Right, I think that what is really the case, is that "the present is defined relative to the past and the future". That is the conventional definition, as I explained in my last post, It is "what is really the case". What I am proposing is something other than the conventional definition. My proposition is that we ought to define past and future relative to the present. This is not "what is really the case" it is what I believe ought to be. Notice in the following paragraph that I characterized the separation between past and future, which results from the conventional way of defining present as a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding.

What I am arguing is that this separation between past and future is a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding, as the present is really a unity of the past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are quite correct to say that I revert to common usage at times, and that is because I make much effort to explain common usage, to reveal its faults. That is what I am arguing, that our way of speaking, our grammar of language, from which you derive your temporal conceptions, is misleading, because it is based in some fundamental misunderstandings concerning the present and the nature of time in general.

What you need to do in order to understand what I am saying, is to pay close attention to the difference between what I am criticizing and what I am promoting. This is very important in philosophy. It is a common mistake here at 'The Forum' for people to take quotes from philosophers, Plato especially, but also other greats like Aristotle, completely out of context. They present these out-of-context quotes as representing something which is being promoted, without recognizing the reality of the context, that the author is being critical of that perspective.

Then what is your conception? How do you define "the past" and "the future"? — Luke

"Present" is defined by conscious experience, the presence of being. Past and future are defined by before and after in relation to a duration of time which is the present. Before and after are defined by the order observed in temporal duration.

There is "the past" which is not part of "the present" (call this P1), and "the past" which is part of the present (call this P2). There is also "the future" which is not part of "the present" (call this F1), and "the future" which is part of the present (call this F2). — Luke

Yes, you seem to be finally getting it.

Can we not distinguish P1 from P2 and F1 from F2? — Luke

Right, we cannot make these distinctions, now you're catching on. Due to the problems already discussed, we cannot establish such points of division. These points are arbitrarily assigned, not distinctions based on anything real.

Most people call only P1 "the past" and only F1 "the future", with "the present" as its own distinct third period of time that contains neither P2 or F2 (inside it) and to which P1 and F1 (outside it) are relative. I think you sometimes revert to this common usage, too. — Luke

Right again, the way we speak displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the present, and of time in general. I discussed the reasons for this. The fact that I sometimes speak in the conventional way does not lessen my claim that I think this is incorrect. It's like a bad habit.

I think this common usage is apparent in your claim that at the beginning of time there is all future and no past, and that at the end of time there is all past and no future. For what are "the past" and "the future" relative to in this scenario? — Luke

That was not a claim, it was an example to help you understand the nature of the overlap, and that it is not necessary that all past overlaps with all future in such an overlap. You didn't seem to understand so I gave you an example. Notice I said "if" there was a beginning in time, then this would have been the case at that time. If the example confused things more, then forget it. You seem to be understanding now without it.

I am not making any claims of necessity about the relation of P1 to P2, and F1 to F2. Since we cannot determine the points of division, it may be the case that all past overlaps all future, in the way of proportions, like I suggested. Conscious experience gives the appearance that there are such divisions, but conscious experience may be misleading us.

In your argument, the past and future are not defined relative to the present, as it is per common usage; instead you define the present relative to the past and future, as an overlapping region containing parts of each. — Luke

I don't think that this is quite right. Convention defines "present" relative to past and future. We have conscious memories, and conscious anticipations, as you and javra assert, and these represent past and future. By recognizing that there is past and future, we posit a "present" which is now, the centre of the conscious experience of the living being, as the separation, or division between the past and future which we are consciously aware of. So conventionally, we have started with past and future, which we are consciously aware of, and have defined "present" accordingly.

My proposition is to start with the conscious experience of the present, and define "present" according to the conscious experience of being present, directly. Then we move from this definition of "present" to define "past" and "future". This is opposite to the conventional way which derives "present" from a recognition pf past and future.

And what we notice in our experience of being present, is that we observe activities, motions. From this we can conclude that there is a duration of time at the present because motion requires the passing of time. And, we can say that any length of time is divisible into a before part and an after part. In relation to the present we can call the before part "past" and the after part "future".

Would you find it more acceptable to say that the future part is before the past part?

So why would there be all future and no past at the beginning of time on your view? This appears to be defining past and future relative to the present, with the present presupposed at the beginning, and all of time as F1 outside it. — Luke

Right, I define past and future relative to the present, and the present relative to conscious experience, as I've said numerous times. This is different from the conventional way, which defines present relative to the past and future, and past and future relative to conscious experience. Does that make things clearer for you?

First off, what I expressed was about “prioritizing” and not “limiting” one’s understanding of time. Makes a world of difference. — javra

The issue I explained, is that I can conclude from a logical process, that my conscious experience of the present must consist partly of past. I went through this at the beginning of my posting in this thread. I only supported it with the evidence of sensory experience later in the thread because Luke would not accept the logic.

By the time I say "now" it's in the past. But I sense activities, motions, at the present. This means that the present must consist of duration. Also any duration can be divided into before and after. And before and after in relation to my experience of the present are past and future. Therefore I can conclude that this duration of time which I experience as the present consists of future and past, which are inherent within my experience of the present, as memories and anticipations. My experience of the present consists of memories and anticipations.

Your way of "prioritizing" limits "memory" to conscious memory,. Therefore it excludes these memories which are inherent within my conscious experience of the present. That's why I called this type of prioritizing a bias.

Obviously what I meant was: in the context of your argument, do you call it "the future" or "the present"? — Luke

In that context it is very clearly both. You do not see it as that, because you enforce a mutual exclusion between these terms which is unwarranted.

I'll try another way. Do you agree with the following definitions?

(1) "The present" is the temporal region in which the past and the future are combined.
(2) "The past" is the temporal region which is not combined with the future.
(3) "The future" is the temporal region which is not combined with the past.

Can you see that there are two different definitions of "the past" and "the future" here? — Luke

Of course, 2 contradicts 1, and is not part of my conception.

If the past is not combined with the future as per (2), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the past". — Luke

I already explained all this, it is explained by parts, like the Venn diagram example.

If the future is not combined with the past as per (3), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the future". — Luke

It is not two definitions of "future". Look at my example of "animal". It does not require two definitions of " "animal" to have some animals which are human beings and some which are not. Nor does it require two definitions of "future" to have some of the future combined with the past, and some not.

That analogy would hold only if you were arguing that a human being is a combination of an animal and something else. — Luke

Yes, "human being" traditionally is a combination of "animal" and "rational". that part of the realm of animality which overlaps with rationality is known as "human being". That is the way that conceptualization works.

To be clear about what I meant, I qualiified the perfect fixedness of the past with "for all intended purposes". Meaning that the past is not, as I interpret it, absolutely fixed. — javra

I agree that the past is fixed, and the future is not, but this creates enormous, seemingly unsurmountable problems for understanding the nature of the present. The first question is, what happens at the present, which could cause such a change? The unfixed future must consist of possibilities, and the past must consist of the results of some sort of selection process. The selection process is often referred to as the Will of God, and in this way we meet the subject of the op head on.

The deeper question is how does the unfixed future relate to the fixed past, how is the selection process allowed to be carried out? This is why I like to assume a present which consists of an overlap of past and future. The human being has a fixed presence, by its physical body, sharing in the principles of continuity of Newton's first law, which states that the fixedness will continue into the future in a fixed way, unless caused to change. But in the mental world of intelligible objects, the mind partakes of the future, full of possibilities. So the human being as a whole, at the present, must be partly in the fixed world of the past, and partly in the unfixed world of the future. The overlap allows that the mind, in the future, can have influence over, and the capacity to change the continuity of the fixed body, in the form of free will choices.

So I so far don't find this epistemological prioritization to be a matter of confirmation bias. — javra

Let me say then, that it is a limitation you impose. The problem with this limitation, limiting your understanding of time to conscious experience, is that if you adhere to it strictly, you get a solipsist position. But you do not accept the solipsist position, you allow conscious experiences other than your own to have an influence on your understanding of time.

By taking this step, you must allow for the reality of a whole lot of other things, beginning with the separation which makes another's conscious experience distinct from your own. And by your own description, you allow a lengthening of the duration which you call "present", to allow for human beings to communicate. Strictly speaking, this lengthening of the present is not consistent with conscious experience, it is an adaptation you must make to allow for the reality of other individuals, and the separation between individuals. So now, you have allowed right here, that logic, along with premises derived from observation of the external world, infringes on your stated limitation, strict adherence to conscious experience.

In reality, once you leave the world of solipsism, to allow that the experience of others has any influence over your principles, you no longer adhere to the strict epistemic principle of conscious experience. Then allowing a specific type of alteration to your principles, as the result of your interaction with others, while disallowing others because you claim to adhere only to conscious experience, is a sort of bias.

Not typically. Our vision, as one example, always holds a focal point (more technically, a "focal zone"), i.e. some given area of vision upon which we visually focus, which is itself surrounded by peripheral vision we don't focus on, itself surrounded by non-vision. — javra

I don't think this is a good example. I think that vision is always dependent on conscious effort, it requires attention. So i do not see any argument from you, which would persuade me that the focus of vision can be carried out without conscious effort.

And all this occurs, typically, in manners fully devoid of conscious effort. When we're very attentive visually, this focal point becomes smaller bringing more details into visual focus; when we "zone out" this focal point can become so disperse so as to virtually blend everything into our peripheral vision; nevertheless, most of the time, our visual focal point, or that which we visually focus on, will occur without any conscious effort. — javra

I think we must have differing ideas as to what constitutes "conscious effort". Do you for example, find that you point your head toward that which you are looking at? Isn't this a matter of conscious effort? And suppose you are not even pointing your head, isn't moving your eyes a matter of conscious effort? In general, when you direct your attention toward something, anything, don't you consider this a matter of conscious effort? How do you believe that you could focus on anything, in any way, without conscious effort? Isn't that exactly what "focusing" is, to direct your attention at something? And directing your attention is making conscious effort.

Nevertheless, you bring up good points. My tentative, overall understanding of what you've written is that it addresses the issue of time by prioritizing physical matter over conscious experience. (I say "physical matter" so as differentiate it from the Aristotelian notions of, for example, individual ideas being the constituent matter - or material substrate - of a paradigm (with neither ideas nor paradigms being physical matter)).

If so, our metaphysical outlooks will then get in the way of our agreeing upon the nature of time.

But if I'm not misinterpreting you with the just mentioned, I'd be interested to know how you would address time in regard to prime matter? This given that prime matter, from which all matter as individual units develops, is understood to be completely undifferentiated in all ways. — javra

The answer to this question is complex and layered. I'll be brie but probably hard to understand. The Aristotelian conception of matter characterizes matter as potential, just like the modern conception of energy is as potential. "Matter" also provides for temporal continuity, that which persists through a change of form. And for Aristotle matter is proposed as the possibility for a substrate to reality. But it fails in its capacity to meet the requirements of this position due to its nature as potential. The cosmological argument demonstrates that ultimately there must be an actuality as the substrate.

So "prime matter" is shown by the cosmological argument to be a concept whose physical reality is impossible due to the reality of the physical world we inhabit. Aristotle shows how the form of any particular thing must precede in time, the material existence of that thing, in order that when it comes to be the thing which it is, it is that thing and not something else, which it must be, as dictated by the law of identity. By this fact of reality, prime matter cannot be a true concept. Individual units come to be by the form which determines what they will be and this is an actuality, not the potential of matter.

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”? — Luke

You can call it either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say. What do you call those animals who are also human beings? Do you call them human beings, or do you call them animals? Obviously, either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say.

Allow me to put it another way.

What do you call that part of the future which lies outside the present? You call that “the future”, right?

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”?

Now, does the future exceed the present? If so, then it is distinct from the present.

You are trying to use “the future” in two different ways.

And same for “the past”. — Luke

Sorry Luke, I just can't see your point. Look, "animal" exceeds "human being", and "animal" is distinct from "human being". However, there is overlap because some animals are human beings. In a similar way, "the future" exceeds "the present", and is distinct from the present, yet there is overlap because some of the future is at the present. That is not a case of using "animal" in two different ways, nor is it a case of using "future" in two different ways. Why is this so hard for you to understand?

The grammar of our language is not synonymous with "the way we speak". It involves the logic of our language and the meaning of words, e.g. why you cannot be both asleep and awake, but you can be both asleep and dreaming. It is also why the past and future cannot both exceed the present and not exceed the present. It does not concern any propositions or theories about the world, so neither does it concern truth or falsity in the manner you suggest. — Luke

To me, what you describe here is simply the way we speak. That it makes no sense to say that a person is asleep and awake, both at the same time, is simply a feature of the way we speak. That there is logic which supports the way we speak requires that there are premises as well. In this case the premise would be the law of noncontradiction. Therefore "the grammar of our language" does involve propositions and theories about our world, such as the fundamental laws of logic. But, we also speak about awakening, and this is understood as a process which is neither being asleep nor awake. So despite the fact that the way we speak, or "the grammar of our language" discourages us from claiming that we are both asleep and awake at the same time, it does allow us to say that we are neither asleep nor awake.

That we understand awakening as neither being awake nor asleep is the result of the rule established by Aristotle, that becoming violates the law of excluded middle. Aristotle's logical structure resulted in the convention, that becoming, which is now expressed as processes like awakening are neither one nor the other of the two opposing predications. In modern times, there are some who following Hegel, like the dialectical materialists, think that becoming ought to be expressed as a combination of both the opposing predications, in violation of the law of noncontradiction.

How can differences in the frame of reference cause the arbitrariness to the points in time? This makes no sense to me. — Luke

According to the relativity of simultaneity, two events which are simultaneous from one frame of reference (the specific time on a specific clock, and another event), are not simultaneous from another frame of reference. Therefore the point in time at which the specified event occurred is arbitrary, depending of the choice of frames of reference.

So "the reality [is] that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming" which is not compatible with states (or arbitrary points). I don't believe I got #4 wrong. — Luke

You are still not understanding. The "becoming" which lies between particular states-of-being is real, but so are the states-of-being real. Both are real, and this is contrary to your #4 which states that reality is continuous. Reality is not continuous, by what I am arguing, it consists of states-of-being and a process of becoming which lies between the states of being. Hence the need for real points, and the conclusion that continuity is not real.

I'm asking: what are we meant to do in the meantime, until we find them? — Luke

Look for them, obviously.

In that case, until we get "conclusive proof" that there are not points in time, then we ought to continue talking as if there are points. — Luke

Sure, why not? As long as it serves the purpose. But when we get to the limits of any specific representation we need to switch to another, rather than trying to force the reality to fit the representation, when it does not. That is known figuratively as trying to force a square peg into a round hole.

Then that's both (i) and (ii). (i) is where past and future do not exceed the present. (ii) is where past and future do exceed the present. You are arguing for both, which is a contradiction. — Luke

No, it's not contradiction, your options were just not well formulated. My perspective takes parts from each. You did not give the proper option, past and future being unified at the present, and also each of them exceeding the present. As I said, unification does not imply that all properties of the things unified overlap with each other, or are unified, only that some are unified or overlap.

When you first mentioned this "zero point", you defined it as the point in time when an object begins a new motion after being acted on by a force. You are now saying it is a logical point instead of a physical point. This is fine, but please stick with one or the other. — Luke

It's both, I explained. We determine logically that there must be a point in time when a change begins. So it's as I explained, we see logically that there must be such points, and these ought to be supported by physical evidence, but we have not been able to find the physical evidence. So we employ the mathematics of limits, and this hides the fact that we can't find or are simply not looking for, the real points.

There is both continuity and non-continuity in mathematics. And it's not my premises that "produce the conclusion of a zero point", but the grammar of our language. — Luke

Logical conclusions require premises. If you want to characterize your premises as "the grammar of our language", then I will assume that your principle premise is "the way we speak". The problem with this premise of course is that we often speak falsely and deceptively. So it makes for an unsound argument. Such and such is the truth, because we say it's the truth.

Do you recognize the distinction between being "correct", meaning according to convention, and being "true", meaning according to reality? And do you acknowledge that a statement might be correct but false, according to that distinction?

Why blame the relativity of simultaneity for the arbitrariness? — Luke

The arbitrariness to the points in time, at which acceleration begins and ends is due to differences in the frame of reference. This arbitrariness is known as the relativity of simultaneity.

To summarise:
1. Reality is represented as a continuum
2. To use logic (or grammar or language), the continuum must be divided into arbitrary states
3. Arbitrary states are incompatible with becoming (implying that becoming is continuous)
4. Reality is actually continuous, therefore we should not use logic (or grammar or language) to divide the continuum into arbitrary states — Luke

You got #4 wrong. Remember, I argue for real zero points. I also said that I believe sense experience misleads us into thinking that reality is continuous, when it really is not. The reason I spent so long arguing the continuity of time was to get a good understanding of exactly what sense experience gives us as an experience of time as continuous.

My question is: how do you intend to represent reality without dividing it into arbitrary states (i.e. without using language)? — Luke

What I proposed already, is that we need to find the real points of division, then we can avoid the arbitrariness of the current way of dividing.

Are you suggesting that we should stop using all temporal concepts until we know whether there are "real" points in time? — Luke

No, I said if we get conclusive proof that there are not points in time then we ought to stop talking as if there is points.

Do the past and the future exceed the present? — Luke

I don't know the answer of this. Remember, that was an example of how such an overlap could be real, and I cautioned you not to take it as necessarily the way I would conceive of time, just an example.

That is, do you use "the present" to represent (i) a combination of the past and the future (where past and future do not exceed the present), or do you use "the present" to represent (ii) a period of time that separates the past from the future (where past and future do exceed the present)? You earlier rejected (ii), that the present is a period of time which separates the past from the future. However, since you now say "they are not perfectly overlapping", this indicates that you accept (ii), because it implies that the past and future exceed the present. Or, do you accept both (i) and (ii)? — Luke

I think I would choose (i), with a change, that past and future exceed the future. A combination of past and future where past and future exceed the present. So not all of past, or all of future are combined at present, only some of each, in the way I described already. "Union" does not imply that all the parts of the things united are equally united to each other. But I do not think that experience gives me what is required to answer with any certitude, as to exactly how past and future overlap, and exactly how the parts exist outside the overlap.

Perhaps I am lost, because I don't see how this is supposed to work. "Points in time" supposedly exist in reality, whereas memory and anticipation exist in my mind. How do we use real points in time to distinguish memory from anticipation? You say that the points would enable a distinction to be made between the past and future parts of a sensation, but how will that help to separate a memory from an anticipation? — Luke

Your mind is part of reality. Determining the real points within the mind would allow for application outside the mind, because both are part of the same reality.

What I argued is that the experience of sensation, which is an activity we do at the present, must consist of both past and future. The past part consists of memory and the future part consists of future. Real points of "present" would allow a separation between these two, for a better understanding, instead of having them conflated into one activity, sensation.

If we distinguish past, present and future from each other by reference to properties rather than by reference to (arbitrary) dimensionless points, then why are you taking issue with arbitrary points? — Luke

Many people, including you it seems, claim that we distinguish past, present, and future by dimensionless points, when in reality we distinguish these by description. It is "the grammar of our language", which makes people think like that, but it is a misrepresentation of how we really understand the difference between these three. It's done for simplicity to facilitate ease of speaking. Since our descriptions of past, present, and future are so thoroughly underdeveloped and vary from person to person, yet the need to separate past from future in discussion is very commonplace, it's much easier just to talk as if there is a point in time, present, which separates past from future.

There exists a process/entity duality (which in some ways is akin to the wave/particle duality of QM) in the operations of cognition. For one example, our cognition naturally, innately, perceives physical objects, or entities, set against a background – objects that we can cognize as sometimes engaging in processes (e.g., the rock (entity) is rolling (process) down the hill (entity)).

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept. — javra

I would say, that traditionally the background is of entities. The entity is what is static, and changes occur to it. This is the traditional logic of predication, the subject accepts changing predications. The static aspect is representative of what does not change as time passes, what is continuous, and this is matter in ancient philosophy, and matter is the background. It is only in the modern world view, that energy has taken the place of matter, as the continuous. But energy is fundamentally a predicate, the capacity which a moving thing has, to do work. So now movement, which really ought to be predicated to something, as that which is moving, is allowed to be the background, or substratum itself, hence your background of flux. But this is inherently problematic, because without the ether we have wave motion with no substance which the waves are the waves of.

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept. — javra

What makes a thing a thing, is temporal continuity. Anything which displays temporal extension is given thinghood. So for example, in Newton's first law, uniform motion is given thinghood. It will continue to persist through time, as it has, unless ended by a force.

Unlike the future, though, our recollections of past present-durations wherein we in any way interacted with other minds will always reference events commonly stored (here overlooking mistakes of memory and such) within the memory of all minds concerned. Hence, the past will be fixed relative to all minds that once partook of it when it was a (commonly shared) present duration. In contrast, the future – not having yet been presently experienced – will not be.

As an aside, I’m one to believe that such musings could (together with other principles) be applied so as to formulate a theory of presentism wherein the past is for all intended purposes perfectly fixed and the future is indeterminate – a theory of presentism that parallels the theory of relativity’s stipulation that simultaneity is always observer-dependent. But I’m here presenting all this simply to provide better general background for the current purposes, this in terms of defining the present in respect to the past and future. (In other words, though I’m aware these given premises could be further enquired into, I’m only here presenting them for the purpose of the current issue.) — javra

If you define the past as absolutely fixed, and the future as absolutely unfixed, then we run into the same problem that I was showing with Luke's arguments when past and future are mutually exclusive contraries. There cannot be any overlap of past and future. Then, the nature of "the present" becomes extremely problematic. Since the present has to be a process (it cannot be a dimensionless point when a predicate changes to is contrary because this requires a duration of becoming), this time, "the present" must be completely distinct from past and future. But then we need to account for the process whereby the past becomes the present, and the present the future, and I think we'd have to posit some other form of time for this. It may become an infinite regress.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others. — javra

I think that these points of distinction are imposed pragmatically, depending on the purpose. For example, you intentionally qualified "past" with what is consciously remembered as past. That is just for the purpose of having a clear division. If we allow all past, then we have to deal with things like "sensory memory", which I brought up earlier. So sure, you can say that we can make clear and distinct divisions between memories (past), and anticipations (future), so long as you restrict your definitions of memories and anticipations to those which we recognize clearly and distinctly as memories and anticipations. That's a sort of confirmation bias, defining terms to support a bias. These things defined by that bias are further back in the past, and things further ahead in the future. But if you include things in the very immediate future and past, bringing your perspective narrower than the conscious perspective, to consider the relations of the constituent parts of the conscious perspective, then we cannot distinguish between memory aspects and anticipatory aspects in this way.

We then know from experience that there is no measurable distinction between the future and the experienced present, with the latter always changing to incorporate what in the past was strict future. The same lack of measurable distinction holds between the experienced present and the past. So we know all this to be process, for it's all continuous change. Notwithstanding, we also know that the experienced present is always qualitatively distinct from all past we can recall (be it the past of two seconds ago or that of two years ago, etc.). Likewise with future present-durations which we can in part predict and thereby anticipate.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others.

Furthermore, when we focus on the past, present, or future, we then cognize each of these to be composed of befores and afters. For example, I am in this current duration of the experienced present writing this word before this one. Upon closer experiential examination, all these befores and afters too are perfectly devoid of measurable distinctions. Yet, when we conceptualize these processes of lived experience – such as by consciously or unconsciously ascribing causality – each before and each after will then be cognized as a distinct unit. — javra

Here is where the problems present themselves. When you say "focus on", I consider this to be conscious effort. The process which we know as experiencing the present, if it were purely experiencing, without applying any conscious effort, perhaps in meditation or something like that, would not consist of any differentiation between past and future. Maybe dreaming is like this, no discernible difference between past and future. But dreaming is completely removed from sensation. When sensation is active, then it actually takes conscious effort to remove a sort of natural distinction between past and future which inheres within, or underpins our consciousness.

What I think is the case, is that what you call the "measurable distinction" between past and present, and also future and present, is so deeply inherent within the conscious experience of the present, or prior to it, as foundational to it, that to say that there is no such measurable distinction without conscious effort, is somewhat incorrect. This is why it actually requires conscious effort to remove the influence of this distinction from the conscious experience. For example, practises like meditation which are designed to put oneself into a purely experiential mode of being without the influence of memories and anticipations, actually require great effort.

This would imply that most or all life forms, even those which have not evolved enough to be fully conscious, would have some process for distinguishing between memories and anticipations, as fundamental to their experience of being present. That is implied by the fact that it requires great effort, and is actually impossible, to remove the difference between memory and anticipation from the experience of being present.

The issue here is that consciousness has developed a method of cognizing and recognizing memories and anticipations, through conscious effort, which is most likely completely distinct, and different from the underlying "natural way" of distinguishing memories from anticipations, which underpins, and forms the foundation of the conscious experience. I propose that there are two distinct ways involved, one being the way of continual process and the other being the way of distinct states-of-being, what you call entities.

I believe that the crux of the matter is the use of symbols or signs. If we take Luke's proposed "grammar of our language" for example, we see that language is fundamentally conformed to the entities, or states-of-being type of temporal reality. But there is always a part of the conscious experience of being present, which language cannot get at, or is ill-formed for describing. This is the underlying, background of process which you refer to. So the underlying experience of being conscious at the present appears to consist of a continuous process, and the conscious effort to distinguish past memories and future goals as objects or entities, is somewhat inconsistent with this natural background.

What I propose is that even the underlying experience of continuity is constructed from an even more primitive way of recognizing distinct past and future entities or states-of-being. And what has happened is that the living system for pragmatic reasons has produced a synthesis which creates the appearance of continuity. This type of synthesis is the very same type that we find in modern physics. The underlying grammar of language provides an understanding of temporal reality in terms of entities, objects which are states-of-being. This representation is supposedly supported by strong philosophical principles, metaphysics and ontology, so theology and religion have enforced this usage for centuries, as best representative of the truth. However, all the entities we find in the physical temporal reality are in flux, so we move to represent the entities as active, Newton's first law for example. This law represents continuity as a uniform motion. And this representation is supported by the underlying experience, which is itself an experience of continuous process. Since the fundamental inner experience is apprehended as continuous process, we move to represent the entire outer universe as continuous process. This is done for pragmatic reasons, but it is claimed as truth, because it is supported by the underlying inner experience, which is apprehended as a continuous process.

So I have exposed four levels of representation in the preceding paragraph. At the upper levels of consciousness we have the entire universe represented as continuous process. This is a synthesis of of the distinct entities which are the substance of the layer below that, in the more base levels of consciousness, the common language. The synthesis is carried out for pragmatic purposes of understanding the motions and activities of the entities represented in the more base level of consciousness. Below this base level of representing performed by consciousness is the conscious experience itself. The conscious experience is apprehended as a continuous process and the base level representation of it, with entities, which is derived from ancient metaphysics is seen as a faulty representation. However, what I've proposed is that this presumed foundational level, the continuity of the conscious experience at the present, is really itself a synthesis, produced by the evolution of the living being for pragmatic reasons, and that underlying this apparent continuity is further, more base, entities, or states-of-being, which have been synthesized into the continuity evident as the conscious experience of the present.

In summary, what I say is that the representation of entities is more real, more truthful in its correspondence with temporal reality, than is the representation of the continuum. But temporal reality is extremely complex and very far from understood by any living beings on earth. So as our understanding of temporal existence progresses, it proceeds through an evolution of representing entities, synthesizing them into a continuity of existence, which is guided by pragmatic reasons, until the synthesis reaches the limits of its usefulness. At this time, a whole new level of representation of entities is required, so that the cycle starts over again.

Therefore I can propose a fifth level to the four described above. The representation of modern physics, as a synthesized space-time continuum has pretty much reached the limits of its usefulness. Quantum physics has presented us with the reality of fundamental quanta, entities which underly the spatial-temporal reality. The space-time continuum as currently synthesized cannot provide comprehension of these fundamental entities because it has reached the limits of its usefulness. So we need to identify a whole new level of entities, as foundational to spatial-temporal reality, and renew the cycle on a new level.

The Paradox is roughly this: information or knowledge of the initial conditions and laws of nature should allow a true prediction of the action of some person or subsystem with those initial conditions and that is governed by those laws of nature. Such a prediction must be true. However, if the person or subsystem in question acts in a way that falsifies the prediction, then the prediction is not true. In brief, the prediction must be true, however it is not true when the prediction is falsified by the action of the person or subsystem considered. — NotAristotle

The problem here is that we need to know, with absolute certainty that the conditions have been met, in order for the experiment to be useful. The two conditions are knowledge of the initial conditions, and accurate laws of nature. If it is not known with absolute certainty that these two conditions are met, then failure of the prediction could be the result of inadequate knowledge of the conditions. And, success of the prediction is only useful to the extent covered by Hume's induction problem. Since we cannot know the two conditions with absolute certainty, due to that induction problem, the proposed experiment is useless.

I have given you an argument for why there must be points of distinction between past, present and future. I'm not saying this for the sake of saying that you contradict yourself. However, you did contradict yourself, as I pointed out. — Luke

This is the point we've come to. We seem to be in total agreement. I agree that "there must be" such points of distinction. That is what I've called the "zero point" and I've explained why intuition provides us with the premises which make such zero points a logical necessity. However, what I argue is that experience, therefore empirical evidence, does not support these premises. Empirical evidence shows us time as continuous, and without such points of distinction. And, because we need such points of distinction for our measurement procedures, though experience does not provide them for us, we impose them arbitrarily, according to pragmatic conditions.

I'll grant you these "in between periods" of being half asleep and half awake. However, you must admit that there comes a point when you are no longer half asleep but asleep, and there comes a point when you are no longer half awake but awake.

Likewise, there comes a point where an event is no longer in the present (i.e., in combination with the future) but is fully in the past, and there comes a point where an event is no longer fully in the future but is in the present (i.e., in combination with the past). — Luke

There is no such point though, in experience. When I awaken, I can say with certainty, "now I am awake", and also say with certainty that at some temporally separated (duration of time) past time, "I was asleep", but I cannot find within my experience, the precise point which separates the two.

What you are arguing is a logical necessity for such a point, as the "zero point". You are not showing me the experience of such a point. This logical necessity which you refer to is produced from our common way of speaking about time, and this reflects our intuitions. The logic proceeds from premises derived from intuition. The problem is that the logical systems of mathematics. which are adopted by, and employed by science use premises derived from experience, these are the premises of continuity, and these premises are incompatible with your premises which produce the conclusion of a zero point.

The problem was well explained by Aristotle, as the incompatibility between being and becoming. There is an incompatibility between describing things as distinct states-of-being (what is and is not), and the process, becoming, which is the change which must occur for one state to lead to the other. I have characterized the premises of being and not being as intuitive, and the premises of becoming as empirical.

If we describe things in terms of states-of-being, 'Luke is asleep', and 'Luke is not asleep', this is what is known as predication. The one excludes the other (contradiction) if we follow the fundamental laws of logic, and there is no third possibility (excluded middle). However, if we try to describe the entirety of reality in this way, there is a very serious problem, we cannot account for how one state of being is produced from its opposite. We cannot account for how the subject 'Luke' alters from being asleep to being not asleep.

The intermediary is the process, "becoming", by means of which the subject changes to its opposite state of being, in relation to that predicate. If we try to describe becoming as an intermediary state-of-being we meet the problem of infinite regress. 'Luke is awakening' is a proposition of an intermediary state-of-being. Now we have 'Luke was asleep', 'Luke is awakening', and 'Luke will be not asleep', as three distinct states-of-being. To fully understand, we need to account for how the subject 'Luke' changes from being asleep, to being awakening, and from being awakening to being awake. If we propose further states-of-being we face infinite regress. So Aristotle proposed that becoming is incompatible with being, and the intermediary between distinct and mutually exclusive states-of-being, the process of change, cannot be understood through the terms of states-of-being.

In classical physics (modern physics) the state-of-being is represented by Newton's first law of motion. This is the continuity of experience, empirical evidence, a body at rest remains at rest, or in uniform motion remains in uniform motion continuously, unless acted upon by a force. States-of-being are represented as continuous through time, which is consistent with experience. The intermediary, the process of becoming, by which one state-of-being is changed to another, is represented as acceleration. These are the two incompatible types of description, uniform motion, and acceleration.

However, introducing a distinct and incompatible intermediary (becoming), between two contrary states-of-being does not relieve us of the inclination to assume points. You demonstrate this by insisting that there is a requirement for a point between future and present, and a point between present and past. So if the past is a continuous state 'Luke was asleep' and the future is a continuous state 'Luke will be not asleep', and the intermediary present is 'Luke is awakening' is also a sate-of being, you insist that there must be a point in time when the past state 'asleep' changes to the intermediary state 'awakening', and the intermediary state 'awakening' changes to the future state of 'not asleep'.

Notice the mistake there. The intermediary, the becoming or process of awakening has been represented as an intermediary state. This is what Aristotle showed leads to infinite regress. The intermediary "becoming" cannot be made to be compatible with states-of-being in this way because it only produces an infinite regress and stymies any true understanding which requires that becoming remains incompatible with being.

In modern physics, the intermediary is acceleration. So 'Luke is awakening' is analogous with acceleration, as the intermediary between two distinct states of uniform motion. In physics, we practise the mistake exposed above, and describe the intermediary, acceleration, the becoming, as a third distinct of state. This produces the need for two points which separate the prior state and the posterior state from the intermediary state of acceleration. The points have the characteristic of arbitrariness due to the relativity of simultaneity, and the infinite regress produced from representing the intermediary "becoming" as a state-of being, is absorbed by the concept of a "limit" in calculus.

The conclusion to that long-winded explanation above, is that modern physics represents the reality of physical existence as continuous. To be consistent with the empirical evidence, spatial-temporal reality is represented as a continuum. However, to be able to employ deductive logic, the continuum is divided into distinct states-of-being, and this produces the need for points of separation or division. The application of points is arbitrary as provided for by the axioms of "continuity". The mistake in this practise is that it does not provide for the reality, that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming which is fundamentally incompatible with states-of-being, and cannot be represented as a state-of-being. By placing points or "limits" as the divisions between states-of being instead of the incompatible process of becoming, the change between one state-of-being and another is misunderstood due to the implied infinite regress.

Why must we "substantiate our way of speaking"? — Luke

So that we are speaking truth, instead of falsity. If it turns out that there are no points in time, then we should stop speaking as if there is, and get on with understanding the true nature of time as continuous. I have substantiated my way of thinking, that's what I've been doing in this thread. I've explained the reason why we talk about points in time, and also the reason why we talk about the continuity of time

This implies that the present (the combination of past and future times) consists of all of time. In that case, I did misunderstand you. This is not your typical Venn diagram, because the "past" and "future" circles here are perfectly overlapping with each other, one directly on top of the other. Thanks for clarifying. — Luke

No they are not perfectly overlapping, you still misunderstand. At the beginning, there is all future and not past, therefore no overlap here. At the end there is all past and no future, therefore no overlap there. For all we know, these non overlapping areas could be bigger than the overlapping area. We have no way to measure this.

Why do we need such points in order to distinguish memories from anticipation? — Luke

You seem to be lost here. Suppose you are sensing (seeing) the chair. You cannot tell which part of the sensation is produced from memory, and which part is produced from anticipation. Points in time would enable a distinction to be made between the past part of the sensation and future part. This would be helpful to understanding sensation, therefore also helpful to empirical science which relies on sense evidence.

If you don't want any "arbitrary points" in your description of a continuous present, then there will be nothing to distinguish the present from the past from the future from a turnip. These temporal terms become meaningless. — Luke

We usually distinguish things from each other by reference to properties, not dimensionless points. So this is completely false.

Is there any reason that we would choose a "way of speaking" that makes it impossible to distinguish one object or event from another? That is what your "way of speaking" without "points" gives us. — Luke

Again, we generally use properties to distinguish things, not points.

It seems this discussion has become rather pointless, even though you are continually trying to insert arbitrary points. This you do simply for the sake of saying that I contradict myself when I say there are no points. That's not interesting for me, so maybe the discussion has run its course.

I was following your example of two different types of experience: — Luke

It was not my example, you proposed two different types of experience. I just showed you why it wouldn't work.

Tell me, what other experience is in between being asleep and being awake? What separates them? Must there be another experience between these? Aren't we asleep and then, at some point, awake again, in succession? — Luke

Come on Luke. Don't you experience awakening, that brief period when you're half asleep and half awake? And don't you experience this 'in between period' when you are falling asleep as well?

Why do we need "something real" to distinguish the end of one and the beginning of another? What real thing distinguishes the end of being asleep and the beginning of being awake? Perhaps there is no distinction between being asleep and being awake and it's just "one continuous experience"? Or did you "arbitrarily assert" that being asleep and being awake were distinct types of experience? — Luke

I am not following you now.

But there must be a point when an event is no longer present and becomes past. Otherwise, past and present are indistinguishable. — Luke

I've been through this already. No point is required if "past" and "future" name different categories which may overlap, instead of them being opposing terms where one denies the possibility of the other by way of contradiction. And this is consistent with our experience, "future" does not name the opposite of "past", it names something categorically different. So, past and present are distinguishable from each other by their relation with the future.

I really don't see why you insist on inserting an arbitrary point all the time.

In this quote, the "point" at which what is in the present becomes past is the starting point of the present. In your terminology, this is when the past (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future). There is also a second point where the future has not yet passed the present, which is the end point of "the present". In your terminology, this is when the future (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future). — Luke

I don't see my use of "point" anywhere in those quotes, so I think you are constructing a contradiction from a misquote.

I know that you are trying to argue that there is some smooth, unnoticeable transition between them, but the distinct concepts won't let you. — Luke

You are treating the concepts as mutually exclusive, not as distinct. That is your failure to properly understand what I've already explained numerous times, not a contradiction by me.

There can be a period of changing, but at some point there must be a moment of change when what is present is no longer future and what is past is no longer present; when the past is no longer combined with the future and when the future has not yet become combined with the past. — Luke

This is what I called the "zero point", and the fact that we tend to think like this, intuitively, instead of the way that I proposed, is evidence that we need to seek, and find the real points in time, to substantiate our way of speaking.

But since you are having so much difficulty understanding this idea of overlap, try this image as an example. In the overlap of past and future, which I described as "the present", consider that the proportion of each, the amount of past, in relation to the amount of future, is constantly changing. So if there was a beginning of time, then at the very beginning, there was only future, and no past. At the very end of time, there will be all past, and no future. We are somewhere in between, and the past and future at our present is proportioned accordingly.

That is just an example of how such a thing could be conceived, so please do not say that it contradicts a completely different example.

Do you believe that, in order to distinguish memories from anticipation, we need to discover "real points in time"? — Luke

No you seem to misunderstand. In order to distinguish memories form anticipations within what we experience as "the present", (for example or sensations), we need such points.

Moreover, if the present is a combination of past and future, as you claim, then how will the discovery of "real points in time" help to disentangle this entanglement of memories and anticipation? — Luke

By providing a point of separation, like you've been desperately trying to do. But your points of separation are arbitrary, I'm looking for points with substance.

Is "the chair of two seconds ago" in the present or in the past (according to your context)? — Luke

Sorry, I do not follow. And I'm tired of trying to explain this point to you, it appears hopeless, just like trying to get you to quit inserting arbitrary points into my description of a continuous present.

The relevant question is "when are you perceiving?" — Luke

We are always perceiving at the present, and the present consists of past and future. We've already discussed this. Where's the problem?

Be that as it may…..I mean, you pretty much disagree with everybody…..it is clear that priority in the mind, as such, cannot be phenomena. — Mww

Sure, I might not be very agreeable, but if you read Stanford's article on a priori justification, you'll see that there are many problems with Kant\s system. So it's not just me.

The problem I have with the idea of a priori judgements, is that if the justification comes from within the mind, this just produces an infinite regress, as each a priori judgement would require an a priori justification, which would be an a priori judgement requiring a further a priori justification, and there would be no substance upon which all these justifications would be supported, just an implied infinite regress.

What Kant does do though, is grounds, or substantiate the a priori in intuition. However, this removes "intuition" from the mind, making it prior to the mind, as the basis for the a priori judgements within the mind. But intuition is also the necessary condition for phenomena. Therefore he provides no real principles which would place a priori judgements as prior to phenomena in the mind. In reality, he just uses "intuition" in an ambiguous, obscure way, to hide the problems with his proposed system.

This is a false dichotomy. You're saying there must either be a gap between the two experiences or else there must be an overlap between them. The third option is that one experience follows the other immediately without any gap or overlap. — Luke

It is incoherent to describe this as two distinct experiences, in succession, unless there is something which separates them. Otherwise you have just arbitrarily inserted a point and claim that on one side of the point is one type of experience and on the other side is another distinct type. You need something real, which distinguishes the end of one and the beginning of another, or else you are just arbitrarily asserting distinct experiences in a succession, rather than one continuous experience.

Your other questions on this matter will be answered for you, when you come to comprehend what I've said above.

Okay, at some point inside the present, the future becomes the past. — Luke

No! We have no premise for a "point". You incessantly want to insert a "point" when the unreality of such a point is my primary premise. You insert the unjustified "point" which is completely inconsistent with the justified position I am arguing, then you ask me to make sense of such a point. It cannot be made sense of because it is incompatible with what makes sense.

Ah, but here you say that the past refers to time that has passed (or "past") the present. This means that the past is not within the present and is no longer within the present because it has passed (outside of) it. If it has passed the present, then it is not inside the present. It cannot be both inside the present and outside the present. There is your contradiction. — Luke

I explained this, the present consists of duration. read the following:

When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, there is the issue of dividing the continuous into parts, the parts are arbitrary. But this is why it is so extremely difficult to distinguish the anticipatory parts of the human experience of "the present" from the memory parts. That is why I argue that the present will remain unintelligible to us until we find the real points in time. That there necessarily is real points, is demonstrated by the issue with the "zero point" of change, which I described. The problem is that we do not experience these points, so experience has misled us into modeling motions as continuous, and accepting mathematical axioms which produce a continuum. And since these premises prove to be very useful (up to a limit), we are reluctant to see them as misrepresentations. What is required to get beyond the limitations which those premises impose, is to determine the real points.

If "there is no now" as you say, then what did you mean by "your perception of it now"? — Luke

Human experience, along with the conventions employed for measurement have misled you to believe that you perceive a "now" at the present. There is no such now, as described by you, your perception of it is an illusion.

I was referring to your scenario of looking at a chair in front of you. Which event is simultaneous with the present in that scenario? You used the phrase "your perception of it now". If you used "now" to mean something different than "the present", then what did you mean?

And, again, when is the present situated in that scenario? — Luke

OK, I found the paragraph in question:

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this context, "now" means present, which is continuous. It is not the "now" of a point in time, which you propose, the one I argue is an illusion. The context ought to reveal this to you, " the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now".

Your perception of anything at the present, what is called "now" above, includes memories of past (exemplified by sensory memory). The perception also includes anticipations for the future. Due to the problem described above, it is impossible to separate which aspects of your conscious perception are produced bu memory and which parts are produced by anticipation.

So for example, if you are consciously watching the chair, and something unexpected suddenly happens, you will recognize the sudden occurrence as unanticipated, but this will occur with a reaction time. That there is a reaction to sudden change indicates that anticipation is part of the conscious experience, that there is a time it takes for the reaction to occur, indicates that memory is part of the conscious experience. Therefore we can understand the conscious experience described as "the perception of it now" as a combination of past and future.

So, to answer your questions, "your perception of it now" refers to "at the present", and this is an extended duration of time, as indicated, by "the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part" of that perception now. And, as explained above, your anticipations concerning the future of that chair, 'the chair in the future' are also an integral part of that perception of the chair at the present. Your true perception of the chair now, or at the present, is as of the chair as existing through a continuous duration of time, not the illusionary point, or infinitesimal point, or anything like that, as you keep proposing for me to make sense of. What you ask me to make sense of cannot be made sense of because it is inconsistent with what makes sense.

At best, with respect to phenomena, it can only be said that the priority in the mind is the antecedent conceptual conditions by which they are possible, which is the deduction of the pure conceptions, better known as the categories. — Mww

I do not agree with your interpretation of Kant here. The categories are produced by judgement, and I think that Kant does not properly characterize judgement. This is where the issues of his system are evident, and Kant runs into problems. I think you and I have discussed the nature of judgement before.

The conditions for sensibility, phenomena, are the pure intuitions of space and time. And "intuition" is not well defined by Kant. It is not even implied that intuition is necessarily within the mind. But these pure intuitions are necessarily prior to phenomena. But the categories are created, or discovered as a means for judging phenomena. They are not necessarily prior to phenomena, as Kant described them as conforming to the appearance of phenomena. Nor are the categories properly called "intuitions" because they are already judgements of some sort, and judgement is posterior to intuition. But then he seems to want to assert that such tools of judging phenomena are prior to phenomena, though he formulates his categories as conforming to phenomena.

'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' ~ Bertrand Russell — Wayfarer

As an "object" of thought, we can ask where that object exists. Thinking occurs within the mind, and we can conclude that the object of thinking, the goal or end, is within the mind as well, as directing the thought. Other objects of thought must exist within as well.

The problem with Plato's analogy, comparing the good with the sun, and the intelligible object with the visible object, is that the sun and visible object are external to the mind. This may create the impression that the good and the intelligible object are external to the mind as well. I believe the proper interpretation of the analogy is to compare the internal "realm" of thinking, mind, and intellect, with the external "realm" of sensation. This places the good, the intellect, and the intelligible object as internal to the mind.

However, since there is ambiguity as to how the intelligible object, and the intelligible realm are to be understood, there is also ambiguity as to the proper location of "the good". Accordingly, Aristotle distinguished between the apparent good, and the real good. This distinction is commonly used, and misused in Christianity. It is often proposed that the real good is the external good, as supported by God, and the internal good is the apparent good. However, God cannot support the real good, as demonstrated by the Euthyphro problem. And it becomes evident from the problems of the immoral human being knowing what is good (as external good), yet acting in a contrary way (guided by the internal good), that the real good must be the internal good. This is "the good" which motivates the actions of a human being, therefore it is the real good, and the external good, the one supposedly supported by God is the apparent good, as other external objects are only appearances of objects as well.

What does it mean to be 'much closer to what is?' — Wayfarer

I think that is best interpreted as temporal priority, "what is", is the present, therefore what is meant is closer to the present. The shadows are the effect, therefore in the past. If you come to apprehend the causal role of the internal, then a vast realm of "inner space" with its own mode of relations, distinct from external relations, will be revealed to you. The temporal order, which is supported in some degree with science by the concept of spatial expansion, is from the inside outward. The future, with all its related features lies within the internal realm which the human mind partakes of in a very limited degree. The internal (future) manifests at the present in an outward process and this is what gives the internal intelligible objects causal capacity.

This still doesn't explain what makes something a "true and real" whole object, rather than just a part. All coconuts (that we know of) are part of the Earth, and the Earth is part of the Solar System, and so on. All of these divisions - indeed all divisions - are "artificial", because those concepts belong to our language and we divide the world up into those "objects" or concepts that we value, not according to any "natural" divisions. — Luke

I agree, that is one way of looking at things. We can class all divisions as artificial. Then we must look at the nature of divisibility itself. The assumption of the reality of continuity implies that any division imagined in theory can be carried out in practice. So the real issue now is whether some theoretical divisions are impossible in practise. If some theoretical divisions are impossible then the assumption of continuity is incorrect. I think that physicists general believe Planck units to be a boundary to divisibility. Divisions beyond this are possible in theory but not in practise. And if there are fundamental units like this, limits to divisibility, then spatial-temporal reality is not as a continuum.

You are complaining about the infinite divisibility of the continuum of numbers while also arguing that the empirical reality of time, or the present, is continuous. Are you arguing against yourself? — Luke

No, I am saying that it is highly likely that the human conscious experience misleads us in respect to the true nature of time. This way of looking at human experience is common in philosophy, dating back to Plato who said that the senses deceive, and the mind is to be trusted over the body.

So I've argued that the conscious experience provides for us a representation of a continuous spatial-temporal reality. So the assumption of continuity provided the foundation for classical physics, and along with this came the relevant mathematical axioms required to model physical activity within this continuum. However, I see that the assumption of continuity has reached the limits of its effectiveness. Quantum uncertainty has revealed that there are real problems with this assumption of continuity.

The evidence therefore ought to lead us to question, doubt, what we assume about conscious experience. This is the philosophical way, to accept the possibility that the senses mislead us, what we accept as "empirical fact", is really a deep misunderstanding. So the common example is that a serious of still frames can produce what appears to be the continuous activity of a movie. Likewise for the human experience, it may feel just like a continuity of consciousness, a continuum of space and time, but at the foundation is really a series of discrete units.

The important point is that with the assumption of continuity, points of divisibility are allowed to be anywhere within the supposed continuum, arbitrarily. But if the real underlying substratum of spatial temporal existence has within itself, natural points of divisibility, then the arbitrarily assigned points will not correspond, therefore no truth will ensue.

If there are different types of experience, then we can sensibly speak of having one type then another, different type. Hence, we can sensibly speak of a succession of different types of experience. — Luke

Unless we posit points to separate the different experiences, this would lead to an infinite regress. To be a succession, one would have to follow the other, and something would have to separate them, or else there'd be an overlap, and not a succession. The thing which separates two distinct types of experience would have to be another type of experience, and this would lead to an infinite regress of always positing another type of experience to separate one from the other. Otherwise we'd have to posit points which separate one type of experience from the other, and then we're back to the problem I described, of the "zero point", and points in general.

How can the future become the past at the present, when you also claim that the present contains both the future and the past; when the past and future are inside the present? — Luke

I don't see the problem. This is what happens "inside the present", the future becomes the past. Therefore both future and past must exist within the present, as one becomes the other inside the present. Consider the freezing point of water for example. "Inside the freezing point", water becomes ice, so both water and ice exist inside the freezing point. This process though, is also reversible, as ice becomes water inside the melting point, which is the same as the freezing point.

How can this be, when you claim that the past and future are both inside the present? — Luke

I see no problem. The present is not a point, as I've been arguing, it has breadth, or width. "Point" has been adopted by pragmaticism As the Venn diagram example shows, past and future extend outside the present, but they also overlap inside the present. When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time.

It contradicts what you said just above. This is what I've been telling you all along. — Luke

Sorry, you've lost me. I've addressed all your concerns, so there is no reason to accuse me of contradiction, just your refusal to accept my terms.

When is "now" (i.e. the present) in this scenario? Which event is simultaneous with the present here? — Luke

There is no now, unless we change the meaning of "now", as I've been explaining. By the time you say "now" it is in the past. So the use of "now" to designate some point at the present is just a pragmatic practise to facilitate measuring and such things. There is no "now" in that scenario because there is no now in general, it's a useful fiction.

"Simultaneous with the present" makes no sense. There are events which move from future to past, at the present, and every single real event does this, but there is no sense to ask which event is "simultaneous with the present", because every event occurs at the present, yet they have different times when they are at the present.

One of those straws is the belief that the parable of the cave does indeed present an allegory for a kind of intellectual illumination or an insight into a higher domain of being, and that those who have ascended to it see something which others do not, as I think the allegory plainly states. (I’m of the view that this is what is represented by the later term ‘metanoia’ which is not found in the Platonic dialogues but which means in this context an intellectual conversion or the breakthrough into a new way of seeing the world.) I suppose one secondary source I could refer to for support is this SEP entry on ’divine illumination’ in Greek philosophy. — Wayfarer

The breakthrough referred to here, intellectual conversion, or illumination, is to apprehend the priority of conceptions and ideas. Ideas are first in the mind of the individual, as what are present to the mind. This is Kant's starting point in the Critique of Pure Reason, the priority of what's in the mind, phenomena. But for Plato the priority is not just a logical priority, but also a temporal priority as well. He sees ideas as causal through the reality of "the good". This way of looking at things is outlined in The Symposium, when the student of love grasps the beauty of human artefacts and institutions, and learns of a Beauty which transcends the beauty of any particular artefact.

So the cave allegory expresses this causal relationship of temporal priority. What the people in the cave see, are shadows on the wall, and the shadows are representative of artificial material objects. Behind the scenes, what few people properly relate to, and understand, is that human ideas, along with ambition, desire, intention or good, are the cause of these artificial products. Human intention and ambition is represented as the fire, and we are directed to apprehend the material products as simple representations of the human ideas, the shadows which come into being through the means of the fire.

That is the first stage of the philosopher's illumination, and the important point is that the ideas, along with the intention or good (the fire), are temporally prior to the material products as the cause of them. This temporal priority is what validates Plato's claim of a higher degree of reality to the intelligible realm (what's inside the mind), as the artificial material products are simply a copy or reflection of what's inside the mind. Aristotle adopts this position, and assigns actuality to form.

The second stage of the illumination is when the philosopher exits the cave. Then the philosopher sees the entirety of the natural world under this conceptual structure of temporal priority. All material objects are seen as reflections of the Form which produces them. The human good (the fire) is replaced by the natural good (the sun) and the philosopher sees all natural material objects illuminated by the sun, as reflections of the Forms which produce them. The Forms are temporally prior to the material objects as the cause of their existence, and this priority is also a logical priority as expressed in Plato's Timaeus and Aristotle's Metaphysics as the cosmological argument.

The logical necessity of the priority of the Forms is the result of assigning actuality to form, and this is validated by the concept of final cause, the causal force of human ideas, and the existence of artificial objects. You'll notice that Plotinus' proposition of "the One" as prior to all, fails in logical necessity because "the One" is assigned the character of unlimited potential. So "the One" as Plotinus' first principle, lacks in the required actuality to be causal. Therefore it lacks the logical force required as a first principle.

Yeah, I'm aware of Einstein's Nobel Prize-winning work, but that doesn't begin to explain why you think that quanta signify any sort of "natural points" in time, or why time might possibly be naturally divisible into quanta. — Luke

Well, it's intuition, with many complicated factors involved. But I am not arguing that, am I? I am arguing continuity. So despite the fact that there are many reasons to make me intuitively believe that there are natural points in time, this is not consistent with our experience of time as continuous, and that is what I am arguing, the experience of time as continuous.

Briefly though, there is an issue with what could be called "point zero". Whenever an object at rest, or one in regular motion as per Newton's first law, begins a new motion from being acted upon by a force, there must be a point in time, or "moment" when the motion begins. In human experience, this would be self-movement. If I'm sitting on the couch, and decide to stand up, and actually move in that way, there must be a point in time when this motion begins.

Classical physics represents an object being acted on by a force, with the concept of acceleration. But there is a problem with this representation because there must be a point in time, the zero point, when the object goes from not having, to having, the new motion. At this time, the rate of acceleration must be infinite because the value goes from zero to some quantity. Conventional mathematics handles this with calculus, which treats the zero point as a limit rather than a point in time which is actually traversed. In short, the concept of acceleration cannot account for the zero point, because of the need for infinity, and a different form of this same problem manifests in quantum mechanics as the uncertainty principle.

What is intuitive though, is that there must be a real point in time, when a new motion of an object begins. This is assuming that objects have real distinct existence. If objects are not distinct, then a change in motion is just a continuation of the whole (universe) through cause and effect, and there is no need for a real point of beginning. It is intuitive because objects appear to have real distinct existence, independent from each other, and can be moved freely.

For example, is a coconut an object or a part? How about a hydrogen atom? — Luke

Your examples are concepts, "a coconut", "a hydrogen atom", universals. You are not pointing to particular aspects of the world here, so I cannot address the examples directly. Each of these named types could have particulars which exist as a separate object, or as a part of a larger object. As I said, we need to refer to empirical evidence, and this would give us the context of existence of each particular occurrence.

Naming the type usually doesn't provide for us the context of existence. However, whether the thing is a part or a whole is essential to some universals. This depends on how the named things exists within its environment. So the hydrogen atom for example cannot exist naturally as an object, it must be a part. Human beings can in some sense separate hydrogen atoms, and present it as an object. But in reality, it is not an independent object even after this separation, because the device which separates it is required for its purported separation, therefore this device is necessary to its environment, so it really just becomes a part of that device. This is why I referred to "natural" divisibility. Artificial divisibility is very deceptive, creating divisions where divisions are not naturally possible, such that the separation of the supposedly separated part is dependent on the coexistence of some device, and this renders the objective existence (existence as an object) of the part as not properly independent according to empirical evidence. Empirical evidence indicates that such a part has just changed from being a part of a natural object to being a part of an artificial object, the device which separates it from its natural place.

So, unlike a continuum, only a finite set of (positive?) integers has natural points of division. Is that right? Does the set need to contain an even number of integers? — Luke

No, numbers are conceptual, therefore divisions are fundamentally arbitrary. When I spoke of natural divisibility I was referring to material things, the empirical world which we sense. That's why theories of real divisibility are based on empirical information.

Since numbers may be divided in any way we can manipulate the divisibility of them to match the natural divisibility of the world, through the use of axioms. This in part, is what makes numbers useful. Pure mathematicians may create whatever axioms they desire, at will, but the way that the axioms conform to the empirical world is what determines how useful they are.

The problem with "the continuum" is that this is itself a stipulation, or proposition concerning the empirical world, 'space and time form a continuum'. It is very useful because it conforms to the empirical reality to a large degree. However, since we observe that natural divisibility within the empirical world is restricted, according to the spatial existence of independent objects, "continuum" is not completely appropriate. So the problems begin.

The concept of "continuum" allows for divisibility in any way, but this is not truly consistent with the empirical reality of spatial-temporal existence. However, it is consistent with a large percentage of practical applications, and it has proven itself to be extremely useful in facilitating all sorts of measurements. Because it is so extremely useful, it is the accepted convention, so it gets used even where it is not adequately suited. In these instances, we impose the principles of continuity onto aspects of the empirical world which do not properly correspond. This misleads us, leading to misunderstanding and misconception.

Take the hydrogen atom example. The assumption of continuity leads us to believe that the empirical world can be divided in any way that we want. So, the hydrogen atom must be separable from its natural environment. We produce a device to separate it, and we conclude that we have created an independent hydrogen atom. This in turn, is supposed to support, as empirical evidence that reality is continuous, and can be divided anywhere. However, the truth of the situation is that the hydrogen atom has not really been given independent existence as an object on its own, its supposed independent existence relies on the device which removed it from its natural environment, so it is now just a part of that device. Therefore the appropriate interpretation of the empirical evidence ought to be that the empirical reality is not continuous, and cannot be divided anywhere we want. This issue becomes extremely evident when the existence of massive fundamental particles like hadrons and quarks which are associated with the strong force, are considered. It becomes very clear, that the assumption of continuity, the spatial-temporal "continuum" is completely inappropriate here.

You're saying that, unless time has natural points of division, then everything we count in reality is arbitrary and not real? — Luke

I said "the entirety of reality", not strictly "time". When the entirety of reality is considered, we do find natural points of division, distinct spatial objects, as explained above. These divisions are what allow one object to move in one direction, and another in another direction. This is what allows you to take one individual away from a group, and activities like that. These natural points of division are what make a count more than arbitrary. The count is based on real, natural divisibility, as substantiated by empirical evidence.

In the case of time alone, we have identified no such natural points of divisibility. So counts of time are dependent on the repetitive motions of distinct, naturally divided objects. However, since measurement requires comparison, and with time we are comparing motions, the problem of the relativity of simultaneity arises.

We have a continuous succession of experiences from birth to death; we do not experience everything in our lives "all at once". — Luke

This is a misrepresentation. We have continuous experience, not a "succession of experiences". Any division of that continuous experience into separate experiences is arbitrary. Even during sleep we are experiencing, in dreaming etc., it's just a change in type of experience. This misrepresentation is fundamental to your insistence that "duration" must be "a duration" with beginning and end. There really is not any such natural points of divisibility in human experience which would substantiate this representation of a "succession of experiences". Therefore, "the present moment" as a point along that succession of experiences is not substantiated either.

This question also applies to you. If you reject the present as a short period, or moment, of time, then it must be "an infinitely long duration of time" that "continues on and on indefinitely" (since they are the only two options you have given). What, then, of the past and future? When is something past and when is it future? That is, what are the past and future relative to? — Luke

There is no problem here. As time continues onward, the future is always becoming the past. That's what happens at the present, as the present continues, next minute becomes last minute, next hour becomes last hour, etc.. "Future" refers to time which has not yet passed the present and past refers to time which has past the present, such that if there was a fixed amount of future at the beginning of time, the future is always getting smaller while the past is getting bigger. This is a continuous process which we experience as the continuity of the present.

I don't deny this, except it's not only for the sake of measurement, because it is also relative to when one is experiencing, doing or being, and specifically, indexical to when one is speaking. I have never claimed that "the present" is something we find in nature (just as I wouldn't say that "here" is something we find in nature), but I would say that the passage of time is something we find in nature, because things age. Looking for some natural source of "the present" or for natural divisions in time is not my concern. — Luke

OK. let's say that this type of point in time, this moment, is like the "point zero" I described above. The point in time when you are saying "now", or the point in time when you start to do X, etc.. Notice that it is better not to refer to this type of point as "the present", because it is just a designation of the relation between one physical action in the world, to another, or others. We might assign the point zero a date and a time, which relates it to the position of the earth and sun, etc.. If it's a real event, with real occurrence, then that point is in the past. If it's a designated possible future event, the point is in the future. But there is no reason to think that such a point would be exclusive to the present, so it should in no way be a defining feature of the present.

But what would it be like to conceive of such a point at the present? Suppose we can talk about a zero point in the past, and a zero point in the future. And also suppose that the present is when future points are becoming past points. Since this is a process, "the present", the process whereby future points become past points, and processes are events which take time to occur, then we must conclude that it takes time for a future point to become a past point, even while it is at the present. In this time, we might say that the point is neither past nor future, but that seems to imply that this point, when it's at the present, is right outside of time. But it's already been determined that there is time at the present because it is a process. So the point itself doesn't really go anywhere outside of time when it's said to be at the present. Therefore I think it would be better to say that the point is both future and past in this transition which is the present, rather than neither. And as I explained earlier there is no reason to think that this implies contradiction.

Aren't you claiming that my "perception of it now" is also a memory? — Luke

Right, that's why I mentioned the concept of "sensory memory". If I understand correctly, the information from the senses is put into a type of extremely short term, subconscious memory, and this memory is what the conscious mind interprets as the sense experience, and then allocates the memories to other types of memory, which the conscious mind has influence over.

How does quanta possibly indicate that there are "points in time"? I'm guessing that you consider these "points" to be natural divisions in time. I don't see what difference they would make over and above the quanta. Couldn't we have quanta without any natural divisions in time (like we already do)? What do these "natural divisions" add? — Luke

That's a complex issue beyond the scope of this thread, which would only serve as a distraction, but the photoelectric effect indicates that energy is transmitted as discrete units rather than as a continuous wave.

How do you plan to take a "precise measurement of time" without any sort of clock, or without making a comparison to any physical, cyclical event? — Luke

As I said, this would require determining natural points in time. Then the points can be counted as real objects, units of time.

How can you tell if something is a "true and real" object or only part of a "true and real" object? Presuming it's via "natural divisibility", how does that work? — Luke

As I explained, empirical evidence.

Explain to me again why a continuum does not have natural points of division? — Luke

There's nothing to explain. A continuum is assumed to be infinitely divisible. It can be divided in any way, and no particular way is more suited to the matter itself being divided than any other way, because there are no natural points of divisibility, proper to it. If you do not understand this, then you do not understand what "continuum" means.

Okay, but the measurement is made in numbers and what is measured is something that isn't numbers, but is objects/events. I don't see how the numbers (or the set or the continuum) has any effect on which objects/events are real or not. I can count objects using either a finite or an infinite set of numbers. — Luke

The point is not the effect of the numbers on the real, but the effect of the real on the numbers. If the entirety of reality is indivisible, then there is nothing real to count. Any count is arbitrary. If the entirety of reality is continuous, yet infinitely divisible in anyway possible way, then division is arbitrary and the count is arbitrary. Each of these produces an unmeasurable reality. But if reality has natural divisibility, then we can distinguish real objects to count and measure according to those divisions. Such a reality is measurable.

It's funny how you say that "the present" is not a moment, yet you consider "the moment" to be one of the "two important features" of "the present". — Luke

Laugh all you want. I use the quotes to signify the concept of "the present". So what was meant is that the concept of "the present" has two important features. And as I've been explaining, I believe the "present moment" is a misconception. Nevertheless, regardless of its truth or falsity, it maintains status as a very significant feature of the concept "the present".

The feature that you say I "point to" also continues on and on continuously. There's not much that I disagree with here, except that the present is not a "conjunction" between past and future because past and future are not concurrent with the present. — Luke

Explain to me how you conceive of this "present moment", that infinitesimal period of time, or shortest duration of conscious awareness, as something which continues on and on indefinitely.

You did say that you could exchange "present moment" for "present" didn't you? Now you are saying that the present continues on and on indefinitely. How do you formulate consistency between the present being an extremely short duration, yet also something which continues on and on indefinitely?

That's right, the present continues on and on just like your experiencing. And it's not a coincidence, because whenever you are experiencing is when the present is for you. In relation to this, those things that you've already experienced are in your past, and those things you will experience but are yet to experience are in your future. It's simple really. — Luke

If this is what you believe, then do you see that it is incoherent to speak about a "present moment" as if the present is a very short period of time, or a point in time? How could it be that the present continues on and on indefinitely, as if it is an infinitely long duration of time, yet it is also an infinitesimally short period of time, as "the moment". One of these must be dismissed as the cause of contradiction, and the latter, "the moment", is inconsistent with empirical evidence. That is why I say "the present moment" is incoherent to me. .

Yes, except we don't speak of the present as a continuous, long duration, but as a moment or point along that duration which is present for us at that moment. — Luke

Now, look closely at this statement. Do you see that "at that moment" has no real meaning, no real referent. It refers to nothing real. It's a convention which human beings concocted for pragmatic reasons, for the sake of measuring. "Start the clock now, at this moment". "Motion is transferred from one object to another at the moment of collision". Etc.. "At the moment" is a convenient fiction.

So, remove "at that moment" from the proposition above, as an untruthful part of the proposition. Now we have "the present as a continuous, long duration", exactly as we experience it, and all this speaking about a moment, or point along this duration, is nothing but bs.

I think there is a distinct difference between having or undergoing an experience and remembering it later. Think back to any memorable event in your life. That is just a memory compared to the actual event that you lived through and experienced. I understand your reluctance to acknowledge this obvious distinction, however, given that it is simply too detrimental to your argument (that every experience is a memory). — Luke

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not.

So, it's easy for you to take an event years ago, and say that's in the past, its only memory, and you can surely tell the difference between that memory and what's happening now. But when we are talking about the perception of events happening right now ("right now" being incoherent) then we are faced with having to separate what we anticipate from what we remember, as having influence over the perception. And this is much more difficult because we cannot fall back on the false premise of the "present moment". We cannot assert that our sense perceptions are at the present moment, because "the present moment" is incoherent. It's a convenient fiction created for pragmatic purposes, not consistent with reality. Look into the concept of "sensory memory" for example, it's very important to the way that we hear music.

It's a shame his work is not more approachable, because I think his central thesis - that Platonism basically articulates the central concerns of philosophy proper, and that it can't be reconciled with today's naturalism - is both important and neglected. — Wayfarer

I believe that understanding the various forms of post-Platonism (rather than Neo-Platonism) is very significant to any study of metaphysics. Plato exposed many ontological and metaphysical problems inherent within the conventions of his day. He pointed in numerous different directions as to possible resolutions. The different ways that various philosophers have taken up his challenges is very indicative of the problems which philosophy encounters in addressing the nature of reality.

But I'm of the view that it was the decline of scholastic realism and the ascendancy of nominalism which were key factors in the rise of philosophical and scientific materialism and the much-touted 'decline of the West'. — Wayfarer

The decline was predicted by Plato, in "Republic", Bk. 8, 546. There is a number which relates the circumference of circles to the fertility of living creatures. That number is also related to the powers of 3,4, and 5 (Pythagorean theorem?) in some obscure way. Knowledge of the "perfect number" is required for divine birth. And the rulers of the state, lacking this knowledge will inevitably provide for the births of human beings who are not good natured and fortunate. Because of this, even the best state, as proposed, will decay and face dissolution.

Unless you are able to present some evidence, that animal learning does not supervene on cellular learning it's a bit ludicrous to call it very deceptive use of equivocation. — wonderer1

More evidence of your indoctrination. The onus is on the researcher, to show the evidence, that's how science works. By giving the process the same name, "learning", the authors of this article are hinting that a direct and necessary relation has already been established. That's how the psychology of this type of deception works. Use the same word and a psychological association is made, which "implies" that a relationship has been established.

Suppose instead, we rename this process which they have named "cellular learning", calling it "laboratory manipulation of cells". Then the deception might be much more evident to you. You'd be more inclined to ask, how is this laboratory manipulation related to the actual learning process of an animal, instead of taking for granted that there is a direct and necessary relation, because of the use of the same word, "learning".

Then you might notice a few weaknesses in your assumption of a direct and necessary relation. Consider the following passage:

"Surprisingly, however, the biphasic changes occurred over a time scale five-fold longer than that anticipated from typical STDP studies in vitro (Markram et al., 2012). Using a computer model, Pawlak and co-workers showed that this temporal rescaling could result from noise in the spike timing of inputs. Such noise is to be expected in the intact brain, where there is always ongoing activity, but not in dissected brain tissue, which is relatively inactive.

It appears like the cellular responses (so-called learning) took five times longer to occur in living tissue than it took in prior studies inanimate mass, "in vitro". That is very clear evidence that the relationship between stimulus and effect, is not direct. The cause of this five-fold delay (clear evidence that there is not a direct cause/effect relation) is simply dismissed as "noise" in the living brain.

Furthermore, it is noted that the the subjects upon which the manipulation is carried out are unconscious, and so it is implied that "attention" could add so much extra "noise" that the entire process modeled by the laboratory manipulation might be completely irrelevant to actual learning carried out by an attentive, conscious subject. Read the following:

"It is important to note that these findings were obtained in anaesthetized animals, and remain to be confirmed in the awake state. Indeed, factors such as attention are likely to influence cellular learning processes (Markram et al., 2012).

Now, take note of the concluding sentence of the article:

"Despite these limitations, the elegant work of Pawlak, Kerr and colleagues provides some of the strongest evidence to date that STDP may underlie cellular learning in the intact brain."

Sure, STDP may underlie this process which they have called "cellular learning", but it's very clear that they have established no relationship between this process (more appropriately called "laboratory manipulation of cells") to actual animal learning. In fact, the exposed problem with "noise" indicates that the idea of such a relationship is rather far-fetched.

It looks to me like you simply have a bias against science. — wonderer1

It looks to me, like you are easily swayed by pseudo-science.

The article is evidence of your indoctrination. There is clearly equivocation. The opening paragraph starts talking about "cellular learning", then claims a relation with how the "animal learns". And then it makes a conclusion about "learning" in general, as if these two senses of "learn" are the same. That's very deceptive use of equivocation.

I think you equivocate. Neural networks of AI are said to be "trained". But we weren't talking AI, we were talking about biological neurons, involved in a person reading.

To me it sounds like you are saying something like, "It is inappropriate to talk about riding in a car, because riding is something which is done on a horse, or in a carriage drawn by a horse. — wonderer1

Yes, similar to that, but not quite the same. An individual is trained, a person or some other being. We do not train a part of a person. I find that to be an absurd usage of the term to say that a person trains a part of one's body, like saying that a man trains his penis when to have an erection and when not to.

Anyway, it's off topic and I see that discussion with you on this subject would probably be pointless, as you seem to be indoctrinated.

The possibility of Trump winning the election in 2024 and making all of his legal troubles go away as if by waving a magic wand is absurd. — GRWelsh

Many of us thought that the idea of Trump getting elected in the first place was absurd. There must be magic wand out there somewhere.

Plato's Ideas are both sensible and intellectual, yet they do not exhibit necessity and strict universality and, thus, are not transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience.

They necessarily apply to only some, but not to all the objects of human experience. For example, the Idea Elm Tree applies necessarily to only some trees, but not to all trees.

In fact, most of Plato's Ideas exhibit only a limited necessity and a restricted universality. — charles ferraro

I don't see your point. We always apply such restrictions in the case of any universals. "Elm" has its restrictions, "tree" has its restrictions, "plant" has its restrictions, "living" has its restrictions, "being" has its restrictions, etc.. If there was a universal which did not have any restrictions it couldn't have any real meaning, because the lack of restrictions would allow it to have any meaning whatsoever, therefore no specific meaning and incomprehensible.

So even when we apprehend "space" and "time" as universals, and propose these as the names of categories, they still have restrictions, as is the case with categories. These restrictions which characterize the category may be provided by definitions. Therefore the presence or non-presence of "restrictions" is not the distinguishing factor here as any such named categories must have restrictions.

I believe that the difference you are alluding to is to be found in the nature of the restrictions. Some definitions (restrictions) are produced from (empirical) descriptions, while others are produced from stipulations (like the axioms of pure mathematics). The former obviously cannot be "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience". And the latter, since they are stipulated by human beings which are already engaged in experiencing, surely cannot be the transcendental conditions for human experience either.

Therefore, I think it is misdirected to try and categorize the "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience" as some sort of universal idea. The transcendental conditions are not categories, conceptions, or universals. There doesn't seem to be any evidence for the existence of that sort of "idea", so we should not think of these conditions as ideas. Therefore, if "space" and "time" are proposed by Kant as "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience", we need to understand these terms as referring to something other than universals, ideas, or conceptions. I think Kant calls them "intuitions".

Trained neural nets can have a lot of 'fault tolerance', which is easy to say, but not so easy to explain. — wonderer1

It's not appropriate to say that a neural net is "trained". Nor is it appropriate to say that a neural net performs word recognition. So I'll just say that your post is an attempt to simplify something very complex and the result is a gross misrepresentation, and leave it at that.

Yes, I read it and found the additional text samples interesting as well. Regardless of the hoax, it is still interesting to consider what text samples like that can reveal to us about our thinking. — wonderer1

I think that what it reveals is that the process is noy like we think it is. And I guess that's why we have different opinions about it, no one really knows how they read.

More work is required on what? Is it possible, in principle, that we are able to experience "such points"? — Luke

More work is required on understanding what we call the passage of time, in order to establish more accurate measurement. I think that the work done in quantum mechanics indicates that it is highly likely that there actually is points in time, that's why events occur as quanta rather than continuous. If this is the case, then we probably do experience such points in time, in some way, but we do not recognize them, just like we experience molecules, atoms and electrons, but we do not recognize them as such, through sensation.

I might see that they are two different (types of) objects. I don't know what "natural divisibility" is supposed to mean. — Luke

Let me try again then. When you see two different chairs in a room, do you not see them as two distinct objects? The natural, spatial separation between them, which we apprehend through the sense of sight, represents a natural divisibility in spatial existence. We see distinct objects, and this apprehension of distinct objects is a division performed by the perceptual process, which is carried out according to a natural spatial divisibility which we perceive in our environment. It is the way that we perceive our environment, as consisting of a natural divisibility, which the perceptual process takes advantage of, to produce distinct objects of perception. This is the foundation for the concept of quantity. We need principles to distinguish one thing from another, in order that we can evaluate a multitude of distinct things, count, quantify or measure them. If there was no natural divisibility in our environment any division into discrete objects would be completely arbitrary, therefore any measurement of quantity would also be completely arbitrary.

In the case of time, we assume a continuum, therefore no natural divisibility. So to count or quantify distinct periods of time we look to repeating cycles, earth, moon, sun, quartz crystal vibrations, and now the quantum characteristics of the cesium atom. The problem is that all of these cycles are physical events, which in order to serve as measurement need to be compared to other physical events, the ones to be measured. This requires a means of determining the beginning and ending of a cycle, in relation to the event to be measured. The event to be measured is always spatially separated form the clock. The various possible features of this spatial separation are what Einstein dealt with in his special theory of relativity, where he stipulated that simultaneity is relative. This stipulation means an accurate comparison is

\ impossible, and therefore precise measurement of time impossible, because the simultaneity of the beginning and ending of the cycle of measurement, in comparison with the event to be measured, is dependent on the frame of reference. In other word the temporal measurement of the same event will differ depending on the frame of reference.

This sounds like little more than a complaint about infinity, or uncountable sets, but it's unclear what the complaint is exactly. I assume what you mean by "natural points of divisibility" is that we should use only a finite set of numbers? But I don't see how a reduced, finite set of numbers would give us more accurate or more precise (or non-arbitrary) measurements. We would miss out on all those "in-between" numbers/measurements, and that would make our measurements less accurate, not more. Otherwise, I don't know what you mean. — Luke

No, the point is that the object to be counted in any act of quantification (a count) must be a true and real object, or else any proposed count is arbitrary. To be a true and real object, it must be distinct, discrete, separate from its surroundings, or else it's just a part of another object. And if we are allowed to count parts as objects, and everything is infinitely divisible, then every count will be infinite.

That's what happens when we try to quantify something which is already assumed to be a continuum (the real number line, or time, as examples). Since there are no natural points of division we can't even start to count anything because there are no distinct objects to count. So we allow divisions and we produce a count according to the divisions. But these divisions are arbitrary, so there is no rule about how to apply them, except that they can be applied anywhere. Then any count will be a count of infinity (any random section of the number line contains an infinity of numbers, and any random section of time contains an infinite number of time durations).

So it's not a matter of choosing finite numbers over infinite numbers, it's a matter of basing "the count", which is the act of quantifying, or measuring, in something real, real divisibility as the example of distinct physical objects (mentioned above) demonstrates. Then the measurement is of something real.

The problem therefore, is the assumption of continuity, the continuum. The number line, with the real numbers is a very good example. The assumption is continuity, represented as the infinitely divisible line. That assumption is problematic when applying numbers to the divisions, because the divisions are arbitrary. Of course in most practise of measuring, things are separated by natural divisions (as explained above), and so numbers are applied in measurement according to the natural divisions. But then there is time, and we do not find natural divisions, so we assume continuity, but this creates problems.

I don't understand your complaint here. I don't care if we call it "the present" or "the present time" or "the present moment"; I see no difference between these. If it will help to prevent your complaints, I will stop using the phrase "present moment". However, if I accidentally use the phrase again in future, then please just substitute it with "the present" instead. That seems to keep you calm. — Luke

If "moment" has no meaning to you, then so be it. It has meaning to me. And, "the present" is not a moment because the present goes on and on continuously. This seems to be where we are having difficulty. You do not conceive of the present as something which goes on and on continuously, like I do. You want to mark "the present" as a very short period of time, but this cannot capture, or represent the present as we know it through experience. This is why I used that example, by the time you say "now", that point which you have tried to mark as the present, is in the past. What you do not seem to apprehend is that the present continues on after that particular "moment" has gone into the past. And no matter how many times you mark "now", the present continues through all of them, and onward.

This is why we must apprehend "the present" as having two important features. One is the feature you point to, the moment, "now", from which we base measurements, starting the stop watch, etc.. The other feature is the conjunction between past and future, which I point to, and this continues on and on, seemingly continuously, so it is indefinite. This continuity of the present is what is measured when we measure passing time. We use arbitrary points, and mark a section of the continuity of the present, as a period of time.

So it does no good for me to substitute your "present moment" with my "present", because these have completely different meanings, referring each to a different aspect of time. One is the artificial, imaginary, or fictional "point" which you wan to deem as "the present", the other is the continuous, extended passage of time, duration, which is "the present" as we experience it.

If so, then why do you say that the present has a duration? — Luke

The present continues on and on, as time passes. From this perspective, its duration may be as long as time itself.

The present (moment) is defined in terms of when we are experiencing. — Luke

There is no such thing as the moment when you are experiencing. Experience continues on and on, in a seemingly continuous and indefinite duration, just like the present, except you die. Do you not apprehend your experience in this way, as a continuous, long duration, rather than as a moment, or any sort of pin pointed duration?

Or are there two different types of remembering? Otherwise, we could say that we experience things in the present and remember things that we experienced in the past, and not try to change the grammar in the way you are proposing. — Luke

There are many different types of remembering, and many different ways of reading. So this does not look like a productive direction for the discussion, too much ambiguity and confusion. For example, do you not think that remembering is part of your experience? So this distinction you make here, between remembering things and experiencing things is not sound because remembering is a form of experiencing.

You were proposing from the start of this discussion that the present has a duration. Have you changed your position on this? — Luke

Obviously not.

Agreeing (for the sake of argument) that the present has a duration does not require two pinpoints; it requires one larger pinpoint. — Luke

Can you agree, that according to experience, the present continues on and on indefinitely, and so trying to pinpoint it is trying to represent it in a way completely opposed to how we experience it? The present is our experience of time, and the present continues indefinitely, just like time. Trying to represent it as a dimensionless point in time, as an infinitesimal point in time, or as a slightly larger point in time, is a completely futile adventure, because these points cannot represent "the present" as we know it from experience, as extended indefinitely

Do you know that a duration has a start time and a finish time? The duration of the present is the pinpoint (or what we were earlier attempting to pinpoint). The start and finish times of that duration are not two separate pinpoints. — Luke

There is a difference between "duration" in the general sense, and "a duration", as a particular. The former is how I have been describing the present, as an indefinite duration. You have been wrongly interpreting me as speaking of "a duration". If I was unclear, and that mislead you, then I apologize. However, now I have made the clarification. When I speak of the duration of the present, it is in the general sense of duration, indefinite duration.

Maybe we just experience it differently. — wonderer1

I think that's right. I think different people read in different ways. That's why some read faster than others. I myself read in different ways depending on what it is that I am reading. Sometimes I need to read carefully, sometimes i skim through.

I thought you might recognize that you didn't need to be conscious of every letter to understand the content. — wonderer1

If understanding the content is the issue, rather than simply reading, then the entire content must be respected, so Luke's claim that we read one word after the other could not be correct. We only really understand each word after reading the entire sentence, and we only really understand the sentence within the context of the entire passage.

But the issue of misreading, and misunderstanding must also be addressed. If someone reads a passage very quickly, and mixes up some words so that there is misunderstanding, can this really be called reading it?

Would you say that for you it was like solving a sort of logic puzzle to determine the following content? — wonderer1

It definitely is a sort of puzzle, but not a logic puzzle. Some words (especially the long ones) are very easy, and flow naturally, but others require thought. I would say that much thought was put into the way the presentation was made. And I do not agree that it is the positioning of the first and last letter which makes the word recognizable. Notice the double c in According, and the ch's in research, (if that is what that word is supposed to be). I am not educated in phonetics, but things like that strike me as give aways, which if they had been scrambled in a different way would have made the words much harder to recognize. If you read the article, it's all a hoax anyway, there was no such research.

..while any sensible and intellectual characteristics of the experienced object which do not exhibit necessity and strict universality have their originating source in the object per se... — charles ferraro

How could there be such a thing as a "sensible and intellectual characteristics of the experienced object which do not exhibit necessity and strict universality"? If it's a sensible and intellectual characteristic, isn't it necessarily universal?

I'd ask you to look at the following link. — wonderer1

I checked your link. Notice that each letter still needs to be there. Luke says reading occurs as a temporal order, I disagreed. Your link seems to support my position.

I'm not averse to discussing some of the complexities of sensation, but your denial that eyes are objects in the world is indulgent -- contrary to ordinary English. 'Wanting to examine them objectivity' is way too fancy here. Kant himself invokes the sense organs. That's the context.

An object is (first definition) something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision or touch; a material thing. I see others' eyes directly, my own in a mirror. I'm not being metaphorical.
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=objects&atb=v379-1&ia=definition — plaque flag

A measured appreciation of what the subject contributes is maybe the essence of philosophy. But claiming there is only subject is as empty as claiming there is left without right. — plaque flag

Can you, plaque flag, explain to me, the principles by which you distinguish a subject from an object? For example, notice in the second quote above, that you draw this analogy, the subject/object relation is like the left/right relation. So we have principles to distinguish left from right, face north and right is east, left is west, or something like that.

Notice in the first quote, you say that an eye is an object. Is an eye a part of a subject? If so, are all objects parts of subjects?

I would not say that an eye in its natural state qualifies as an object. This is because I think that "object" implies a degree of independence from its environment. That independence is what allows objects to move, and be moved freely. Eyes do not have the independence required of "object", in my opinion. However, an eye can be removed from its natural place, and treated as an object, but this removal denies its function, so it is not a natural eye anymore after being removed from its proper place. Therefore, to treat an eye as an object is to make it something other than what it really is, and that is to deny its dependence on something else (as a part of something else), thereby giving it independence as an "object". That act of giving it independence, to make it an object, robs it of its function, which makes it no longer "an eye" when "eye" is defined by what it does.

I would say that both, subjects and objects have this in common, independence from their environment. This independence is what allows them to move and be moved freely. What principles would you refer to, to argue that there is a difference between an object and a subject, like the difference between left and right?

Then how could the accuracy or precision of the measurement be improved? — Luke

More work is required before this can be determined. If we can find natural points of division, and abide by them, measurement would be improved greatly. The problem though is that such points are not experienced by us.

What would a "natural point of divisibility" look like? — Luke

Take a look at two distinct objects, like a chair and a table. Do you not see a natural divisibility between these two? This is the foundation for counting, such natural points of divisibility allow us to count objects as distinct things. A supposed continuum has no such natural points of divisibility, therefore it can provide no principles for counting.

Because the present is defined in terms of conscious awareness, and I am conscious of reading each word, per my internal monologue, not of reading each letter of a word. — Luke

I am very sure that I am conscious of each letter in each word, or else I would misread the word. Are you sure that you are not conscious of each letter in each word?

Are you saying that conscious awareness has nothing to do with what we are consciously aware of (in the present)? It is merely "an awareness of the difference between past and future"? — Luke

No, I said that we are not consciously aware of the present. We are consciously aware of the past, through sensation and memory, and consciously aware of the future, through anticipation. And I said that since we are consciously aware of both, past and future, we come to the logical conclusion that our awareness is at the present.

The present is defined in terms of your "consciously aware mind". Whenever your "consciously aware mind apprehends a sensation", it does so in the present moment. The present moment is not the time at which you are consciously aware of something plus (or minus?) the time it takes to become aware of it or for your brain/body to produce your conscious mind or anything of the sort. — Luke

I am not at all understanding what you are saying. First, as you are well aware, "present moment" doesn't make any sense to me. And what I said, is that the consciously aware mind is in the future relative to whatever it is aware of via sensation. So in your example of the distant celestial object, the conscious mind is in the future of the past event that it becomes aware of in that celestial object.

The point is that the thing, whatever it is, which we become aware of, through sensation, is always in the past by the time we become aware of it. And, the mind which becomes aware of it is therefore always in the future relative to the thing which it becomes aware of. Furthermore, the mind is concerned with anticipating what will happen next, and it is even actively determining (as cause through freedom of choice) what will happen next.

There is no room for your "present moment" here. The mind is in the future relative to the things sensed which are in the past. So where do you think this so-called "present moment" is, where the mind apprehends the sensations? That "present moment" is just a misconception.

No, it is the time at which we consciously experience. Scientific understanding does not change that. — Luke

That is the faulty definition which is inconsistent with human experience, and which you are trying to impose on human experience. We do not experience any present moment. We experience the past and we anticipate the future. There is not anything within human experience which indicates a present moment. You assume that since past and future are "distinct", they must be separated, therefore there must be a present which separates them. You deny and refuse to accept the reality that past and future are distinct in the sense of different categories, and therefore may overlap. So there is no need to impose a "present moment" to separate them.

But the division of time into the periods of past, present and future is unchanging, so I don't see how the passage of time affects your Venn diagram, or its overlap, at all. — Luke

Again, you fall back on your misrepresentation. Time is divided into past and future. The conventional divisor is "the present". In the conventional sense, the present divides time, it is not itself a period of time. What I propose is that in reality the present unites the two parts of time, past and future. When these two are united, then the present may actually be a part of time, the part when past and future coexist. But this cannot be represented as time being divided into three periods, past present and future, that is a misrepresentation.

I thought we were talking in terms of the present when defined in terms of conscious experience, and the duration of the present denoting the shortest duration of one's conscious awareness. Or, as you put it earlier: — Luke

The problem is that you always think in terms of separate portions of time past, present, and future, as if the present is a distinct portion of time. I know that this is your preferred way of understanding "the present", but this idea is inconsistent with what I am proposing, so if you cannot dismiss it for the sake of discussion, and quit falling back on it as a crutch, you'll never be able to understand what I am proposing.

It is this meaning of "present" that I thought we were discussing, where uttered words become past once spoken, not longer periods such as hours or days. How can you not understand this "pinpointing" of the present? — Luke

What I've been arguing is that the pinpointing of the present is a mistake. That is what is at issue, I am saying it is a mistaken notion of "the present". You were willing to respect that first step, and accept the present as a duration instead of a pinpoint, but then you wanted two pinpoints, one at the beginning and one at the end of the present. So all you did was double the mistake. And then you wanted to move the two pinpoints closer and closer together, to produce a shortest period of conscious awareness, as if you were trying to get back to the original one pinpoint. You need to drop these ideas about shortest duration, pinpoints, etc. these are not what the experience of time is all about.

The idea was to remove points in time altogether, as inconsistent with the nature of time as we experience it. Until you remove from your mind, this idea of dividing points in time, you will never be able to understand "the present" as a unifier, and the paradigm of unity, rather than as a divisor.

See above. You very clearly said that "it is impossible to measure one's present". In fact, you said it twice. You also added that any arbitrary measurement is "not a measurement at all". — Luke

To clarify what I meant, the "arbitrary" measurement is a type of measurement, but not accurate or precise. I should not have said it is not a measurement at all.

So I thought we were discussing the possible duration of this "shortest window of consciousness" (or conscious awareness), rather than the colloquial usage denoting longer periods, such as the present hour, day, year or millennium. If it's the latter, then I don't understand what's in dispute, or what you mean by "the duration of the present", as though the colloquial usage might have only one standard duration. Your response to my Google search results did not indicate any surprise on your part of the duration being in the range of only milliseconds or seconds. — Luke

Sorry, I just don't see your point. There's no such thing as "the shortest window of consciousness", that's what your google search shows. It's an arbitrary designation. That's why I said it's not a measurement at all. But to clarify now, it would be a type of measurement, but not a very accurate or precise one.

I don't find any "points" in my conscious experience that separate the present from the past and future. Instead, I experience the passage of time in a continuous manner. This continuity may help to explain why some people think of the present moment as having an infinitesimal duration, as it is the shortest discernible "unit" within a continuum. — Luke

There is no such thing as a unit within a continuum. That is the whole problem here. It is a fundamental issue with "the real numbers". The continuum is designated as divisible in any way (infinitely). This means that any division of it is purely arbitrary, and artificial, there are no natural points of divisibility within it. If there was any natural dividing points, then any true division would be constrained to follow those natural points of divisibility. But the very nature of "continuum", by definition means that there are no such points of natural divisibility, all is the same. So the assignment of points of division (real numbers on the number line for example) is completely arbitrary. There is an infinity of numbers between any two numbers.

You seem to think that the proposition of an "infinitesimal duration" could provide real dividing points. But the infinitesimal duration is itself arbitrary. You call it a "shortest discernible 'unit' within a continuum" But there are no discernible units within a continuum, that's the definition of continuum. Any units are assigned to the continuum in an arbitrary way of representation. But this "representation" is not a true representation because the units represented cannot exist within the continuum itself (by definition).

To clarify though, the assignment of units is not absolutely arbitrary, it is carried out according to some mathematical axioms which are principles of order, such as the real numbers of the number line. This is supposed to be a way of "representing" division of the continuum. That is why it was incorrect for me to say that the arbitrary measurement is not a measurement at all. It is a real measurement in the sense that it's carried out according to principles, but the axioms are not based in any thing real.

Therefore, what your refer to, "an infinitesimal duration, as it is the shortest discernible 'unit' within a continuum", is just a fictional thing. There are no discernible units within a continuum, and any representation of the continuum as "units" is an arbitrary representation, based in some axioms of pure mathematics, rather than discerning real units within the thing divided. So this proposal does nothing for us.

While reading, my internal monologue "reads" the words. That is, I "hear" the words in my mind while I am reading them. Since each word is distinct in my mind, then I believe my conscious awareness while reading can be divided into individual words. SInce the present time is defined in terms of my conscious awareness, and since my conscious awareness can be divided into the reading of individual words, then the present time can be associated (or present-time-stamped) with my reading of each word, and the past and future are defined relative to the present time. — Luke

Of course this is just arbitrary. Why not divide your conscious awareness by apprehending each letter of a word, in order, instead of by apprehending each word of a sentence in order?

Do you agree that the past and future are defined relative to the present time? If not, then how do you reconcile this with your view that the present time is defined relative to one's conscious awareness? — Luke

I think I may have said that earlier, that past and future are defined relative to present. But now I see I may have misspoke on this as well. I think what is really the case is that "the present" is defined relative to past and future, which are defined relative to conscious experience. This means that conscious experience gives to us, past and future, as the memories and anticipations which I mentioned, and from this we derive a present. "The present" is derived from conscious experience, but from an understanding of the elements of it (past and future).

So what we call "conscious awareness", or the conscious experience of the present, is really an awareness of the difference between past and future. Since these two are radically different, yet appear to be in some way a continuum, we conclude that there must be a "present" which separates them. What I am arguing is that this separation between past and future is a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding, as the present is really a unity of the past and future. This unity would be the basis for the conception of the "unit", parts united. The "unit" you mentioned above fails as being completely arbitrary.

How do you find that "everything sensed is in the past"? When you are consciously aware of having a sensation, how is that sensation (and everything sensed) in the past? You said that "the present is defined by conscious experience". — Luke

I know from science, that there is a process within my body whereby the information, signals which are sensed, are apprehended by the consciously aware mind. That process is carried out by organs which have a spatial separation of some degree, and I know that it takes time for such information to traverse spatial separation, even at the speed of light. So I know that even by the time my consciously aware mind apprehends a sensation, the thing sensed is in the past in relation to my consciously aware mind. This is a principle which is well understood scientifically as "reflex".

In what sense is the overlap changing? The duration of the present (i.e. the shortest possible window of conscious awareness) is changing over time? Why? — Luke

As I said, "the shortest possible window of conscious awareness" makes no sense to me as your Google search supports. Different aspects of conscious awareness take different amounts of time. Check the reflex of different senses for example.

The overlap between past and future is changing because time is passing. For simplicity, the overlap is the present, and the present is changing as time passes. That's why the "now" is a moving target, by the time you say "now" it's in the past.

You consider the past and future to be additive or subtractive forces working in harmony or in opposition with each other to produce the present? — Luke

That was an example of how things can overlap, yet still be distinct. There are many different examples, each different in its own way. So you ought not take one example and assume that I think time is defined by the example.

In your opinion, are "temporal things, objects, events, etc." a part of time at all? — Luke

Strictly speaking, no. Thinking that temporal things are the parts of time produces the misconception that time is change. Temporal things, events and change, demonstrate the existence of time to us. From the existence of change we abstract the idea of time. Time, in this sense is an abstraction. The abstraction is distinct from the things which it is derived from. The things are particulars, the abstraction is universal.

I believe that the reason why people believe time and change to be one and the same thing, is that they know that "time" must represent something real, but they are not prepared to take the next step, to see that this real thing called "time" is necessarily logically prior to physical existence which we know as change. Time is what is required for change therefore is logically prior to it. This is the same problem which people have with "God". God is required for material existence, as prior to (cause of) material existence, but people are not ready to take that next step to apprehend this logical requirement. So they refuse and deny.

So temporal things are not, strictly speaking, a part of time, just like material things are not a part of God. Time, and God are prior to temporal, material, or physical things, as necessary for their existence, the cause of them. This produces a separation similar to that of the separation between cause and effect, past and future, between them. And as I explained earlier, the separation is categorical, which allows for overlap of distinct things as predicates, rather than denying them as contradictory. Cause as prior to, is not contrary to effect as posterior.

This appears to contradict your latest statements, such as: — Luke

Yes, I think I made a mistake back then. The proper representation would be that we determine a past and a future, then we deduce that we must be at the present, as described above. My apologies for the mistake. Conscious experience demonstrates that the idea of "the present" is a deduction derived from experience. The conception of "present" is based in the conscious experience which consists of past and future, as I've been saying, but "present" is not what is experienced, it is deduced logically.

This explains why we have such a wide ranging variety of claims concerning the conscious experience of "the present". No one really experiences "the present", they deduce the existence of the present, and that they must be present. That they produce this conclusion from different premises depending on how they understand "being" is the reason why you and I, and others, have different conclusions as to what the conscious experience of the present is.

You cannot, on the one hand, claim it is impossible to measure one's present, but, on the other hand, accept the Google search results indicating that the measurement of the present is milliseconds to seconds in duration. — Luke

I don't think I said it's impossible to measure one's present, only that such a measurement would be quite arbitrary. Your Google search supports this.

For example, each word of this post you are reading is read in the present; each word you have finished reading is now in the past; and each word you are yet to read is now in the future. You could also substitute "speaking" for "reading". — Luke

What are you saying, that the present is as long as it takes to read a word? That supports what I said, that the present is as long as the event which has one's attention. If doing something else was your example, the duration of the present would be defined by that activity.

Why do you claim that this "separation" between past, present and future is inconsistent with subjective experience? — Luke

I explained that already, it has to do with the "point" in time which separates past from present, and the point in time which separates present from future. Why do you keep asking me this? Are you having difficulty understanding that such a separation requires a point? Or do you find points in time in your subjective experience of time? I even asked you to explain your experience of these points which separate these parts of time?

For example, when you are reading, do you find that there is temporal points of separation between each word you read? I do not. In fact, I don't find that reading is anywhere near like how you described it. I have to understand the words in context, so I'm always reading a bunch of words at a time. Proper understanding requires that the entire sentence is present to my mind, so I often reread. I don't find these points of separation anywhere.

All of your memories are related to your actions and conscious awareness in the present. All of your anticipations of the future are made in the present. If there is no "present" in your experience, then it sounds as though you deny the present. But, until now, the present is what you have been claiming has a duration and has an overlap with the past and the future. I thought that's what was in dispute here. Now you seem to be saying there is no "present". — Luke

What's in dispute is my understanding of "the present" vs. your understanding of "the present". You have a habit of saying things like 'then there is no present for you' when what I describe as the present is contrary to your description.

Is this your analysis of your own sensation? — Luke

Yes.

Now you appear to have changed your argument to claim that there is only one overlap, and that the present is an overlapping area between the past and future. — Luke

I haven't changed my mind, I mentioned the Venn diagram example, past overlapping future, as the present, a long time ago. You are just so consumed by your intent to look for things i say which are contrary to how you understand "the present", that you didn't even try to understand my examples.

In that case, there are very "real points which mark the beginning and ending of that [present] duration", which are where the past and future (circles) intersect. — Luke

This is incorrect, because time is not static. If past and future were static, then there would by specific points of overlap. However, the relation between past and future is not static, as we know, the future slips into the past. Therefore there are no points of overlap, as the overlap is constantly changing continuously, as time is passing.

If the present is the area within the overlap of the past and future (circles) in your Venn diagram, then the present has two distinct boundary lines, which are simply the arcs of the past and future that form the boundaries of the overlapping area (i.e. the present). Those two arcs are distinct, single lines. — Luke

The Venn diagram is not a perfect example. As you can see, it consists of two static circles with an overlap, while time is not static. So what is required for a better illustration is a moving overlap. The time of the future (tomorrow for example) has to move through the period of overlap (today), and then become the time of the past (yesterday), or something like that. Supposing a point at which the overlap begins and a point at which it ends produces the very same problem as supposing that the present is one point, except the problem is doubled. So this supposition is not useful.

There is no distinction between past, present and future in "the present" area of your Venn diagram, or in the overlapping area of past and future which creates/defines the present. That section contains all three time periods and there is no distinction between them. — Luke

Again, this is incorrect. The distinction may still exist despite the overlap. For example the wavelength which constitutes green may overlap with the wavelength which constitutes yellow, and this might produce the colour blue. But that does not mean that those wavelengths are no longer there just because a different colour is created. Also, two equal and opposite forces may balance each other as an equilibrium, but that does not mean that the forces are not there. Therefore there is no problem whatsoever with conceiving of the past and future as distinct, yet overlapping at the present.

Furthermore, the present is distinct in terms of its boundary, which is formed by the non-overlapping sections of the past and future (times/circles) that lie outside the present. The boundary created by the overlap distinctly defines the beginning and end points of the present that you earlier claimed were not distinct. — Luke

This objection is based on the incorrect things you've stated, so it is not relevant.

Once again, you appear to deny that the present is a part of time. In that case, what have we been discussing? What is it that has a duration? How can a duration exist outside of time? — Luke

I don't see the problem here. Temporal things, objects, events, etc., have duration. The human experience of the present is such a thing, it has duration. Duration is not time itself, it is what is measured through the principles of a conception of time. So, what exactly is the problem you are pointing to here?

What do you think? — leo

:"Limitless power" implies nothing is impossible. Don't you think? So the question is an exercise in recognizing incompatible concepts, kind of like asking can a circle be square.

There are implications to that, relevent to having a theory of time that is explanatory in a general way of a great many events that go on in the world. Your theory of time defines time in terms of your subjective experience. It suggests solipsism. — wonderer1

If you read more of my posting in the last week, you'll see this is not true at all. We can discuss our differences and work out systems of compromise. Look at the way the world is divided into time zones for example. As you look around the world, the numbers assigned to the present time are different depending on location, but we have a system which works. And as I described to Luke, "the present" in general, is reduced to a point in time because this facilitates measurement. There is no suggestion of solipsism, because we wok out our differences, but truth is sometimes sacrificed to simplicity due to pragmatic forces. That is why the present is commonly represented as a point in time.

The way things are in reality, is that in the period of time it takes you to have a subjective recognition of PRESENT-NOW, zillions of things happen, one after the other, all around you, and within you. — wonderer1

This is clear evidence that what I say is true, "PRESENT-NOW" always consists of duration, and is never actually a point in time.

You lack sufficient resolution on your metric for time, because your metric for time is part of a paradigm that doesn't really work for communicating with people about time with accuracy. — wonderer1

You have this reversed. What you call "communicating with people about time with accuracy" is really communicating with people about time without accuracy. You think that since we manage to engineer complex systems, and get things done, that this implies "accuracy" in our communications about time. However, if you look at the problems, the brick walls, which scientists have run into, quantum uncertainty, multiple worlds, loop gravity, spatial expansion, etc., you'll see that accuracy is impossible with the methods currently used.

I recognize that despite what you and Luke might say, claiming that such problems are insignificant, these are very real and significant problems which have manifested due to our inability to communicate about time with accuracy. You look at human successes as evidence of perfection in our conception of time, while I look at human failures as evidence of imperfection in our conception of time. So I propose a way to get around these failures, and you say there is no need to because we already have the best, or most accurate way of measuring time that is possible.

Do you see how it's a bit egocentric to base your metric of time on your subjective experience? — wonderer1

I see that the only possible way to have a truthful and accurate metric of time is to base it in human experience, empirical evidence. Whether this is egocentric or not is irrelevant.

I would have thought that Hume based his theory of constant conjunction on our natural sensations, not on some abstract philosophical reasonings. — RussellA

Clearly, Hume's understanding of "our natural sensations" was somewhat off the mark, as I explained. Therefore what he took as being "our natural sensations", was really just some abstract philosophical reasoning.

Anyway, unless they are specifically scientific, aren't all theories about natural sensations just abstract philosophical reasonings?

Right, but as an empirical matter, have you done any measurements of anyone's duration of the present? Even on yourself? If not, then how do you know that judgements vary? — Luke

Measurements of time rely on the determination of points which mark the moments which begin and end the measured period. Such points are not real, but arbitrary. In practise, we mark a point with the occurrence of an event, (the numbers on a clock for example). There are no such events which mark the beginning and ending of one's present, unless of course we make arbitrary ones. Therefore any such measurement of one's present would be completely arbitrary, and that is not a measurement at all. Without such points it is impossible to measure one's present.

So I know that the judgements of anyone's duration of the present vary because it is impossible to measure one's present, and through my experience with common usage I have noticed variance. People usually mark "the present" with reference to an event, "the moment when X is occurring, or occurred. But different types of events take different amounts of time, so the length of the person's present is dependent on the type of event that the person is concerned with at the time. Right now my present is marked by writing this post, and that might be an hour or so. When I'm pouring a coffee, that's a present of less than a minute. Since "the present" is arbitrary, without any real points, it's defined by whatever event one is paying attention to. So it is very clear to me that my own present varies in length.

If you accept the Google results, then where's the dispute? — Luke

What you presented from Google shows a very significant variance, between a couple hundred milliseconds and a couple seconds. Yet you claim this is not significant.

My "insistence" (I've only said it once) that the difference between various subjective experiences in this matter are insignificant does not affect, and is completely unrelated to, our agreement that the "present" time is defined in terms of conscious experience. — Luke

The principal disagreement between us is your insistence that no part of the past or future overlaps into the present. This would require points which separate past from present and future from present. Such a separation is inconsistent with subjective experience. It is an ideal which you hold, and you impose, yet you insist that your conception of the present is based on subjective experience. My reference to the differences between various subjective experiences is just provided as evidence that there is no such points of separation between past/present and future/present, because you refuse to find this in your own subjective experience, being in a state of denial.

I do not agree that "dimensionless points are not consistent with the subjective experience of time". Dimensionless points may be inconsistent with your view of the subjective experience of time, but they are not inconsistent with my view. Earlier in the discussion, I suggested an improvement to your argument that the present consists of a duration rather than a dimensionless point. However, even if I were to agree that the present consists of a duration rather than a dimensionless point, then I would only agree that the duration of the present itself is not a dimensionless point; that the present has a duration, and that that duration is bounded by definite end-points which separate it from the past and the future. I have maintained this position regarding definite distinctions between past, present and future throughout the discussion. — Luke

OK, so now it's your turn. Analyze your own subjective experience, find those points which separate past/present and future/present, and describe them to me. Justify your claim that there is no overlap in your own subjective experience.

Can you honestly tell me that your experience of time provides an overlap between past and present so that there is no boundary? How do you identify this overlap? — Luke

That's simple. I know there is past because of memories. I know there is future because anticipation. I can identify nothing which marks "the present" in my experience. Analysis of sensation indicates that everything sensed is in the past, therefore memories, and analysis of anticipations indicates that these relate to things in the future. Therefore I can conclude that my entire experience of "the present" is just an overlap of memories and anticipations, as the Venn diagram example I mentioned earlier.

What updated "understanding of what being present" means leads you to believe that there is an overlap of past/present and present/future? I thought your knowledge of this "overlap" was derived from your own personal experience, rather than from scientific knowledge? — Luke

Personal experience needs to be subjected to relevant knowledge in order to understand it. A being looking at one's own experience without any knowledge at the outset would come away with very little. Modern science, physics and engineering, which deals with extremely short periods of time indicates very clearly that what we thought was the present experience, sensations, are really in the past by the time they are apprehended by the mind. So the mind is "ahead of", or in the future, relative to the information it gets from the senses. That information is delayed through electrical processes. This implies that if the human being itself is said to be at the present, some parts of the human being, the mind, are in the future, while other parts, the senses are in the past. This means that the whole act of sensing and apprehending what is sensed, being eventual, and requiring an extended period of time, is part past, and part future.

What does any of this have to do with your proposed "overlap" between past/present and present/future? — Luke

It describe how other conceptions of the present, like yours, have been found to be incompatible with experience, and that we ought to change our conception of the present rather than blindly insist on compatibility.

If there is no distinction between past, present and future, then the duration of the present must be infinite, right? — Luke

It is not that there is no distinction, it is that they are not "distinct" in the sense of not overlapping. I already addressed this, you equivocate between "distinct" as in the way you use it to mean mutually exclusive, and "distinction" as in the way I use it to determine different features. So I say that there is a distinction between past and future, meaning that these are different predications of the same subject "time" but they are not necessarily opposing predications, therefore there is no contradiction in the subject, time, having both these predication at the same time, the present. You make them opposing predications so that there can be no overlap without contradiction.

If you take some time to consider the difference between past and future, you will see that these are not opposite to each other in the sense required in order that one would necessarily negate the other. Yes, they are completely different, but in no way is the past the opposite of the future, in the sense required for one to negate the other, as contraries.

Otherwise, what is the duration of your personal present time? How do you know if something is still present or if it is now in the past? Likewise, how do you know if something is still in the future or if it is now present? — Luke

These are difficult questions because time is a difficult subject. There is no reason to expect that anyone ought to know the answers to this sort of questioning.

If there is no distinction between them, then past, present and future just blur into one single time period. — Luke

Clearly there is a distinction between past and future. I never denied this. I only deny that it is the type of distinction we know as opposition, where the presence of one would deny the possibility of the presence of the other, by the law of non-contradiction. So the distinction is more like a distinction of category, like the difference between light and sound for example. There is a distinction to be made between light and sound, but the presence of sound in no way implies that the presence of light is impossible, nor vise versa. That is the type of distinction I am talking about, a difference in category.

But, in that case, there cannot be any differences between the duration of the "present" for different people because there really is no present time distinct from past and future times, and therefore there cannot there be any overlap of past/present and present/future. — Luke

You misunderstand this. There really is no present time distinct from past and future time. What I said is that the present is the perspective. So it is not a part of time at all, but the perspective from which time is observed. Time consists of the two aspects, past and future, and where these two are observed as overlapping is known as the present. Refer back to my Venn diagram explanation. There are two overlapping categories, past and future, and where these two overlap is called the present.

The reason why there is difference in the duration of the present, for different people, is that we all understand and interpret the overlap differently. Most, like yourself, don't even recognize the overlap, claiming "the present" to be something completely different from this, like you do. Obviously, if you do not even recognize that the overlap of past and future is real, then for you, any claimed duration of this overlap would be completely arbitrary. Therefore, since most people do not even recognize the reality of this overlap, if they were asked to state the duration of the present, it would be something arbitrary. So the duration would be different for different people.

On the other hand, if people started to take this perspective seriously, and started looking into the reality, and objective truth of this overlap, then they could come up with principles to measure it. In this way we could develop a conventional, standardized measurement of the overlap (the present). Then instead of "the present" signifying the perspective from which the overlap is view, we could move toward "the present" signifying the overlap itself, after we develop the principles required to understand the overlap itself.

In driving along a busy road through a city centre, if all me perceptions were of instants of time, and I had to connect these frozen perceptions by cognitive judgement, I would have crashed my car within the first five minutes. No amount of quick thinking would allow the human to successfully succeed in any task requiring a quick response - such as driving through a city centre, playing tennis, reading a novel, cooking a meal, engaging in conversation - if they had to constantly consciously reason how one event at one moment in time is connected to a different event a fraction of a second later. — RussellA

You have no argument here, because each of your examples requires practise. The exercise must be learned, and in the learning process the activity is nowhere near as smooth and fluid as you make it out to be here, in the case of an individual who is well educated and practised.

There is an object to the right of my field of vision, and one second later there is an object to the left of my field of vision. Hume induces that there is only one object and it is moving from right to left. — RussellA

The problem with this approach is that we expect to see the object move from right to left, if we watch it. And if the object suddenly jumps from right to left, without me seeing it move, this is very suspicious to me. It is suspicious because we naturally sense movement, so to see something jump from point A to point B without moving there looks unnatural, as if magical or supernatural. We assume that the eyes can keep up with any movement that the object can make, even if it's just a blur, so for it to instantaneously go from being at one spot, to being at another, would appear very suspicious.

So Hume's explanation is not consistent with our natural sensation which is to see the object moving from right to left, in a manner of spatial-temporal continuity of the object. In other words, we expect to see the spatial-temporal continuity of the object, including its motions, that is intuitive. So Hume's starting point, the assumption that we see the object at point A and then at point B, is not consistent with our intuitions. It starts from a broken spatial-temporal existence, one which would appear like magic, or supernatural if we ever saw it in the way he proposed.

Firstly, how do you know that judgements vary on this matter? — Luke

To begin with, yours and mine vary, obviously. And, I've had numerous similar discussions on this forum which indicate variance among others. Also the google search you cited indicates a range between "a couple of hundred milliseconds to a couple of seconds"

Secondly, I don't believe that it does vary; at least, not to any significant degree. There is general consensus and conventional agreement over the present time, down to the microsecond, thanks to GPS satellites. Almost anyone with a working mobile phone or computer can verify the present time. — Luke

Obviously we disagree on what constitutes "significant". Engineers today are working in timescales of nanoseconds and shorter, so clearly the difference you derived from google, of over a second is very significant

We, at least, agree that "the present" time is defined in terms of conscious experience. — Luke

You assert this, but display otherwise with your expressions, insisting that the difference between various subjective experiences in this matter is insignificant.

You've also been insisting that there is no overlap between past and present, or present and future. This implies that there are two points in time, dimensionless boundaries, one which separates past from present, and one which separates future from present. But you agree that such dimensionless points are not consistent with the subjective experience of time You don't seem to grasp the fact that assuming that there is no overlap between such segments of time implies dimensionless boundaries, points within the experience of time, to provide these separations, and this is completely inconsistent with the subjective experience of time.

Can you honestly tell me that your experience of time provides a boundary between past and present so that there is no overlap? How do you identify this boundary? Do you see it, or otherwise sense it? Or, is it the case that this is just an ideal which you impose on your experience, insisting that your experience must be like this in order that your experience be consistent with your definition of "present", even though you do not really experience any such boundary between present and past, whatsoever? You just think that there must be a boundary because that's what your conception tells you, but you do not experience any such boundary.

Furthermore, many people assume the "present moment" to be a simple point in time, which separates past from future. This reduces your assumed two points, one separating past from present, the other separating present from future, to one point separating past from future. That point is the present. This is a significant simplification in comparison to your proposal, and one which has agreement amongst many different people. But it signifies a radical difference from your conception. Now "the present moment" has no duration at all. But this, though it is more agreeable than any stipulated length of time as "the present" because it is a simplification, requiring one point in time rather than two, and creating the illusion that measurements are precise, is not at all consistent with subjective experience of time.

ou are attempting to change the conventional meaning of the concept of "the present" to account for all potentially different "present times" — Luke

I am proposing a definition which is not conventional. This is because there is no conventional definition of "the present" which is consistent with the empirical evidence, the human experience of being present. Conventional definitions are outdated, coming from a time when we had less understanding of what being present meant.

There is no conventional definition of "the present" which states that it consists of parts of the past and/or the future. — Luke

That is exactly the problem with conventional definitions of "the present". None of these proposed definitions are consistent with the reality of the present according to human experience. This has created a significant problem, which is that many people have been led to deny the reality of the present. So, what is most basic, and fundamental to human experience, being at the present, is now completely denied by many people who insist that "the present" is not something real.

Therefore we have the very significant problem which is the denial of the reality of the human experience. Some insist for example, that we live in a simulation. This denial of the reality of human experience is the result of there being not a single conventional definition of "the present" which is consistent with reality. There are only false representations of "the present", like what you propose, ones which utilize arbitrary points in time. Since the subjective experience is inconsistent with the conventional definitions of "the present", instead of rejecting the definitions, as I do, people accept these representations of "the present" as true representations of the present, and reject the human experience of "the present" as not real.

Presumably, this "overlap" is due to the fact that the duration of one person's "present" is different from the duration of another person's "present". — Luke

No, this is a bit of a misunderstanding of what I've argued. The overlap is not due to the fact that one person's present is different from another. The overlap is the true nature of what the present is, and what time is. We do not know why time exists like this, so we cannot say what the overlap is due to. The fact that the duration of one person's present is different from the duration of another person's present, is evidence that this overlap is the real, or true nature of the present.

So you need to reverse the order of implied causation in your statement. The overlap is not caused by one person's present being different from another's, the overlap causes one person's present to be different from another's. That's why we can say that the difference between one person's present and another's, is evidence of overlap.

Maybe they have the same duration. It does not necessarily follow that the durations are different or that there must be some overlap. So how do you know that different people must have a different duration of "the present" in the first place? — Luke

As I explained already, the standard convention is to represent the present as "a moment", or "an instant", and this is a zero duration. It is the convention because it is an ideal which is agreeable, acceptable. But when it is seen by philosophers that this ideal is not consistent with the reality of time, then durations are proposed, such as infinitesimals. The fact that we cannot agree on the precise length of the infinitesimal which represents "the present" indicates that we do not all experience the same length of duration for the present. If we all experienced the same length of present, we could agree on the length of present, just like we agree on colours and things like that. We do not agree on the length of the present though, because we do not experience it the same as one another,. Therefore we've adopted a durationless, dimensionless, "present moment" instead, as something which is agreeable, and avoids the problem of having to find some means for determining the actual length of the present.

But I cannot perceive an object moving without perceiving the manner in which it is moving. — RussellA

I don't think that this is right at all. Think about how sensation works. Sight and hearing receive the activity of waves. But people were seeing and hearing long before they knew the manner of this motion. And the other senses perceive the activities of molecules, but the perceptions which result do not include anything about the manner in which the molecules are moving.

This is to say that the percept, the sense image, or whatever you want to call what your mind apprehends, is nothing at all like, or similar to the motion which is actually being sensed. So your mind creates for you an image of an object moving, but this is not even similar to the manner of motion which the senses are sensing.

I agree judgement is independent to perception, but when perceiving a moving object, the fact that the object is coming straight towards me is part of the perception, not part of a subsequent cognitive judgement. — RussellA

This is the issue which Hume had difficulty with. To determine which direction the object is moving, requires sensing it over an extended period of time. For him this meant a number of distinct sensations of the object at different locations, a conclusion as to the direction it has moved, then a cause/effect assumption that it will continue to move in a similar way in the future.

In reality, the conclusion that the object is coming straight towards you requires what is known as "quick thinking". When someone is capable of ducking from a rapidly approaching flying object, we say that the person has demonstrated "quick thinking". You'll notice that human beings are much better at this quick thinking than other animals.

Not necessarily.

It is true that Hume is described as an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience", such that the cornerstone of his epistemology was the problem of induction.

However, such a philosophy may be argued to be founded on Hume's belief in natural instinct, rather than reason, thereby discovering a strong link between Hume's inductive inference and Kant's non-empirical intuition. — RussellA

But the point is that Hume describes sensation as apprehending distinct states, then using what you call "natural instinct" to infer that motion has occurred between these distinct states. This is completely different from Kant who places the intuitions of space and time as necessary for the possibility of sensation. For Kant then, motion is already inherent within the sensation as those intuitions are prior to and necessary for sensation, but for Hume motion is inferred from the sensation of distinct states, so this "natural instinct" operates posterior to sensation making judgements about motion from the sensations..

But even if motion is already inherent within sensation, this does not validate your claim that sensation provides for you the judgement as to which way the motion is going. We sense change as motion, activity, without knowing where the change is headed toward.

Why does this require there to be any "overlap" of the past, present and future? — Luke

"The present" is defined by human experience. This implies human judgement. The distinct judgements of distinct human beings varies on this matter. Therefore "the present" as a standard, or principle, varies accordingly, and there is overlap accordingly.

I don't see the need to create a singular past, present and future that accommodates everyone, everywhere, travelling at all speeds, especially if relativity is acknowledged. — Luke

The goal is to understand the nature of time. I was defining "the present". If "present" refers to something completely different in every different situation then we cannot have any definition, Nor will we ever be able to understand the nature of time, because we will not be able to make any true propositions about the present in order to proceed logically. Instead, we look for general, true propositions which we can make, such as the following. The present separates past from future. It is itself a duration of time. Depending on one's point of view, past and future must extend into this duration which is called the present.

. A quick Google search suggests this duration ranges from a couple of hundred milliseconds to a couple of seconds. — Luke

This is clear evidence of the overlap I described. The fact that "the present" has duration, and there are no real points which mark the beginning and ending of that duration, nor is there a standard length of that duration, implies that there must be some overlap between past, present, and future.

Moreover, I don't believe it's a terribly important question. — Luke

Maybe you don't see it as important, but it definitely has implications. That is, that there cannot be distinct boundaries of separation between past, present, and future, if "present" is defined by human experience. There must be overlap of past and future within the present, "the present" being defined as what is common to us all, and possibly even overlap between past and future.

Once we realize, and accept as fact, that the overlap is very real, then we can see that the intuition which inclines us to define these temporal terms so as to exclude overlap, misleads us in this way. Then each one of us can look at one's own personal experience as having such an overlap inherent within, and recognize that the inclination toward exclusion was simply the result of that faulty intuition.