Logically, how can something reflect on itself? — RussellA

Start with the premise that this "thing" has a memory. And the thing's existence has temporal extension. Memory allows the thing to revisit its past existence. That is called "reflection". Reflection allows a person to reconsider one's actions relative to one's thought processes and see where the actions did not follow logic.

Would Mary learn something new when she saw red if Mary were God? — Hanover

I think the more appropriate question is, does God learn something new if Mary sees red. It appears necessary that God must learn something new every time a person learns something new, because God must learn that the person has learned.

This is similar to the problem Augustine addressed concerning the apparent contradiction between a human being's free will, and God's omniscience. Simply put, the idea of an omniscient God appears to imply determinism. Yet human experience appears to justify "free will". I don't think that Augustine came up with a satisfactory answer to this problem, only suggesting that the nature of time is very difficult for us to understand. And I think that's the lesson we ought to learn from problems like this, that we do not have a very good understanding of time.

This is why "experience" is such an important part of knowledge. We can make all sorts of speculations, hypotheses, and theories about the nature of time, but the only way to actually understand the passing of time is by analyzing one's own experience. This is the aspect of knowledge which is provided by experience, which cannot be derived from any other principles, the role of time.

Philosophical ideas seem to require ream after ream of supporting prattle. — jgill

This seems to be self-contradictory. If it is supporting the ideas, how could it be called "prattle"? That reams of material is required to support the philosophical ideas is a good thing, isn't it? That support is what makes the philosophy sound.

And without a hierarchy of moral values which only philosophy can provide, your own proposition itself, that "physicists have better things to do", is meaningless prattle. Such a proposition would require reams of support to justify it as sound.

How would you do that? — NOS4A2

To begin with, a "whim" is a sudden, unpredictable, and very subjective, inclination. Because of the idiosyncratic nature of whims, the logical first step which a "state" could take toward avoiding whims would be to have a ruling group, or party, instead of a ruling individual. Having to go through the party would impose the sober second thought required to eliminate acting on whims.

Is this possible?

Is it possible to have a thought about an internal logical process, when the internal logical process has caused the thought in the first place?

In other words, can an effect cause itself? — RussellA

I don't see why it has to have caused itself. I think it's commonly known as "reflection".

What I feel remains to be explored further is the process of "finding our feet with them", say, as a matter of imagining ourselves as them, getting at why one might want to judge as they do. Maybe: in taking them seriously; allowing another's reasons to be or become intelligible; respecting their interests by taking their expressions as a commitment of their self, their character as it were (what "type" of person they are). I take this not as a matter of critique, but of letting them be "strange" to us without rejection (tolerating but not assuming/resigned to difference); with open curiosity, (cultural) humility (that my interests and context are not everyone's). In a sense: understanding as empathy; understanding in the sense of: being understanding (Websters: vicariously experiencing the [interests] of another; imagining the other's attitudes as legitimate; the imaginative projection of [myself] into [the other] so that [they] appear to be infused with [me, being a person]). — Antony Nickles

Isn't it shown by Wittgenstein, that any sort of completeness to "finding our feet with them" is actually impossible? To understand them requires communication with them, but communication with them requires that we understand them. So we are forever isolated from each other. It's as if the other person is a lion. Learning the other's language does not necessitate an understanding of the other. Understanding the lion requires that one could put oneself in the lion's shoes, but to obtain this sort of understanding requires knowing the lion's language. The best we can do, is learn the other's language, then attempt to put oneself in the other's shoes. Therefore this way of looking at things, that learning a language requires an understanding of the other, therefore communication implies understanding, gives us a problematic philosophical perspective replete with an irresolvable problem.

Consequently, we must dismiss this way of looking at language. We must start with the proposition that each one of us is an island of isolation, with one's own private language. Then we see how language as a communicative tool comes into being, independent from, and not reliant on an understanding of the others whom we communicate with. So it evolves through processes like justification, which ultimately develop into formal knowledge. The key point though, is that skepticism cannot be removed, and is inherent within the nature of language, therefore also within the structure of formal knowledge which is a product of language. Skepticism is an essential part of what it means to be human, as a living being. It is what keeps us on our toes, wary, and keen to the real possibility of deception, and other lurking dangers. And what Wittgenstein demonstrates is that those philosophers who take as their goal or aim, to remove skepticism (as he did in the Tractatus), are profoundly misguided toward an impossible ideal, which is not at all representative of reality.

I would propose that a state is successful wherever it is considered sovereign, while the people who it nominally represent remain dependent and subordinate to its whims. — NOS4A2

A state has "whims"? I would think that eliminating whims from the ruling system would be a defining feature of success.

How can we know that. I cannot look at someone and know their internal logical processes. Even I don't know my own internal logical processes. — RussellA

One can know it by self examination, introspection. It looks like you haven't tried it, or gave up to soon without the required discipline.

Suppose I saw someone act in an unexpected way. For example, they had bought a winning lottery ticket and then proceeded to tear it up. As an outsider, how can I know their inner logical processes in order to say they are exhibiting either Determinism or Free will. — RussellA

The point was that people act in ways contrary to their own logical process. They know that it is illogical to buy lottery tickets, yet they still do. They know that the law enforces consequences for illegal actions yet they still proceed in those actions. They bypass safety precautions which they know the reasons for. There is an endless amount of examples.

The conclusion therefore is that we cannot characterize people in the way that the "logic gate" was characterized, because we know that the people are not bound to follow what the logical process dictates.

However, what if in fact my act had been determined, and what I thought was Free Will was in fact only the illusion of Free Will. — RussellA

Whether or not free will is an illusion is not the issue. The issue is whether people are bound (determined) to act according to what their own logical process dictates. And the answer is clear, they are not. I said that the concept of free will accounts for the reality of this fact, that people are not determined in this way. Whether or not this concept of free will is itself faulty, and free will is an illusion, is not the question right now. What is the question is whether or not the concept is sufficient to account for the fact that people are not determined to act according to their own logic.

Philosophy as physics without the maths. — Banno

I think this thread shows that mathematics is insufficient for explaining the reality of physical existence. That's why we've developed philosophy.

In practice, do people act illogically? How many times do we see people in a city centre, when seeing a truck approaching them at speed, decide not to step out of the way? — RussellA

Yes, in practice people commonly act illogically. Your truck example is just so extreme, it would rarely occur. Take something more simple for example, like when someone buys a lottery ticket, or breaks the law, knowing that getting caught would have serious consequences. There are many other common instances, like when we are overcome by passion to act violently or lustfully for example.

The fact that gravity is a force beyond the control of humans does not mean that humans don't understand gravity.

The fact that humans understand gravity does not mean that humans can control gravity. — RussellA

Humans do not understand gravity. They can predict the effects of gravity, but they do not understand how it works. One cannot control something without understanding how it works.

You're assuming free will rather than determinism. — RussellA

I am assuming that humans do not necessarily follow the results of logic in their actions. This is evident and common, every time one is "overcome by passion" or something similar and does not act according to what was figured to be logically necessary. And, I am pointing out that this type of behaviour, where one acts contrary to one's own logical process, is explained by the concept of free will.

Why do you think humans have free will rather than being determined by forces beyond their control? — RussellA

In the context, this question does not make any sense. If there are "forces beyond their control" these are forces not understood, because understanding them allows us to make use of them, therefore control them. Therefore we cannot know whether such proposed forces are deterministic or not, and cannot assume that a person would be "determined" by them, as you propose.

As a CPU within a computer interprets, processes and executes instructions, I suggest that within the brain are also particular types of structures that interpret, process and execute instructions, where a thought is no more than a difference in the physical structure of the brain between two moments in time. — RussellA

Th difference between the physical structure which interprets, what you call the logic gate, and the human mind, is that the human mind does not necessarily have to follow the procedure when the input is applied, while the logic gate does. This is the nature of free will. The logic gate has an outcome determined by the input and the system. The outcome from the human mind is not determined in the way that the outcome from the logic gate is, because the human mind has something else, called free will, which implies that the system is not closed in that way, which necessitates the product. The initial conditions cannot predict the outcome with logical necessity.

You asked for something you could understand, and I gave it to you. But, instead of researching it, you want to argue about it. I do not. — Dfpolis

You gave me something which I could not understand though. The problem is that I've already researched, and what you say often seems inconsistent with what I've already found out. So to me it appears like you alter basics principles of physics, in an attempt to hide faults in your metaphysics, and attempt to disguise this by refusing to elaborate. So you prove to be unwillingly to explain, and I have to flatter you with reference to your superior education in order to encourage you to divulge all that knowledge of the discipline of physics, which you conceal within. You pretend that you haven't got the time, but we have no deadlines or time constraints here.

For instance, I said that I have never been able to understand the separation of electromagnetism into distinct electric and magnetic fields, and you replied that the two are transformable in special relativity. But that does not explain why they were separated in the first place, which is what I said that I did not understand.

Our understanding of electromagnetic waves consist of both aspects, the electric and the magnetic aspects. The division into separate fields, I assume is based on the observations of distinct effects, electric effects and magnetic effects.

You asked me to "Imagine positively and negatively charged parallel plates" as a method toward understanding the relation between mass and energy. I assume that the positive represents the mass, and the negative represents the energy, but "parallel plates" implies an image of two dimensional planes, instead of a three dimensional body, which an atom with electrons and protons is. So I really do not understand how this image which you are proposing is applicable, or how it is in any way a representation which I can understand.

Here's an example of why this "parallel plates" representation seems unreasonable to me. Suppose an electron orbits a nucleus, and we have an observational perspective which sees the electron approaching us on the right side of the nucleus, and moving away from us on the left side of the nucleus. The electric and magnetic fields are represented as perpendicular. However, every time that electron moves 180 degrees around the nucleus, the relation between the negative electron, and the positive nucleus has to flip 180 degrees, to represent the change between coming toward us in relation to the nucleus, and going away from us in relation to the nucleus.

Further to that, the turning of the electron, in the interim, must be represented. Then the electron appears to have a spin, when there is really no spin at all, the apparent spin is just a product of applying a 2 dimensional coordinate system to an assumed 3 dimensional activity. The assumed 3 dimensional activity is the orbiting of the electron. But if it's just a wave, there is no orbiting electron, there is no need for flipping, nor spinning, just the opposing crests and troughs in a 3 dimensional representation. The need to separate electric from magnetic fields was produced from the assumption of an orbiting electron, and is completely unnecessary if electrons are properly represented as wave phenomenon.

That is a problem with your proposed "parallel plates" image, along with the 2 dimensional coordinate system of distinct electric and magnetic fields. The further problem, which cannot even be approached because these spinning coordinate systems obscure it, is your claim "that they can transform into each when we change reference frames." The problem being that we cannot actually change reference frames without creating falsities in relation to a wider environment. Therefore the claim to be able to change reference frames is a falsity.

The apparent spin of the electron is a product of the coordinate system which maps the electron as an object moving relative to the proton. If we try to transform, and attempt to map the proton as moving relative to the electron (change the frame of reference), then the positive field which is mapped as parallel to the negative (parallel plates) must flip to account for that spin of the coordinate system. But this flipping would produce problems of contradiction in the wider context of multiple electrons and multiple protons. Therefore the change of reference frames which you propose would actually be impossible.

The issue of course, as I indicated earlier, is that the reference frame of a single quantum of energy, an electron, or a photon, cannot be a true inertial reference frame. So any attempt to produce a rest frame for such an object, whether it's by separating the electric field from the magnetic, or some other means, will always be fraught with difficulty, compromised, and ultimately producing a false representation. The electron is simply not an orbiting body, as you know, it is a wave phenomenon, so assigning it an inertial frame is a falsity which creates problems. Therefore the only way to get a true representation is to produce a rest frame around the nucleus, and map the quanta of energy accordingly, accepting that there is no possibility of reference frame exchange, therefore no truly transformable properties. This requires disregarding the false ideal of an inertial frame for an electron, which is exchangeable with the inertial frame of the proton, because this implies that the electron is a body with a location relative to the proton, determinable by spatial coordinates.

The separation of electromagnetism into distinct electric and magnetic fields is something I've never really been able to understand. But I know it's essential to the concepts of polarization, and the supposed spin of particles.

Since most natural light is unpolarized, I think that this is not a real representation of the associated wave phenomena. I think it is just an artificially created part of the mapping system, in the same way that a coordinate system is. This produces an unnecessarily complex representation, which instead of having a proper 3D representation of waves emitting from a source in all possible directions, requires a moving, generally rotating coordinate system. Needless to say, the moving coordinate system is very problematic, because motion is understood as relative, and the motion of the coordinate system is therefore arbitrary, related to nothing other than the intention of the mapmaker.

So I believe that this practise of representing an electric field as distinct from the magnetic field is nothing but a coordinate system used for mapping the waves. In natural occurrences, waves are going every which way, as they propagate out from a mass consisting of a variety of parts. This would require a vast multitude of distinct fields to represent the natural waves coming from what would appear to be one united source. This requirement of a multitude of distinct fields, to map the most simple natural waves, I think is very strong evidence that "fields" are completely unreal, and just a coordinate system.

Why though, did you ask me to imagine "parallel plates", when the convention for producing the coordinate system of distinct electric and magnetic fields is to make them perpendicular? Are the positive and negative fields you propose supposed to represent the positive and negative aspects of the atom? If so, how does the neutron get represented, which is mass without electric charge? And how would you make both the electric field, and the magnetic field, which are perpendicular to each other by convention, parallel to the proposed positive field?

You can look at my (dfpolis) youtube physics videos if you wish. There I have corrected a number of common misunderstandings. You might also look up my paper "Does God Gamble with Creation?" — Dfpolis

Ok, thanks for the references Dfpolis. You know my principal interest, as I've developed it in this thread, the concept of mass in physics. Can you direct me toward anything specifically related to the ideas I've expressed here.

You claim you have been trying to teach me, but you really don't seem to be making much effort. I know that I am of the very skeptical sort, and as such I am a very difficult and trying student, but you often don't seem to be trying very hard yourself. You simply make random statements, assertions which to me often seem either inconsistent with other assertions you've mase, or are simply mistaken.

For example, you said:
"All known waves, even ocean waves, have momentum. The momentum of sound waves moves your ear drum."
Now, that in itself is a satisfactory statement, because the momentum of waves is attributable to the movement of the mass of the medium. The particles of the medium have mass, and the movement of these particles is constitutive of the momentum of the wave.

However, if I couple this with your statement that electromagnetic radiation is known to exist as waves, and these waves are known to have momentum, then I see inconsistency. How can the momentum of these electromagnetic waves be known, if the momentum of waves is attributed to the movement of the mass of the particles of the medium and there is no known medium for these waves?

Therefore I assume that the momentum, which you "associate" with a light wave must be derived from some completely different principles. And, since you accept that the light wave has no medium composed of particles with mass, the "mass" which is an essential aspect of momentum must also be derived from some other principles.

What I've suggested is that there is inconsistency, ambiguity, perhaps even equivocation in your use of "mass". And I've supported this proposition with an explanation as to why "Mass is proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame." appears to be a self-contradicting statement. "A quantum in its rest frame" appears to contradict itself.

So if you are at all willing to teach me, maybe you could demonstrate how the conception of "mass" in that statement, as "proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame", is consistent with the conception of "mass" as a property of a particle of water, in an ocean wave. I suggest that you start with the proposed concept of "a quantum in its rest frame", because that is what causes a roadblock for me from the very outset.

From what I understand, you might have a rest frame for a collection of photons, quanta, as a "system", so the momentum and therefore mass of the whole system might be determined by giving the system a rest frame, as a sort of ideal, a contrived and unrealistic equilibrium. However, it is impossible that a single quantum could have a rest frame. Since the mass of a collection of water particles is divisible amongst its members, and this cannot be the case in a photonic system, this indicates to me, that the "mass" assigned to a system composed of photons is fundamentally inconsistent with the "mass" assigned to a system of water particles.

The former is derived from a contrived, artificial, and unrealistic ideal, while the latter is derived from observations of naturally existing bodies. Because these two dissimilar conceptions of "mass" are inconsistent with each other, and fundamentally incommensurable, I apprehend an interaction problem. I would be very pleased if you could try to dispel this apprehension through the effects of teaching.

Then you need to study nuclear physics and the behavior of the quarks in high energy physics. — Dfpolis

Wave mechanics does not explain the behaviour of quarks. I believe the proper terminology is "field theory". And, there are many aspects within quantum field theory which break the laws of wave-type representations, such as those very important aspects known as spontaneous symmetry breaking.

Mass is proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame. — Dfpolis

This is what I've identified as a self-contradicting concept, 'a quantum of energy in its rest frame'. Ideas like this are what distort and render the concept of mass as completely unrealistic, regardless of whether it's consistent with special relativity. As I explained, "mass", as "relativistic mass", or variable mass, or whatever you want to call it, has become the tool which physicists use to coverup flaws in the theories they apply.

No physical theory has explained the existence of mass. We can explain our observations of the quantity of mass, but existence is a metaphysical problem. It was solved by Aquinas, who concluded that it is contingent on the continuing creative act of God.

I am well aware of the strong force. It is described using wave mechanics. Its range is related to the time an intermediating boson can exist (which is inversely proportional to its mass). That time is calculated using Heisenberg's indeterminacy relation. The same is true of all the forces known to physics. — Dfpolis

So the boson does not explain the existence of the quantity of mass then. Therefore it does not explain the strong force, nor the existence of matter either. Why do you think mass is explained, or described by wave mechanics then?

As I understand it, the colour charge of a gluon cannot represent a wave, because it is solely time-like and non-spatial. It appears like you have stretched your imaginary conception of "wave" far beyond reasonable limits, to include non-spatial conceptions as "waves". Since you say "the same is true of all the forces known to physics", I conclude that none of the forces can actually be described as waves. "Force" is the term used for how things, including waves, interact, but the interaction occurs in a medium between.

The mass of the electron is known with great precision. It is not zero. — Dfpolis

Nor is the mass of a photon zero, "in its rest frame", by your statement above.

Other than displaying the inconsistency in the physicist's use of "mass", you appear to be mainly just circling back now. Unless you want to try and describe to me how you think the concept of the boson, represented as a wave feature, can provide an adequate description for the strong force and the reality of mass, we might be best off to just leave the discussion at this point.

Thanks for the explanation DF. I'll expound a bit on my own perspective, to clarify why I think your idea of "matter waves" is insufficient. Like I explained earlier, the Michelson-Morley type experiments indicate that the medium of electromagnetic waves, and what composes the "matter" of massive bodies is likely one and the same substance. However, I think it is a mistake to characterize an object with mass as a wave activity in this substance.

I know it is true that electrons may simply be represented as waves, and electrons are also designated as having mass, but the quantity of mass of an electron is so tiny relative to the overall mass of a an atom, this need to assign mass to a wave feature (electron) may readily be attributed to possible faults in the mass/energy equivalence theory. It may be the case that it is a mistake to say that an electron has mass. A slight fault in the theory, along with the customary procedure of assigning quantities of mass according to what the theory predicts, would produce the need to assign mass to that wave phenomenon which is called "an electron", when electrons really ought to be represented as pure wave features without any mass.

From this perspective, I'll point to a few spots where I have criticism of your explanation.

So, electrons, an essential constituent of every atom, are waves. Every property previously explained using the particle assumption can be explained by their wave nature. On the other hand, no wave property is explained by the particle assumption. That means the particle hypothesis is falsified. — Dfpolis

This is a conclusion made about electrons only, not the other parts of an atom, being the massive nucleus. So what has been falsified, by your argument, from my perspective, is the theory that electrons are particles with mass. This supports what I have said above, that electrons ought not be represented as having mass, and should be represented entirely as waves. This would imply that the interaction between radiant energy and electric energy is completely an interaction of waves. And it would force the need to further analyze the relationship between the atom's nucleus being expressed with a positive charge, and it's electrons having a negative charge.

The current need to assign mass to the electron appears to be the result of a lack of understanding of the relationship between the massive nucleus and the wave features. I propose that the waves of electromagnetic radiation are affected, altered, by interaction with the nucleus (rather than to conventional representation of an interaction with electrons), making electrons and electromagnetic radiation one wave structure instead of interacting waves, and the characteristics of this wave phenomena is the result of, effect of, the activity/inactivity of the nucleus.

The nucleus causes changes to the electromagnetic field, and vise versa, and we understand these changes as electrons. Accordingly, all electron phenomenon would need to be understood in terms of relations between massive nuclei and electromagnetic field. Radiation would be an extension of this, eliminating the need for complex and unnecessary electron/photon relationships.

We have since found that wave mechanics also applies to protons and neutrons, the constituents of atomic nuclei. Every part of atoms, which constitute both ordinary and ionized matter, behaves like a wave. None is a point particle, or a hard object with a well-defined edge. That physics has nothing more to say about what is vibrating does not mean that the constituents of matter do not oscillate in both space and time in well-defined ways. So, ordinary matter is made of waves. That is what I mean by "matter waves." — Dfpolis

This is where I find the most significant fault with your proposed theory. I believe it is simply not the case that wave mechanics can explain the massive nucleus of an atom. And "mass" is what is most properly related to "matter". Mass is what provides the stability for the temporal continuity of sameness manifesting as "inertia" in common physics. The fact that wave mechanics cannot explain the existence of mass ,may be understood through a glimpse into the mechanics of the strong interactive force. This force accounts for the vast majority of "known" mass, and the rest of "known" mass may be dismissed in the way described above as applicable to the mass of an electron, simplifying calculations. Here's a passage from the Wikipedia article on the strong force. After considering the reality of this force, please reconsider whether you truly believe that the nucleus of an atom can be represented with wave mechanics. If you still do, maybe you can explain it to me.

The strong force acts between quarks. Unlike all other forces (electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational), the strong force does not diminish in strength with increasing distance between pairs of quarks. After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10,000 newtons (N), no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7] As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. The explanation is that the amount of work done against a force of 10,000 newtons is enough to create particle–antiparticle pairs within a very short distance of that interaction. The very energy added to the system required to pull two quarks apart would create a pair of new quarks that will pair up with the original ones. In QCD, this phenomenon is called color confinement; as a result only hadrons, not individual free quarks, can be observed. The failure of all experiments that have searched for free quarks is considered to be evidence of this phenomenon. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_interaction

But, if there is no body, why would we expect it to have a well-defined (point) location or arrival time? — Dfpolis

The particle is understood to behave under the principles of Newtonian mechanics. Therefore it has momentum, and mass is a requirement for momentum. And the reality of mass is observed through the effects of gravity which constitutes empirical evidence for the concept of a centre of gravity, therefore a point of location which marks the centre of the mass. When the electron is represented as having mass, then the Newtonian conceptual space applies, including momentum etc.. It has a rest mass, a point of location, an inertial frame applies, and all that follows for a body of mass.

If we rob the electron of its mass, take it away, and deny that it has any mass, then that discrepancy in total mass, and violation to conservation laws needs to be accounted for. But we know from experimental data, and the need for "entropy", that the conservation laws are ideals which are not completely applicable as the true physical reality. And the supposed mass of an electron is so tiny that the only real reason why it is assumed is the need to maintain the conservation laws. Therefore there is no good reason to maintain the principle that an electron has any mass, consequently no reason to represent it as having momentum, or any well-defined point of location. That need is simply the desire to maintain an untrue ideal, the conservation law, and follow traditional conventions of calculation. But it's a misleading path, and like a vector, the further away you get from the starting point, the further you get from the true path.

Since a quantum's energy is proportional to its frequency and its momentum is inversely proportional to its wave length, finite wave packets have neither well-defined energy nor momentum. — Dfpolis

See, the fault here is to assign momentum to a wave. This implies that the electron has mass and a stable, inertial centre required by Newton's first law. But if mass truly converts to wave energy, then the centre point of an electron which is radiating or absorbing wave energy would actually be an unstable, decaying or increasing mass, and this is not consistent with the first law. The atom's mass would decrease as it emits radiation, or increase as it absorbs. Therefore the electron really cannot be represented by the Newtonian mass/inertia/momentum conceptual space.

So, we can transfer this mass to the nucleus, and the instability which exists as the radiation and absorption (interaction) of energy represented as electrons, is in most cases a very minimal instability, as a proportion of the total mass of the atom. However, there are features of the nucleus, which result in the various electron shells for example, which represent critical thresholds in the stability. The key point is that the Newtonian stability assumed by the first law of motion (which is itself an ideal symmetry) must be forfeited in order to adequately account for these minute change to physical bodies, by allowing that changes inherent within and originating within the nucleus, may alter the wave field.

That is exactly what the wave equations do represent. The problem is that you cannot pick the one actual solution out of an infinity of possible solutions without knowing the initial conditions. — Dfpolis

I think that this is incorrect. "Probability" is produced from a comparison of what is known about many instances of particular circumstances, with a statistical analysis of a set of similar particular circumstances. The crucial point is the judgement of "similar". That is why the probabilities of the wave equations do not actually represent the particular circumstances, these probabilities represent a conclusion drawn from numerous particular circumstances, which are categorized as "the same" by a judgement of similar.

Again, there is no "body." — Dfpolis

There is mass, and mass is what constitutes the matter of a body. I strongly believe that wave structures cannot account for the mass of a body, and I will continue to believe that, unless you or someone else, can answer my question above, and show how waves can explain the strong interactive force.

When you say you dont consider yourself to BE something "necessarily", are you speaking of anatman? — Gregory

I suppose that would be one possibility.

Well you got me there Dfpolis, I really don't know what you know so I clearly do not know what I'm talking about. But that's because you're not very forthcoming with your principles. Can you explain how you conceive of a "matter wave"?

I mean don't give me a mathematical formula, give me the principles. How do you make the kinetic energy of a single moving body which necessarily has mass to have kinetic energy, and therefore a center of gravity at a point, consistent with the energy of a wave which is necessarily spread out over an area? The momentum of the body could be provided by an energy equivalence with the energy of the wave, but the uncertainty principle would render the position of such a body, with a determined momentum, as having no determinable location.

I suggest that what is the case, is that data from many similar circumstances is collected to together, and from statistical analysis probabilities are produced. Hence the "matter" wave is better known as a "probability" wave. And, there is no real consistency produced between the energy associated with the mass of a body, and the energy associated with the wave, because the particular wave in the particular set of circumstances is not ever actually represented. All that is represented is the energy of the wave derived from application of theory, and the probability of location, which is a conclusion drawn from the statistical analysis.

So for example, if we make a statistical analysis of the rising of the sun over many years, we can make a very accurate projection of where and when the sun will rise tomorrow. However, this statistical analysis does not represent the movement of the sun relative to the earth, it represents the sun's appearance at a multitude of specified times. The likelihood of where it will appear tomorrow is deduced. Likewise, the statistical analysis used to produce the probability wave (matter wave) does not represent the movement of the supposed underlying wave, it represents the locations of a multitude of instances of the detection of a body with mass.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the uncertainty relation between momentum and location is overcome in that way. The momentum is derived from wave observations and theories of energy equivalence. And the position is determined by probabilities derived from statistical analysis. But what is represented by the statistical analysis, as the "probability" or "matter" wave, is not a wave at all. It is not a representation of the wave, because it represents possible locations of the body with mass. The wave is actually represented by what is on the other side of the uncertainty relation, the momentum of the body.

They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. — Dfpolis

The problem being that these equations do not describe waves, and you know this. A description of the medium, and the restrictions placed on potential wave movement due to the composition of the medium, or substance which the wave exists in, is replaced with "degrees of freedom". Even if we assume real underlying waves, as what is being described, not one of these equations can provide an adequate description of what is going on, because the "degrees of freedom" are formulated according to the circumstances rather than according to an understanding of the medium itself, and the restrictions intrinsic to the nature of that medium. That's why a synthesis of many such equations is required for quantum field theory, to account for the various ways of determining degrees of freedom.

Furthermore, the fact that a representation of a temporal continuity may be produced which is very similar to how waves would appear if represented in this way, is insufficient evidence to make the deductive conclusion that waves are being represented. This is because the essence of "waves", by definition, is "disturbance in a substance", and that is not what is represented by those equations which describe degrees of freedom. Simply, the substance has not been identified.

Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures. — Dfpolis

This is where we disagree. "Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. They are mathematical descriptions without substance, as Wayfarer describes above. So they are descriptive 'forms', not the 'matter' of physical bodies, evidenced by the fact that they only reference the possibility of a body. Saying that matter is wave structures is like saying that matter is a collection of properties. But this annihilates the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, and leaves the collection of properties without substance.

I believe that what you are proposing is a simple Pythagorean idealism. As such, it suffers from the interaction problem. Like I explained, the ideals (symmetries) of the wave structures, if they were the real matter, could not possibly interact with the world of physical bodies which we observe in experience. This interaction problem has two principal manifestations in quantum physics, first the problem of nonlocal causation, and second, the need to assume random chance activities.

The solution I outlined is the need to identify the true substance of the waves, the medium which is waving, as the proper "matter" which the wave structures are the formal representation of. Without identifying this substance as "the matter", the "wave structures" representation will always suffer from this interaction problem.

Further analysis of the wave function representation will show the interaction problem involved with this type of idealism much more clearly. Space is represented as points in a coordinate system. Because each point is represented as having commuting observables, uncertainty is inherent within the representation of each point of the space represented. The uncertainty is represented by the Fourier transform, as the fundamental inability to accurately determine spatial activity (frequency) over a duration of time. This uncertainty leaves a gap between the mathematical ideals of representation, and what is actually occurring in the space being represented. It is an "interaction problem" because the ideals employed have incorporated within themselves, the inability to accurately represent the spatial-temporal relation (the uncertainty of the Fourier transform), and therefore cannot provide the means for bridging this gap. In other words "the ideals" are compromised to allow uncertainty to inhere within them, rendering them as less than ideal.

The difference between the representation of the Fourier transform, and what is actually happening in the physical reality can be approached here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_mechanics

As I have already spent a lot of time trying to teach you what physics tells us, and this whole area is off-topic, I am going to stop here. — Dfpolis

OK, in truth, I forgot the topic. I'll have to reread the op, because the title doesn't seem quite consistent with the op.

While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. — Dfpolis

The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". "Potential", as the Aristotelian defining feature of matter is insufficient because the wave functions are clearly understood as referring to forms, actualities, therefore not consistent with Aristotelian "matter". And "mass", as the defining feature of matter in conventional physics is obviously insufficient. So the only way to represent what the wave function refers to as something material, is to produced an intentionally designed definition of matter.

This violates your statement in the op:

Since physics has no intentional effects (despite wishful thinking), it cannot effect intentional operations. — Dfpolis

Obviously, the physics of wave functions has effected the way you look at matter, and influenced you to create an intentionality driven conception of "matter". Physics has affected your intentions, such that you conceptualize "matter" in a way such that you may call these waves "matter waves", when in reality wave functions are formal structures, consisting of ideals which have no true bearing on "matter" by convention conceptions of matter.

You even alter the definition of "physics" to suit your purpose. Instead of the conventional definition, as the discipline which deals with the interactions of matter and energy, which refers to real particular instances of interaction, you define it as dealing with "changes in space and time". Space and time are universals, abstractions which may or may not have been derived from the discipline of physics.

So you actually reverse the role of the discipline. Instead of recognizing that physics is the science of particulars, instances of matter and energy, you cast it as the science of the universal abstractions, space and time. In reality though, metaphysics is the discipline which deals with such abstractions.

This is hardly a problem when we realize that both physics and mathematics are based on abstractions -- which is to say they are the result of attending to some aspects of reality while ignoring others. — Dfpolis

This mischaracterizing of "physics" is evident here in the op. Physics is not based in abstractions. It is an empirical science, based in particular instances of observation, from which abstractions may be logically induced and deduced. This is a very significant difference ontologically, and consequently epistemologically, which you ought to respect.

When you respect this difference, you will understand that abstractions, universals, and ideals, are necessarily prior to any empirical science, as the means by which the particular instances of the physical world, are grasped and understood by the intellect within the activities of the empirical sciences. The faculty of the intellect, or soul which produces these abstraction cannot be an empirical science like physics, because these abstractions are necessarily prior to the activities of those science. The empirical science must not be allowed to be based in the abstractions themselves, or else the objectivity of the science will be overcome by the subjectivity of the abstraction. The science therefore is based in the particular instances of observation, and this may be used to override the preexisting (therefore prejudiced) abstractions

So for example, the scientific method is said to proceed from hypotheses to try them in experimentation. These hypotheses are necessarily prior to the method of sciences which seeks validate them, therefore they are not themselves "scientific". That word can only be affixed posteriorly, after they been tested through experimentation. Therefore the hypotheses must be produced through some other means than science. And if you look into this, you will discover that the production of such hypotheses is very much purpose directed, driven by intentionality. The science itself though, must be based in the particular instances of observation, in order that it may be used to rid the abstractions of subjective prejudice.

Once we realized that abstractions are not reality, things become easier. There is no reason to think that the laws of mindless matter should apply without modification to thinking beings. — Dfpolis

This statement then becomes rather ironic. The "modification to thinking beings" which you recommend turns out to be the need to dismiss the proposition which leads to this, "abstractions are not reality". Once it is realized that abstractions are at the very base of our understanding, prior to observation, as the means by which observation is made, we must realize that abstractions are the only reality which we have, and everything else is understood in relation to this assumed reality. When observation indicates mistakes within "reality" (being the abstractions) modification of reality is required.

You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions.

Quantum waves constitute matter. Wave functions are the mathematical functions describing these matter waves and their interactions. The concept is an ideal, but it is based on the observation of real wave properties, specifically, interference of the type demonstrated in Young's experiment. — Dfpolis

Without an underlying substance which is waving (the proposed aether for example), these are not real "waves", and cannot constitute matter. Being "ideal", there is no representation for the accidents of "matter". There is simply "uncertainty", with no matter/form distinction to isolate the uncertain aspects from the certain. The result is that uncertainty permeates the entire conceptual structure. It's a type of formalism whereby the content is incorporated right into the form, to produce the illusion that the conceptual structure is entirely formal, thereby eliminating the unintelligible content (matter), but this is just an illusion. In reality though, the unintelligibility of content (matter) is incorporated right into the form from the premises, allowing it to permeate the entire conceptual structure as uncertainty.

You may insist that the idea of immaterial waves, waves without substance, is good enough for physics, but it's not good enough for metaphysics. It would seem like physics allows contradiction then. "Wave" is defined in physics as a disturbance moving in a medium. Allowing contradiction into the premises by premising a wave with no medium, is what allows uncertainty to permeate. "Matter" as the designator of the unintelligible is lost as being incorporated into the form.

Rather, mass is a quantity associated with them. — Dfpolis

Now we have ambiguity as to what "mass" is. In some cases it's the property of a body, and in other cases, it's "a quantity associated with them". This is further evidence of allowing the unintelligible into the premises as the result of formalism. What does that "quantity" represent then, if it is not a property of a body?

It seems like "mass" has become just a variable, a number assigned arbitrarily, but according to rules, to make the equations balance. What is the mass in X set of circumstances? It is whatever quantity is required to balance out the equation. No wonder symmetries are all over the place, they are created whenever desired, by assigning a quantity for "mass" which is required for upholding a symmetry. "Mass" is based in nothing other than the quantity required to fulfill the needs of the physicist. to maintain the invariance prescribed by laws such as conservation laws and the invariance of the speed of light in relativity.

You need to read the history of modern physics if you want to think about these things. It was assumed that we could measure different speeds of light as the earth passed through the either. In 1887 Albert A. Michelson and Edward Morley attempted to do so, and failed. They measure the same speed in each direction and at different orbital positions of the earth. So, we were forced, experimentally, to conclude that the measured speed of light is invariant. Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what I argued in another thread recently, "Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false". But your stated conclusion "that the measured speed of light is invariant", is equally inaccurate. What the experiments demonstrate is that the substance of the physical body, and the substance of the aether, are not distinct substances, but they must be one and the same substance. The experiments involved a very narrow range of type of physical body, so there is insufficient evidence to extend the supposed invariance to other types of bodies, like atoms and the parts of atoms, and in the other direction, galaxies and large things like that.

No, it is not. Fourier transforms enter into the derivation of the uncertainty principle. — Dfpolis

Conjugate variables are the pairs which bear the uncertainty relation of the Fourier transform. It is because of this uncertainty relation prescribed by the Fourier transform, that the relation has the name you gave it . Energy, as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", denotes an uncertainty relation. According to "Quora", this is what ChatGPT said"

Why are energy and time complementary variables in quantum mechanics?
Profile photo for ChatGPT
ChatGPT
In quantum mechanics, energy and time are described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that the more precisely the position of a particle is known, the less precisely its momentum can be known, and vice versa. The same applies to energy and time, where the more precisely the energy of a particle is known, the less precisely its time can be known, and vice versa. This is due to the wave-like nature of particles in quantum mechanics, where a particle can exist in multiple states simultaneously until it is measured, at which point it collapses into a single state. The uncertainty principle is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics and is a result of the wave-particle duality of matter.

So, yes it is true that defining energy as ""the dynamic variable conjugate to time" puts "energy" into a wider context, just like defining "hot" as the opposite of cold puts "hot" into a wider context, but you now need to respect the context which you have placed "energy" into. You have placed it into the context of having any uncertainty relation with time, as determined by the Fourier transform. This is unlike the certainty relation created by defining "hot" as the opposite of cold. If it is hot it is not cold, is a relation of certainty created by that definition.

Let me be more precise. I mean we have been unable to detect violations of conservation of energy. — Dfpolis

Violations of conservation of energy are detected anytime an experiment is carried out. All of the energy can never be accounted for. There is always a quantity which is lost as time passes. Within a "system", the energy loss may be written off to entropy, and then some people might assume that the energy remains within the system but is unavailable to it. But this is not actually implied, the energy is simply lost. And, it's rather nonsensical, to think that the energy is still in the system when it has been lost to the system. To support the nonsense one might simply adjust the amount of mass assumed to be in the system so that it appears like conservation is upheld. That's the problem with mass being an associated quantity rather than a property of a body, the quantity may be variable, and allowed to be manipulated so as to conform to the theory, providing for the appearance of symmetry.

But, we can. That is what physics, chemistry, biology, etc. do. — Dfpolis

Are we adhering to Aristotelian terms or not? What is represented is always form. "Matter" names the aspect of a thing which does not enter into the understanding. Science produces a formal understanding, and there is always something at the bottom which escapes the formalization, this is the "matter".

However, the modern conception of "matter" has been altered by Newton's laws which name "mass" as a property of matter. But properties must be formal. This move by Newton allows the unintelligibility of "matter" into the formal representation, an example of the problem with formalism which I explained. Now the unintelligibility inheres within the concept "mass". Further, an equivalence has been established between mass and energy by means of Einsteinian relativity and the supposed invariance of the speed of light, such that the unintelligibility of matter, through the means of the concept of "mass" manifests as the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle.

We cannot say that. We can only say that in some cases, we are unable to observe possible imperfections, so, we have no reason to believe that the symmetries are imperfect. — Dfpolis

Symmetries are not imperfect. I am not saying that symmetries are imperfect. What I am saying is that they are ideal, and represent nothing real in the natural, physical world, due to the assumed perfection of the ideal. Current use of "symmetry" is analogous to the ancient law of perfect circular motion criticized by Aristotle in "On the Heavens". Aristotle demonstrated how a thing moving in a circular motion must be a body, and the body must consist of matter, and by this fact it is generated and corrupted, therefore not eternal. So what was demonstrated is that as much as eternal circular motion is logically consistent, and therefore a real logical possibility, the reality of matter in the physical world makes this ideal physically impossible. There must be something material, corruptible involved in that activity, rendering the eternality as impossible, therefore the entire concept as a false representation for anything real.

The very same thing is the case for modern symmetries. The "invariance" described by the laws is ideal and logically consistent, but not truly representative of, or corresponding with, the physical reality of material existence. This problem is covered by Hume's discussion of the incompleteness of induction. The laws of physics have limits to their applicability such that the "invariance" implied by them is not a true, or real representation, because it breaks down at these limits, and the idea that "invariance" is a true or real aspect of the physical world is a faulty conclusion drawn from the fact that the range of applicability appears to be broad, and everything outside this range is ignored. This issue with the supposed "invariance" of the laws of physics is explained well by physicist Lee Smolin, in his book "Time Reborn"

You do not understand the meaning of "symmetry" in physics. It is not the kind of thing that can interact. Rather it is a property of the way things interact. — Dfpolis

The above paragraph ought to demonstrate that this is incorrect. The laws which describe the way that things interact suffer from Hume's problem of induction. And, the invariance presumed, which makes the law a "law" is evidenced only by observations made within the confines of the limits of applicability of the law (ref. Smolin). The invariance, therefore symmetry, of these ideal laws, is not a true representation of the way that things actually do interact.

And it's not a matter of some interactions are consistent with the laws and some are outside the laws. What is the case, is that all interactions have aspects which partake of the extremely micro, and aspects which partake of the extremely macro, so all interactions have aspects which fall outside the range of applicability of the laws. This means that the symmetry expressed as "a property of the way things interact" is not a true representation of any interaction at all, just like an eternal circular motion is not a true representation of any motion at all.

A good example is the law of conservation of energy which you mentioned. Empirical data, observational evidence indicates that energy is never completely conserved in any interaction. This means that any symmetry derived from application of this law is not a true representation, because energy is not actually conserved.

The obvious implication is that we need to determine why energy is never completely conserved in order to have a true understanding of the nature of material existence. The faulty conclusion is that this slight imperfection in the law is simply a difference which does not make a difference. To identify something as a difference, and then insist that it hasn't made a difference is contradictory. Therefore we need to take account of these slight imperfections which demonstrate that the ideal symmetries do not truthfully represent material existence.

I'm not a physicist or topologist, so I'm not qualified to argue the question of "faulty deduction". Are you? — Gnomon

Deductions are logic, which is part of the discipline of philosophy, not physics. Philosophers are trained to determine whether deductions are faulty or not. So if a physicist makes a faulty deduction, being poorly trained in philosophy, it is the task of the philosopher to identify the faulty deduction and bring it to the attention of the physicist.

Are you suggesting that physical symmetry --- or its "application" to philosophy --- violates some higher rule of reality? — Gnomon

I am suggesting that the symmetries of physics are highly useful principles (like my analogy of perfect circular motion which is eternal, was highly useful thousands of years ago, and variations actually remain in many concepts employed in physics), but they are ideals which do not truthfully represent anything existing naturally. So, when we take these ideals, and try to represent them as what is fact, or true in nature, or reality, we are making a mistake of misunderstanding the true nature of reality, which has none of these symmetries in any part of its existence.

Does physical symmetry have a philosophical role in the Dualism vs Monism question? :smile: — Gnomon

Ideals such as "symmetry" play a key role in demonstrating the interaction problem. If way say that a symmetry such as perfect circular motion is in any way a real part of the physical material world, then that perfect symmetry is necessarily isolated from the rest of the world. If it interacted with the material , world which does not consist of those perfections, in any way, the symmetry would, by that interaction, be broken. So, for example, the body engaged in the perfect (ideal) circular motion described by Aristotle would necessarily be eternal. If that body interacted with anything else in the world this would break the perfection of the circle, altering the body, and rendering the whole concept as not applicable. Therefore if these ideal symmetries described anything real within the world, the real things described by them could not be interacting with anything else in the world.

Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. — Dfpolis

The uncertainty principle is not so simple. What I believe is that the concept of "mass" incorporates the unintelligibility of "matter" into the formal description of a body. "Mass" as representing "matter" is something unintelligible, which is disguised as being understood in the conceptual structure. When compatibility between mass and electromagnetic radiation is attempted, the limits to our capacity for understanding rapid wave activity described by the uncertainty relation derived from the Fourier transform, is transferred, implanted, and disguised in the unintelligibility inherent within the concept "mass". The uncertainty produced by our limited capacity to understand these waves, is absorbed into the unintelligibility of "mass", hence the tendency to think of waves as particles, particles being understood as things with mass. So the uncertainty is more properly assigned to the attitude of thinking that bodies have mass.

Yes, but not the ontology of quantum waves. — Dfpolis

Quantum waves, or more properly called "wave functions" are ideals, mathematical constructs. They have no physical existence. We ought to start with this clearly stated.

It makes perfect since once you realize that the electrons and nucleons composing atoms are waves. — Dfpolis

I accept that the electrons and nucleons of atoms are composed of waves. The problem is that physicists tend to represent these as bodies with mass. And then of course there are the quantum waves which you refer to above. These so-called waves are ideal constructs composed of mathematical axioms. So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. The solution I proposed is to determine the substance which the waves that compose electromagnetism, as well as electrons and nucleons, exist in. This would allow us to speak of waves with physical existence. Then all activities, electromagnetism and the activities of massive objects, would be activities of the same substance.

They underlie the classical understanding, not our quantum understanding. Now we understand that energy depends on the frequency at which elementary structures vibrate. E = h where h is Planck's constant and is the frequency. — Dfpolis

Nice try Df, but Planck's law is based in the emission of electromagnetic radiation from bodies (black-body radiation). This is the activity of a body with mass, not the activity of waves. The simple fact of the matter is that physicists do not have the required theories, or principles, to measure the energy of wave activity directly, without converting this energy to the activity of a physical body. And, like I've been explaining, this is done through the precepts of relativity theory which pays no respect for the true medium, or substance, which the waves and the bodies are a part of. Instead, it dogmatically imposes unsubstantiated ideals, like the constant speed of light.

Now we understand energy as the dynamic variable conjugate to time. — Dfpolis

I understand this, it is derived from the Fourier transform. And, our inability to make measurements of high energy in a very short period of time is the reason for the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle, in general.

However, stating that energy is understood as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", does not in any way state what energy is. That's like saying "hot" is understood as the opposite of cold, that says nothing about what hot is. The only difference in your expression is that you use fancy jargon to make it look like you're saying something important.

Nonetheless observation is the basis of all human knowledge. — Dfpolis

This is the physicalist perspective, and the perspective of scientism, the idea that observation is the basis of knowledge. "Observation" is understood as the collection of data from external sources through the use of sensation. The alternative perspective is that internal experience is the basis of all knowledge. If we compromise and say that both are a requirement for "knowledge" as we know it, then we can't say either one is the basis of all human knowledge.

Still, that is very approximately conserved is a real feature of nature and points to nearly perfect time-translation symmetry. — Dfpolis

OK, you may call it "nearly perfect", but "nearly" is a subjective judgement. So, do you agree then, that a good ontology must respect this fact, that natural things are not perfect, as sometimes modeled, but are actually "nearly perfect". This is represented by Aristotle as the reality of accidents. The material world which we represent with forms, formal models etc., is not actually as we represent it because we cannot represent the material aspect. All we have as representation is forms, and "matter" refers to those accidents which always escape the formal representation.

They point to real features of nature. — Dfpolis

What they point to, is the fact that the real features of nature are not perfect symmetries, as modeled. You might say, reality is "nearly" like it is modeled, but to me that is just an admission that it is not like it is modeled. And if it is not like it is modeled, then the models are wrong, the theories and principles need to be revisited, and improved upon.

That symmetries are properties does not mean that they do not exist. It only means that they do not have independent existence. — Dfpolis

This is exactly the point of the interaction problem. Symmetries are perfectly ideal balances, just like the eternal circular motion described by Aristotle. If that perfect ideal has any interaction with anything else, then by that very interaction, it loses its status as a perfectly ideal balance. Therefore these ideals cannot play any role in the real physical world, because they could no longer be perfectly ideal.

So, what I explained about designating these symmetries as properties, is that they cannot be properties, because a property is only a part of the thing it is a property of. And anything which is a part of something else, has some sort of interaction with the rest of that thing. So it is impossible that a part could be a symmetry because this interaction would break the symmetry. By the very fact that a part has a relationship of interaction with the thing that it is a part of, the proposal that the part is a symmetry is made impossible. Therefore it is impossible that symmetries are properties.

es. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. It's good to be aware of that distinction when engaged in metaphysical discussions. Symmetries are, however, handy tools for mathematical analysis of topological transformations. — Gnomon

If these symmetries were deductions, then they would be faulty deductions, just like the ancient ideal that the orbits of the planets were perfect circles, therefore eternal circular motions. However, I do not think that such things are deductions. I think that they are mathematical principles or axioms which are not properly applied. So they are handy tools, as you say, but when they are applied where they ought not be applied, they become misleading.

Philosophically, I agree that waves are modifications of something; however, saying that contributes nothing to the goal of physics, which is to describe the behavior, and not the ontology, of physical systems. For physics, it is enough that the waves can be described in space and time. If a hypothesis about what they modified, say that it was made of particles or strings, led to a better description, then it would be relevant to physics. — Dfpolis

This is incorrect. If you take any time to study the physics of waves, you'll know that waves cannot be described simply by space and time. A wave is an activity of the particles of a substance. This is Physics 101.

Furthermore, the subject of the thread is an ontological topic, so an appeal like 'it's enough for physics' has little if any bearing on the subject of the thread, which would be whether it's enough for metaphysics. There is no logic to the implied premise, that if it is outside the goal of physics it is not significant to the ontological subject of the thread.

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures. — Dfpolis

Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. And calculations are done in terms of inertial frames and "rest mass" which is essential. These are concepts of classical mechanics of bodies, not waves. I'm sure you know this, and this is why I was so frustrated by your refusal to attempt to justify your claim, and the reference to a higher education. It's as if you believe that a high education can magically make what you know to be false claims, true. What kind of instruments are understood to be wave structures?

I greatly appreciate your perspective, and I would probably agree if you said that the instruments and their measurements ought to be represented as wave structures. But they simply are not, under the principles and theories currently employed. So it doesn't make sense to claim that they are, and it would make a lot more sense to look at the reasons why they are not. And the reason is that we understand energy and all movement in terms of massive bodies existing in space, and the movement of light waves is understood as relative to that fundamental understanding. So the movement of massive bodies is foundational, and the movement of light waves is layered on top as relative to this. So the certainty of this understanding of light waves is dependent on the certainty of the theories which relate it to the foundation, the movement of massive bodies, and ultimately the foundation itself, our understanding of the movement of massive bodies.

You might insist that these concepts are archaic, and even be able to demonstrate how problems arising from the theories which relate the activity of light waves to the activity of massive bodies indicates that the foundational understanding of the activity of massive bodies is deeply flawed, but still it's simple fact that these are the concepts which underly our understanding of energy. None other are employed. Even a quantum of wave energy, a photon, must be assigned a "relativistic mass" to make the wave energy consistent with he momentum of moving bodies. This is because "energy" as a concept is fundamentally a property of the momentum of mass (kinetic energy being 1/2mv2).

Symmetries are observed in nature. — Dfpolis

Symmetries are not observed in nature. Each thing that we observe as a near-symmetry is not actually a symmetry, which is an ideal balance. Laws are artificial, and created as universals so your examples are irrelevant. That the Pythagorean theory is true here, and also over there, does not indicate the existence of a natural symmetry because these laws are artificial and intended to state something universal. Natural things are particular, and there is an interaction problem involved with trying to demonstrate how the particular partakes of the universal.

It does not because physical symmetries are not interacting things, but properties of interactions of things. — Dfpolis

Exactly, properties do not exist independently of the things that they are properties of, except as abstractions in the mind. Natural, "interacting things" do not exist as symmetries, the mind creates the symmetries in an attempt to understand these things. But the artificial symmetry does not grasp the accidentals which inhere within the thing, so that the natural things do not actually exist as symmetries.

To explain this in a different way, let's say that "a property" is a part of a thing, but not the whole thing. We represent the property as a symmetry. But that representation does not show how the property is related to, or inheres within the thing itself. Since the property is a part of the thing, and is necessarily connected to the thing, as it does not exist independently, there is something more to the property which is not represented by the symmetry, i.e. how it is connected to the thing. This "something more" necessarily breaks the symmetry as the means by which the assumed symmetry must be united to the whole. This indicates that symmetries simply do not exist naturally.

OK, but I was using the term "coin-flipping" metaphorically, not literally. Einstein used the similar metaphor of God playing dice, to ridicule the quantum evidence that Nature is inherently indeterminate*1*2. Also, I was not talking about un-natural Random Number Generators. Instead, I was referring to the innate Quantum Indeterminacy that provoked Heisenberg to define his Uncertainty Principle in terms of statistical Probability*3. — Gnomon

My point still stands, all known instances of random chance occurrences are artificially created. Something natural may appear to be a random occurrence, but a claim to know it to be a random occurrence could not stand up to epistemological scrutiny. This is because the reason why the occurrence is designated as random, is that its cause is unknown. And "unknown cause" does not justify "no cause", or randomness. From the position of not knowing the cause we cannot conclude that there is no cause.

Artificially, we can create the conditions for chance occurrences, the coin flip, the dice roll, etc.. Likewise, in a lab we can sufficiently isolate the conditions as required to produce an approximation of a symmetry. But all of these are not naturally occurring situations, they are fabricated. The randomness of the coins and dice dependent on the design, and the lab-created symmetry depends on the lab. Therefore these instances do nothing to support the claim that there could be an independent, natural random chance occurrence.

Since you found my implication that Nature is not rigidly Deterministic problematic, are you a strict classical Determinist*4 like Einstein? — Gnomon

No, I'm definitely not rigidly deterministic. I just find that the method you use to reach your conclusion is deeply flawed.

@Dfpolis
Quantum field theory and the standard model of particles are composed of immaterial ideals which have no direct correspondence in the physical world. If you have the education you claim, you know this. The truth of this is evidenced by the reality assigned to symmetry in the models, when such symmetries are simply not discovered in nature. Symmetries are ideals which may be artificially synthesized to an extent, in a lab, but have no true occurrence in the natural world.

The interaction problem involves the question of how such ideals could interact with the true natural physical world which we live in. And this manifests as the problem of how the ideal world of symmetries described by the standard model could interact with the world of material bodies which we live in. The proposed solution, random chance symmetry breaking, suffers the problem I described in my response to Gnomon above. There is nothing in our experience of living in the world of material bodies, which would indicate that nature consists of any sort of random chance generator. Such implements are all known to be artificially created.

I agree that our subjective "mode of understanding" is suspect, but in the expression "natural fact", I was referring to the scientific evidence that Nature is inherently statistical (random chance) in its fundamental behaviors*1. Some might interpret the statistical nature of waveforms as a sign that coin-flipping Luck is a feature of natural processes. Hence, a smidgen of doubt smudged the surety of classical physics. — Gnomon

The whole idea that coin-flipping is evidence of natural random chance is fundamentally flawed. The production of this random chance type of event is intentionally designed, as are all examples of such random chance generators, so these examples do nothing to support the claim of naturally occurring random chance events.

So nobody is "blaming the object" ; merely accepting that statistical probabilistic uncertainty is inherent intrinsic immanent in physical Nature. — Gnomon

This is a faulty conclusion, based in the unsound premise described above, that there could be a naturally occurring generator of random chance events.

This is not the place to argue this. Let's just say that my education puts me in a better position to judge. — Dfpolis

Again, I disagree. Instead of addressing the valid points I brought up, points which are very relevant to the subject, "interactionism", you retort with an implied 'you're wrong because I'm more highly educated than you'. You demonstrate childishness rather than education, and that's why I disagree with your claim "my education puts me in a better position to judge". If you really have the education which you claim, you could very easily show me why you think I'm wrong. Therefore I conclude that whatever education you do have, indicates to you that you are actually wrong, and you have not the gumption to address this problem.

No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency. — Dfpolis

The problem here is that without a medium (aether or whatever), a substance to support this so-called "wave phenomena", it is fundamentally immaterial. There is no substance to these supposed waves, no material to their existence, The wave function is simply an immaterial, mathematical representation. And all it represents is something like the probabilities of how that supposed immaterial activity might interact with a material body. Clearly, what we have here is an interaction problem between the immaterial waves (with no material substance), and the material bodies (instruments of measurement).

C. If the universe produced us, and we have purposes, then nature already obviously does create purpose. In a rather straightforward way, plungers are for unclogging toilets, hearts are for pumping blood, etc. Any comprehensive theory of the world needs to explain these, not deny them. If hearts don't have a purpose in the way plungers or corporations do, we need to be able to explain the similarities and differences in terms of something we DO understand, not claim the difference is in presence or lack "of purpose," the very thing we want to understand. That's just circular, question begging, and dogmatic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the problem you are demonstrating is that if you switch to "universal purpose", you need to adjust your premises accordingly. You can no longer talk about nature creating purpose, because nature would be created with purpose, therefore purpose would be prior to nature, and not the type of thing which nature creates. Then we need to look at intention as it is evident to us, within ourselves, as an example of it, in order to understand it in the universe in general.

We can see that there is a problem with looking at the object created with intention and trying to determine the intention behind its creation. This is because of the nature of the "necessity" involved in this relation. It is not a logical "necessity", but "necessity" in the sense of what is determined as needed, for the sake of something else, and that judgement may be carried out without the use of logic. Also, the object created may be used in a way other than the way intended by the creator, and this is evidence of that problem.

So we might refer to the "accidentals" of things created with intention. The reality of accidentals ensures that there is no logical necessity in the relationship between the intent and the thing created with that intent. Therefore logic does not provide us with the means for understanding the intention or purpose behind a thing, from an analysis of the thing produced with intention. Accordingly, we cannot understand the intent or purpose behind the universe, or nature in general, through a study of these as objects.

However, if we look at intention directly, as it exists within us, we can see this lack of logical necessity from the other side, from the side of intention itself, and it appears to us as free will. When we have a goal or objective we may consider numerous options for achieving that end. There is no direct and logically necessary relationship between means and ends, and this is why we presume the reality of free will. We may choose our means. Furthermore, the end or goal, as what is desired or needed, is never fixed but is adaptable and may be manipulated according the apprehension of available means. This implies that both means and ends are flexible.

That the ends are flexible has a considerable effect when we attempt to understand the intention from the point of view of analyzing the intentionally created object. Because the artist may adapt the goal to be suitable to the means available, the object created may be not a very good representation of the true intention, as the original ideal, but a representation of a very compromised form of the intention.

Do you conceive of, or define "you" and "we" as something? — Fooloso4

Not necessarily.

"Survival of the fittest," works well for all sorts of things we don't think of as living. — Count Timothy von Icarus

When you consider that "survival" in evolution theory refers to the species, which is a type, rather than to individuals, this becomes even more evident. The stability of molecules for example, is the reason why the periodic table of elements is arranged in the way that it is. Specific types of molecules are more apt to survive.

The problem though, is that life likes to make use of instability, as instability provides for the special capacities which living things enjoy. This means that survival, and having special capacities to be able to enjoy being alive, are two distinct ends, which at the fundamental level must be very much in confliction. I suppose this is why risk-taking is exhilarating.

Evolutionary theory therefore, ought to take into account both of these two conflicting purposeful features of being alive, modeling evolution as a sort of balancing process. And by being an imperfect balance, employing the instability which is available within its own being, life is allowed to extend itself towards a multitude of different types of enjoyment, which it discovers through its journeys. Current conventional evolutionary theory is very one-sided, representing stability only, as survival, and this is not at all representative of what it means to be alive. This is because it completely misses what it means to enjoy being alive, and the enjoyment of being alive is what drives the will to survive.

That there is something is a necessary condition for speculating about nothingness. — Fooloso4

Not necessarily, because it depends on how you would conceive of, or define, "something". It's possible that all that is does not fit the criteria of "something".

:clap:

So, the "appearance" of subatomic (i.e. fundamental) Uncertainty and Unpredictability appears to be a natural fact. :cool: — Gnomon

"Appears to be a natural fact", doesn't get us anywhere. it always appeared to be a natural fact, but that's irrelevant. The fact is that "uncertainty" is a property of the subject, not the object. And, it is always caused by the subject's mode of understanding not being properly suited to the reality of the object which it is attempting to apprehend. It makes no sense to blame the object here, therefore the subject's mode of understanding needs to be scrutinized.

Uncertainty principle :
It states that there is a limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, can be simultaneously known. — Gnomon

There's obviously a basic problem here. If something is moving it cannot truthfully be said to have a position. And if something has a position it cannot truthfully be said to be moving. Since only moving things can have momentum, a thing which has a position cannot also have momentum.

Therefore it appears very obvious that this type of "uncertainty" is the result of a faulty human ontology which allows the contradictory premise that a moving thing has a position, or the converse, that a thing with a position could be moving. Clearly the uncertainty here is the result of faulty concepts.

Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity? — kudos

Consider this, quantum mechanics demonstrates to us the real existence of possibilities in the physical world. However, quantum mechanics does not provide for us the means for understanding the subjective capacity to choose from possibilities. This subjective capacity, to choose from possibilities available, is demonstrated by even the most basic life forms.

Argues that organic life is qualitative from the get go, that the processes embodied in organic molecules already transcend the bounds of physical causation. — Wayfarer

That's right, the organization inherent within organic molecules extends to the most fundamental levels of the physical parts of these molecules. This implies that the cause of this type of organization is itself not physical.

Okay, absolute nothingness is either a thing or not. If it is a thing, it is self-contradictory, and thus cannot exist. If it is not a thing, it cannot exist (by my earlier definition). Thus, absolute nothingness cannot exist no matter what. So, something exists, right? — Ø implies everything

I think you need to recognize distinct uses for "thing". This makes "thing" have a much wider range of usage than that outlined by your definition when you say "if it is not a thing, it cannot exist". So we might recognize that as well as things which exist, there is also things which do not exist. Consequently we talk about all sorts of fictional (non-existent) "things", as well as concepts as "things, and so on. Now as much as it may be true that "if it is not a thing, it cannot exist", there are also many "things" which do not exist.

Therefore we can say that "absolute nothingness" is such a thing. It is a "thing" in the sense of being a concept. And whether or not it is self-contradictory cannot be judged in the way you propose, because it would be required to determine what "nothingness" means in that context of the qualifying term "absolute". So far, I see nothing to indicate that the concept of "absolutely no thing" is self-contradictory, unless we stipulate that all concepts are necessarily things.

And if this is the case, I think we'd be better off to describe it as a type of hypocrisy rather than as self-contradiction. We'd have the proposition of "all concept are things" as a premise, and also we'd have a concept of "absolutely no thing". By that premise, the concept itself is a thing, and this would prove that the proposed concept does not state something true about reality, but it could still present us with a possible situation. However, we could truthfully state that under no circumstances could the description of "absolutely no thing" be true under this premise, because this would be a case of trying to do what the stipulated premise makes impossible. Notice though, that such stipulations don't render the described action as impossible, they only stipulate that it ought not be done. And doing what is contrary to what we state that we ought to do, is hypocrisy.

The further problem though, is that hypocrisy is very real, and actually occurs regularly. Therefore concluding that it would be hypocritical to hold as true, the concept of "absolutely no thing", does not prove that the concept is false. It may simply be the case that the premises which produce this conclusion are false. So we'd have to revisit the premises to see why the stipulated rule could be broken in a hypocritical way. Then we'd see that "all concepts are things" is not at all sound, and we'd discover that the hypocrisy is allowed for by this false premise. We can actually produce a concept which is not a thing.

That's why this type of argument does absolutely nothing for us.

That's definitely not what truth is. Science makes use of language where truths are inherently pragmatic and goal-orientated. We can test the "effectiveness of X" or "compare the effectiveness of X and Y". It might be true that method X is effective if it fulfils the objective, and true that another method is superior because it can be done faster and more cheaply. We want methods that better accomplish our many goals, such as being more environmentally friendly or safer for workers and so on. — Judaka

The cause/effect relationship between means and ends deserves analysis. The basic representation is as you outline here, methods are employed as the means for achieving the goals, ends. So there is a cause/effect relation whereby the means are the efficient cause of the ends. However, there is obviously an inverse relation whereby the goals are the cause of the coming into being of the means, as the means are judged as what is needed to achieve the desired end. This is known as the causal affect of intention, final cause. So for example, if "truth" is the goal or end of the scientific method, then "truth" as an ideal (the desire for truth), as such, is the cause (final cause) of the coming into being of the scientific method. The scientific method is then represented as the potential cause (efficient cause) of truth, and may be judged as to whether it actually causes truth, based on the successfulness of its outcomes, results, in relation to the guiding end, which was the ideal, "truth".

Now, when we understand this inversible relationship between the means as efficient cause, and the end as final cause, we can move toward understanding a deeper, more significant and impactful inversion of the relationship between means and ends. When the means (methods) are judged as successful for bringing about the desired end, they are put into practise, production, and the methods are employed on a regular basis, toward bringing about the desired end. The successfulness and effectiveness of the method for bringing about the desired end, has been judged, and this judgement is now taken for granted.

So we have a practise of repeated employing the same means, and its successfulness is taken for granted. We can understand this practise of repeatedly employing the same means for the sake of producing an end which is taken for granted, as a sort of "habit", and we can understand this type of activity through that concept "habit". The inversion I am speaking of here, occurs when the method which is the habit, becomes the end itself, as a habit may get to the point of being. The addictive habit is chosen for the sake of itself only, because its effectiveness for achieving the end is taken for granted therefore it is actually desired for the sake of itself only.

If, on reflection, the ends which are taken for granted are revisited, and the habit is very addictive, such that the desire for it is strong, then the ends get shaped to fit the needs of the means, as the means are the addictive habit and have become desired for the sake of themselves. This is commonly known as "rationalizing". At this point, the method is actually the end, as that which is desired, and the stated goals are pseudo-ends. They are created, shaped, and stated, in a way which is subservient to the desire for the means as the addictive habit, which being desired for the sake of itself is the true goal here.

For example. We start with the goal of "truth", as the ideal which is desired, and we create the scientific method as the means to that end. The means are judged as effective and successful, and therefore become habitual. Then, as an addiction, the habit itself has become the desired end. Now the original goal, which was the ideal "truth", is replaced with the new goal, the scientific method as the addiction, and any reference back to the original goal must ensure that the status of "taken for granted" is well maintained. Now the original goal, the ideal "truth", must become subservient to the means, which is the scientific method, such that the means will always be judged as successful and effective at bringing about the end, so that the method will be continued to be employed. That results in a manipulation of the definition of "truth", because of the irrational desire due to addiction. At this point, it is required to adjust the definition of "truth" according to circumstances, to ensure that the scientific method is always successful and effective at bringing about the desired end, "truth". In reality though, the rationalized "ends" have become subservient to the means, the addictive habit, which has actually become the end itself.

This reality is very evident in the following exchange:

Science pursues truth, namely scientific truth. It does not pursue non-scientific truth, such as philosophical or political truths. — Leontiskos

So, there are all of these different types of truths, dozens of them, potentially infinite, and science pursues only one of these. — Judaka

Quantum leaps seem to be inherent in the foundations of the physical world, as revealed by 20th century sub-atomic physics. In the 17th century, Isaac Newton assumed that physical processes are continuous, but the defining property of Quantum Physics is discontinuity. When measured down to the finest details, Energy was found to be, not an unbroken fluid substance, but could only be measured in terms of isolated packets, that came to be called "quanta"*1. Yet, on the human scale, the brain merges the graininess of Nature into a smooth image. There's nothing spooky about that. If you put your face up close to your computer screen, you will see a bunch of individual pixels. But as you move away, those tiny blocks of light merge into recognizable images. — Gnomon

The first thing I need to correct you on, is that energy is not measured it is calculated. Measurements are made, a formula is applied, and the quantity of energy is determined. Because of this, it is not accurate to talk about energy as a substance, it is actually a property, as a predication.

Bohr, Planck, etc found the observed quanta & quantum leaps to be "unintelligible", and characterized by inherent Relativity & Uncertainty*2. — Gnomon

Since a quantity of energy is calculated through a formula, and uncertainty arises from application of the formula, this suggests that the formula being applied is in some way deficient, and this is the cause of the appearance of uncertainty.

Due to the "spooky action at a distance" that annoyed Einstein, sub-atomic physics defies common sense. But pragmatic physicists gradually learned to accept that Nature did not necessarily play by our man-made rules. — Gnomon

This is especially the case when the "man-made rules" are not well crafted.

*2. That Old Quantum Theory :
Einstein's two theories of relativity have shown us that when things move very fast or when objects get massive, the universe exhibits very strange properties. The same is also true of the microscopic world of quantum interactions. The deeper we delve into the macrocosm and the microcosm, the further we get away from the things that make sense to us in our everyday world. — Gnomon

Strong evidence that the formulas being applied are deficient.

Everett’s Many worlds theory might get around the collapsing wavefunction problem. Not saying it’s the right theory, but it accounts for a sort of reason behind the becoming (each probability is really a separate world that did actually happen). — schopenhauer1

I don't see how you can make such a leap from future to past. If the wave function deals with possibilities of what might be measured, that's a prediction for the future. But I see no reason to believe that when that predicted point in time moves into the past, we ought to believe all those possibilities have actually happened. If there are many possibilities as to what you will be doing in an hour from now, and that time moves past, there is no reason to believe that all those possibilities actually happened.