1. Make a strong fact/value distinction, as per Hume.
2. Establish the scientific method with truth as the only and unquestionable value. — unenlightened

The meaning of some words may change over time, and it could be that we have a shifting in the principal significance of "truth" here. This is indicated by Ciceronianus' quotation:

. "I am the way, the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me." — Ciceronianus

Notice here that "truth" is represented as a way of life, a way of being, instead of as fact . This is the distinction we find today between the two basic definitions of "true". The primary definition today is 'fact, corresponding with reality', while the secondary and sub-definitions are 'genuine, honest, faithful'.

So what is at issue is your primary premise, the "strong fact/value distinction". This distinction drives a wedge between the two definitions of "true" by associating it with "fact", and assuming that facts are independent from values.

We can see the very same issue with the separation between moral "values" and quantitative, or mathematical "values". It is often assumed, or simply taken for granted by people, that mathematical values are completely distinct and unrelated to moral values, instead of being seen as two different members (types) of the same set (category), "values". This way of taking for granted that mathematical values are completely distinct from other values, like moral values, and are somehow objective while other values are subjective, thereby categorically distinct, contributes to this delusional fact/value distinction.

I am very familiar with your sense of better and worse, so a statement of that sort was expected, and taken as a compliment.

Back on the topic of monism - I'm convinced that the original monist systems were derived from 'the unitive vision' in, for example, Plotinus. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think there was a form of Neo-Platonism which denied the reality of matter, making it monist idealism. I don't think Plotinus would quite fit that bill though. But I think monism was prevalent in philosophy before this, Parmenides being monist idealist (all is being), and Heraclitus being monist materialist (all is flux).

.. informed by modern information / computational theory. I stand by my earlier dismissal of Aristotle's cosmological argument as a pedantic aside by you, MU, that misses Fooloso4's conceptually salient forest for your anachronistic trees. — 180 Proof

I think you got lost in mixed metaphors Rig Hand (I hope you don't mind me calling you that). An anachronistic tree cannot be part of the modern day forest. So the fault is really Fooloso4's who tries to fit the anachronistic tree into the modern day forest, and in so doing kills the tree. Regardless of how conceptually salient Fooloso4's forest is, it only consists of pretend trees which are really dead, so it's all imaginary.

Actually, he says "zoon politikon" (political animal), yet given his monumental Organon, Aristotle tends to get tagged with that "rational animal" (which I think actually comes from Plato). Anyway, our uniquely distinguishing feature as a species, I think, is that, despite mostly being delusional, we are collaborative knowledge-producers. — 180 Proof

There's a reason for why the definition is said to be "rational animal" rather than "political animal", and that is because "political" is further broken down by Aristotle, as being a special type of social activity. So it's true that he describes man as a political animal, but "political" is described as a social activity which involves moral reasoning. This is better described in his ethics, and here reasoning or contemplation is described as the highest moral activity. Then in his biology we see that reasoning is described as intellection, which, as a power of the soul is similar to sensation but distinct from sensation because it is not like a sixth sense. And the way that reasoning is done, through the use of immaterial abstractions, is what makes it unique to human beings.

I would argue that there is even a distinction to be made between reasoning and thinking. We see that all other animals think in some way, but as I said in the last post, reasoning is a special type of thinking which uses symbols, like numerals and words. And, the use of symbols in thinking is very different from the use of symbols in communication. This is what Wittgenstein is getting at in his discussion of private language. Under this terminology, reasoning is a private activity, with a private use of symbols, therefore it is based in the private language. This makes moral reasoning very special because it's fundamentally a private use of symbols (reasoning), but it's a private act which has as its intention, or end, a synthesis of the private with the communal.

What we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of the rock, or the screen you're looking at, or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. — Wayfarer

I completely agree with your post, and what you've said, but I would like to add something here. The principal thing which sets us, as human beings, off from other species, in the way that we perceive "the Universe at large", is the use of logic. This is what supports Aristotle's definition of "man" as rational animal. But even the extremely rapid development of the modern logical processes, initiated by Aristotle, has created a sub-variation definable distinction within the species, between ancient "man", and modern day "human being".

Here is my theory on the development of the use of logic in the human mind. The use of logic is a feature of language which is completely distinct from language as used for communication. This is the 'dual personality' of language which Wittgenstein approached with his inquiry into "private language". I like to look at this dual personality as a division between oral language and written language. And, I think the two can be seen historically to have developed initially in separate ways, and separate directions.

Spoken symbols had the use of communication, written symbols had the personal use of being a memory aid. These two evolved initially in separate directions. In ancient times though, it became evident that spoken word could be memorized through the use of verse, and verses were passed down through generations. This was a specific type of communication which required memorizing. At this time, written symbols were already employed personally for memory of things like numbers and maps. Then it became evident that representing spoken words with written symbols, as a memory aid for the verse repetition, was very effective, and this led to the formerly very personal memory device being translatable from one person to another. That combining of spoken and written language produced the explosion of human reasoning power.

I cannot find this post (wherein I "agree"), reply with a link please. — 180 Proof

[ ... ] Wheeler conceived of information, not as non-physical, but as "a fundamental physical entity"!

@Gnomon :point: You also might want to read this to educate yourself as to the diversity of views on the matter of information.

This is nice apt summation:

According to Aristotle biological beings are a single physical entity. There are no separate forms and hyle floating around waiting to be combined. There is not one without the other, substantiated in living physical entities, that is, substances.
— Fooloso4
— Janus
:fire: :100: — 180 Proof

Whether the argument is unsound or not is irrelevant to the point, which is whether Aristotle upheld the notion of independent form. Since Aristotle produced the argument, which was intended to proved the reality of independent form, then I think we ought to respect the fact that he did believe in independent form, and therefore reject Fooloso4's statement as false

When the the cosmological argument supposedly demonstrates the necessity of an independent form, why would you accept Fooloso4's assessment that for Aristotle there are no independent forms?

Are you familiar with Aristotle's cosmological argument?

That makes conventions sound every bit as solid and consistent as any rock or table. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't deny that conventions are solid as rock. But human beings easily break rocks, so the metaphor rings hollow.

You quote Janus on Aristotle simply because it is what you like. I just spent days explaining to Janus how Aristotle demonstrated that it is logically necessary to assume the reality of immaterial form. This is commonly referred to as Aristotle's cosmological argument. But Janus did not listen, and still insists that Aristotle did not talk about separate form, simply because the Foolso4 says what Janus wants to hear. We have a bunch of parrots here in this thread.

It says something about reality as you judge it to be. Other may not judge reality to be as you do, and reality may not be as anyone judges it to be, if we are talking about anything other than what is observable. — Janus

You have this confused. Conclusions drawn from observation are what we most disagree on. That material things have a cause is a conclusion derived from observation, and that is what we seem to disagree on. The disagreement becomes even more evident when we start discussing particular occurrences.

Why must there be a cause of material existence? — Janus

I told you, this is a premise which is necessary in order that material existence may be intelligible.

The point is why could the cause of material existence or the first cause not be physical? — Janus

I answered that in my last post.

"Reality as we know it" is reality according to human thinking, so it is circular to then say that the idea that something might have no cause is not in accordance with reality. — Janus

It is not circular, because the intent is to portray aspects of reality as intelligible, yet not known. If the claim was reality as we know it is all that can be known, this would be circular. Instead, the claim is that reality as we know it indicates that the unknown can be known. And that is not circular.

What we should say is it would not be in accordance with reality as we know, that is reality according to human judgement, to say that an event could have no cause. But saying that tells us nothing other than about the nature of our own thinking. And that also assumes that there is just one version of human judgement on this issue of cause. — Janus

I think you misunderstand Janus.. My understanding of reality is what induces the claim that material things have a cause, and as you say, this statement is reality according to a judgement of mine. However, the judgement concerns reality, it says something about reality, as the subject. It does noy say something about human judgement as the subject. Therefore it really doesn't tell us anything about the nature of our own judgement. It says something about reality, as the subject, and nothing about how that judgement was derived. I really did not explain why "matter" is defined in this way. To say something about one's own thinking requires that the person analyzes and describes how this judgement was derived. But that's not the case here, I am saying something about reality, and if you do not agree that it is true, then so be it, because the concept of "matter" is not explained in a few simple posts.

So there is a piece of a sort of "true by convention" account here. — Srap Tasmaner

But convention does not make truth, it makes "right". It may turn out later that the convention needs to be changed, like in the case of the planet named Pluto.

Now you've granted that nature supports and enables our conceptualizations, and in this case using the word in the normal way is choosing that word instead of "smaller" only if the sun is further from here than the moon. The norm for usage of the word "bigger" requires something like this, else no one could understand and follow the norm. — Srap Tasmaner

The "norm" only requires that we all perceive things in a similar way. This does not imply that we perceive things as they are. We see the sun as rising and setting for example, and years ago the convention was that the sun went around the earth. We all perceived in a similar way, the sun rising and setting, and this convention was supported by that similarity in perception. Then it turned out that the convention needed to be changed. The fact though, is that in that time when convention held that the sun went around the earth every day, this is what was "right", or "correct". And, if someone tried to argue that the earth was actually spinning instead, this person was wrong, or incorrect, as not obeying the convention.

For "bigger" to be meaningful at all, there must be things (I'm speaking loosely and generally here) that are stably different sizes. — Srap Tasmaner

No, that's not true. There is no need for things, that's the point Descartes made. All that is required is that we have similar perceptions, and we identify parts of these similar perceptions as things. And, for "bigger" to be meaningful it is required that there is consistency in the similarity between our perceptions. This allows for what is sometimes called intersubjectivity.

So let's move beyond Descartes form of extreme skepticism, and allow that there is something external, and independent, which is real. We have perceptions, and there is some degree of consistency between us. The consistency reinforces the idea that there is something external, independent, and real. Furthermore, our activities, and interactions demonstrate decisively, that there is something real which separates me from you. Now, we can inquire about "things". What do you suppose separates a thing from its environment, to justify us calling it "a thing", as a unit, an entity, individual, or one, a whole?

If there mist be a first cause, which is by no means established. I see no reason why it could not be a material cause. — Janus

I'm not arguing a "first cause", I am arguing a cause of material existence. This is an actuality which is prior to material existence, as cause of material existence. Since it is prior to material existence it is immaterial.

All material things have a cause. This is essential to the nature of being a material thing. Material things are generated and destroyed, they are contingent. This is simply the defining feature of being composed of matter. So a material thing without a cause (which is what would be required for a material thing to be the first cause), would require changing the definition of "matter". But then we would just be within a different conceptual structure from the Aristotelian hylomorphism. If that's what you want, go right ahead, but how would you propose to define "matter"?

Either way, there is no guarantee that reality must operate in accordance with human reasoning. — Janus

This is not the issue. The issue is to conform human reasoning to be consistent with reality. If we assume something uncaused, like your proposed material first cause, then this thing is designated as unintelligible to us. A significant part of understanding things is learning the cause of them. So when we stipulate that a certain thing is uncaused (like spontaneous generation for example) we are designating that thing as unintelligible in that respect.

What we have here is a case of human reason not operating in accordance with reality. Reality, as we know it, is that all things have a cause (principle of sufficient reason). So when we allow ourselves to say that such and such a thing has no cause, we are really allowing our reasoning to be not in accordance with reality, by accepting this premise. So to conform our reasoning to be in accordance with reality to the maximum extent that we know reality, we must deny this premise of an uncaused material cause.

Nature supports making this distinction, enables it. — Srap Tasmaner

I never intended to argue against nature providing support for our conceptualizations. The point was that distance is not the type of thing which has independent existence. In fact, in the discussion on distance I said there are two aspects to distance.

The assumed "distance" is really as much a feature of the measurement as it is a feature of the reality or "itself" of the thing measured. Therefore the assumption that there is a distance "itself" is a false assumption, because "distance" requires an interaction between the "itself" and the subject's measurement.. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, unlike jorndoe who seems to think that "distance" refers to some independent thing, I would say that the word "distance" refers to a specific type of interaction which we have with whatever it that is independent. So there is no real truth or falsity (in the sense of correspondence) with respect to distance, only conventional ways of acting and speaking, norms.

(1) Measurements that have not been done have not been done.
(2) Distances are created not discovered.

Certainly yes, if you start from (2), you can derive (1). But (1) is a tautology, so you can get it from anything.

The question is whether the truism (1) provides any support for (2). — Srap Tasmaner

Right, (2) is an ontological principle while (1) is epistemological. (2) is not derived from (1), and you might question whether (1) provides "any" support for (2).

This is an actual argument for your position, so you need to spell it out. How do various techniques for determining a distance differ, what principles are involved, and how are they valid with respect only to their own principles not each other?

Looking back, I see that you take this variation as evidence: — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, it was jorndoe who provided the evidence of variation, so it is better to ask jorndoe about that.

The other side would like various techniques to give the same answer, or, in the case of estimates, roughly the same answer -- which means: the same, but only to a certain degree. — Srap Tasmaner

This is a faulty principle in ontology. Differing by degree implies "similar" means at least two, or a multitude, with differences. And this is completely different from "same", which means one thing, by the law of identity. "Similar" and "same" have very distinct meaning in ontology, and this is a distinction which needs to be respected for adequate understanding.

(Funny, Wayfarer used to make exactly the opposite argument, that because the content of a statement can be translated from one language to another -- as we might convert from imperial to metric, say -- this content must be somehow transcendent or whatever.) — Srap Tasmaner

I think Wayfarer and I disagree on this matter. I do not believe in Platonism in the sense of a transcendent realm of "numbers". I think that since the numeral "2" for example, has a different meaning in different contexts, and different interpretation by different people sometimes within the same context, we cannot say that there is one thing, an object which is the number two symbolized by the numeral. And this is how all concepts and ideas are, the symbols which represent them have different meaning in different contexts, so "a concept" is actually flexible in that sense.

Some argue that this is a difference which does not make a difference, but I argue that in ontology that would be contradiction. That this difference does not make a difference, may be the case in some pragmatic epistemologies, but since the person notices it as a difference, it cannot be truthfully held that the difference doesn't make a difference. The fact that the person notices the difference implies that it already has made a difference.

And, as explained above, it is a very important difference ontologically because it is the difference between two different objects which are similar, and one object which is the same as itself, by the law of identity. So to say that two distinct objects are similar enough, that we can call them the same, instead of similar, is to introduce a meaning of "same" which is inconsistent with the law of identity, thereby creating ambiguity in that word, and the opportunity for equivocation.

The law of identity is the means by which Aristotle separated true "objects", having a material existence, complete with accidentals which inhere within, from the supposed "intelligible objects" which are abstractions that exclude accidentals. The abstraction, as a supposed object has no true identity as "an object", by the law of identity.

There is something to get wrong. — jorndoe

As I said, wrong is a matter of convention. So long as there is a convention which constitutes "right", then being inconsistent with this is to get it wrong. That there is right and wrong has nothing to do with whether or not there is actually an independent "thing" called "the distance", which is being measured. That there is a "right", and consequently multiple possibilities of wrongness, only implies that there is an accepted convention. In the case of something like moral principles, there is inconsistencies between various conventions, therefore a number of incompatible "rightnesses". I think you'll also find this in high level mathematics where one can choose from competing axioms, incompatible rightnesses depending on the axiomatic system chosen.

Is this another way of saying that it's not measured until it's measured? — Srap Tasmaner

Essentially yes, I am saying that it's not measured until it's measured. But the important thing is the meaning here, and the implication it has on those who believe otherwise. "Distance" is relative, and therefore a value which must be determined through the application of principles, implying measurement. So it is impossible that "the distance" between here and there has any existence prior to being measured.

With respect to the distance "itself", as it were, it is indeterminate before measurement; with respect to those who will measure, but haven't yet, there is an assumption that the distance is measurable, that it can be determined. Is this a way of saying that scientists, unless they are foolish indeed, ought to agree that values they have not determined are values they have not yet determined? Or is there more to this assumption? — Srap Tasmaner

The assumption that there is an existential distance which can be measured is the false and misleading assumption. The better assumption would be that the distance is produced, or created by the measurement. The truth of this is demonstrated by the fact that different measuring techniques will produce a different measurement (as indicated by jorndoe's post), and each will be a valid measurement by the principles of the technique. The assumed "distance" is really as much a feature of the measurement as it is a feature of the reality or "itself" of the thing measured. Therefore the assumption that there is a distance "itself" is a false assumption, because "distance" requires an interaction between the "itself" and the subject's measurement..

So, it is more than just a matter of what you say here, that "values they have not determined are values they have not yet determined", it is a matter of a faulty way of looking at values. A "value" is something subjective, its existence is dependent on a subject, or a multitude of subjects in the case of intersubjectivity. To assume that the value "itself" exists prior to being determined by the subject, and is "discovered by measurement" (as in jorndoe's expression "Whatever distance is discovered, not invented, and not existentially dependent on whatever human discoverers' heads.") is a faulty misleading assumption. And, that this assumption is misleading becomes very evident in quantum physics.

If by "distance" you mean a value, the result of a measurement, indeed it won't exist until it exists. Or do you mean that the spatial separation of the earth from the moon doesn't exist until someone thinks it does? Something must underwrite the assumption that "it" can be measured; its existence of that "it" to be measured would do nicely. — Srap Tasmaner

This just brings the problem to a deeper level. Since it is true that the value, which comprises "the distance" is subjective, and it's existence is dependent on the subject, then we must further consider the supposed real thing, the "itself" which is supposedly represented by that term "distance". This you call "spatial separation". Now, what was previously a simple problem of the reality of measurement becomes a very complex problem. "Space" is conceptual, and it is a concept we use to represent separation between individual objects, as well as the extension of objects in volume, along with the changes and movements of objects. All of these are relative, and turn out to be subjective values just like "distance". And so the existence of individual objects, and the separation between these, and all those related concepts are equally dependent on the subject, as that which produces the separation in conception.

Furthermore, the way that "an object" is determined by the subject, as "one", is the foundation for quantitative values, which accordingly are subjective. Now, to produce objectivity in quantitative values we must proceed even deeper, so we look to order instead of quantity to ground the numbers. But the problem just gets more difficult.

then how come we sometimes get it wrong? We can get estimates wrong. (Some more than others.) Doesn't make sense for inventions. That's the direction of existential dependency. — jorndoe

"Wrong" is a matter of being outside the boundaries of convention. Conventions are subjective in the sense of intersubjective.

If the material forms are evolving, then how do the "immaterial forms" evolve prior to them in order to give rise to the former's evolution, and why would there not be the same problem of infinite regress with the latter (assuming for the sake of the argument that the idea of "immaterial forms" makes sense)? — Janus

The infinite regress is the result of the materialist/monist perspective which requires that a material form is always the cause of another material form. This produces the endless chain of causation commonly understood as the problem with determinism. By introducing the immaterial cause, the endless chain is broken because this cause is of a distinct type, category, or substance, as implied by "substance dualism". With this principle we can say that it is not necessary that there is a material object which is prior, as cause, of every material object. We thereby allow for real true causation of what would appear from the materialist/monist perspective as the spontaneous generation of a material object. From the materialist/monist perspective this would be nothing other than magic (or a highly improbable symmetry breaking, or random fluctuation), but from the dualist perspective there is a true cause, the immaterial cause.

The question of "how" this occurs is unanswerable because of the current deficiencies of human knowledge. But understanding reality in this way provides us with the direction we must take if we want to expand our knowledge so as to be able to answer this question. From this perspective it becomes very clear that our understanding of time is inadequate. We base our measurements of the passing of time on observed changes to material forms. This limits or restricts our measurements and applications to that theatre, changing material forms. But if we allow the reality of changing immaterial forms, and the possibility that immaterial forms can change without necessarily resulting in any change to any material forms (a true proposition by thinking without acting), then we must conclude that time may pass without any change to material forms. This truth will open our minds to the reality of periods of time which are shorter than physically possible (when "physically" is restricted by observed changes to material forms).

It's not an infinite regress of fixed forms, but rather an evolution of forms. — Janus

Sure the form is not fixed. The point is that the form comes from a prior form. And if each is a material form, then there is an infinite regress of material forms. This causes the problem of improbability. The improbability of infinite regress is resolved by removing the requirement of matter. Then we have immaterial forms as prior to material forms. This solves the improbability problem that the "evolution of forms" otherwise leads to when adhering to the requirement that a form is material.

But the issue is, that the form is always "somewhere else", prior to being in the material object which bears it. So if we postulate a chain of material objects of prior existence of the form (an acorn before the prior tree, and a tree before that acorn), we have an infinite regress. The infinite regress runs into the problem I explained, of extremely high (approaching infinite) improbability. So if we allow a first material object, the prior "somewhere else" must be a non-material existence (transcendent realm?).

Distance to the Moon doesn't begin to exist because someone makes an estimate, rather it can be estimated because it exists. — jorndoe

So you say, but where are the premises which prove this?

The distance between here and the moon is indeterminate until it's measured. This means that there is no fixed value. The variance in the numbers you gave are evidence of this. And that there is such a thing as "the distance", is just an assumption prior to the measurement. This assumption motivates the measurement, and the measurement produces the value. But this does not imply that the value existed before the measurement. Prior to measurement there was just an assumption.

This is really no different from the issue of uncertainty in quantum physics. That the particle has a position prior to being located is just an assumption. This inspires the act of measurement which fixes the position. But the fact that the measurement fixes the particle's position, does not imply that the particle had a position prior to being measured. Likewise, if the measurement of the distance between here and the moon fixes the distance, this does not imply that the distance existed before the act of measurement.

When I said that I don't buy the idea that the form of the oak in the acorn comes from somewhere else I wasn't referring to previous oaks; in fact, I explicitly said so. — Janus

Well, then what did you mean when you said you don't buy that idea. Obviously you accept as a reality, that the form comes from somewhere else, prior to the acorn, so why did you say that you don't buy that idea?

Since the form obviously comes from "somewhere else", then this is the reality that we need to understand, rather than to try and argue that the form's origin is that it is intrinsic to the acorn. In reality, the acorn is created as a purveyor of the form, which comes from somewhere else.

I think some formulation of Aristotelian matter-form dualism might be quite in keeping with anything that science turns up. — Wayfarer

The reality of the matter is that modern science is based in Aristotelian principles. While it's true that his physics and biology were superseded long ago, his logic and categories formed the basis for scholarly study throughout the formative period of early modern science.

Whatever distance is discovered, not invented, and not existentially dependent on whatever human discoverers' heads. :shrug: — jorndoe

You seem to be wrong here jorndoe. Miles, km, etc., all those terms you used to express the distance refer to something invented, not discovered. It seems you have this backward, distance is invented not discovered.

I would say the form of the oak is inherent within, immanent to, the acorn, and I think Aristotle thought the same. — Janus

What Aristotle shows is that there necessarily is a form (actuality) which is prior to the potential (matter) of the acorn. This would be the prior oak tree. The prior oak tree puts the form into the acorn, and the existence of the acorn, as the potential for another tree is dependent on the existence of that prior form, the tree, as cause, just like art is dependent on the artist who puts the form into the piece of art.

This would be similar to the which came first, chicken or egg question. When it is put in terms of "actual" (form) and "potential" (matter), Aristotle shows why potential is always dependent on a prior actuality, so actuality is necessarily first. This is known as the cosmological argument, and the Christian theologists have adopted this necessary, prior actuality, as God.

The ensuing issue which is evident, is that from the materialist/physicalist perspective, we look at the temporal existence of physical objects, and we realize that in every case the potential for the object precedes the actual material existence of the object. The simplistic, monist, inclination tends toward the conclusion that potential is prior to actual, because of this materialist/physicalist perspective which inclines us to think in this way. Furthermore, our conceptions of time tend to bind time with physical/material actuality. This allows the materialist/physicalist to simply assume an unintelligible origin to material existence, as the potential for actual material existence is represented as prior to time.

The problem with this materialist/physicalist, monist, perspective which Aristotle demonstrates, is an issue with the nature of "potential". Potential provides the possibility to be actualized in a number of different ways. Not any single, specific actuality is necessitated by a condition of potential. But since there is in reality, one specific and particular actuality which proceeds (we might say emerges) from any condition of potential, we need to assume a cause of that particular actuality. There is a reason (cause) of why one particular actuality is derived from any condition of potential, rather than some other particular actuality. This is known as the contingency of material/physical existence. "Contingent existence" means that the particular material object which exists was necessitated by a cause. It is contingent on a cause. This cause is the necessary actuality, and the need to assume such an actuality negates the possibility of potential being prior to actual, in an absolute sense.

ou seem to be claiming it is something "abstract" that comes from "somewhere else". I don't believe Aristotle would agree with this (although Plato might, depending on how you interpret him). — Janus

What I am claiming, is what Aristotle actually painstakingly demonstrates. The prior actuality, which comes from "somewhere else", is not properly represented by spatial terms. In his "On the Soul" the soul is described as that prior actuality. And, he makes an effort to show that it is a mistake to represent this immaterial existence in spatial terms. In his "Metaphysics" he demonstrates why it is necessary to assume an actuality (Form) which is prior to all material existence (cosmological argument).

Today we know about something Aristotle didn't: DNA. So, the form of the oak is encoded within the DNA in the acorn. But that DNA comes from previous oaks, and there is no reason to think the DNA itself has not changed, evolved, over time from ancestor trees, precursors to the oaks and other types of trees that evolved along different lines.. — Janus

Don't you think that the presence of DNA requires a cause? If "DNA" represents the potential for a living body, and DNA exists as an actual material form (itself a material object), wouldn't you think that it's reasonable to believe that there is a specific cause of this particular and unique material object?

Suppose that prior to the existence of DNA there is some sort of "matter" which would serve as the potential for DNA. This matter would have to have a particular form to serve as that potential. Then we would have to assume another potential as prior to that form. As we proceed in this way, to avoid infinite regress, and also to properly represent the reality of the situation, the "potential" involved becomes more and more general, providing a wider range of possibility. So each time we step backward in time, toward the original material condition of possibility, the range of possibility gets greater, approaching infinity as the limit, in the manner of calculus. Consequently, the materialist perspective is to assume an original infinite potential (in Aristotelian terms, prime matter).

The cosmological argument shows the deficiency of this perspective. What happens, is that when we look backward in this way, toward the wider and wider range of possibility, the cause which 'chooses' to actualize this particular actuality rather than some other, becomes more and more important, as providing significant and very important direction. So the actuality which corresponds with this proposed possibility becomes more and more significant, in the sense of important or meaningful. In the case of your example, DNA, you can see that the actuality which 'chose' to create DNA, and not something random, is extremely significant. As we approach the limit, the proposed infinite potential, the magnitude of potential (number of possibilities) would get so high, and coincident to that (to provide the reality of that very high degree of possibility), the level of actuality must be conceived of as extremely low. However, the first step, of that actualizing cause, to go in the required direction, is at a correspondingly high (approaching infinite) level of importance, and this is not provided for by that extremely low level of actuality, logically necessitated by the high magnitude of possibility.. So the idea of that extremely important actualizing first cause, coming from that very low degree of actuality provided by the almost infinite potential, becomes just as highly (approaching infinity) improbable.

I accept the other sense, but all I am asking for is textual evidence for the above sense as being more, something ontologically fundamental and at the same time "abstract" according to Aristotle, than merely the commonsensically obvious fact that every particular form or pattern can be reproduced, copied or visualized. — Janus

I told you, Metaphysics Bk 7, Ch 7. I even gave a brief quote. The form of the artificial thing comes from within the artist. This is not a reproduction or copy, it is 'the design'. In this section, Aristotle compares the coming-into-being of artificial things with the coming-into-being of natural things. This form of the thing, what the thing will be when it comes into existence, is prior in time to the thing, it is not derivative.

He has at this point, already demonstrated that the form of a material thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of the thing, as the cause of the thing being what it is, and not something else (necessitated by the law of identity). So he proceeds to inquire 'where' the form comes from. In articles of art, the form comes from the soul of the artist, but in natural things the question is much more difficult. The acorn provides an example. I discussed this section with @Dfpolis extensively in the past. Df insisted, at that time, that the form is intrinsic to, or inherent within the matter, I think that Aristotle demonstrated a similarity between natural things and artificial things, showing that the form comes from somewhere other than the matter, like the soul of the artist.

Not capable of initiating anything. — Wayfarer

The source of activity in "actual existence" is a deep ontological question. We can get a glimpse of it through introspection, and understanding the will, or what is describing as "blind striving". But Janus' account is a little off the mark, because this "will" can never be truly blind because it would then just be a cause of action which would be completely random, and unintelligible in an absolute sense. What we do find (or I find) through introspection is that the inclinations of the will are not totally accessible to the conscious mind. This is what gives the will the appearance of being "blind", and these origins of activity as being somewhat unintelligible. We are driven by many features from the subconscious (or unconscious) level of our physical living bodies, and the conscious mind does not have access to that source of activity.

Likewise, when we look externally with our senses we observe the activity of things, and our sensations do not have access to the true cause of these activities. This leaves the cause, or origin of activity as completely out of reach of empirical science. The application of numbers leaves us baffled because we allow "infinite" to be incorporated into the axioms and this implies no end (or beginning), leaving the origins as necessarily unintelligible.

So, we have two approaches toward the origin (cause) of activity, inward and outward, and neither one provides us with what we need to be able to understand it. Furthermore, the approach provided by looking inward, toward the will, becomes completely incompatible with the approach of empirical sciences which is looking outward with the senses, as we delve deeper and deeper. What this suggests to me is that we do not have an adequate understanding of the relationship between space and time.

Conventional representations of space do not provide the means for distinguishing the outward direction from the inward direction. We make a three dimensional object, like a sphere, and we model motion in space, relative to that proposed object, as the same, whether the motion is inside or outside this object. If the object is imaginary, fictional, just a plotting of points, like a reference frame, there is nothing real to substantiate a difference between inside and outside of the object. But when we take a real object, with molecular structure, there is a real, substantial difference between inside and outside due to the existence of mass, and the known forces which are associated with it. However, we (physicists), with our advanced principles, still represent forces in the Newtonian way of two massive objects having an effect on each other from the outside inward, a "collision". So for example, physicists cannot model the interaction of two objects as there being an intrinsic source of activity within each object, and these two internally sourced activities interacting, with each other, because they do not have an adequate spatial-temporal representation to allow for internally sourced activities. Activity coming from inside appears counterintuitive to the materialist perspective because it does not conform to a three dimensional model of space, so it must come from "nowhere", or just spontaneously (magically) appear at a random point in space.

I'll take that as an admission that you cannot cite anything which supports the claim that form is first and foremost abstract or "immaterial". — Janus

As I said, in Aristotle there are two senses of "form".

There are two senses of "form" in Aristotle, one is the formula, abstract pattern or design, the other is the form of the individual, particular object, as united with the matter in hylomorphism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Someone might say one or the other is "first and foremost" but what would one base that judgement on?

I agree(?) that the way our perceptual systems are apt to chunk stuff, and even sequences of events, into things tends to lead to misconceptions, but in many cases I would be more inclined to call 'things' being discussed "simplistic but epistemically pragmatic abstractions" rather than fictions. — wonderer1

The issue I tried to point to was the difference between an object and a property. We tend to differentiate between a thing and a property of the thing. So for example, the colour red is a property. If we make "red" itself into an object (an intelligible object), what I called an imaginary or fictional object, then we ought to recognized the difference between this type of object, and the thing which we say is red.


The importance of individuation, and how we individuate, is I think key to understanding the so-called wave function collapse of quantum physics. We approach the microscopic from a perspective derived from our experience with the macro. From the macro scale, we understand the continuity of physical existence through principles of mass and inertia, these are the properties of assumed "objects". So these concepts, "object", "mass", "inertia", are all tied together under our experience of temporal continuity, and they form the grounding or substance for "continuity".

But when the physicists go to the micro scale, the principles for temporal continuity are based in energy rather than mass, and there are conversion principles. The temporal continuity is then expressed as a wave function. However, to take a measurement of that continuous existence of energy, which is expressed as the wave function, we employ the principles of mass and inertia, meaning that the energy must be converted through the principles, to be represented as a thing, a particle. We could call it a sort of interaction problem. There is an immaterial realm of wave existence, grasped only by the mind. And, there is also the material objects which we have come to know through our senses which we have become very familiar with. There is a certain incommensurability, as the principles do not quite jive. I would say that we ought to take heed of our past experience, and recognize that we need to be vey skeptical of knowledge derived from sensation.

I think the central issue here is in how we separate objects from their environment. Understanding things as existing separate from their surroundings is what seems to support the idea of "an object". Some things appear to be naturally distinct, and we can just pick them up and move them around, like a rock, a stick, etc., and some things even move around by other forces, like leaves in the breeze. This freedom to move around seems to support the designation of "object".

Then there are also natural things which are more difficult to separate out and move around, like minerals, copper, gold, lead, etc.. These seem to adhere within natural objects, yet we can separate them out, and give them objective existence on their own, as a separate object made of a particular element, or mineral. Bu now the description changes slightly, as the object is said to be "made of" that mineral

Both of these instances of providing for real objects, with independent existence, consist of a process of dividing our surroundings, the environment, to create the reality of objects through this act of division. This division has two aspects, theory and practise, and the two are consistent and compatible in the proper method of science.

Beyond this, there are properties, attributes, which do not seem to be able to be separated in this way. These are what are proper to sensation, taste, smell, colour, etc.. We can say a lot about these properties, even distinguish them from each other as types, but we cannot properly separate them in the environment, and move them around as objects. So these we do not assign full objective existence to. These properties, if we talk about them as objects, are better classified as imaginary, fictional objects, because we cannot seem to be able to give them proper independent existence in practise.

As I said, I don't see much point in quoting passages. Read carefully Metaphysics Bk 7, though, that might help you. You ought to find that in Ch 7 he specifically focuses on things which come to be by design. He compares and discusses the similarities between things which are produced by art, and things produced by nature: "...but from art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul of the artist." 1031a, 34.

Can you cite a passage from Aristotle where he speaks about abstract pattern or design? — Janus

If you won't take my word for it, I think it's best if you do your own reading. Otherwise I might just use Fooloso4's technique of taking quotes out of context, and giving inappropriate meaning to those quotes.

I suggest you start with his Physics to get a good preliminary and basic understanding, where form is said to be the formula, statement of essence, or definition. Then in On the Soul he describes the two distinct types of actuality, or form. To understand how form is the design of a thing, read Metaphysics Bk 7 very carefully. Happy reading!

:down:

Not really. Having extension in space is that by which objects are sensed and represented intuitively as phenomena. Objects represented conceptually is that by which they are thought. Technically, albeit theory-specific, re: intrinsic human cognitive duality, having successions in time is how we represent objects conceptually, space not being a condition for conceptual representation. — Mww

But space is conceptual. We do not sense space we think it. It might be the way that we make sense of, or understand our sensations as sensations of objects with spatial extension, and space between them, but space really is not part of the sensation.

I believe the issue here is the nature of objects. It may be the case that space is required for the conception of "objects", as a principle of individuation, which is necessary to separate one object from another, but we do not actually sense objects. Objects as well as space are conceptual. We do not sense anything which is object, like we do sense taste, smell, colour, sound, etc., Object is something created by the mind, conceptually, and so is space.

So I think it is only from this misunderstanding, the idea that we sense objects, that the idea that space is required for sensation is derived. So all these ideas, "object|", extension", and "space", are all conceptual, and not at all sensed, because none of them is proper to any particular sense, they are proper to the mind, as apprehended by the mind rather than the senses.

Distance between Moon and Earth is in our heads...? :chin: — jorndoe

If you know the distance between here and earth, it's in your head. I don't, so it's not in my head. Of course distance is something in human heads, it's a value, something measured. There is no value without the measurement.

Now here's an example of misusing Aristotle: for him form is not "abstract pattern or design" but the substantial actualization of potential (matter) as evidenced by your own footnote: — Janus

There are two senses of "form" in Aristotle, one is the formula, abstract pattern or design, the other is the form of the individual, particular object, as united with the matter in hylomorphism.

For example, the excerpt below*1 indicates that the term Form was indeed equated with recognizable Patterns, "in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle". Moreover, there are accidental patterns (noise) and intentional or designed patterns (signal). And that distinction does make a difference in philosophical exchanges. — Gnomon

I would say that this is essentially correct. The abstraction, or "pattern" referred to here is "the form" in the sense of the formula, but the accidentals are proper to the form of the individual, and therefore not included in the abstracted form. This is the independent form, the form of the particular.

Form, In the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle the active, determining principle of a thing. — Gnomon

This is the important point, form is what is active or actual. So there are two sources of activity for Aristotle, and this completes Plato's resolution to the supposed "interaction problem" of dualism, making dualism much more sound. One source of actuality, or causation is found within the mind, as the source of intentional acts (final cause), and the other source is found within the external world as the independent forms of material objects.

I agree Aristotle makes a distinction between potential and actual. but I don't read him as thinking of potential as 'Insubstantial form" but as "primary matter" which I take to mean formless matter. We were not discussing Plato, but again I don't understand Plato's forms to be "abstract patterns" but rather understood to be things more real than actual forms. — Janus

Aristotle discusses the possibility of prime matter, as pure potential, but refutes this possibility as actually impossible, with the cosmological argument. This argument shows that if there ever was a time when there was matter and no form (prime matter), there would always be matter with no form, eternally, because prime matter could not actualize itself. But what we find in reality, is that there truly is form, actuality. Therefore it is impossible that there ever was matter without any form, prime matter.

That it would be, to summarize, a category error to class the in-itself as either physical or mental entails, I think, that we have good reason to eschew any form of ontological dualism. So, I see monism, the idea that there are not ontologically different categories of being or substance, as the most rational conclusion to hold to. — Janus

So you describe two distinct categories, the physical/mental and the independent, then you conclude monism. That doesn't make any sense. How can you claim these two distinct categories, and the ensuing category mistakes you refer to, then conclude no ontologically different categories (monism)?

Agreed, but with respect to the case at hand, the form of the perceived, but as yet undetermined, object, is not the same as the shape of it, which is its extension in space and belongs to the object alone. — Mww

As having "extension in space" is simply how we represent objects, conceptually. "Space" is conceptual, or intuitive, as a tool of representation, it really has no place outside of the mind. What is out there, is surely not "space" as we conceive of "space". So unless we say that the object only exists within the mind, like space only exists within the mind, then we cannot truthfully sat that "space belongs to the object".

You still don't understand the difference between a neutral thing and how a neutral thing can generate bad outcomes in specific circumstances. Even when I try to explain it like if I did so to a child, you still just continue your confirmation bias on this topic.. — Christoffer

Right, I still do not understand, because as I've told you, your attempts to explain are incoherent. Unlike a child though, I am quite able to demonstrate the incoherency of those attempts.

Now, I've laid out very clearly the ambiguity of your use of "neutral", and the resulting equivocation in your attempts to explain your usage. This equivocation is what allows you to persist in pretending that what you say makes sense.

The rock falling is neutral, the rock falling ON YOU is the specific case in which it is bad FOR YOU. — Christoffer

Obviously, if you judge the rock falling on you as bad for you, then you cannot without contradiction judge the rock falling as neutral. You have judged it as bad for you. I mean come on Christoffer, get over this bullshit contradiction and get on with something reasonable.

I made a proposal last post to resolve the ambiguity in your use of "neutral" so that you can rid yourself of the consequential fallacious equivocation. Are you prepared to narrow your use of "neutral"? Does neutral mean that the subject which "neutral" is predicated of, is neither good nor bad, or does it mean that the subject might be either good or bad depending on the circumstantial specifics?

By this passage here, you appear to choose the latter, the rock falling is either good or bad, depending on the specific case. Do you agree, and accept this as your choice for use of "neutral". This would mean that the same bias might be good in some situations, like helpful in rapid decision making, but it might be bad in the case of critical thinking. Do you agree with this? And do you also agree that the same bias might be bad for one person, yet good for another person, like the rock falling on your head is bad for you, but good for your enemy?

This is about the difference between human arbitrary values and non-human values of something. — Christoffer

"Non-human values"? What are you talking about? "Value" is the worth, or desirability of something. By "non-human values" are you referring to the desirability of something to another type of animal, or to God or something like that?

A rock falling ON YOU, means that your well-being, your emotions, and your entity as a human being has become part of an event and IN THIS CONTEXT, the rock falling on you is "bad" for you because the arbitrary value is applicable for the human involved. — Christoffer

You are not making any sense Christoffer. What is your proposed difference between "human arbitrary values", and "the arbitrary value is applicable for the human"? First you say that the falling rock has no human arbitrary value. Then you say that it does have arbitrary value in relation to the human involved. What I see is that you are saying it does not have arbitrary value, yet it does have arbitrary value. That is contradiction.

Please address the issue of my last post Christoffer, and answer my question so we can rid ourselves of the ambiguity in relation to the word "neutral". If you do not, I will assume that your refusal to address this matter of ambiguity is an indication that equivocation is your intent.

...but shape is intrinsic to stones and the COVID virus and countless other things. — Fooloso4

"Shape", or as having a "shape", or being "shaped", is how we represent things. The "shape", in appearance, as an image, or phenomenon, is itself a representation, a sense representation. The shape, or sense representation is then further understood by the mind through the application of geometrical figures.

Obviously, the supposed independent object is nothing like the representation or "shape" of the sense image, as high powered microscopes have revealed to us. And so, we have the obvious further problem of what is the real "shape" of the object. Is it the shape derived from the image of directly seeing? Is it the shape seen under a high powered microscope? Or is it a indescribable shape like quantum physics shows us?

So, we have all sorts of different "shapes" to choose from, for description of the very same supposed independent object, depending on one\s spatial-temporal perspective. Since all these various shapes are valid, right down to and including the non-descript shape of quantum physics, we ought to conclude that there is really no specifiable "shape" which is intrinsic to the proposed independent object.

By Aristotle's law of identity the "form" that the thing has, which is proper to the the thing itself, as its true identity, is separate and distinct from the "form" which we assign to the thing. The form we assign to the thing is its "shape", which is supported by geometric figures. The form which the thing really has, as its true identity, proper and unique to itself only, is a type of actuality which we cannot apprehend through sensation and spatial "shapes".