If you define "the present" as the entirety of 2023, then the duration of the present is - the present lasts for - the entirety of 2023, by definition. — Luke

That is an example, "the present is 2023". It is not a definition of "the present". That's why all the other examples were examples too, none of them defined "the present". They were examples of possible particular instances.

That time passes is presupposed regardless of your argument that the present contains parts of the future and past or not. Your stipulation that the present contains parts of the future and past does not make time pass, logically or otherwise. — Luke

If, "time passes" is presupposed, then you'll understand exactly why "the present" cannot be defined as 2023, or any such named "time", because the name of the present time would always be changing.

That the present contains parts of the future and parts of the past is not a stipulation, it is the conclusion of the logical argument I presented, whether you like it or not. It is a conclusion, not a stipulation.

Within both the past and future, there are "before" parts and "after" parts. Does it follow from this that the future is in the past and that the past is in the future? — Luke

Events only occur at the present, so this is not relevant, because I was talking about the occurrence of an event, something which only happens at the present.

By definition, it is the duration of the present, not the duration of the past nor the duration of the future. — Luke

As I've been busily demonstrating to you, this is the faulty definition of "the present", which you cling to even though it renders the present as something incoherent and unintelligible. That's why I've been telling you that you ought to approach this topic with n open mind, and allow that perhaps the definition of "the present" which you cling to is wrong, instead of continually insisting that what I say is wrong "by definition".

Since what I say accords very well with the reality of time, and the conclusion of the very sound argument I've presented is in discordance with your definition of "the present", it's very clear that you ought to reject, and replace your definition.

We seem to agree that the present moment is defined by your conscious experience, and it is the duration of your conscious experience that defines the duration of the present moment, and only the present moment. — Luke

You say that you agree with me that the present is defined by conscious experience, but then you want to define "the present" as either a point in time, or an interval of time with beginning and ending points. Points in time are not at all consistent with our experience of time as continuous. Therefore if you really believed that the present is defined by our conscious experience you would have rejected this idea of points in time which mark "the present", way back when I first explained that such a thing is not consistent with our conscious experience of time. Instead you insist on clinging to this faulty ideas of points.

Why not? There were many years before 2023 and will be many afterwards. — Luke

Because there is no occurrence of any event if there is no passing of time. And passing of time only occurs at the present, as our experience indicates. We have no experience of any events ever occurring at any time other than the present. Events occur at the present, and only at the present. We can create an artificial representation of events occurring in the past or in the future, by artificially projecting the present to that time. But if the entirety of 2023 is already designated as "the present", we cannot artificially project another present to sometime within 2023 without contradiction. Therefore the occurrence of events within that designated "present" are unintelligible, as I explained in a slightly different way, last post.

Which premises? — Luke

How can you assert that you've rebutted my argument when you cannot even state the premises? 1 conscious experience indicates that the present is not a point, it consists of duration. 2. A duration consists of parts which are before and parts which are after. 3. Before and after in relation to the present are past and future. I suggest you reread.

How do they contradict the principle premise? They would need to state that conscious experience occurs in the past and in the future in order to contradict it. To avoid contradiction, we could simply state that conscious experience occurred in the past and will occur in the future. — Luke

Then you are not talking about the present any more, which would be inconsistent with the premise. To avoid contradiction we'd have to say that conscious experience occurred when that time which is now past, was present, to ensure that conscious experience is always at the present.

We don't, not until the end of the story. — Ludwig V

But the whole point was, how do we know that it's the end of the story, rather than just a pause? Even when the story teller makes you think it's "the end of the story", a couple years later there will be another one, which is really a continuation of the old one, and it will turn into a series.

There's another complication here, (which I was about to trip over at the end of my last paragraph. unenlightened's link between narrative and identity focuses on the stories we tell ourselves. — Ludwig V

Yes, unenlightened's self-identity narrative seems to be a sort of self-describing story. Maybe an autobiography?

I don't know how to articulate the next point properly, so I shall ask questions instead. What ensures that there is a single narrative throughout a biological life? What makes it impossible to live more than one narrative at a time? If the answer to those questions is Nothing, and a narrative defines a self, doesn't it follow that multiple narratives and multiple selves are possible? Apart from our legislation, what makes that conclusion paradoxical? — Ludwig V

This is one of the problems I brought up, with associating identity with the narrative. Not only does it make it possible for multiple identities, but the difference between how one describes oneself, and how others do, (which you mentioned), necessitates multiple identities. We might say the the self-describing narrative provides the true identity, but we still get the possibility of intentional deception and multiple identities by accident, or through ignorance of oneself.

To be able to flush out the deceiver as presenting a false identity, or the ignorant identity, we need to be able to look at something beyond the self-describing narrative as the true indicator of identity.

I've already provided you with several rebuttals to your argument. You are welcome to address them. You could start with this: — Luke

I haven't seen a reasonable rebuttal from you yet, only mention of measurement principles, and straw man representations which are irrelevant. You refuse to address the actual argument, just insisting that the conclusion is inconsistent with what you believe about "the present", therefore you claim that the argument cannot be sound and refuse to address it directly..

Your questioning here is more of the same. In essence, you are asking me, how can it be that the present is not as I believe it to be. The answer is simple, your belief is incorrect. And so you will inevitable continue with more of the same sort of so-called rebuttals. Instead of looking at the argument, and understanding it, you will continue to ask "how can it be that the present is ..., when I understand it to be ..."?

s a part of your present conscious experience in the past and part in the future? — Luke

Yes part is in the past and part is in the future.

How can your present conscious experience be in the future or the past? — Luke

Present consciousness is very complex, therefore it consists of parts, many, many events occurring at the same time, as the parts which compose it. And just like any event, some parts are before others. When an event occurs at the present it has a temporal duration and so some parts are in the past (have already occurred), and some are in the future (have not yet occurred). Therefore the "present conscious experience" is both in the future and in the past by virtue of its parts being thus situated temporally.

I know from the way you treated my examples (the present is 2023) that this idea is what you object to. You say that if the event (2023 for example) is "the present" then all of it is at the present, and anything before the entirety of it is past, and anything after the entirety of it is future. This would leave the entirety of that event (2023 in the example) as "the present" with no part inf the future or past.

The problem with that way of looking at it, is that it makes the temporal duration of the event which is "at the present" (2023 in the example) as unintelligible. In reality, if there is an event which occurs at the present, then by the fact that it is an "event" it is logically necessary that it has temporal duration and time passes during the occurrence of that event (2023). Therefore within the event itself, there are before parts and after parts. And it also follows that during the event, the present event (2023), while that event is occurring and time is passing during its occurrence, some of it in the past and some of it in the future. Therefore within the occurrence of the event which is "at the present" (2023 in the example) we can only understand its temporal progression by assuming that part is past and part is future. If we insist that all the event (2023) is present, and there is no past or future, there is no grounds for apprehending any temporal progression within the occurrence of the event. So the temporal dimension of the event is rendered as unintelligible.

Therefore we can conclude with a very high degree of certainty, because the premises are very strong, that within the event which we call "present conscious experience", some parts are in the past and some are in the future.

Wouldn't they just be your past and future conscious experiences? — Luke

Conscious experience occurs in the present. That is the principle premise. Conscious experience in the past, and in the future, contradict this premise. So, we start with that premise, and then position past and future relative to conscious experience. Therefore past and future are apprehended as distinct parts of the conscious experience, at the present, as explained, rather than independent things which conscious experience might be a part of. The latter is incoherent by the terms of the principle premise by way of the contradiction mentioned above. The former is not.

It is defined by our conscious experience and it is the year 2023, or July 2, or whatever. — Luke

Actually, I provided those dates as examples you might be able to relate to. I now see that trying to talk your language was a mistake. Remove the examples, and the argument is logically sound, but it makes no sense to you. This is because you will not allow "present" to be defined by conscious experience. So it appears like my argument makes no sense to you because you insist on an incoherent definition of "present".

The difference is this. You insisted that "present" be defined by past and future. I say that the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present. The reverse of what you desire, and what makes "the present" require the incoherent dimensionless points. This is because present is logically prior to past and future, and human beings determine past and future relative to their existence at the present. They do not determine the present from past and future, like you say.

How can there be a duration without start and end points? If there is a duration of some length, then that length must have end points. — Luke

We went through this already, the duration is indefinite. it is not "a duration of some length", simply duration. It is your tendency to fall back on measurement which makes you insist on points. However, we can and do experience time, and duration without measuring it.

How can the present both be defined by our conscious experience and also be 2023? Is a part of your present conscious experience in the past and part in the future? How can your present conscious experience be in the future or the past? Wouldn't they just be your past and future conscious experiences? Unless you wish to argue that you consciously experience 2023 all at once? — Luke

Sorry for the misleading examples, let's just go back to the argument itself, if you will. I suggest that if you want to understand, release your preconceived notion of "the present", and start with an open mind. Are you willing to start with your conscious experience of being at the present, experiencing the passing of time, without reference to measurement?

The point being that the heavy-hitters in philosophy of maths all decry any form of platonism, on the grounds that it verges on a spooky ability to grasp non-physical truths. — Wayfarer

Perhaps, but those same "heavy-hitters in the philosophy of maths" accept without questioning, the axioms (basic set theory for example), which represent numbers as immutable objects. The philosophy of math is full of hypocrisy.

The second sentence does not follow from the first. What is before the present is called "past" and what is after the present is called "future". Therefore, neither the past nor the future are part of the present. — Luke

"Present" is not defined that way in my argument. It is defined by our conscious experience. So your objection is based in equivocation, and is irrelevant.

Furthermore, it is this definition of "present", which requires a non-dimensional divisor between different parts of time, and this is dealt with in the first part of the argument. So you are really just relying on a definition of "present" which is demonstrated by the first part of the argument as incorrect, unreal, or false.

The present is a duration with start and end points. — Luke

Start and end points are what is demonstrated by the first part of the argument as incorrect, unreal, false. Remember, you wanted to give the "instant" temporal extension, duration, with start and end points. But I explained that the problem is with the assumption of points, so you cannot avoid the problem this way. If you do not understand this, I can probably give you a better explanation.

If 2023 is the present, then the past is everything before 2023 and the future is everything after 2023.
If July 2 is the present, then the past is everything before July 2 and the future is everything after July 2.
If this minute is the present, then the past is everything before this minute and the future is everything after this minute. — Luke

Now you are neglecting the second part of the argument. If the present is a period of time, part of the present is before, and part is after. And in relation to "present" before is past and after is future. Part of 2023 is in the past and part is in the future, despite the fact that 2023 is the present. You can deny this all you want, with your use of imaginary points, but that's just your way of denying the reality of time.

There is no part of the past or the future in the present. — Luke

So says the person with the demonstrably incoherent idea of "present".

Good. Im glad you did not mean before and after the present. Now all that’s left to explain is how your conclusion follows: — Luke

I said, "in relation to the present". The present was already described as the period of time within in which we find our conscious existence. And, it was shown that this is necessarily a period of time, not a dimensionless point. That was the first part of the argument.

Why must part of the present be in the future and part of it in the past? — Luke

I really can't believe that this is so difficult for you. I think you are faking it. Anyway, I'll recap the argument for you in case you might come around. The "present", as described, is a period of time, not a point in time. Any, and every period of time has one part before the other part which is after, as explained. In relation to the present, the before is called "past", and the after is called "future". Therefore when we talk about this period of time which we call "the present", part is in the past and part is in the future.

Perhaps a couple examples will help you to understand. This year, 2023, is the present. Part is in the past, part in the future. Today, July 2, is the present. Part is in the past, part is in the future. This minute is the present. Part is in the past, part in the future. Etc..

Before and after what? — Luke

Before and after each other. That's what I said explicitly "some of that duration must be before, the other part which is after". How could I be more clear? I'll try though. One part of the duration is before the other, which is after the part which is before.

I don't see how the conclusion follows, — Luke

OK, in other words you do not understand the argument. It seems you are having difficulty with "before" and "after". Is my usage unfamiliar to you? Do you understand the following example? "Last night was before this morning, which is after last night. So if the time duration we are talking about consists of last night and this morning, the part which is called last night is before the part which is called this morning, which is after the part called last night.

It was this claim about any proposed period of time being "indefinite" and "imprecise" that I was querying and criticising. As you confirm above, this relates only to measurement. There is nothing indefinite or imprecise about a stipulated measure of time, such as a minute. Your introduction of how to "actually apply measurement principles in practise" are not relevant to your statement that "any proposed period of time is indefinite [and] imprecise". A minute is exactly 60 seconds long - no more, no less. — Luke

I thought it was quite clear that I was talking about the thing measured, the passage of time, hence my statement "time is known as what is passing, and what always has some duration".

This makes little sense to me. The present is neither past nor future. I see no reason to accept why it must "consist" of either past or future. — Luke

If you would like to address the argument, then I'd be happy to oblige you, and reply to any questions you have about it, or explain further any parts which you say that you do not understand. But to simply state that the conclusion makes no sense to you, and claim "I see no reason to accept" that conclusion, (regardless of the argument given), gives me nothing to discuss with you.

Are you saying that (e.g.) a minute is an indefinite period of time? Isn't it exactly 60 seconds?

Or are you saying that any measurement of time is indefinite? — Luke

Both, defining one period of time with another doesn't clarify anything because it would lead to an infinite regress, without ever giving any indication as to how to actually apply those measurement principles in practise. And, in practise any measurement is imprecise due to the problem with the start and end point.

My interest is that I didn't find your argument - that the present moment cannot be an instantaneous point in time - to be very convincing. — Luke

If you are interested in my argument, then address the argument itself, rather than some other vague ideas about measurement problems, which seem to be irrelevant to my argument anyway.

You could make an argument such that if we imagine an instant of time to be like a photograph, and if we consider that the average shutter speed of a typical photograph is 1/60th of a second, then it follows that an actual instant of time requires some duration, no matter how small. — Luke

That's a better question, more directed at the argument itself. What you propose here would not resolve the issue because that 1/60th of a second time period would require a beginning and end point. So defining an "instant" as a specific time length does not remove the need for points to mark the beginning and ending to that time length. Whether the "instant" is defined as the time between the points, or defined as the points, makes no difference to the actual issue which still remains despite such attempts at annihilation by definition.

As (I think) you note, an instantaneous point in time, like a point in space, is a dimensionless concept. However, in reality, if we assume the present to be the time at which we each find ourselves conscious, then a dimensionless point in time with zero duration would seem to be an insufficient "time window" in which to be conscious. A point in time with zero duration is no time at all, and there is nothing to be conscious of in no time at all. Or something like that. — Luke

Right, that was the first part of the argument, arguing that "the present" must consist of duration. And, this is consistent with our sense experience. We sense things as moving, therefore duration is implied within the present of our consciousness. The second part of the argument is that any duration of time consists of a part which is before and a part which is after. In relation to the present, the prior part is past and the posterior part is future, therefore the present must consist of both future and past.


It appears like it is the first part of the argument which you find unconvincing. But then you say "if we assume the present to be the time at which we each find ourselves conscious", this first part would be correct. So how would you propose to define "the present" in any other way? You could define it as the point which divides future from past, but the argument is designed to show that this is an incorrect representation of the present, inconsistent with empirical evidence. There is no such point which separates future from past.

If you mean a period of time, such as a minute or an hour, then I disagree that these are indefinite periods of time. If you mean any measurement of time, then I suppose there might be at least some imprecision involved with any measurement, but I don't see why it matters. — Luke

I didn't say that "it matters", only pointing out the reality and truth of it. It might matter to you, or it might not, depending on your interest. But it seems to me like you are trying to make an argument where none is called for.

But if "an instant" is "not really consistent with reality" as a point in time, then "a minute" is "not really consistent with reality" as a period of time. — Luke

Right, and as I said above, this might matter to you or it might not, depending on your interest.

I can stop smoking and then start again, or I can stop smoking and never start again. what's the problem? — unenlightened

Is there not a difference to you, between stopping and starting again, and stopping and never starting again? The problem is, that when it stops, how can you know whether it will start again or not, in order to say the right thing about it? Someone says "I quit smoking" and two weeks later they're smoking. Another person says "I quit smoking", and five years later they still have yet to smoke. One might be inclined to say that the latter has stopped and will never start again, but then the next day you might find them smoking.

To stop and then start again, and to stop and never start again are two very different things. But when something just stops, how do we know which is which?

A process like identification can begin, and can end, and can begin again. — unenlightened

So maybe I misspoke to ask "can we really say it?", but the question would be "what does it really mean to say this?". If we allow that whatever ended might at any moment begin again, then we need to justify that the thing which just started is that same thing as the thing which already ended, and not simply something similar, if this is supposed to be an "identification". That's where the difference lies, if it starts again, as the same thing, there must be something which connects the two instances or else they are similar occurrences of distinct things, and not the same thing starting again.

If the "thing" in question is a process, we can attribute that process to something else, and the something else can provide the means for the proposed continuity. In your examples therefore, it is you who stops writing and starts again, you who stops smoking, and starts again, and the train which starts and stops. So the subject, you or the train, of which the process is predicated, provides the required continuity of existence. You have provided a subject, and are speaking of your activity, the train's activity, and we assume that you continue being even though the activity which describes you through predication, stops.

This is the way that Aristotle describes the capacities of the soul, self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, intellection, etc., as potentials. Each is an activity, something that the body does, which consists of stops and starts. Since no specific activity is active all the time, he designates these powers of the soul as potentials, requiring actualization for each occurrence, or start-up. There is therefore the need for an actuality which provides the continuity, and is the source of actualization for each start-up, and this is the soul itself.

I have bee quite clear from the beginning that the thread and the topic is all narrative and none other. — unenlightened

The glaring problem in what you have been quite clear from the beginning about, is that you have been incessantly trying to assign identity to the narrative. And this is where the narrative inevitably fails. The stops and starts, punctuation, of the narrative indicates that we must assume something else, behind the narrative to provide for the assumed continuity which makes "the narrative" appear as a coherent whole. This is "the story" which the narrative tells, and the story is distinct from the narrative.

If identity was all in the narrative, then how would I distinguish one subject from another when you write in this thread, or another thread? Instead, I assign identity to the author, and look at any narrative as an activity of the author. This allows me to see unenlightened, with one identity, as the author of many narratives, instead of concluding that unenlightened has many identities, according to the many narratives.

It could be argued that the present time is that time while or during your saying of the word "now", and that (at that time) the past precedes this act and the future procedes it. — Luke

Yes, and that\s what comes later in the post. If activity occurs at the present, then the present must consist of duration, not a point.

Then the same could be said of any period of time - not just an instant - and so all periods of time are "useful ideals" that are not "consistent with reality". — Luke

Yes, exactly. Any proposed period of time is actually indefinite, having an imprecise beginning and ending because of this issue.

we must not use language as it is "not really consistent with reality". — Luke

This does not follow though. As I said, it's a useful ideal. Usefulness is not dependent on accuracy, precision, or even truth in the sense of correspondence.

Can you find any evidence that condemning trespass was ever actually a rule, rather than just an emotional thought produced from the personal feeling of infringement, or violation?

Mostly theists opt for door number 2, and defend revelation as knowledge producing. — Srap Tasmaner

Isn't it obvious to you though, that revelation must produce knowledge? If we were to restrict our definition of "knowledge" so that it only contained ideas produced by science, then how would we account for all the rest of the ideas that we would normally call "knowledge"? This would include the tools applied by science, like the axioms of mathematics.

This is the problem of epistemology, to give an accurate account of what knowledge actually is, rather than some definition, or set of criteria which we believe knowledge ought to be. If we say "knowledge is..." when this reflects what we think knowledge ought to be, rather than what knowledge actually is, this will mislead us in any attempt at ontology.

These two are very different, as demonstrated in Plato's Theaetetus. In that dialogue, they went looking to describe "knowledge", with a preconceived idea of some criteria as to what could constitute "knowledge". Then Socrates demonstrated how it was logically impossible that any description they came up with as to how knowledge actually exists, could not fulfil the preconceived criteria. In the end they realized that the preconceived idea must be misleading them in their quest to figure out what knowledge is.

A bullet at any instant is at some point in space but my perception limits me to perceiving it in some region of space in that I cannot tell exactly where it is. Ontologically, the now may be a point in time even if I perceive it as a small region of time. — Art48

As I explained, the idea of "an instant", as a point in time, is not really consistent with reality as we know it. It's a useful ideal, but not at all real.

Ontologically, the now may be a point in time even if I perceive it as a small region of time. — Art48

Ontological principles need to be supported by something. If no experience, nor logic can demonstrate the reality of a point in time, then there is no room for it in ontology. Since time is known as what is passing, and what always has some duration, then such a proposed point must be something other than time. So we can't really say it's "in time". The point is in our minds, as the useful tool, it's not in time.

Sorry, but misunderstanding on your part does not qualify as non sequitur on my part, as much as you like to think so. But go ahead, and think what you like.

For instance, its contemptibility is the same as it has always been... — Merkwurdichliebe

Why would you say that humanity's contemptibility is the same as it ever was, and then say its stupidity has increased dramatically? Do you not see this as blatant contradiction, or is stupidity not contemptible? If the stupidity you are talking about is an innocent naivety then perhaps the latter would be possible, but you position it in relation to technology.

Here's something to think about. Try to pinpoint the present, the exact point in time, which divides the future from past. Every time you say "now', by the time you say "now" it is in the past. So the present cannot be a point in time which separates past from future, because that point will always be in the past.

Now consider the way you sense things in your existence, or being at the present. We always sense things happening, activity, motions. And all activities and motions require a period of time during which the activity occurs. So if we sense things at the present, and we sense activities, then the present must consist of a duration of time rather than a point in time.

But if the present consists of a duration of time, then some of that duration must be before, the other part which is after. So if the present separates future from past, and it consists of a duration of time, then part of the present must be in the future, and part of it in the past.

We have no knowledge or experience of any immaterial entity of process. — Fooloso4

Speak for yourself here. Your use of "we" is out of place.

Cite an instance when and where Newton's 3rd Law and/or any conservation laws "have been transcended" even once. — 180 Proof

Newton's first law is "transcended" with every freely willed act. A body's motion changes without the application of force. The conservation of energy law is broken with every act which occurs, as some energy goes missing which cannot be accounted for. The idea that the laws of physics are never broken, or "transcended", is naivety at best.

Oh yes, it signifies that we have to change all our taboos if we even question one of them, and I am advocating that. — unenlightened

I think we ought to question all base principles, not only basic taboos, but fundamental axioms of mathematics, foundational laws of physics, and assumptions of biology as well. This gives the skeptic a useful place in our society.

The problem is that the more basic, or foundational, that a principle is, the older it tends to be. But the human world, is a living, changing, and evolving world, as are human beings. And these old principles which were established way back when humanity wasn't the same thing which it is today, really need to be revisited.

When the flow of thought ceases, the conflict of the self that is not itself ends.

And then it starts again... — unenlightened

Very interesting. Can we really say that it ended then? Or is it just always like that, punctuated, with various lengths of punctuation? Punctuation is not an end and a beginning, because something carries through, some kind of continuity, so that we say the parts are connected as one. The narrative is punctuated, but the story continues through the punctuations where the narrative is absent. What part of the story is this, an essential part of the story which connects the parts of the narrative, but not itself part of the narrative? And how is it that the story itself is something other than the narrative?

That is true also, but irrelevant to the effect of the taboo. — unenlightened

Irrelevant to the effect of the taboo, but relevant to the cause of the taboo. So I don't understand the objection you have towards Hanover's statement, why you find it bizarre.

You agree that sensation is stimulus for arousal, and you also recognize that naked skin is often more of a cause for arousal than covered skin in a similar situation. Do you also see why a young man or boy might not like the idea of being aroused in a public place? Sexual arousal might influence one to act in a way which one might regret later, for example. So, doesn't it seem more likely that this would be the cause of existence of the nakedness taboo, the reason for it becoming a taboo, rather than the effect of the taboo?

In one person’s reference frame the event is in the present (or past), and in the other person’s reference frame the event is in the future. I find this peculiar. — Michael

Think of what this means as that "the present", or "now" is defined by the frame of reference. This is a type of subjectivity. The present, and therefore future and past, are defined by the frame of reference. So if we want an "objective" present, or now, or an objective divisor between events of one period of time and those of another another, we have to realize that this is impossible under the precept of special relativity. Such divisions of before and after are arbitrary, as is the frame of reference which defines the divisor.

This becomes problematic when you try to relate the before and after of one frame of reference to that of another. This give the problem you describe. Physics resolve this problem with the creation of a "world line" for the object at question, in this case Andromeda. The world line allows for a "proper time" relative to that object. So once a world line is created for Andromeda we could use that to say which events are before others, for Andromeda itself, despite the differences between different frames of reference. The problem with this is that the world line is somewhat arbitrary.

Thus far I agree, but in general, the way we 'put clothes on' the body or rather socialise a dress code with legal sanctions, does as a matter of fact serve to raise the level of potential arousal. — unenlightened

I think that thus is a misrepresentation of so-called "fact". Your claim that clothing necessarily rases the level, instead of my claim that it may raise or lower the level, cannot be supported simply by examples of when the potential is raised. You need to show the necessity, that clothing cannot have effects in the other direction, to support your generalization that clothing "does as a matter of fact serve to raise the level of potential arousal". But I suggest that you accept as reality, that the effects of clothing can be either negative or positive.

If we look at the sense of touch, instead of the sense of sight, the possible negative effects of clothing on arousal are very evident. Consider Hanover\s example of squeezing into the shower, skin on skin, as compared to squeezing into an elevator, cloths on cloths. It's very evident that cloths can have a very negative effect on the sensual stimulus which provides the potential for arousal.

Altering the sense stimulus is more than just a matter of messing with the taboo, because sense stimulation is essential to sexual acts. So altering the stimulation can alter the nature of the act itself, and this goes beyond any taboo which deals with the perception of the act.

But the relativity of simultaneity isn't just about one person seeing something before another person; it's about that thing actually happening for one person before another person. That's what I find peculiar. — Michael

Before and after are relative to the frame of reference. So if the two persons are of the same frame of reference, then the event will not happen for one person before the other person. And, if they are of different frames of reference it makes no sense to talk about it "happening for one person before another person" because before and after are frame dependent. That is why it is sometimes necessary to use a "world line", or "proper time", to make sense of such an idea.

I don't see how this psychology has provided any evidence to support your claim.

I believe that the facts are quite obvious. There are two primary factors involved in male arousal, imagination and sensation. Imagination is the primary, yet sensation plays a role which is also very natural. Any sense may be involved, including the visual sense of sight. Clothing serves as a filter between the sensing subject and the body being sensed. It is very effective to the sense of touch, but also quite effective to the sense of sight. As a filter it affects the way that the sensation influences the primary cause of arousal, the imagination. So clothing can have either a positive affect on the imagination which causes arousal, if perceived as provocative, or it can have a negative affect if perceived as plain covering. Since it is a filter between the person sensing and the body being sensed it cannot have a zero effect.

It seems to me like you are not properly apprehending the ground, or base. The grounding point is that sensing another body provides the potential for sexual arousal. We can do things to that body, like put clothes on it, to either raise or lower the level of potential, but we cannot remove that potential in any absolute way. It appears to me like you want to start from the assumption that there is no such basic potential for arousal involved with sensing another body. You want to say that the potential for arousal is a product of the taboo. But this is an unnatural starting point, and simply false because sensation has a real and natural influence over the imagination.

The reason i find it bizarre is because it is quite clear to me that nakedness becomes sexualised by being made taboo, not the other way round. — unenlightened

I don't think so, I've seen other animals get erections. Notice how the "de-sexualizing" described in your referred article requires effort, so it is not what is natural. Maybe the embarrassment, shame, discomfort, and fear, come from the taboo aspect, but not the sexuality. Still there is a certain natural discomfort associated with an erection, which inclines the male toward further action, and this natural feature cannot be neglected either.

about five to twenty minutes has elapsed — jgill

I'm glad you're not on my appointment list.

I wasn't disagreeing with that necessarily, but I was just remarking that part of the reason they don't let women squeeze into the men's showers along side men isn't just because the women might fear assualt, but it might also be that the heterosexuals would find that too arousing. — Hanover

You're saying that the reason we have separate changing rooms is because men are frightened they might get aroused? Really? Bizarre. — unenlightened

I'm with Hanover on this one, even though unenlightened finds it bizarre. However, I think it's more of a young man's, or even boyish, problem, and the separation is imposed to help those boys develop in a healthy way. Being aroused in a public place, like having a bulge in your pants, would produce serious embarrassment for many boys, (exceptions like Robert Plant), quite conducive to fear. In my old age, I would never have such a fear, but still great discomfort as Hanover describes. Part of that discomfort might be a holdover from the days of that boyish fear.

Being “friendly” to people we have just met is a marker strategy for being a good cooperator. — Mark S

That's a very unreliable principle. If I meet someone on the street who is unusually friendly toward me, I am very wary that the person is trying to take advantage of me in some way or another, because that is how the con works.

What evidence do you have that your perspective on cooperation that does not include being friendly is useful? — Mark S

It's very useful to distinguish differences between concepts, in analysis, to better understand those concepts, and to apply deductive logic. Cooperation involves working together toward a goal, and you may say that being friendly is a necessary condition for cooperation. I would not argue against that.

However, being friendly is not the same thing as cooperating. Being friendly is the wider concept, so cooperation is not necessary for being friendly. This means that being friendly is logically prior to cooperation, as a necessary requirement for cooperation, but being friendly does not necessarily result in cooperation.

As an analogy, consider that being human is necessary for being a women, just like being friendly is necessary for cooperating. But being human doesn't mean that you are a woman, just like being friendly doesn't mean that you are cooperating. This implies that people with very different goals or ends, may be friendly to each other, but because their goals are quite distinct, we cannot say that they are cooperating. This is the principle which allows that competitors, who are obviously not cooperating because they have opposing goals, can still be friendly to each other.

So it is not the case that my perspective on cooperating doesn't include being friendly, it's just that being friendly does not necessarily mean cooperating. And I think that this perspective is useful to help us understand what it means to cooperate, and what it means to be friendly. Further, it allows us to properly relate these concepts to competition, which is where we came from in this discussion.

And seriously, do you think that the Golden Rule is either not a cooperation strategy or does not advocate being friendly to other people? — Mark S

I explained already why the Golden Rule is very clearly not a cooperation strategy. Cooperation requires a common end. The Golden Rule as commonly stated has no implications of any end. You simply misinterpret it to claim that it states that one should treat others in a particular way, with the end, or goal of getting treated that way back. And I already explained why that particular goal, which is inserted by you in your interpretation, is clearly not a part of the Golden Rule.

Furthermore, because the Golden Rule stipulates that we ought to behave in this friendly way, irrespective of what our goals are, it encourages you to act this way toward people regardless of whether the person is cooperating with you or competing with you.

Being nice to each other” is cooperation. — Mark S

It seems we have two very distinct ideas of what constitutes cooperation. I know of no other definition of cooperation other than to work together. And so it follows that people can be friendly toward each other without necessarily cooperating.

I describe the same phenomena of moral behavior but point out these unselfish behaviors exist because they provide net benefits. — Mark S

You are proposing an unjustified cause/effect relationship which is inconsistent with my interpretation of the golden rule. You are saying that the benefits of working together, cooperating, cause people to be friendly and unselfish. However, I am saying that the golden rule says that we ought to be friendly and unselfish without any view toward benefits. Therefore according to the golden rule, benefits cannot be perceived as the motivating force, or cause of people being unselfish and friendly.

This is why your description is not objective. It contains a cause/effect assumption which you have not justified, and this assumed cause/effect relation is inconsistent with the moral principle we know as the golden rule. Therefore this proposed description is not a sound observation.

When societies fail and the rewards for acting morally in the larger society stop and become losses, I assure you that people will stop acting morally in the larger society because they no longer benefit from those moral acts. — Mark S

This is pure conjecture, so it does not adequately justify your unsound observation.

This version explicitly calls out why we should follow the Golden Rule. I am a bit dubious about the translation since the translator made it rhyme, but I expect he got it mostly right. Several sources suggest this implied understanding of morality as cooperation strategies was a common view at the time. We just got confused about morality for a few thousand years. — Mark S

It's good to be dubious about the translation, because I think this material was written in hieroglyphics so the translation of verb tenses and causal relations would be rather subjective.

To support your position I think you would be better off to look at something like "Karma". This concept expresses a clear causal relation. The way you behave will have consequences toward what happens to you in the future.

The problem though, is that this still does not support the causal relation which you assume. You are claiming that actual benefits which have occurred in the past, benefits which have actually materialized, are the cause of unselfish behaviour now. But Karma works with a temporal relation which is inverted to this, by asserting that unselfish behaviour now will cause benefits in the future.

So you haven't presented the means for your inversion. You say "unselfish behaviors exist because they provide net benefits", implying that benefits have caused the existence of unselfish behaviour. However, Karma says that unselfish behaviour will cause benefits. You propose an inverted form of Karma which you have not justified.

Several sources suggest this implied understanding of morality as cooperation strategies was a common view at the time. We just got confused about morality for a few thousand years. — Mark S

Since you have a backward, inverted perspective on morality, you think that human beings are digressing instead of progressing in their morality. You think that the Christian Golden Rule which states that we ought to do good without any expectation of benefit or return, is a case of being "confused about morality" in relation to Karma, which encourages us to do good at the expectation of return. Then you yourself digress even further from the true nature of morality, to suggest that the benefits, or return, are what actually cause us to do good.

The fact is that everyone is always “looking for bad behavior from someone else”. But this vigilance (innate to our moral sense) is not primarily “an excuse to do something bad”, but a reason to do something good – punish the moral norm’s violator. Punishment of moral norms violators is necessary to sustain the related cooperation strategy.

One punishment for moral norm violators is a refusal to cooperate with them in the future. In dysfunctional societies, this can lead to refusal to cooperate with (to act morally toward) anyone who is not a member of your most reliable ingroup – usually your family. — Mark S

This is the type of confusion which results from your backward way of looking at morality. You portray inflicting "punishment" as doing good. But the inclination to punish is nothing but vengefulness, which is not good at all, and inconsistent with Christian principles of confession and forgiveness. But of course you look at Christian morality as a step backward, so it makes sense that you would look at punishment as a good.

Competition is not the opposite of cooperation. The opposite of cooperation is creating cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Cooperation to limit the harm of competition and increase its benefits is what makes our societies work as well as they do. We can cooperate or compete to achieve the same goals. They are not opposites, but alternates. The difference is that people who agree to compete are agreeing to the potential for harm (limited harm if the competition is to be moral). — Mark S

Well, I think that if you are not prepared to inquire into the true nature of competition, and simply represent it as a form of cooperation, this discussion has no place on this thread. The whole point of me bringing this up was to expose the reality of competition, and how it relates to the subject of the op, "what is a 'woman'".

When we "agree to compete", we have an artificial form of competition. The ensuing engagement will be restricted and greatly limited by rules and regulations. If we want to understand the real nature of competition we need to look at it independently from such artificial restrictions.

What I said already, is that equality norms, and fairness norms, are produced as required for such artificial restrictions to competition. To understand competition in its natural form we need to see it as based in inequality. Inequality is what is essential to, and what enables, or capacitates, the real and natural existence of competition.

I think Hume provides us with a very good approach to this problem with his discussion of induction and causation. We create inductive rules through empirical observation of what has happened in the past. And from this we can, and do, produce very effective predictions concerning the future. However, we have no empirically derived principle which tells us that things in the future must necessarily be the same as they have been in the past.

So the prediction must always be expressed in terms of probability rather than the necessity which we desire of logic. This means that empirical observation along with inductive reasoning cannot provide us with an understanding of causation, and prediction in general. There is a feature of the universe which allows that empirical observation, with inductive reasoning, can provide us with very good predictions, but empirical observations with inductive reasoning cannot provide us with an understanding of this feature. That is because this mode of prediction which employs empirical observation along with inductive reasoning, to make accurate predictions, takes this feature of the universe for granted.

By taking this feature for granted, as a sort of foundational premise, the logical system built on top of this premise has no capacity to understand the meaning of that premise, it just employs it. The premise employed, or feature of the universe represented, can be portrayed as a temporal continuity. This is the same temporal continuity which is taken for granted by Newton's first law. When these "laws" which are in themselves actually derived from inductive reasoning, are taken for granted as a premise for a logic system (an axiom), the logical system cannot be turned back on itself to question, inquire, or analyze the premise in a skeptical way, because the premise must be taken for granted in order for the system to be applied. So to analyze the fundamental premise (axiom), in order to understand it, we must use principles from outside that system, therefore an independent system.

Now when we get to the very bottom of empirical observation, and the inductive reasoning which deals with it, and we want to understand these features, and how they work in our universe, we must employ principles which are not empirically derived. Therefore our logic must transcend empirical observation, or else we could not ever understand the relationship between past and future.

I will argue the contrary, that fairness and equality moral norms are norms for solving cooperation problems. — Mark S

You don't seem to be grasping the incompatibility between "cooperation" and "competition". We cooperate, help each other, as the means to an end. So cooperation requires an agreeable end, such that people will work together to achieve that goal. Without the agreeable goal, people can be nice to each other, and behave respectfully, but this cannot be called "cooperation", because they are simply being respectful of each other without cooperating (working together). On the other hand, competition between you and I means that we are both striving for the same goal, but the goal can only be achieved by one of us, exclusively. This rules out the possibility of cooperation.

Now, when people cooperate there is no need for any fairness or equality norms. If we are cooperating, like a man and a women raising a family for example, we are each contributing what we can, toward the common goal, and whether we do this in a fair and equal way is completely irrelevant. Since we each contribute something completely different, toward the common goal, how could one even begin to judge whether the contributions were fair or equal? Fairness and equality are concepts which cannot even be properly applied to cooperation, which is derived from the will to help out.

Therefore fairness and equality norms cannot solve cooperation problems. Cooperation problems are the result of a lack of a common goal, or a failure of agreement on the goal, which kills the will to cooperate. No amount of fairness or equality rules can restore the will to cooperate, only the initiation of an agreeable end, and the will to help obtain it can.

“Do to others as you would have them do to you” and “Do not steal or kill” are all moral norms which are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible, rules of thumb) that initiate indirect reciprocity. (An example of indirect reciprocity is you help someone else in your group with the expectation that someone in the group will help you when you need help, and that the group will punish people who refuse to help others.)

Following the Golden Rule, you would treat others fairly because you would like to be treated fairly. — Mark S

I think you are misrepresenting the golden rule here. When it says "as you would have them do to you", this is spoken as an example of how you should treat others. In no way does the golden rule imply that you expect an equal, or fair return on the goodness which you give. This is the meaning of Christian/Platonic love, to do good without the expectation of reciprocation. Therefore it is a significant misunderstanding, to represent the golden rule as principle of equality in this way, that one only ought to do good in expectation of reciprocation.

If the moral will of human beings, to do good, is dependent on having others do good, then everyone would be looking for bad behaviour from someone else, as an excuse to do something bad, and all of humanity would slip into evil at a very rapid rate, as one bad deed would incite many more.

Equality norms are equal rights norms, not norms that would incoherently somehow claim equal capability. Equal rights norms are reciprocity norms that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma. — Mark S

That you can point to a "cooperation/exploitation" dilemma ought to be an indication to you, that this is the manifestation of the cooperation/competition incompatibility. Money is one of those goals which we compete for. If there is a fixed amount of money on the table, and everyone in the room wants as much of it as they can get, then there is an inclination to compete rather than cooperate. Therefore equal rights norms solve the "cooperation/exploitation" by addressing exploitation as a competition induced problem. They do not address cooperation at all, they address a breakdown in cooperation which has emerged from competitive urges. The competitive urges are the manifestation of goals which are personal, and cannot be shared with others. Cooperation, as explained above requires a shared goal. If my goal cannot be shared with you, then there is no cooperation, and my desire to be competitive will lead me to exploit.

Consider two groups. Each cooperatively makes and tries to sell widgets to the same outsiders. As part of this competition, one group figures out how to make better widgets cheaper than their competitor’s widget. The group that makes the worse, more expensive widget loses all their investments and are now unemployed. The losing competitor has been harmed.

Has the winning group necessarily acted immorally in causing that harm? No, so long as they acted fairly in the competition and limited the harm they did to the generally agreed on limits to that harm. — Mark S

Remember Mark S, I did not say that competition is inherently bad. I only said that it is inconsistent with cooperation. That's why I said that cooperation does not suffice as a first moral principle, because it cannot account for the good of competition. And I further explained this above, cooperation requires an agreeable end. So the agreeable end is logically prior to cooperation.

In your example here, you show competition between the two groups, and the competition results in a better, cheaper product, which we can say is good. But you do not show any cooperation between these two groups, which brings about this good. And, since it wasn't cooperation, but competition which brought about this good, there was a bad side-effect, the one group lost their jobs. This sort of bad side-effect seems to be a feature of life in general.

The following books explain fairness as the keystone of morality: — Mark S

If fairness is the keystone of morality, then cooperation is not, that's plain and simple. This is because cooperation is based on having a common goal, as explained above, and fairness is not at all required for cooperation.

I remember reading somewhere that the novelty of competetive sports evolved as a nonlethal alternative to lethal combat. — Merkwurdichliebe

It could be that these sports developed as training exercises for soldiers. But this brings up another issue, historically only men wage war. So we might consider whether only men are inclined toward such battles, as a product of hormones etc., or whether women were excluded due to a lack of strength or some other reason. I think it would be some other reason, like they were being protected as valuable. The possibilities are endless, but if the former scenario is the case, then we might consider that the competitive attitude which leads to war and such sports, is itself a masculine trait.

So, given all this conjecture, if men originally endeavored in competetive sports for honor and pussy, can we contrast it with the original reason women began to endeavor in competetive sports? I can't think of a reason women first endeavored in competetive sports. My instinct tells me it was imposed on them by the patriarchy - to demonstrate woman's inherent subordination to men by manipulating them into immitating man's activity. I could be wrong. — Merkwurdichliebe

According to the speculations above, it would be the case, that women simply do not have the same competitive attitude which men do. If we can blame their inequality in sports on a lack of testosterone, and perhaps other innate physiology, then we ought to look at how these factors might affect their overall mental attitude as well.

And here we have an issue. If morality is associated with cooperation, as described earlier, and this competitive attitude is opposed to cooperation, then men are inherently lacking in morality. But again, it might be a mistake to associate cooperation with morality, at the exclusion of competition. Classically, morality is associated with the good, and the good is what is desired, as the end. War, and competition in general, are the manifestations of conflict in what is desired, ('I win vs you win'). So reconfiguring morality to exclude this intention, the good, might not be the proper thing to do.

However, I've laid out the parameters for a distinction between the kind of thing which men desire (the good for men) and the kind of thing which women desire (the good for women). If it is possible to make such a categorization, it might shed light on the question of whether men are truly more competitive than women.

The rules and ideas about fairness we establish regarding competition are cooperation norms. — Mark S

I don't think this is correct. "Fairness" based rules for competition are derived from equality norms, rather than cooperation norms. And equality norms are fundamentally different from cooperation norms because there is no requirement for the intent to cooperate for there to be a desire for equality. That is to say, that when people compete, and there are rules established to ensure fairness of competition, that is the only required end, fair competition. And fairness is based in equality. There is no requirement that the people also cooperate, they simply desire equal rights.

I think perhaps you are under the impression that competing while following rules is a form of cooperation. But that is an illusion, the people are really competing against each other. That they agree to follow rules is a form of cooperation, but this type of cooperation is a restriction on what they are doing, so it is directed toward some other end, not toward the competition itself. The competition remains the primary end, and the agreement is simply to hold up some other end, that of fairness or equality.

So I think we need to separate equality based principles (therefore "fairness") from cooperation based principles, and see them as being derived from distinct ends, i.e., the means to different ends. The end for competition is a "win" which belongs to the winner only, the end for cooperation is something which is shared. Cooperation allows people with distinct differences, performing distinct activities, to work together toward the same end. "Equality" intends to make distinctly different people equal, in some sense the same. This makes "equality" an ideal which is fundamentally flawed, as oxymoronic, attempting to apprehend different things as the same.

Since the ideal itself is fundamentally flawed, problems will follow from its applications in practise. The problems become very evident in competitive sports. Rules of fairness are intended to ensure that all competitors start on an equal footing. Of course the competitors themselves are not "equal" in any absolute way, or else there'd be no competition. There would be a draw every time because everybody would have equal skills.. So the basic rules of fairness are actually intended to emphasize inequalities which are internal to the competitors by reducing external differences. This is done to encourage a "fair win".

Now the problem is that "equality" as an ideal, must have its limits. We define the boundaries, human equality means that all humans are equal, despite differences, and the boundary is at the limit to the species. In competitive sports we are inclined to put a boundary within the species, such that men and women are not equal. We justify this by saying it is required to make the games fair, and have a fair winner. However, we must respect the fact, that games are artificial, creations of human beings. And this sort of game produces a boundary or division between men and women in relation to equality.

So we need to ask the question of why would men create games to be played by men, for the purpose of displaying their manliness. Or is it the case that women created these sports so that men could show off their abilities, and the women could use this to judge them. Understanding the intent behind this type of sports is crucial to understanding this proposed inequality between men and women. Consider, that if men created these sports for the purpose of demonstrating to women that they cannot compete with men, and that they are therefore unequal to men, then this is nothing more than systematic sexism. Furthermore, if this is the case, then the men would not even actually be competing, they'd be cooperating in this system, by participating in these sports. Then, that this is competition is really what is an illusion, because the design of the game is not based in competition, it is based in the difference between men and women. So the players would be nothing but actors in a sexist form of entertainment.

I think your post is a good summary of the issue. I'm not someone who cares much about sports, but I do care about fairness. From what I've read, biological males who compete as women in mixed martial arts consistently beat the crap out of biological females, sometimes causing serious injury. That's not fair. — T Clark

How do you define "fair" in a competitive sport? Is it a matter of following the rules? How do we know if the rules are "fair"? Consider @Mark S 's thread on the science of morality. There, morality is defined by cooperation. But competition is directly opposed to cooperation. So we have a big problem right off the bat. Competitive sport is fundamentally immoral according to the science of morality. How do you propose that we can make "fairness" a principle in any competitive sport, which by its very nature is immoral. Fairness would have no real bearing in an immoral activity.

Of course, the solution here is to realize the benefits of competition in general, and to see that morality is not restricted to cooperation, because this would exclude the the good of competition. So when we proceed to look at competition as a good, we need to put that into context, what is it good for. If it was only good for entertainment, this would provide the guidelines needed. However, competition is good in many ways, primarily in the sense that it builds strength in character. And, we see it in the market place, in the office, and in many other places where it often is good. Therefore I ask you, if it is morally correct, for men and women to compete against each other for the same career positions, how could it be moral incorrect (unfair) for men and women to compete against each other in competitive sports?

[Edit] Should have included issues with sports teams. — T Clark

Sports, in general are very problematic. This is probably because sport is an entertainment based industry, and activity. And the inclination to entertain may lead the mind of the actor in many strange directions. Some of these directions are demonstrably unhealthy and that's why censorship is a real feature of the entertainment industry.

The boundary between healthy and unhealthy is ill defined, and we still allow people to make unhealthy choices until it becomes a burden on the welfare system, or has a noticeably bad effect on others, as the freedom to smoke cigarettes demonstrates. When the unhealthy choice affects others, second hand smoke, not wearing a mask in a pandemic, etc., restrictions are enforced. In the entertainment industry such restrictions occur as censorship.

Sports are generally viewed as healthy entertainment, censorship not required. But, there is another feature of sports which complicates the issue, competition. This produces another requirement for restrictions, the need to create fairness in competition. Now sports has two incompatible principles for restrictions, the requirement of healthiness, and the requirement of fair competition. This is because natural healthiness is not conducive to fair competition, and this is at the base of evolutionary theory. So sport is a very complex psychology and not something one can just wade into.

Interesting notion : time (change) without a material substrate to evolve. How would you describe "non-empirical passage of time"? "Eternity" is usually defined as changeless by philosophers. But for religious purposes, Heavenly Eternity has been described as changeable, but never-ending. How would you define "non-empirical" (non-experiential)Time? — Gnomon

Time is other than change, for a number of reasons. First, change is more specific, particular, it is something becoming different than it was. Time on the other hand is more universal. The very same period of time applies to a vast multitude of different changes. In this way time has become a means for comparing changes. This makes time completely different from change, as something which all changes have in common.

Basically, change is the physical difference that we notice. We do not notice the passing of time, only the physical difference, then we conclude logically that time must have passed. This is because we posit the passing of time as what is required for change. We do this, because we see that all changes have this in common, the passing of time. So whenever we notice that change has occurred, we know that it is necessary that time has passed. But this cannot be reversed. Time can pass with no noticeable physical change. This is evident at time periods shorter than Planck time. A short length of time must pass before change can be noticed. Therefore time is logically prior to physical change. For comparison, "animal" is logically prior to "human being", as something which all human beings have in common, just like all physical change has "time" in common. But we cannot reverse this to say that all time has physical change, just like we cannot say that all animals are human.

I don't see how the timing of when I walk out makes any difference at all. The end comes soon... but not yet.