By thing, I mean anything that could exist, be it a process or a concept or whatever. So, if absolute nothingness is a thing, then it would mean it could exist, which would make it self-contradictory. It cannot exist, because its existence would imply its non-existence. Thus, absolute nothingness is impossible. — Ø implies everything

What you are saying, is that we ought to conceive of absolute nothingness as something other than a thing. No problem there, right? But then you define "thing" in such a way that if it is not a thing, it does not exist. Therefore you want us to conceive of absolute nothingness as other than existent. There's no problem there either, but it does not mean that such a concept would be impossible, self-contradictory, or in any way incoherent. We can and do conceive of many non-existent things.

In answering this question, one must contemplate absolute nothingness, that is, the non-existence of everything. This "concept" is often deemed oxymoronic. For something to exist/be true, it must be
a thing. If absolute nothingness is a thing, it would entail its own non-existence, which would mean absolute nothingness would be true and untrue at the same time: a contradiction. If absolute nothingness is not a thing, then it cannot exist/be true. — Ø implies everything

The principal premise of your argument is: "For something to exist/be true, it must be
a thing." To consider the soundness of your conclusion we need to understand the soundness of this premise. Why do you believe that existence necessarily consists of "things"? If you take a look at "process philosophy" you will see that this class of philosophers deny the truth of this premise. They place activity as prior to and therefore not dependent on being. From this perspective it is possible to have existence without things.

However, in your conclusion, you move to qualify nothing with "absolute". This qualification is not supported by your argument, which restricts existence to things. Your argument premises that existence consists only of things, then it classes "absolute nothing" as a thing. So it fails to address all of reality which falls between things and true absolute nothingness, which is activity, process. Then you take an obviously false premise, that the nothingness you are talking about is "absolute", and proceed from that.

The premise is clearly false, because your principal premise has already restricted "existence" to things, therefore not an absolute nothingness. So "existence", by this definition is not absolute. In reality therefore, your argument proceeds from two contradictory premises, the first being that existence is restricted to things, and the second being that "absolute nothingness is a thing".

Consequently, I have wondered if we could take Nothingness seriously, and eliminate the perceived necessity for a mysterious ethereal substance. Take a typical atom for example, and watch as an electron (point particle) jumps up, and then back down, between energy levels (orbits). This up & down -- maximum to minimum -- action produces waveforms on an oscilloscope. But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. So, what if we imagine them as quantum leaps without passing through the space (nothingness) in between. In that case, the pattern would look more like a series of dots than a sine wave curve. {see image below} — Gnomon

I don't think this concept of nothingness works, because it renders what you call the quantum leap as unintelligible, impossible to understand. It may be the case that it actually is unintelligible, that is a real possibility, but we ought not take that as a starting premise. We need to start with the assumption that the medium is intelligible, then we'll be inspired to try to understand it, and only after exhausting all possible intelligible options should we conclude unintelligibility, nothingness.

Quantum observations are completely explainable without invoking the "particle" concept. Modelling the physics using the concept of particles works in many, but not all cases. Modelling it in terms of waves works for all the observations. — Dfpolis

I don't agree with this. The reason for modeling "particles" is to account for the waves' interaction with physical bodies. This is exemplified by the photoelectric effect. In this example the wave activity is a form of "becoming", understood as a continuity of change through a duration of time. The physical body is a form of being, is understood as the continuity of an unchanging subject with changing predicates.

The obvious issue here is that we do not understand the medium (substance or aether) within which the waves are active. We know that waves are an activity of a substance, but we do not know the substance which these waves are an activity of. It is often argued that the Michelson-Morley type experiments have demonstrated that there is no such substance, but as I just argued in a different thread, this is a faulty conclusion drawn from those experiments. In reality, what those experiments show is that the relation between physical bodies and the waving medium is not as premised.

With this way of looking at the medium which the waves are active in, the photoelectric problem is better exposed. The relationship between the waving medium and the physical body is not properly understood or represented. The body needs to be represented as a property of the medium, negating its supposed independence from its environment. This means that Newton's first law of motion which represents a body as an independent thing with a necessary continuity complete with "identity" as per the law of identity, with changing properties, is a faulty representation.

Therefore the body, individual, or particular, must be stripped of its identity as a thing in itself with a temporal continuity of sameness (law of identity), and be represented as changing properties of an underlying substratum, the waving medium or aether. This would allow that any body, in its entirety, could come into being, or cease being, at any moment in time, as we normally allow contrary premises. The temporal continuity, which in Aristotelian physics is assigned to matter as the supporting substance, is then passed to the underlying medium.

This has been made necessary by the advancements in physics which have seen the need to represent the continuous (existing as a temporal continuity) "potential" of the world as "energy" rather than as "matter". Aristotle represented this potential with "matter", and provided a guideline for restrictions to it with the law of identity, representing the potential as inherent within individual bodies. This supported the Newtonian concepts of mass, inertia, etc.. But the modern concept of "energy" allows that this underlying potential readily transfers from one body to another. Now we see that this underlying potential cannot be properly represent as inherent within individual bodies because the interaction between bodies cannot be adequately represented in this way. So that entire conceptual structure which assumes the temporal continuity of a body as having an identity as a body, must be deconstructed and rebuilt based on the underlying medium having an identity as the temporal continuity of potential, with the bodies being properties of the medium.

Quantum mechanics provides a very good example of the incompatibility between being and becoming I've been talking about, which Plato and Aristotle exposed. "Being", is represented here as the describable state of a fundamental particle. It is what is, at any specific point in time, what you call a stage of becoming. But change, "becoming" is what occurs between these points in time, how the particle gets from A to B, etc., and this is represented as a wave function.

So the wave function, as a representation of a form of becoming, must be expressed as linear or else it would be completely unintelligible to us, as totally unrelated to our points of observation. However, the points of observation (providing the states of being) must be adapted, manipulated artificially to match up with the information we have about what occurs between these points, rendering the representation as nonlinear, involving substantial unknowns. Therefore each, the representation of being and the representation of becoming, are left compromised due to the attempt to bridge the underlying gap of incommensurability, as the incompatibility between being and becoming manifests itself in particle physics.

Responding to you is time-consuming and seems to provide little benefit to either of us or to anyone else. I need that time to work on my articles for publication. So, I have decided to spend it there.

With kind regards,
Dennis Polis — Dfpolis

Thanks for the time Df, I do not think it was wasted. I know you've helped me to reconsider and better understand some things in the past, and I'm looking forward to more of the same in the future. Anyway, despite my criticism I do like your work. As a novel variety of science based metaphysics, it's like a breath of fresh air. That's why I'm quick to engage you when you post a thread, I like you.

You did not cite Aristotle and you did not lead me to reject being during change. — Dfpolis

I did, Metaphysics Bk 4 Ch 7-8, where he discusses change and the applicability of the of excluded middle . You refuse to address it. What's the point in asking for the citation if you refuse to go to the text and read the context for your own sake of understanding

To say that a thing is identical with its essence (which btw is false) is not to say anything about what happens over the course of time, which is what you are talking about. Essences only define what a being could do if it existed. So, as Aquinas saw, we need actual existence in addition to essences. — Dfpolis

You continue to deny the relevance of the two senses of "essence" and "form", saying that this statement is false while adhering to one sense, and not considering that it may be true in relation to the other sense. Essence is form, and form is actuality.

You keep doing this, trying to present some forms as non-actual, but this is completely unAristotelian, and makes a mess of his conceptual structure. So your statement "we need actual existence in addition to essences" is nonsensical, "essence" as form, is what gives actuality to existence.

That is the point of the passage I quoted. There is no difference between Socrates the individual, primary substance, and the essence of Socrates, what it mans to be Socrates. You can disagree, and say it ought not be expressed like this but then you step out of Aristotle's conceptual structure. This is how Aristotle makes matter accidental, and Form separable and prior to matter as cause of material existence, which is the basic, guiding purpose of his Metaphysics. You deny this point because you are not willing to accept independent Forms. Therefore you say it is false, and remove yourself from being Aristotelian.

I accept that, but there is also being at each point in the process. — Dfpolis

But you were denying my insistence that being and becoming must overlap. Do you now accept this, that there is a duality of being and becoming within each material particular, or individual? And, the further point you need to apprehend is the fact that the aspects which are "becoming" cannot be described in the terms used to describe the aspects which are "being". And whatever aspects are described as "being" cannot be described in the same terms as those used to describe "becoming", because of the fundamental incompatibility, or incommensurability demonstrated by Plato and Aristotle. This is discussed in Plato's Theaetetus, and Aristotle Met. Bk4 Ch 7-8.

Becoming is the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency. — Dfpolis

You accuse me of "nonsense", then you make a statement like this. If a potency is actualized, then it is no longer in potency. You argued this yourself. Now you are saying that the potency might still be in potency, in the actualization of that very potency. Which is it that you believe? Either there is overlap between the actuality and the potency because they are distinct categories, which is what you seem to be saying now, or one simply replaces the other, as you said before.. Don't you think? But you don't seem to grasp Aristotle's guidance for violation of the law of excluded middle at all. Read Bk4 Ch 7-8 please, and get back to me when you have something sensible to say on the issue of becoming.

I did not say that. I said the number of kinds was always finite. — Dfpolis

Why though,? We can make up whatever imaginary "kind" we want. So there is infinite possibility for kinds. That's demonstrated by set theory.

A continuum is not a regress. There is typically one efficient cause, and one potential being actualized, for the whole transformation. What do you see as a regress? — Dfpolis

I explained the infinite regress, twice now. Between each supposed different state of being which marks each stage in a change, there is necessarily another state of being to mark that stage of the change. This goes on ad infinitum, i.e. an infinite regress.

Since it is neither true nor false, the rules applying to truth and falsity do not apply. — Dfpolis

Right, so this is the case with "matter" in general, being designated as the aspect of the world which is "potential", the rules applying to truth and falsity do not apply to matter.

Now matter is that part of reality which we cannot understand because the rules of truth and falsity do "not apply". So this produces a very real interaction problem. We have two senses of "form", "actuality" or "essence". One is the essence of the thing itself, which is the same as the thing itself, the other is the essence we assign to the thing, through our use of sense, intellect, and understanding. Each is equally "actual", but what separates these two are the accidents, and Aristotle posited "matter" to account for the accidents, as the aspects which the intellect does not grasp. So "matter" becomes the intermediary between these two very distinct types of actuality, therefore it is the medium of interaction between the two types of actuality. But since it is what the intellect does not grasp, the interaction is not grasped. Therefore an interaction problem.

There are different ways of interpreting this situation. The materialist will assume that "matter" represents something real in the universe, and therefore conclude that there are real aspects of the universe which are impossible for the intellect to grasp. So we have ontologies like dialectical materialism which allows that the reality of matter violates the law of non-contradiction, therefore matter is something real which is impossible for us to understand. But from the Aristotelian perspective, "matter" does not represent anything real, it is just a name used to refer to that part of reality, "potential" which the intellect of man, at that time, could not understand. It is that part of a particular thing's essence which the human mind does not grasp. You will probably insist, as most others do, that Aristotle intended for "matter: to represent something very real, and I would reply that a lack of understanding of the human intellect is something very real. It is just not what we tend to think of as the reality of matter., because it is a type of nothingness rather than a type of something.

Not quite. Conceiving the same reality in different ways is a form of equivocation. When we are using different meanings for the same (nominal) concept, the same formal proposition can be true and false, not because the reality is indeterminate, but because we are not thinking the same things about it. — Dfpolis

Aristotle is not talking about using different meanings for the same concept. He is talking about "relativity" as proposed by Protagoras. In this case, since the world is said to be as it is perceived, or "appears" to be, and it appears to be different to different people, we are faced with the possibility that there is no such thing as truth. This is similar to, but clearly not the same as giving different meanings to the same words. Read the referenced section please.

In Plato's theory, sensible things are like images in a mirror and have no more an essence than a reflection does. — Dfpolis

It seems you have not read Plato's Timaeus.

Yes, it is an activity, and it can change but it is not always changing. — Dfpolis

Wait, what kind of activity is not always a change? I think activity is always a change, whether it's change of place, or change of some quality. Activity as motion, necessarily implies change.

Becoming is not incompatible with being. At each stage, what is becoming is what it is. — Dfpolis

I explained to you why becoming is incompatible with being, and this is directly from Aristotle. Plato initially outlined this problem in The Theaetetus I believe it was. Aristotle demonstrated it in a way similar to what I expressed.

Yes, at each stage of becoming, the thing is what it is, but as Aristotle demonstrated, "becoming" as change is what occurs between each stage. It must be, or else there is an infinite number of stages between each stage. So it is impossible that becoming can be described by states of being at various stages, because this would require an infinity of stages for even the smallest degree of change.

Citation? The Law of Identity is "Whatever is, is and whatever is not, is not." So, you are making up your own law. Please state what you think it is. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what Aristotle denies. Metaphysics BK 4, Ch 8, 1012b,5-8 "But against all such views we must postulate as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means." See below for context.

A good representation of the law of identity is found in Metaphysics Bk7, Ch 6.

Each thing itself. then, and its essence are one and the same in no accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.
...
Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one ad the same as its essence. The sophistical objections to this position, and the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered by the same solution; for there is no difference either in the standpoint from which the question would be asked, or in that from which one could answer it successfully. — 1031b-1032a

No, the self-identity of a changing being is based on organic continuity. I do not have the same description I did when I was conceived, but I have organically developed developed from that zygote into the person I am today. — Dfpolis

I haven't the vaguest idea of what "organic continuity" means. It's not Aristotelian and it seems that it is actually you who is making up your own laws. How would you account for the temporal continuity of changing inorganic things like rocks? Surely the rock remains the same rock, despite despite a change in location, or chipping and other changes which occur to it.

It is not that we have different being, but a different kind of being. "Kind" is a conceptual reality, based on the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time. — Dfpolis

You seem to be incapable, or unwilling to grasp the fact that "becoming" is what occurs between points in time, and therefore cannot be accurately described as "the being in progress at each point in time". This issue is fundamental to an understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics. As Aristotle demonstrated, if understanding becoming was a matter of grasping "the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time", then "becoming" would be completely unintelligible as requiring understanding "the being in progress" at an infinite number of points in time, just to be able to understand even the most simple case of becoming.

That intelligibility does not become an actual "kind" unless the agent intellect actualizes it, and forms a universal concept by prescinding from individuating notes of intelligibility. So, while we have an infinite number of potential kinds, we only have as many actual kinds as the agent intellect is able to generate. — Dfpolis

This does not resolve the problem, nor is it Aristotle's recommendation.

Suppose there is assumed to be an actual number of different states of being inherent within each instance of change. So there would be an actual number of stages each consisting of a different kind of being at each stage. What Aristotle pointed out is that "change" is what occurs between each instance of existence of a different kind of being.

So, saying that at t1 there was X type of being, and at t2 there was Y type of being, does not explain the intermediary change which occurred, which is known as how X became Y, because this is what happened between t1 and t2. If we posit Z type of being as the intermediary stage, we face an infinite regress. If we say as you are proposing, that there is a limited number of actual stages, then we are right back to the very same problem as we have at the beginning which Aristotle was addressing. We need to account for what happens between each of the stages, as this is when change, or becoming occurs, how one stage becomes the next. Clearly, what you propose is not what Aristotle proposed, because this proposal produces the very problem which he proceeded toward finding a solution for.

Citation? His solution was to point out an equivocation. — Dfpolis

There is a number of places where Aristotle demonstrated the necessity of violation of the law of excluded middle. I think the most famous is in "Categories" where he talks about the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow.

What I believe is the best demonstration is in Metaphysics. One place is Bk 4. First, in Ch 3 he explains why the law of non-contradiction must be adhered to, as the most self-evident principle of all. Then, in Ch 5 he explains Protagorean relativity theory, and the problem involved with understanding "change". If different people perceive the same changing thing in different ways, and the truth about a thing is according to how it is perceived, then the same thing is at the same time both "so and not so". Because of this problem, it appears like many people, believed that there could be no true or false statements made about change, so some concluded that change is impossible.

The real problem Aristotle said, is that these people attribute "truth", "that which is", as being identical with the sensible world, and the sensible world is always changing. This view blossomed into the extreme position of Heraclitus, who said you could not make a true statement about anything, and finally Cratylus who criticized even Heraclitus for assuming it to be true that you cannot step in the same river twice, claiming you could not even step in it once, because "the same river" makes no sense at all. So Aristotle's conclusion is something like 'that which appears is not necessarily the truth', because the same thing may both appear to be and not be in the same way at the same time, depending on perspective.

In Ch 7 he proceeds in a discussion of the law of excluded middle. First he shows that the argument that "there must be an intermediary between all contradictories", in the same sense that grey is intermediary between black and white, leads to infinite regress, just like I've explained. This is not a problem of ambiguity, but a problem of insisting that change can be described by intermediary states of being. It is a fundamental problem of that way of speaking. It produces sophistic, or "eristical" arguments which men will concede to because they cannot refute them.

The solution is discussed in Ch 8. What is required is that the intermediary which is change, be undefined. Attempts to define it produce the infinite regress. Therefore the law of excluded middle applies only to defined terms, not to appearances as observed. 1012b,5-8: "But against all such views we must postulate as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means."

It is Aristotle's definition. I just accepted it. — Dfpolis

But Aristotle had two definitions of substance, primary and secondary, and you simply dismiss secondary substance as derivative. However, in his Metaphysics the substance of a self-subsistent, separate thing, is equated with the thing's essence, following Plato's Timaeus. This is not derivative, but prior.

Metaphysics Bk 5 Ch 8. " It follows, then, that 'substance' has two senses, (A) the ultimate substratum which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a 'this' is also separable --and of this nature is the shape or form of every thing"

This does not follow. In Aristotle's view I am the same substance I was the moment I qualified as a rational animal. What need is there for another substance? — Dfpolis

As Aristotle demonstrated, and I explained above, this view you state here, cannot account for the reality of change. If we accept as true, that you are always the same substance, just having a different form at different times, then we can never understand the reality of changes which occur to you. The changes are necessarily something distinct from, and cannot be described as, substance which is a your form or essence. And since your form is constantly changing, then your identity must be something other than your substance because this constantly changes. But, change is just as much a real part of you as identity is, therefore "substance" also has the definition of matter with form. Now we have two "substances". So, as Aristotle demonstrated, change is real, actual, and substantial, but consisting of "substance" in the sense of a logical necessity but there is also "substance" in the sense of a combination of matter and form, and that is of a physical, or sensible necessity, to account for the reality of appearances. And it must be allowed, that appearances defy the law of excluded middle.

Not by Aristotle's definition. He knows that things undergo accidental changes and remain the same substance. — Dfpolis

That's exactly why we need to accept the reality of something other than "substance", as per the way you apply the term. However, when we start to understand this "something other", it becomes very clear that it is no less substantial, by the very definition you employ to call the other thing 'substance". So now there is a need for two distinct substances, both fitting the definition you propose, but each being very different from the other.

If you think ideas exist as particulars, then you need to define "particulars," because what I see is particular humans thinking ideas. The dependence on humans makes an idea an accident in the sense of a predicable, not a "this something" (tode ti), as humans are. — Dfpolis

OK, I think we can start from this point. What I described as a "particular idea", you say is not a particular at all, in the sense of substance, but since it is dependent on a human being, it is a predicable. However, since this sort of idea which I was talking about, the idea which circumscribes the means to an end, or personal goal, is unique to the individual, in a particular set of circumstances, it is as you say an accident, and therefore not a universal. Would you agree with me that this sort of idea is better represented as an activity, a thinking activity, always changing according to the evolving circumstances as physical activities are carried out? And would you agree that although habit plays an important role in this sort of thinking activity, there are many ideas which stretch beyond habit, freely willed ideas, which contribute to creativity?

Please read Aristotle's Physics I, where he explains the relation between these concepts. — Dfpolis

I have, more than once, and my objection stands.

There is no middle ground between being the completed thing and not yet being the completed thing (an entelecheia). — Dfpolis

There is always a middle ground, it's called "becoming", and becoming is fundamentally incompatible with being, as explained by Aristotle. There are two logical states, the being of the thing and the not-being of the thing. The middle ground between these two is what we know as "change", or becoming.

Suppose at t1 we have the not being of a particular thing, A, and at t2 we have the being of A. Between t1 and t2 there is necessarily change, becoming. If we describe the change in terms of a different being, and suppose that halfway between t1 and t2, at t1.5, we have a different being, being B, then we must account for the change between being B and being A, in the time between t1.5 and t12. Now we posit being C at t1.75. You can see that this leads to an infinite regress of different beings at each conceivable moment of passing time in the duration of change.

So Aristotle concluded that "becoming" is incompatible with the logical terms of being and not-being. He stated that sophists who adhere strictly to the fundamental laws of logic are known to "demonstrate" or prove absurd conclusions ( Zeno's paradoxes for example) by doing this. His solution was to allow that the law of excluded middle be violated in instances where potential (may or may not be) was involved and this is the case for "becoming".

Therefore we need to conclude that there is always a middle ground in an activity of change. The potential of activity cannot be described in terms of being and not being, due to the problem of infinite regress outlined by Aristotle, and there must always be something in between any two distinct states of being, which cannot be described as a state of being, because it is change, becoming.

Yes, we can. What we may not be able to say is where the line is. For example, when is a fetus a human being? Still, wherever the line is, before that, we have becoming and from that point on we have the being. — Dfpolis

As demonstrated by Aristotle, and explained above, there is not a line, there is always necessarily a duration of change, or becoming, and this cannot be described as a line between two distinct states of being. If we try to describe this with lines between distinct states of being we have an infinite regress, of an infinite number of distinct states of being between each moment in time.

First, we are not completely identical at different times, so the law of identity does not apply. — Dfpolis

This is a misunderstanding of the law of identity. The law of identity allows that the very same thing is changing as time passes, because a thing is the same as itself, not the same as any description of it. This is the beauty of the law of identity, and why it is so ontologically useful in understanding the nature of material existence. We notice that objects are constantly changing, they get chipped, dented, or otherwise damaged, or altered. If the "identity" of a thing is a description which is supposed to correspond, then at each passing moment, a thing which consists of moving parts, must have a new identity, i.e. be a new thing at each passing moment. However, we also see the need to allow that a thing maintains its identity as the same thing, despite changes to it. So Aristotle was very intuitive to clarify the law of identity to account for this reality of observed temporal continuity, that a thing maintains its identity as the thing it is, despite changes to its form, as time passes.

Second, we are the same being because of our dynamic continuity, not because of the same stuff or the exact same form. — Dfpolis

This dynamic continuity is exactly the reality which the law of identity accounts for. And this is why I said being and becoming must overlap. A thing, such as a human being for example, is continuously changing, becoming, yet maintaining its identity as the same being.

My 10 year old self was not identical to my 11 year old self. — Dfpolis

You maintained your identity as the same being when you were 10, when you were 11, and still now. You were always the same being despite many changes, and you were always "the same as yourself". That is the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". No specific description forms the identity of a thing.

I agree that applying our concepts can be fuzzy. This results from our concepts not being as clear as we would like, and perceptions being inadequate to determining sharp lines. These are epistemological, not ontological problems. — Dfpolis

The infinite regress demonstrated by Aristotle, and explained above, is a very significant ontological problem. This is why we cannot accurately account for the nature of reality by simply assuming one substance. The substance would exist in distinct states, but there would be an infinite regress of distinct states in each moment of time. So we must accept that there is something other, which is incompatible with this one substance existing in distinct states. It doesn't matter that you do not want to call this 'other' thing "substance", so that you can avoid substance dualism, because we end up in the same situation any way. Instead of having two real substances, we now have real substance and real non-substance, so what's the difference?

No, I am applying the term in the different ways it was applied historically. Aristotle and Aquinas define a substance as "this something" (an ostensible unity). Descartes and the modern tradition see substance as a kind of stuff things are made of (an analogue of matter). These are radically different concepts. — Dfpolis

Again, you are adhering to Aristotle's "primary substance", and conveniently ignoring his "secondary substance", in your definition of substance.

Concepts are real because they are acts of real people, e.g. the concept <apple> is people thinking of apples. — Dfpolis

So, we're back to the top of my post. Concepts are "acts", as stated here, and as described at the beginning of this post. And, as described in the rest of this post, activity, as change, becoming, is what lies between states of being, as something incompatible with the descriptive conventions of being and not being. So concepts are very real occurrences of "non-substance".

But now we have a problem with your definition of "substance", as "this something". Every time we point to a "this something", we find that it is engaged in change, activity, so it is also non-substance at the very same time. Any instance of substance, a thing, also consists of active becoming or change, and by your exclusionary definition of "substance", this must be "non-substance". So now, instead of violating the law of excluded middle, which Aristotle recommended, you violated the law of noncontradiction, which Aristotle strongly urged us not to do in this situation of trying to account for the dual reality of being and becoming.

There is no actuality of a potentially living body before there is an actual living being. — Dfpolis

There is necessarily an actuality which is before, that's what Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument demonstrates. A potentiality cannot actualize itself, something actual is required. So if there is a body with life potentially in it, it is required that there is an actuality which actualizes this body and makes this become an actual living body. This is "the soul", the actuality which is necessarily prior to the actual living body.

So in the way that this law is usually identified - “A=A” - what, precisely, is the difference between the left-hand ‘A’ and the right hand ‘A’? Are they ‘particulars’? — Wayfarer

Are you familiar with the law of identity? I mean do you understand its presentation and meaning, rather than just being able to copy the conventional representation of "A=A"? Did you read the SEP quote, which states that identity is a relation which can only hold between a thing and itself?

Surely you must understand that "a thing" is a particular, not the representation of a particular. And the meaning of "can only hold between a thing and itself", is self-evident. Therefore representing a particular individual with a symbol ("A "for example), does not produce an identity relation, when the law of identity is formally adhered to. The commonly accepted notion of "identity", the vulgar notion, by which a thing is identified with a name, is not consistent with the law of identity. This is a corrupted "identity" which is derived from a faulty ontology, and cannot provide for a rigorous logic.

A category is "specific", not "particular". This is because the parameters of the category are specified, and are not necessarily "particular", meaning of that specific category and not other categories. Call me pedantic, but logic fails when it is not rigorous.

Plato demonstrated this problem in The Parmenides. If a whole, "One" (category in this case) is defined as a collection of individuals, (particulars in this case), then One (as category) cannot be an individual (particular) because then there is no logical separation between the One and the Many. Therefore the metaphysically, or ontological acceptable, as in logically rigorous, way of proceeding is to employ a further definition which distinguishes the category from the things which exist as members of that category. So if the members are said to be particulars, then the category itself must be something other than a particular. We call it a universal.

Whether or not set theory adheres to this principle is debatable. Set theory makes a set an individual, as a mathematical object, which the members of the set also are, mathematical objects. This is a metaphysical or ontological flaw. which I believe produces the problem described above, resulting in "Russel's Paradox". I believe that the conventional solutions to this problem do not provide the required separation between the definition of "set" and the definition of "element" to actually resolve the problem. To produce the required ontological separation would annihilate the validity of set theory.

That a "set" is necessarily distinct from an "element" of a set, therefore requiring different defining terms, is evident from proofs which show the reality of the "empty set". The empty set is distinct from the set which contains zero as an element. And that it is possible to have an object (set, as mathematical object), which consists of nothing at all, no substance, demonstrates the need for a separation between "category" as specified, and "particular" as an element of the category. The latter, the particular, cannot consist of nothing, no substance, but the former the empty set is very real as a logical possibility.

So in the way that this law is usually identified - “A=A” - what, precisely, is the difference between the left-hand ‘A’ and the right hand ‘A’? Are they ‘particulars’? — Wayfarer

A signifies one particular. Therefore in that expression of the law of identity there is no difference between the left and right side. However, since this is a representation of the law of identity, "=" must signify "is the same as" not equality. "Is the same as" is a very special case of equality.

So what is the case, is that when the law of identity is represented as "A=A", "A" symbolizes the thing, and "=" symbolizes "is the same as". In mathematics, "=" symbolizes equality. Therefore in the quoted representation of the law of identity, "A=A", the "=" symbol must mean something different from what it means in mathematical usage.

The issue of, and history of, how the law of identity came to be stated as A=A, instead of as A is A, as proposed by Leibniz, and how "is the same as" became replaced with equality, is actually quite complex. If you study it, you might discover a sophistic trick, which is a type of inversion fallacy. The proposition is that in all instances of A, A is equal to A. And so A is equal to A is proposed as the law of identity in formal logic. It says something about A, that it is always equal to itself, and cannot not be equal to itself. However, A is equal to A is not as logically rigorous as A is the same as A. This is because in all cases of "is the same as", there is necessarily equality, but not in all cases of equality are the equal things the same. Therefore identity is a very special type of equality, a relation which a thing has with itself, but "A is equal to A" does not signify what the special type of equality is, which is stated as "is the same as".

Here's a quote from SEP:

Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).

Numerical identity is our topic. As noted, it is at the centre of several philosophical debates, but to many seems in itself wholly unproblematic, for it is just that relation everything has to itself and nothing else – and what could be less problematic than that? Moreover, if the notion is problematic it is difficult to see how the problems could be resolved, since it is difficult to see how a thinker could have the conceptual resources with which to explain the concept of identity whilst lacking that concept itself. The basicness of the notion of identity in our conceptual scheme, and, in particular, the link between identity and quantification has been particularly noted by Quine (1964).

You are misrepresenting what Wayfarer said. Ideas exist only in minds, not as particular substances, even though they may be about particulars. — Dfpolis

Well, this is what is being debated, whether or not some ideas actually exist in some minds as particulars. Simply stating that they do not, does not argue your case. It seems to me, that if I see a piece of fruit on the counter, and my goal is to eat that particular piece of fruit, this is a very particular idea. Likewise, if I have a plan to put some particular pieces of lumber together with some particular nails that I have, in a very particular way, this is also a very particular idea.

What I explained above, is that intention starts out as something very general, a general desire or ambition, or in my example, the general feeling of hunger. But by the time the individual acts on one's intentions, the goal is something very particular, to manipulate very particular material objects in a very particular way. It must be that this is the case, because we manipulate particular things in the world, in particular circumstances, and we cannot move around, and work with particular material objects in a general way, because our actions are particularly shaped to the situation. Each instance of manipulation is particular, as is the thing manipulated, and the circumstances within which it is manipulated, so the corresponding ideas must also be particular.

This is the issue of moral philosophy. How do we apply general principles in particular situations. The reality is that we do not. The general principles act as a sort of guide which assist us to produce particular ideas which are suited to each particular situation in which we find ourselves.

What prevents mathematical objects from being physical is that they require a counting or a measuring operation to become actual, while bodies need not be observed to exist. So, mathematical objects are mental existents with a foundation in reality, not realities simplicitur. — Dfpolis

By Aristotle's Metaphysics, it is the mathematician's mind which actualizes mathematical objects, therefore they have actual existence within the mind.

Good! What makes them the "same" is that they can elicit the identical (universal) idea. They need not be equal. 1 kg of sugar is the same kind of thing as 5 kg of sugar, but they are not equal. — Dfpolis

As each is sugar they are equal, in that parameter, and can be measured by the same laws of measurement. In the same way, you and I are equal as human beings, and are subject to the same laws.

Nonsense! They are saying nothing about the law of identity. You are equivocating on "the same." It has one meaning in identity, and a different meaning in equality. — Dfpolis

I suggest you speak to some mathematicians on this forum. There are many here who insist that "2+2=4" means that "2+2" is the same as "4", by the law of indentity. I believe it is the axiom of extensionality in set theory which gives rise to this way of thinking. Here's something Wikipedia says about that axiom: "Thus, what the axiom is really saying is that two sets are equal if and only if they have precisely the same members." Notice that under this axiom. for two sets to be equal, they must be the same. This axiom supports the claim that if two things are equal they are therefore the same.

No, he never has an interaction problem because one substance, a human being, cannot interact with itself. The interaction problem arises when you deny that we are one substance and make us two: res cogitans and res extensa. — Dfpolis

You seem to be forgetting that Aristotle distinguished primary and secondary substance. Primary substance is one individual, consisting of matter and form, but secondary substance is formal only. Since each sense of "form" is actual, we need to resolve how primary and secondary substance interact with each other.

Becoming cannot be an interaction with the product of becoming, because they do not co-exist. — Dfpolis

You have no grounds for this statement because "becoming" is incompatible with the states of being and not being. So when a thing comes into being from not being, through the means of becoming, you have no principles to argue that becoming cannot overlap both the not being, and the being of the thing which is coming into existence. By Aristotle's principles, "becoming" violates the law of excluded middle, neither being nor not being, but by Hegel's principles, "becoming" encompasses bot being and not being. So we really cannot say with any amount of certainty whether becoming truly overlaps the being of a thing or not.

I would say that since a thing is always changing, and maintains its identity as the same thing, despite undergoing change, according to the law of identity, we must conclude that the being and the becoming of the very same thing, do co-exist.

Yes, but while it is being perfected, it is not the finished (formed) product. — Dfpolis

By the law of identity it is still the same thing, during that extended period of time which it is undergoing the changes which are attempts to perfect it. Clearly, the becoming of a thing must overlap the being of the thing, and this is why there cannot be a clearly and distinctly defined "point in time" at which the not-being of the thing is replaced with the being of the thing. There can always be debate as to the precise point in time when a thing actually starts to be the thing that it is.

If you mean that there are two kinds of form, one the mental plan and the other the actuality of the product, I agree. If you mean that there are two substances in the product, which is what "dualism" usually means, I disagree. — Dfpolis

It appears like you are just manipulating your use of "substance" to suit your purpose. That's fine, if you do not want to call the immaterial form which precedes in time the material form, a "substance", because "substance" implies matter to you, then we can proceed on those terms. Still we must account for the reality of that immaterial actuality.

You seem not to have read De Anima. Psyche is defined as the first actuality of a potentially living body. It cannot exist before there is an actual living body. The agent intellect is "divine" and separable, while the passive intellect is "perishable" and so physical. — Dfpolis

I've had extensive discussion on De Anima, on this forum, and I've read it multiple times. It contains ambiguity and reason for differing interpretations. By my translation, "soul" is defined as the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This means soul is prior to life. But you and I have already discussed the two senses of "actuality" used by Aristotle in this book, and I would be willing to further this discussion. It is an interesting topic.

seems like pointing to a non-issue: categories are particular just as indivdual objects are. — Janus

I would not agree to that. A category is a universal, not a particular.

The form, idea or principle is not something that exists - at least, in the sense that a particular exists. The intelligible form of particulars is a universal. — Wayfarer

This is a misrepresentation. The idea, as design or form in the mind of the artist exists as the idea of a particular, not of a universal. The thing desired is very particular, not universal. We can characterize "desire" as a general feeling, a universal, in the way that "hunger" is a universal, as a general feeling, or urge, but when the individual human being is moved to act on a specific desire, or intent to create something, the object of intent becomes very particular, as a goal of a particular material consequence. The general "hunger" becomes the goal to eat a particular thing.

In Aristotelian and classical philosophy, the law of identity is a logical law that is general and not tied specifically to particulars. — Wayfarer

The law of identity is a general law, but it applies to particulars just like any inductive law. So is tied specifically to particulars, as a statement about what all particulars have in common. It states something about all particulars which differentiates a particular from a universal. It is actually intended to represent the very difference you refer to above, the difference between a particular and an universal, in order to prevent the sophistry which follows from failing to maintain this difference, such as the tendency to allow that mathematical objects, like numbers, have the same type of existence as material objects.

The law of identity says that "a thing" (i.e. a particular) is the same as itself. It serves to differentiate the use of "same" in reference to particular individuals from the use of "same" in reference to type or category, and avoid the sophistry employed through the use of equivocation and the employment of this category mistake. When the law of identity is well understood, this usefulness becomes very evident.

When two things are of the same type, people commonly say that they are the "same". However, they are not "the same" by the law of identity, because that would imply that they are one thing, not two. The law of identity dictates that "same" refers only to a relation which a thing has with itself, not a relation with other things. Therefore being judged as "of the same type" whereby two distinct things are said to be "the same" is best represented as establishing a relation of equality between the two. They are equal according to the parameters of the type, and are said to be "the same" by those specific parameters. They are not "the same" in the sense of the law of identity which is an absolute sameness.

The law of identity allows only that a particular has that specific relation, "same" with itself making "same" absolute rather than relative. Therefore whenever someone argues that two things which are equal, such as what is represented by the left side and what is represented by the right side of a mathematical equation, are "the same" because they are equal, they violate the law of identity. I believe it was Hegel who initiated the modern trend of violating the law of identity, by insisting that it could not be useful. And we might say that this violation is always carried out for some sophistic purpose. That purpose is usually to support an untenable ontology such as Pythagorean idealism, where the potential referred to by numerical figuring is said to be the very same as the "potential" of matter. But this is a category mistake.

No. You cannot have an interaction between a prior intention and its instantiation anymore than a line can interact with its terminal point. First, the intention to create terminates once the object is created, and second, a form as plan is not a form as actuality. If they were, we would have an actuality whenever we had a plan. — Dfpolis

Under Aristotelian principles, all instances of "form" are actual. Are you seriously trying to deny this, or are you proposing something non-Aristotelian? This is how the interaction problem is resolved by Aristotle, by making forms actual.. And there is interaction between the prior intent, and the instantiation, it's called "becoming". Becoming requires a period of time within which the two interact, as an artist interacts with one's work, with the intent to perfect it.

True, but that continuity does not make a plan the same as an actuality. — Dfpolis

A plan is a form, and a form is an actuality. That is Aristotle 101. The object of intent is an actuality, that is how it acts as a cause, final cause.

We must not confuse accidents as unplanned outcomes with metaphysical accidents, which are notes of intelligibility that inhere in, and can be predicated of, the the whole. It is not unplanned accidents that make a thing actual, but the efficient cause implementing the plan. Accidents inhering in a being cannot be prior to that being. Matter as potential is prior, but once we have an actuality, all accidents belong to that actuality or form. For a human artisan, the actuality may depart from the plan because of the stuff used, but that is not the reason a plan is not an actuality. — Dfpolis

The accidents are attributable to the matter's prior form. The artist chooses one's medium, as "the matter" to work with, but that matter necessarily has a form. The form which this matter has, which is not properly accounted for by the artist's plan is the reason for accidents, "form" in the created object which is not a part of the "form" of the design. In this way, the accidents are prior to the material object, and they are causal in the sense of "material cause". "Material cause" referring to that which was prior to, and persists after the act of becoming.

Again, no. The mental form part of the process of execution. There is no gap because that process terminates in the executed reality. If there were a gap, it would mean that were were finished making the thing before it became actual, a contradiction. — Dfpolis

If the form of the intended object and the form of the material object created, are not the same form, then there is necessarily a gap between the two, a lack of formal continuity which must be explained. Simply asserting "there is no gap" does not close the gap. As I described, and you seem to agree, the gap is commonly understood to be closed through the implication of "efficient cause", as the means to the end, which occurs during "becoming". However, as stated above, becoming requires a temporal duration, and the efficient causes must be directed during that time period. This is the interaction which closes the gap. But it requires either that the form of the object of intent is the very same form as the form of the created material object, or that they are distinct, and that there is interaction between the two during the process of becoming. Either way is dualist. Denying that the "form" which is called the object of intent, as plan or design, is actual, as you are doing, is not Aristotelian. Form is always actual.

But, it cannot, because it has no mind. God has a creative intent. It is manifest in the laws of nature which guide the transformation of the acorn's potential into an oak — Dfpolis

Anytime a plant or animal selects from possibilities, for a purpose, there must be intention involved. To say that intention necessarily involves "mind" makes mind prior to the material body of living beings. This is a problem which Aristotle addressed and I believe proposed a solution by separating the concept of "intellect" from that of "soul". At his time, "mind" and "soul" were often used synonymously and he pointed to this problem. But the soul is demonstrated to be prior to the body, while the intellect is posterior as dependent on the body. However, the soul is actual, and acts with purpose or final cause. Therefore "intent" or "final cause" does not necessarily imply "mind" or "intellect".

We have to turn to God immediately because oaks do not have minds, and we need a mind as a source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

No, we do not need to refer to "a mind" here. That is a faulty restriction of the definition of "intentionality" which has become common in the modern vernacular. However, if you check a reasonable dictionary like OED, you will see that "intention" means simply to act with purpose. This modern tendency, to restrict "intention" as you do, thereby claiming that only human acts, or acts of "a mind" can be intentional, renders all the purposeful acts of all the creatures which have no mind, as unintelligible because then you have purpose without intent. Purpose without intent cannot be understood as it makes this sort of "purpose" a sort random chance selection, which cannot be "purpose".

Indeed it does, but a being's own form/actuality cannot be a prior cause because nothing is actual until it exists. What is prior is a being's matter, its efficient cause, and its telos or end. Thus, the efficient cause, working on specific matter for a specific end produces a specific form or actuality. — Dfpolis

The telos or end as the intent of the designer, is actual, and prior to the material existence of the thing. This is Wayfarer's principle, or blueprint. The blueprint, or design of the thing, as a form, is actual and prior to the individual material thing. Further, there must be continuity between the form as design, and the form in the individual thing, to avoid the interaction problem. These must be one and the same form, or else we have the so-called interaction problem.

The artist who is "working on specific matter for a specific end" with the means of efficient causation, must actually put the form into the matter. Otherwise there is a separation, a gap, between the form as design and the form within the individual object. This gap denies the possibility of the telos or end being causal. If there is a gap between the form as desired end, and the form as individual object (outcome), there is no causation between the two, and the telos or end is not causal.

So the gap is filled with "efficient cause". The efficient causes are the means. But still there appears to be a difference between the form as design, and the form within the individual, the material object as outcome. The difference is attributed to accidents, and the accidents are the influence of the matter which is chosen by the artist.

Now the question is whether the influence of matter, and the resulting accidents, renders the form of the individual as a distinct form, or is it just a change of form, allowing the form to maintain its identity as the same form, in the way that a changing object maintains its identity as the same object, by the law of identity. I believe that we must allow for the temporal continuity of "the same form", or else there is an interaction problem, a gap between the form as intent, and the form as outcome. But when we allow for this continuity which I am describing, we also admit to independent forms, as the form is then prior to its material existence, therefore independent.

To defend your position, you need to explain how a thing can be actual before it is. I think you are confusing two meanings of "form." An artisan has a "form" in mind before she produces her work, but that "form" is not the "form" (actuality) of the finished product, but her intention, i.e. an end (final cause). In the same way, the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, act on prior states produce final states. — Dfpolis

As I said above, if we do not allow that the form in the artist's mind, and the form of the artist's finished work, are one and the same form, there is a gap between the two which produces an interaction problem. So, in common understanding, we say that the form is brought from the artist's mind, and put into the medium, through the means of efficient causes. Therefore, the intermediary, efficient causation, solves any interaction problem. However, if we deny the continuity between the form in the artist's mind, and the form in the work of art, then we cannot say that the artist takes the form from one's mind and puts it into the medium, through the means of efficient causation. And then we have an implied interaction problem between the form in the mind, and the form in the work of art.

Every creature has a prior creative intention in the mind of God. But, that is a metaphysical, not a physical, explanation. Physically, the form of an acorn is the foundation for the form of the oak into which it may sprout, but, being the foundation for a form is not being the form. It is being a potential. — Dfpolis

The problem here is that physics does not deal with telos, ends, and intention, but metaphysics does. So if the reality of the situation is that telos and intention are causal, and you reject the explanation as metaphysical rather than physical, you are going in the wrong direction. Physics cannot give an explanation for this, but metaphysics can. Therefore you ought to consider the metaphysical explanation , and forget about your desire for a physical explanation.

This is confused. What is ontologically, not temporally, prior is God's creative intent. — Dfpolis

What I am saying is that the oak tree has creative intent when it produces the acorn. It must, because the purpose of the acorn is to produce another oak tree, and intent is defined as purpose. So there is no need to refer to "God's creative intent" at this point, we need only look at the oak tree's creative intent. However, there will be a problem of infinite regress, or a first living being, and at this point we might be inclined to turn to God.

Quite blustery, but demonstration of more accurate understanding of Special Relativity is what I was hoping to see. So like I said, if you can provide that, get back to me. — wonderer1

I demonstrated a very accurate understanding. But you requested math, which is not necessary for an accurate understanding of the principles involved. Therefore you demonstrated an inaccurate understanding, thinking that math was a requirement. And still you refuse to state your argument. Please state your argument.

No actuality can be prior to the existent of which it is the actuality. — Dfpolis

This is inconsistent with Aristotle's Metaphysics. A thing is necessarily the thing which it is and cannot not be the thing it is, by the law of identity. And "a thing" is not a random disorderly existence. So when a thing comes into existence it necessarily has a cause of being the thing it is, and not something else. This cause is the form of the thing, which pre-exists in time, the material existence of the thing. Therefore the form of a thing (its actuality, as what it actually will be) must be prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as cause of it being the very thing that it is, and not something else.

If it were a separate entity, we would have dualism. It is not. A "principle" is the source (arche) of a concept. Consider the actuality and potential of an acorn. Its actuality (eidos = form) is being a kind of nut. Its potential (hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") is to be an oak tree. These are not two substances joined in some way, but one thing considered in two ways. So, human souls are actual human beings, while human "matter" is our potential to be planting soil for daisies. — Dfpolis

I think you misrepresent "potential" here. The potential of an acorn is not "to be an oak tree", because "an oak tree" is a form. Potential is better represented as the capacity to be or not be. And since potential encompasses many possibilities, it cannot be restricted by one specific thing, such as your statement, "an oak tree". What restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn in this way, such that we might say it may either become or not become an oak tree, rather than a maple or something else, is the form of the acorn. So your statement "to be an oak tree" does not represent the matter of the acorn, it represents the form of the acorn, as that which restricts the matter to specific possibilities.

Furthermore, this form which is put into the acorn, which restricts its potential in that way, is prior to the material existence of the acorn, as Wayfairer indicated with, "a principle of organization, or blueprint". So it is very clear that the form of the acorn "a kind of nut", which restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn so that the possibilities for what it may become are limited, pre-exists the material existence of the acorn. This form is derived from the parent oak tree which produces the nut.

Therefore the form of the acorn pre-exists the material existence of the acorn, and acts (as an actuality) to direct the coming into being of the material acorn such that the potential (matter) of the acorn is limited in the particular way that it is. This pre-existence of the form of the acorn, as prior in time to the acorn, therefore separate from the acorn, is what we need to deal with as implying the requirement for dualism.

But you won't find out why I think as I do, until you study special relativity well enough to know what you are talking about. So get back to me if that happens. — wonderer1

If you think one has to do the math to understand special relativity, you clearly haven't read Einstein's book. This is a ridiculous conversation. But you're making it fun for me, so carry on please.

If the "principle" has a separate existence can't we call it a "thing"?

But to the point of the op, @Dfpolis, doesn't this separate existence, whether its called a principle or a thing, necessitate dualism? I mean we are saying that the soul is prior to, and therefore separate from the body, how we categorize it, as "substance", "principle", or "thing", doesn't seem very relevant to the point that this separation seems to necessitate a dualism. And how this separate "principle" or whatever we call it, the soul, manages to produce an organized body would be the interaction problem in a nutshell.

It's not called relativity for nothing. Yet it isn't hard to determine that a lot of thing are at rest with respect to my initertial reference frame and I can discuss the shape of many such things as they are in my inertial reference frame. If I, for some reason, need to calculate how they might look from a different inertial reference frame I could do so. It's not a big deal. — wonderer1

But the question is whether those things have a real or true shape, independent from a frame of reference. That you can provide a measurement, and a representation of the shape of many objects, from a specific frame of reference indicates nothing about whether they have a shape independent from a frame of reference.

Anyway, why would I bother providing an argument to someone who wants to argue about something he doesn't understand? I don't see the point in doing so. — wonderer1

Well, it seems like you took objection to something I said, not vise versa. So if you cannot provide an argument to support your objection, then please be still. But I really wish you would provide such an argument, so I could find out why you think as you do, concerning this matter.

I've learned that hylomorphic dualism offers a different perspective. The soul is not a separate "thing" or "substance" in the way Cartesian dualism conceives it. Instead, it is the form of the body—a principle of organization, a blueprint. — Wayfarer

If the soul, as the form of the body, is the blueprint, or principle of organization, and the living body comes into existence as an organized body, then the soul must be prior to the living body, as cause of it, and therefore a separate thing.

Have you ever done the math? — wonderer1

You haven't provided an argument. The fact is that depending on the frame of reference, measurement of the same thing will be different, and not any one of the measurements can be said to be the objectively real or true measurement That a frame of reference can be produced which represents the object as "at rest", and this frame is said to provide the object's "proper length" is irrelevant, because that designation is completely arbitrary. By the precepts of relativity theory no object is truly, or really at rest, so "proper length" makes no assumption about a true or real length of the object.

You are mistaking the appearance of shape from different reference frames with each other.

It is similar to saying a pencil isn't straight because when dropped into a glass of water the pencil appears bent. — wonderer1

No it is not "appearance" only. That is the whole point of relativity theory, it is what is really the case if e adhere to relativity theory. Just like the simultaneity of two events is actually different depending on frame of reference, and the passage of time is actually different (time dilation) depending on the frame of reference, the shape of the object is actually different (length contraction) depending on the frame of reference. When it is the case that from two distinct frames of reference, the shape of the object is different, we cannot say that one is the real, or true shape. That is the whole point of relativity theory in general.

Each of these two concepts serves to account for the temporal continuity of sameness of objects, in its own way, with its own history, but in reality each is just a different place holder for the unknown; each having its own connotations and extensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

To further understand this difference, it manifests as the difference between transcendent and immanent in the understanding of divinity, as well as the difference between local and non-local in quantum mechanics.

Simply put, the difference is in the way that we understand temporal continuity in relation to spatial existence. If temporal continuity is proper, and unique to each point in space, then each point has its own inherent maintenance as immanence, but if temporal continuity is universal, and the temporal continuity of all points everywhere, is related, this is transcendence.

What Berkeley actually denied was the existence of material substance that exists independently of being perceived. — Wayfarer

To be more precise, Berkeley described how the existence of matter is an unnecessary assumption. He provided very good arguments, and demonstrated how "matter" is just a concept employed by us to account for the inferred temporal continuity of bodies, objects. This supposed temporal continuity (which is inferred from observations) makes an object identifiable at different times as the same object, supporting Aristotle's law of identity. The inferred continuous existence of the same object which is derived from observations of sameness (similarity) at different times, is commonly justified as caused by, or the result of the "matter" which inheres within the object.

Notice that I used "inheres within the object", because this is what I explained is a place holder for the unknown. So "matter" is just a place holder for the unknown. The real cause of the temporal continuity of sameness, which people attribute to "the matter" of the object is unknown.

So Berkeley demonstrates that "matter" as a concept of something which exists independently of human minds is no more justified, nor even better than the concept of "the Mind of God". Each of these two concepts serves to account for the temporal continuity of sameness of objects, in its own way, with its own history, but in reality each is just a different place holder for the unknown; each having its own connotations and extensions. Analysis of the connotations, extensions and history of usage is how we find out that each involves a different perspective toward the unknown.

But it is basically the same argument, with the difference that instead of appealing to the stone's hardness, you're appealing to its shape. — Wayfarer

That the boulder truly does not have a shape is supported by Einsteinian relativity, as shape is dependent on the frame of reference. This is understood under the concept of length contraction which is related to time dilation.

Well, we fix flaws in concrete acts of understanding, but not foundational flaws in the faculty of understanding (the intellect). — Leontiskos

I believe that foundational flaws are flaws of the ends rather flaws of the means which are methodological flaws or flaws of technique, according to this difference which I described in my last post. Methodological flaws (flaws of the means) are epistemological, while flaws of the ends are metaphysical flaws. This is why pragmaticism is a form of epistemology and it provides no acceptable metaphysical approach. It can provide no real principles for judging ends and determining foundational flaws (flaws of the ends).

So I believe that we actually can address foundational flaws in the faculty of understanding itself (the intellect), through metaphysics. And, I believe that change in these foundational elements (ends) is a form of evolution which is evidenced by the history of metaphysics and theology. Evolution is very real and the intellectual limitations of one species are not the same as those of another, so we need to be able to account for the reality of real substantial changes to the faculty of understanding (the intellect).

Sure. My point was only that if one accepts the premise that the faculty of the intellect itself is inherently incapable of knowing reality as it is in itself, then no amount of self-reflection or epistemological work will change that fact. I think we are in agreement. — Leontiskos

As stated above, we are not in agreement here. One thing I tried to explain in the last post, is the point of |the ideal", as the highest possible perfection which is not ever actually obtainable. If we set an obtainable goal, then our efforts to better ourselves cease when that goal is reached. Therefore if we want to forever better ourselves, we need to set a goal of perfection, the ideal, unobtainable goal.

So when it is said "that the faculty of the intellect itself is inherently incapable of knowing reality as it is in itself", what is meant, is that there is an ideal, perfect knowledge of reality (God's knowledge for example), which we recognize that we will never achieve. However, this does not preclude the possibility of greatly improving our knowledge of reality. So it's not like we can never know anything about the independent reality, because clearly we make all sorts of statements, and pretend to know all sorts of things about the supposed independent reality, and many of these things are acceptable as true knowledge. However, such knowledge will always be fallible, and never of the sort of perfect certainty which some epistemologists who exclude fallibility from knowledge would request. Therefore it's only by excluding fallibility from knowledge, and forcing that requirement of perfect certainty, that "knowing" gets defined in such a way which produces the conclusion that we cannot "know" anything about the external reality.

Accordingly, we can accept the premise that "knowing reality", in this sort of perfect sense of "knowing" which excludes fallibility, this ideal knowledge, is impossible for the human intellect. But this need not stimy our attempts to produce such perfect knowledge through good metaphysics. To conclude then, I, as a human being, recognize that I will never obtain this ideal knowledge, but I do not exclude the possibility of another being reaching that level, so I will do what I can to help in that effort.

Your argument is well-made, but I actually disagree. I actually have a thread drafted on why epistemology is always posterior to metaphysics, but I don't know if it will ever see the light of day. — Leontiskos

I agree that epistemology is always posterior to metaphysics, so perhaps you have drawn the wrong conclusion from my argument. In your glass analogy, metaphysics would be the discipline by which we understand the glass, which is "being" in general, and of which perspective is a feature. This would lay the grounds for epistemology.

The extremely truncated argument is that it comes down to which of the two is more known: 1) That we know things (as they are), or 2) That there is a glassy perspective. Whichever is less-known must be funneled through that which is more-known, and the modern assumption is that (2) is more-known and that we must therefore begin with epistemology. I don't think that will work. Will I ever get around to addressing this more fully in its own thread? I don't know. :sweat: — Leontiskos

The problem though, which I tried to describe, is that we need principles by which we can make the judgement, 1) or 2), and these are metaphysical principles, derived from the philosophy of being. If we premise either 1) or 2), we proceed with an epistemology accordingly, but whatever is your argument for choosing one over the other is a metaphysical argument.

(Another argument is that if our understanding is 'flawed', then our understanding of our understanding will also be 'flawed'. We can't fix (or necessarily perceive) the flaw in our understanding by reflexively applying our understanding to our understanding. Any uncertainty deriving from the faculty of the intellect will color both internal and external objects.) — Leontiskos

You say that we cannot "fix" the flaw by understanding our understanding, but this is exactly what we do in practise, to improve ourselves, we repair flaws in our understanding. That understanding of understanding would be an analysis of our methods, procedures and techniques. The method is the means, the goal is the end. The analysis reveals the relation between means and ends.

Initially, the end shapes the means, such that the means are designed to produce the end. However, the means can then be characterized as becoming habits, and the propensity to follow habits produces a special relationship between the agent and the end, whereby the specific end which the means are designed for is "locked in" as the desired end. In habituation the relevance, importance, or even necessity of the end, is completely neglected because satisfaction is guaranteed by the means. In this way, (habituation), the means now determine the ends by crippling our capacity to freely choose our goals. We act in the habitual way, we are satisfied, therefore we do not question the ends and the forms of satisfaction which the habits provide for us.

Notice though, that I referred to a special type of goal, the ideal, as perfection. I said that it was the ideal, perfection as a goal, which cannot be obtained by the human intellect. So the goal then is not to "fix" the understanding, but to improve upon it, in relation to the ideal, which is perfection. This is a big difference, because "fix" implies to put the system in an unchanging state of best operation, while leaving the system open to improvement implies something completely different. So the ideal, the perfect condition, as a goal, takes a position higher than any possible real condition, allowing that the goals, or ends, do not become fixed by habituation, in the manner described above. This allows that the goals or ends which our methods of understanding conform to, can always be reassessed, in relation to an ideal which will always stand higher than the end which the means currently provide for, and the ends will not get "locked in" by a habit which was once good, but is now bad, due to changing circumstances.

Well for Aristotle and Aquinas the intellect is immaterial for precisely the reason you are outlining. But on the other hand, matter qua matter (or qua singular) is not intelligible on Aristotelianism, but only matter qua property (or qua universal). So Aristotle would not be surprised that something like the quantum realm begins to approach unintelligibility. — Leontiskos

I agree, "matter" is posited by Aristotle for the purpose of accounting for that feature of reality which we cannot grasp, the part of reality which appears as unintelligible. This is derived from Plato's Timaeus. The "form" of a thing, being the universal for Plato, what the thing is, must necessarily be prior to the existence of the thing as the determining factor of what type of thing the thing will be, when the thing comes into existence. But each corporeal thing, each particular, or individual (primary substance in Aristotle's terms), is unique and peculiar as represented by the law of identity. So the reality of those "accidents" which make the individual unique and peculiar, must be accounted for. The "accidents" are fundamentally unintelligible to us, or else they could be accounted for by our understanding of the "form" of the thing. So the accidents are what escape our grasp, our apprehension of the thing, and "matter" is assigned as that which is responsible for this unintelligibility.

I don't begrudge you your conclusion, because it is a reasonable inference. Yet recall that for Aquinas we will know God "perfectly" (as perfectly as we can) not only in the intermediate state, but also in the resurrected state. And in the resurrected state we will have a body of some kind. — Leontiskos

I disagree that Aquinas believed we would "have a body of some kind" in the resurrected state. But of course there would be ambiguity providing different interpretations on this matter because Aquinas often had to stretch his ontology to appear consistent with Church dogma. Paul had insisted on personal resurrection, which would imply a material body to account for individuality. Aquinas also held that each spiritual incorporeal being, each angel, had providence over a corporeal body, so "will have a body of some kind" could also be interpreted as an incorporeal being having providence over a body.

Let's consider the case of bona fide COVID vaccines vs quack cures such as hydroxychloroquine. Scientific studies show that the former are effective and the latter not. That is because of the inherent properties of the real vaccines, which the quack cures do not possess. — Wayfarer

I think you are stretching the meaning of "inherent properties" here. When you say that the vaccines are effective because of the inherent properties of these vaccines, that is only half the story. The other half is the inherent properties of the virus itself. Now we might say that the vaccines are effective because there is a relationship between the inherent properties of the vaccine, in relation to the inherent properties of the virus.

However, notice that this is just a sort of assumption we make, that if two things react, there is a relationship between their "inherent properties". But it doesn't require that we know anything about their so-called inherent properties, nor does it even require that we really know what "inherent property" refers to. In reality, "inherent property" just stands to signify what we do not know. The two react, and you as the narrator do not know why or how, so you simply employ that place holder, "inherent properties" to talk about what you do not know. The scientists would not use that place holder, they would talk about mRNA and proteins, immune system, etc., because they have more knowledge about this than us.

The scientific studies show that the vaccines are effective, and the quack cures are not. They also show a whole lot about the interaction between the vaccines and the virus. But notice that the human immune system is the medium between these two, the arena or theatre where this interaction plays out. And in reality the human immune system is the principal role player here. This means that my proposal above, that there is a special relation between the inherent properties of the vaccine and the inherent properties of the virus, is completely wrong, because it totally neglects the agency of the immune system. And so we have an open door for the placebo effect and such things. Therefore it appears like it is this procedure, of using terms like "inherent properties" to cover over what is unknown, and create an illusion of knowledge which is really detrimental and misleading.

So none of this open and shut. As the closing quote says in the essay ''Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.’ — Wayfarer

This is very good and well-written. But ultimately it comes down to a question of what is implied by "re-presentation" here. Notice the difference of intent implied by the difference between "representation" and "re-presentation". The former implies correspondence, the latter implies a presentation with intent. This marks the difference between holding truth as your guiding principle (ideal), and having pragmatics as your guide. Notice that pragmaticism removes the need for an ideal, perfection. If it serves the purpose at hand, it is good, and there is no need, or inspiration, to better it. But when we are looking for "truth", it becomes an ideal perfection, so the inspiration to improve is ever present, regardless of whether we think the absolute will ever be obtained.

It is objective to all intents and purposes (i.e. empirically) but also ultimately requires that there is a subject who judges (transcendentally ideal). — Wayfarer

It is not "objective" when the intent and purpose is to maintain consistency with the definition you provided, "inheres within the object". What you are saying is that the judgement, "it is cold", or "it is hot", is objective, so that the objectivity is a property of the judgement, not a property of the object. Therefore this use of "objectivity" is not consistent with your definition. The objectivity is something which inheres within the judgement, not within the object.

Suppose there were an argument about a piece of glass. One person says that anything perceived through the glass has "an inextricably glassy aspect." Another person disagrees, holding that this piece of glass is perfectly translucent. As far as I can tell, that's analogous to the argument over the intellect between Realists and Anti-Realists. If the former person is right, then nothing viewed through the glass can be seen as it is in itself. If the latter person is right, then things viewed through glass need not have a glassy aspect. — Leontiskos

The point to this analogy, better known as the tinted glass analogy, is that to settle this question it must be determined whether or not the glass adds a "glassy aspect" to the perception. If the glass is supposed to represent the human body, through which our perceptions of the world are made, then it is impossible to remove the glass to make a glass-free comparison. Therefore the only way to proceed is to produce a thorough understanding of the glass itself, to be able to determine whether or not it adds a "glassy aspect".

Because of this, the only way that we can achieve with certainty any understanding of the external world, is to first produce a thorough understanding of the perceiving body. That is to say that we cannot know with certainty, the nature of the supposed independent world without first knowing with certainty the nature of the perceiving body.

(The point is not that the power of the intellect is entirely unrelated to the body, but rather that it has an operation which is apart from the body.)

Note that modern philosophers would presumably just disagree with Aquinas that "by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things," but if his point is granted then I believe his conclusion follows, and scientists are liable to grant his point (especially to the degree that they are ignorant of modern philosophy). — Leontiskos

I come to a slightly different conclusion. It has become evident to me that the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things. That is where the problems of quantum physics have led us, there are corporeal things which we as human beings, will never be able to understand. The reason why the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things is that as Aristotle indicates, the human intellect is dependent on a corporeal thing, the human body, and this in conjunction with the premise given by Aquinas, that to know all corporeal things requires that the intellect be free from corporeal influence, produces the conclusion that the human intellect cannot know all corporeal things.

The point now, is that the human intellect, as an intellect, is deficient in the sense that it can never know all corporeal things. It is deficient because it is dependent on a corporeal body. Aquinas also argues this point when he discusses man's ability to obtain the knowledge of God. The same problem arises in that a man's intellect cannot properly know God while the man's soul is united to a body.

I don't say 'the mind has no access to what is inherent in the object'. Plainly if my shower is too hot, I won't get in it, if my meal is cold, I won't eat it. They are objective judgements. — Wayfarer

I can't see how you understand this as consistent with your definition of "objective" as "inherent in the object". Clearly any judgement similar to the ones mentioned, "hot" and "cold", are proper to the subject, and so these judgements are not "inherent in the object".

It seems like you are not distinguishing between the judgement itself, and what the judgement is about. Yes, the judgement is about an object, and it may be a judgement about what inheres within the object, but the judgement is not inherent in the object, and therefore cannot be "objective" by the definition you provided.

I believe that this is a very significant and important point to respect because it is the justification for, as the reason for, the idealist/phenomenologist assertion that even an "object" is a creation of the perceptual system of the living being. We sense the existence of "objects" surrounding us, as constitutive of our environment, but even this act of perception, by which things are perceived as objects, is a sort of judgement made by the sensing being, the subject. Therefore even the judgement of "object" which is an inherent part of the perceptual system, the very act of perceiving, which presents "objects" to the mind of the conscious subject, and which inclines us to take the existence of "objects" for granted, is itself a subjective judgement.

This is what Manuel points to:

Whatever is out there, strictly speaking, cannot be called "objects" - there no good neutral word for it that comes to mind, unfortunately. — Manuel

When we understand as fact, that apprehending the environment as consisting of distinct entities, unities, which we call "objects", is common to all human beings, and also most likely the case for many different types of animals, we need to respect that there must be a reason for this. So we might accept as reality, that there is something about the mind independent "stuff", which makes it appear to us, and influences us to accept as a fundamental ontological principle, that there is "objects" out there.

There is a selective response to the environment even at the simplest level... — unenlightened

I believe this is a very important point which needs much more respect than it is commonly given. When there is a multitude of possibilities present, what some call "potential", and something "selects" from that multitude of possibilities, or simple potential, then we need to account for the reality of this selection process. The type of words we currently employ to refer to such selections are consistent with the concept of free will, words like "choice", and "judgement".

So this is a good example of that boundary some refer to, as the area of that which we cannot speak of, or where words fail us. If we talk about simple organisms, like the single celled amoeba making judgements, we get ridiculed. This in clearly nonconventional, simple organism do not make "judgements", by conventional use of the term. But if this is not form of "judgement", then on what principles are we going to attempt to understand this "selective response"?

I take the term 'objective' at face value, that is, 'inherent in the object'. Seems to me that estimation of objectivity as the main criterion for truth parallels the emergence of science, which really is kind of obvious. Remember Carl Sagan's 'Cosmos is all there is'? By that he means, I think, the Cosmos qua object of science. So the overestimation of objectivity in questions of philosophy amounts to a bias of sorts (per Kierkegaard 'Concluding Non-scientific Postscript'.) At any rate, as far as today's popular wisdom is concerned, as the domain of the transcendent is generally discounted, objectivity is presumptively the only remaining criteria. I don't hold to relativism, I think objectivity is extremely important in many domains but that there are vital questions the answer to which may not necessarily be sought in solely objective terms. So anything to be considered real has to be 'out there somewhere', existing in time and space. (This shows up in debates of platonic realism.) The ways-of-thought that accomodate the transcendent realm have by and large been abandoned in secular philosophy. — Wayfarer

I cannot follow your use of "objective" here. You define it as "inherent in the object". But according to the article of the op, the human mind has no access to what is "inherent in the object". As per Kant, the mind only has access to how the object appears to it, through the medium of sensation and intuition. But then you go on to discuss the objectivity of science, as if "the objectivity of science" is a valid concept by that definition, which it is not. Science cannot provide for us "objectivity" by that definition, what is inherent within the object, due to the problem elucidated by Kant.

So you have demonstrated an inconsistent use of "objective" which needs to be sorted out. Either we adhere to your definition, and recognize that it is beyond the capacity of science to actually be "objective", and say that this is just an ideal which science strives for (an "objective" used as 'goal'), like a guiding light which will never actually be reached, or we must look to a different, a compromised definition of "objective".

The latter appear to be what most participants in this thread opt for. They would prefer to define "objective" as "consistent with convention". But this definition is extremely problematic. First, and principally, it removes the necessity of "the object" from "objectivity", by basing "objectivity" in a sort of inter-subjective agreement. This means that "objective" is defined by what is agreeable rather than by "inherent within the object". This effectively circumvents the necessity of correspondence with observations, "truth" in that sense, as an essential feature of objectivity, by replacing "within the object" with what is agreeable. That actually allows for other, chiefly pragmatic, principles to take priority over "truth" as the defining feature of "objective". And when pragmaticism takes hold of "objective", the definition is more closely aligned with "the goal" than with "inheres within the object".

We follow a convention and accept a taken-for-granted everyday world. But that world is not created by anyone since it doesn't actually exist. — Janus

"The world" as abstract theoretical construct exists, and it is mind created.

What do you mean by "put back the subjectivity"? — wonderer1

It was actually @unenlightened's phrase. It was meant to express what the op was about. The issue is that to get a true representation of reality we must include the subjective aspect, which is an essential part of any such representation. So in other words "objective reality" is a sort of falsity because it is an attempt to remove the subjective aspect, which cannot possibly be done. Therefore, in creating a representation of reality we need to "put back the subjectivity" which the misguided attempt to produce an objective reality has removed. This I believe is the point of the op, we cannot produce a true "objective reality" because subjectivity is an essential aspect of any representation of reality.

o, the everyday world is convention-created, I would say, rather than mind-created; there are collective conventions, but there does not seem to be any collective mind. — Janus

I don't think that this is very accurate. Conventions do not create anything, they are passive, inactive, and minds, which are active, may follow them like rules. It is minds which create rather than conventions.

I think this is what the thread is suggesting; that the objective world is an abstract theoretical construct, and to arrive at the real, one has 'to put' back the subjectivity that has been discounted. — unenlightened

I agree with this, and I think the issue is the question of how we can arrive at a "correct way" to put back the subjectivity. If we define "correct way" as the way that follows the conventions, and these conventions are the ones which are consistent with the abstract theoretical construct, then any application of the "correct way" will not put back the subjectivity, as desired, because it will just create a new aspect of the same old "objective world". To "put back the subjectivity" requires including the features of subjectivity which are outside the boundaries of convention.

The interesting aspect of this type of thread, is that there is a significant number of hard realists who flatly refuse to acknowledge this need to put back the subjectivity, as required to have an honest approach to reality. Since these people think that "the real" can be arrived at simply by following the conventions, they are in great agreement with each other, and you'll see them on these threads, slapping each other on the back, giving thumbs up and high fives etc.. On the other hand, those who apprehend and agree with this need, "to put back the subjectivity" as a requirement for an approach to "the real", can never agree with each other as to how this ought to be done. This is because the very thing that they are arguing for, the need to respect the concrete base of subjectivity, as very real, and a very essential and true part of reality, is also the very same thing which manifests as the differences between us, which make agreement between us into a very difficult matter.

So we are broken into two groups. The first group agrees with each other, and commits to an ontology which denies the significance or importance of perspectival difference. The "objective world" is the one we understand through certain conventions of abstract theoretical thought, and those who see "the world" in a different way are by definition "wrong", therefore we can exclude them, and their absurd perspectives, as irrelevant to our objective reality. This first group has explicit terms of agreement supported by the conventions of language, so there is great conformity and unity amongst them. The second group, which supports the real, essential, and significant nature of difference, is pushed further and further away from the first, by the first, so that the first can apply terms of mental illness and things like that, to the second, as required to support the illusion of the reality of their "objective world" construct.

Now the second group, by the very nature of what they are arguing for, lacks unity. Because of this lack of unity, they will always be "wrong", and even my act of classing them together as one group is wrong. They are better characterized as wayward individuals lacking what is required for categorization. And even if some of them find points of agreement, that small group will still be in the minority compared to the first group, and therefore wrong. This ought to serve as a demonstration of how the first group is always "correct", but correct by their own theoretical constructs of what is true and real, and not "correct" by the true reality of honest subjectivity.

Here's an evolutionary example which may or may not be helpful to some. Imagine a species appears on earth, and flourishes greatly, to the point where it overruns and inhabits every space of the entire plane. The species does not understand the toxicity of its own waste, such that its own annihilation from the effects of its own waste becomes imminent. At this point individuals come into existence amidst the toxicity of "the species", demonstrating various differences, perhaps mutations caused by the toxic elements of the waste. Each individual separates from "the species" in its own way, with an instinctual form of knowledge, knowing that the species is toxic and that there is a need to separate from it. Not one of these individuals is "normal" by the conventions of "the species", and not one of them has the characteristics required to be called a new species. Each one is a monstrosity or deformity relative to "the species" They are all within some intermediate condition not covered by the norms of our "objective world" so they are simply mutations. However, these differences are essential and necessary for the continuation of all the features of that life form, which have been progressively building for millions of years, producing the necessary conditions for its extreme flourishment, and this would all be completely lost if the species proceeded to annihilate itself prior to the individuals establishing something new.

The subjectivist camp is right that the world is always given perspectively, but they don't squeeze enough juice from the fact that it's the world, our world that is so given. Logic is ours not mine. We always intend the one and only 'landscape.' — plaque flag

This is very good evidence of the problem I discuss above. In reality, the assumption of "the world" is only supported by the truth of "our world". And "our world" implies an inter-subjectivity, of agreements and conventions. So long as agreement holds, there is such a thing as "the world". But as more and more people see faults and defects in "our world", and those who cling to "our world" refuse to address these faults because they automatically reject those people as simply "wrong", insignificant and irrelevant, the foundation of "our world" gets shakier and shakier as the concrete which supports it, is that very agreement which is not being properly maintained.

One can do something close to that. It's called a map. From the map, if it is a contour map, one can construct elevations along a sightline and thus reconstruct the perspective at any point in any direction.

I therefore conclude that perspective is not personal (as Banno points out if we swap places, we swap perspectives), but a feature of topography. — unenlightened

The problem though is that not all aspects of a human perspective can be reconstructed in the way you describe. And a human perspective, as @wonderer1 pointed out, is very complex. So the fact that one, or even a number of aspects of a perspective can be reconstructed, does not produce the conclusion that a human perspective can be reconstructed. That's a composition fallacy.

Quite simply, swapping places does not imply swapping perspectives, because the unique particularities of the being brings a lot to the perspective. If swapping perspectives was just a matter of swapping places, you could take a dog's perspective, or a cat's perspective, by taking that creature's place. But this is all wrong. And that is why "walking in someone else's shoes" is a matter of understanding the other person, not a matter of swapping physical positions.

Well, not really. Physics, with one of its principal subjects being the relations of one thing to another, motions, is actually designed for understanding complexity. So all you are saying is that physics is not sufficient for the task which it is designed for, understanding complexity, because there is a complexity which is too immense for its capacity.

Saying that there is a physical complexity which physics cannot understand, when physics was designed to understand physical complexities, is like saying that despite the fact that the natural numbers are designed to be able to count anything, by being designated as infinite, there is a number which is greater than the capacity of the natural numbers to count. It's simply defeatist.

Instead of addressing the issue, which is the reason why, and proceed toward a real solution, it is to accept defeat.

It's trying to talk about stuff about which we cannot talk... — Banno

This assumption that there are things which we cannot talk about is unequivocally defeatist. That shows a very similar attitude to the judgement that there are aspects of reality which are fundamentally unintelligible. Succinctly, it is unphilosophical, and when it's allowed to fester it becomes anti-philosophical.

If we instead said that physics talks about matter and energy and stuff like that, we wouldn't be surprised to find that physics tells us little about jealousy and democracy and stuff like that. A different area of study, with different concerns. Folk who claim love is nothing but oxytocin don't have much of a grasp of love. — Banno

Those with the philosophical mindset, the wonder and desire to know, will inquire as to why it is the case that physics tells us little if anything at all, about things like jealousy and love.

It's one thing to recognize the reality of fundamental differences in the various aspects of reality, and the need to employ completely distinct disciplinary methods to acquire an understanding of these very different aspects, but some of us want to know why such differences are very real.

I'm attempting a philosophical critique of why it doesn't. — Wayfarer

Banno appears to have the attitude that this is something which cannot be talked about, so shut up because you're proving me wrong by talking about it.

I forget, please remind me. The distance from my bureau to my desk is four feet. What is between them? — tim wood

Air. How could you forget, you just asked about the possibility of removing the air?

And it is possible we simply understand two - at least two - different things in our respective usages of "space." Perhaps you could offer your definition or if you claim there's no such thing, then so state. — tim wood

It appears you are having difficulty remembering simple things tim. You already asked me for a definition of "space".

So, from my OED, the first definition of "space" reads like this: "a continuous unlimited area or expanse which may or may not contain objects etc." — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I went on to say that this supposed "continuous unlimited area or expanse" is just an ideal, there is no such thing independent of the human minds which employ this ideal in there activities..

What I've been telling you, is that this does not refer to anything real, independent, in the world. It is an ideal which facilitates all sorts of human activities of conceptualizing, measuring, etc.. Take your example of movement now. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mine is too simple: it is that which remains when every thing is removed: the space, e.g., between my bureau and my desk. And when things are present, what they occupy. — tim wood

This provides another example of why I say "space" is just an ideal which does not refer to anything real. It is impossible to remove everything from any area. We are always left with something in that area, gravity, whatever is represented by various fields, etc.. It seems like all normal usage of "space" renders it as something ideal which cannot actually be obtained in the real physical world.

It's a fact that the term 'idealism' is itself a product of the modern period - first came into use with Leibniz, I think. Plato would not have known the word. We can retrospectively assess Platonism as idealist but it needs careful interpretation. — Wayfarer

I've given this statement further consideration. The idealism presented by Plato (though it was not explicitly called "idealism") was the ontology held by the Pythagoreans. They believed that the cosmos was made up of ideals, as represented by mathematics and geometry. The Pythagoreans put forward the idea of eternal circular motions, an ideal, to represent the motions of the heavenly bodies, each being itself a sort of perfect unity, One. Further, it was assumed that each perfect circle was related to each other through a system of ratios, like musical notes are related through principles of division.

In interpreting Plato, I believe it is very important to understand that Plato was actually very skeptical and critical of the ontology of Pythagorean idealism, but these ideas were highly respected in the philosophical (scientific?) community, so Plato had to tread carefully. The issue is the relationship between the perfect and eternal Ideals (circular motions), which as observable (orbits of the heavenly bodies), must have a real connection with the mundane. (In modern terms this is the interaction problem). This relationship was understood within the precepts of idealism, as the theory of participation, demonstrated in principle in The Symposium. By the time Plato wrote dialogues like The Parmenides, The Sophist, and The Timaeus, he had greatly developed the logical problems with the theory of participation.

What Plato exposed is the need to assume an intermediary, a medium between the Ideas which are conceived as eternal, perfect ideals, and the real existence of particular things. The medium was called "matter", and proposed in The Timaeus as a sort of receptacle which would receive the ideal form. The particular thing could only participate in the Ideal Form (as per the theory of participation) through the intermediary "matter"; and the matter of the particular thing would be the reason for individual differences and deficiencies. "Participation" therefore was compromised as matter would necessarily come between.

The introduction of "matter", and its essential nature, as logically necessary to account for the interaction problem, greatly enhanced Aristotle's capacity to attack Pythagorean Idealism. He showed for example, in On the Heavens, how a supposedly "eternal circular motion" must consist of a material body which is moving, and therefore could not truly be "eternal". This completely collapsed Pythagorean idealism because it became clear that the cosmos was not composed of perfect, eternal Ideals, but was actually composed of material objects engaged in motions which were somewhat other than they were being represented through the perfect ideals of mathematics and geometry.

I believe we ought to recognize two very distinct sorts of relations between the ideals of mathematics and the reality of material objects. This distinction is based in a distinction of two sorts of material objects, natural and artificial. In the case of artificial material objects, we can produce such objects which very closely resemble the ideals of the mathematics which produces them. In the case of natural objects however, we use the same mathematical ideals to represent them, but there is great discrepancy, or difference between the ideal representation, and what actually exists naturally. The problem here is that since we can create artificial things, in a lab or in a factory, which very closely resemble the mathematical ideals which produce them, we tend to conclude that the mathematical ideals which are being employed are very accurate representations of what exists in nature. This conclusion of course, is the product of disrespect for the difference between artificial things and natural things. Recognition of this difference I believe is very important to understanding the activities of high energy physics and the production of so-called "elementary particles" in laboratories.

No, this is a misrepresentation of metaphysics such as Descartes's meditation. It's not the senses that mislead you, it's the thought that ideas come out of nothing. No one is deceiving us. The world out there does not deceive. — L'éléphant

You use "the world out there does not deceive" to justify "it's not the senses that mislead you". But you have provided no premise to connect those two.

Do you agree with the following? The mind creates an idea of "the world out there". And it uses information received from the senses. The various different senses often provide the mind with inconsistent and even conflicting information. Therefore we can conclude that the senses can, and do, mislead the mind in its creation of an idea of "the world out there".

We have to acknowledge that MU is narrowly correct.. — tim wood

What does this mean, "narrowly correct"?

But he would deny space per se. If what separates my desk and bed is four feet of air, and there is no space, then removing the air is removing the medium in/of which the measurement is made, and thus my bed and desk then touching, Yes? — tim wood

How would you remove the air between them, if not by either pushing them together, or displacing it with something else? Anyway, I don't see how this is relevant, because as I explained already, there is necessarily a medium even between air molecules. So even if you could remove all the air molecules this would still leave a medium.