, which is best exemplified as Newton's first law of motion. Things will continue to be in the future, as they have been in the past, unless a "force" is applied. This is a statement of necessity. It is necessary to apply a force to break the continuity of existence at the present.

The free willy may argue that such a statement of the necessary continuity of existence through the present, is a false statement. There is no such necessary continuity of existence at the present, and evidence demonstrates that absolutely everything, and anything has the possibility of changing at any moment of passing time. This means that instead of a cause of change at the present (the requirement of the application of force as described by Newton), in reality there must be a cause of things staying the same at each moment of passing time. From this perspective, "random" means that at every moment of passing time, every aspect of what we know as "existence" could be scrambled in any possible way. However, we observe continuity therefore the continuity must be caused.

The cause of the observed continuity of observed existents through the present, from the past, to the future, is the aspect of temporal reality which the determinists do not apprehend, and therefore misunderstand. They take this continuity for granted, as Newton's first law. However, the free willy knows that this observed continuity must be caused. This cause cannot be understood by determinist principles because it is prior to, therefore independent from, and necessary for, determinist causation, as producing the conditions for the temporal continuity required for deterministic causation. In other words, there is a type of causation which produces the required conditions for deterministic causation, and this type of causation cannot be understood as deterministic causation. This is reasonable and not random.

Additionally, environments are able to select genetic expressions in organisms for example and whether they live or die. Selection happens all up and down the hierarchies of nature and the universe, it's what evolution is made of (variation and selection). Even fundamental particles make decisions in how they respond to different electrical charges for example. A simple particle can be seen behaving the same way a cell does when it moves towards food or away from toxins and when the particle moves toward its complimentary charge and away from a self-similar charge. — punos

There is equivocation between two distinct meanings of "select" here. That is why I was clear to say that "to select" is an act carried out by an agent. So, one meaning requires an agent which "selects", but "selection" in biology, under Darwinian principles requires no such agent. Darwin blurs the boundaries between human beings as agents of selection, doing selective breeding, and breeding under natural conditions, such that this can be called "natural selection". Thus Darwin sows the seeds of ambiguity in "selection". "Selection" in this sense can then be understood as the result of determinist forces which annihilate some things while others survive. So if you and I were both in the same plane crash, and I died while you lived, this would be an example of that type of "selection", where no agent actually "selects". Notice that there is no need to assume an active agent which "selects" in this meaning of "selection". It is this equivocation which generally supports compatibilism.

Yes, of course what did you think they do? Why do you think it fires sometimes and sometimes not, even when in both cases it is receiving signals (contributing factors). It obviously has a preference for certain signals. — punos

I've never heard this before. You are saying that in distinct cases when the same neuron is subjected to what can be said as "the same conditions", it will sometime fire under those conditions, and sometimes not fire under those conditions. Can you provide some supporting documentation which I can read?

I have been asked by ↪Ludwig V in another thread, if I believed in the existence of the world, when I am not perceiving it. — Corvus

Is it possible for you to be not perceiving the world while you are still alive? Would this be when you are asleep? But don't things still wake you up? Are you not in some way perceiving the world even when you are asleep?

Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows. — Ludwig V

The cave allegory is explicitly presented as a metaphor, that's why it's known as an "allegory". Plato does not conclude that all we see is shadows, he presents that as a symbolic representation to elucidate how the average person is wrong in one's assumptions about the nature of reality. And as I explained, it is the common way of using language which misleads us in this way.

I would be very interested in seeing a comprehensive list of these contributing factors if you can provide one. Also, am i to understand that contributing factors no matter how many or which ones are not responsible for any choice determination? Besides contributing factors, what else is there? Once the contributing factors are in place what makes or determines the choice according to you? It appears to me that without a final determination a choice is not possible, free or not. — punos

There is no need for a list of contributing factors to demonstrate free will. The fact that not one of the multitude of contributing factors can be said to be the cause of the choice, and that the agent chooses from a multitude of options is enough to demonstrate free will.

So to answer your question, besides contributing factors, there is the thing which selects, we might call this the agent. The multitude of contributing factors provide a mutitude of options for "the agent", and a selection is made.

By considering the cumulative effect of all present contributing factors in conjunction with prior contributing factors, the neuron makes a discerning determination to emit a signal back into the environment, thereby instigating an action that informs the future state of the neuronal environment (the brain). — punos

Are you proposing that a neuron itself makes a selection, it decides whether or not to fire when stimulated? That's what seems to be implied when you say "the neuron makes a discerning determination to emit a signal...".

Is there anything else you would add or modify in this neuronal model of decision making to make it compatible with free will? — punos

I really do not think that a neuron makes a selection, or decision at all. So I think your terminology, "discerning determination to emit a signal" is not accurate.

I'm arguing that we don't make decisions without the influence of the past. — Patterner

Of course, I don't think anyone would disagree with this, so it doesn't need to be argued. But I don't think it's relevant to the question of free will.

Perhaps there can be specialized philosophical terms. But they can only amount to a dialect of English. So ordinary language is inescapable. — Ludwig V

The point though is that ordinary language misleads us when we discuss the nature of reality, therefore the philosopher must be very wary about this. Take the example of "see" discussed by . It appears like the ordinary use of "see", being the activity that the specific sense, the eye is involved in, is the "literal" use of the term. But just like in my example of "good", ordinary language is based in what "appears" to us, and it often has no consideration for what is "real", i.e. reality, as in what is really the case. This misdirection from ordinary language inclines us to alter our definition of "real", such that it fits with what is apparent to us through the senses, rather than adhering to rigorous logic in determining what is "real". That is the problem which Plato's cave allegory exposed. The vulgar are looking at the appearance of shadows as if they are the real things, because that's how the vernacular leads them.

However, the philosopher sees beyond this. What really happens in the act of seeing is that the brain produces an image, and it is not the eyes which are producing the image, nor is it the eyes which are "seeing". The eyes are the medium, a tool used in the act of seeing. Then the real, more literal sense of "see" is the one based in the imagination of the mind, rather than the one based in the sense. And that this must be "the real meaning" of the term is evident because it refers to what is really occurring in both situations, seeing with the eyes, and imagining, rather than simply referring to what appears to be occurring. This is demonstrated more clearly with my example of "good", and it is the reason why the common, vulgar or naive people, who will not resist the restraints imposed by common language, will remain in Plato's cave, refusing to follow the philosopher's ascent.

We don't make decisions with no memory of the past. And, remembering the past, we don't ignore it when we make decisions. — Patterner

Like I explained, that does not imply that the past determines the decision.

You probably don’t often make something you have never tried before. — Patterner

There must be a first time for everything. Have you never heard of a process called trial and error?

Knowing you are going to want to enjoy your lunch in the future, you likely make something that you know you like because you’ve had it in the past and you liked it. When you are shopping at the grocery store, you think about what you were going to take to lunch for the next several days. You pick out things that you have enjoyed in the past. That’s why you pick them out. — Patterner

Not necessarily, that's the point, we often like to try different things. Since we actually do choose, and try things we've never done before, your argument that choosing familiar things is evidence of determinism fails. Those examples are all irrelevant because we actually do sometimes choose otherwise, therefore the necessity required for determinism is lacking.

What you think about the future determines what you will do, but what you think about the future is determined by your past, or more precisely, your memory of the past. — punos

But what you think about the future does not "determine" what you do. It is only a contributing factor. There is also many other factors, like what Patterner argues, the force of habit.

So you and Patterner are arguing two very distinct things that "determine" the choice. Patterner says that it is habits you've formed in the past, things you've come to be familiar with and like, while you are arguing that it is something you think about for the future which determines your action. However, it is quite clear to me, that both of these play a role, and neither one "determines" the choice.

And neither one of you has addressed the fact that the choice is made at the present. If the future is determined by the past, there is a continuity of necessity through the present, which lies between these two. This implies that nothing can really happen at the present, because if something actually happened it would break the continuity and alter the relationship of necessity. Of course evidence is contrary to this, we see that everything happens at the present, and freely willed choices at the present will have an effect on the future which is not determined by the past. Therefore we ought to form the obvious conclusion that determinism is based in a faulty understanding of the present.

Well, that's one way of putting it. But I can't see that it is Plato's way. Surely, for him, there is only one real good, i.e. the Form of the Good? The good things of this world may participate in the Form, but they are "shadows" of the Good and so not real (really) good. — Ludwig V

I suggest you read Plato more closely. The "Form of the Good" is unknowable, even to the philosopher. So what Plato talks about is "the good", and the good is particular to the circumstances. Whether or not a particular good participates in the Form of Good can never be known, because the Form of Good cannot be known. Are you familiar with Plato's Euthyphro? This is where such an independent "Form of Good", which the goods of this world would participate in, is shown to be an incoherent idea. This is the start to Plato's refutation of the theory of participation. Look at The Republic, there is no such thing as the Form of Justice, which all instances of "the just" would participate in, there is only individual ideas as to what "just" means.

I agree that the alcohol can be regarded as a cause of the alcoholic's actions (in some sense of "cause"). But nothing follows as to whether it is a good thing for the alcoholic or not. — Ludwig V

Consider precisely what "good" means in the context of Plato's philosophy. It is what motivates a person to act, what Aristotle called "the end", 'that for the sake of which', and what we call the goal or objective. As such, the "real" good must be what motivates a person to act. If the desire for alcohol has motivated an alcoholic to act, then we must say that it was the real good. If you want to make a further judgement about whether alcohol is "a good thing" for the alcoholic, then you are going to need a completely different sense, a different meaning, of "good".

This different meaning of "good" is based in some moral principles or some other standards. But these standards suffer the problem pointed out in the Euthyphro. We cannot say that this meaning of "good" is anything real or independent, because it is only supported by a code of ethics or something like that, and the attempt to make it something "real" produces incoherency. Therefore we can only say it is an apparent good not a real good.

So when you judge whether the alcohol is a good thing, or not a good thing for the alcoholic, this judgement is only as it appears to you. There cannot be any real truth or falsity to this judgement because it is only based in appearance, how things appear to you through the application of some standards. However, when we see that the desire for alcohol motivates the alcoholic to act, as an end, or a goal, what Plato called "the good", and Aristotle called "final cause", we can definitely say that the alcohol is a "real" good, because it has caused real activity, in the real world.

I'm inclined to think that this discussion, interesting though it may be, does not fit well with the main topic of this thread. So perhaps we should leave this there, until another opportunity arises. — Ludwig V

Perhaps our discussion is a little off topic, but it points to the fundamental problem being discussed in the thread, concerning the difference between the philosophical use of words, and the ordinary use of words, and how this difference starts to significantly mislead us when it comes to discussing the meaning of words like "real".

See, ordinary language would have us believe that "good" refers to some judgement based in a code of ethics. However, if we try to make this ordinary language sense of "good" into something "real" we end up with incoherency which would incline us toward a fundamentally incoherent definition of "real" in order to make this sense of "good" the real good. And this demonstrates why, when doing philosophy, we must adhere to rigorous philosophical meanings of the terms, and not be corrupted by ordinary language, because this corruption leads us into incoherent metaphysics.

I believe he's saying that, if things in my past aren't causing my decisions in the present, then my decisions are random. — Patterner

There's no logic to support that conclusion. The decisions are made concerning the future, and they are made at the present. The present is prior in time to the future, so a decision made at the present can have an effect in the future. And there is no need to assume that a decision made at the present, which is free from being determined by the past, is random, because it is made with respect to the future therefore not random. This takes into account the reality of all three aspects of time, past, present, and future.

I don't understand how this is supposed to fix things. It's still the case that our thoughts, beliefs, memories, rational decision making process, knowledge, etc. all pre-exist our choices. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, all of these pre-exist the choice, just like the past condition of the physical world pre-exists the choice, but none of these can be said to be the cause of the choice. This is because the choice is made in relation to the future. So the thing which chooses, the agent, considers all sorts of past things, and possible future things, and makes a decision, at the present, concerning the future. If the decision was caused only by pre-existing things, the agent could not consider the future. Yet the future plays an integral role in the decision.

If those things don't determine our choices, then it's hard to see how our actions are "free. Moreover this seems to fly in the face of phenomenological experience and the social sciences as well. E.g., I am generally hungry before I decide to go make lunch, my past sensations determine my current actions in that case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think you are paying close attention to your own experience. I prepare my meals, and I think this is the case for most people, before i get hungry, by some sort of schedule or habit. Then I am ready to eat before I get too hungry. This is known as thinking ahead. I make my lunch even before I go to work in the morning, and bring it with me, so I in no way wait till I am hungry before I make my lunch.

Determinism is just the view that: "events are determined by previously existing causes." The Principle of Sufficent Reason gets you there by itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The principle of sufficient reason does not get you there, because as I explain above, the cause may be a freely will act of a free willing being, at the present, rather than previously existing causes. This is consistent with the principle of sufficient reason, but not consistent with determinism.

But if the act isn't determined by anything in the past what is determining it? If you say "your will," does this will involve your memories, desires, preferences, etc.? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The free will act is caused by a choice made at the present, free from the past. And as I said, the past is definitely considered, but the past does not determine the choice. The future is also considered. And since the thing which is desired, the good which is acted toward, is something in the future, the future has the principal position as providing the primary influence on the choice. So it is clearly incorrect to say that the act is determined by the past.

Surely, the reliable way in which drugs and hormone injections affect behavior suggest some relation between past events and actions, no? Drinking alcohol changes how people decide to act. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Obviously, I do not deny that there is "some relation" between the past, and the choice which is made. However, there is also a relation to the future, and the relation to the future is the principal one. That's why the free will choice is more properly represented as a relation between the present and the future. But the being which makes the choice must make careful consideration of the past in order to adequately know its position at the present, and make the best choices.

This is an example of past choices dictating future choices. Hence, not consistent with "free will that unaffected by the past." Our past choices affect our future choices, and how they do so depends on how they have affected us and the world around us. That is, past choices determine future choices. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I never said that the free will choice is "unaffected by the past". I clearly said precisely otherwise. What is being discussed is whether the choice is determined by the past.

I agree, it's asking for a contradiction. That's why libertarian free will makes no sense. The idea of "us" choosing in a way that is autonomous from the past - our experiences, memories, desires, past thinking, etc. removes "us" from the will. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It does not remove "us" from the will. As I explained, it inverts the relation so that "us" is attributed to the will rather than "will" being attributed to us. Attributing "will" to us, as you do, actually removes "us" from will, in order to have an autonomous self which has a will as a property.

To say that such a "free will," "isn't actually totally free, that it's constrained by (determined by) all sorts of things like past experience, memory, desire, physics etc." is to simply grant the main claim of compatibilism. This is what I mean by "libertarianism turning itself into compatibilism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is not compatibilist because the will is not necessarily constrained by determinist 'laws of nature' which is what is inherent to determinism. So, at any moment in time, the will is free to act in a way which is inconsistent with determinist laws, even though the action produced can be described as consistent with those laws, to a degree. The "to a degree" is what makes compatibilism appear to be correct, but the "inconsistent with determinist laws" is what makes compatibilism actually impossible. In other words, determinist laws are not complete in their capacity to explain what happens in reality, and there are things which happen which cannot be explained by determinist laws. Freely willed acts have a source which is outside the governance of these laws. That makes free will not compatible with determinism. However, in so much as the free will act which occurs at the present, can only act on whatever is already existing, it is constrained by the past.

If you say "no, only most of our decision making is pre-determined, there is an extra bit of free floating free will that isn't determined by anything in the past," then I'd just repeat the same question: "what does such a will have to do with me?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

The free will act is not determined by anything in the past. However, it is constrained by the fact that it can only act at the present. This means that its capacity to have an effect in the material world is limited by the time when it occurs. Notice that the act itself is not determined, therefore not compatibilist, but the effect that the act has, is restricted and therefore limited by the temporal conditions produced in the past.

It basically comes down to this; "If something is not determined by anything in what way is it not random?" The uncaused is random, and there is no reason anything uncaused should tend towards any choice and not another. It seems incoherent to me to say "our wills are determined by our past experiences, thoughts, desires" but then also that there is also an "extra bit" that isn't determined by any of these. Ok, even if this is true, it doesn't result in more freedom, it just makes my actions partly random and unfathomable. If I can't possibly know what determined my actions, how am I to become free? — Count Timothy von Icarus

When we do not understand the cause of an act, we might be inclined to say that the act is random. This is due to our failure to understand, and it does not necessarily mean that the act is truly random in any absolute sense, it may just be that we do not have the ability to understand the cause. The determinist will say that if the cause is not a determinist cause then it must be truly random, because the reality of a freely willed cause, as a true cause, is not allowed by the determinist.

Therefore your statement reduces the act which is caused by a free will to an "uncaused" act, in the determinist way of excluding free will causes as possible causes, and concludes that such an act would be "random". The mistake is in categorizing the act of the free will, which is a type of act we do not completely ,understand as "uncaused", rather than categorizing it as a cause which is inconsistent with "cause" as defined by determinist principles, and therefore not understood by those principles.

The point isn't about whose will is involved, it is that, in every such instance of positive freedom the past dictates what we are free to do in the future. I have no problem saying that "past free choices influence future free choices." But this is still the past determining the future. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The free will act is neither past nor future, it is at the present. So in saying that the past necessarily determines the future, you exclude the possibility of a free will act at the present, and you have determinism. The concept of free will allows for an act at the present, which is not determined by the past.

If you don't learn to read, you're not free to read War and Peace. This is past states of the world determining freedom of action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, but the will to learn allows one to learn how to read, and then read War and Peace. So it is not true to say that if you do not know how to read you will not ever read War and Peace, because you can learn and then do it. And the choice to learn is freely willed, therefore not determined by the past.