In 1966, Abraham Robinson introduced Non-standard Analysis, which provided a rigorous foundation for working with infinitely small quantities. This provided another way of putting calculus on a mathematically rigorous foundation, the way it was done before the (ε, δ)-definition of limit had been fully developed. — tim wood

I already told you the problem with the "rigorous" solutions. They are not real solutions because they allow "infinite" which is fundamentally unintelligible, as indefinite, into the mathematical representations. So any mathematical model employed, using these axioms which are designed to produce a "rigorous foundation" will have indefiniteness, which is a form of unintelligibility, built into it.

This is the problem with "formalism" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formalism_(philosophy_of_mathematics)) in general. In its attempt to exclude the problems involved with applying the ideal (mathematical principles) to the material (physical) world, complete with accidents which appear as indefiniteness, formalism allows the indefiniteness (unintelligibility) to inhere within the formal (logical) structure itself. The result is that the source of unintelligibility (which inevitably arises in application), is impossible to isolate and identify.

If you do not understand this, then so be it. I will not try to explain, because I've done so numerous times on this forum, and I've come to respect that those who do not understand this are in that position because they deny the issue, and refuse to accept it as a real problem. They perceive that mathematics is very useful, and cannot apprehend the possibility that it could have problems. So it's generally a misunderstanding which is supported by a closed mind, and I am incapable of influencing people like you to open your minds.

And it is equally clear that, short as the article is, you did not understand any of the rest of it either. "Berkeley did not dispute the results of calculus; he acknowledged the results were true. The thrust of his criticism was that Calculus was not more logically rigorous than religion. Berkeley concluded that the certainty of mathematics is no greater than the certainty of religion." Berkeley was writing as a Christian apologist. — tim wood

Yes, what I tried to explain is that the type of "truth" that Berkeley is talking about here is a faith based truth. It is "truth" in the sense of coherence theory. If there is coherency within the logical system it produces truth. This is why I as well, do not dispute the usefulness of things like relativity theory, and calculus. The problem is with the "false", in the sense of correspondence theory, principles which the "free-thinkers" in Berkeley's words, employed. The "free-thinkers" we can understand as the pure mathematicians who dream up mathematical axioms. The problem is that there is no requirement that any mathematical axioms be "true" in the sense of correspondence. And if the axioms prove to be useful they are accepted, and used, regardless of truthfulness (correspondence). Now we all know that the soundness of any logical argument relies on the soundness of the premises (mathematical axioms in this case), so if you prefer, we can replace "truth" with "sound", and analyze how sound the supposed "rigorous" logic is.

In this case the subject was "fluxions" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fluxion). According to the Wikipedia entry, this concept was central to the disagreement between Newton and Leibniz. If you have not studied this, principal disagreement between Newton and Leibniz concerned the relative importance of Newton's "momentum", as mass times velocity, and Leibniz' "vis viva" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vis_viva) as mass times velocity squared. As it turned out, each is important in its own way, but Leibniz' principle needed be adapted by a coefficient of a half.

Any claim of yours, then, of any problem with the maths in question here, whether mathematical, philosophical, or metaphysical, is ignorant, stupid, self-serving, and that you used it to evade a fair question on your inconsistent usages of "truth," I call vicious. — tim wood

Uh huh. As I explained, I avoid your questions because I apprehend them as rhetorical. Your questions are presented not for the purpose of finding a point of mutual agreement, from which we can proceed in a rational inquiry, but they are designed for the purpose of opening up a point of attack. And when I refuse to answer, you are reduced to ad hominem, like above, demonstrating that you are overwhelmed by emotional weakness.

These are incompatible. Reconcile them! — tim wood

I do not see the incompatibility. To represent reality in the way of correspondence (truth), requires necessarily that one has some understanding of the reality being represented. Therefore "truth" in the sense of correspondence, implies understanding.

Show your math. — wonderer1

What math? It's a philosophical problem, one which mathematics has not resolved. Look, there's a point in time, when a body at rest becomes a body accelerating. The body changes from being at rest, to being in motion at some point in time. Since the rate of increase of velocity (acceleration) is expressed as over a period of time, at this point in time, when the body changes from being at rest to being in motion, the rate of increase must be infinite because it's a number expressed over zero, x/0.

Regardless of philosophical issues, we can in fact experimentally verify, to some reasonable degree of precision, that bowling balls and pool balls both accelerate toward the ground when dropped. If you have philosophical problems with the concept of acceleration, you should separate that from your ability to look at that evidence and see what does, in fact, happen — flannel jesus

Yes of course, such objects accelerate. They must, in order to get from zero velocity to having some velocity. The problem is that we as human beings, do not have a very accurate understanding of acceleration. Our mathematical representation of it is very problematic. Read the following: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Analyst

Notice that the article says that Berkeley's criticism of Newton was resolved with the concept of "limits". But this really doesn't solve the problem of acceleration because it places zero as a boundary, limit, which is never obtained. So the principle utilized is that there is no point in time when the object changes from being at rest to being in motion, because an infinite amount of time would pass before the boundary is crossed. So the crossing of that boundary, between rest and motion is never actually obtained by the mathematical representation.

It is this same proposition, which makes calculus logically rigorous, which also leads to the uncertainty principle, by allowing this "infinite" into the mathematical representation, and having boundaries within the modeling which cannot be crossed. You determine the momentum (motion) or you determine the position (rest), whichever one you choose to make an accurate representation of, the other approaches the boundary (infinite uncertainty).

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Why don't you try answering his question? — tim wood

I could not answer EricH's question because the presumptions which the question was based on were false. He said "I think you would agree that that is a true statement". I could not agree that it was a true statement, for the reasons I gave. He cited a measurement, and I explained that there is a measurement problem which did not allow me to agree that his measurement was "true". Then EricH tried to say that such a complex measurement was just an observation, which it clearly is not. That makes two false presumptions. What kind of inquiry is that, asking a loaded question with two false presumptions. That's like asking me 'did you stop beating wife, again?'.

Now flannel jesus gave me a better example of "an observation". Flannel said that heavy balls when dropped, accelerate toward the ground. I agree that they "must accelerate", because they go from being held to being in motion. But this is not an observation, it's more like a conclusion of logic. I do not notice the ball accelerating when I drop it, but I conclude that it must accelerate, because it goes from zero to having some velocity.

Now EricH's question concerned the relationship between "truth" and "understanding". EricH asked if I could agree to the truth of something without any understanding of what I was agreeing to the truth of. I'm sure many people could agree to the truth of something without any understanding of it, if this agreeing is done on faith, like the way that some religious people agree to the truth of God for example. But I am not prone to such agreements, I want to understand first, before I agree.

Regardless, this is irrelevant to the point I was making. I said "truth" implies understanding. But for someone to say "I agree that this is true", and for it to actually be true, are two different things. So "I agree that X is true" does not imply understanding in the way that truth itself implies understanding.

Assume all of that is done to your satisfaction beyond all reasonable doubt. — EricH

The concept of "acceleration" involves a fundamental philosophical problem. Acceleration is the rate of increase of velocity. So if an object goes from being at rest, to moving, there is a brief period of time where its "acceleration" is necessarily infinite. This is a fundamental measurement problem, and another form of the same problem is at the heart of the uncertainty principle of quantum physics, as the uncertainty relation between time and energy in the Fourier transform.

This problem was exposed by Aristotle as the incompatibility between the concept of "being" (static) and the concept of "becoming" (active). The way that modern physics deals with this problem, through the application of calculus does not resolve the problem. It simply veils the problem by allowing the unintelligible issue, infinity, to be present within the mathematical representation.

Now, the very same philosophical problem which Newton and his contemporaries had to deal with in the relationship between bodies, becomes paramount in modern physics in its relationships of energy. The issue though, is that Newton and his contemporaries were dealing with relatively long durations of time, so the methods of calculus were adequate for covering up this problem which only increases as the period of time is shortened. Now physicists are dealing with extremely short durations of time, so the uncertainty becomes very relevant and significant. That's what the time/energy uncertainty indicates, the shorter the time period, the more uncertain any determination of energy will be.

Accordingly, using the current mathematical conventions, such calculations of acceleration will never be done "beyond all reasonable doubt", because the current convention is to allow the unintelligible (infinite) to be a part of the mathematical representation..

E.g., if I say that I observed an object in a vacuum chamber accelerating towards the center of the earth at 9.8 m/sec**2, I think you would agree that that is a true statement (it corresponds with reality). — EricH

No I don't agree with that at all, far from it in fact. Why would I just take it for granted that this is a true statement? I would have to see your justification, your measurement technique, and how you come up with "sec**2". What does "sec**2" even mean?

Furthermore, I disagree that this is "just an observation", it is actually a very complex calculation. That something is "accelerating" requires a multitude of measurements of velocity, and each measurement of velocity requires multiple determinations of spatial-temporal location.

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Also, is there a distinction when you put the word in quotes? — EricH

I put the word in quotes, because I was talking about the meaning of that word, which I put in quotes.

Sorry, I didn't mean "the set of discernment which are not subjective." I meant, "the set of all discernments (which are necessarily made by subjects) is a set, an abstract entity," and abstract entities are generally not considered to be subjective. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't say that. Only through Platonism do abstract objects lose their subjectivity. but whether or not Platonism provides us with a representation of the true nature of abstractions, is another question.

For example, we could have the set of all experiences where people experience red. The experiences are subjective, the set is an abstract object. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would say that is more like a fictional, or fantasy "set". To have such a set would require that all experiences be judged as to whether or not the experience was of "red". Then there would be a whole lot of undecisive experiences, is this red or is this pink, for example. Some people would say that such and such experiences are members of the set, while others would say no. So there is really no such thing as this type of fictional, or fantasy set.

Right, but the converse is generally not accepted. "If no observer notices something as a difference, then by the very fact that no difference has been noticed as a difference, the difference has, necessarily, made no differences to any observer... and so is not a difference." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, that does not follow, because it's contradictory. You are stating that it is a difference, therefore it makes a difference to you, in your example. That's the problem, this so-called difference is imaginary and in your imagination it makes a difference or else you'd have no example. You are an observer, and it has made a difference to you, in your imagination. Whether or not it makes a difference through the means of sensation, or through the means of imagination, is not relevant.

Really, I am just looking for a good argument that says "positing inaccessible differences is sort of nonsensical." — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is nonsensical, because the very act of positing such differences is an act which designates them as accessible. To designate specific differences as inaccessible is contradictory, because designating tham as inaccessible is to provide access to them.

Both views lead to coherent accounts, just with different numbers of things in the world.

Unless someone can show how either view leads to contradiction, then the choice is arbitrary, not empirical. — Banno

If both views are coherent, but each suggests a different number of empirical objects in the world, then there is no reason to choose one or the other, accept according to empirical evidence, therefore the choice must be empirical.

We're going way off topic here, but when you use the word "truth" are referring to the Correspondence Theory of Truth? — EricH

Yes, that's what I said, truth means corresponding with reality, therefore I'm using "truth" in the sense of correspondence theory.

Since effing when has science ever been "truth-apt"? Where in any edition of the scientific method does "truth" enter in. And another question to you, what is it that you imagine "truth" to be? — tim wood

OK, so now we see a big difference between science and metaphysics. I would say metaphysics seeks truth, and truth means corresponding with reality. This would answer ''s question as well.

Prediction in itself is a usefulness, but usefulness is limited by the intended purpose, so prediction does not necessarily indicate truth. A person can successfully predict that the sun will rise the next day, using nothing but statistics. With even more information the person can predict the time and place that the sun will rise. All these predictions are based in assumptions of continuity, that things will continue to occur in the way that they have in the past. But these predictions, and the ability to predict, give no indication of an understanding of what is actually going on. This is obviously the case with quantum mechanics, and quantum field theory right now, there is a tremendous ability to predict, without any understanding of what is actually going on.

"Truth" implies an understanding of what is going on, which takes us beyond the ability to predict. What Galileo showed with relativity theory, is that an understanding of what is going on is not a requirement for the capacity to predict the notions of bodies. All that is required is an adequately formulated frame of reference, information from the past, and the fact that the bodies will continue to move as they have (as Newton's first law). So the motions of bodies can be equally predicted from distinct frames of reference, as Galileo showed with the geocentric and heliocentric models, and what is really going on (the truth) is completely irrelevant to the capacity to prediction.

This is why we have scientists like Stephen Hawking promoting ontologies like "model-dependent realism", within which the fundamental principle (or presupposition) is that there is no such thing as what is really going on. This is because pragmatic theories, such as relativity, dismiss "what is really going on" as unnecessary for making predictions. Then scientists turn to prediction as the sole purpose of science, neglecting a key part of the scientific process, which states that the usefulness of prediction is to be directed at verifying theories, and this clearly indicates that prediction ought not be the end in itself.

When prediction is not taken to be the end in itself, we clearly see the limitations to relativity theory, where it cannot accurately predict.

Metaphysics has been defined as either the study of being, which is the study of nothing at all, because if being has any predicates it ceases to be just being. — tim wood

Boy your logic skills are pathetic.

Cause is so difficult a concept to make rigorous that for a century most of science has dispensed with its use as a meaningful term, except in informal usage where it stands as a shorthand, or in the few areas it may still be used. — tim wood

Ok. now you admit it. Cause does not have a scientific definition. Why did you keep asking me for a scientific definition of cause, then ridicule me when I did not provide it? And if I would have provided you with a definition of "metaphysics", you would have made fun of it as well, based on what you now admit as your prejudice.

Your questioning is nothing but deception, trickery. The questions are intentional designed for one purpose only, and that is to trick someone into saying something which you can poke fun at. Your mode of discussion is simply disgusting.

So just to be clear, you sincerely believe that Einstein (along with the entire scientific community) misinterpreted the results of M-M and are engaging in some form of pseudoscience? — EricH

No, I believe that there is divided opinion in the "scientific community", and many members of it do not even form an opinion about this, because it is not necessary for their purposes. Most physics is applied physics, and the extremely speculative part is better known as metaphysics. The majority of scientists do not venture into this, "metaphysics", or make their opinions (if they have them) known. So I believe members of this forum are making unjustified generalizations (inductive conclusions) with statements like "along with the entire scientific community".

Here's something to consider Eric. Relativity theory was created for pragmatic purposes, and is fundamentally not truth-apt. Relativity gives us very useful principles for application, and modeling motions, but it cannot give us truth. When Galileo first developed modern relativity, he used it to show that both the geocentric, and heliocentric models of the motions of the sun and planets are compatible and equally valid, by the precepts of "relativity". However, most of us believe that there is a "truth" to the modeling of the solar system, and we know that to get to the truth of this matter, we need to go beyond what "relativity" provides for us.

Since relativity models movement as relative to an artificial frame of reference, rather than as relative to a background "space", the reality of the background is ignored. Simply put, since we do not know the reality of the background, we replace it with known frame of reference, which serves the purpose. The frame of reference is designed for the purpose, it is not designed to truthfully represent a "real" background.

This became a problem for relativity theory because things like light, and gravity, were considered as properties of the background. It made classical relativity theory inconsistent with the observed movement light. So Einstein proposed that if we make some stipulations about the speed of light relative to moving bodies, and the passage of time, we could establish compatibility between the movement of light, and the movement of bodies, and bring light and gravity to be consistent with relativity theory. This opened up a whole new field of usefulness for relativity theory, Einsteinian relativity.

The fundamental issue remains though, relativity theory is pragmatically oriented, and is designed to ignore the importance of truth. This is why we have physicists like Stephen Hawking proposing ontologies such as "model-dependent reality", and others with the idea that the universe is a "simulation". If we ignore this fundamental fact, that relativity is designed to be useful, but with its usefulness we sacrifice the possibility for truth, and instead we start to think that relativity theory is true, this induces the possibility of all sorts of strange ontologies to support the "reality" of relativity.

Now we have a backward approach to metaphysics. Instead of basing our metaphysics in strong principles directed toward truth, we direct or metaphysics away from truth to support relativity theory which denies the possibility of truth. So, as metaphysicians looking for truth, the proper approach is to observe and understand all features of reality, and build a consistent ontology accordingly. This means the influence of useful theories like relativity must not be given undue preference, because the goal is truth, which relativity is not directed toward.

I'm all done here. — T Clark

Hi T Clark, back at your favourite pastime I see. Come in, spout some pseudoscience, then state your declaration. Care to tell me what you think you have succeeded in finishing when you say you're "done".

The idea is that MU can have his aether - there is no evidence for it - as what he calls metaphysical speculation, and which I disqualify of substance in a scientific discussion. — tim wood

Have fun with your so-called "scientific discussion". I'll leave you to your pseudoscience now.

And of course Mickleson-Morley is "pseudoscience" and "blatantly false."
10 hours ago — tim wood

Tim woods, your reading skills are as bad as T. Clark's. I didn't say "Mickleson-Morley is 'pseudoscience'". I was arguing that the conclusion, that some people draw, that Michelson-Morley type experiments have proven that there is no medium for light waves, is pseudoscience.

Typical. You're asked three questions, which you ignore. You confuse "forum" with "discussion." And of course Mickleson-Morley is "pseudoscience" and "blatantly false." — tim wood

I ignored your questions because each one of them except the last requires a very long essay, and I really do not see the relevance of the material. If you want to know what "cause" and "metaphysics" mean, try looking them up. If you want to know more precisely, my use, in a specific context, then provide the context. Otherwise I'll continue to ignore such questions as unnecessary distractions. The third question I had already answered so that's why I ignored it. Here, I'll repost.

It's fundamentally different from the aether, because the aether was always understood as an independent, separate substance from the bodies which exist within it. This was the premise of the M-M experiment. Now, respecting the results of M-M, we can either say that this was a misunderstanding of the aether, and produce a new model of the aether which does not have that requirement, or we can insist that "separate substance" is essential to the conception named "aether", and therefore dismiss "aether" as inadequate, and come up with a new word to refer to the medium for light.

Clearly, "field" is inadequate because it represents the medium with random locations, arbitrary points, instead of identifying the true particles which must exist within the medium, comprising the medium, as is required to support the observed wave motion of electromagnetism. Only through identification and modeling of the true particles of the medium can an adequate understanding of it be produced. And according to what M-M indicates (no aether wind), along with what the experiments of quantum field theory indicate, all massive objects must be composed of this same medium. — Metaphysician Undercover

If that doesn't answer your third question, let me know what is lacking.

Starting with MIckleson-Morley in 1887, and successive experiments, it has become understood and accepted by anyone with at least a high school, or even junior high school, science class that the aether simply does not exist. And this is the science of the thing. — tim wood

Well, I myself, am very sound evidence that this statement is a blatant falsity. And why do you think that this is "the science of the thing" when it's really the pseudoscience of the thing. In reality, it's just a denial of what can logically be concluded from Michelson-Morley type experiments, and denial of the current body of evidence, in a hypocritical effort to adhere to some dogmatic stipulations.

This is unfortunate because, stripped of these connotations, it rather nicely captures the way most physicists actually think about the vacuum. . . .

The denial is like a fear of God. But good theologians have progressed far beyond this attitude of instilling fear, the conventional approach now is to cultivate the love of God. Why are scientists so primitive in their behaviour, showing outright fear of the unknown, as if they will be punished if they step off the beaten path to the slaughterhouse?

You're in a science discussion, which you are determined to derail, and your account is just that you're "doing" no science at all, but metaphysical speculation. — tim wood

This happens to be a philosophy forum, not a science forum, so the participants in any discussion are more likely to be philosophers rather than scientists. So you ought to expect that your thread would contain philosophical points of view instead of insisting that we adhere to some dogma of pseudoscience.

The fact that light can propagate as a wave through a vacuum with no medium is an established scientific fact — T Clark

I think you've been corrected on this, the proper scientific description is "wave-like behaviour".
So, I'm going to throw your line right back at you, and please, quit with this assertion of "established scientific fact".

It's pseudoscience. — T Clark

Would you say that we should take into account boredom when discussing why a nazi became a nazi? Or would you attribute the joining to a mental weakness that is exploitable by charismatic leaders heading up (not so) righteous causes? Maybe we should consider whether or not they joined because their favorite uncle said he would buy them a case of beer if they did? — ToothyMaw

Yes, all those reasons are valid possibilities, along with a myriad of others, some more prominent, some less. That you choose one as "the strongest", without any clear justification of your choice, makes it nothing but a subjective opinion.

Phenomena in the world are not constrained to behave in accordance with our definitions. Before Michelson-Morley, people did believe that a medium was required for a wave to propagate. It took them a while to be convinced otherwise. Your definition is 150 years out of date. — T Clark

This is not at all true. The physics of waves is very definite. Waves require a medium. All physicists know this, it is taught in basic high school level physics. This is why light is understood by physicists to exist as particles, photons, not as waves, and the movement of photons is understood by "wave functions", not waves

So the best analogy I can come up with is that photons are particles which also exhibit wave-like behavior. — EricH

That's right, the principles of physics force us to treat this as "wave-like behaviour". This will be the case until we determine and identify the medium, at which time we will be able to treat it as true waves, which the empirical evidence indicates that it obviously is. Consider, that thousands of years ago people understood sound to be vibrations in the air. They knew, by its behaviour, wind and sound vibrations, that "air" had to be a medium, but they could not see it, nor identify the particles which air is comprised of. Having no capacity to see or identify any particles of air did not prevent them from developing an understanding of "air" as a substance. This is the same way that we should look at the aether. The evidence, wave-like behaviour, indicates that it is there, we just have not yet been able to understand its existence.

By way of background, I'm pointing to the issue of definite descriptions, claiming that the arguments to the effects that one does not need a definite description in order for reference to function are pretty convincing. — Banno

It's very obvious that we do not need definite descriptions for proper names to work. We can just point to a thing and name it, with absolutely no description whatsoever.

The problem appears when we consider the fact that anything named in this way necessarily has a temporal continuity of existence (in traditional terms it is a "temporal object"), and so it has the property of a temporal duration.

This is a problem for "definite descriptions" because empirical evidence indicates that all temporal things are necessarily changing as time passes. So any proposed "definite description" would require an inclusion of the temporal changes to the object, in order to make the object identifiable at any time. Simply stating the description for a specific point in time would not suffice, because then the object would only be identifiable at that point in time, which would never coincide with "now" which always seems to consist of a duration of time.

The problem becomes even more difficult when we consider the nature of temporal existence, and the fact that the future consists of possibilities. Because the future consists of possibilities, any supposed "true" temporal extension of the object, into the future cannot be known. As Aristotle argued there is no truth or falsity concerning future events which are possible (future possibilities violate the law of excluded middle). Therefore this part of the object's description is necessarily "indefinite". This renders "definite descriptions" as an impossibility. So not only is it the case that definite descriptions are not necessary, they are necessarily impossible, and very definitely not the way that proper names work.

I don't have much background in Aristotle, but suspect that logic has come some way since his time. — Banno

You ought to listen to what @Leontiskos says. Aristotelean logic was the principal, if not the only, form of logic studied in European schools for hundreds of years. It forms the foundation for all modern formal logic, other than modern mathematics which under the influence of Hegel took a different approach to Aristotle's law of identity. Aristotelian logic even provided the grounds for modern modal logic, with his insistence on an exception to the law of excluded middle for future events, and the role of the potential of "matter" in the unfolding of time. The Hegelian approach is to allow that "matter" violates the law of noncontradiction (dialectical materialism), something which Aristotle was strongly opposed to. Violation of the law of noncontradiction leaves the law of identity as completely useless, which is what Hegel argued about this law, that it is in fact completely useless.

Well, I think there is two basic problems with the conclusions you draw from the experiment. First, is that you cannot necessarily say that it was a sense of duty which lead those people into that movement. Different people have different reasons for joining into such a movement. Second, is that even if all those people were moved by a sense of duty, this does not validate your claim that duty is the "single strongest motivator for action", because there is no other motivators offered for comparison.

There is no indication of what percentage of the people exposed to the movement joined the movement, and there is no indication as to what other type of motivators those people were exposed to at the same time for comparison, to show that they chose the experimental movement out of a sense of duty, over something else. So for example, it might have been the case that the people who joined the movement were just extremely bored at the time, with nothing better to do, or even that some other incentives for joining were offered, that are undisclosed to us. (The followers were students, and the conditions were of course set up by the teacher who was carrying out the experiment, so he might have set up conditions of extreme boredom in the classroom, then offered the students 'something to do'.)

If I believe what I am writing I am not operating on bad faith.

I try my best to explain my reasoning. — NOS4A2

I think it's better known as "rationalizing". When a person rationalizes it is quite likely that they do not actually believe what they are rationalizing. The rationalizing seems to be done as a way for the person to convince oneself that something which they want to believe, but they cannot quite apprehend as believable, actually is believable.

This is not a metaphysical statement. In this context it's a statement about optics, the physics of light, and it's wrong. — T Clark

You're displaying very poor reading skills T Clark. Please reread the statement you quoted. It's not at all a statement about the physics of light. I never mentioned "light" or "electromagnetism". It's a statement about what it means to be a "wave", how the concept indicated by that word is understood through normal human conventions, especially as it is used in the more specific physics of waves.

So, if light exists as a wave, which much evidence indicates, then it exists according to the principles understood by the concept signified by "wave", which i was talking about in the statement. It is a simple conclusion of deductive logic. P1, Waves have x essential properties. P2 Light exists as waves. C Therefore light has X properties.

Again - this statement is at odds with the fundamental basis of modern physics. — T Clark

It might be "at odds with the fundamental basis of modern physics" but it's a true statement about the logical conclusion we can draw from the M-M experiments, if we adhere to the premise that light exists as a wave. As the article you quoted stated, the experiment was an attempt to detect the relative motion of matter through the aether. The experiments could not determine any such relative motion, and strongly indicate that there is no such relative motion. From here we can either conclude that there is no aether therefore light does not exist as waves, but for some unknown reason appears to be spookily similar to waves, or we can maintain the premise that light exists as a wave, therefore there is an aether: and from the results of those experiments we can conclude that matter moves with the aether, so that there is no such relative motion. If modern physicists have failed to draw the latter conclusion, and cannot understand why light spookily appears to exist as a wave, then that is a problem with modern physics, not a problem with my statement, which is at odds with modern physics.

I agree that a value judgement is an activity, an event. But I’m not talking about a particular value created by such a judgement - a measurement. That is a position in a hierarchical (linear) relation to our momentary involvement in that event. It is not an object. What I’m referring to is qualitative or potential value as variability, not a value as a reductionist relation to intra-action. — Possibility

Do you not agree that a "value" is the worth, desirability, or usefulness of a thing? And that this is the product of a judgement? If a particular thing has a "variable" value, then the thing has a different worth, desirability or usefulness depending on its context of existence relative to the mind that makes the judgement. How could a thing possibly have a variable value unless its value is a feature of its relationship with the mind which determines its value?

What I’m saying is we assume that value structures are dependent on the human mind, but this is a misunderstanding. The number is a measurement, a momentary intra-action with value, not value itself. It is the human mind that consists of ongoing value judgement - ongoing relationality to the inherent variability of potential/value. — Possibility

I really cannot see how you are proposing to separate the value from the judgement, in order to support you claim that it is incorrect, or a misunderstanding, to say that value structures are mind-dependent.

What you appear to be saying, is that the number produced by a measurement, is the result of an interaction between a mind, and a value, such that both the value and the mind pre-exist the judgement. When the mind and the value come into relationship with one another, the mind measures, or makes a judgement, and the result is a number. The number represents the value, but the value maintains its independent status. So numbers are not values, they are representations of values.

In order for me to understand what you are proposing, I'm going to replace "number" which is a quantitative representation of value, with "good", which is qualitative. So we have goods which exist independently of the minds which apprehend them, as independent values. I like to call these goods "objects", instead of values (but maybe you don't like this), and I reserve "value" as the result of the judgement which the mind makes concerning the independent thing, which is considered as the "good" here. But I'll consider that the independent thing, the good itself, is a value, as you propose, and allow that the mind simply makes a representation of the real value, which exists independently.

Now, let's consider the matter of "variability". From my perspective, I would say that the variability of a value is a product of the relationship between the thing being valued, and the mind which values it. Differences in this relationship are responsible for the variability of the value. Variability is a product of the process of evaluation. But your proposal does not allow this. The value is independent from the mind which evaluates, so variability must inhere within the value itself.

How do you propose that a mind could ever determine the true representation of a value if the truth is that the value itself is variable? Any determination, or representation of a value, made by a mind, could be proven to be false, because the value itself, being represented, is intrinsically variable. Therefore no representation could be the true representation, or else contradicting representations could be true. If your proposal represents the truth about the way that values exist, then it would be absolutely impossible to determine the true representation of the value, because the value itself would be inherently variable, and any representation of it, produced by a mind, would be equally true and false.

On the other hand, the way that I look at values, "value" being the result of the relationship between a thing, object, and a mind, we can readily account for variability as a result of differences within this relationship. There can be a truth about the thing, the object, and variability is just a product of differences in the variety of possible relationships between mind and object.

Accordingly, your proposal excludes the possibility of truth concerning 'that which is independent', while the way that I look at 'that which is independent' allows for the possibility of truth. This is why I say that philosophers, metaphysicians, who are seeking truth, must necessarily reject proposals such as yours, because they render truth as impossible, and they ought to proceed in a direction such as what is outlined here by me, because this direction leaves truth as possible.

The only requirements for a system are complexity and relationality. — Possibility

Not quite, #1 assumes a "working together" as a "complex whole". This implies cooperation in relation to a purpose. And this means that such a "system" is created by intention. Also, #2 expresses intention toward getting something done. Therefore both #1 and #2 express more than complexity and relationality, but also purpose and intent. That is why I say that all systems are artificial, it's simply within the nature of what "a system" is, by any conventional definition.

Stop trying to anthropomorphise the hurricane. Regardless of our models, a hurricane would not exist without certain intra-acting variables (not particular values), which also determine its duration, movement, intensity, etc. Whether or not anyone cares or understands, these variable aspects of reality are important and significant to the hurricane in its becoming. — Possibility

This clearly exemplifies the philosophically repugnant and unintelligibility of you perspective, as explained above. You position "values" as within the thing itself (the hurricane in this example), and therefore the variability of the values is also within the thing itself, rendering the truth about the thing as impossible to determine because the values themselves are indeterminate. Why did the hurricane make a last minute change which was not predicted? Because there was an amplified number of quantum fluctuations of value, which are actually impossible to predict, and this made it decide to do that.

There is the human mind governed by grammatical logic, and some external system of reality it cannot accurately represent. — Possibility

This is what is derived from your perspective, "some external system of reality it cannot accurately represent", because you place variability as inherent within that external "system". The human mind cannot possibly represent the external system of reality in a truthful way, because variability inheres within the independent reality, as contradicting properties within the thing itself. My perspective, on the other hand allows that the human mind can accurately represent the external reality because variability is a result of the relationship between the mind and the thing, it just has not yet developed that representation. Understanding this relationship, and properly representing it as a feature of our representations of reality allows for accurate representation.

It’s a refusal to posit and seek to understand a broader relational framework in which two systems can intra-act. — Possibility

the idea of two systems intra-acting is completely useless as an approach to understanding the truth about natural reality. This is because the division of nature into separate systems would be completely arbitrary so the relations between systems would not represent any true relations between true things, but arbitrary boundaries imposed for various purposes, just like "model-dependent reality". This is evident in your hurricane example. We could model a high pressure area as "a system", and a low pressure area as "a system", or two low pressure areas as "two systems", and map these distinct systems with boundaries. However, any such boundaries are completely artificial, and arbitrary, and are not truthfully representative of the true nature of the atmospheric processes.

I’m suggesting that you consider the possibility that this logical system dictated by grammatical conventions exists in a broader relational framework which includes those aspects of mathematical and scientific findings that appear to contradict within the narrow framework of grammatical logic. Consider the possibility that you’re on the wrong track, if it must stop at dualism. — Possibility

I have very often, in the past considered the possibility that I am on the wrong track, and I continue to do so today. That is why I consider your posts very seriously, as I said, an open mind is a requirement for the seeking of truth. However, I have discussed this type of metaphysics already at this forum, and the deficiencies of the approach are becoming more and more apparent. Therefore this discussion with you serves more to strengthen my opinion rather than to change my mind. It's becoming more and more apparent to me, that the reason why mathematical and scientific findings seem to contradict the narrow framework of grammatical logic (the very few true principles I've found to cling to), from which I approach, is because the logic of these fields of discipline is severely compromised.

This is completely at odds with the fundamental basis of modern physics. There's no legitimate physicist in the world who believes it. Light propagates without a medium. If you post this on a physics forum, it will be removed immediately. It's pseudoscience. — T Clark

It's not pseudoscience which I am engaged in, because I do not pretend to be doing science. I am speculating in metaphysics and not at all pretending to be doing physics. The larger problem though is with the way that many people regard physicists. If a physicist speculates in metaphysics, many individuals will believe that such speculations are actually science because the speculations are carried out by a scientist.

Clearly such speculations, even if carried out by a scientist, are not science. And in reality, unless the physicist is properly educated in metaphysics, this physicist is just an undisciplined metaphysician, practising pseudo-metaphysics. Steven Hawking is a prime example of a pseudo-metaphysician. He clearly had very little if any training in metaphysics, yet in books like "The Grand Design" he pretended to be well-versed in it.

The experiment compared the speed of light in perpendicular directions in an attempt to detect the relative motion of matter through the luminiferous aether ("aether wind"). — Wikipedia - The Michaelson-Morley Experiment

This is the key point, the attempt to detect "relative motion" of matter through the ether. If it is the case that matter as well as the waves are both properties of the ether, then there would be no such relative motion, what we perceive as matter would just be a moving part of the ether. And, this is supported by quantum field theory. Particles of matter are understood as properties of the field, not distinct from (so as to move relative to) the field.

The comparison is an understandable one to bring up, I think, but this answer illuminates what I was saying above: the quantum field(s) being Lorenz invariant makes it fundamentally different from the aether — flannel jesus

It's fundamentally different from the aether, because the aether was always understood as an independent, separate substance from the bodies which exist within it. This was the premise of the M-M experiment. Now, respecting the results of M-M, we can either say that this was a misunderstanding of the aether, and produce a new model of the aether which does not have that requirement, or we can insist that "separate substance" is essential to the conception named "aether", and therefore dismiss "aether" as inadequate, and come up with a new word to refer to the medium for light.

Clearly, "field" is inadequate because it represents the medium with random locations, arbitrary points, instead of identifying the true particles which must exist within the medium, comprising the medium, as is required to support the observed wave motion of electromagnetism. Only through identification and modeling of the true particles of the medium can an adequate understanding of it be produced. And according to what M-M indicates (no aether wind), along with what the experiments of quantum field theory indicate, all massive objects must be composed of this same medium.

But a value judgement is not value as an objective structure of reality. It’s much more complex than this narrowly perceived relation configured as a linear hierarchy or sliding scale. — Possibility

OK, I will admit that it is possible to say that a value is not itself a value judgement. We can say that it is the result, or consequence of a value judgement. And, this is a necessary relation, a value does not exist independently of a value judgement, it is dependent on a value judgement, as only being capable of being produced by a value judgement. We can say, this is what a value is, what is produced from that type of judgement.

Also, please note that a value judgement, is an activity, an event. But a value, if we allow it separate existence, as something created by such a judgement, is now static, an object, because it has been separated from the agent, and the activity which created it. This is why we can say that a value is dependent on that agency, and is not properly independent from it.

To understand value, we need to take into account the capacity of non-human materiality to contribute to a broader perception of meaning. The oscillation frequency of an electron in a caesium atom matters to us ‘reading’ an atomic clock, but does this matter if no-one is ‘telling’ the time? And isn’t the number we attribute to this frequency just a value judgement - a measurement derived from our collaboration with the materiality of the clock components in ‘telling time’? The notion that meaning and value are structures exclusive to the human mind is symptomatic of grammatical conventions falling behind in understanding our broader relationality with the world. — Possibility

In this paragraph you describe value structures as being dependent on the human mind, then you conclude by saying that this is a " falling behind in understanding". But there is no other way to understand values, except as being dependent on minds, so how can this understanding be a" falling behind", rather than a moving forward. In reality, to deny that values are dependent on value judgements, which are dependent on minds, is what ought to be called a falling behind in understanding.

Agency is recognised as a property of the system itself, and these so-called ‘subjects’, ‘actions’ and ‘objects’ are all fundamentally active elements, their apparent ‘properties’ a purposeful configuration of the particular intra-action, within which we should recognise ourselves as necessarily involved. — Possibility

All systems are artificial. We have mechanical systems, logical systems, as well as representative systems such as models. But all types of systems are fundamentally artificial, therefore agency in the sense of an intentional action of an intentional being, is required for the creation of any system. So agency is prior to a system, as cause of it, and any form of agency which inheres within the system is distinct from the type of agency which acts as a cause of the system. Now we have a very obvious need for dualism, to account for these two very distinct types of agency.

A mind is not required to respond to the variability of value, only to render it as a judgement, an opinion. — Possibility

All you are saying here is that a mind is required for the existence of the value, as a value. That is exactly what I am arguing.

We can reference God if you’d like, but I would argue that God is not an actual being who makes value judgements, but is the pure, undifferentiated source of logical, qualitative and dynamic relationality, with which all judgements are but a localised (limited) intra-action of perceived meaning. — Possibility

If God does not make value judgements, then we cannot reference God as the source of values independent from human minds. Therefore we ought to accept what the inductive reasoning and evidence shows us, that there are no independent values. All values are dependent on minds of the type that are human minds.

So we understand that what is important to the hurricane are some variables and not others - regardless of how it might be perceived in terms of ‘value’. — Possibility

This is very obviously a misunderstanding. Those particular values which are called "variables" are not important to the hurricane itself, but are important to the human understanding of the hurricane. The human beings are modeling the storm as a "system" and these are the variables which are important to them in their understanding of the storm. They are not important to the storm itself, because the storm has no intention, purpose, and doesn't care about anything whatsoever.

Then how can you be sure you’re on the right road, or even heading in the right direction? — Possibility

As I said, intuition. And, very often I am on the wrong track, that's the problem with intuition, it's not super reliable. However, the open mind which is a necessary aspect of seeking the truth allows a person to readily change one's mind, as the need arises. That's the Socratic position of not knowing, the lack of certitude provides for an open mind.

That feeling of ‘repugnance’ is intuition telling you there’s something amiss, but there's no determining from affect alone whether what’s amiss is in what you’re describing or the system you’re using to describe it. And you can only critique the system from outside it. So what are you afraid of? — Possibility

I don't follow this. The whole point of dualism is to allow for this position, that the thing being described, and the system describing it, are distinct. You reject dualism, but now you use a premise which requires dualism, "you can only critique the system from outside it", to make your argument. Without dualism, there is no such thing as outside the system, so the describing would be done with the same system which is being described. I believe this is why you seem to have a hard time with the category separation between the representation and the thing represented resulting in the category mistake I've pointed to. An activity, as a type, a description, or a model, does not require a particular thing which is active, because any specific activity is a type, a universal. But a particular activity, meaning a particular instance of activity, always involves something which is active.

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So why cling to the goal? Why not try to understand the complexity as it exists? — Possibility

Contradictions are impossible to understand. When they arise, we must respect the fact that the method being used, which creates contradiction, is faulty, rather than trying endlessly to understand what is impossible to understand.

M-M explicitly disproved that notion. If there was a substance, then M-M would have detected it. That's what eventually led to relativity. If I'm misunderstanding it then please explain. — EricH

What M-M disproved is that the relationship between massive objects, bodies, and the ether, is not as was hypothesized. That does not prove that there is no substance which is waving, it just proves that the relationship between massive objects and the substance which is waving, is not as they thought it ought to have been. I think you can read this on Wikipedia, or other online explanations of M-M.

Then, instead of trying to determine the proper relation between massive objects and the ether, the physics community decided just to dispense with the ether altogether, because that facilitated the application of Einsteinian relativity.

Ok, suppose space is the "substance there which is waving". After all, the gravitational wave observations (combined with electromagnetic observations of the source of detected gravitational wave observations) provide some pretty good evidence for space waving. — wonderer1

All right then, do you understand that a "wave" consists of an interaction of the particles which make up the substance which is the medium? So if "space" is the substance within which the waves exist, then space must be made up of particles.

That some people are highly motivated without feeling duty says nothing about the power of duty, just as the claim that, say, there are more roses in a garden than any other type of flower is not affected by the claim that there are other types of flowers in a garden. That this "garden" could hypothetically have a different composition I grant, but all of the flowers need not be roses for most of them to be. — ToothyMaw

OK, so now it's your turn to demonstrate why you believe that this particular flower, the one you call "duty", is more prolific than all the rest. I don't see how the Third Wave experiment demonstrates this.

The article says "As the movement grew outside his class and began to number in the hundreds, the experiment had spiraled out of control. " There are millions, billions of people in the world, "outside his class", "hundreds" does not represent a majority. This is more like Trumpian logic, 'I have thousands of people at my rallies, therefore the majority supports me'. You might say 'I see hundreds of people motivated by duty, therefore duty is the single strongest motivator'. You have not provided the premises required to produce your conclusion.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but the Michelson–Morley experiment disproved that idea. — EricH

I don't think you misunderstand me, but I do think you misunderstand what the M-M experiments disproved.

I contend that duty is perhaps the single strongest motivator for action I can think of, whether it is duty to the tribe, an ideal, a spouse, etc., and should be nurtured wherever it exists to good ends. — ToothyMaw

As others have indicated,, , this is really incorrect. I would characterize the motivator for action as "ambition", or even "spirit", but that's just my personal preference of words. The important point is that the motivator has personal a base, not a relation to something external like "duty".

"Duty" is better described as a director of action rather than a motivator of action. A person with no sense of duty might still be highly motivated to act. So if you want to talk about "duty", you ought to be able to make this distinction, between being motivated to act, ambitious, and being directed in your actions by some sort of sense of duty. Then we could discuss how ambitions are directed. Accordingly, the following paragraph doesn't make much sense:

Soldiers, office clerks, garbage men, engineers - everyone craves duty, and those who can deliver the correct conditions are the most potent agents. Some say that the people might need to rise up in the United States because we are increasingly having to choose between fascism and neoliberalism - all the while the oligarchs line their pockets. — ToothyMaw

What do you think "everyone craves duty" actually means? People crave things, and this may or may not influence their ambition. It "may not" influence their ambition in cases of people who are lazy, or something like that, and so they still do not act on their cravings. But how would you say that "duty" relates to what people crave? Not only do I see no necessary relation here, but I see no relationship at all, due to the subjective nature of individuals and cravings. It's just like as if you are saying 'everyone craves chocolate ice cream'. It's really wrong on multiple levels.

And yes, I do maintain that duty is the most powerful motivator, as it can override just about any other consideration if the human is manipulated correctly. Remember the Third Wave experiment? — ToothyMaw

If the "Third Wave experiment" supports what you say, then maybe you need to describe it.

I do think the usual idea of the fields is that the waves aren't distinct from the field, the waves are literally perturbations of the field. I don't know if there's any conception of quantum fields where the waves are somehow distinct from the field, never heard of that idea before. — flannel jesus

I think what is needed here is a clear understanding of what is a "field". Wikipedia tells me that it is a geometrical representation which assigns values to various points in space. The values will
change as time passes.

What I would say, is that the changing values of the field are a representation of the real wave motion (a motion which would require an ether). However, there is no ether identified, so there is no real wave motion which can be identified. However, the field representation does show the transmission of energy through the thing represented as a field. So many physicists are inclined to just think of the field as the thing which is real, and forget about the real waves which the field represents.

I find it strange, the way you seem to get hung up on words being used in ways you disapprove of. Analogies play an important role in the way humans communicate things with each other and the use of "wave" to convey somewhat analogical things about electromagnetic fields has been going on for longer than either of us have been alive. It looks to me like you are fighting a losing battle.

What do you see as a problem, with having a notion of "wave" that needs nothing more than space to propagate through? — wonderer1

I've studied enough physics to know that a wave is an activity of a substance. That's simply what a wave is, and all waves are understood through modeling the movement of the particles within that substance. That's what a wave is, a specific type of activity of a substance which involves an interaction of its particles. Therefore a wave in empty space is simply impossible because there would be no particles there to make the wave. Yet we know from observation, rainbows, and other refractions, that light must consist of waves, therefore there must be a substance there which is waving.

Importance and significance implies value, yes - but be careful not to assume that all value is judged by human minds, or according to a single system of logic. And no, importance and significance (value) can be meaningful simply in relation to other values. — Possibility

I definitely agree that value is not necessarily judged according to one system of logic, that's why values are commonly said to be subjective. But what else, other than human beings, do you think is capable of making value judgements? Would this be some other animals? I can agree that animals, maybe even plants, are capable of doing something which we might call making value judgements. Is this what you had in mind?

Why must importance and significance only be judged in relation to human minds? — Possibility

Human minds are the type of thing which makes value judgements. We know that from experience. It is possible that other types of things. like animals and plants have a sort of mind which could make a value judgement. Is this what you are suggesting?

When value is recognised as a variable (as in mathematical logic), it is freed from the affected judgement of human minds (that assume they are logical), and perceived only in potential relation to other variables. — Possibility

No, recognizing a value as a variable does not free it from the judgement of a human mind, because a human mind is making that judgement to recognize it as a variable.

I agree in principle with much of what you say following this, but I have difficulty with this:

We need to include non-human matter in discussions about agency, importance and significance. — Possibility

I don't understand how you can talk about non-human matter, importance or significance without referencing God. Suppose some other creatures, plants and animals are capable of making value judgements (this would be a requirement if we are going to talk about what is important to them, they would have to be able to make such a judgement, because we cannot decide for them what is important to them, just like I cannot decide for you what is important to you). Don't you see that there would be so many contradictions between the various creatures, concerning what is important? Creatures eat other creatures. How do you propose that we could ever sort out this massive mess of conflicting matters (things of importance) without referencing some sort overlord judge, like God? Clearly us human beings are not capable of making such decisions and judgements, because what is important to me already conflicts with what is important to you. So each of us is going to insist "I am the one to decide what is important".

This requires a new logical framework, most noticeably in the area of grammatical logic. But this is not a matter of quantum mechanics dictating changes to grammatical logic, but rather bringing discursive practices into the intra-active process, acknowledging their significance as inseparable from the material practices of ‘doing science’. Because I think grammatical logic, properly understood and configured, is actually the key to our sustainable future. — Possibility

But above, you argued for separate values, by recognizing values as variable. How can you argue the two opposing sides of the coin, variable values which are separable (above), and now, values which are inseparable form other values. What makes a value non-variable is its relations with other values. These relations set or fix the value within a concept. If there was such a thing as a separate, variable value, it would just be free floating, not attached to any other value to set its worth as "x value", therefore it would actually have no value at all.

Consider that a hurricane consists of both actual and potential matter, as well as actual and potential form. — Possibility

Sorry, I cannot decipher what you are trying to say here. As far as I know, a hurricane does not make value judgements, so we cannot say that a hurricane consists of matter, by your definition. There is nothing which is inherently important to the hurricane itself, because the hurricane makes no such judgements, there is only what a person, or persons might say is important to the hurricane, but this is a completely different matter. It is an importance which people impose on another, and that is what produces contradiction, and conflict, such attempts at forcing one's values on others.

If you have to keep referring to a ‘living human mind’ or a ‘divine being’ to make the system work, then you have a self-shaped gap in your understanding. Humans are not necessary beings. — Possibility

It is you who has chosen to define "matter" as importance or significance, and this is what requires reference to a mind which makes a value judgement. I had a different way of defining matter, which did not require referencing a mind which makes value judgements in order to understand the concept of "matter". Mine is the traditional concept of "matter", adopted by the sciences. The problem you refer to here is a problem with your ontology, your proposed definition of "matter", not mine.

You keep trying to explain events in terms of objects, but it’s not the same structure. ‘Active’ and ‘actual’ have different qualitative structures for an event and for an object. Try to explain “acceleration” without reference to an object. Try to describe an entire acceleration event. You cannot use your current understanding of grammatical logic to describe the event - you are forced to change your perspective. But do you even notice that you’ve changed perspective? Do you recognise that you are describing an instantiated observation of the event, when I’ve asked for a description of the actual event? How can you describe ‘acceleration’ by simply describing an object at the point it begins to move? How is this describing actual acceleration? — Possibility

Like I've told you, and explained why to you, a number of times already, a particular "event", or "activity", without something which is active, is incoherent as a category mistake. You claim otherwise, but have provided nothing to back up your bald assertions. You simply continue to deny the obvious.

No, fields have been previously assumed to be the property of something, but evidence from quantum experiments has brought this assumption into question. Your first clue should have been your appeal of ‘always known to be’. You have to remember that we’re talking about relational structures of significant variables as active (not actual) entities in a four-dimensional system. — Possibility

Actually, quantum mechanics has provided absolutely no evidence of fields which are not the property of something. What is the case is that the failure of quantum mechanics in its ability to provide an understanding of reality, has made people speculate about the possibility of such fields. That's merely speculation which is unsupported by science.

Values don’t exist in a single hierarchy, anymore than all events exist on a linear timeline. — Possibility

I know, this is obvious, and it's the reason why there is contradiction and conflict. The goal is a single hierarchy to dispel conflict and contradiction, but it is clearly not the case within the world we live in.

How can you be so certain you ‘know the truth’ of reality, if you cannot use it? Philosophy is the love of wisdom - wisdom being knowledge of correct action, not simply knowledge. — Possibility

We are seeking the truth, not claiming to know it. As philosophers we apprehend that the truth about reality is a long way off, but that does not stop us from heading in that direction. It's a march down a long road, which provides nothing useful to us who are doing the marching.

And yet you automatically exclude what doesn’t adhere to the doctrine of grammatical logic, despite being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science. That sounds like blindly following doctrine to me. — Possibility

Contradiction is a repugnancy, and repugnancy is not determined by grammatical logic, but intuition. So it's a matter of adhering to intuition, not a matter of adhering to grammatical logic. But naturally grammatical logic is intuitive. as grammatical logic is derived from intuition.

Mathematics and science are both so full of contradictions its pathetic. So your claim of "being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science", is nonsense because the various different logical structures of mathematics are not consistent with each other, nor are the various different logical structures of science.

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On your view, why does it matter what material the conductor is composed of, or what the cross sectional area of the conductor is? — wonderer1

I made a reply to tim wood's statement of opinion "the electron is particle-like, and only cloudlike in the sense that it moves around really, really fast." On the other hand, it is my opinion that the transmission of energy through a field cannot be adequately represented as particles moving really really fast. In fact, what I've been arguing is that the representation of such energy transmission as through particles is completely wrong. This is compatible with what flannel jesus is arguing, that the outcome of Bells theorem is that the classical representation of energy as the property of bodies (particles in this case) is fundamentally inadequate.

Of course "the body" of the conductor plays a role, and that's why I argued elsewhere in the "Entangled Embodied Subjectivity" thread, that it makes no sense to talk about "just the field", as if the field could exist without the body. This specific problem, I believe is due to the deficiencies in our understanding and conceptualization of what is called "the field".

Since there is no ether identified as the medium within which the waves exist, the only substance which this concept is grounded in is the body which the field is a property of. Establishing the correct relationship between body and field is problematic in current conceptualizations. If the ether which is logically required to support the real existence of waves, was identified such that its real properties could be tested, this would allow us to conceptualize independent existence of the waves, enabling us to properly conceive of the waves as prior in time to the body, and therefore the appearance of a body (particles, atoms, molecules, etc.) as property of the waves. But this implies a conception of the waves which would be completely distinct from the current "field".

Matter (noun): 1. physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy.
2. a subject or situation under consideration.
(verb): 1. be important or significant.

I would say that ‘matter’ is not so much a concept as the human conceptualisation of an idea. In reference to things, matter is physical substance, but also mental substance. But in reference to activity, to matter is to be important or significant. You can’t just ignore these additional aspects of the conceptualisation of ‘matter’. And you can’t declare them ‘different substances’ without an understanding of how they relate. — Possibility

OK, I see how you want to define "matter". You define it as the verb in the definitions above, "to be important or significant". Do you agree, that "importance and significance" implies a judgement of value? Importance and significance only have meaning in relation to something which is valuable.

First of all, I didn’t say that ‘immaterial’ implies inactive. I said it implies that the activity in question doesn’t matter. What you’re arguing is that the only way this kind of activity can matter is if it actually matters to living human minds FIRST. Quantum mechanics refutes this, and so does neuroscience. — Possibility

So I cannot understand what you are trying to say here. What "matters" is what is important or significant, and this is only judged in relation to human minds. Why do you believe that quantum mechanics refutes this? Does it demonstrate importance and significance in relation to values which are non-human? What are you saying?

The first assumption is that ‘categories’, with their determinate boundaries and properties, divide up reality with mutually exclusive accuracy. So, according to Aristotle, a particular event cannot be both potential and actual. — Possibility

This is another bad misrepresentation. Categories are not mutually exclusive in the existence of real things, like dichotomies are. That is the whole point of using categories rather than dichotomies, to allow for the overlapping of concepts, which would not be allowed by dichotomous divisions. So in Aristotle's hylomorphism, physical objects consist of both matter (potential), and form (actual). In fact, a particular is by definition both. Yes, "potential" is distinct, as a separate category from "actual", so that one is not the other, but the categories don't serve to divide up reality, they serve to divide up the conceptual structure for the purpose of better understanding reality.

For example, we might have the categories of sight and sound, and we could divide up a conceptual structure accordingly. But this is not to divide up reality, as the same thing might be both seen and heard, though the property which is heard is distinct from the property seen, according to that conceptual structure. it is a tool to help us understand reality, but if you think that it is actually dividing up reality, that is a misunderstanding.

But that necessary event need not have become fully actual prior to all other events in the series. It only needs to have begun. In which case said necessary event - the universe itself - is being, and even now, still in the process of becoming. So there is no reason for the universe in its becoming to be denied agency, except that this affects us in a way that impacts our homeostasis. — Possibility

I do not know what you might mean by "fully actual" here. If an event has "begun", it is active, therefore actual. To suggest that there is a time when the event is partially active, yet not fully active is incoherent. Take the concept of "acceleration" for example. Suppose something is assumed to be at rest, it is not active. At some point in time it begins to move, accelerate. At that point, it is fully active, though it hasn't reached its top speed. We do not say that it is nof fully active, or not fully actual. As soon as it has motion it is active, actual, and it make no sense to say that it is partially actual, but not fully actual.

So I really don't know what you're trying to say here. If the supposed event is not occurring, not actual, then it requires a cause to become actual. That cause itself must be actual, and the cause is prior to the actuality of the event which is the effect. So if the universe is that event, then there must be something actual which is prior to it as the cause of its actuality. We cannot simply say that the potential for the universe was prior to the universe, because that pure potential could not act to cause the universe, so there must have been something more than just the potential, there must have been something actual. There must be something actual which was prior to the universe.

True and mathematical Newtonian time exists; it is a real entity; it is the gravitational field — Carlo Rovelli

Time cannot be reduced to gravitation, that is a misconception.

For his part, Aristotle is right to say that ‘when’ and ‘where’ are always located in relation to something. But this something can also be just the field, the spatio-temporal entity of Einstein, because this is a dynamic and concrete entity, like all those in reference to which, as Aristotle rightly observed, we are capable of locating ourselves. — Carlo Rovelli

And this is also a misconception, because a field must itself be a property of something. So we cannot truthfully say "this something can also be just the field", because fields are always known to be the property of something which creates the field, therefore to assume "just the field" is in violation of physical evidence and inductive reasoning.

Understanding is not about grounding concepts in just one ‘logical’ system — Possibility

Yes understanding is about having one logical system, because that is what produces consistency and coherency. To have multiple different conceptual systems which are unrelated allows for contradiction and incoherency, and this is misunderstanding. The only way to eradicate contradiction, incoherency, and misunderstanding is to have one overall system within which all the parts are coherent. To have parts out side one system, which are incoherent to that system, but are allowed to be maintained because they are coherent within a different system, is a symptom of misunderstanding.

To put this into your perspective, the perspective of "matter", or "what matters", what is required is a hierarchy of values. What is important or significant is determined relative to something valued. But when two competing values produce contradiction, or inconsistency in what is important, or not important, then we must appeal to a higher value to make the judgement as to whether the thing is important or not.

‘Good dialectics seeking truth’ is just seeking to ‘support the usefulness of their own discipline’. Surely you see this? — Possibility

Not at all, truth is sought for the sake of knowing the truth, not for some usefulness. That is why philosophy is known as being useless. Surely you must see this?

Compatibility does not require a ‘higher purpose’, only a broader understanding of each discipline. — Possibility

This is clearly not true, as explained above. There is very clear evidence of a difference between various disciplines as to what is important, what matters. When it is the case that what is important to one discipline is not important to another discipline, there is incompatibility. The "broader understanding" which you refer to is just a higher purpose, a higher value, which can arbitrate the incompatibility.

To declare otherwise is to put your faith in a narrow ideology, to blindly follow doctrine. I honestly thought you were more intelligent than than, and I’m a little disappointed at all this pontificating. What is truth if it isn’t — Possibility

To seek the truth is not to "blindly follow doctrine", in fact it is the very opposite of that.

As to cause, one of the basic presuppositions of Newtonian science, Newton held that some things were caused and some things were due to the operation of law — tim wood

What you propose here is a distinction between things which occur because they are caused, and things which occur because there is a law operating. This places "things which are occurring because there is a law operating" into a separate category from "things which are occurring because there is a cause". The problem with this proposed separation is the problem of induction which I pointed to already. As Hume demonstrated, these "laws" are inductive, and induction does not provide the necessity required for that category "things which are occurring because there is a law operating", to completely explain any activity.

In simple terms, "there is a law operating" is insufficient to account for the occurrence of things which are said to be "due to" the operation of the law, because the relationship between these two, the occurrence of things and the law, is not one of necessity. That was Hume's point, "law" is an inductive conclusion, and induction cannot ensure that every occurrence will be according to that law. This is why Newton who was trained through Church run institutions, in the traditional manner, supported his laws with "the Will of God". Because "the operation of law" on its own, is insufficient to necessitate any contingent occurrence, the Will of God is needed to underly "law" as substance. You remove "the Will of God" from your representation, but then it does not correctly portray what Newton believed. Newton believed that "the operation of law" required the Will of God. So things which "were due to the operation of law" were understood by Newton to also be due to the Will of God.

I think you need to take a good look at the nature of "contingency", "contingent events". Suppose there is an apple hanging on a tree, and then the apple falls. You'd be inclined to say that when the apple is falling, the falling is due to the operation of law. However, prior to falling, the apple was hanging. And to transition from hanging to falling requires a cause, a bird pecked it, the stem rooted, whatever. Now, you ought to be able to see that "the operation of law" is insufficient as an explanation for any contingent event because a cause is still required at the boundary, which marks the temporal beginning of any event which occurs according to the operation of law.

So we might take a bigger event with a much longer temporal duration, than the falling apple, like the orbiting of the earth around the sun. You'd say that activity is due to the operation of law. However, just like the falling apple, this event is not eternal, it must have a temporal beginning, a cause. That every event such as this requires a cause for its existence, and cannot be explained simply as "due to the operation of law", is the reason why we call them "contingent". Even if the event is according to, or consistent with, a law, it still requires a cause, and at this point necessity was lacking, hence it is contingent. The same principle holds for quantum events of extremely short duration. Any occurrence is contingent, and requires a cause, it cannot simply be said to be due to the operation of law. This implies a very large number of causes in a very short period of time, to account for the reality of all these contingent events.

But you it seems would take a bit of snake, and of newt and frog and bat and dog, and some other ingredients, and boil up a potion that you would call knowledge, but in fact is nonsense or worse. So, for any of your "conclusions" in your posts, never mind all your qualifications and variant perspectives, how do you know? — tim wood

I have no idea what you are talking about here. I didn't talk about snakes, newts, or frogs, that's all in your imagination. And so is your assessment that what I said is "nonsense or worse". Furthermore, your question here is incoherent, you ask me to tell you how I know, without reference to my qualifications.

I'm afraid your source is not very good. It seems to be mistaking the skin effect which is applicable to AC signals, for a general rule about electrical conduction.

In either the AC or DC case, electrical current travels through the conductor. That link provides some explanation as to why in the AC case the conduction of current becomes more and more confined to the outermost portions of the conductor as the frequency of the AC signal increases. — wonderer1

Your assertion is not very convincing wonderer1. I've read a fair bit of material authored by Richard Feynman, much is available on the net. And, he is very explicit in saying that the flow of current is not in the body of the conducting material, because the electrons are freed from the atoms, and the flow is therefore in the field.

It seems to on any macro-scale. The "seems to" not just a throwaway phrase, but rather a pretty good clue as to what is, er, seems to be, the case. The real trick here is to not use the "I don't knows" as grounds for knowing. — tim wood

What seems to be, often is not what is the case. The issue is the nature of what has been called "persistence" in this thread. And although we take persistence for granted, as indicated by Newton's first law of motion, it is demonstrably not a necessity, not necessary. That things will continue to be, as they have been in the past, is not a necessity. This is what Hume pointed to with his discussion of causation and the problem of induction, the necessity required for solid, sound conclusion of certainty, just is not there. Even Newton stated that his first law of motion was dependent on the will of God. He noticed that what this law takes for granted, that a body will continue to move, as time passes, with the same motion that it had in the past, unless caused to change, is not a statement of necessity. It is an inductive conclusion, and such conclusions lack necessity, as Hume argued.

So there is another way to look at the persistence of objects, a way which does not take for granted the continuity of existence, the persistence, which is expressed by Newton's first law. When we do not take this law for granted, then we see that what is expressed by this law requires a cause. So for example, if a body is going to continue to move in a predictable, uniform way, then at each moment as time passes, there must be a cause which makes it be at that particular predictable place. From this perspective, we do not take for granted that the body will move in a predictable way, as described by Newton's law, we understand that there must be a cause of it moving in that predictable way, and so this cause is acting on the body at each moment of passing time, making it exist at the place where the prediction dictates.

And you know this how? — tim wood

I know this by inductive reasoning. Every real physical body, object, or thing, has a location. If it does not have a location it is a fictional thing. If you are not inclined to believe that inductive reasoning can give sound premises, and you recognize that it is lacking in necessity, then you are in a good position to understand what I wrote above.

My private opinion is that the electron is particle-like, and only cloudlike in the sense that it moves around really, really fast. And it would not offend my scientific sensibilities if someone were to suggest that maybe the particle-like in its motion sets up a kind of standing shock wave, though in what medium or made of what I don't know. — tim wood

Why then does electrical energy travel through the field around copper wires, instead of traveling through the copper wires, where the electron particles are supposedly located? Or do you think that particles of the wire, the electrons are actually outside the wire?

However, electrical energy does not travel though the wire as sound travels through air but instead always travels in the space outside of the wires. This is because electric energy is composed of electric and magnetic fields which are created by the moving electrons, but which exist in the space surrounding the wires. — http://scienceline.ucsb.edu/getkey.php?key=3199

"Validated"? I'm not sure this will be a useful discussion. It seems you want to commit the fallacy of, "Because I do not know, I know."

And if you were honest about it, you'd have taken note of the quoted remark above that make clear that the term - and the concepts - of spin are problematic, — tim wood

No, I'm being honest, it's not a matter of "because I do not know...". I'm going by what flannel jesus said:

Then, Bohr, Planck, Heisenberg, Schrodinger and friends introduced QM to the world. They said that there are some properties of particles that, prior to measurement, we can't actually tell a Classical story about. If we shoot a particle at t=0, through a double slit for example, and measure where that particle landed at t=100, we might be tempted to ask the question "ok, so where was that particle at t=50?" If the world worked classically, then there would be an objectively true answer to that question - even if we as human beings couldn't find an answer. If we can't find an answer, that's just our own ignorance, but there still *is* an answer. QM said, actually, there *is not* an answer. Or at least, not a *singular, definite answer* -- that's the phrasing I like to use. Prior to measurement, some of these properties of things like Photons and Electrons do not in fact have singular definite answers - not even to God. If God himself were to peer into the universe and look at that particle at t=50, he wouldn't have a singular definite answer to the question "where was that particle?" (Please note that I'm using God as a narrative tool, I'm not a theist. "God" is just a stand in for the idea of some external entity who could, in principle, know the world as it really is - could answer any question about any system without disturbing that system). — flannel jesus

If the particle has no location at t50, then there is no particle at that time. Why is that not obvious to you tim?. There is no such thing as an object like a particle, without a spatial location. To accept otherwise is to venture into a world filled with magic.

The detectors reliably and consistently measure something, called in this case spin - and it is at the moment irrelevant as to what spin is - and this spin deemed to be an aspect or quality of the particle itself. — tim wood

Let's be more precise with our terminology, let's just say that the detectors detect something. Because there is uncertainty between the relation of position and momentum, we ought not even call this a "measurement". Due to the uncertainty relation, we cannot accurately say what is being measured, so it's a stretch to even say it is a measurement.

And, because of this uncertainty, the concept referred to by "spin" is not a property of anything at all. It's just a mathematical way of describing what the detector detected. So if we go ahead and look at your proposition 'This spin is an aspect or quality of the particle itself', we must designate it as a false and misleading proposition. The detector is not really detecting any properties of any particles. It is detecting something which is called "spin", but the concept associated with this term in no way is an accurate representation of what is actually being detected

Denial of the particle having this spin except when it is measured begs the question as to how the particle knows it's being measured and reacts, and what, exactly, triggers that knowledge and reaction, not to speak of the time that all takes. — tim wood

Failure to recognize that there is not even a particle being detected, and that these dimensional-based (classical-based) concepts such as "spin" are woefully inadequate for describing the wave activity being detected, is misleading you here. I am not denying that the particle has "spin", I am denying that there is a particle. The concept, "spin", which refers to what is detected, does not properly represent what is actually detected, therefore the existence of the thing (particle) which is assumed to have that property is not substantiated (if you do not like "validated").

It seems you fail to distinguish between spin and "spin." Forget the ordinary English word "spin". And for clarity's sake just for you in this post let's call the other spxn. Let's suppose what is actually the case, that certain people use the term that we call here spxn to represent a set of ideas that they have collectively, and that they can convey to each other by speaking and writing the word spxn. In as much as I am not one of those people, I will leave to them the choice of their own words for their own use; and I (shall) assume the the word is efficacious when used by them among themselves. So much for the word — tim wood

It's not quite correct to ask for such a separation in the use of "spin", because no matter how you look at it spin is still a type of angular momentum, and this is a vector concept. The point I was making is that such dimensional concepts are not adequate for explaining the properties of particles which are assumed to be non-dimensional. Read the following from Wikipedia:

The three-dimensional angular momentum for a point particle is classically represented as a pseudovector r × p, the cross product of the particle's position vector r (relative to some origin) and its momentum vector; the latter is p = mv in Newtonian mechanics. Unlike linear momentum, angular momentum depends on where this origin is chosen, since the particle's position is measured from it. — Wikipedia: Angular momentum

Notice, "pseudovector", because the principles of classical 3-d vectors do not hold for these particles. So consider Flannel Jesus' explanation. The existence of the particle cannot be validated during the entire time between t1 and t100. It is only validated at these two time points through measurement of those properties like "spin". However, these concepts which make up those supposed properties are not adequate to measure what is really there at that time. So, since the existence of the particle is only known by determining these properties, at those two times, and these properties do not even accurately represent what is there at those times, and the indication is that there is no determinable particle between those times, then why should we even think that there is any particle at any time whatsoever? These dimensional concept like "spin" are misleading us.

I thought you were opposed to such antics. — NOS4A2

That was an unsound conclusion you made, as you are prone.

I choose my actions according to the situation, so I can be mean when meanness appears necessary. Go on now, hit me if you will. I'll suffer the pain but admit to having started the fight, rather than suing you for damages.

Maybe I'm misreading you, MU. It seems to me you're objecting to the use of the English word "spin" to refer to something meaningful to a technical user as a term of art. If that's the case, why? — tim wood

Yes, you very much were misreading me. I was talking about the deficiencies of the concept which is labeled with the word "spin", as stated in the first sentence of my post: "'Spin' is a highly deficient concept." The choice of word to name the concept is irrelevant. All I can say is try rereading, and stay focused this time. That ought not be difficult because it's not a long post.

..proving to me.. — NOS4A2

We've seen a lot about proving things to you. No one can prove anything to you, which you do not want proven. But anything which you want proven, you readily prove it to yourself.

"When certain elementary particles move through a magnetic field, they are deflected in a manner that suggests they have the properties of little magnets. In the classical world, a charged, spinning object has magnetic properties that are very much like those exhibited by these elementary particles. Physicists love analogies, so they described the elementary particles too in terms of their 'spin.'

"Unfortunately, the analogy breaks down, and we have come to realize that it is misleading to conjure up an image of the electron as a small spinning object. Instead we have learned simply to accept the observed fact that the electron is deflected by magnetic fields. If one insists on the image of a spinning object, then real paradoxes arise; unlike a tossed softball, for instance, the spin of an electron never changes, and it has only two possible orientations. In addition, the very notion that electrons and protons are solid 'objects' that can 'rotate' in space is itself difficult to sustain, given what we know about the rules of quantum mechanics. The term 'spin,' however, still remains." — tim wood

Just as I said, the so-called "spin" is not a property of a particle at all. The 3-d geometrical representation which is called "spin" cannot be the property of a non-dimensional point.

May I know what you were drinking before you wrote your post? I should like to try some for those occasions when I too would like to loosen my grip on reality. — tim wood

As you've already indicated, we ought not focus on realism, so reality might be completely irrelevant to this subject. I believe that now might be the optimum time for you to go a ahead and loosen that grip on your assumed "reality". So, if you're interested in purchasing some of my special intelligence boosting juice, you'll need to send the money first, then I'll decide whether you're likely to benefit from it.

This is a formidable challenge. Do you think this makes Leibniz Law untenable entirely? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's not that the law is "untenable", because it, like the law of identity, holds, is applicable if it is ever required in argument, and is never proven false. But both, Leibniz' law, and the law of identity, suffer the problem of induction, which means that they are never proven true. So they are convenient assumptions used to defend against sophistry, which could be said to be sophisms themselves.

Or can we talk about entities' properties without any reference to an observer? If the latter, can't we do the same sort of abstraction and apply the Principle to the set of all possible discernments? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can talk about the properties of entities without reference to an observer, and we commonly do. Unfortunately, an observer is always implied within such talk, and this implication is not always respected by everyone who looks at this issue. So, when you proceed onward, and talk about "discernments", it becomes evident that what you are talking about is an act which discerns a property. Since this act is necessarily the act of an observer, the implication of an observer is even stronger, more evident.

That is, within the set of all possible discernments, there is no case in which x ≠ y, thus x = y. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Since discernments are acts of observers, this claim makes an unjustifiable proposition about the nature of observers, as I said in my last post, which is blatantly false. The reality of hallucinations and such features of observers, demonstrates that this proposition would be false.

All possible discernments are not "subjective discernments,"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not see where you get the idea that what you would call "a discernment", could be anything other than the product of an act of discernment, which is the act of a subject. Because of this, I do not see how you propose the possibility of a discernment which is not a subjective discernment. Each and every discernment is produced by a subject, therefore all possible discernments (by induction only) are subjective discernments.

You might propose a form of discernment which is not subjective, but this would violate inductive reasoning, rendering it as a useless tool within your argument, so that your whole argument which is based on induction would be undermined, by allowing that a very strong inductive principle could be violated.

Perhaps this trivially reduces the principle to Leibniz Law, but I don't think it does because Leibniz Law leaves open the possibility of bare haecceities of difference, differences that never make any possible phenomenological difference, which is what the Principle denies. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Leibniz' law does not leave open the possibility of differences which make no difference. Instead, you ought to recognize that what the law intends, is that there is no such thing as a difference which makes no difference, this itself would be contradictory. If an observer notices something as a difference, then by that very fact that the difference has been noticed as a difference, the difference has already, necessarily, made a difference to that observer. The law does not speak of possibilities, and I think that is where you misrepresent it. It is based in an impossibility, which is an exclusion of possibility. This is the impossibility that an entity which could only be identified as itself, could also be identified as something else.

Different because the respective spins are not limited to opposites. — tim wood

"Spin" is a highly deficient concept. It is an attempt to represent non-dimensional, non-spatial activity which is understood to occur within the internal of a non-dimensional point (a somewhat incoherent idea), with a three-dimensional representation. So the property which is represented by "spin" is not adequately represented in this way, and restricting the possibilities to two opposites will ensure that the law of excluded middle is always violated.