If I wasn't able to perceive space and time, I wouldn't be able to perceive that the truck was moving straight towards me. It would appear stationary and not presenting an immediate danger. — RussellA

That the truck is moving straight toward you is a conclusion, not a perception. You perceive (sense) motion, and you make a judgement as to whether the truck is coming toward you or not. The judgement that it is coming straight toward you is not a perception, and is independent from the sensation that it is moving.

Unfortunately, when going to the dentist, it is my mind that perceives the pain of the cold water on a sensitive tooth. If only it was just my unconscious senses that perceived the pain. — RussellA

You make a judgement that the cause of your pain is cold water, rather than that it is something else, like hot water. You do not perceive that the "water is cold", you decide this by way of judgement. You do not perceive that the "sky is blue", nor that the "grass is green". Those are all judgements, which in basic epistemology are called predications.

But according to Kant, you do perceive (sense) activity and motion. And this is why space and time, as a priori intuitions, are said to be prior to sensibility and sense experience in general, as necessary conditions for the possibility of sensation.

This is perhaps the fundamental difference between Hume and Kant. Hume represents sensations as static, states of existence, which change from one moment to the next. Kant represents sensations as active, according to the necessary requirements for sensation, those pure a priori intuitions, space and time. This is the means by which Kant places mind as prior to sense experience, as required for sensation, while Hume is empiricist. Hume would argue that change and movement are judgements derived from sense experience.

However, in your latest post, you refer to the present time as "the temporal position of the sentient being" and "the human perspective" of one individual. — Luke

Your addition of "one individual" here is what I described as "unreasonable" in the rest of that post. So read the rest of my post, and keep that in mind. It is unreasonable to reduce "the human perspective" to the perspective of one human being. Each individual human being makes the judgement concerning "the present", past/future, before/after, but the judgement is "unreasonable" if the perspective of other human beings is not considered in that judgement.

Therefore, no, you did not explain this. You simply changed your definition of "the present" to suit your argument, and once again did not address mine. — Luke

The definition is still the same. I just expanded it to explain how we account for the reality of other subjects. This is necessary to avoid solipsism. I touched on this already in my replies to Wonderer1 concerning the subjectivity of the present.

Disputes over when, or how long, the present time is are irrelevant. Once agreement is reached (or context understood) on that matter, then past and future are determined relative to that. — Luke

Obviously, as demonstrated right here, between you and I, it is highly probable that agreement will never be reached in the way you propose. It's simply not realistic to think that people will ever agree on how long a period of time "the present" lasts for.

No, the present needn't be reduced to a non-dimensional point in time, hence my 1000 years example. You've also given examples of the present time being 2023 or July 8. Once established, the past and future are determined relative to that. — Luke

I don't see anyone agreeing with you, that the present is a period of time which lasts for 1,000 years. Nor do I see any one agreeing that the present is one year, one day, one hour, a second, or a nanosecond. So you're simply speaking out of your hat, assuming that people will agree to such proposals. I brought those up as examples of what might be proposed as "the present", but clearly none of these are acceptable, and this demonstrates hoe the present, a a length of time is indefinite.

That people might bicker over the "real" duration of the present is irrelevant. — Luke

No, this is not irrelevant at all, it's the whole point. If the length of the period of time which is called "the present" cannot be justified, and people disagree because it is nothing more than an any arbitrary length, then clearly no one knows the real length of "the present". Therefore the length of "the present" might just as well consist of all past and all future time. That is why I called it "indefinite".

If we agree to refer to the current millennium as "the present time" then what comes before the current millennium is the past and what comes after the current millennium is the future, wIthout overlap. Your assertion is therefore refuted. — Luke

Your statement starts with "if", and ends with what would be the case if that condition, "we agree", would be fulfilled. Obviously we do not agree, nor is agreement likely, therefore it will likely be the end of time before my assertion is refuted. Have a happy time waiting for agreement.

Why must it be "reduced to a mathematical point" in order to be "agreeable and reasonable"? You clearly don't agree with it or find it reasonable. — Luke

Obviously, any proposed length of time, as that length of time which provides a distinct separation between past and future, (as are your conditions for "the present"), will never find agreement. And agreement is what demonstrates "reasonable". Because a specific length of time will never be agreed upon, and is therefore unreasonable, the proposal may be reduced to a point in time which separates past from future. That is why the point in time, as "the present moment" is the common convention for "the present". It is agreeable and reasonable. Therefore we might call it justified. However, it is not true, because it is not consistent with reality.

You are repeating your error of conflating "before" with "past" and "after" with "future". These are not interchangeable terms. If before and after are inside the now, it does not follow that past and future are inside the now, because past and future are determined relative to now. — Luke

I explained this. "Now" is the human perspective. Both, past/future, before/after, are judgements made from within that perspective. The human subject is a sensing being, and such judgements are made from within that being. Therefore past/future are within "the present". "The present" is the temporal position of the sentient being and past/future are judgements made within.. To put past/future outside the present requires projection, extrapolation. Putting past/future outside the present of the sentient being is a further process which can only be understood after a firm grasp of past/future within the sentient being is established.

Nonsense. Past and future are determined relative to the present. The present is not divisible into past and future, otherwise it would not be the present. — Luke

Any example that anyone gives as what is referred to as "the present" can always be broken down by someone else, and denied as the true "present". Look at the examples I already gave. If someone says that 2023 is the present, someone else could say no, July 8 is the present, and the rest of 2023 is past and future. Then someone could state the hour as the present, and the rest of July 8 is past and future. Then the second, nanosecond, etc.. Whatever is referred to as "the present" is always divisible into a smaller present with a past and future. I've explained this to you already. Why is it so hard for you to understand? It's never clear exactly what "now" or "present" refers to when someone uses these terms.

No part of the present can be in the past because if it were then it would no longer be in the present, and no part of the future can be in the present because if it were then it would no longer be in the future. Likewise, no part of the past can be in the present because if it were then it would not yet be in the past, and no part of the present can be in the future because if it were then it would not yet be in the present. — Luke

All you are doing here is explaining why your definition of "present" is not consistent with reality. What you stipulate as required for the meaning of "the present" cannot be upheld in reality. Look at the examples. If 2023 is stipulated as the present, then someone can say part is in the past and part is in the future. And this is the case with any time period which is stipulated as "the present", anyone can argue that part of that time period is in the past and part is in the future.

To avoid this problem, and maintain your stipulated requirements "no part of the present can be in the past...etc.", the present must be reduced to a non-dimensional point in time, which separates future from past. However, such points are not consistent with the reality of our experience of time.

Therefore, what is stipulated as required for "the present" under your proposed definition, "no part of the present can be in the past...etc.", cannot be fulfilled in a way which is both logically rigorous (agreeable to all rational people) and consistent with reality. If a time period is proposed as "the present", any rational person can show how that time period contains both past and future, (as the examples demonstrate). And if "the present" is reduced to a mere point, this is not consistent with reality. So the reasonable response is to reject your stipulated conditions for "the present" as providing nothing but a false premise.

The present could be a dimensionless mathematical point or it could be 1,000 years long and, either way, it would still not overlap the past or future. The past is before the present and the future is after the present. — Luke

Don't you see that if you propose that "the present" is 1,000 years long, or any other period of time, without any overlap of past or future, any reasonable person would reject this proposition, saying that the time period has some past and some future within it. You could insist that this time period is what you stipulate as "the present", but then you are only being unreasonable, as trying to force your own arbitrary stipulated time period as "the present". So to make your stipulation agreeable, and reasonable, it must be reduced to a mathematical point. But then it is not consistent with the reality of time as we experience it. The problem is that your requirement "no part of the present can be in the past.." is impossible to fulfill in a reasonable way. Therefore it is unreasonable.

This is not part of the measurement... — Luke

You and I have such a vastly different idea of what constitutes "measurement", that discussion on this subject would just make the thread a messy digression. That's why I've been insisting that we avoid the topic, as not a requirement for the subject of the op.

But, as I understand it, while numbers tend to get grounded in quite abstruse work within set theory that there is less general confidence in, they can also be grounded using category theory. Barry Mazur has some relatively approachable stuff on this, although I certainly don't get all of it.

Timelessness remains either way, mathematics is eternal, not involved in becoming— in most takes at least. This, I think, may be a problem. Mazur had an article on time in mathematics but it didn't go that deep. But I recently discovered Gisin's work on intuitionist mathematics in physics, and that is quite interesting and sort of bound up with the philosophy of time. The Nature article seems stuck behind a paywall, but there is this Quanta article and one on arXiv.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.02348

https://www.quantamagazine.org/does-time-really-flow-new-clues-come-from-a-century-old-approach-to-math-20200407/ — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't had a chance to read the referred material yet, but I think that this is an important subject, very much related to the op. As I see it the crux of the matter is the nature of "order". The first principle of mathematics is order, yet pure mathematicians do not want to be constrained by any natural order. So they propose a fundamental orderless condition which would allow infinite freedom for creations of order. This is the set which is not ordered.

The problem with this "not ordered" condition is that time is a type of order, and this puts the "not ordered condition as outside of, or prior to time. Now we can ask in what sense is this condition "prior" because it really cannot be prior in a temporal sense. And we might say that it is "logically prior". But this ought to be questioned. So the question might be, does it make sense logically, to speak of something which is "not ordered". If this idea, the existence of something without any order, is itself illogical, then the "priority" implied by placing this condition as prior to temporal order, cannot be said to be a logical priority, because it would appear more like an illogical type of priority.

You can forget about mathematical "points". The upshot is that there is no overlap between them; no part of the past or the future "inside" the present. — Luke

The reality is that there is a whole lot of overlap. As I said in my first post, by the time you say "now", it is in the past. By the time someone hears you say "now" it is in the past. That's the unavoidable reality. And if you say that what was meant by "now" is a period of time encompassing both speaking and hearing, then there is both before and after inside the now. So, any time that someone uses "the present" to refer to a period of time, anyone can divide that period of time into past and future, consequently there is "overlap".

The overlap in usage is very real, obvious, and unavoidable, yet you just deny this with "there is no overlap", as if denial makes the obvious overlap not real. If you really believe what you say, tell me how "the present" can refer to anything other than a dimensionless mathematical point separating past from future, which everyone must respect, if there is to be no overlap in the usage of these terms.

When have the conventional meanings of "past", "present" and "future" been "employed for the purpose of measurement"? — Luke

The conventional meanings are put to use anytime that time is measured. A future is presupposed prior to measurement as the time which will be measured. A present moment is designated to start the measurement. The time going past is measured until another designated present moment. Have you ever used a stopwatch?

You have changed the meanings of "past", "present" and "future" to try and accommodate relativity? — Luke

Since relativity is one of the most often used theories in physics, don't you see it as a problem if it is not consist with the conventional (correct) meanings of "past", "present", and "future"? Obviously, something needs to be changed. Perhaps it is the case that conventional usage is actually based in false premises, as I've been telling you.

Right, so past and future come before and after the present, respectively. In fact, that's what these words are typically used to mean. — Luke

No, "past or future", "before or after", are judgements made from a perspective. The perspective is said to be "the present". Therefore past and future are before and after each other, from the perspective of the present. Think of the way that first is before second, which is after first. The observer, or counter's perspective is not between first and second. The perspective encompasses both, it is not between the two. This is no different from any other set of opposing terms, right and left, up and down, hot and cold, etc.. The two opposing terms are conceptual, and are used to describe things relative to the perceiver.

And my argument has been that if you want to place the past and the future within the present time, then you need another present time inside that, that these past and future times actually come before and after. The words create the distinction. You are misusing these words. — Luke

No, your argument is based on equivocation. The claimed "need" is the result of you trying to create compatibility between your use of "present" and my use of "present". But your use relies on the false premises of points or boundaries which divide separate parts of time. Therefore it ought to simply be rejected as incompatible with the truth, due to falsity, and there is no such need for your proposed nested present time.

Why do they need to be within the present? — Luke

To be consistent with reality, and this is known as being true. To proceed from true premises, true proposition about the nature of time, in an effort to understand further, the nature of time, we must accept the propositions which position past and future as within present.

As I explained to Wonderer1, this makes presentism into a coherent ontological perspective by making past and future intelligible, and real, to the presentist.

Okay. But the past is not before the present and the future is not after the present in this example (per your second premise). Of course you will say that some of it is, but then you will need another present which completely is. That's what coming before and after means. — Luke

This is your misunderstanding. The past and future are before and after, each other. None of this is before or after the present, as the present is simply the position of perspective, the so-called point of view. The idea that the perspective is a "point" of view is the problem, the false premise. So "before: and "after" are judgements made from that perspective. Think of the way that right and left, up and down, etc;, are judgements made from a perspective.

Therefore there is no need for your proposed "another present", because this is already accounted for within my proposed "present" due to the nature of subjectivity, as I discussed with Wonderer1. The overlap of past and future (as evident in the Venn diagram example), which appears to contradict the premise that past and future are before and after relative to each other, is the result of subjective differences in perspective. This feature of "the present", as the perspective of the observer manifests as the relativity of simultaneity. And, we can extend it even further to cover the unclarity within one person's own subjective experience.

No, the meaning of the words requires those arbitrary points. — Luke

No, the meaning of the words does not require "points". The points are just a mathematical tool applied in the practise of measurement. For example, to my right, and to my left requires no point, to have meaning, up and down requires no point. What is required is a perspective, and the perspective is often referred to as the "point of view", and this is commonly reduced to a "point". The reduction of the perspective to a "point" is done to facilitate measurement, but it is not as you say, a requirement for meaning.

Are you saying that everyone uses the words "past", "present" and "future" incorrectly? — Luke

"Correct" and "incorrect" are a matter of convention, meaning consistent with or inconsistent with a specific conventions. "Truth" is a matter of consistent with reality. What I am saying is that the conventions which are employed for the purpose of measurement are principles which are not consistent with reality. Therefore when people talk about points in time they speak correctly, but not truthfully.

Since we can think about the past or the future in the present, then those times are present? — Luke

Past and future, like before and after, are concepts employed in judgement. We must respect the fact that judgements made by distinct people may be inconsistent with each other, just like whether something is to the right or to the left. Because of this we must look at the judgement as property of the judge (i.e. within the judge), and not as something independent, regardless of whether the thing judged is supposed to be external to the judge. The latter, is a projection of the internal to the external.

If you make a distinction between these, then what is it? — Luke

I've been through this so many times, I don't know why I continue. The distinction is a judgement of before and after in relation to, or if you prefer, from the perspective of, the present.

As a reminder, (A) represents past and future times that are external to the present time (A), whereas (B) represents past and future times that are internal to the present time (A); of which the present time (A) consists. Except you later reclaimed (A) times but with imprecise boundaries. However, I note that I never mentioned anything about sharp or imprecise boundaries with regard to (A) times (in the post where I first referred to (A) and (B) times). — Luke

You referred to |"three distinct periods of time", and that's what I objected to. And I told you why, because to be distinct periods of time requires boundaries of separation. These boundaries, or points in time re what I consider to be a false premise.

If the past and future, as we experience them, are within the present then there is not three distinct periods. But this still allows that the past and future might extend outside the present as well. Think of a Venn diagram of past and future, overlapping at the present, for example. In no way can this be described as three distinct periods of time. However, both past and future are within the present, and also extend outside the present.

You designed it that way? — Luke

Yes, of course, that is the point. The conventional way, which you describe requires arbitrary points, or boundaries in time, to separate distinct periods of time. However, these points and boundaries are nowhere to be found in our experience of time. So I designed a conception which works very well without such points, but it is necessarily incompatible with a conception which employs such arbitrary points.

Once again: If the present time (A) consists of both past (B) and future (B) times, then what are those past (B) and future (B) times relative to? They are in the past and in the future of what? — Luke

As I explained in my last reply to wonderer1, distinctions of past and future are judgements made by the thinking being. So "past" and "future" are conceptions within the mind of the being, at the present, who uses these conceptions to make judgements. So the "past (B) and future (B) times" are past and future relative to those judgements. And the thinking being may use projections to extend one's judgement to things outside of one's mind.

If there is no distinction between "past", "present" and "future", then what does each word mean? — Luke

You have an unbelievable way of associating meaning with words Luke. That is why it is very difficult to hold a discussion with you. Obviously what I mean by "distinct" is not the same as what you mean by "distinction" here. So your criticism of my argument has just turned into an exercise in equivocation. My use of "past" and "future" (A) is inconsistent with, and cannot support yours (B), therefore my use is problematic. What you apparently fail to understand is that my use is designed to be incompatible with yours, because of the problems I associate with yours. The principal problem is that you require points in time to distinguish your three aspects, and these points are not real, but arbitrary.

I'm curious about your theory, as to how it is we are communicating with each other. However, I can tell you, that you can't understand much about the answer without a more accurate theory of time than you currently have. I suspect you haven't subjected your theory of time to the many falsifying tests which could be done. Thus you haven't seen the need for a more accurate paradigm. — wonderer1

The theory is a starting point, a launch pad toward a more accurate understanding of the reality of time.
It is designed and intended to avoid many of the current problems associated with the conventional understanding of time. I don't see how your comment about communication is relevant. Clearly communication is a difficult task, as my attempt at discussion with Luke indicates, and the capacity to communicate is not something which ought to be taken for granted. However, I don't see how this bears on my temporal theory.

Perhaps you could explain the "falsifying tests" which could be carried out. I've described the theory as well grounded in conscious experience, and extremely sound, therefore I clearly believe that the required falsifying tests have already been carried out in human practise.

You are correct that we can't think thoughts without a period of time elapsing but look at the inability to clearly distinguish between past and future that comes with your perspective. Do you think it is your thought processes which determine what is past and what is future? — wonderer1

Distinguishing between past and future is a judgement which is carried out by human beings. I do not think that any other creatures could do such a thing because they would have to form an understanding of the meanings of these words, "past" and "future", and then make a judgement according to some criteria. So I think human beings are the only creatures we know of who attempt to make such a judgement. In any case, it is only thought which makes such a judgement, whether it's your thought, mine, Luke's, anyone else, or everyone. So I think it is very clear that it is thought processes which determine what is past and what is future, whether it's yours, mine, or some other. Can you think of anything else which might determine what is past and what is future?

ou don't acknowledge any duration called "the present" that is distinct from past and future times? — Luke

That's exactly right, and the principal premise of my argument. Since there are no points in time the past and future cannot be distinct from the present. Therefore our only means for understanding the nature of time is through our conscious experience of the present. And within our conscious experience of the present, we encounter the past and future.

Sorry Luke, but I see a whole lot of straw men in your post, and nothing worth replying to, very little effort, if any, on your part. If you put some effort into an attempt to understand, I would be very willing to reply.

Well, we have different subjective experiences, and based on my subjective experiences it is not only possible, but extremely valuable to recognize difference in our subjective experiences of a present, and happenings in time in the world. — wonderer1

Yes, this is another good point. Since we all have somewhat different subjective experiences of "the present", this is a very good reason why there cannot be an objective, and to use Luke's word, "distinct", separation between present, past, and future. There are no objective points of distinction within time, those distinctions are subjective and somewhat arbitrary

Another factor in my subjective experience is looking at signals captured by oscilloscopes that represent things at time resolutions down to around a nanosecond. I have very good reasons for thinking events really are happening on extremely small time scales regardless of the fact that my unaided perceptions don't reveal things on such small time scales. — wonderer1

I agree, things happen on a very large time scale, and also on a very small time scale. And we observe this, in one way or another. That's another good reason why we cannot limit "the present" to one particular time scale. If we designated "the present moment" as a tenth of a second, or something like that, then a whole lot of nanoseconds would be going past at the present moment. This would mean that within "the present moment" some nanoseconds would be in the future, and some would be in the past.

Might it be the case that there is a relevant lack of diversity to the sort of subjective experiences you have had? — wonderer1

I don't understand the question. Diversity in the conscious experience of the present is what this conception of the present is aimed at accounting for.

Most people use the following terms to refer to three distinct periods of time: — Luke

Yes, and I've discussed the problems with this way that most people think. "Distinct periods of time" requires points, dimensionless boundaries to separate them. These points are inconsistent with our experience. Furthermore, if we assume that there are dimensionless points, boundaries, within time, then these points cannot themselves consist of time, but must be composed of something other than time. Then we have something other than time within time, and this produces the incoherency.

If 1 and 3 above are determined relative to 2, then 4 and 5 are determined relative to what? That is, 4 and 5 are in the past and in the future of what? — Luke

We've been through this a number of times, 1 and 3 are simply rejected as incoherent, false ideas of what past and future are. There are no points or dimensionless boundaries separating distinct parts of time. That idea is completely inconsistent with our conscious experience of time. Then after these are dismissed, we adopt 4 and 5 as a more realistic representation of past and future, a representation which is consistent with our empirical knowledge.

We might then proceed toward understanding a "past and future" which is outside the realm of experience and empirical knowledge, and this would be a "past and future" which is outside of the present, like your 1 and 3, with the difference being that they are not based on distinct boundaries. Then we have a way to properly understand past and future as they are, outside the realm of the present , and this understanding will be consistent with our experience, and therefore our empirical knowledge, as not based in distinct boundaries.

The answer can only be a second present - Present (B) - that is nested within Present (A). — Luke

Not at all, Present (A) is simply incoherent, and wrong, as explained above. It is inconsistent with experience and is a faulty idea which cannot be justified, because it is wrong. That is the point I made when I first entered this thread, and you still do not get it, wanting to nest Present (B) with present (A). The point is that Present (A) is incompatible with conscious experience, and incompatible with present (B) which is compatible with conscious experience. Therefore there can be no nesting, and present (A) must be rejected as a misleading idea.

Rather than a set of immutable numbers, which seems less defensible today, we can have a set of possible, contextually immutable axioms, which define a vast, perhaps infinite space of systems. The truths in the systems are mutable, because there are different systems, but then there is a sort of fall back, second-order Platonism where the existence of the systems themselves, and relations between them, are immutable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that this works. The reason why different systems are needed is because incompatibilities arise between one and another. Incompatibility makes it impossible to have immutable axioms which would be applicable to all systems.

The problem is right at the foundation, the nature of a unit, one. We can assume an ideal unit, "one", but then the things which we allow ourselves to do with "one" through stated axioms, must be consistent with what we can actually do with one object, in practise. In practise though, we find that different types of things, or objects, allow us to do different types of activities with them. This is very evident with division. Each type of thing has specific ways which it can be divided. In mathematics, the common principle is to allow that the unit "one" can be divided in any possible way. This does not properly represent the restrictions on division which exist in reality.

Do you think it would make sense to distinguish between the nature of our subjective experiences of 'the present' and the nature of time in the larger reality we are a part of? — wonderer1

I don't think that this would be possible at this point. The only thing we have to go on is our subjective experiences. So I think it's necessary to get a good understanding of our subjective experiences of time before we can proceed toward speculating about the nature of time in a larger reality. This is because our subjective experiences of time have a very significant impact on our speculations concerning any larger reality. I think that how one interprets one's subjective experience of time influences whether God may or may not enter the speculations about the larger reality.

It seems to me that you and Luke are both right in ways, but this discussion seems a muddled mess due to not making such a distinction. — wonderer1

The muddled mess is due to Luke's assumption that we can step outside of our experience of the present, and make assumptions about the nature of time outside of this experience of the present. See below, Luke puts forward an unwarranted and unjustified proposition that the future and past are "outside" of our experience of the present. So Luke seeks to define "present" in such a way that the future and past are outside of the present, leaving them as impossible to experience, therefore unknowable and unintelligible to empirical knowledge.

This is the problem with "presentism". By assuming Luke's premise, future and past get placed outside of the present. Then future and past become unintelligible to presentism when Luke\s premise is adopted without a thorough understanding of how we really experience "the present".

I, on the other hand define "present" in a way which is completely consistent with our experience of the present, and in a way which also brings "past" and "future" into our experience of the present, as part of it. This makes activity at the present (as we do sense motion at the present) coherent and intelligible, and it also brings past and future into our experience of the present, making these empirically knowable.

It is relevant because you are misusing the terms "past" and "future" — Luke

This supposed "misuse" is a product of your incoherent definition of "present", as I've already shown to you. You have an incoherent definition of "present" which puts past and future outside of the present, and this renders all aspects of time as unintelligible. By the terms of this incoherent definition, I misuse "past" and "future".

Your use of two different senses for each of these terms indicates your use of two different senses of "the present". — Luke

In the course of this discussion, I have on occasion, used "the present" in your way, solely for the purpose of demonstrating the incoherency of that way of using "the present".

Points in time are consistent with a duration. A duration is a determinate period of time with beginning and end points. It is your premise that the present consists of a duration. — Luke

Points in time are not consistent with our conscious experience of duration. As I said, the duration of the present is indefinite. I said the present consist of "duration", not "a duration", and if I sometimes mentioned "a duration", I meant an indefinite duration.

This seems to be our principal disagreement. If you want to understand, then drop the points. But if this is where you think the weakness of the argument lies, then explain to me how you think there are points within our conscious experience of the present. Because that lack of points is a fundamental premise which I believe is very sound.

Thanks for clarifying. However, there seems to be some hidden premises because I fail to see how you reach the conclusion that "time passes" from these premises alone. — Luke

The conscious experience of the present is the experience of time passing. We could discuss whether or not it's properly called "passing", or if some other word would be better. As I explained in the original argument it is the experiencing of a continuous passing which cannot be pinpointed.

Also, if we take a closer look, premise 1 states that the present consists of a duration and premise 2 states that a duration consists of before and after parts. This implies that the present consists of before and after parts. This does not imply that those before and after parts are past and future parts, because it is the present which consists of those before and after parts. — Luke

The premise is "duration", not "a duration".

I don't see how the matter described is relevant. It's an issue of defining the terms. "Before and after" in relation to "the present" are known as past and future. If you like, we could adhere to "the present consists of before and after parts", and discuss what this means. But what it means is that the present consists of future and past parts, because if it consisted of only past, or only future parts, this would not be consistent with the conscious experience.

We could add that, relative to the present moment, the past comes before the present moment and the future comes after the present moment, but we are not committed to any conclusion that the before parts of the present are past nor that the after parts of the present are future. The before and after parts are only what the present consists of. — Luke

But we have no "present moment". You are inserting an unwarranted "moment" into the scenario. This is the manifestation of your desire to utilize "points". There is not "moment" in the conscious experience of the present. We only have the continuous experience of time passing to deal with, and this manifests as duration, indefinite duration.

So I don't see any reason for your limiting of the naming of the before and after parts. You impose an unwarranted "moment", in order to define "past" and "future" as relative to this moment. Then by this unwarranted definition you exclude "past" and "future" from the naming of the parts of "the present", because they have already been used as names relative to the "present moment". But there is no "moment" in the conscious experience so we must deny this proposition as false and this frees up "past" and "future" to be used relative to "the present", as I described, without any "moment" .

You are still using two different senses of the present moment. — Luke

I do not use "present moment". You introduced this. The present is duration, not a moment. That is the principal premise. Any time we try to assign "a moment", or "a point" to the present, the assignment fails, because the present does not consist of moments, nor is it "moment" in general.

However, on the other hand, you also treat the present as some mid-point within the duration, which has some parts before it and some parts after, and you treat these as being past and future. — Luke

Saying "before parts and after parts" does not imply a mid-point. There is no mention as to how any division into parts is to be carried out here, it is only implied that there is distinct parts. The mode of division is not mentioned so "mid-point" is not implied.

You should instead treat what is outside the duration of the present as being past and future, rather than what is inside it on either side of the duration of the present's mid-point. — Luke

This proposal is the manifestation of your faulty way of looking at the present, as a moment. Since there are no moments, only an apprehension of duration, which is indefinite, we have no boundary which would enable us to go "outside" the present. The principles for this "going outside" have not yet been established. We need a thorough understanding of the fundamentals before making such complex proposals.

The Golden Rule advocates initiating indirect reciprocity, the most powerful cooperation strategy known. Indirect reciprocity has no stated goal - it is a cooperation strategy, not a goal generator. — Mark S

As I've repeated already, I believe there is no reciprocity implied by the Golden Rule, and I think that this represents a gross misinterpretation on your part.

It appears like neither of us has any will to compromise on this issue.

If you define "the present" as the entirety of 2023, then the duration of the present is - the present lasts for - the entirety of 2023, by definition. — Luke

That is an example, "the present is 2023". It is not a definition of "the present". That's why all the other examples were examples too, none of them defined "the present". They were examples of possible particular instances.

That time passes is presupposed regardless of your argument that the present contains parts of the future and past or not. Your stipulation that the present contains parts of the future and past does not make time pass, logically or otherwise. — Luke

If, "time passes" is presupposed, then you'll understand exactly why "the present" cannot be defined as 2023, or any such named "time", because the name of the present time would always be changing.

That the present contains parts of the future and parts of the past is not a stipulation, it is the conclusion of the logical argument I presented, whether you like it or not. It is a conclusion, not a stipulation.

Within both the past and future, there are "before" parts and "after" parts. Does it follow from this that the future is in the past and that the past is in the future? — Luke

Events only occur at the present, so this is not relevant, because I was talking about the occurrence of an event, something which only happens at the present.

By definition, it is the duration of the present, not the duration of the past nor the duration of the future. — Luke

As I've been busily demonstrating to you, this is the faulty definition of "the present", which you cling to even though it renders the present as something incoherent and unintelligible. That's why I've been telling you that you ought to approach this topic with n open mind, and allow that perhaps the definition of "the present" which you cling to is wrong, instead of continually insisting that what I say is wrong "by definition".

Since what I say accords very well with the reality of time, and the conclusion of the very sound argument I've presented is in discordance with your definition of "the present", it's very clear that you ought to reject, and replace your definition.

We seem to agree that the present moment is defined by your conscious experience, and it is the duration of your conscious experience that defines the duration of the present moment, and only the present moment. — Luke

You say that you agree with me that the present is defined by conscious experience, but then you want to define "the present" as either a point in time, or an interval of time with beginning and ending points. Points in time are not at all consistent with our experience of time as continuous. Therefore if you really believed that the present is defined by our conscious experience you would have rejected this idea of points in time which mark "the present", way back when I first explained that such a thing is not consistent with our conscious experience of time. Instead you insist on clinging to this faulty ideas of points.

Why not? There were many years before 2023 and will be many afterwards. — Luke

Because there is no occurrence of any event if there is no passing of time. And passing of time only occurs at the present, as our experience indicates. We have no experience of any events ever occurring at any time other than the present. Events occur at the present, and only at the present. We can create an artificial representation of events occurring in the past or in the future, by artificially projecting the present to that time. But if the entirety of 2023 is already designated as "the present", we cannot artificially project another present to sometime within 2023 without contradiction. Therefore the occurrence of events within that designated "present" are unintelligible, as I explained in a slightly different way, last post.

Which premises? — Luke

How can you assert that you've rebutted my argument when you cannot even state the premises? 1 conscious experience indicates that the present is not a point, it consists of duration. 2. A duration consists of parts which are before and parts which are after. 3. Before and after in relation to the present are past and future. I suggest you reread.

How do they contradict the principle premise? They would need to state that conscious experience occurs in the past and in the future in order to contradict it. To avoid contradiction, we could simply state that conscious experience occurred in the past and will occur in the future. — Luke

Then you are not talking about the present any more, which would be inconsistent with the premise. To avoid contradiction we'd have to say that conscious experience occurred when that time which is now past, was present, to ensure that conscious experience is always at the present.

We don't, not until the end of the story. — Ludwig V

But the whole point was, how do we know that it's the end of the story, rather than just a pause? Even when the story teller makes you think it's "the end of the story", a couple years later there will be another one, which is really a continuation of the old one, and it will turn into a series.

There's another complication here, (which I was about to trip over at the end of my last paragraph. unenlightened's link between narrative and identity focuses on the stories we tell ourselves. — Ludwig V

Yes, unenlightened's self-identity narrative seems to be a sort of self-describing story. Maybe an autobiography?

I don't know how to articulate the next point properly, so I shall ask questions instead. What ensures that there is a single narrative throughout a biological life? What makes it impossible to live more than one narrative at a time? If the answer to those questions is Nothing, and a narrative defines a self, doesn't it follow that multiple narratives and multiple selves are possible? Apart from our legislation, what makes that conclusion paradoxical? — Ludwig V

This is one of the problems I brought up, with associating identity with the narrative. Not only does it make it possible for multiple identities, but the difference between how one describes oneself, and how others do, (which you mentioned), necessitates multiple identities. We might say the the self-describing narrative provides the true identity, but we still get the possibility of intentional deception and multiple identities by accident, or through ignorance of oneself.

To be able to flush out the deceiver as presenting a false identity, or the ignorant identity, we need to be able to look at something beyond the self-describing narrative as the true indicator of identity.

I've already provided you with several rebuttals to your argument. You are welcome to address them. You could start with this: — Luke

I haven't seen a reasonable rebuttal from you yet, only mention of measurement principles, and straw man representations which are irrelevant. You refuse to address the actual argument, just insisting that the conclusion is inconsistent with what you believe about "the present", therefore you claim that the argument cannot be sound and refuse to address it directly..

Your questioning here is more of the same. In essence, you are asking me, how can it be that the present is not as I believe it to be. The answer is simple, your belief is incorrect. And so you will inevitable continue with more of the same sort of so-called rebuttals. Instead of looking at the argument, and understanding it, you will continue to ask "how can it be that the present is ..., when I understand it to be ..."?

s a part of your present conscious experience in the past and part in the future? — Luke

Yes part is in the past and part is in the future.

How can your present conscious experience be in the future or the past? — Luke

Present consciousness is very complex, therefore it consists of parts, many, many events occurring at the same time, as the parts which compose it. And just like any event, some parts are before others. When an event occurs at the present it has a temporal duration and so some parts are in the past (have already occurred), and some are in the future (have not yet occurred). Therefore the "present conscious experience" is both in the future and in the past by virtue of its parts being thus situated temporally.

I know from the way you treated my examples (the present is 2023) that this idea is what you object to. You say that if the event (2023 for example) is "the present" then all of it is at the present, and anything before the entirety of it is past, and anything after the entirety of it is future. This would leave the entirety of that event (2023 in the example) as "the present" with no part inf the future or past.

The problem with that way of looking at it, is that it makes the temporal duration of the event which is "at the present" (2023 in the example) as unintelligible. In reality, if there is an event which occurs at the present, then by the fact that it is an "event" it is logically necessary that it has temporal duration and time passes during the occurrence of that event (2023). Therefore within the event itself, there are before parts and after parts. And it also follows that during the event, the present event (2023), while that event is occurring and time is passing during its occurrence, some of it in the past and some of it in the future. Therefore within the occurrence of the event which is "at the present" (2023 in the example) we can only understand its temporal progression by assuming that part is past and part is future. If we insist that all the event (2023) is present, and there is no past or future, there is no grounds for apprehending any temporal progression within the occurrence of the event. So the temporal dimension of the event is rendered as unintelligible.

Therefore we can conclude with a very high degree of certainty, because the premises are very strong, that within the event which we call "present conscious experience", some parts are in the past and some are in the future.

Wouldn't they just be your past and future conscious experiences? — Luke

Conscious experience occurs in the present. That is the principle premise. Conscious experience in the past, and in the future, contradict this premise. So, we start with that premise, and then position past and future relative to conscious experience. Therefore past and future are apprehended as distinct parts of the conscious experience, at the present, as explained, rather than independent things which conscious experience might be a part of. The latter is incoherent by the terms of the principle premise by way of the contradiction mentioned above. The former is not.

It is defined by our conscious experience and it is the year 2023, or July 2, or whatever. — Luke

Actually, I provided those dates as examples you might be able to relate to. I now see that trying to talk your language was a mistake. Remove the examples, and the argument is logically sound, but it makes no sense to you. This is because you will not allow "present" to be defined by conscious experience. So it appears like my argument makes no sense to you because you insist on an incoherent definition of "present".

The difference is this. You insisted that "present" be defined by past and future. I say that the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present. The reverse of what you desire, and what makes "the present" require the incoherent dimensionless points. This is because present is logically prior to past and future, and human beings determine past and future relative to their existence at the present. They do not determine the present from past and future, like you say.

How can there be a duration without start and end points? If there is a duration of some length, then that length must have end points. — Luke

We went through this already, the duration is indefinite. it is not "a duration of some length", simply duration. It is your tendency to fall back on measurement which makes you insist on points. However, we can and do experience time, and duration without measuring it.

How can the present both be defined by our conscious experience and also be 2023? Is a part of your present conscious experience in the past and part in the future? How can your present conscious experience be in the future or the past? Wouldn't they just be your past and future conscious experiences? Unless you wish to argue that you consciously experience 2023 all at once? — Luke

Sorry for the misleading examples, let's just go back to the argument itself, if you will. I suggest that if you want to understand, release your preconceived notion of "the present", and start with an open mind. Are you willing to start with your conscious experience of being at the present, experiencing the passing of time, without reference to measurement?

The point being that the heavy-hitters in philosophy of maths all decry any form of platonism, on the grounds that it verges on a spooky ability to grasp non-physical truths. — Wayfarer

Perhaps, but those same "heavy-hitters in the philosophy of maths" accept without questioning, the axioms (basic set theory for example), which represent numbers as immutable objects. The philosophy of math is full of hypocrisy.

The second sentence does not follow from the first. What is before the present is called "past" and what is after the present is called "future". Therefore, neither the past nor the future are part of the present. — Luke

"Present" is not defined that way in my argument. It is defined by our conscious experience. So your objection is based in equivocation, and is irrelevant.

Furthermore, it is this definition of "present", which requires a non-dimensional divisor between different parts of time, and this is dealt with in the first part of the argument. So you are really just relying on a definition of "present" which is demonstrated by the first part of the argument as incorrect, unreal, or false.

The present is a duration with start and end points. — Luke

Start and end points are what is demonstrated by the first part of the argument as incorrect, unreal, false. Remember, you wanted to give the "instant" temporal extension, duration, with start and end points. But I explained that the problem is with the assumption of points, so you cannot avoid the problem this way. If you do not understand this, I can probably give you a better explanation.

If 2023 is the present, then the past is everything before 2023 and the future is everything after 2023.
If July 2 is the present, then the past is everything before July 2 and the future is everything after July 2.
If this minute is the present, then the past is everything before this minute and the future is everything after this minute. — Luke

Now you are neglecting the second part of the argument. If the present is a period of time, part of the present is before, and part is after. And in relation to "present" before is past and after is future. Part of 2023 is in the past and part is in the future, despite the fact that 2023 is the present. You can deny this all you want, with your use of imaginary points, but that's just your way of denying the reality of time.

There is no part of the past or the future in the present. — Luke

So says the person with the demonstrably incoherent idea of "present".

Good. Im glad you did not mean before and after the present. Now all that’s left to explain is how your conclusion follows: — Luke

I said, "in relation to the present". The present was already described as the period of time within in which we find our conscious existence. And, it was shown that this is necessarily a period of time, not a dimensionless point. That was the first part of the argument.

Why must part of the present be in the future and part of it in the past? — Luke

I really can't believe that this is so difficult for you. I think you are faking it. Anyway, I'll recap the argument for you in case you might come around. The "present", as described, is a period of time, not a point in time. Any, and every period of time has one part before the other part which is after, as explained. In relation to the present, the before is called "past", and the after is called "future". Therefore when we talk about this period of time which we call "the present", part is in the past and part is in the future.

Perhaps a couple examples will help you to understand. This year, 2023, is the present. Part is in the past, part in the future. Today, July 2, is the present. Part is in the past, part is in the future. This minute is the present. Part is in the past, part in the future. Etc..

Before and after what? — Luke

Before and after each other. That's what I said explicitly "some of that duration must be before, the other part which is after". How could I be more clear? I'll try though. One part of the duration is before the other, which is after the part which is before.

I don't see how the conclusion follows, — Luke

OK, in other words you do not understand the argument. It seems you are having difficulty with "before" and "after". Is my usage unfamiliar to you? Do you understand the following example? "Last night was before this morning, which is after last night. So if the time duration we are talking about consists of last night and this morning, the part which is called last night is before the part which is called this morning, which is after the part called last night.

It was this claim about any proposed period of time being "indefinite" and "imprecise" that I was querying and criticising. As you confirm above, this relates only to measurement. There is nothing indefinite or imprecise about a stipulated measure of time, such as a minute. Your introduction of how to "actually apply measurement principles in practise" are not relevant to your statement that "any proposed period of time is indefinite [and] imprecise". A minute is exactly 60 seconds long - no more, no less. — Luke

I thought it was quite clear that I was talking about the thing measured, the passage of time, hence my statement "time is known as what is passing, and what always has some duration".

This makes little sense to me. The present is neither past nor future. I see no reason to accept why it must "consist" of either past or future. — Luke

If you would like to address the argument, then I'd be happy to oblige you, and reply to any questions you have about it, or explain further any parts which you say that you do not understand. But to simply state that the conclusion makes no sense to you, and claim "I see no reason to accept" that conclusion, (regardless of the argument given), gives me nothing to discuss with you.

Are you saying that (e.g.) a minute is an indefinite period of time? Isn't it exactly 60 seconds?

Or are you saying that any measurement of time is indefinite? — Luke

Both, defining one period of time with another doesn't clarify anything because it would lead to an infinite regress, without ever giving any indication as to how to actually apply those measurement principles in practise. And, in practise any measurement is imprecise due to the problem with the start and end point.

My interest is that I didn't find your argument - that the present moment cannot be an instantaneous point in time - to be very convincing. — Luke

If you are interested in my argument, then address the argument itself, rather than some other vague ideas about measurement problems, which seem to be irrelevant to my argument anyway.

You could make an argument such that if we imagine an instant of time to be like a photograph, and if we consider that the average shutter speed of a typical photograph is 1/60th of a second, then it follows that an actual instant of time requires some duration, no matter how small. — Luke

That's a better question, more directed at the argument itself. What you propose here would not resolve the issue because that 1/60th of a second time period would require a beginning and end point. So defining an "instant" as a specific time length does not remove the need for points to mark the beginning and ending to that time length. Whether the "instant" is defined as the time between the points, or defined as the points, makes no difference to the actual issue which still remains despite such attempts at annihilation by definition.

As (I think) you note, an instantaneous point in time, like a point in space, is a dimensionless concept. However, in reality, if we assume the present to be the time at which we each find ourselves conscious, then a dimensionless point in time with zero duration would seem to be an insufficient "time window" in which to be conscious. A point in time with zero duration is no time at all, and there is nothing to be conscious of in no time at all. Or something like that. — Luke

Right, that was the first part of the argument, arguing that "the present" must consist of duration. And, this is consistent with our sense experience. We sense things as moving, therefore duration is implied within the present of our consciousness. The second part of the argument is that any duration of time consists of a part which is before and a part which is after. In relation to the present, the prior part is past and the posterior part is future, therefore the present must consist of both future and past.


It appears like it is the first part of the argument which you find unconvincing. But then you say "if we assume the present to be the time at which we each find ourselves conscious", this first part would be correct. So how would you propose to define "the present" in any other way? You could define it as the point which divides future from past, but the argument is designed to show that this is an incorrect representation of the present, inconsistent with empirical evidence. There is no such point which separates future from past.

If you mean a period of time, such as a minute or an hour, then I disagree that these are indefinite periods of time. If you mean any measurement of time, then I suppose there might be at least some imprecision involved with any measurement, but I don't see why it matters. — Luke

I didn't say that "it matters", only pointing out the reality and truth of it. It might matter to you, or it might not, depending on your interest. But it seems to me like you are trying to make an argument where none is called for.

But if "an instant" is "not really consistent with reality" as a point in time, then "a minute" is "not really consistent with reality" as a period of time. — Luke

Right, and as I said above, this might matter to you or it might not, depending on your interest.

I can stop smoking and then start again, or I can stop smoking and never start again. what's the problem? — unenlightened

Is there not a difference to you, between stopping and starting again, and stopping and never starting again? The problem is, that when it stops, how can you know whether it will start again or not, in order to say the right thing about it? Someone says "I quit smoking" and two weeks later they're smoking. Another person says "I quit smoking", and five years later they still have yet to smoke. One might be inclined to say that the latter has stopped and will never start again, but then the next day you might find them smoking.

To stop and then start again, and to stop and never start again are two very different things. But when something just stops, how do we know which is which?

A process like identification can begin, and can end, and can begin again. — unenlightened

So maybe I misspoke to ask "can we really say it?", but the question would be "what does it really mean to say this?". If we allow that whatever ended might at any moment begin again, then we need to justify that the thing which just started is that same thing as the thing which already ended, and not simply something similar, if this is supposed to be an "identification". That's where the difference lies, if it starts again, as the same thing, there must be something which connects the two instances or else they are similar occurrences of distinct things, and not the same thing starting again.

If the "thing" in question is a process, we can attribute that process to something else, and the something else can provide the means for the proposed continuity. In your examples therefore, it is you who stops writing and starts again, you who stops smoking, and starts again, and the train which starts and stops. So the subject, you or the train, of which the process is predicated, provides the required continuity of existence. You have provided a subject, and are speaking of your activity, the train's activity, and we assume that you continue being even though the activity which describes you through predication, stops.

This is the way that Aristotle describes the capacities of the soul, self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, intellection, etc., as potentials. Each is an activity, something that the body does, which consists of stops and starts. Since no specific activity is active all the time, he designates these powers of the soul as potentials, requiring actualization for each occurrence, or start-up. There is therefore the need for an actuality which provides the continuity, and is the source of actualization for each start-up, and this is the soul itself.

I have bee quite clear from the beginning that the thread and the topic is all narrative and none other. — unenlightened

The glaring problem in what you have been quite clear from the beginning about, is that you have been incessantly trying to assign identity to the narrative. And this is where the narrative inevitably fails. The stops and starts, punctuation, of the narrative indicates that we must assume something else, behind the narrative to provide for the assumed continuity which makes "the narrative" appear as a coherent whole. This is "the story" which the narrative tells, and the story is distinct from the narrative.

If identity was all in the narrative, then how would I distinguish one subject from another when you write in this thread, or another thread? Instead, I assign identity to the author, and look at any narrative as an activity of the author. This allows me to see unenlightened, with one identity, as the author of many narratives, instead of concluding that unenlightened has many identities, according to the many narratives.

It could be argued that the present time is that time while or during your saying of the word "now", and that (at that time) the past precedes this act and the future procedes it. — Luke

Yes, and that\s what comes later in the post. If activity occurs at the present, then the present must consist of duration, not a point.

Then the same could be said of any period of time - not just an instant - and so all periods of time are "useful ideals" that are not "consistent with reality". — Luke

Yes, exactly. Any proposed period of time is actually indefinite, having an imprecise beginning and ending because of this issue.

we must not use language as it is "not really consistent with reality". — Luke

This does not follow though. As I said, it's a useful ideal. Usefulness is not dependent on accuracy, precision, or even truth in the sense of correspondence.

Can you find any evidence that condemning trespass was ever actually a rule, rather than just an emotional thought produced from the personal feeling of infringement, or violation?

Mostly theists opt for door number 2, and defend revelation as knowledge producing. — Srap Tasmaner

Isn't it obvious to you though, that revelation must produce knowledge? If we were to restrict our definition of "knowledge" so that it only contained ideas produced by science, then how would we account for all the rest of the ideas that we would normally call "knowledge"? This would include the tools applied by science, like the axioms of mathematics.

This is the problem of epistemology, to give an accurate account of what knowledge actually is, rather than some definition, or set of criteria which we believe knowledge ought to be. If we say "knowledge is..." when this reflects what we think knowledge ought to be, rather than what knowledge actually is, this will mislead us in any attempt at ontology.

These two are very different, as demonstrated in Plato's Theaetetus. In that dialogue, they went looking to describe "knowledge", with a preconceived idea of some criteria as to what could constitute "knowledge". Then Socrates demonstrated how it was logically impossible that any description they came up with as to how knowledge actually exists, could not fulfil the preconceived criteria. In the end they realized that the preconceived idea must be misleading them in their quest to figure out what knowledge is.

A bullet at any instant is at some point in space but my perception limits me to perceiving it in some region of space in that I cannot tell exactly where it is. Ontologically, the now may be a point in time even if I perceive it as a small region of time. — Art48

As I explained, the idea of "an instant", as a point in time, is not really consistent with reality as we know it. It's a useful ideal, but not at all real.

Ontologically, the now may be a point in time even if I perceive it as a small region of time. — Art48

Ontological principles need to be supported by something. If no experience, nor logic can demonstrate the reality of a point in time, then there is no room for it in ontology. Since time is known as what is passing, and what always has some duration, then such a proposed point must be something other than time. So we can't really say it's "in time". The point is in our minds, as the useful tool, it's not in time.

Sorry, but misunderstanding on your part does not qualify as non sequitur on my part, as much as you like to think so. But go ahead, and think what you like.

For instance, its contemptibility is the same as it has always been... — Merkwurdichliebe

Why would you say that humanity's contemptibility is the same as it ever was, and then say its stupidity has increased dramatically? Do you not see this as blatant contradiction, or is stupidity not contemptible? If the stupidity you are talking about is an innocent naivety then perhaps the latter would be possible, but you position it in relation to technology.

Here's something to think about. Try to pinpoint the present, the exact point in time, which divides the future from past. Every time you say "now', by the time you say "now" it is in the past. So the present cannot be a point in time which separates past from future, because that point will always be in the past.

Now consider the way you sense things in your existence, or being at the present. We always sense things happening, activity, motions. And all activities and motions require a period of time during which the activity occurs. So if we sense things at the present, and we sense activities, then the present must consist of a duration of time rather than a point in time.

But if the present consists of a duration of time, then some of that duration must be before, the other part which is after. So if the present separates future from past, and it consists of a duration of time, then part of the present must be in the future, and part of it in the past.

We have no knowledge or experience of any immaterial entity of process. — Fooloso4

Speak for yourself here. Your use of "we" is out of place.

Cite an instance when and where Newton's 3rd Law and/or any conservation laws "have been transcended" even once. — 180 Proof

Newton's first law is "transcended" with every freely willed act. A body's motion changes without the application of force. The conservation of energy law is broken with every act which occurs, as some energy goes missing which cannot be accounted for. The idea that the laws of physics are never broken, or "transcended", is naivety at best.

Oh yes, it signifies that we have to change all our taboos if we even question one of them, and I am advocating that. — unenlightened

I think we ought to question all base principles, not only basic taboos, but fundamental axioms of mathematics, foundational laws of physics, and assumptions of biology as well. This gives the skeptic a useful place in our society.

The problem is that the more basic, or foundational, that a principle is, the older it tends to be. But the human world, is a living, changing, and evolving world, as are human beings. And these old principles which were established way back when humanity wasn't the same thing which it is today, really need to be revisited.

When the flow of thought ceases, the conflict of the self that is not itself ends.

And then it starts again... — unenlightened

Very interesting. Can we really say that it ended then? Or is it just always like that, punctuated, with various lengths of punctuation? Punctuation is not an end and a beginning, because something carries through, some kind of continuity, so that we say the parts are connected as one. The narrative is punctuated, but the story continues through the punctuations where the narrative is absent. What part of the story is this, an essential part of the story which connects the parts of the narrative, but not itself part of the narrative? And how is it that the story itself is something other than the narrative?

That is true also, but irrelevant to the effect of the taboo. — unenlightened

Irrelevant to the effect of the taboo, but relevant to the cause of the taboo. So I don't understand the objection you have towards Hanover's statement, why you find it bizarre.

You agree that sensation is stimulus for arousal, and you also recognize that naked skin is often more of a cause for arousal than covered skin in a similar situation. Do you also see why a young man or boy might not like the idea of being aroused in a public place? Sexual arousal might influence one to act in a way which one might regret later, for example. So, doesn't it seem more likely that this would be the cause of existence of the nakedness taboo, the reason for it becoming a taboo, rather than the effect of the taboo?

In one person’s reference frame the event is in the present (or past), and in the other person’s reference frame the event is in the future. I find this peculiar. — Michael

Think of what this means as that "the present", or "now" is defined by the frame of reference. This is a type of subjectivity. The present, and therefore future and past, are defined by the frame of reference. So if we want an "objective" present, or now, or an objective divisor between events of one period of time and those of another another, we have to realize that this is impossible under the precept of special relativity. Such divisions of before and after are arbitrary, as is the frame of reference which defines the divisor.

This becomes problematic when you try to relate the before and after of one frame of reference to that of another. This give the problem you describe. Physics resolve this problem with the creation of a "world line" for the object at question, in this case Andromeda. The world line allows for a "proper time" relative to that object. So once a world line is created for Andromeda we could use that to say which events are before others, for Andromeda itself, despite the differences between different frames of reference. The problem with this is that the world line is somewhat arbitrary.

Thus far I agree, but in general, the way we 'put clothes on' the body or rather socialise a dress code with legal sanctions, does as a matter of fact serve to raise the level of potential arousal. — unenlightened

I think that thus is a misrepresentation of so-called "fact". Your claim that clothing necessarily rases the level, instead of my claim that it may raise or lower the level, cannot be supported simply by examples of when the potential is raised. You need to show the necessity, that clothing cannot have effects in the other direction, to support your generalization that clothing "does as a matter of fact serve to raise the level of potential arousal". But I suggest that you accept as reality, that the effects of clothing can be either negative or positive.

If we look at the sense of touch, instead of the sense of sight, the possible negative effects of clothing on arousal are very evident. Consider Hanover\s example of squeezing into the shower, skin on skin, as compared to squeezing into an elevator, cloths on cloths. It's very evident that cloths can have a very negative effect on the sensual stimulus which provides the potential for arousal.

Altering the sense stimulus is more than just a matter of messing with the taboo, because sense stimulation is essential to sexual acts. So altering the stimulation can alter the nature of the act itself, and this goes beyond any taboo which deals with the perception of the act.

But the relativity of simultaneity isn't just about one person seeing something before another person; it's about that thing actually happening for one person before another person. That's what I find peculiar. — Michael

Before and after are relative to the frame of reference. So if the two persons are of the same frame of reference, then the event will not happen for one person before the other person. And, if they are of different frames of reference it makes no sense to talk about it "happening for one person before another person" because before and after are frame dependent. That is why it is sometimes necessary to use a "world line", or "proper time", to make sense of such an idea.