I don't know what makes this understanding "proper". It is defensible as a view. But people often do things that they think are in their interests, but actually bring them harm. Moreover, it clearly wasn't Plato's view. (Only philosophers can understand what the real good is) — Ludwig V

If the person acts on it, it must be a "real" good, because it caused the person to act. Whether it is later judged as being a mistaken act is irrelevant to whether or not the good which is acted on is "real". It is necessary that this "good" the one which is acted on, is real in order that it may be said to cause action.

This is a very important point in understanding Plato because it brings actuality, "act" into the idealist realm of intelligible objects, resolving the so-called interaction problem which is intrinsic to the prior theory of participation. Now the objects of the intellect may be understood as real and actual. Through the medium of "the good" intelligible objects can be known as prior to, and cause of all artificial material objects which are like shadows or reflections of the intelligible objects, making the intelligible as higher in priority. "The good" is said to illuminate intelligible objects in a way which is analogous to the way that the sun illuminates visible objects (Republic Bk.6), the will to know. It provides the basis for Aristotle's conception of "final cause". I say it is the "proper" understanding because it is the only way to make "real good" intelligible, rather than the incoherent mess which Ayer presents us with.

Because there doesn't seem to be a problem is freedom is grounded in "self-determination." It doesn't seem like much of a definition stretch to say that we are free when "we do what we want and don't do what we don't want," and that "we are the cause of our own actions." Such a definition doesn't clash with determinism. The definition the clashes with determinism is: "we are free if we can do other than we actually do,"which just seems like a bad definition since, by necessity, we only do what we actually do. The freedom we care about lies in how we make our actual choices, not the metaphysical potentialities re choice, so this ends up being a non-sequitur. Not to mention that free will as self-determination makes it much easier to define how we can be relatively more or less free, which certainly seems to be the case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problems described here arise from a misrepresentation of the nature of time. We would require a better representation of freedom in relation to passing time, in order to sort out these issues. We are free in relation to the future, and not free in relation to the past, is a position which does clash with determinism, and it does not require that we are free to do other than we did.

Ok, that still doesn't answer how such decisions are "mine"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are just asking for a contradiction. You want to say "the decisions are mine", as if you are determining them, so that you can say "this contradicts 'the will is free'".

You can declare by fiat that free floating "will" is ours, but what exactly does it have to do with us if it isn't determined by our feelings, memories, etc? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is not declared by fiat, it is known by evidence. Your parents preexisted you, and so did the will which brought your body into being. It is only when you move to make the will the property of the individual, instead of the individual a property of the will, that you separate a multitude of wills, the wills of your parents, and yourself into individual wills. But you do this only because you are asking for contradiction.

Then there is the whole issue of how any will can possibly effectively work to bring about states of affairs they prefer, and prevent states of affairs they don't prefer, if their actions lack determinant effects. If my showing my son books might make him forget how to read, how am I free to teach him to read? I am only free to do this because I know that specific acts help with the aquisition of literacy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not understand this criticism. Learning is attributable to the combined and unified will of both teacher and student, with the unified goal of education. If the will for education was only on one side, as you portray, there could be no education.

Finally, consider the alcoholic, drug addict, sex addict, sufferer of OCD, or "rageoholic" They are influenced by internal causes outside their control in a way many who suffer these conditions liken to "slavery." But how can we explain this sort of internal bondage if our freedom isn't determined by our personal history? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not understand this criticism either. The will is free to choose, but it must live with the consequences of its choices. That is the nature of time. Mistakes happen and we suffer from the consequences. That we suffer from mistaken choices of the past, does not imply that those choices were not freely made.

And, as I also explained to Viskane above, in no way is "free" ever used to signify something absolute. There is always restrictions to freedom. It is only by asking for absolute freedom in the concept of "free will", that the incoherency which you find, arises. But that incoherency is really the result of making "free" something which it never is in reality, and that is absolute. In reality, "free" is always qualified.

But there is a reason incompatibilism is no longer a dominant position in debates free will. It's arguably incoherent, as I've tried to point out. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, compatibilists are generally people who do not want to think out the problems, so they insist there is no problem.

You say this makes us somehow unfree, by virtue of our rationality, desires, knowledge, and preferences pre-existing our actions. My question is: what doesn't preexist our making a choice that is meaningfully "us," such that this non-prexisting force has anything to do with us and thus can be an extension of our will? The demand that some core element of "what is doing the choosing," not pre-exist our choosing seems to preclude that any
of the freedom described is actually "ours." — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are characterizing "the will", and the freedom which the will has, as a property of "us". But if you allow that each person is an individual, and the free will as a property of "us" is something which preexists the individual, (and this is evident by the nature of life), then you will see that an individual's free will is an extension of the will which precedes the individual. As I said to Vaskane above, consider that to have a body was a choice made by the will.

Plato placed emotion as the intermediary between contrary forces, the body and the mind. Sometimes emotion takes direction from the mind, like when the law is being enforced, and sometimes it takes direction from the body, like when the law is being broken. Sometimes it might even be left directionless, when a person is lost and confused.

No one expects that the will is free in an absolute way. That is not how we use 'free", and it seems like a sort of ridiculous idea. That's what I was trying to say. You and I are "free", but we cannot break the law without being punished. Freedom always has its limits.

Have you ever considered that perhaps the will chose to have a body, so that it could use the body as a tool? Then having a body is the means by which the will is expanding is boundaries.

Ayer's problem (which is common to most modern philosophers) is that he approaches the distinction between the real good and the apparent good from the preconceived idea that "the real good" must have some sort of independent objective existence, supported by some divine unity like God, and that "the apparent good" is the good which the individual person apprehends.

However, this distinction between the real and apparent good, needs to be understood through the Platonic principles from which it was derived. Proper understanding reveals that "the real good" is the good apprehended by the individual, as one's goal or objective. Because the individual's apprehended goal or objective is "the good" which actually motivates the individual to act, it must be known as "the real good". This leaves any proposed independent good, supposedly supported by a divine unity, or God, as the "apparent good". Inverting this, and trying to understand "the real good" as some sort of independent, objective good, supported by God, leaves "the real good" as completely incoherent, as demonstrated in Plato\s Euthyphro, and this incoherency is what confronts Ayer.

The will without the body was your proposition. Do you accept it or not?

Why would I want to remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance? — Ludwig V

That seemed to be the objection you were raising, that Berkeley's and Locke's arguments removed the need for potential, as matter.

My suggested explanation doesn't even eliminate the counterfactual phenomenon; it simply provides a fully explanation of the causes that produce it. — Ludwig V

I explained, the explanation you provided was far from a full explanation. When you come to grips with that we might be able to continue the discussion.

Somehow people do regularly distinguish real from unreal, for all practical purposes anyway. It's not merely a logical thing, it's more at the level of innate capability. — frank

But the example was when a person was under the influence of LSD. It is in this situation that the real parts of the experience are not so easily distinguishable from the unreal. We could say the same about someone suffering mental illness like schizophrenia.

We know, for instance, that if a person is blind from birth, but then gains sight, they won't be able to distinguish a picture of an apple from a real apple. That's not a logical issue. It's something about perception. — frank

I don't see how you draw the conclusion that if it's something about perception, it's not a logical problem.

Which my response is making a claim -- lets see how free the will is without the body. — Vaskane

Wouldn't it be absolutely free, without any boundaries or limitations whatsoever? But that's just my guess, I really don't know what you're talking about.

Remove your body from the equation and tell me how well you will. Also record us your will typing out your reply free from your body. — Vaskane

What?

LSD is not a "true" hallucinogenic, which means you know at the time that what you're seeing isn't real. — frank

You might try increasing the dosage. You cannot dismiss all that you see while you're on acid as not real, because you must see some real things or else you\d be completely lost in a completely unfamiliar surrounding. So some of what you see must be real.

The problem of course is how do you distinguish between what is real and what is not real. And if you cannot make the distinction you cannot know that what you are seeing isn't real, at any given time, nor that what you are seeing is real at any given time.

Or alternatively the answer might be yes it is. — flannel jesus

Sure, if you have free will, you might answer as you please.

Well, surely it's possible just by pure chance. If I asked a hundred people to guess a number between 1-100, I might guess the number they guessed correctly once or twice - that's not impossible by any means. He didn't really clarify how the painter got it right, he just said he got it right. — flannel jesus

Notice though, that the only way you make the correct prediction possible is by restricting the possible choices of the agent. The more you restrict the possibilities of the agent, the easier it is to predict. So when you change the perimeters to 1-50, or 1-10, you make the prediction easier, but if you change to 1-1000 you make the prediction more difficult.

So in reality, in this type of scenario, the agent's actions are only becoming predictable by forcing the agent (contrary to free will) to make a choice within a specified range of possibilities. In the op, the agent must clear a line from one corner to another, and this denies the agent's free will, as a premise. So the op denies the possibility of free will, by starting with a premise that the agent must do as he is told to, thereby denying him the free will to do what he wants to do.

But the accusation of belief without evidence is often raised on this forum whenever any vaguely religious sentiment is expressed. — Wayfarer

Not only that, but the meaning of "evidence" to some here has been so narrowed down by empirical principles, that it could only mean something which appears directly through an individual's sensations. This effectively renders "evidence" as completely subjective which is the exact opposite to what these people intend.

This is the result of removing the requirement of a logical relation between the thing which is evidence, and the thing which it is evidence of. And this logical relation is the essence of "evidence". The empiricist attempt to remove this necessary logical relation, to make "evidence" an empirically based concept would render the concept completely subjective and worthless.

That's right, the example is nonsense, because it has not been proven that the perfect prediction of an individual's actions which is described by the example, is even possible. @Art48 might just as well have described a world in which all actions are completely predetermined due to causal determinism, and asked if there is any free will in this world. So the question Art48 is really asking is whether free will is compatible with determinism, and the answer is no it is not.

MDR doesn't explain the relationship of theoretical models to their observational semantics and truth-conditions, neither does it give any guidance as to how and when to select a model among "equally good" alternatives, let alone for deciding what is a good model, and neither does it serve as an explanation for theory-change.

So what exactly does MDR solve? — sime

MDR has no provision for "truth-conditions". And that's what it solves, the need to define truth conditions.

But we can probably agree that there is a feeling that simply to analyse a disposition (potential, capacity, ability, skill, tendency, liability, habit, custom) as a counter-factual that x would happen if... is not enough. But I notice that you never specify what would count as the bottom of it. But we do look for, and often find, a basis for the disposition. Petrol is flammable because its' molecular structure is such that it easily reacts with the oxygen in the air and so forth. Most ice floats because its molecular structure makes it less dense and therefore lighter, than water. But these are empirical discoveries. So the most that we can say is that a disposition includes the idea that there is a causal basis for the counter-factual, but no more than that. In the end, it's just an application of the principle of sufficient reason. — Ludwig V

You are not at all paying attention to the difference between capacity, or potential, and a disposition, which I explained. They are opposing terms in the sense that capacity is the freedom to act in a multitude of different way, while a disposition is a restriction to that capacity, resulting in one specific type of action. That is why explaining potential, capacity, skill, liability habit, custom, etc., in terms of dispositions can never be sufficient.

It's very clear to me, that we do not ever get to the bottom of a disposition, because the singularity of the disposition becomes unintelligible when we try to make it consistent with the underlying multitude of possibilities. Molecular structure is not "the bottom" . We must look at the structure of atoms and electron shells to understand the underlying potential which gets tied up in the disposition you call "molecular structure". Then we get faced with the reality of quantum particles being described as possibilities. Ultimately the question of why specific possibilities are selected to be actualized (wave function collapse) cannot be answered. The tendency, in the modern mindset is to ignore the necessity of the act of selection, therefore deny the logical requirement of an agent which selects, and simply assume that the underlying potential restricts or limits itself (self-organization) in an habitual way, resulting in the describable disposition.

My problem with your view is that, so far as I can see, your view of capacity and potential are wide open to the objection that Berkeley rightly levels against the scholastic idea of matter as pure potential and Locke's view that substance is something unknown - that it is empty. — Ludwig V

These arguments both, can only remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance, by replacing it with something actual. This is the actuality of God. The problem though, is that the reality of potential cannot simply be replaced by the actuality of God, because this produces determinism, which is inconsistent with our experience. Therefore to maintain the reality of free will we must maintain the reality of potential. However, since the concept of free will in human beings cannot account for the agent involved in the selection from the possibilities which underly the natural dispositions you refer to, such as molecular structures, we do not avoid the need for the Will of God.

Thanks for this. But isn't it also true that the Theory of Forms presents an idea that seems to be a generalization of mathematics and provide a basis for his view that the things of this world are but shadows of reality? I would have thought that Plato was quite able to hold a view and recognize difficulties with it at the same time. — Ludwig V

The problems with the Theory of Forms, are more complex than you might think. It became evident to Plato that there was a need for "the good", as that which makes the Forms, as intelligible objects, intelligible, in the same way that the sun makes visible objects visible. Then he started to outline his understanding of the requirement of a medium between the Forms and the things of the sensible world. This medium was Plato's solution to the interaction problem often attributed to dualism.

Showing that Ayer's metaphysics is misconceived is itself a deeply metaphysical activity. — Banno

Has anybody here actually read any Ayers? — frank

I've read enough of A.J. Ayer to know that the way to show his metaphysics as misconceived is through his moral philosophy. He seems to misinterpret the classical (Aristotelian) distinction between the apparent good, and the real good, such that he cannot find any principles which might distinguish these two. I think Copleston provides a good approach.

Hawking indicated his disinterest in philosophy, which concerns these higher-order propositions, for his interest in physics, where I interpret his "model dependent realism" to refer to his view that the remit of physics is strictly in the analysis and testing of first-order physics propositions, as illustrated by his "world picture" analogy.

So it remains very unclear to me as what his philosophical views are, for his "model dependent realism" clearly wasn't meant to be a philosophical proposition, but only to express that as far as physics is concerned, philosophical questions are besides the point. — sime

I think you misrepresent Hawking's intentions sime. In "The Grand Design" he presents himself as having an adequate understanding of philosophical problems, and proposes model-dependent realism as a superior alternative to other philosophical theories. So he is not suggesting that philosophical problems are beside the point, he is proposing model-dependent realism as a solution to those philosophical problems.

I don’t claim anything in particular about it other than as an example of the standard, which Plato in the Theatetus and Descartes set out better than me. — Antony Nickles

That's what I disagreed with, that math is regarded by philosophers as the ultimate paradigm, "the standard" for knowledge. Perhaps Descartes characterizes it like that, but definitely not Plato in his later work, nor Wittgenstein in his later work. Even Russel found problems with math, as evidenced by the paradox he pointed to.

For these philosophers the search for certainty in knowledge leads them to mathematics, but upon analysis math becomes very problematic and disillusionment follows. In the Theaetetus for example, Plato may have presented math as if it was supposed to be the standard, but then exposed problems with that presupposition, and in the Parmenides, he demonstrates problems with math's basic foundational concept, "one", or "unity".

If you do math, and I do math (competently), we come up with the same answer. It doesn’t matter who does it. It is universal, rule-driven, predictable, repeatable, logical, a fact, etc. (that’s all I mean be “certain”). Imagine everything Socrates wanted for knowledge; that’s why he used math as the ultimate example in the Theatetus. — Antony Nickles

But the question is, how does this relate to "Reality". How does the fact that you and I agree that the answer to 2+2 is 4 say anything about reality. It's clearly not everything Socrates wanted for knowledge because it doesn't tell us anything about the world we live in. That we agree on rules for using symbols doesn't constitute knowledge. And when we get down to actually applying those rules in the real world, people round things off, and cut corners in their own idiosyncratic ways.

So yes, we agree that 2+2 equals 4, and this is "universal, rule-driven, predictable, repeatable, logical, a fact, etc.", but it's not knowledge because it's not applied to anything real. And when we go to apply it, we need to decide, does a husband and wife qualify as 2, or would it be better off to count then as 1 family. And this depends on the purpose, what are you counting, individual people, or families. Then we must define terms and apply the math accordingly. So the math does not provide us with any higher degree of certainty about the world than other language forms, because it is applied according to principles stated in other forms of language anyway.

However, despite this need for—let’s call it a pure knowledge (as Wittgenstein does) or perfect knowledge (as Descartes does)—everything but math is not “objective” in the way philosophy imposes on “Reality”. — Antony Nickles

What justifies putting math in a different category? If math is just a different way of using language, how does it possibly obtain this status of "objective"? All instances of language use provide for different degrees of certitude, but what provides the principles for putting math in a completely different category from other ways of using language, in respect to certitude?

...one action doesn't make a disposition.. — Ludwig V

This is representative of the faulty way of looking at things, which I am trying to get you to recognize. No matter how you look at any specific action itself, or how many times you look at the recurrence of a similar action, this will never provide for you an understanding of the capacity for that specified action, nor will it provide an understanding of that disposition which produces the similarity of repetition. This is because the nature of "a capacity", as a potential, involving a multitude of possibilities, is such that there is no necessary relation between the potential, capacity, and what actually occurs.

So, we cannot proceed from an observation of what actually occurs, to produce an adequate understanding of the capacity which provided the potential for that actual occurrence, because we are missing an essential ingredient, required for that understanding. This required element is the agent which chooses from the multitude of possibilities, to produce the specific activity. In the case of intention actions we know this agent as the "free will". The agent which makes the choice, apprehends the possibilities in its own unique and peculiar way, therefore understanding the reason why one specific sort of action is caused, rather than one of the multitude of other possibilities, requires knowing the agent's perspective.

Your infinite regress suggests that I cannot acquire any capacity, and I don't believe that. — Ludwig V

You misunderstood the infinite regress. The infinite regress demonstrates the failure of your way of looking at things, that the existence of a capacity can be understood through learning, doing, trying. It arises from trying to explain the capacity for a living activity through reference only to the activity produced from the capacity. This is what you do when you refer to learning, you refer to various forms of a similar activity, as a being develops its disposition toward the capacity it holds. Your suggestion that a stone's disposition is similar, is not supported by common knowledge because we do not understand the stone to choose from possibilities, like we understand living beings to.

So, take your example of the capacity to walk across the room for example. We can only say that this capacity exists after we observe the being walking across the room. However, we know that the capacity must preexist the action, to enable it. Then, we might say that the being demonstrated this capacity when it walked halfway across the room. But still, the capacity to walk halfway is the same sort of capacity as the capacity to walk all the way, and this must have preexisted the walking of halfway. Therefore we must look at the capacity to walk a quarter of the way. Prior to this, we have an eighth of the way, etc., and this would produce an infinite regress, like a Zeno paradox.

You might think that such an infinite regress is silly, but it's really just a short cut to getting to the real problem. If you say that prior to the capacity to walk, came the capacity to stand up, replacing one specified capacity (to walk), with another prior capacity (to stand up), we face the same type of infinite regress, only replacing the development of one specified capacity (to walk) with an infinite series of similar capacities (to walk, to stand up, to crawl, etc.). The infinite regress is only avoided by stopping, which renders the capacity as still not understood, because we do not get to the bottom of it

The fact is that if we try to understand the reality of the type of capacity which living beings possess, solely through reference to the activities produced by the capacities, we face an infinite regress which renders the capacity as unintelligible. This is due to the nature of the relationship between the capacity and the activity produced from it; the fact that there is no logical necessity to this relationship. The lack of a logical relation produces the need to impose boundary conditions on the activity, which results in an infinite regress when the boundary is approached.

Whereas, to me the purported beyond physical actions of metaphysical entities also qualifies. — LuckyR

The reality of "metaphysical entities" beyond physical actions is necessitated by logic. That is, sound logic demonstrates the reality of "metaphysical entities" beyond physical actions. This is why metaphysics is, and has always been an important discipline. It is not magic though.

The simple fact is that there are limits, boundaries to how far "physical actions" can take us in explaining what is real. Logic demonstrates that we must turn to something beyond physical actions to understand these aspects of reality which are beyond those boundaries (intentional design, and free will for example), and this is metaphysics. Insisting that these aspects (like free will) are not real, would simply be denial of the evidence.

So for me it speaks little of the directness or indirectness of perception and doing so leads me into wild territory. — NOS4A2

That's the point I was making. When we properly look at the issue, the question of "directness or indirectness" becomes incidental and insignificant. That question is misguided, most likely as an ill-advised attempt to avoid the "wild territory", which is reality.

I choose "walking across the room" as my example. — Ludwig V

OK, now do you agree that a person must have the capacity to walk across the room prior to actually walking across the room? And, this is not the capacity to learn how to walk, because the person has already learned that. Despite the fact that we might not be able to judge that this person had the capacity to walk across the room, until after the person actually demonstrates this ability by walking across the room, it is also a simple fact that the person must have had the capacity to do it, before carrying out the act.

I asked myself whether you intend what you say to non-actions, to what are called dispositions. — Ludwig V

No, I consider "dispositions" to be something completely different. A disposition is an arrangement of parts. And, if a specific arrangement of parts inclines a person to act in a specific way, then the disposition plays the role of a restriction on a capacity. A capacity, and the restrictions on a capacity are very distinct. So for example, a habit may be a sort of disposition. The habit inclines the person with the potential, or capacity, to actualize it in a specific way, the habit of walking across the room for example. This disposition restricts the capacity, which could act in many different ways, walk to many different places for example, inclining the person to act in the one specific way, out of the many possible ways. So a disposition is somewhat opposite to a capacity, the latter being a freedom, the former being a restriction.

This is a fake puzzle, based on the fact that we tend to use "capacity" in an ambiguous way. We say of an infant that cannot yet walk, or of someone that has not yet learnt to drive that they cannot walk or drive, but that they have to capacity to learn to walk, or drive and in that sense, can walk or drive. — Ludwig V

Here you demonstrate misunderstanding. The ability to walk across the room, which necessarily preexists the physical act of walking across the room, (as the skill to do it), is very specific, by those terms. The more general "capacity to learn to walk" is completely different. Being more general, as a capacity to learn something, the same capacity is also the capacity to learn all sorts of different things. So it is not properly called the capacity to learn to walk, because that unnecessarily restricts it to learning to walk, when it actually could manifest in the learning of many different things. When a person learns to walk, that capacity to learn many different things, is restricted in a specific way, as a sort of dispositioning, so that a more specific capacity results, the capacity to walk. And, the even more specific, the capacity to walk across the room.

The capacity to learn or otherwise acquire, as skill is distinct from the exercise of that skill. Your infinite regress, I'm afraid, is little more than a pun. — Ludwig V

Now you are simply avoiding the issue by leaving out the logically necessary intermediary between the capacity to learn a skill, and the exercising of that skill once it is learned. The intermediary which you neglect, is having the skill without actually exercising it. I have learned how to walk, I have the capacity to walk across the room, but I am not currently exercising this capacity. This capacity, which we might call the skill itself, comes after learning the skill, but it must always exist prior to exercising the skill.

I do not know how you can describe an infinite regress as a pun. That makes no sense, but I think you must see it that way due to the misunderstanding which you demonstrate.

Except that we acquire many skills by practice. The infant learns to walk by trying and failing and gradually getting better at it. We learn to drive by sitting in the driving seat and trying to drive and gradually getting better at it. This learning process is built on what we already can do, but which we have not learnt to do. Infants can do various things from birth and even before birth. These are the result of the physical development of the body, and can be compared to the tendency of the stone to resist pressure - that is, they are dispositions, not capacities. — Ludwig V

This attempt to reduce capacities to dispositions does not address the issue at all. It just demonstrates a basic misunderstanding, or possibly an intentional effort to avoid the issue. The issue is that the capacity to walk, drive, or whatever specific skill you will name, which. as actually having the skill, is necessarily posterior in time to learning the skill, is also necessarily prior in time to carrying out the specified activity. It cannot be reduced to learning the activity, as you seem to propose, because it only exists after the skill is learned. And, it cannot be described in terms of carrying out the specified activity because it is necessarily prior in time to carrying out the activity.

As I explained above, the capacity to learn to see is indeed "prior to" the capacity to see, but is not the same capacity as the capacity to see. — Ludwig V

The issue is that the capacity to see, which is temporally posterior to learning how to see, is necessarily prior in time, to the physical act of seeing. Therefore the capacity to see cannot be reduced to the capacity to learn how to see, nor can it be reduced to the physical activity of seeing.

But surely, the perceiver is only a perceiver as capable of exercising that capacity, just as parents are only parents in relation to their children, even though they are many other things that do not require any such relationship. If they don't have children, they are not parents. — Ludwig V

The two or not quite analogous. Perception is a capacity, as you say, the perceiver is "capable of exercising that capacity". So it is a special type of activity which may be produced. The ability to perform that special activity is what defines "the perceiver". This does not logically require that the perceiver has actually carried out that specific activity yet, as is required with "parent".

The difference, may not seem important at this point, and you will find some philosophers pushing in the other direction, like Wittgenstein, who would define having the ability to 'follow a rule' as someone who has been observed to have followed a specified rule, rather than as someone who has the capacity to follow that rule. But you will see that this sort of mistake (misdirection, or misguided way of looking at such activities) leads to a very serious problem. He then has the problem of trying to figure out at what point the ability to follow the rule comes into existence. Is it after demonstrating the correct action once, twice, or whatever? Furthermore, since the capacity which is understood by 'following a rule' must, from this perspective, come into existence at some point in time, Wittgenstein is faced with the question of what type of capacity exists prior to this. Then each such capacity would be defined by having demonstrated a fulfillment of the required actions, and there would always be a further capacity prior to each action, leading to an infinite regress of capacities prior to the first action, which could not be described as the capacity to perform that observed action.

So Aristotle neatly avoided this problem of infinite regress of potential by defining the potential, or capacity for a specific type of activity as being prior to the activity, in a more absolute sense. From this perspective, the capacity to perceive, what we are calling "the perceiver", must necessarily preexist the act which is implied here by the name, as the act of perception. We must therefore forfeit our empirically based principles to make the understanding of capacities possible. Empiricism infiltrates our thoughts in an attempt to simplify, but it really corrupts our capacity to understand. This corruption of the capacity inclines us to assume that the existence of a "perceiver" requires that an act of perception has already occurred, and such an epistemology leads us to an infinite regress of capacities, rendering these capacities as unintelligible to us. Instead, we must accept the obvious, much more highly, and truly intuitive principle, that the capacity to perceive, which defines "the perceiver" must be prior in time to any act of perception. From here we have a much more realistic way of understanding the relation between the perceived and the perception.

But surely, understanding the capacity requires also understanding the exercise of it? — Ludwig V

So, as outlined above, I would answer "no" to this question. The capacity preexists the exercising of it, therefore analysis of the exercising of it will not provide an adequate understanding. The implied infinite regress will produce infinite discussion, like in this thread. But, as Aristotle showed, any capacity relies on a prior actuality. So understanding the capacity requires understanding the prior actuality which the capacity is based in. This is due to the nature of existence and the passing of time. "Capacity" implies a number of possibilities, while exercising the capacity produces one actuality. The act, which produces one from many, which is exercising the capacity, is not a necessary act, as understood by the concept of free will. It is an act of selecting from possibilities. So the specific act, a specified capacity, must be understood as part of a more general capacity, not by understanding the specific act itself.

You also said that the nervous system was the medium. So if both perceiver and nervous systems (in general) is the medium, then I’m left to assume nervous systems are perceivers in your view. They perceive and are also mediums. But I just don’t know how that can be possible, because much more than a nervous system is required for the act of perceiving. — NOS4A2

Correct, that's why I was careful to begin my discussion of the medium with the qualification "in general". We could start with the eye, or the nose, as the medium for those specific senses. Then we would say that nervous system is the medium for all the senses, "in general". But then you start talking about "the perceiver", and we move to an even more general sense of "the medium" because we see the need to include all the aspects of the living being which support the nervous system, as also required, and therefore part of "the medium".

As for your positioning of perceiver, perceptions, and mediums, it’s too odd for me to think about because it implies the perception (whatever that is) is somewhere outside or behind the perceiver. — NOS4A2

If my way of speaking is foreign to you, making it too difficult to understand, we can drop the discussion, that's fine. But why do you need to imagine a spatial relation between perceiver and perception? It is better to imagine a temporal perspective, as outlined above in my reply to Ludwig. The perceiver is prior to the perception, as necessary to cause it. Therefore the "behind" you refer to is temporal, as after.

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself. — sime

It is the natural outcome of relativity theory, when relativity theory is taken to be true. Relativity is a very useful category of theories which allow activities, events, to be looked at from different perspectives. Each perspective is assigned equal validity. But if we deny that there is anything real, or true, which would serve to provide the principles required to distinguish one perspective as better than another, assuming that equal validity implies equally true, and opt instead for other principles to make that judgement, we end up with model dependent realism.

Mind you, this ‘skill’ without the likes of Bannon and Murdoch, would probably not have taken him far. — Tom Storm

Don't forget his Russian comrades.

I don’t think it can be established that a perceiver is both perceiver and perceived. I — NOS4A2

I didn't say that. I said that the perceiver (in general) is the medium between the perception and the perceived.

I suspect that, given the indirectness theory, that you would say we perceive our nervous systems, and not the sound waves in air. Is this so? — NOS4A2

No, I would not say that. The nervous system, as medium is neither the perception nor the perceived.

I don't see how one can separate three things, perceiver, perceived and perception. They are clearly interdependent, by definition. — Ludwig V

I think a thorough analysis would show that the three are not properly "interdependent". A "perceiver" is necessarily prior to, as logically required for, both "perceived" and "perception", but it is not necessary that a perceiver is actively engaged in that act which involves a perception and a perceived. This puts "perceiver" into a different category, and independent from both those two. "Perceiver" does not necessarily imply the existence of a "perception" or a "perceived", as the perceiver is not necessarily engaged in that activity referred to by the name. This point is very important to Aristotle's biology, as it is the reason why all the capacities, or powers, of living beings are described as potentials, potencies, rather than as actualities. The reality of this fact implies that we must turn to terms other than "perceived" and "perception" to understand "perceiver".

It is neither the perceived, nor the perception, or even a combination of both, which can provide the defining features of the perceiver because the perceiver exists independently of these. As "perceived" and "perception" become incidental to the perceiver in this way, and not necessary to "perceiver", we must turn in another direction, toward what "perceiver" is dependent upon in order to understand the perceiver.

That's why i said threads like this which focus on the question of a direct or indirect relation between perceived and perception are fundamentally misguided. The relation cannot be understood without first developing an adequate understanding of the perceiver, and this requires turning away from the act of perceiving, towards whatever it is which provides the power or capacity for that act.

So, if we start with a proposition which states the nature of the perceiver, then the relation between perceived and perception will follow from this necessarily, as implied by that proposition, without question. And, as explained above, if we want to understand the nature of the perceiver we must turn to principles other than the relation between perceived and perception. Therefore discussions about the relation between perceived and perception are completely unnecessary, leading nowhere, and they will go on endlessly when this is the subject of discussion rather than the nature of the perceiver.

The nervous system is not a medium, though, because it is a part of that which senses—the perceiver—not that which the perceiver senses. I guess my next question is: where does the perceiver begin and end? I doubt appealing to biology can furnish an answer in favor of the indirectness of perception. Sound waves, for example, where the medium is air, contacts the sensitive biology of the ear directly, not indirectly. — NOS4A2

Your question is made irrelevant by the conditions I described. The two described conditions are things perceived, and the perceptions. The perceiver therefore is the medium. There is no need to discuss a beginning and end to the perceiver unless we make the medium, i.e. the perceiver, our subject. But if the medium, perceiver, is made to be the subject of our inquiry, then the thing perceived and the perception are incidental to the inquiry, and the silliness of this thread is avoided.

First, unless you want to redefine metaphysics in the current era from what it has meant historically, the role of "magic" cannot be excluded from it's repertoire. — LuckyR

I've read a lot of metaphysics, and I've never seen magic in the repertoire. Maybe an example would help.

Rather I mean it as a explanation that defies observation, experience and knowledge. — LuckyR

Such a "magical" explanation would not be metaphysics. Metaphysicians work toward explanations which are consistent with observation experience and knowledge. An explanation which defies these would be illogical, and not acceptable to anyone, so a metaphysician would know to stay away from that.

For example explaining lightning in the absence of an understanding of electricity. Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism all ascribed lightning to the workings of gods (surprising no one) when those religions were invented in the Bronze and Iron ages, clearly not science, that's metaphysics. However, in Medieval times lightning (which commonly struck the tallest structures ie churches) was either thought to be prevented by the piety of the ringing of church bells warding off evil spirits (a metaphysical proposal) or that the sound of the ringing of the bells disrupted the air and thus prevented the lightning from striking the tower (a physical or a scientific theory). — LuckyR

I haven't seen lightening ascribed to gods in any metaphysics. Nor have I seen any metaphysical proposals about church bells. It's become quite evident that you don't know what you're talking about.

What is the medium? — NOS4A2

Generally speaking, the nervous system.

Philosophers... always finding problems where there are none. — javi2541997

That accurately sums up this thread. I would say that it is going nowhere, slowly.

If philosophers would respect the fact that there is always a medium between the thing sensed (sometimes called external), and the sensation of the individual (sometimes called internal), most of these silly problems could be avoided.

First, we could understand very clearly how there is no direct, or even indirect cause/effect relation between the thing sensed and the sensation, due to the intermediary activity of the medium. Further, we could apprehend the fact that most of the intermediary activity is the activity of a living organism, as an agent, and is therefore causal in the sense of purposeful actions. Then we could simply dismiss all these misguided problems of direct vs. indirect, and apprehend the living being as a biological agent which creates its own sensations. This would provide a much better starting point for wannabe philosophers.

Notice that each of those titles refer to the debate about the nature of reality or ‘the soul of science’ - which comes into sharp focus in the 30-year debate between Neils Bohr and Albert Einstein (who advocated a staunch scientific realism). — Wayfarer

It's sort of ironic that after stipulating the relativity of simultaneity, Einstein would become a staunch realist. If he was not being outright contradictory, this indicates that he did not adequately understand the logical consequences of the relativity of simultaneity, in relation to "reality".

If reality is "what is", and what is, is conditional on the present time, then the relativity of simultaneity makes "reality" dependent on one's frame of reference. How could this be consistent with any form of realism?

Contrasting ideas?

My point was why look at the issue solely "logically" when the hallmark of the metaphysical is the "magical"? After all, that was the whole reason humans invented the metaphysical, namely to explain the (currently) unexplainable. — LuckyR

You seem confused. I agree that metaphysics looks to explain what hasn't yet been explained, but magic is not the hallmark of metaphysics. Magic doesn't explain anything, so metaphysicians cannot turn to magic, in their efforts to explain. In fact, that is what metaphysicians try to avoid, by showing that what is currently unexplainable, inclining people toward "magic", can actually be explained in ways other than magic.

I did not restrict the options of gods to the logical, because I was not talking about the options of gods. I was talking about the type of knowledge which a god could have, and the question of whether omniscience is compatible with free will. You seem to have jumped to the unwarranted conclusion that I was talking about the operations of gods, when I was just talking about the knowledge of gods. That is a distinction between an active god, and a passive god. I was talking about a passive god, who is supposed to be omniscient.

So, I restricted knowledge, knowing, to the reasonable because that is how we understand the nature of "knowledge". I said that if a god knows something, then there must be a reasonable explanation for the thing known by that god. I then classified a chance or random event as something without a reasonable explanation, and so I questioned how a god could "know" this type of event, according to how we understand "know".

I assumed that the only way to know such an event would be to observe it in its occurrence, because no other information could necessitate the logical conclusion of the event's occurrence. Therefore the event's occurrence could not be known in any other way. This creates a problem if we want to say that the god knows the event prior in time, to the event's occurrence. It implies that the god must be capable of observing the event, prior in time to the event's occurrence. And this appears to imply determinism.

Ah, you missed my reference to gods being metaphysical. I am not necessarily proposing any particular mechanism for the operations of gods because 1) being personally physical, I (and you, perhaps?) have no experience with the metaphysical and more importantly, it's inner workings and 2) I don't personally believe gods exist objectively (they do exist inter-subjectively). — LuckyR

I don't call myself a "metaphysician" for nothing. I think I have a lot of experience with the metaphysical.

For example being able to fool gods with card tricks and coin flips is considered ludicrous to theists and most atheists. — LuckyR

OK, suppose a god can know the result of a proposed coin toss prior to the toss occurring. How would this type of knowledge work if there is no reasonable explanation why one result is favoured over the other? If the result is truly random chance, there could be no explanation, so the god would be just guessing. If the god really knows then there must be a reason which validates that knowledge, and it is not random chance.

Or, are you proposing that the god knows the outcome through some other means, perhaps by actually having observational capacity in the future, while existing at the present? So the god, at the present, would know the future outcome by observing it before it actually happens for us, at the present. But wouldn't this just be determinism, if future acts, which are dependent on present choices, can be observed by God, before they are chosen by the person at the present?

While I concede that Science itself is not free from biases, but this is one area where the formal position is pretty respectable. This position defines the confirmed existence of the "Big Bang Theory" by the multiple stages of rapid expansion that we know the universe experienced in its first few seconds, days, and years. So we can (and do) know that the Big Bang happened immediately after the birth of the universe, but our knowledge can only get asymptomatically close to "t=0". Our current mathematical models extrapolate the existence of a singularity at t=0, but in every case where they come up, a singularity represents a transition point where our theories (or maybe just our current system of mathematics, or both) stop working and, as far as we can tell, no longer describe reality. — Jaded Scholar

Consider that every time we make a temporal measurement there is necessarily a t=0, the point at which the measurement starts. And, as you explain, "our knowledge can only get asymptomatically close to 't=0'". Because of this, the very same problem which we have in modeling the Big Bang, exists when we model any temporal reality. In Newtonian mechanics it manifests as an infinite acceleration at the precise moment a force is applied, and in wave mechanics it manifests as the uncertainty of the Fourier transform.

Not only do we not know if or how reality might work on the "other side" of any singularity, we don't know if or how reality might work *at* a singularity. — Jaded Scholar

So this is the problem with any supposed "point in time", it is a singularity and we cannot understand what exists at a point in time. Accepted conventions place the limit at about the Planck length, but that is dependent on the conventions.

Not only is it possible that we don't actually understand the birth of the universe, it is an established fact that we do not. — Jaded Scholar

Likewise, as explained above, we do not understand the universe at the present, at every moment of passing time.

I thought you and others might enjoy knowing that most physicists regard String Theorists and other specialists in unprovable/unfalsifiable theories as not really being "physicists", and actually being "mathematical philosophers". ;) — Jaded Scholar

I would classify that as metaphysical speculation. The issue with this speculation which is derived from mathematicians and physicists, is that it tends to rely heavily on the reality of mathematical ideals and geometrical figures. This is known as Pythagorean, or Platonic, idealism.

God could know the result of every unrealized hypothetical, though. He just couldn't know which choice we're going to make if you believe pre-knowledge entails determinism and therefore negates free will. — Hanover

That necessitates a division between thinking and choosing. It's part of the reasoning which led Augustine to propose a three part intellect, memory, reason, and will. The will, as "choice" in your example, does not necessarily follow the thought in a cause/effect manner. So the result of a thought cannot be said to be the choice, as there is a separation between these two which allows the choice to be inconsistent with the reasoning.

It really doesn't solve the problem though, because if the choice does not follow directly from the reasoning, as necessitated by the reasoning, then it must be "caused" by something else. If God knows everything, then God must know what that other cause is, or will be, prior to it occurring, and this entails determinism.

If the will is truly free, and God does not know the choice which will be made, prior to it being made, then the choice is caused by something which God does not know. This prevents the possibility of God knowing everything. To maintain this premise, that God does know everything, we'd have to allow that the choice is not caused. This would imply random uncaused actions. That's how I interpret what you say here, that freely willed choices are not known by God, who knows everything knowable, therefore they are unknowable, as completely random, uncaused actions. Or would you propose another category of actions which are unknowable to God who knows everything, but in some way still caused. The cause would be outside the realm of "everything".