I choose "walking across the room" as my example. — Ludwig V

OK, now do you agree that a person must have the capacity to walk across the room prior to actually walking across the room? And, this is not the capacity to learn how to walk, because the person has already learned that. Despite the fact that we might not be able to judge that this person had the capacity to walk across the room, until after the person actually demonstrates this ability by walking across the room, it is also a simple fact that the person must have had the capacity to do it, before carrying out the act.

I asked myself whether you intend what you say to non-actions, to what are called dispositions. — Ludwig V

No, I consider "dispositions" to be something completely different. A disposition is an arrangement of parts. And, if a specific arrangement of parts inclines a person to act in a specific way, then the disposition plays the role of a restriction on a capacity. A capacity, and the restrictions on a capacity are very distinct. So for example, a habit may be a sort of disposition. The habit inclines the person with the potential, or capacity, to actualize it in a specific way, the habit of walking across the room for example. This disposition restricts the capacity, which could act in many different ways, walk to many different places for example, inclining the person to act in the one specific way, out of the many possible ways. So a disposition is somewhat opposite to a capacity, the latter being a freedom, the former being a restriction.

This is a fake puzzle, based on the fact that we tend to use "capacity" in an ambiguous way. We say of an infant that cannot yet walk, or of someone that has not yet learnt to drive that they cannot walk or drive, but that they have to capacity to learn to walk, or drive and in that sense, can walk or drive. — Ludwig V

Here you demonstrate misunderstanding. The ability to walk across the room, which necessarily preexists the physical act of walking across the room, (as the skill to do it), is very specific, by those terms. The more general "capacity to learn to walk" is completely different. Being more general, as a capacity to learn something, the same capacity is also the capacity to learn all sorts of different things. So it is not properly called the capacity to learn to walk, because that unnecessarily restricts it to learning to walk, when it actually could manifest in the learning of many different things. When a person learns to walk, that capacity to learn many different things, is restricted in a specific way, as a sort of dispositioning, so that a more specific capacity results, the capacity to walk. And, the even more specific, the capacity to walk across the room.

The capacity to learn or otherwise acquire, as skill is distinct from the exercise of that skill. Your infinite regress, I'm afraid, is little more than a pun. — Ludwig V

Now you are simply avoiding the issue by leaving out the logically necessary intermediary between the capacity to learn a skill, and the exercising of that skill once it is learned. The intermediary which you neglect, is having the skill without actually exercising it. I have learned how to walk, I have the capacity to walk across the room, but I am not currently exercising this capacity. This capacity, which we might call the skill itself, comes after learning the skill, but it must always exist prior to exercising the skill.

I do not know how you can describe an infinite regress as a pun. That makes no sense, but I think you must see it that way due to the misunderstanding which you demonstrate.

Except that we acquire many skills by practice. The infant learns to walk by trying and failing and gradually getting better at it. We learn to drive by sitting in the driving seat and trying to drive and gradually getting better at it. This learning process is built on what we already can do, but which we have not learnt to do. Infants can do various things from birth and even before birth. These are the result of the physical development of the body, and can be compared to the tendency of the stone to resist pressure - that is, they are dispositions, not capacities. — Ludwig V

This attempt to reduce capacities to dispositions does not address the issue at all. It just demonstrates a basic misunderstanding, or possibly an intentional effort to avoid the issue. The issue is that the capacity to walk, drive, or whatever specific skill you will name, which. as actually having the skill, is necessarily posterior in time to learning the skill, is also necessarily prior in time to carrying out the specified activity. It cannot be reduced to learning the activity, as you seem to propose, because it only exists after the skill is learned. And, it cannot be described in terms of carrying out the specified activity because it is necessarily prior in time to carrying out the activity.

As I explained above, the capacity to learn to see is indeed "prior to" the capacity to see, but is not the same capacity as the capacity to see. — Ludwig V

The issue is that the capacity to see, which is temporally posterior to learning how to see, is necessarily prior in time, to the physical act of seeing. Therefore the capacity to see cannot be reduced to the capacity to learn how to see, nor can it be reduced to the physical activity of seeing.

But surely, the perceiver is only a perceiver as capable of exercising that capacity, just as parents are only parents in relation to their children, even though they are many other things that do not require any such relationship. If they don't have children, they are not parents. — Ludwig V

The two or not quite analogous. Perception is a capacity, as you say, the perceiver is "capable of exercising that capacity". So it is a special type of activity which may be produced. The ability to perform that special activity is what defines "the perceiver". This does not logically require that the perceiver has actually carried out that specific activity yet, as is required with "parent".

The difference, may not seem important at this point, and you will find some philosophers pushing in the other direction, like Wittgenstein, who would define having the ability to 'follow a rule' as someone who has been observed to have followed a specified rule, rather than as someone who has the capacity to follow that rule. But you will see that this sort of mistake (misdirection, or misguided way of looking at such activities) leads to a very serious problem. He then has the problem of trying to figure out at what point the ability to follow the rule comes into existence. Is it after demonstrating the correct action once, twice, or whatever? Furthermore, since the capacity which is understood by 'following a rule' must, from this perspective, come into existence at some point in time, Wittgenstein is faced with the question of what type of capacity exists prior to this. Then each such capacity would be defined by having demonstrated a fulfillment of the required actions, and there would always be a further capacity prior to each action, leading to an infinite regress of capacities prior to the first action, which could not be described as the capacity to perform that observed action.

So Aristotle neatly avoided this problem of infinite regress of potential by defining the potential, or capacity for a specific type of activity as being prior to the activity, in a more absolute sense. From this perspective, the capacity to perceive, what we are calling "the perceiver", must necessarily preexist the act which is implied here by the name, as the act of perception. We must therefore forfeit our empirically based principles to make the understanding of capacities possible. Empiricism infiltrates our thoughts in an attempt to simplify, but it really corrupts our capacity to understand. This corruption of the capacity inclines us to assume that the existence of a "perceiver" requires that an act of perception has already occurred, and such an epistemology leads us to an infinite regress of capacities, rendering these capacities as unintelligible to us. Instead, we must accept the obvious, much more highly, and truly intuitive principle, that the capacity to perceive, which defines "the perceiver" must be prior in time to any act of perception. From here we have a much more realistic way of understanding the relation between the perceived and the perception.

But surely, understanding the capacity requires also understanding the exercise of it? — Ludwig V

So, as outlined above, I would answer "no" to this question. The capacity preexists the exercising of it, therefore analysis of the exercising of it will not provide an adequate understanding. The implied infinite regress will produce infinite discussion, like in this thread. But, as Aristotle showed, any capacity relies on a prior actuality. So understanding the capacity requires understanding the prior actuality which the capacity is based in. This is due to the nature of existence and the passing of time. "Capacity" implies a number of possibilities, while exercising the capacity produces one actuality. The act, which produces one from many, which is exercising the capacity, is not a necessary act, as understood by the concept of free will. It is an act of selecting from possibilities. So the specific act, a specified capacity, must be understood as part of a more general capacity, not by understanding the specific act itself.

You also said that the nervous system was the medium. So if both perceiver and nervous systems (in general) is the medium, then I’m left to assume nervous systems are perceivers in your view. They perceive and are also mediums. But I just don’t know how that can be possible, because much more than a nervous system is required for the act of perceiving. — NOS4A2

Correct, that's why I was careful to begin my discussion of the medium with the qualification "in general". We could start with the eye, or the nose, as the medium for those specific senses. Then we would say that nervous system is the medium for all the senses, "in general". But then you start talking about "the perceiver", and we move to an even more general sense of "the medium" because we see the need to include all the aspects of the living being which support the nervous system, as also required, and therefore part of "the medium".

As for your positioning of perceiver, perceptions, and mediums, it’s too odd for me to think about because it implies the perception (whatever that is) is somewhere outside or behind the perceiver. — NOS4A2

If my way of speaking is foreign to you, making it too difficult to understand, we can drop the discussion, that's fine. But why do you need to imagine a spatial relation between perceiver and perception? It is better to imagine a temporal perspective, as outlined above in my reply to Ludwig. The perceiver is prior to the perception, as necessary to cause it. Therefore the "behind" you refer to is temporal, as after.

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself. — sime

It is the natural outcome of relativity theory, when relativity theory is taken to be true. Relativity is a very useful category of theories which allow activities, events, to be looked at from different perspectives. Each perspective is assigned equal validity. But if we deny that there is anything real, or true, which would serve to provide the principles required to distinguish one perspective as better than another, assuming that equal validity implies equally true, and opt instead for other principles to make that judgement, we end up with model dependent realism.

Mind you, this ‘skill’ without the likes of Bannon and Murdoch, would probably not have taken him far. — Tom Storm

Don't forget his Russian comrades.

I don’t think it can be established that a perceiver is both perceiver and perceived. I — NOS4A2

I didn't say that. I said that the perceiver (in general) is the medium between the perception and the perceived.

I suspect that, given the indirectness theory, that you would say we perceive our nervous systems, and not the sound waves in air. Is this so? — NOS4A2

No, I would not say that. The nervous system, as medium is neither the perception nor the perceived.

I don't see how one can separate three things, perceiver, perceived and perception. They are clearly interdependent, by definition. — Ludwig V

I think a thorough analysis would show that the three are not properly "interdependent". A "perceiver" is necessarily prior to, as logically required for, both "perceived" and "perception", but it is not necessary that a perceiver is actively engaged in that act which involves a perception and a perceived. This puts "perceiver" into a different category, and independent from both those two. "Perceiver" does not necessarily imply the existence of a "perception" or a "perceived", as the perceiver is not necessarily engaged in that activity referred to by the name. This point is very important to Aristotle's biology, as it is the reason why all the capacities, or powers, of living beings are described as potentials, potencies, rather than as actualities. The reality of this fact implies that we must turn to terms other than "perceived" and "perception" to understand "perceiver".

It is neither the perceived, nor the perception, or even a combination of both, which can provide the defining features of the perceiver because the perceiver exists independently of these. As "perceived" and "perception" become incidental to the perceiver in this way, and not necessary to "perceiver", we must turn in another direction, toward what "perceiver" is dependent upon in order to understand the perceiver.

That's why i said threads like this which focus on the question of a direct or indirect relation between perceived and perception are fundamentally misguided. The relation cannot be understood without first developing an adequate understanding of the perceiver, and this requires turning away from the act of perceiving, towards whatever it is which provides the power or capacity for that act.

So, if we start with a proposition which states the nature of the perceiver, then the relation between perceived and perception will follow from this necessarily, as implied by that proposition, without question. And, as explained above, if we want to understand the nature of the perceiver we must turn to principles other than the relation between perceived and perception. Therefore discussions about the relation between perceived and perception are completely unnecessary, leading nowhere, and they will go on endlessly when this is the subject of discussion rather than the nature of the perceiver.

The nervous system is not a medium, though, because it is a part of that which senses—the perceiver—not that which the perceiver senses. I guess my next question is: where does the perceiver begin and end? I doubt appealing to biology can furnish an answer in favor of the indirectness of perception. Sound waves, for example, where the medium is air, contacts the sensitive biology of the ear directly, not indirectly. — NOS4A2

Your question is made irrelevant by the conditions I described. The two described conditions are things perceived, and the perceptions. The perceiver therefore is the medium. There is no need to discuss a beginning and end to the perceiver unless we make the medium, i.e. the perceiver, our subject. But if the medium, perceiver, is made to be the subject of our inquiry, then the thing perceived and the perception are incidental to the inquiry, and the silliness of this thread is avoided.

First, unless you want to redefine metaphysics in the current era from what it has meant historically, the role of "magic" cannot be excluded from it's repertoire. — LuckyR

I've read a lot of metaphysics, and I've never seen magic in the repertoire. Maybe an example would help.

Rather I mean it as a explanation that defies observation, experience and knowledge. — LuckyR

Such a "magical" explanation would not be metaphysics. Metaphysicians work toward explanations which are consistent with observation experience and knowledge. An explanation which defies these would be illogical, and not acceptable to anyone, so a metaphysician would know to stay away from that.

For example explaining lightning in the absence of an understanding of electricity. Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism all ascribed lightning to the workings of gods (surprising no one) when those religions were invented in the Bronze and Iron ages, clearly not science, that's metaphysics. However, in Medieval times lightning (which commonly struck the tallest structures ie churches) was either thought to be prevented by the piety of the ringing of church bells warding off evil spirits (a metaphysical proposal) or that the sound of the ringing of the bells disrupted the air and thus prevented the lightning from striking the tower (a physical or a scientific theory). — LuckyR

I haven't seen lightening ascribed to gods in any metaphysics. Nor have I seen any metaphysical proposals about church bells. It's become quite evident that you don't know what you're talking about.

What is the medium? — NOS4A2

Generally speaking, the nervous system.

Philosophers... always finding problems where there are none. — javi2541997

That accurately sums up this thread. I would say that it is going nowhere, slowly.

If philosophers would respect the fact that there is always a medium between the thing sensed (sometimes called external), and the sensation of the individual (sometimes called internal), most of these silly problems could be avoided.

First, we could understand very clearly how there is no direct, or even indirect cause/effect relation between the thing sensed and the sensation, due to the intermediary activity of the medium. Further, we could apprehend the fact that most of the intermediary activity is the activity of a living organism, as an agent, and is therefore causal in the sense of purposeful actions. Then we could simply dismiss all these misguided problems of direct vs. indirect, and apprehend the living being as a biological agent which creates its own sensations. This would provide a much better starting point for wannabe philosophers.

Notice that each of those titles refer to the debate about the nature of reality or ‘the soul of science’ - which comes into sharp focus in the 30-year debate between Neils Bohr and Albert Einstein (who advocated a staunch scientific realism). — Wayfarer

It's sort of ironic that after stipulating the relativity of simultaneity, Einstein would become a staunch realist. If he was not being outright contradictory, this indicates that he did not adequately understand the logical consequences of the relativity of simultaneity, in relation to "reality".

If reality is "what is", and what is, is conditional on the present time, then the relativity of simultaneity makes "reality" dependent on one's frame of reference. How could this be consistent with any form of realism?

Contrasting ideas?

My point was why look at the issue solely "logically" when the hallmark of the metaphysical is the "magical"? After all, that was the whole reason humans invented the metaphysical, namely to explain the (currently) unexplainable. — LuckyR

You seem confused. I agree that metaphysics looks to explain what hasn't yet been explained, but magic is not the hallmark of metaphysics. Magic doesn't explain anything, so metaphysicians cannot turn to magic, in their efforts to explain. In fact, that is what metaphysicians try to avoid, by showing that what is currently unexplainable, inclining people toward "magic", can actually be explained in ways other than magic.

I did not restrict the options of gods to the logical, because I was not talking about the options of gods. I was talking about the type of knowledge which a god could have, and the question of whether omniscience is compatible with free will. You seem to have jumped to the unwarranted conclusion that I was talking about the operations of gods, when I was just talking about the knowledge of gods. That is a distinction between an active god, and a passive god. I was talking about a passive god, who is supposed to be omniscient.

So, I restricted knowledge, knowing, to the reasonable because that is how we understand the nature of "knowledge". I said that if a god knows something, then there must be a reasonable explanation for the thing known by that god. I then classified a chance or random event as something without a reasonable explanation, and so I questioned how a god could "know" this type of event, according to how we understand "know".

I assumed that the only way to know such an event would be to observe it in its occurrence, because no other information could necessitate the logical conclusion of the event's occurrence. Therefore the event's occurrence could not be known in any other way. This creates a problem if we want to say that the god knows the event prior in time, to the event's occurrence. It implies that the god must be capable of observing the event, prior in time to the event's occurrence. And this appears to imply determinism.

Ah, you missed my reference to gods being metaphysical. I am not necessarily proposing any particular mechanism for the operations of gods because 1) being personally physical, I (and you, perhaps?) have no experience with the metaphysical and more importantly, it's inner workings and 2) I don't personally believe gods exist objectively (they do exist inter-subjectively). — LuckyR

I don't call myself a "metaphysician" for nothing. I think I have a lot of experience with the metaphysical.

For example being able to fool gods with card tricks and coin flips is considered ludicrous to theists and most atheists. — LuckyR

OK, suppose a god can know the result of a proposed coin toss prior to the toss occurring. How would this type of knowledge work if there is no reasonable explanation why one result is favoured over the other? If the result is truly random chance, there could be no explanation, so the god would be just guessing. If the god really knows then there must be a reason which validates that knowledge, and it is not random chance.

Or, are you proposing that the god knows the outcome through some other means, perhaps by actually having observational capacity in the future, while existing at the present? So the god, at the present, would know the future outcome by observing it before it actually happens for us, at the present. But wouldn't this just be determinism, if future acts, which are dependent on present choices, can be observed by God, before they are chosen by the person at the present?

While I concede that Science itself is not free from biases, but this is one area where the formal position is pretty respectable. This position defines the confirmed existence of the "Big Bang Theory" by the multiple stages of rapid expansion that we know the universe experienced in its first few seconds, days, and years. So we can (and do) know that the Big Bang happened immediately after the birth of the universe, but our knowledge can only get asymptomatically close to "t=0". Our current mathematical models extrapolate the existence of a singularity at t=0, but in every case where they come up, a singularity represents a transition point where our theories (or maybe just our current system of mathematics, or both) stop working and, as far as we can tell, no longer describe reality. — Jaded Scholar

Consider that every time we make a temporal measurement there is necessarily a t=0, the point at which the measurement starts. And, as you explain, "our knowledge can only get asymptomatically close to 't=0'". Because of this, the very same problem which we have in modeling the Big Bang, exists when we model any temporal reality. In Newtonian mechanics it manifests as an infinite acceleration at the precise moment a force is applied, and in wave mechanics it manifests as the uncertainty of the Fourier transform.

Not only do we not know if or how reality might work on the "other side" of any singularity, we don't know if or how reality might work *at* a singularity. — Jaded Scholar

So this is the problem with any supposed "point in time", it is a singularity and we cannot understand what exists at a point in time. Accepted conventions place the limit at about the Planck length, but that is dependent on the conventions.

Not only is it possible that we don't actually understand the birth of the universe, it is an established fact that we do not. — Jaded Scholar

Likewise, as explained above, we do not understand the universe at the present, at every moment of passing time.

I thought you and others might enjoy knowing that most physicists regard String Theorists and other specialists in unprovable/unfalsifiable theories as not really being "physicists", and actually being "mathematical philosophers". ;) — Jaded Scholar

I would classify that as metaphysical speculation. The issue with this speculation which is derived from mathematicians and physicists, is that it tends to rely heavily on the reality of mathematical ideals and geometrical figures. This is known as Pythagorean, or Platonic, idealism.

God could know the result of every unrealized hypothetical, though. He just couldn't know which choice we're going to make if you believe pre-knowledge entails determinism and therefore negates free will. — Hanover

That necessitates a division between thinking and choosing. It's part of the reasoning which led Augustine to propose a three part intellect, memory, reason, and will. The will, as "choice" in your example, does not necessarily follow the thought in a cause/effect manner. So the result of a thought cannot be said to be the choice, as there is a separation between these two which allows the choice to be inconsistent with the reasoning.

It really doesn't solve the problem though, because if the choice does not follow directly from the reasoning, as necessitated by the reasoning, then it must be "caused" by something else. If God knows everything, then God must know what that other cause is, or will be, prior to it occurring, and this entails determinism.

If the will is truly free, and God does not know the choice which will be made, prior to it being made, then the choice is caused by something which God does not know. This prevents the possibility of God knowing everything. To maintain this premise, that God does know everything, we'd have to allow that the choice is not caused. This would imply random uncaused actions. That's how I interpret what you say here, that freely willed choices are not known by God, who knows everything knowable, therefore they are unknowable, as completely random, uncaused actions. Or would you propose another category of actions which are unknowable to God who knows everything, but in some way still caused. The cause would be outside the realm of "everything".

Logically, how can something reflect on itself? — RussellA

Start with the premise that this "thing" has a memory. And the thing's existence has temporal extension. Memory allows the thing to revisit its past existence. That is called "reflection". Reflection allows a person to reconsider one's actions relative to one's thought processes and see where the actions did not follow logic.

Would Mary learn something new when she saw red if Mary were God? — Hanover

I think the more appropriate question is, does God learn something new if Mary sees red. It appears necessary that God must learn something new every time a person learns something new, because God must learn that the person has learned.

This is similar to the problem Augustine addressed concerning the apparent contradiction between a human being's free will, and God's omniscience. Simply put, the idea of an omniscient God appears to imply determinism. Yet human experience appears to justify "free will". I don't think that Augustine came up with a satisfactory answer to this problem, only suggesting that the nature of time is very difficult for us to understand. And I think that's the lesson we ought to learn from problems like this, that we do not have a very good understanding of time.

This is why "experience" is such an important part of knowledge. We can make all sorts of speculations, hypotheses, and theories about the nature of time, but the only way to actually understand the passing of time is by analyzing one's own experience. This is the aspect of knowledge which is provided by experience, which cannot be derived from any other principles, the role of time.

Philosophical ideas seem to require ream after ream of supporting prattle. — jgill

This seems to be self-contradictory. If it is supporting the ideas, how could it be called "prattle"? That reams of material is required to support the philosophical ideas is a good thing, isn't it? That support is what makes the philosophy sound.

And without a hierarchy of moral values which only philosophy can provide, your own proposition itself, that "physicists have better things to do", is meaningless prattle. Such a proposition would require reams of support to justify it as sound.

How would you do that? — NOS4A2

To begin with, a "whim" is a sudden, unpredictable, and very subjective, inclination. Because of the idiosyncratic nature of whims, the logical first step which a "state" could take toward avoiding whims would be to have a ruling group, or party, instead of a ruling individual. Having to go through the party would impose the sober second thought required to eliminate acting on whims.

Is this possible?

Is it possible to have a thought about an internal logical process, when the internal logical process has caused the thought in the first place?

In other words, can an effect cause itself? — RussellA

I don't see why it has to have caused itself. I think it's commonly known as "reflection".

What I feel remains to be explored further is the process of "finding our feet with them", say, as a matter of imagining ourselves as them, getting at why one might want to judge as they do. Maybe: in taking them seriously; allowing another's reasons to be or become intelligible; respecting their interests by taking their expressions as a commitment of their self, their character as it were (what "type" of person they are). I take this not as a matter of critique, but of letting them be "strange" to us without rejection (tolerating but not assuming/resigned to difference); with open curiosity, (cultural) humility (that my interests and context are not everyone's). In a sense: understanding as empathy; understanding in the sense of: being understanding (Websters: vicariously experiencing the [interests] of another; imagining the other's attitudes as legitimate; the imaginative projection of [myself] into [the other] so that [they] appear to be infused with [me, being a person]). — Antony Nickles

Isn't it shown by Wittgenstein, that any sort of completeness to "finding our feet with them" is actually impossible? To understand them requires communication with them, but communication with them requires that we understand them. So we are forever isolated from each other. It's as if the other person is a lion. Learning the other's language does not necessitate an understanding of the other. Understanding the lion requires that one could put oneself in the lion's shoes, but to obtain this sort of understanding requires knowing the lion's language. The best we can do, is learn the other's language, then attempt to put oneself in the other's shoes. Therefore this way of looking at things, that learning a language requires an understanding of the other, therefore communication implies understanding, gives us a problematic philosophical perspective replete with an irresolvable problem.

Consequently, we must dismiss this way of looking at language. We must start with the proposition that each one of us is an island of isolation, with one's own private language. Then we see how language as a communicative tool comes into being, independent from, and not reliant on an understanding of the others whom we communicate with. So it evolves through processes like justification, which ultimately develop into formal knowledge. The key point though, is that skepticism cannot be removed, and is inherent within the nature of language, therefore also within the structure of formal knowledge which is a product of language. Skepticism is an essential part of what it means to be human, as a living being. It is what keeps us on our toes, wary, and keen to the real possibility of deception, and other lurking dangers. And what Wittgenstein demonstrates is that those philosophers who take as their goal or aim, to remove skepticism (as he did in the Tractatus), are profoundly misguided toward an impossible ideal, which is not at all representative of reality.

I would propose that a state is successful wherever it is considered sovereign, while the people who it nominally represent remain dependent and subordinate to its whims. — NOS4A2

A state has "whims"? I would think that eliminating whims from the ruling system would be a defining feature of success.

How can we know that. I cannot look at someone and know their internal logical processes. Even I don't know my own internal logical processes. — RussellA

One can know it by self examination, introspection. It looks like you haven't tried it, or gave up to soon without the required discipline.

Suppose I saw someone act in an unexpected way. For example, they had bought a winning lottery ticket and then proceeded to tear it up. As an outsider, how can I know their inner logical processes in order to say they are exhibiting either Determinism or Free will. — RussellA

The point was that people act in ways contrary to their own logical process. They know that it is illogical to buy lottery tickets, yet they still do. They know that the law enforces consequences for illegal actions yet they still proceed in those actions. They bypass safety precautions which they know the reasons for. There is an endless amount of examples.

The conclusion therefore is that we cannot characterize people in the way that the "logic gate" was characterized, because we know that the people are not bound to follow what the logical process dictates.

However, what if in fact my act had been determined, and what I thought was Free Will was in fact only the illusion of Free Will. — RussellA

Whether or not free will is an illusion is not the issue. The issue is whether people are bound (determined) to act according to what their own logical process dictates. And the answer is clear, they are not. I said that the concept of free will accounts for the reality of this fact, that people are not determined in this way. Whether or not this concept of free will is itself faulty, and free will is an illusion, is not the question right now. What is the question is whether or not the concept is sufficient to account for the fact that people are not determined to act according to their own logic.

Philosophy as physics without the maths. — Banno

I think this thread shows that mathematics is insufficient for explaining the reality of physical existence. That's why we've developed philosophy.

In practice, do people act illogically? How many times do we see people in a city centre, when seeing a truck approaching them at speed, decide not to step out of the way? — RussellA

Yes, in practice people commonly act illogically. Your truck example is just so extreme, it would rarely occur. Take something more simple for example, like when someone buys a lottery ticket, or breaks the law, knowing that getting caught would have serious consequences. There are many other common instances, like when we are overcome by passion to act violently or lustfully for example.

The fact that gravity is a force beyond the control of humans does not mean that humans don't understand gravity.

The fact that humans understand gravity does not mean that humans can control gravity. — RussellA

Humans do not understand gravity. They can predict the effects of gravity, but they do not understand how it works. One cannot control something without understanding how it works.

You're assuming free will rather than determinism. — RussellA

I am assuming that humans do not necessarily follow the results of logic in their actions. This is evident and common, every time one is "overcome by passion" or something similar and does not act according to what was figured to be logically necessary. And, I am pointing out that this type of behaviour, where one acts contrary to one's own logical process, is explained by the concept of free will.

Why do you think humans have free will rather than being determined by forces beyond their control? — RussellA

In the context, this question does not make any sense. If there are "forces beyond their control" these are forces not understood, because understanding them allows us to make use of them, therefore control them. Therefore we cannot know whether such proposed forces are deterministic or not, and cannot assume that a person would be "determined" by them, as you propose.

As a CPU within a computer interprets, processes and executes instructions, I suggest that within the brain are also particular types of structures that interpret, process and execute instructions, where a thought is no more than a difference in the physical structure of the brain between two moments in time. — RussellA

Th difference between the physical structure which interprets, what you call the logic gate, and the human mind, is that the human mind does not necessarily have to follow the procedure when the input is applied, while the logic gate does. This is the nature of free will. The logic gate has an outcome determined by the input and the system. The outcome from the human mind is not determined in the way that the outcome from the logic gate is, because the human mind has something else, called free will, which implies that the system is not closed in that way, which necessitates the product. The initial conditions cannot predict the outcome with logical necessity.

You asked for something you could understand, and I gave it to you. But, instead of researching it, you want to argue about it. I do not. — Dfpolis

You gave me something which I could not understand though. The problem is that I've already researched, and what you say often seems inconsistent with what I've already found out. So to me it appears like you alter basics principles of physics, in an attempt to hide faults in your metaphysics, and attempt to disguise this by refusing to elaborate. So you prove to be unwillingly to explain, and I have to flatter you with reference to your superior education in order to encourage you to divulge all that knowledge of the discipline of physics, which you conceal within. You pretend that you haven't got the time, but we have no deadlines or time constraints here.

For instance, I said that I have never been able to understand the separation of electromagnetism into distinct electric and magnetic fields, and you replied that the two are transformable in special relativity. But that does not explain why they were separated in the first place, which is what I said that I did not understand.

Our understanding of electromagnetic waves consist of both aspects, the electric and the magnetic aspects. The division into separate fields, I assume is based on the observations of distinct effects, electric effects and magnetic effects.

You asked me to "Imagine positively and negatively charged parallel plates" as a method toward understanding the relation between mass and energy. I assume that the positive represents the mass, and the negative represents the energy, but "parallel plates" implies an image of two dimensional planes, instead of a three dimensional body, which an atom with electrons and protons is. So I really do not understand how this image which you are proposing is applicable, or how it is in any way a representation which I can understand.

Here's an example of why this "parallel plates" representation seems unreasonable to me. Suppose an electron orbits a nucleus, and we have an observational perspective which sees the electron approaching us on the right side of the nucleus, and moving away from us on the left side of the nucleus. The electric and magnetic fields are represented as perpendicular. However, every time that electron moves 180 degrees around the nucleus, the relation between the negative electron, and the positive nucleus has to flip 180 degrees, to represent the change between coming toward us in relation to the nucleus, and going away from us in relation to the nucleus.

Further to that, the turning of the electron, in the interim, must be represented. Then the electron appears to have a spin, when there is really no spin at all, the apparent spin is just a product of applying a 2 dimensional coordinate system to an assumed 3 dimensional activity. The assumed 3 dimensional activity is the orbiting of the electron. But if it's just a wave, there is no orbiting electron, there is no need for flipping, nor spinning, just the opposing crests and troughs in a 3 dimensional representation. The need to separate electric from magnetic fields was produced from the assumption of an orbiting electron, and is completely unnecessary if electrons are properly represented as wave phenomenon.

That is a problem with your proposed "parallel plates" image, along with the 2 dimensional coordinate system of distinct electric and magnetic fields. The further problem, which cannot even be approached because these spinning coordinate systems obscure it, is your claim "that they can transform into each when we change reference frames." The problem being that we cannot actually change reference frames without creating falsities in relation to a wider environment. Therefore the claim to be able to change reference frames is a falsity.

The apparent spin of the electron is a product of the coordinate system which maps the electron as an object moving relative to the proton. If we try to transform, and attempt to map the proton as moving relative to the electron (change the frame of reference), then the positive field which is mapped as parallel to the negative (parallel plates) must flip to account for that spin of the coordinate system. But this flipping would produce problems of contradiction in the wider context of multiple electrons and multiple protons. Therefore the change of reference frames which you propose would actually be impossible.

The issue of course, as I indicated earlier, is that the reference frame of a single quantum of energy, an electron, or a photon, cannot be a true inertial reference frame. So any attempt to produce a rest frame for such an object, whether it's by separating the electric field from the magnetic, or some other means, will always be fraught with difficulty, compromised, and ultimately producing a false representation. The electron is simply not an orbiting body, as you know, it is a wave phenomenon, so assigning it an inertial frame is a falsity which creates problems. Therefore the only way to get a true representation is to produce a rest frame around the nucleus, and map the quanta of energy accordingly, accepting that there is no possibility of reference frame exchange, therefore no truly transformable properties. This requires disregarding the false ideal of an inertial frame for an electron, which is exchangeable with the inertial frame of the proton, because this implies that the electron is a body with a location relative to the proton, determinable by spatial coordinates.

The separation of electromagnetism into distinct electric and magnetic fields is something I've never really been able to understand. But I know it's essential to the concepts of polarization, and the supposed spin of particles.

Since most natural light is unpolarized, I think that this is not a real representation of the associated wave phenomena. I think it is just an artificially created part of the mapping system, in the same way that a coordinate system is. This produces an unnecessarily complex representation, which instead of having a proper 3D representation of waves emitting from a source in all possible directions, requires a moving, generally rotating coordinate system. Needless to say, the moving coordinate system is very problematic, because motion is understood as relative, and the motion of the coordinate system is therefore arbitrary, related to nothing other than the intention of the mapmaker.

So I believe that this practise of representing an electric field as distinct from the magnetic field is nothing but a coordinate system used for mapping the waves. In natural occurrences, waves are going every which way, as they propagate out from a mass consisting of a variety of parts. This would require a vast multitude of distinct fields to represent the natural waves coming from what would appear to be one united source. This requirement of a multitude of distinct fields, to map the most simple natural waves, I think is very strong evidence that "fields" are completely unreal, and just a coordinate system.

Why though, did you ask me to imagine "parallel plates", when the convention for producing the coordinate system of distinct electric and magnetic fields is to make them perpendicular? Are the positive and negative fields you propose supposed to represent the positive and negative aspects of the atom? If so, how does the neutron get represented, which is mass without electric charge? And how would you make both the electric field, and the magnetic field, which are perpendicular to each other by convention, parallel to the proposed positive field?

You can look at my (dfpolis) youtube physics videos if you wish. There I have corrected a number of common misunderstandings. You might also look up my paper "Does God Gamble with Creation?" — Dfpolis

Ok, thanks for the references Dfpolis. You know my principal interest, as I've developed it in this thread, the concept of mass in physics. Can you direct me toward anything specifically related to the ideas I've expressed here.

You claim you have been trying to teach me, but you really don't seem to be making much effort. I know that I am of the very skeptical sort, and as such I am a very difficult and trying student, but you often don't seem to be trying very hard yourself. You simply make random statements, assertions which to me often seem either inconsistent with other assertions you've mase, or are simply mistaken.

For example, you said:
"All known waves, even ocean waves, have momentum. The momentum of sound waves moves your ear drum."
Now, that in itself is a satisfactory statement, because the momentum of waves is attributable to the movement of the mass of the medium. The particles of the medium have mass, and the movement of these particles is constitutive of the momentum of the wave.

However, if I couple this with your statement that electromagnetic radiation is known to exist as waves, and these waves are known to have momentum, then I see inconsistency. How can the momentum of these electromagnetic waves be known, if the momentum of waves is attributed to the movement of the mass of the particles of the medium and there is no known medium for these waves?

Therefore I assume that the momentum, which you "associate" with a light wave must be derived from some completely different principles. And, since you accept that the light wave has no medium composed of particles with mass, the "mass" which is an essential aspect of momentum must also be derived from some other principles.

What I've suggested is that there is inconsistency, ambiguity, perhaps even equivocation in your use of "mass". And I've supported this proposition with an explanation as to why "Mass is proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame." appears to be a self-contradicting statement. "A quantum in its rest frame" appears to contradict itself.

So if you are at all willing to teach me, maybe you could demonstrate how the conception of "mass" in that statement, as "proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame", is consistent with the conception of "mass" as a property of a particle of water, in an ocean wave. I suggest that you start with the proposed concept of "a quantum in its rest frame", because that is what causes a roadblock for me from the very outset.

From what I understand, you might have a rest frame for a collection of photons, quanta, as a "system", so the momentum and therefore mass of the whole system might be determined by giving the system a rest frame, as a sort of ideal, a contrived and unrealistic equilibrium. However, it is impossible that a single quantum could have a rest frame. Since the mass of a collection of water particles is divisible amongst its members, and this cannot be the case in a photonic system, this indicates to me, that the "mass" assigned to a system composed of photons is fundamentally inconsistent with the "mass" assigned to a system of water particles.

The former is derived from a contrived, artificial, and unrealistic ideal, while the latter is derived from observations of naturally existing bodies. Because these two dissimilar conceptions of "mass" are inconsistent with each other, and fundamentally incommensurable, I apprehend an interaction problem. I would be very pleased if you could try to dispel this apprehension through the effects of teaching.

Then you need to study nuclear physics and the behavior of the quarks in high energy physics. — Dfpolis

Wave mechanics does not explain the behaviour of quarks. I believe the proper terminology is "field theory". And, there are many aspects within quantum field theory which break the laws of wave-type representations, such as those very important aspects known as spontaneous symmetry breaking.

Mass is proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame. — Dfpolis

This is what I've identified as a self-contradicting concept, 'a quantum of energy in its rest frame'. Ideas like this are what distort and render the concept of mass as completely unrealistic, regardless of whether it's consistent with special relativity. As I explained, "mass", as "relativistic mass", or variable mass, or whatever you want to call it, has become the tool which physicists use to coverup flaws in the theories they apply.

No physical theory has explained the existence of mass. We can explain our observations of the quantity of mass, but existence is a metaphysical problem. It was solved by Aquinas, who concluded that it is contingent on the continuing creative act of God.

I am well aware of the strong force. It is described using wave mechanics. Its range is related to the time an intermediating boson can exist (which is inversely proportional to its mass). That time is calculated using Heisenberg's indeterminacy relation. The same is true of all the forces known to physics. — Dfpolis

So the boson does not explain the existence of the quantity of mass then. Therefore it does not explain the strong force, nor the existence of matter either. Why do you think mass is explained, or described by wave mechanics then?

As I understand it, the colour charge of a gluon cannot represent a wave, because it is solely time-like and non-spatial. It appears like you have stretched your imaginary conception of "wave" far beyond reasonable limits, to include non-spatial conceptions as "waves". Since you say "the same is true of all the forces known to physics", I conclude that none of the forces can actually be described as waves. "Force" is the term used for how things, including waves, interact, but the interaction occurs in a medium between.

The mass of the electron is known with great precision. It is not zero. — Dfpolis

Nor is the mass of a photon zero, "in its rest frame", by your statement above.

Other than displaying the inconsistency in the physicist's use of "mass", you appear to be mainly just circling back now. Unless you want to try and describe to me how you think the concept of the boson, represented as a wave feature, can provide an adequate description for the strong force and the reality of mass, we might be best off to just leave the discussion at this point.

Thanks for the explanation DF. I'll expound a bit on my own perspective, to clarify why I think your idea of "matter waves" is insufficient. Like I explained earlier, the Michelson-Morley type experiments indicate that the medium of electromagnetic waves, and what composes the "matter" of massive bodies is likely one and the same substance. However, I think it is a mistake to characterize an object with mass as a wave activity in this substance.

I know it is true that electrons may simply be represented as waves, and electrons are also designated as having mass, but the quantity of mass of an electron is so tiny relative to the overall mass of a an atom, this need to assign mass to a wave feature (electron) may readily be attributed to possible faults in the mass/energy equivalence theory. It may be the case that it is a mistake to say that an electron has mass. A slight fault in the theory, along with the customary procedure of assigning quantities of mass according to what the theory predicts, would produce the need to assign mass to that wave phenomenon which is called "an electron", when electrons really ought to be represented as pure wave features without any mass.

From this perspective, I'll point to a few spots where I have criticism of your explanation.

So, electrons, an essential constituent of every atom, are waves. Every property previously explained using the particle assumption can be explained by their wave nature. On the other hand, no wave property is explained by the particle assumption. That means the particle hypothesis is falsified. — Dfpolis

This is a conclusion made about electrons only, not the other parts of an atom, being the massive nucleus. So what has been falsified, by your argument, from my perspective, is the theory that electrons are particles with mass. This supports what I have said above, that electrons ought not be represented as having mass, and should be represented entirely as waves. This would imply that the interaction between radiant energy and electric energy is completely an interaction of waves. And it would force the need to further analyze the relationship between the atom's nucleus being expressed with a positive charge, and it's electrons having a negative charge.

The current need to assign mass to the electron appears to be the result of a lack of understanding of the relationship between the massive nucleus and the wave features. I propose that the waves of electromagnetic radiation are affected, altered, by interaction with the nucleus (rather than to conventional representation of an interaction with electrons), making electrons and electromagnetic radiation one wave structure instead of interacting waves, and the characteristics of this wave phenomena is the result of, effect of, the activity/inactivity of the nucleus.

The nucleus causes changes to the electromagnetic field, and vise versa, and we understand these changes as electrons. Accordingly, all electron phenomenon would need to be understood in terms of relations between massive nuclei and electromagnetic field. Radiation would be an extension of this, eliminating the need for complex and unnecessary electron/photon relationships.

We have since found that wave mechanics also applies to protons and neutrons, the constituents of atomic nuclei. Every part of atoms, which constitute both ordinary and ionized matter, behaves like a wave. None is a point particle, or a hard object with a well-defined edge. That physics has nothing more to say about what is vibrating does not mean that the constituents of matter do not oscillate in both space and time in well-defined ways. So, ordinary matter is made of waves. That is what I mean by "matter waves." — Dfpolis

This is where I find the most significant fault with your proposed theory. I believe it is simply not the case that wave mechanics can explain the massive nucleus of an atom. And "mass" is what is most properly related to "matter". Mass is what provides the stability for the temporal continuity of sameness manifesting as "inertia" in common physics. The fact that wave mechanics cannot explain the existence of mass ,may be understood through a glimpse into the mechanics of the strong interactive force. This force accounts for the vast majority of "known" mass, and the rest of "known" mass may be dismissed in the way described above as applicable to the mass of an electron, simplifying calculations. Here's a passage from the Wikipedia article on the strong force. After considering the reality of this force, please reconsider whether you truly believe that the nucleus of an atom can be represented with wave mechanics. If you still do, maybe you can explain it to me.

The strong force acts between quarks. Unlike all other forces (electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational), the strong force does not diminish in strength with increasing distance between pairs of quarks. After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10,000 newtons (N), no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7] As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. The explanation is that the amount of work done against a force of 10,000 newtons is enough to create particle–antiparticle pairs within a very short distance of that interaction. The very energy added to the system required to pull two quarks apart would create a pair of new quarks that will pair up with the original ones. In QCD, this phenomenon is called color confinement; as a result only hadrons, not individual free quarks, can be observed. The failure of all experiments that have searched for free quarks is considered to be evidence of this phenomenon. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_interaction

But, if there is no body, why would we expect it to have a well-defined (point) location or arrival time? — Dfpolis

The particle is understood to behave under the principles of Newtonian mechanics. Therefore it has momentum, and mass is a requirement for momentum. And the reality of mass is observed through the effects of gravity which constitutes empirical evidence for the concept of a centre of gravity, therefore a point of location which marks the centre of the mass. When the electron is represented as having mass, then the Newtonian conceptual space applies, including momentum etc.. It has a rest mass, a point of location, an inertial frame applies, and all that follows for a body of mass.

If we rob the electron of its mass, take it away, and deny that it has any mass, then that discrepancy in total mass, and violation to conservation laws needs to be accounted for. But we know from experimental data, and the need for "entropy", that the conservation laws are ideals which are not completely applicable as the true physical reality. And the supposed mass of an electron is so tiny that the only real reason why it is assumed is the need to maintain the conservation laws. Therefore there is no good reason to maintain the principle that an electron has any mass, consequently no reason to represent it as having momentum, or any well-defined point of location. That need is simply the desire to maintain an untrue ideal, the conservation law, and follow traditional conventions of calculation. But it's a misleading path, and like a vector, the further away you get from the starting point, the further you get from the true path.

Since a quantum's energy is proportional to its frequency and its momentum is inversely proportional to its wave length, finite wave packets have neither well-defined energy nor momentum. — Dfpolis

See, the fault here is to assign momentum to a wave. This implies that the electron has mass and a stable, inertial centre required by Newton's first law. But if mass truly converts to wave energy, then the centre point of an electron which is radiating or absorbing wave energy would actually be an unstable, decaying or increasing mass, and this is not consistent with the first law. The atom's mass would decrease as it emits radiation, or increase as it absorbs. Therefore the electron really cannot be represented by the Newtonian mass/inertia/momentum conceptual space.

So, we can transfer this mass to the nucleus, and the instability which exists as the radiation and absorption (interaction) of energy represented as electrons, is in most cases a very minimal instability, as a proportion of the total mass of the atom. However, there are features of the nucleus, which result in the various electron shells for example, which represent critical thresholds in the stability. The key point is that the Newtonian stability assumed by the first law of motion (which is itself an ideal symmetry) must be forfeited in order to adequately account for these minute change to physical bodies, by allowing that changes inherent within and originating within the nucleus, may alter the wave field.

That is exactly what the wave equations do represent. The problem is that you cannot pick the one actual solution out of an infinity of possible solutions without knowing the initial conditions. — Dfpolis

I think that this is incorrect. "Probability" is produced from a comparison of what is known about many instances of particular circumstances, with a statistical analysis of a set of similar particular circumstances. The crucial point is the judgement of "similar". That is why the probabilities of the wave equations do not actually represent the particular circumstances, these probabilities represent a conclusion drawn from numerous particular circumstances, which are categorized as "the same" by a judgement of similar.

Again, there is no "body." — Dfpolis

There is mass, and mass is what constitutes the matter of a body. I strongly believe that wave structures cannot account for the mass of a body, and I will continue to believe that, unless you or someone else, can answer my question above, and show how waves can explain the strong interactive force.

When you say you dont consider yourself to BE something "necessarily", are you speaking of anatman? — Gregory

I suppose that would be one possibility.

Well you got me there Dfpolis, I really don't know what you know so I clearly do not know what I'm talking about. But that's because you're not very forthcoming with your principles. Can you explain how you conceive of a "matter wave"?

I mean don't give me a mathematical formula, give me the principles. How do you make the kinetic energy of a single moving body which necessarily has mass to have kinetic energy, and therefore a center of gravity at a point, consistent with the energy of a wave which is necessarily spread out over an area? The momentum of the body could be provided by an energy equivalence with the energy of the wave, but the uncertainty principle would render the position of such a body, with a determined momentum, as having no determinable location.

I suggest that what is the case, is that data from many similar circumstances is collected to together, and from statistical analysis probabilities are produced. Hence the "matter" wave is better known as a "probability" wave. And, there is no real consistency produced between the energy associated with the mass of a body, and the energy associated with the wave, because the particular wave in the particular set of circumstances is not ever actually represented. All that is represented is the energy of the wave derived from application of theory, and the probability of location, which is a conclusion drawn from the statistical analysis.

So for example, if we make a statistical analysis of the rising of the sun over many years, we can make a very accurate projection of where and when the sun will rise tomorrow. However, this statistical analysis does not represent the movement of the sun relative to the earth, it represents the sun's appearance at a multitude of specified times. The likelihood of where it will appear tomorrow is deduced. Likewise, the statistical analysis used to produce the probability wave (matter wave) does not represent the movement of the supposed underlying wave, it represents the locations of a multitude of instances of the detection of a body with mass.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the uncertainty relation between momentum and location is overcome in that way. The momentum is derived from wave observations and theories of energy equivalence. And the position is determined by probabilities derived from statistical analysis. But what is represented by the statistical analysis, as the "probability" or "matter" wave, is not a wave at all. It is not a representation of the wave, because it represents possible locations of the body with mass. The wave is actually represented by what is on the other side of the uncertainty relation, the momentum of the body.

They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. — Dfpolis

The problem being that these equations do not describe waves, and you know this. A description of the medium, and the restrictions placed on potential wave movement due to the composition of the medium, or substance which the wave exists in, is replaced with "degrees of freedom". Even if we assume real underlying waves, as what is being described, not one of these equations can provide an adequate description of what is going on, because the "degrees of freedom" are formulated according to the circumstances rather than according to an understanding of the medium itself, and the restrictions intrinsic to the nature of that medium. That's why a synthesis of many such equations is required for quantum field theory, to account for the various ways of determining degrees of freedom.

Furthermore, the fact that a representation of a temporal continuity may be produced which is very similar to how waves would appear if represented in this way, is insufficient evidence to make the deductive conclusion that waves are being represented. This is because the essence of "waves", by definition, is "disturbance in a substance", and that is not what is represented by those equations which describe degrees of freedom. Simply, the substance has not been identified.

Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures. — Dfpolis

This is where we disagree. "Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. They are mathematical descriptions without substance, as Wayfarer describes above. So they are descriptive 'forms', not the 'matter' of physical bodies, evidenced by the fact that they only reference the possibility of a body. Saying that matter is wave structures is like saying that matter is a collection of properties. But this annihilates the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, and leaves the collection of properties without substance.

I believe that what you are proposing is a simple Pythagorean idealism. As such, it suffers from the interaction problem. Like I explained, the ideals (symmetries) of the wave structures, if they were the real matter, could not possibly interact with the world of physical bodies which we observe in experience. This interaction problem has two principal manifestations in quantum physics, first the problem of nonlocal causation, and second, the need to assume random chance activities.

The solution I outlined is the need to identify the true substance of the waves, the medium which is waving, as the proper "matter" which the wave structures are the formal representation of. Without identifying this substance as "the matter", the "wave structures" representation will always suffer from this interaction problem.

Further analysis of the wave function representation will show the interaction problem involved with this type of idealism much more clearly. Space is represented as points in a coordinate system. Because each point is represented as having commuting observables, uncertainty is inherent within the representation of each point of the space represented. The uncertainty is represented by the Fourier transform, as the fundamental inability to accurately determine spatial activity (frequency) over a duration of time. This uncertainty leaves a gap between the mathematical ideals of representation, and what is actually occurring in the space being represented. It is an "interaction problem" because the ideals employed have incorporated within themselves, the inability to accurately represent the spatial-temporal relation (the uncertainty of the Fourier transform), and therefore cannot provide the means for bridging this gap. In other words "the ideals" are compromised to allow uncertainty to inhere within them, rendering them as less than ideal.

The difference between the representation of the Fourier transform, and what is actually happening in the physical reality can be approached here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_mechanics

As I have already spent a lot of time trying to teach you what physics tells us, and this whole area is off-topic, I am going to stop here. — Dfpolis

OK, in truth, I forgot the topic. I'll have to reread the op, because the title doesn't seem quite consistent with the op.

While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. — Dfpolis

The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". "Potential", as the Aristotelian defining feature of matter is insufficient because the wave functions are clearly understood as referring to forms, actualities, therefore not consistent with Aristotelian "matter". And "mass", as the defining feature of matter in conventional physics is obviously insufficient. So the only way to represent what the wave function refers to as something material, is to produced an intentionally designed definition of matter.

This violates your statement in the op:

Since physics has no intentional effects (despite wishful thinking), it cannot effect intentional operations. — Dfpolis

Obviously, the physics of wave functions has effected the way you look at matter, and influenced you to create an intentionality driven conception of "matter". Physics has affected your intentions, such that you conceptualize "matter" in a way such that you may call these waves "matter waves", when in reality wave functions are formal structures, consisting of ideals which have no true bearing on "matter" by convention conceptions of matter.

You even alter the definition of "physics" to suit your purpose. Instead of the conventional definition, as the discipline which deals with the interactions of matter and energy, which refers to real particular instances of interaction, you define it as dealing with "changes in space and time". Space and time are universals, abstractions which may or may not have been derived from the discipline of physics.

So you actually reverse the role of the discipline. Instead of recognizing that physics is the science of particulars, instances of matter and energy, you cast it as the science of the universal abstractions, space and time. In reality though, metaphysics is the discipline which deals with such abstractions.

This is hardly a problem when we realize that both physics and mathematics are based on abstractions -- which is to say they are the result of attending to some aspects of reality while ignoring others. — Dfpolis

This mischaracterizing of "physics" is evident here in the op. Physics is not based in abstractions. It is an empirical science, based in particular instances of observation, from which abstractions may be logically induced and deduced. This is a very significant difference ontologically, and consequently epistemologically, which you ought to respect.

When you respect this difference, you will understand that abstractions, universals, and ideals, are necessarily prior to any empirical science, as the means by which the particular instances of the physical world, are grasped and understood by the intellect within the activities of the empirical sciences. The faculty of the intellect, or soul which produces these abstraction cannot be an empirical science like physics, because these abstractions are necessarily prior to the activities of those science. The empirical science must not be allowed to be based in the abstractions themselves, or else the objectivity of the science will be overcome by the subjectivity of the abstraction. The science therefore is based in the particular instances of observation, and this may be used to override the preexisting (therefore prejudiced) abstractions

So for example, the scientific method is said to proceed from hypotheses to try them in experimentation. These hypotheses are necessarily prior to the method of sciences which seeks validate them, therefore they are not themselves "scientific". That word can only be affixed posteriorly, after they been tested through experimentation. Therefore the hypotheses must be produced through some other means than science. And if you look into this, you will discover that the production of such hypotheses is very much purpose directed, driven by intentionality. The science itself though, must be based in the particular instances of observation, in order that it may be used to rid the abstractions of subjective prejudice.

Once we realized that abstractions are not reality, things become easier. There is no reason to think that the laws of mindless matter should apply without modification to thinking beings. — Dfpolis

This statement then becomes rather ironic. The "modification to thinking beings" which you recommend turns out to be the need to dismiss the proposition which leads to this, "abstractions are not reality". Once it is realized that abstractions are at the very base of our understanding, prior to observation, as the means by which observation is made, we must realize that abstractions are the only reality which we have, and everything else is understood in relation to this assumed reality. When observation indicates mistakes within "reality" (being the abstractions) modification of reality is required.

You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions.