Like….the only possible analysis of the one reduces to the other? If I made such a preposterous deduction, I would not be so inclined to admit to having a degree in philosophy. — Mww

You actually made an even more preposterous reduction Mww. I explained very clearly why there must be some form of "judgement" inherent within sensibility, and you then reduced this "judgement" to a faculty of "thinking", deducing that only an act of thinking could produce a "judgement".

Surely you must understand that subconscious mental activity is just as much a part of the human psyche as conscious mental activity. Why not acknowledge that this subconscious activity involves some form of "judgement" just like conscious mental activity involves judgement?

Or, we could have it your way, and insist that "judgement' implies "thinking", so that we would have 'conscious thinking' and 'subconscious thinking'. But 'subconscious thinking' really doesn't make sense because thinking is considered to be the act of the conscious mind. And that\s why you were right to suggest that we should have it my way. And in saying that, you are just as right as I am.

I think MU needs a "reality check". — Janus

That's rich, coming from the person who insists on something called "shared experience". And when asked to explain how this makes sense, you refer to a shared plate of food as an example. Reality check: a plate of food is not at all the same type of thing as experience.

If you would have explained how we share our experiences through language and communication, I would have accepted this as a valid justification of "shared experience". Instead, you wanted to pose "shared experience" as a necessary requirement for language and communication, instead of accepting the reality that language and communication are a necessary requirement for "shared experience".



I've been arguing honestly, but you and I are speaking in completely different ways. That is the honest truth, and it's been obvious since the beginning of this exchange, when you asserted that there is no such thing as a specific scientific method, and insisted that there is a specific method which constitutes the philosophical method. We obviously have contrary opinions as to what constitutes "science" and "philosophy". Whether the ideas you express are what you honestly believe, or not, doesn't really concern me, I simply recognize them as fiction.

This is tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks, from which follows that given that understanding is the faculty of thought, there are now two thinking faculties in the same system. What a mess that would turn out to be. — Mww

Yes, and what a mess the human being is. We're torn apart by the difference between rational thought and bodily desires, such that we are sometimes overwhelmed by emotional feelings, anxiety and stress. Plato found many examples, (of what you crudely express as "two thinking faculties in the same system"), such as the thirsty man who knows that the available water is not potable. This man is torn by the two "faculties" in the same system. Therefore the evidence supports what I said, two distinct sources of "judgement" inclining us toward contrary actions.

You tell me. Something tastes good, turns out to make you sick, so……what, it really didn’t taste good?

Have it your way. — Mww

Of course, because you realize I'm right. How would you define "good"? Or would you simply equivocate with two senses of "good", one for things that taste "good", and another for what is beneficial to your survival, or "rationally good"?

I'm not wasting further time on your distortions. — Janus

Of course not. Like Mww above, it becomes overwhelmingly obvious that I am right. When the meaning of what you say is actually analyzed, it is revealed to be an absurdity.



That a principle is useful in application, and therefore can be used in making predictions, does not imply that the principle is "scientific". The axioms of mathematics are very useful in making predictions, but they are not scientific. Do you recognize the difference between a scientifically proven hypothesis and an axiom? Any way that you might formulate the principle of relativity, it is always an expression of an ontological principle, an axiom, not a scientific theory. Consider the following formulations;

The principle of relativity states that there is no physical way to differentiate between a body moving at a constant speed and an immobile body. It is of course possible to determine that one body is moving relative to the other, but it is impossible to determine which of them is moving and which is immobile. — https://www.tau.ac.il

In physics, the principle of relativity is the requirement that the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form in all admissible frames of reference. — Wikipedia: Principle of relativity

Notice that the first formulation is a statement of what is impossible. it is impossible to differentiate between an immobile body, and a body moving at a constant speed. How do you think that this, if it was presented as an hypothesis rather than as an axiom, could be tested in experimentation, so as to confirm it as a scientific theory?

The second formulation is a derivative of the first. It affirms that any body moving at a constant speed can serve as the grounding for a frame of reference, a point of rest (rest frame), and the laws of physics will be equally applicable from each. Notice how this is a grounding principle for the laws of physics, as stated in the quoted passage, describing how the laws of physics may be applied. It is expressed as a "requirement" for the laws of physics, thereby separating the principle of relativity from the laws of physics. It is not itself one of the laws of physics, but an ontological principle, an axiom, which dictates the applicability of the laws of physics.

Because you seem to misunderstand the difference between axioms and scientifically proven hypotheses, Nickolasgaspar, I suggest that you look a little more closely into the difference between what is derived from science, and what is derived from ontology. That ought to improve your understanding.

Two experiences of the same thing at the same time qualifies as a shared experience in my lexicon. — Janus

That your "lexicon" describes two distinct, but similar experiences as one shared experience indicates that it is not logically rigorous.

f we shared a plate of food that would not entail that we ate exactly the same items on the plate: that would be impossible. — Janus

If you do not understand the difference between two people sharing one plate of food, and the two distinct experiences that these two people are undergoing while sharing that one plate of food, and you conclude that because it is one plate of food being shared, the two experiences must be one shared experience, then I'm afraid that I am at a loss to dispel your misunderstanding of this matter. I'll give it a try anyway.

Let's start with this. Do you understand the difference between an event, and the participants in the event? Do you agree that the fact that the participants share in the event, does not imply that what is the property of any of the participants, is shared by the event, as property of the event? That would be a composition fallacy.

So here's an example of this fallacious way of thinking. Suppose someone gets raped, and one of the two participants in that event has a very enjoyable experience. And you conclude that since this person who has the enjoyable experience, is a participant in a shared experience, the other participant also has a very enjoyable experience as well, being a participant in that shared experience. Do you see the problem with your fallacious "shared experience"?

No it isn't. Its a scientific theory that ticks all boxes. It provides a sufficient narrative, hasdescriptive power non extreme conditions and it offers accurate predictions allowing us to producetechnical applications. — Nickolasgaspar

It's incredible the way you just make things up. Are you a professional fiction writer?

If we both see the same kinds of things in front of us that qualifies as a shared experience. — Janus

No, it means that we are each having the same kind of experience. Two distinct experiences which are both of the same kind does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

This is definitely true for the quantitative infinite, but I'm not so sure about the qualitative. — spirit-salamander

I do not see how "infinite" could be anything other than quantitative. I don't see how to conceive of an infinite quality. What would that even mean? Notice that the "omni" prefix sometimes used to describe God's qualities, does not mean "infinite". In fact it's more like the inverse of infinite, as the limit to the quality, whereas "infinite" means unlimited.

Certainly, what you say has never been uncontroversial:

"In VI. 4. 2 Plotinus connects the problem of soul's presence in body with a larger issue, that of the presence of intelligible reality in the sensible world. He is aware that in doing this he is confronting one of the most difficult problems facing any Platonist. Among the difficulties presented by Plato in his Parmenides concerning the theory of Forms is that of the presence of a single Form in a multitude of particular sensible objects (131ac): how could one Form (for example, the Form of beauty) be present in many (beautiful) things without being divided up among them?
The presence of the Form in a multitude seems to mean destruction of the Form as a whole, as a unity. This cannot be right. But to save the Form's unity, one must abandon its presence in many things. This too is unacceptable. Plato himself gives no clear indication as to how one is to resolve this dilemma. Aristotle considered it as yet another decisive reason for rejecting Plato's theory of Forms (Metaphysics, 1. 6). The problem remained unresolved, lying deep, as a possibly fatal flaw, in the heart of Platonic philosophy. The Middle Platonists were aware of it, but they contented themselves with references to the ‘mysterious’ relation between intelligible and sensible reality. Plotinus' Ennead VI. 4–5 is the first Platonist text we have which faces the issue squarely." (Dominic J. O'Meara - Plotinus - An Introduction to the Enneads)

Plotinus' own solution is also considered controversial by some. — spirit-salamander

The theory of participation is flawed, and Plato exposed this. I believe that Aristotle did provide a workable resolution by placing actuality as necessarily prior to potentiality, his so-called cosmological argument.

The concept of individual parts partaking of the whole, makes the whole passive, as being partaken of, without changing. But the active parts must receive their actuality, or activity from somewhere, as cause, and the somewhere cannot be the passive whole. This is why Aristotle proposes a further actuality, which is properly an immaterial actuality, like the soul, which therefore cannot be described in spatial terms, like the activity of parts.

Plotinus does not provide a solution, because the One which is proposed as the source of all, is said to be an infinite potentiality. But this meets the problem which Aristotle expressed, an infinite potentiality could not actualize itself. So there is no means (cause) whereby everything could proceed from the One.

Great example commonly used in favor of this argument is Albert Einstein's approach in developing the Theory of General Relativity. Something that is also important is that the Theory was "Verified" and accepted a over a night after a historic observation without having the chance of any falsification period! (so falsification is not always important too!). — Nickolasgaspar

Instead of using Einstein's relativity as an example of how science is tainted, you ought to simply realize that this theory is unscientific. The principle of relativity, upon which Einstein's theory is based, is unverifiable, therefore not science, it's ontology.

After all if I ask you to describe the scientific method...you will end up naming a bunch of actions.
The same is true for Philosophy.
1. epistemology (first learn what we know and how we know something -on a specific subject).
2. Physika (reevaluate or update your epistemology through empirical evaluation).
3. Metaphysics. reflect on that updated knowledge and use it to construct hypotheses reaching beyond our current knowledge
4.5.6. What are the implication of those hypotheses in Ethics , Aesthetics and Politics.
Restart...project your conclusions on our current body of knowledge ...etc. — Nickolasgaspar

That's strange, I have a degree in philosophy and I was never taught any of this. it's very fictional, and not at all representative of how philosophy is actually taught, in my experience.

I know that most philosophers are shocked when they hear these things for the first time, but I find them to be far more important than any other aspect of Philosophy...if our goal is to become good Philosophers. — Nickolasgaspar

Right, most philosophers are shocked when they hear of your "philosophical method", because it's absolutely foreign to them. Why do you call them "philosophers", when the philosophical method is foreign to them?

There is a form of judgement regarding intuition, or, sensibility itself, which describes the condition of the subject, as such, in his perception of real objects. Best represented as how he feels about that which he has perceived, as opposed to what he may eventually know about it. That the sunset is beautiful is empirical, how the subject reacts to the mode or manner in which the sunset is beautiful, which are given from the sensation alone, is an aesthetic judgement by which the subject describes to himself the state of his condition. — Mww

This is close to what I was suggesting, but let me take a slightly different aesthetic example, to make things clearer. Suppose it's a nice summer day and I walk past a garden of flowers, and notice a vast array of different shades of colour, and I think about how beautiful all those different colours are, in that particular array. Within my sensibility I have distinguished all sorts of different shades of colour, so that I perceive, or see, the landscape as completely varied in colour, and beautiful in this way.

What I am saying is that inherent within my sensibility, there is some sort of "judgement", which "decided" to present this display to me in a way which is beautiful, or pleasant. And if we move here to "pleasure" instead of "beauty", the nature of this sort of "judgement" becomes more emphasized. We cannot describe the pleasure we get from sensations in terms of a simple physical reaction to external stimuli because something inherent within the sensibility must judge whether the sensation ought to be experienced as pleasurable or as painful. This is the type of "judgement" which I think we must consider as inherent within sensibility. It is not my conscious mind which upon receiving the sensation decides that the sensation ought to be classed as pleasurable, the sensation is already judged as pleasurable before I have time to think about it. And of course this is even more emphasized with pain.

It is easy to see one cannot be deceived by how he feels, insofar as his feeling IS his condition at the time of it. — Mww

I don't buy this at all. I think what you propose here is sophistic trickery. I think that "judgement" which inheres within sensibility could very often be wrong. What happens if I eat something, and I think that it tastes good, but it ends up making me sick? Clearly that inherent "judgement", which judged it as good was mistaken. You might argue that the inherent judgement was "pleasurable", and this is different from "good", but this doesn't suffice, because being sick is not pleasurable either.

Therefore there is a problem with your qualification, "at the time of it". You'd say that at the time of eating the substance, it was pleasurable, and I was not mistaken in that sensation. But clearly there was a mistake involved here, the mistake which made the harmful substance appear at that moment to be pleasurable. I think that this condition, "at the time of", is really a deceptive phrase. Nothing is ever judged in relation to "the present moment", it is always judged in relation to the past and future.

So perhaps it might be true as you say that a person is never wrong in a judgement of "at the time of", but this is not a real judgement which is ever really made, so it must be disregarded as irrelevant. Our judgements are directed toward what just happened, or what is about to happen. For simplicity sake, I might say "I am doing...right now", but if I have to truthfully describe my actions, I must make a division between what I just did, and what I am about to do. Then "at the time of" becomes an illusion.

Say you are with someone and she says, "See that dog over there; what kind do you think it is?". Say it's a very large dog, maybe a Great Dane. Do you think the other person is likely to say "Oh, it's so small, maybe a Chihuahua"?

Have you had many experiences something like say you are with some people in the city and you see a car speeding towards you and another person says "Oh, look the waves are breaking well, and there's a lovely dog running towards us; let's go for a swim"? — Janus

I do not see the relationship you are trying to propose. Words are meaning based, therefore based in intention. There is no logical relation between a person's experience and a person's use of words. Similar acts of word usage do not imply the same experience. The similar acts may be used to justify a claim of similar experience, but two distinct yet similar experiences does not make one "shared experience".

If you don't think we can generally agree about what objects are where, what kinds of objects they are, how large or small, and so on, then I don't know what planet you are on. — Janus

You seem to be missing the point. What I objected to, is your use of "shared experience". All that is required for agreement is similarity, and two similar things (experiences) does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

My argument assumes total alteration. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you come to the conclusion that God must be altered. To take away, or subtract from the infinite leaves it no less infinite. So if the defining feature of God is "infinite", subtracting from Him would leave Him still infinite, therefore unaltered. This is what Socrates argued of "the idea". It doesn't matter how many things partake of the same idea, the idea remains the same regardless.

“…. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. (…) But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one….”
(A294/B350) — Mww

Intuition itself maybe be mistaken. Perhaps, faulty intuition ought not be called false judgement, if we should restrict the definition of "judgement''. But this is a different matter. However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition, and this "judgement" may be mistaken. Since there is already some form of judgement inherent within the intuited sense perception, and this judgement may be mistaken, it is very clear that sense perception may be deception. That is self-deception, which is often considered as a virtue because it is the basis of courage, confidence, and certitude. But taken beyond reasonable levels, following intuition becomes a vice, due to the propensity for mistake.

First of all there isn't such a thing as "A" scientific method. Science have many methods but that is a different topic. — Nickolasgaspar

The scientific method is very explicit, consisting of hypothesis, experimentation, observation, etc.. Why do you think that there is no such thing as the scientific method?

Now if you noticed I identified the method of philosophy I was talking about (Aristotle).
The fundamental steps are the following.
1. Epistemology
2. Physika (Science)
3. Metaphysics
4. Ethics
5. Aesthetics
6. Politics
and back to epistemology for additional knowledge.
So if a scientist or anyone decides to skip those first two basic steps he is placing his inquiry on a really shaky ground. — Nickolasgaspar

I do not see how this describes a method at all, you just name a bunch of subjects.

The ONLY training one needs to do philosophy is to reason correctly, obey the steps of the philosophical method and challenge his preconceptions. — Nickolasgaspar

Well, naming a bunch of subjects does not provide a "philosophical method". Perhaps if there was such a thing as "the steps of the philosophical method", it might be a simple matter for the person to get trained in the philosophical method. However, unlike the explicit scientific method, I really do not think that there is an explicit philosophical method which a person could follow.

Why should God, as One, not be His own divisor or boundary-puller, directed towards Himself? — spirit-salamander

If God is necessarily one, then He cannot divide Himself. If He is capable of dividing Himself, you cannot describe Him as necessarily one.

Even if a principle must always have parts, I refer to the Injury Problem: — spirit-salamander

This is an expression of the same problem. It assumes that God is one, and many at the same time. But until the proper principle is applied, which could allow the same thing to be one and many at the same time, the problem described is just fictional, a derivative of the base contradiction of being one and many at the same time.

Okay, then I say God was totally inactive before creation. — spirit-salamander

This doesn't resolve anything, because now you need a cause to make God become active.

Would you agree thatcreatio ex nihilo in the strict sense can only mean creatio ex deo?

The scholars or experts in the philosophy of religion: Daniel Soars, Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker, Bill Vallacella (Maverick Philosopher) whom I quote in the OP see it that way. They all advocate panentheism instead of theism in order to avoid the logical problem. The same applies to the mystic Jakob Boehme.

If in theism stuff of God is the "material" for creation, and considering the following: — spirit-salamander

You'd have to explain to me these proposals before I could assess them properly.

Doesn't it follow that God must use himself up completely in creation? — spirit-salamander

No, because we haven't properly accounted for how "parts" as distinct individuals could exist as a united "whole". Until we establish the proper relationship between parts and whole, such speculation is useless.

The point is that we describe these relations in spatial terms, then we want to transpose spatial relations to establish a temporal priority. But you have provided no principles of commensurability to relate spatial terms to temporal terms.

So for example, you describe God as one whole. This would imply no space within God, as separating one part from another, because this would indicate that god is a multitude. Then (implying temporal posteriority), God divides into parts. But where does the space within God come from? Now we say, that this space is due to the fact that God is active. But space within God implies that God is a multitude, rather than one. So we go around in a vicious circle which is unresolvable, until we remove the idea that God is one. Then God is necessarily a multitude. But how do we call this multitude by one name, "God"? This can be resolved by looking at the possibility of a relationship which is other than spatial.

Anything we say is going to be framed in terms that derive from our shared experience and understanding of the empirical world as well as our intuitions and speculative imaginations. — Janus

How does "shared experience" even make sense to you? From all that I can glean from my own experience, it appears very obvious that my personal experience is radically different from anyone else whom I have relations with.

If this is difficult for you to grasp, try this little experiment. Sometime when you are with a group of people, randomly ask, 'what just happened?'. You'll see that the answers vary just as much as the people in the group.

How can you speak of a "shared experience" when this is so oxymoronic?

We can learn to navigate the empirical world more or less effectively, but if our perception and understanding of the empirical world were at odds with the underlying real nature of things it seems reasonable to think we would not do well. — Janus

Notice how you use 'perception and understanding". This is because we use the rational mind to resolve all the problems which sense perception presents us with. You speak as if the senses provide us with an accurate representation. In reality, the senses provide us with huge problems, problems which the rational mind has some success at resolving. So it's really not the senses which provide us the capacity to navigate, its the rational mind.

The reason I mention this, is because it provides a kind of conceptual background for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive. — Wayfarer

That's a very enlightening passage from the CPR. It demonstrates how "matter" is just a concept, and it is simply an assumption made by us, which is used to explain why our sense perceptions of the world or so radically inconsistent with what our rational minds tell us the world must really be like. We posit "matter" as the medium between rational understanding, and sense perception, as the reason for this inconsistency.

This is the true understanding of "matter", that it is simply a concept, and as Berkeley demonstrates, not a necessary concept, but one which has been chosen. Notice how Kant describes that when we apply this concept "matter" in its true form, all proposed spatial relations are internal rather than external. As objects having spatial relations with one another is simply how we represent the proposed external reality, and there is no necessity to this representation. It is just what is customary to us, as consistent with that assumption of "matter".

As a Scientist he is limited by Methodological Naturalism's principles to keep his work within a specific demonstrable realm, not because of a ideological bias but due to Pragmatic Necessity.(Its where our methodologies and evaluations function).
So by definition his interpretations and conclusions are pseudo scientific. — Nickolasgaspar

This, in no way is an accurate representation of how a scientist philosophizes. The method of philosophy is not the same as the method of science, so when a scientist philosophizes, that scientist may or may not have some training in philosophy. And if the scientist has some training in philosophy, the degree of training will vary from one scientist to another. This degree of training will be evident in the philosophy which the scientist produces.

"Pseudo science" on the other hand is the inversion of this, when someone without proper scientific training makes an attempt at science, without applying the appropriate scientific method. That you confuse these two is evident from the fact that you switch from pseudo science to pseudo philosophy in the course of your post. You don't seem to know what you're talking about.

C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.

C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.

D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you derive what you call "D" here. If God is One, and was active prior to His creation, what prevents Him from being active currently?

What I see first is contradiction within B 2:

B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.

If all that exists at a given time, is one substance, then all is one. Accordingly, it is impossible that one becomes two. or any other multiplicity, unless there is something which is other than the one, which serves as a boundary, or divisor, within the one, to make two, or the proposed multiplicity. Therefore it is contradictory to say that One can transform itself into Many. This proposition implies that the One is not really one, or the Many is not really many.

Because of this, we need to look more closely at your principle that God is simple. You say that God must be simple, as the "most original principle". But this as well is contradictory. The nature of "a principle" is such that it always consists of parts. There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle.

So, allow me to return to my original objection. To "be active" is a principle which implies the necessity of parts. There is a number of things implied within this concept "active". There is a substance which is active, there is space to be active in, and there is time. If God was active, then those three required parts of the principle "active" are necessary.

I conclude that your argument is misdirected in a number of ways.

If the non-mental does interact with the mental however, that raises questions as to how that is even possible. — Ø implies everything

You might start with the simplified question of how any sort of interaction is possible.

since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. — Janus

I guess that depends on how how you define "accurate information". Are you saying that since we nourish ourselves, reproduce, and manage a little entertainment as well, this means our senses must be providing us with accurate information? Even single cell organisms manage to nourish themselves and reproduce, therefore "navigate the world rather smoothly". So does the capacity to entertain ourselves imply that we are getting accurate information? Not really, because in general fiction provides better entertainment than fact.

If the world in itself were nothing at all like the world we perceive, then fitness (or anything else) would seem to be impossible to explain. — Janus

Our perceptions of the world need not resemble the world in any way, in order for us to develop some sort of understanding. All that is required is consistency in usage. For example, the words we use, and mathematical symbols we use, do not resemble in any way the things they refer to, yet the usage of words and symbols develops into an understanding. This is the nature of "meaning", it is based in consistency of usage, not in resemblance.

Hoffman seems to be making the point that we ought to look at the relationship between the human mind and the supposed "world", which is developed through sensation, as a relationship of meaning rather than a relationship of facsimile. The way that the world appears to us is a product of how meaning is apprehended.

Or, to put this in a better light, if we want to understand the reality behind how things appear to us in sensation, we ought to look at how meaning appears to us because the sense apparatus has been developed to aid us in dealing with things which are meaningful, significant, and important to us. So, to understand the way that meaning appears to us, our best and most direct examples are in the use of language and symbols.

What we can see, as a starting point here, in an analysis of the use of symbols, is that the principal usage of symbols is as an indicator, or sign, of some form of classification, type, or universal. The use of the symbol acts as a memory aid, so that a sophisticated concept is signified with a simple symbol, facilitating the memory. There is no need for the symbol to resemble the category. If we now look at the act of naming a particular object or individual, use of a proper noun, we can see the same thing, there is no need for the name to resemble the named particular, only a need for the mind to have the capacity to make the required association.

So if we look at sensation now, we can see that the lower level senses, the tactile senses of taste, touch, and smell, deal exclusively with types, general or universal feelings. We associate similar smells, tastes, or feelings, as "the same" sort of feeling, and we have little if any capacity to distinguish unique peculiarities. Hearing gives us a better tool for distinguishing peculiarities of the particular circumstances, and seeing is even better. Notice that the two basic categories, the principals of the fundamental tactile feelings, are pleasure and pain, and these are subdivided with a whole range of sub-categories. None of these in any way can be construed as resembling the thing sensed.

If we look at the higher senses now, hearing and seeing, there has been developed a stronger capacity toward distinguishing uniqueness and peculiarities. Still, there is no basis for the assumption that the way that the peculiarities of the individual circumstances of sensation are being signified is a mode of resemblance. And, as the evidence of the lower senses indicates to us, it is highly unlikely that it is a mode of resemblance. So if we take the electromagnetic activity which sight is sensitive to for example, we see that a very narrow range of wavelength is interpreted through the eyes. it appears like distinguishing tiny differences within this very limited range has proven to be more meaningful than interpreting a very wide range of wavelengths. But of course, we can understand that colour in no way resembles electromagnetic waves.

Idealism, one way or another, has it that there is nothing that is not related in some way to mind. Hence things only exist if they stand in some relation to mind. — Banno

You ought not describe everything in monist terms. From a dualist perspective, (and many idealists are dualist) there is an unintelligible aspect of reality. So not everything has a relation to the mind, as there is that which does not have a relation to the mind, and this is consistent with idealist dualism.

From the dualist perspective, the issue is which fundamental aspect of reality has priority, is it the intelligible or the unintelligible. Depending on how one understands this priority, the person is either an idealist dualist, or materialist dualist.

Oh thanks, that makes more sense. I couldn't figure out what you were asking, now I can answer the question.

So, how could physcal interactions produce free will? — Dfpolis

Physical interactions do not produce free will, it comes from something else. If Lamarckian evolutionary theory is closer to reality on this point, then so be it. Darwin's theory was accepted for its scientific merits, not for the philosophical aspects. Lamack's treatise on habits is more consistent with Aristotle, (as implying final cause), than Darwin's vague allusion to chance.

Just a suggestion. Let's call whatever it is that is behind the appearance of the rock, a "rock". — Banno

This doesn't work, because what is behind the appearance of the rock could be all sorts of strange interactions, meaning, information, which is not included in the meaning of "rock". So this would mislead us into thinking that we know what we do not know.

As an analogy, 'let's say that the meaning of the word "rock" is rock. It doesn't work to say that the meaning of the symbol is the symbol.

As I argued in my article, there is no reason to think that physics has no intentional effects. — Dfpolis

I believe that intentional effects are fundamentally incompatible with Newton's first law. A force acting from within a body, to alter the motion of that body, cannot be described a force acting on the body.

The missing essential is the interface, viz., the entanglement of data-neutral-wrt-order of the phenomenal universe and operational intentionality of agent-intellect. — ucarr

Wouldn't the "missing essential" be knowledge itself? This would be the mode of interaction.

With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes. — ucarr

The problem with this is that we could not even call this "attributes", because "attribute" refers to an apprehended order. That's the reason for separating matter from form. In principle, matter is the absence of form. But Aristotle demonstrates that in reality the absence of form is logically impossible. So this is kind of like the concept of "infinite", a very useful concept which has no corresponding physical reality.

About the seed: I wonder if it does not already have all the order that the mature tree will have, but packed tighter. — Dfpolis

I do not think that this could be the case, because the growing seed is subjected to external forces, these are accidents, and the way that the growing form responds produces a unique order. So within the seed itself there is an allowance for the development of an order which is not already there. This is why evolution is possible, and consequently a reality.

This capacity to create order is what makes life so difficult to understand. That the order (form) is created as a response, rather than casually determined from the accidents, is what I've been telling you is very important to the understanding of sensation and intellection. This provides for the reality of a being with free will, the form in the mind must be created from within, rather than determined by the external accidents.

I do see that they're both flawed. Do you mean that this leads to idealism? — frank

Where else are you going to turn to get principles for understanding the reasons for these flaws?

Here's my incredible photoshopping skills at work. — Michael

I'd say, that's much better.



When you understand that indirect realism undermines itself, as proposed in the op, and the problems of direct realism persist, the door to idealism will open within you. I'll be waiting for you at that door, which opens inward rather than outward.

But you defined the latter as the same as the former. 'How many marbles are in the jar' is a mental quantity in your mind, which tautologically is going to correlate to count, also the mental quantity in your mind, no matter which number you choose. Interaction with the jar (counting) seem unnecessary for this. — noAxioms

Right, that's the way ontology works, we make definitions which accord with the way that we understand reality, and we proceed from those principles. If you think that you have a better ontological understanding of this matter, (perhaps you think that God always counts how many marbles are in the jar, or something like that), then propose your better definition.

You seem to suffer from the same problem as Wayfarer, which is insistence on applying the premises and definitions of idealism to falsify a view that isn't idealism, which is a begging fallacy.' — noAxioms

This is obviously because idealist premises are the one which best correspond with the reality of the situation. You haven't provided any reasons why you think that they are not the best premises, only the attitude of 'those are idealist therefore reject them'.

The representation in the op is incorrect. it is inherently biased, direct realist, by showing the external as the same as the image which the direct realist has in mind.

What the diagram needs to show is that the direct realist, and the indirect realist both have the same, or similar image in the mind. But the direct realist thinks that this image is as the external world is, and the indirect realist thinks that it is not.

Indirect realism is a prevalent ontological view because it is supported by ideas derived from modern science. Principally, there is the idea that the world really consists of a bunch of tiny particles moving at a high speed, or perhaps even in some sort of superposition, and objects don't really exist in the way that that they are imaged through sense representation.

I believe that ideological conformity requires effort because evolution is a fundamental, essential feature, of the living organism. Intensified societal change makes conformity more difficult, and attempts at conformity become less successful. The only way that ideological conformity can persist is if the will to conform is cultivated. Traditionally, this was moral training, cultivating the desire to be good.

If you think I described a particular stop sign, then surely you can inform me which one was specified.
The sign thing was simply my attempt to figure out how you distinguish ‘perspective’ from ‘point of view’, something you’ve not clarified. — noAxioms

I didn't see that either of us was trying to distinguish 'perspective' from 'point of view'. What would be the point of making such a distinction?

You did not answer my question about this, and it’s important. Correlates to what? — noAxioms

The number which correlates with the defined parameter. I went though that already. There's an object described as a jar full of marbles. The defined parameter is 'how many marbles are in the jar?'. There is no specific number which correlates with this parameter until someone counts the marbles and establishes that relation. You can say that someone estimates, guesses, or assigns a random number, these are all different modes of counting, and the mode of "counting" is not relevant. The point is that there is no answer to the question of "how many marbles are in the jar?" until someone answers it.

No, they are grounded in the reality of change. — Dfpolis

That's not accurate, because they are grounded in before and after, which is a specific feature of change. Your definition was "according to before and after". So if time is a measure of change, it measures only this particular parameter, that which relates to "before and after".

But the problem is that these other terms such as "lately", "long ago", "suddenly", introduce another aspect of time, other than "before and after" and that is duration, temporal extension, the meantime between before and after . So temporal measurement requires not only a judgement of before and after, but also a method for measuring the time (duration) between these, the meantime.

No, the potential and the actualized ground before and after. — Dfpolis

You have this backward, before and after are used to ground potential and actual. That this is the case can be seen from what you refer to as "actualization". Actualization is the concept which establishes a relationship between potential and actual. Without that concept there is no direct relation between those two, and no way of deriving "before and after". Therefore "before and after" are not derived from potential and actual, and are not grounded in potential and actual.

Instead, "actualization" is used as a concept to relate potential to actual, by establishing the temporal relation of "before and after" between potential and actual. So, that there is a relationship between potential and actual is established with "actualization", and that this relationship is the relationship of "before and after" is established by the nature of "actualization".

"Actualization" represents the meantime, the duration between before and after. In traditional Greek terms this is "coming-to-be", the time between being not-X, and being X, in the condition of change, the act of generation. Therefore the concepts of "potential and actual" are grounded in the empirically observed reality of "coming-to-be", which occurs in the temporal duration (extension) of the meantime between before and after.

Change is measurable according to before and after, say in the movement of clock hands. The act of measuring this produces time as a measure number. — Dfpolis

Before and after set the boundaries of the parameter to be measured, which is the duration, or extension of time in between these two, the meantime. This is how we employ the "now" as Aristotle explained, we project it as a point in time, using it to establish boundaries to segregate a specific temporal duration. One instance of the projected "now" represents the before, the other represents the after, the duration between is measured.

It is necessary that "before" and "after" represent something empirically real, this grounds the projection of the now in real. And, in order that the temporal duration measured is applicable, the measured duration must also be something empirically real. Accordingly, the temporal duration measured, as the meantime between the two artificial boundaries created by the projection of the "now", is equally real and measurable and empirically verifiable, as is "before and after".

Potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, not the mind. — Dfpolis

Yes, potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, but potencies are produced by the mind. What is described by us, is what we claim as "actual", and from this we derive through the application of principles, specific potencies which are attributable to that described actuality. So potencies are grounded in actual states, but the "actual states" are descriptions which we produce, and these are themselves grounded in empirical observation.

The important point is that we cannot directly describe the world in terms of potencies, because what is derived from the activity of sensing is actualities. So it is only actualities, forms, which are grounded in the world; "grounded" meaning supported by empirical observation. From an analysis of these forms, actualities, along with the application of specific principles derived from an understanding of change, we can describe potencies. But the key point to apprehend is that there are "principles" which lie between, and separate the descriptions as actualities, and the derivative potencies. So both actualities and potencies are "grounded", but actualities are grounded directly by empirical observation, while potencies are grounded by actualities, through the means of principles which relate potencies to actualities. As described above, in Aristotle this relationship is established with the concept of "actualization", which is derived from the ancient understanding of "coming-to-be".

The discussion of time begins in ch. 10. There he notes that "no part of it is" (218a6). So, we need to be aware that while it is convenient to speak of beings of reason (ens rationis) as though they exist simpliciter, they do not. Time, as a measure number, exists only in the minds contemplating it. So, you need to distinguish between what is a convenient way of speaking, and Aristotle's doctrine. — Dfpolis

I really think you need to reread that section, you might come to a better understanding. He clearly talks about time as being measured and he describes how time exists. This is what he says at 226b, 28:

"We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is, and in how many senses we speak of the 'now', and what 'at some time', 'lately', 'presently' or 'just', 'long ago', and 'suddenly' mean."

Notice that all these terms, all these ways of speaking, are grounded in time being something real. This is not a matter of "a convenient way of speaking". What is the case, is that there must be a real difference between the time referred to as "now", and the time referred to as "before now", and "after now", or else the distinction of before and after is incoherent. In other words, if time isn't something real, before and after make no sense.

As a number, it is not something existing in nature, but a mental entity resulting from a numbering operation. — Dfpolis

Aristotle was a student, of Plato, and numbers were considered to be existent things, as well as the symbols we use to count things. That's why he says number is used in two ways, what is countable, and that with which we count. Time is what is countable, therefore the terrain, not the map.

This is entirely compatible with the classic definition of time as the measure of change according to before and after. — Dfpolis

Sure, but don't you see that in order for "before and after" to have any meaning, there must be time which is something real in nature, to give these words significance. So consider that we use time to measure change according to before and after, as you say. We can't just assign "before" and "after" arbitrarily, these designations are grounded in empirical observations, and this is the manifestation of time in its real, natural occurrence. Before and after are not mere fabrications of the mind, these words refer to a real, observed order in the physical world. The glass fell off the table before it broke on the floor. If there was no real order here, it would make just as much sense to say that the glass broke before it fell.

There is no point in continuing to pile quotation on quotation. You are misinterpreting the text. — Dfpolis

I agree there is no point in looking at quotes, or even discussing what Aristotle thought, what is important is what we believe, you and I, and what is the truth to this matter.

What is measured is time potentially. The result is time actually. — Dfpolis

I don't get this at all , maybe you could explain. Doesn't time have to actually pass before it can be measured? How could one measure the potential passing of time? It seems to me like that would be a fictional measurement. Therefore I think you might want to reconsider this, as you seem to have it backward.

In our minds, in theory, we can work with all sorts of time intervals, and time durations, these mental constructions we might call "time potentially". Also, when we hand a name to a duration, like "day", "hour", "second", these are 'time potentially", because they do not refer to any actual, specific time period. But when we use a clock to measure time, the passing of time, this is actual time, as time is actually passing. The clock provides us with a measurement, "ten seconds" for example. But this is back to a mental construction. "Ten seconds" is potential time, unless we relate this to the actual passing of time in the world, for context, and say in qualification, "the ten seconds when...".

Where? — Dfpolis

That would be "Physics" Bk 4, Ch 11-14.

In Aristotle's definition, the territory is the changing world. Time is a coordinate we place on its map. — Dfpolis

I don't think you've read the section of the "Physics" which I refer to, if this is what you think.

219b: "Time then is a kind of number (Number, we must note, is used in two senses --- both of what is counted or the countable and also of that with which we count. Time obviously is what is counted not that with which we count: these are different kinds of thing.)"

That is not a definition because it is implicitly circular. The result of measurement is time. So, by your definition, time is both the source and result of measurement, which leaves us completely in the dark about what we are measuring. A's definition makes clear what we are measuring, viz. change, which he defines with no reference to time as "the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency." — Dfpolis

It only becomes circular if you allow "time" to have both definitions, which would be equivocation anyway. So your argument that it is circular is an argument based in equivocation. The explicit equivocation is that "time" refers to both the thing measured, and what is produced by the measurement. If we adhere to the one definition, that time is what is counted, then the thing produced by the measurement is not time, but theory relating to time.

As an analogy, let "quantity" refer to the thing counted, and "number" refer to the counting theory. When a quantity is counted, the counting theory is employed to produce a theory which represents the thing counted. "There is x number of C in the lot", would be an example of such a theory produced from counting. Whether or not the theory is sound is not relevant here.

It may be the case that Aristotle in some ways establishes an equivalence between time and change, but he does qualify this by saying that time is the number of "continuous change". He defines "change" in terms of coming to be and passing away, and further with "cause". "Cause" is analyzed even further and divided into potential and actual. In a number of ways he describes how causes precede the end, and he also argues how time is a necessary condition for change. Therefore change is defined with reference to time. This is why he proceeds in the "Physics" from "change" to motion and time.

No, it does not. It allows us to eliminate misconceptions about spatially separate events. Some events are before or after a given event, no matter how we measure time. Others are not. If we fix upon a single place, the sequence of events is never in doubt. — Dfpolis

That sure looks like inconsistency to me. If one way of measuring time results in a reversal of before and after, in comparison with another, and time is defined with reference to before and after, then there is inconsistency within the way that time is measured.

Aristotle's defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." — Dfpolis

He also says, that in another sense "time" is what is measured.

Of course, you could change the definition of time, but then you would need to ensure that it agreed with our normal time when the new definition reduced to that case. — Dfpolis

"Time" as that which is measured, is completely different from "time" as "the measure of...". One's the territory, the other the map, so to speak. But, they both agree with a "normal time", to some extent. Notice though, that the definition you provided is qualified with "according to before and after". This means that we must refer to an apprehended "before and after" to be able to employ time as a measure of change. And this is where the problem which points to, lies.

Since this is a very real problem, we ought to start with the other definition, that time is what is measured. Then we can say that "before" and "after" are products of the measurement of time, and the inconsistency in before and after which ucarr points to, is attributable to the way that time is measured, distinguishing between the measure, and what is measured. And, we can say deficiencies in the way that time is measured creates the appearance of inconsistency in before and after.

That time is what is measured is more consistent with our wider range of experience with the concept of "time" anyway. For example, when someone says what time it is. And when we see the problems of measurement exposed by the relativity of simultaneity, we can start to apprehend the need for more than one dimension of time, in order to give us precise measurement.

Good thing I didn’t specify a particular stop sign. — noAxioms

In your question you asked about describing "parts of the world". This implies particular stop signs. So it just means that your example was not relevant to what you asked for.

I know Bell’s point, but the marble thing is classical and thus doesn’t illustrate the point at all. — noAxioms

You are not grasping the fact that an act of measurement is essentially the same whether it is classical or quantum. There is an act, "measurement" and there is a result produced from the act of measurement, which is "the measurement". The idea that the result, the measurement, exists prior to the act of measurement in a classical measurement, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the act, which is misleading you into thinking that there is a difference in this matter, between classical and quantum measurement.

We could use the map/terrain analogy. The act of measurement is part of the act of making the map, and the resultant measurement is part of the map. The idea that "the quantity" is actually part of the thing measured (terrain), instead of a product of the measurement (part of the map) is a basic misunderstanding of the act of measuring.

In the example, the thing measured is called "the jar of marbles". The parameter is "the quantity of marbles in the jar". To describe the thing (jar of marbles) in terms of parameters requires parametrization which is a human act of defining boundaries. In this respect there is no difference between a classical measurement and a quantum measurement. The "quantity" is the result, posterior to the act of measurement, as derived from and posterior to parameterization. These are human acts which are necessarily prior to the existence of the quantity. This principle is validated by the nature of description in general, as "the property" is representative of the quale, so a property is part of the map, not the terrain.

What Bell is pointing out is that the vulgar way of understanding "measurement" misleads us because we commonly think that the quantity is what is measured, not what we assign to the thing after we measure it. The vulgar way confuses map and terrain. In mundane measurements this mistaken view is inconsequential, therefore it has propagated. But this view misleads us when we consider quantum measurements. It is not the case that quantum measurements differ in this respect, as you propose, it is the case that the vulgar way of understanding "measurement" is mistaken, and misleads us.

That’s a pretty idealistic statement. Not being one, I deny this. — noAxioms

It appears like your anti-idealist attitude is making it difficult for you to understand the nature of the act of measurement.

For instance, I described a stop sign, all without either of us observing it. — noAxioms

To describe a type of thing, a stop sign for example, is not the same as describing a particular thing, like a particular stop sign.

It seems a form of reality supervening on models instead of the other way around. The baguette is skinny and long. The baguette is circular. Both are equally valid. Something like that. — noAxioms

It's not that they are equally valid, but they are equally true, "true" meaning corresponding with reality.

But the baguette being circular and skinny-long are not wrong descriptions, but neither are they complete. Neither fully describes the thing. — noAxioms

If you do not think that "long and skinny" is inconsistent with "circular", then so be it. I don't think that's something I can convince you of.

It was fixed, but then before they were counted, somebody goes and adds a handful more. — noAxioms

You are not grasping the point which Bell is making. The number is not fixed, because no one has determined the quantity. The quantity is not fixed until someone determines it. How could it be? Do you have an explanation as to how a specific numbered could be associated with the objects, unless someone counts them? Does God establish that relationship between the number and the container? If not, who does, if no one counts them?

It does not matter what is counted. What matters is how many marbles are in there. — noAxioms

Obviously, it does matter. If they are not counted there is no number which correlates. Tell me how there could be one specific number which represents how many marbles are in there, if they have not been counted. Who would designate which number that is? And if no one designates the number, how can you say that there is a number which represents how many marbles are there?

Would you also argue that the winning number for a lottery is already designated before the draw is made?

No, I’m asking for vocabulary that you would accept in describing parts of the world that are not in a laboratory or anywhere else where attention is being paid by some human. — noAxioms

Describing something requires paying attention to it. How do you think that someone could describe a part of the world which has no one paying attention to it? You are asking for the impossible, what is excluded by contradiction.

OK, maybe I’m confusing your usage of both, and my stop sign example was a difference of perspective, in which case I need an example of a different PoV that isn’t a different perspective. Point of view usually means appearance from some specific location in space, but you seem to be using the term differently.
None of this seems to have anything to do with relativity theory. — noAxioms

Yes, you seem very confused as to what I was trying to say. I did not express it very well, so we better forget about that. It's very apparent that you have a completely different idea about what relativity theory says from what I do.

Relativity theory isn’t different depending on one’s realism stance on quantum theory and works pretty much the same either way. — noAxioms

It isn't the case that relativity theory is different depending on one's realism stance, but it is the case that a true realism cannot be maintained in the application of relativity theory.

Consider that within any system of formal logic, one must maintain consistency with the axioms. Any premise not consistent with the axioms cannot be employed because it would cause contradiction and incoherency. Take what you said above for example. Axiom: to be described requires that the thing described be observed. If we now proceed with the premise that we can describe something which has not been observed, we'll run into some incoherency.

Realism is not consistent with relativity. Refer back to Galileo's initial development of relativity theory. His point was to show that the orbits of the planets could equally be represented by the geocentric model, or the heliocentric model. By relativity theory each model is equally correct, there is no such thing as the "real" representation. That each representation, or description, is equally correct, and they are contradictory to each other, is the reason why relativity is not consistent with realism. Are you familiar with "model-dependent realism". This is an attempt to make relativity theory consistent with realism, but it isn't a form of realism at all. It just borrows the word "realism", assuming itself to be the closest thing to realism which we can get under the precepts of relativity theory.

The actual physical system isn’t any different due to your choice of description... — noAxioms

Yes it is different. The actual physical system is as described, and the descriptions differ. That's the point. There is no axiom which allows us to say that the physical system is different from what is described, because that would imply that the description is wrong. And, the descriptions differ according to one's choice of description. Therefore the actual physical system is different depending on one's choice of description. For more information read about model-dependent realism.

If you are a hard core realist, there is an escape from this trap. The escape is to realize that relativity theory is not truthful. What it says about the world is a falsity, and we just use it as a useful tool, but the tool is not a truth. Then we can reject model-dependent realism as just a manifestation of relativity theory, and we can maintain a true realism.

Marbles in a jar is a classical system, and yes, the count of them is fixed before they’ve been counted. At the quantum level, which is what Bell was talking about, these things are not necessarily true. — noAxioms

What Bell is saying, is that this idea, that the number of marbles in the jar is fixed, prior to the count is a misleading idea. The quantity of marbles, the number which corresponds with the physical situation, is only determined through a judgement. So the idea, that the number is fixed, prior to the count is a false idea.

Think about this. If the number is fixed, prior to the count, then it is necessary that nothing changes in the meantime, the time between the fixing and the count. If it is even possible that something could change, then we cannot say that the number is fixed. So we tend to think along the lines of Newton's law of inertia, and we figure that a force would be required to change things, so if the jar is watched in the meantime, we'd see if a marble was added or removed. Therefore if we exclude all the ways that we deem are possible ways that the quantity could change, then we can say that the number is fixed. But what if we do not apprehend all the possible ways, and there's other ways, what a physicalist might call "magic" or something like that. The proper conclusion therefore, is to recognize that the number is not actually fixed prior to the count, because there is always some logically possible way that it could change in the meantime. The idea that the number is fixed prior to the count, is just another useful tool that is not the truth about the situation.

Responding to you is very time-consuming, and not enlightening as we go over the same points repeatedly. So, there is no sign that we are approaching agreement. — Dfpolis

I believe we have come to have a much better understanding of our differences, at least I think I understand your perspective much better. The biggest gap between us seems to be concerning the nature of things like selection, choice, decision, and judgement, as well as the relationship between possibility and these. So if we get together again, we'll know where to start. Until then, thanks for the stimulating conversation.

You are conflating sense experience, which is how we know intrinsic properties, with the experience of mental processes, such as judging. It is not that judging is a type of experience, but that we experience judging. — Dfpolis

I've told you already, this is a division which cannot be made. And we discussed what your use of "intrinsic properties" refers to. You agreed that it refers to properties of "awareness", not properties of the sensible object. The point is that we cannot separate sense experience from mental processes, to look at the intrinsic properties of sense experience, independent of mental processes, as you claim, because mental processes are intrinsic properties of sense experience.

Again, this is confused. The judgement is wrong, not the experience of making a wrong judgement. — Dfpolis

By what principles do you separate the judgement from the experience of making the judgement? The experience of judging, and the act of making the judgement are one and the same. How do you say that it is the judgement which is mistaken, but the act of judging, which is the experience of judging, is not wrong? Of course it is the act, which is the experience, which is mistaken.

Associations are not choices, either. — Dfpolis

To associate is to connect with the mind. This is done by choice. Your drive to separate basic associations done at the level of sense experience, from selective causes, for the sake of separating sense experience from mental processes, is inclining you deeper and deeper into false premises. I warned you about this already. You need to turn your ship around, stop trying to support bad conclusions by adopting worse premises.

I am concentrating on truth and falsity because we are not discussing error in general, but having a false idea of an object's intrinsic properties. Other kinds of errors are irrelevant to that. — Dfpolis

Look, your premises have gotten so bad, that you are confusing your own principles now. You've said that judgement, as a mental process is the only thing capable of truth and falsity. You've said that abstraction of intrinsic properties of the sense object occurs at a level prior to judgement. Since we are talking about mistake, error, concerning these intrinsic properties it is impossible that we are talking about error in truth and falsity, which only can occur at the higher level of mental activity, judgement. Please, respect your own principles and maintain consistency.

Because we inherit our sensory capabilities. We do not select them. — Dfpolis

I was not talking about selecting our senses, I was talking about the senses being selective themselves. An intrinsic property of sensing is that it is selective. It must be if we represent the sensible objects as sense possibilities.

You simply refuse to accept that there is any sort of selective capacity independent from conscious choice. Where do you think conscious choice 'emerges' from? Or do you believe that no other living beings practise any sort of selection, then suddenly human beings evolve this radically new capability called "free will", which is not based in any other selective capacities of living beings?

I base my claim based on the physics and neurophysiology of sensation. If you want to see this as programming, then the author of the laws of nature and the initial state of the cosmos would be the programmer. — Dfpolis

This does not explain why you want to exclude philosophers from considering the laws of nature and the designer of those laws.

I agree that many possibilities are reduced to one actuality. I do not agree that the sensing subject has to choose what is sensed. Actual sensation is normally determined by the physical situation and the laws of nature. — Dfpolis

I told you why this is illogical. If sensation is 'determined" by the laws of nature, then it is impossible that many possibilities are reduced to one actuality. By the laws of nature things act on other things through the application of force. There are no possibilities, as these are all in the human mind. Furthermore, as Aristotle explains, a possibility cannot act, it must be acted on. Therefore if it is the case, as you say "many possibilities are reduced to one actuality", then something must select which possibilities will be actualized.

So you have two inconsistent and incompatible statements right within this paragraph. 1) "many possibilities are reduced to one actuality", and 2) "determined by the physical situation and the laws of nature".

Yes, we could. Potency alone does not entail free will. It just means that a change is possible. — Dfpolis

This in no way justifies your illogical claim. It is not the existence of potential which implies a selective process, it is the act which reduces a multitude of possibilities to one particular actuality which implies a selective process. If the act is determined, then the supposed other possibilities were not real possibilities. If the possibilities are real, then something must select. So the issue is not "change is possible", the issue is "change is actual".

The choice is yours, choose from the alternatives. Either the idea that the sensible objects consists of possibilities is really false, and this is just an illusion, based in a faulty mode of expression, an inaccurate way of speaking, or else the possibilities are real possibilities, and there is a selective process that "chooses" which will be actualized. The former is the view from modern determinist scientism, the latter is the view from Aristotle. The two are fundamentally incompatible.

Evolution can also help explain why vision evolved to see the wave lengths we do -- they are the ones that penetrate water, where vertebrates evolved. — Dfpolis

The answers to these questions are speculative, and unverifiable, therefore not scientific. The scientific method requires experimentation to verify theories. So it is not science which gives these answers, it is philosophy.

First, this confuses the first actuality of essence with the second actuality of the acts flowing out of a thing's essence. — Dfpolis

This make no sense to me. When you say "the acts flowing out of a thing's essence", are these acts of final cause, or what?

Finally, if the acts of substances were determined solely by their essences, they could not interact with other things and would be monads. — Dfpolis

What kind of act does a material substance have which would be other than its essence? That would not be an Aristotelian principle. I went through this already in this thread, Aristotle explicitly says in Metaphysics, Bk 7 I believe, that in the case of subsistent things, the thing and its essence are the very same. This is the law of identity. It makes no sense to say that a thing has an act which is other than its essence. A thing has a description, which is formal, and therefore actual, but this is not a proper act of the thing, it is what is predicated of a subject, in the sense of secondary substance.

The principle is that accidents are aspects of the substance, inhering in it, not distinct entities. The more aspects we know, the more we know of the whole. — Dfpolis

We already discussed this we do not know the properties, or accidents which inhere within the sensible substance. You agreed that what we know as "intrinsic properties" is what is intrinsic to our awareness of the thing, not the thing itself.

What follows is based on your misunderstanding of first and second act. — Dfpolis

It is you who misunderstands the two senses of "act". You represent one as potential. I went through this with you already. You distinguish actually "operating" from "being operational". The latter though, "being operational" is just the potential to operate, and therefore not a true sense of "act" as Aristotle intends, an "actuality".

Aristotle's distinction is described as the distinction between the act of being in "possession of knowledge", and "the actual exercise of knowledge'. The former, "possession of knowledge" is the type of actuality which the soul is said to have. We cannot represent "possession of knowledge as you do, because this reduces it to the potential to exercise knowledge, which is not an actuality but a potential. Therefore we must represent it as a form, an actuality, which has the knowledge inherent within, as a possession, rather than as the potential which is the possessed knowledge.

So that is the mistake in your interpretation of these two senses of actuality. You represent the actuality which possesses the knowledge, as the possessed knowledge (a potential), when you say "being operational", instead of representing the actuality, "the soul", as separate from the potential possessed, (the potential to operate), and as the actuality which possesses that potential. In other words, you represent the predicate, "being operational" which is a potential, as if it were the subject itself, the soul, which is what is actual.

The soul is the actuality of the organism. That actuality includes the power of awareness, aka the agent intellect. — Dfpolis

No, this is wrong. All the powers of the soul are distinct from the soul, as potencies, potentials, while the soul itself is defined as the first actuality. This excludes the possibility that "the power of awareness" (not a power listed by Aristotle), as a potential, is included with "the soul". These powers are what the soul possesses, the soul being the actuality which possesses the potential, it has them as habits. The soul is clearly described as separate (an actuality, form) from the potentials possessed, which are the powers.

See, your way of interpreting the first act, as itself a potential, renders all the potencies of the soul as inseparable from the soul, but this is not what was intended by Aristotle who described the soul as the first actuality, and the potential as what is possessed (knowledge possessed) by that first actuality.

The agent intellect therefore is necessarily separated from the soul (as actuality) by the passive intellect. The intellect in relation to the soul is a power of the soul, therefore a potential. Aristotle clearly lists intellection as one of the potencies of the soul. Therefore it is a potential in relation to the soul, as a power possessed by that actuality which is the soul. Likewise all the other powers of the soul explicitly exist as potentials. These are like predications of the subject, the soul being the subject, and the predicates being the habits of the soul, as what the actuality has in its capacity to act.

However, all the powers in relation to their proper objects are active and causal, receiving that actualization from the soul. so the agent intellect is active in relation to its object, the senses are active in relation to their respective objects, the power of self-movement is active in relation to its object, which is movement, the power of self-nourishment is active in relation to its object, nourishment. But in relation to the soul, which is the first actuality of the living body, all these powers are potentials.

I can because the process begins with physical operations, subject to physical analysis, and ends in an intentional operation, subject to intentional analysis. — Dfpolis

This is wrong, the process "began" a long time ago with the soul as the first actuality of the living body, causing the body to become organized in a particular way, so as to be able to sense. Clearly this is prior to the "physical operations" and therefore where the process really begins.

No. The soul is not a Cartesian res. It is the first actuality of a body. What acts is the whole -- the living organism, not some aspect of it. You are committing the mereological fallacy here. — Dfpolis

This makes no sense. The whole, the living organism, is the body of which the soul is the first actuality. Any act of the whole is necessarily an act of the soul which is the first actuality of that organized body.

I have no problem with this principle. My problem is with how you are applying it. The end of organic activity is the good of the organism = its self realization. The application to sensing and knowing is that information contributes to more effective living -- living better suited to our self-realization. Sensing and knowing could not do this unless they informed us of reality -- of the things we interact with as we interact with them. I am arguing that they do, and showing how they do. — Dfpolis

The point though is that "the good" is relative to the soul itself, as the first actuality, not relative to any specific organism. Therefore the end is not the good of the organism, but the good of the soul. This is why the death of organisms is a necessary feature of evolution. Therefore "self-realization" is not relevant, and consequently your assumptions about sensing and knowing are also unfounded. Until you start with the good of the soul, instead of the good of the individual organism, you have not an appropriate approach to sensing and knowing.

That is not my claim. My claim is that only judgements can be true or false, because only they make assertions about reality. Experience, concepts, associations -- none of them claim anything about reality. So, none of them can be true or false. — Dfpolis

We agree here, the problem is that you want to equate error with judgements of true and false. But this overlooks the evidence that the bulk of errors occur in judgements which are other than judgement of true and false. Therefore we must conclude that error extends far beyond judgements of true and false.

I agree. For example, there can be practical judgements -- about what should be done -- or judgements of taste -- what we prefer and what we have no interest in. Still, this does not bear on whether we can know intrinsic properties. — Dfpolis

Yes it does bear on whether we know intrinsic properties. That is because what we perceive as properties which are "intrinsic" to the sense object might be erroneous. Therefore what we know is not really 'intrinsic properties", but something else which is subject to error.

That is not an error. Being unable to "distinguish what" means we did not sense enough to elicit a prior concept. It does not mean that we did not experience what we experienced. It is impossible not to experience what we experience. — Dfpolis

"Error within experience" does not imply that the person did not experience what was experienced, it implies that mistake is inherent within the experience. To make a judgement is a type of experience, and to make an erroneous judgement does not imply that the person did not judge what was judged. No, it implies that the person's experience of judging was erroneous. Your assertion that there cannot be error within experience because this would imply that the person did not experience what was experienced is nonsensical.

I did not say that they cannot be, but, since you bring it up, they cannot be because associations are not assertions that could be true or false. — Dfpolis

How many times do I have to tell you? "Error" is not necessarily related to truth and falsity, it is related directly to mistake, and many mistaken actions are not assertions which could be judged as true or false. "Mistake" is best understood as a wrong choice, and most choices which a person makes do not involve assertions which could be judged as true or false. So the majority of errors which human beings make cannot even be classed as errors by your restrictions. That's how erroneous your category of "error" is.

I have not talked about selection in reference to sensing, but clearly we can choose to look at an object, or avert our eyes. The selection I was discussing was our choice to attend to some aspects of what is sensed, and not others. It does not select our physical interaction, but our mental response. We do this all the time. In racial profiling, police focus on a person's appearance instead of their behavior. We may be interested in the time displayed instead of a clock's mechanism (or vice versa). — Dfpolis

I was the one talking about "selection", and I insisted that you need to recognize that selection occurs within the sense organ. You agree with me that there are aspects of the form of the sensible object which the sensing being senses, not all of the form in completion. How do you think it is the case that some parts of the form are sensed, but not others, unless there is some type of selection going on?

All you provided for me as an explanation of your belief is that it is automatic, the senses just happen to respond to specific stimuli automatically. What do you believe, that the senses are programmed like a computer, or some other piece of machinery to respond automatically to specified stimuli? Who do you think does the programming?

Yes. — Dfpolis

So you agree that the object exists as a multitude of possibilities. Do you not understand that when a specific set of possibilities is actualized out of a multitude of possibilities, it is necessary to assume that something selects which possibilities will be actualized? That is a necessity, because if it was just a matter of determinist causation, then we could not truthfully say that there were any possibilities in the first place.

Therefore in order to portray the sense object as existing as possibilities to the sensing being, you must allow that the sensing being selects from these possibilities. So when specific possibilities are actualized by specific sense organs, this is a selection process carried out by the sensing being. Otherwise you cannot say that the sense object exists as possibilities, because this would not be consistent, possibilities being actualized without any selection.

Still, there is no active selection by sense organs. They respond automatically, in a way specified by their intrinsic nature and current state. — Dfpolis

Do you not see the logic? If the sense object is present to the sensing being as possibilities, then when specific possibilities are actualized, this must be through a process of selection. If there is no type of selection made, then there is automatic, deterministic efficient causation, and there is no real possibilities in the sense object. The sense object just exists as active efficient causes acting on the senses, in a deterministic way, and it would be completely erroneous to represent those active efficient causes as possibilities.

This is not a philosophical question. It is a question for a neurophysiologist or an evolutionary biologist. From a philosophical perspective, it is a contingent fact that we can sense some forms of interaction and not others, and, as a consequence, our experiential knowledge is limited. — Dfpolis

Are you saying that it's a fact that we sense some things but not others, yet philosophers ought not ask why this is the case, because that's a question for neurophysiology? Come on Df, you've got to be joking. Neurophysiology intends to explain how the senses work, it does not question why the eyes are designed to interact with light, and why the ears are designed to interact with sounds, and why there are some things which we cannot sense at all.

That is not the basic reason we cannot know essences exhaustively. The basic reason is that essences specify a substance's possible acts, not just its actual acts. — Dfpolis

This is completely unAristotelian. Essence is form, actuality. Essence does not specify possibilities. Possibilities are derived in another way.

I have no problem with this. In Scholastic language, you are saying that we do not know fully know substantial forms. That does not mean that we do not know accidental forms, which is all that I claim that we know.

In reflecting on this, you need to realize that accidents are not separate from substances, but aspects of them. So, a growing knowledge of a substance's accidental forms is a growing knowledge of its substantial form. — Dfpolis

The problem though, is that primary substance, the sensible object, consists of matter as well as form. And why this is a problem is that matter must be understood as the essence of such objects. And since form is what is intelligible to us, this implies that we cannot know the essence of sensible objects. So you say that "a growing knowledge of a substance's accidental forms is a growing knowledge of its substantial form", but this is not true. There is a gap between the two which cannot be bridged as you suggest. Knowledge of a substance's accidental forms in no way implies knowledge of it substantial form, unless the principles required to bridge this gap (metaphysical principles) are produced.

Aristotle is quite clear in De Anima, that the sense organ changes in sensation. Being changed is undergoing passion. — Dfpolis

I believe you have already demonstrated that you misinterpret Aristotle. He distinguished two senses of 'actual" when defining the soul. You have representedAone of these as a form of potential. At Bk2 Ch 5 when he begins discussing the power of sensation, he refers back to those two senses of actual, and now describes two senses of potential. He says at 418a 3, "We cannot help using the incorrect terms 'being acted upon or altered' of the two transitions involved."

So, he uses these words, "acted upon", "altered' but he is explicit in saying that this is not a correct description. The words facilitate the discussion, but do not actually produce a true representation of the process, hence they are said to be "incorrect terms".

You need to reread De Anima III. The role of the agent intellect is to make intelligiblity actually understood. The actualization of potential information (intelligibility) requires an agent in act, viz. the agent intellect. — Dfpolis

This is not inconsistent with what I said. But what I also said was that the intellect is passive in relation to the soul, which is the source of actuality of the agent intellect. Bk3, Ch8. "Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects, the one what is knowable the other what is sensible." In relation to the soul, ("within the soul"), the powers are potencies, potentials, but in relation to their proper object the powers act. So the agent intellect provides the act which makes intelligibility understood, as you say, but the intellect is still passive, as a potential in relation to the soul, which actualizes the intellect to act as the agent intellect.

With regard to (1) I think Aristotle thought of sensation holistically, starting in the physical modification of the sense organ by the sensible object, and terminating in awareness, which is an intentional process. So, I half agree with you: immateral operations are involved in his model, and in them (but not in the physical operation of the sense organ) the agent intellect is an efficient cause. However, Aristotle did not see the operation of the agent intellect in awareness of sense data. He belived its proper object was universal knowledge. That was an error on his part. — Dfpolis

How can you claim consistency between "the agent intellect is an efficient cause", and, "starting in the physical modification of the sense organ by the sensible object, and terminating in awareness"? You have the start in the modification of the sense organ, and the end in awareness, as a sort of chain of efficient causation, yet you want to say that the agent intellect is the efficient cause as well. How can the efficient cause (as the agent intellect) be at the end point as well as the beginning point in a chain of efficient causation?

However, if we say that the agent intellect acts as final cause, immaterial causation derived from the soul, then we can also allow that the act of the sense object on the sense organ is efficient causation. But as I've been explaining to you, in relation to final cause, efficient causes are selected for, as the means to ends. The actions of the sense objects on the sense organs are selected for, by the final cause of the soul.

Being physical does not mean that it is not an act of the organism and so an expression of (not an act of) the soul as the actuality of the organism. — Dfpolis

An expression of the soul is an act of the soul. I don't think there are any principles allowing you to separate physical acts of the organism from acts of the soul. As the first actuality of the living body, all physical are acts of the soul. And, it makes no sense to separate physical acts, and call them 'expressions" of the soul, and say that expressions are not acts.

No, I do not. If I see a spider, it is acting on me. All I am doing is recognizing that we not only act, we are also acted upon (aka suffer passion). Interaction involves both acting and being acted upon. — Dfpolis

Sure, I do not disagree about "interaction" we've agreed on this already. What I am trying to impress on you is the priority of final cause over efficient cause, within the acts of the living being. in relation to final cause, efficient causes are apprehended as possibilities, as possible means to ends. Since efficient causes are apprehended as possibilities in relation to final cause, then final cause is prior in the absolute sense. This is why the soul is defined as "the first actuality". It is first in causal power, as the first actuality.

The insight that only judgements can be true or false is central to Aquinas' theory of truth. — Dfpolis

But you seem to make a type of inversion fallacy, because you claim that judgements can only be of truth or falsity. Aquinas might be right, that judgements are the only type of things which can be true or false, but this does not mean that all judgements must be either true or false. There are all sorts of different types of judgements, in the general category of "judgement", which do not involve truth and falsity. Judgements of truth and falsity are a specific type of judgement. Likewise with "error". Errors in relation to truth and falsity are a specific type of error, but this only constitutes a small percentage of all the mistakes which people make, which are called errors.

We are not talking about memory, but sensation. The "recognition" that is subject to error is judgement. You have provided no example of an error in experience per se. — Dfpolis

I cannot understand sensation without memory, this is incoherent to me. Sensation is the activity of a thinking being with a brain and a nervous system. I gave you an example of error in sensation, when you cannot distinguish what you are seeing. I could say the same for all the senses, when you can't tell what you are tasting, feeling, hearing, or smelling. If you want to make sensation something other than this to support your erroneous definition of judgement, and your proposed faulty way of separating sense acts from mental acts, then so be it.

Of course, judgement is superior to mere association. — Dfpolis

What is your argument now, that "association" (which my dictionary defines as "connect in the mind") is an aspect of sensation, but judgement is not? This is all becoming very incoherent to me.

How do you think that association occurs without the use of memory? What is associated with what, if memory is not involved in this act? And, why would you think that associations cannot be erroneous. If the association made is not conducive to the desired end which caused it to be made, then it is erroneous. Or is it your intent to remove final causation from "association", leaving no principle by which it may be judged as useful or not? If so, then all associations would be random and this could not provide any foundation for any knowledge to be built upon.

I have no idea what you are talking about. Judgement is not a process that rejects notes of intelligibility. Abstraction selects some notes, but it does not reject the others. It just leaves unattended notes alone for the present. — Dfpolis

When i look at something as illogical and incoherent, like the claims which you are presenting to me, i reject them as unintelligible. That is an example of judgement. Your narrowing of your conception of "judgement' is leaving it without any real instances to correspond with.

This is what happened to Socrates and Theaetetus in the dialogue with that name. They spoke of "knowledge" in a way which required that knowledge must contain only truth and no falsity, then they found no instances of any possible way that falsity could be excluded from the stuff which we call "knowledge", so they concluded that they were going in the wrong direction, they started with an erroneous idea of "knowledge".

That's what I find is occurring with you definition of judgement. You exclude "association" as not a form of judgement, and you exclude the use of logic as not a form of judgement, so what are you left with? Can you give an example of judgement which would not be a matter of association nor a matter of applying logic? You've already mentioned "classification", but to me classification is just a form of association, which you've already separated out to say that it occurs in sensation rather than abstract thinking and is not a form of judgement.

No. We do not. The object does not typically select anything, as most objects have no will by which they could select. They simply interact with their environment, including organisms capable of sensing some forms of interaction. We are one of those organisms. — Dfpolis

I was not talking about the object selecting, I was talking about the subject selecting. You said:

"The action of the object on our neural state is an aspect of the object's actuality or form. ... For example, the object has intrinsic optical properties (aspects of its form) that interact with light and our eyes to create a visual image. That image is both the action of the object, and an aspect of our neural state."

Clearly there are "aspects" of the form which the sensing being senses. The being does not sense the entirety of the form. The issue of "selection" is the question of how does the being select which aspects of the object's form will interact with it.

From the perspective of the being, the object exists as a multitude of possibilities for interaction. Only some of these possibilities are actualized in the act of sensation. Therefore the being must somehow "select" from those possibilities. That is the issue of "selection" which I was talking about.

You are confusing "selection" with specific responsiveness. Sense organs respond to specific kinds of stimuli, but they do not select what they respond to. Their response is automatic, not by choice. Consequently, we cannot and do not know objects exhaustively, but only as they relate to us. I have said this a number of times. This is what Aquinas means when he says that we do not know essences directly, but only via accidents. — Dfpolis

This does not answer the problem of selection. Let's assume that all responses are automatic, in respect to a specific kind of stimuli, as you claim. The question is why does a sense organ respond to only a specific kind of stimuli, and not to other stimuli. This is a matter of "selection". The sense organ must select, from a vast field of potential stimuli which specific kind of stimuli it will respond to. Clearly it does not respond to all stimuli, so it must somehow select a type of stimuli to respond to. Saying that its response to the specific type is automatic, does not answer the question of how that specific type was selected for.

So, we have this matter unanswered. And, we move on to the rest of your paragraph. "Consequently, we cannot and do not know objects exhaustively, but only as they relate to us." Now you need to acknowledge that what underlies "as they relate to us" is "as we select", in this matter. So "we cannot and do not know objects exhaustively", because we know them selectively, and deficiencies in our selective processes leave us unable to know objects exhaustively. We can write this off to evolution, and say that evolution has not provided us with the means to know the object exhaustively, but the fact remains that the form of the object which exists in the mind of the knower is not the same as the form of the object known, and this is very evident in what you say about Aquinas.

Tada!! YES. That is why I keep saying that the object is sensible. — Dfpolis

Now, can you take the next step, and grasp the reality that if the object exists as potential to the sensing subject, there must be a process of selection which determines which potentials will be actualized? And, this selection is caused, and that type of causation is what is known as final cause? We cannot say that this type of causation is random, because random selections and associations cannot support any type of knowledge.

No! Because what is merely potential cannot act, and, in particular, cannot act on the sense organ. — Dfpolis

You keep refusing to recognize that the act of sensation is an act of the sensing being. The source of the "act" here, is the first actuality, the soul itself. You know that the soul is active, actual. And, the object sensed exists as potential, from the perspective of the active soul, whose form of act is that of final cause, as described in the "Metaphysics". There is no need for the sense object to act on the senses, because the soul as the first actuality of the organized living body makes this body active in relation to the passive sense object. And this is how the soul can select which type of potential the various parts of the body (sense organs) will actualize in sensation, by being prior to, (as the first actuality), that very body which selects from those potentials, which exist as the sense object.

What Aristotle pointed out, and I keep repeating, is that one and the same event (actually sensing) actualizes two potentials: (1) the object's potential to be sensed (its sensibility) and (2) the subject's capacity to sense. The sensing event is an action of the object and a passion of the subject. — Dfpolis

See, you even talk about this "actual sensing", as if the organism is carrying out the act, "sensing". Then you go on to describe it as if the sense object is carrying out the act. And you conclude "sensing event is an action of the object". That is implied inconsistency.

You are completely ignoring Aristotle's designation of the soul as the first actuality of the living body, and the very fact that "living" is an activity. There is a reason for that designation. This makes all the powers of the soul, sense organs included, potencies, potentials in relation to the soul itself. He determines these powers, such as sensation and intellection as potentials, because they are not all active all the time. That is essential to understanding Aristotle's "On the Soul". The powers of the soul, potentials, must be actualized by the soul, to be active, operating, otherwise they lie dormant as potentials. And the fact that they are actualized by the soul, in the act of living, makes them each active in relation to each one's respective proper object, which exists as passive potential.

I suggest that this is how we ought to understand the passive and active intellect. Prior to Aristotle there was confusion between soul and mind, the two were sometimes used interchangeably, and sometimes distinct. There was a lot of ambiguity in Plato and others. Aristotle provided a proper separation between the soul, as first actuality, and the intellect as a power of the soul. This means that in relation to the soul, the intellect exists as potential, passive, to be actualized by the soul. And when it is actualized by the soul it is the active intellect.

This is not material causality on the part of the object because the object is an agent acting to modify the state of the sense organ. — Dfpolis

This is backward, not Aristotelian, but the perspective of modern science, which sees the object as an active cause, acting on the sense organ. But Aristotle describes the sense organ as potential in relation to the actuality of the soul. When the sense organ is not active (in sleep for example), it exists as the potential to sense. The soul as the first actuality, must activate it, and then it is actually sensing. When it is sensing, the sense organ is active in relation to the objects sensed, which are passive. That's why we intuitively comprehend the reality of our environment as "objects", first, then motion of the objects second. To the senses, which are active, the things being sensed are passive, objects.

You are confusing sensation as a physical process with awareness, which is an intentional process. In sensing, the object is an efficient cause. In awareness, it is a material cause. — Dfpolis

No, you are misrepresenting, "sensation" in an unAristotelian way, as a physical process, instead of as an act of the soul. You do not seem to comprehend that the soul is the first actuality, and that the powers of the soul, like self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection exist as potentials relative to the actuality which is the soul. So you do not recognize that in Aristotle's conceptual space, the act of sensing is an act of the immaterial soul, through the operation of the sense organs, rather than a physical process. And this is why your descriptions are so backward in relation to Aristotle's descriptions.

he same thing can be actual in one respect, say being a living organism, while being potential in different respects, being sensible and intelligible. — Dfpolis

Here, you recognize that being a living organism is a type of act, but you refuse to recognize that the things which living organism do are also acts. So you do not see sensing as an act, you see it as a passivity in relation to the active sense object. This is to stray from Aristotle, who sees sensation as an act of the living organism rather than as an act of the sense object.

Do you have a citation in Plato for this? I would like the reference to compare Plato's with Aristotle's doctrine. — Dfpolis

The Republic, Bk 6, specifically 508b "What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things". You'd be best off to read the entirety of that chapter, to get an understanding of the context and the complexity of the issue.

No. The will, which does the selection and directs the agent intellect, is drawn to the good. — Dfpolis

Why do you say "no" here? It appears like you are saying the same thing as me, but in a different way. If the will is drawn towards the good, and also directs the agent intellect, then if the agent intellect judges, this is done in the direction of "the good".

I really do not understand your way of conceiving judgement. it appears like you want to make judgement distinct from choice and selection, but why?

What would you call an interaction between systems of which humans are completely unaware, say where one system (some radioactive atom) emits an alpha particle which alters a second system (some molecule somewhere) by altering its molecular structure (and probably heating up the material of which the molecule is part). It isn’t a measurement because there’s no intent and no numerical result yielded, so what word describes this exchange between the atom and the molecule? — noAxioms

It's all descriptive. There's no way around it. That's why it becomes "the hard problem" for those who do not accept the reality that there's an unbridgeable gap between the map and the territory. And, the problem is that the description is completely different depending on the perspective one takes. That's the importance of understanding the true nature of relativity theory.

We can take "relativity" in two ways. 1) The world appears different to us, depending on the perspective we take. 2) The world is different from different points of view. The former is realist, as assuming a true way that things are, independent of the various perspectives. The latter assumes no such independent "real" point of view. And the problem is that to apply relativity theory, and make it work for us, we need to assume the latter. Since that position is adopted for the purpose of applying relativity theory, we cannot make the results derived from the application of relativity theory compatible with the realist assumption of a real independent world. We must recognize and respect this fact, that whatever results are produced from the application of relativity theory, these are fundamentally incompatible with that form of realism.

Consider "an apple hanging from a tree". That's one way of describing the scenario, it's a static scenario, though "hanging" is still a verb. But we could also describe it as a whole bunch of different molecules with atoms interacting, and the gravity of the earth interacting with the massive molecules, putting immense force on the stem, until with ripeness, the atomic and molecular interactions change considerably, and the apple falls.

Notice, the former is a very simple description, as a static state, it takes no account of the passing of time, except for the word "hanging". The latter description makes an attempt to account for the effects of time passing, by describing the scenario in terms of activity.

This is what I am talking about. What precisely physically ‘does something’ to a system that makes its [past] state change, I say physically because I’m not talking about somebody’s mere knowledge or description of a system. I assure you it isn’t the determination of a numerical value by a conscious entity that changes the target system. — noAxioms

This question is answered with "the passing of time". The passing of time "does something" to the system, and we have only the vaguest idea of what it does. Sometimes it's named by "entropy". But what the passing of time really does, is understood much better through terms other than "entropy". You see, we understand the future in terms of possibilities, what may or may not happen, and the past we understand in terms of actualities, what has actually happened. This leaves "the present" with a peculiar temporal position, as the time when possibilities are selected for as the ones which will be actualized. And this actualization of possibilities we observe as the activity which occurs at the present.

The significant and important thing to consider here is that when a vast multitude (even approaching infinity) of possibilities for the future is related to a single, or at least a very restricted number of actualities in the past, there is a need to assume a process of "selection". The determinist wants to describe the selection process as completely determined, while the free willie understands final cause as a type of causation which is not determined in that way. So the free willie concludes that if there is a way that the conscious human being can pick and choose from possibilities, as to which ones will be actualized, in an undeterministic way, so it must be in the greater universe in general, that something (traditionally "God") picks and chooses from the possibilities in an undeterministic way.

The wave function in quantum mechanics evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger equation as a linear superposition of different states. — ”Wiki: Measurement problem

This "deterministic" evolution of the wave function is completely a feature of the type of description employed. It is described so as to be deterministic, when in reality, this description, the "superposition of different states", violates the law of noncontradiction, showing that this deterministic description is actually very faulty.

We can say, "the apple hanging on the tree" is a determinist description, and by Newton's laws that hanging apple will continue to hang, as an equilibrium, in its deterministic way, until a force causes it to fall. The deterministic wave function is analogous with the apple hanging, and we could place bets concerning the collapse, the fall. The deterministic bettor would look for the upcoming forces which would cause the fall. The undeterministic bettor would look at the passing of time itself, and the selective process which inheres within the passing of time itself (the Will of God), as a force which could potentially act on the apple. But the laws of physics, from the foundations of Newton's first law, which provides the basis for the deterministic perspective, do not have the required provisions for looking at the passing of time as a selective force. As Newton himself said, his first law takes the Will of God for granted. So if this implied selective process (as the Will of God) which is active at the micro scale, as time passes, actually makes selections, our determinist laws of physics have no way to account for these selections.

I was going to agree with this until the last bit about physical boundaries. A system’s boundaries are an arbitrary abstraction, nothing physical about it. But the arbitrary designations are needed for description, not for the actual processes to work. — noAxioms

You are not following the distinction I made between a system in theory, and an engineered system. The latter being a designed physically existing system created for the purpose of doing work. It has a physical boundary, and the energy lost to the system as entropy, may or may not escape somehow through this boundary, because where the energy which is lost to entropy actually goes to, is an unknown.

That’s pretty pragmatic to assume that, yes. It’s also pretty pragmatic to assume that I cannot choose to alter some event in the past, but it’s been demonstrated that one of those assumptions (if not both) are wrong. — noAxioms

Huh? I don't see how this follows at all. I don't think you understood what I said. I was taking that from the reference from Bell which you provided. I don't think you understand that quote very well. Here's the part:

When it is said that something is 'measured' it is difficult not to think of the result as referring to some pre-existing property of the object in question. — Against ‘measurement’ - John Bell, 1990

I discussed this principle in another thread with a number of participants. Suppose there is a jar with marbles in it. The marbles can be counted and this will determine the quantity. The others argued that the quantity is already determined, prior to the counting. The quantity is a "pre-existing property". But "quantity" is a human determination produced by the act of counting, and cannot exist prior to the counting. This idea, that the quantity determined by the act of measuring exists prior to the act of measuring, is what Bell is referring to here as a problematic way of looking at QM.

This faulty way of looking at reality is pervasive in the modern intellect. It seems to have been propagated by Platonism in mathematical axioms, which would imply that there is "a number" for the potential count, already in existence, and all we need to do is somehow find that number. The problem manifests deeply when the axioms deal with infinities, and assume that a "countable number" has some type of actual existence in the same way as a counted number.

I didn’t say a frame was a point. — noAxioms

This discussion is pointless (please excuse the pun, it just came out that way). You were arguing that "here" constitutes a frame. If you still can't admit to the fault in this, I really don't see the point to continuing.

If you disagree with that, then do you deny that Earth moves at about 30 km/sec relative to the sun? What additional references are required before that statement can be made? — noAxioms

Do you not see, that "the earth" and "the sun" involves two distinct places, unlike "here"?

It does not. For instance, there is the cosmological frame, an expanding metric that foliates most of the universe. — noAxioms

And "metric" doesn't imply "coordinate system" to you, in this context, such that a coordinate system is a logical necessity for a metric?

No, because I didn’t define it relative to that which says ‘here’. I chose a different origin, which was the nose of the rocket. In fact, I never used the word ‘here’ in releation to the frame of the rocket. — noAxioms

This is exactly the point. What we were discussing is the meaning of "here" in your previous example, and the ridiculousness of that example. Now you want to replace "here" with "the nose of the rocket", but you admit right here (excuse the pun again), that the two are not analogous.

The failure to distinguish between two different kinds of bodies, terrestrial and heavenly or primary body, leads to false assertions and conclusions. — Fooloso4

We already went through this Fooloso4. those quotes come from a small part of the beginning of Bk 1, ch2, we he is stating some principles, theories put forward by the Pythagoreans, as what will be discussed in the book. The arguments and refutations of some of these principles is what follows in the chapters I referred to. It's nonsense for you to take what he states as the current theories of his time, as what he actually believed, and then simply ignore all the arguments he provides concerning these theories. The various arguments are where he states his case. What you are doing is exactly what you accuse me of, to ignore what he actually wrote. You look at Bk1 Ch2, then completely ignore all the logical arguments made throughout ch 3,,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

Let me remind you of your argument. It did not involve the identity issue directly. I said that in classification, we compared intrinsic properties to the class concept. You said that we do not because we cannot know intrinsic properties because of the possibility of error. I countered that the recognition of falsity implies that we can know the truth. You said the very possibility of error implied falsehood. My response is above. — Dfpolis

Come on Df, that's a misrepresentation. What I said is that it is not the case that our knowledge of the sense object consists of knowing the properties which are intrinsic to the sense object (intrinsic meaning inhering within the the sense thing itself). And, my argument is that since there is a possibility of error within our knowledge of the properties, this proves that the properties which we know are not the properties which are intrinsic to the thing itself. If our knowledge of the sense object consisted of properties intrinsic to the sense object, it would be impossible that we are mistaken.

This confuses knowledge as acquaintance, by which we know forms or properties, with propositional knowledge, which results from judgement, and which alone can be true or false. Knowledge as acquaintance, which is what the actualization of intelligibility is, makes no assertion that could be true or false. We just experience whatever we experience. The possibility of error comes in categorizing what we experience. We might, for example, judge the tall pointy thing on the horizon is a church steeple when it is actually a pine. — Dfpolis

You are confusing "error" with "falsity". I already explained this to you, error does not necessarily mean false, it simply means mistaken, and this is "unsuccessful". It is very clear that "Knowledge as acquaintance" is very susceptible to error, poor memory, poor recognition, etc..

The problem here, is that you have restricted "judgement" to the higher levels of knowledge, propositional knowledge. Now you have no type of judgement involved in this "acquaintance" process, so you must say that this process cannot be wrong. But of course mistake dwell in the deepest levels, and your claim "we just experience whatever we experience" is nonsense, because something within the experiencing subject must select from that experience the aspects of it which will be remembered, and how they will be remembered etc.. And, there are all sorts of errors here.

This analysis shows that your conclusion is unfounded. The error does not result from the lack of a form in the knower (we experience a tall, pointy thing), but from the misclassification of that form. The misclassification is the result of adding associated, imagined or hypothetical elements not in the experienced form. (We add that it is a human artifact, that it sits atop an unseen structure, etc., etc.) This kind of "filling-out" may have evolutionary advantages, (the two eyes we see in the darkness might belong to a predator), but its results are unreliable. — Dfpolis

Sorry df, this nonsense has no sway over me. Error occurs without classification. We do not need to classify something prior to remembering it, in order to have a mistaken memory. We have mistaken memories about images all the time.

The opposite to what you say is actually what is the case. We classify things as a memory aid. Remembering the word "steeple " is much easier than remembering the image which was seen, so this facilitates memory. And when we put events into sentences, or descriptions into sentences, this enables us to remember entire sequences of images with a simple sentence.

It is very clear to me, that this higher knowledge, what you say is "judgement', actually eliminates a whole lot of errors which would otherwise occur if we did not have this judgement process. The processes which occur without this form of judgement are much more riddled with error. That's why human beings are generally considered to be more intelligent than other animals, they use this "judgement" process which the other animals do not use, to help them cut down on errors. And logic, as a higher form of judgement, helps us to even further reduce error.

Awareness has two aspects: intelligible contents (forms), and the awareness of those contents. In the first instance, we are aware of being -- that there is something present, something acting on our senses in empirical knowledge. The content of this inchoate awareness is Aristotle's tode ti (this something). If we choose to attend to it more closely, we begin to distinguish various notes of intelligibility, e.g. shape, color(s), dimensions and so on. These aspects of the whole are the "accidents" of Aristotle's Categories. — Dfpolis

But this "awareness" you spoke of is prior to the synthesis, prior to judgement. How can it consist of intelligible forms? Or, is there no difference between "intelligible forms" at the level of awareness, and "intelligible forms" at the post judgement level? If there is no difference, then what is the point of judgement? And if there is a difference, then wouldn't the ones which get rejected in judgement actually be rejected because they are not intelligible. If that is the case, then we cannot even call this content at the level of awareness "intelligible forms" at all, because some are intelligible and some are not.

I argue that the capacity to be aware of intelligibility is what Aristotle calls the "agent intellect" and it is a power of individual subjects. The intelligible content we are aware of is both an act of the object, and encoded by a modification of our neural state. Thus, it is a case of shared (accidental) existence. I say "accidental" because the action is an accident of the object, and the modification is an accident of the subject. — Dfpolis

So we have the issue of "selection" here, which I've been mentioning and you have not been addressing. The content at the level of awareness cannot all be intelligible, or else there would be no need for judgement at the higher level. Since there is a need for judgement, we must assume that the content of awareness contains many aspects which are unintelligible, illogical or nonsensical, just like when you see something in the distance and you can't tell what it is. So "judgement" is a form of selection which occurs at the intellectual level of reasoning. But many other forms of selection also exist.

Don't you think that there must be selective mechanisms built right into the sense organs, and the neurological system? The taste buds, and the cone cells in the eyes for example. Since these features are selective for the sake of some purpose, how can you say that they are accidental causes, on the side of the agent? In the Aristotelian conceptual space, things caused for a purpose are not accidental, but the product of final cause.

This answers your last question. The action of the object on our neural state is an aspect of the object's actuality or form. More precisely, it is the second actuality, or operation, of the object's form. For example, the object has intrinsic optical properties (aspects of its form) that interact with light and our eyes to create a visual image. That image is both the action of the object, and an aspect of our neural state. — Dfpolis

So that part of the questioning has been answered. The action of the "object's actuality or form, has a real causal impact. However, we still have to address the selective process which is inherent and intrinsic within the sensing subject. So when the eyes receive from the sense object, that activity which it will use in making the image, they select certain aspects of the activity which will be utilized.

Now here's the problem. If the sensing subject has the capacity to select from the object's actuality, then the object's actuality consists of possibilities, potentials, from the true perspective of the sensing subject. This would mean that the sense organs are not receiving forms from the sense object, but matter (potential) from the sense object. And so the type of cause which best describes the sense object's position is material cause. Since matter is what persists through a change, then in the act of sensation there must something which comes from the sense objects, and persists through the act of imaging, and the acts of abstraction and judgement, as the underlying matter. I would say then that the same matter might be within both the sensing subject, and the object sensed.

As I explained, in awareness, the neurally encoded content is the material, not the efficient, cause of knowing. — Dfpolis

This is consistent with what I just wrote above. However, if we take this approach we cannot say that the sensing subject receives the form from the sense object, because within the neurological system there is only the material content, rather than the form.

So, the intelligible form is the material, not the efficient, cause of knowledge. — Dfpolis

But this is a little confused now. Matter cannot be the "intelligible form", that is contradictory. And this is why we need to respect the selective process, judgement, intent, and final cause. The soul, with the intellect, operates as final cause, and selects the matter (as the means) best suited for the end. This is the Platonic principle of 'the good". The good he says is what illuminates the intelligible objects, like the sun illuminates sensible objects. So the good (the end) is the cause of the intelligible object in the sense that it is what makes it intelligible, like the sun is the cause of the visible objects in the sense that it is what makes the visible objects visible. And we cannot neglect the importance of this selective process, this final cause, which brings about an intelligible form from the material cause (neurological data).

Abstraction occurs when our awareness (the agent intellect) attends to some aspects of the object to the exclusion of others. So, we can be aware of the inchoate whole (tode it, the substance), and/or of some specific intelligible aspect(s) (accidents). These intelligible aspects are the intrinsic properties we are discussing. Since intelligibility is a precondition of knowledge, intelligible properties are prior to, and independent of, the act of knowing. — Dfpolis

This is that selective process, "attends to some aspects of the object to the exclusion of others". The issue is, that if the agent intellect has this selective capacity, then what is selected from must be possibilities, potential, therefore material. We cannot say that the aspects selected are "intrinsic properties", because properties are formal, and possibilities are material. And, the agent intellect selects on the basis of "the good", or "the end", not on the basis of intelligibility. Intelligibility in its relationship with the subject is posterior to the subject's relationship with the good, or final cause, as explained by Plato.

Since intelligibility is a precondition of knowledge, intelligible properties are prior to, and independent of, the act of knowing. — Dfpolis

Yes, is a precondition of knowledge, but intelligibility is not a precondition for selection. As I explained, selection is built into the sense organs. But selection is done for the sake of a good, final cause. Final cause and selection are prior to "intelligible properties".

Relativity shows simultaneity is local, not that it is somehow arbitrary. It is not the case that relativity in any way prescribes eternalism, although this has not stopped popular science authors from making this claim (or others from continually coming along to debunk it; I have not seen the debunking debunked in turn however, and it convinced me). — Count Timothy von Icarus

What I said in the quoted passage is that the idea that there is a present state of the universe, is shown to be unsound by special relativity, as a premise which is inconsistent with special relativity. This is consistent with "simultaneity is local". I wasn't talking about eternalism.

No one present is privileged, but you can have a "many fingered time," with multiple time variables. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, but this presents a problem toward understanding any causal relations between "one present" and another present. The present is local, but there is still interaction between far away places, as the travel of light indicates.

That there are issues with positing the world as it is sans observers is quite true, but it is true even ignoring SR/GR. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I certainly agree with this. However, as a person who is a temporal realist, it is easy for me to see SR/GR as taking advantage of the fact that there are issues with positing the world as it is sans observers.

The issue is that knowing how the world would have been without observers is not a realistic counterfactual to entertain. This is because even if we could theoretically produce a "without observers" perspective, any sort of "knowing" which is derived from this perspective still implies observers, as "knowledge" has an observational aspect.

So the first thing that I notice, if I try to produce an observer-free perspective in theory, is that the "here" of "here and now" (here and now being the defining features of the observational perspective), could be anywhere, and the universe would maintain intelligibility. However, the now, since "now" must be restricted to a specific duration of time to make the universe intelligible, does admit to that freedom. If "now" were an infinite duration of time, the universe would be unintelligible because everything would be everywhere, now. The conclusion therefore, is that how we understand "now" determines which aspects of the universe will be intelligible to us.

So let me relate this to why I say SR/GR takes advantage of the problem with positing a world without observers. To understand the universe in its totality requires that we have a conception of "now", which accurately accounts for all the restrictions imposed by the reality of what now is. But SR/GR provides no real principles to account for the reality of now, thus allowing "now" to be defined by other principles. As explained above, this will render aspects of the universe (where the restrictions imposed by theory are not representative of the restrictions imposed in reality) as unintelligible.

Thisness—which is also known by medieval philosophers as haecceity—has its own special version in the work of Adorno, namely the non-identical. It’s the part of the thing that remains unique to it when you bring it under a category or think of it in terms of concepts, but which is lost sight of in this process. The singular thing is non-identical with the specimen, the latter being an instantiation, an example defined by categories, universals, or concepts. But the thing is not exhausted by any category you put it in, any abstract universal you bring it under, or any set of concepts you apply to describe it. — Jamal

:ok:

Possible errors do not imply actual falsity. — Dfpolis

Your categories are very confused Df. We were not talking about falsity, we were talking about identity. Your claim is that the form in the knower is the same as the form of the known sensible object. My argument is that the possibility that the form in the knower is mistaken indicates that they are not the same. There is no need to show actual mistake in any particular instance, to refute your claim. The premise that there is a possibility of mistake in any instance of the form in the knower, in its representation as the form of the sensible object, indicates that the two "forms" are not the same.

Please address the argument as it stands, and quit with your strawman misrepresentations. The argument does not move from what is possible to conclude what is actual. It is a refutation of your claim of what is actual. And it refutes your claim by moving from what is possible to conclude what is impossible. And the conclusion is that what you claim, is impossible.

No. First, there is knowing by acquaintance. It is not judgement, but an inchoate awareness of intelligibility. Second, we may parse or divide that awareness, abstracting property concepts. Judgement is a third movement of mind in which we reunite what we have abstracted, to form propositional knowledge. Thus, the abstraction (or knowing) of intrinsic property concepts is a necessary precondition for judgements about objects, and it is these abstracted concepts we compare to definitions in category judgements. — Dfpolis

OK, so in relations to the sense object, you say that there is first awareness, second a sort of analysis, which is to divide the "awareness", and third a sort of synthesis, which is to reunite abstracted parts to form propositional knowledge. "Judgement" you confine to this described synthesis, and you deny that the analysis portion ought to be called judgement.

Let me ask you now, what is this "awareness" which is divided in the second stage? What is the content? Obviously, you would not be talking about the sense object itself being divided, in this process of abstraction, it is the "awareness" of it which is being divided. Where does this awareness come from, and how does it exist? Would you agree that the "awareness" you speak of here, from which properties are abstracted is a property of the sensing subject, and not a property of the object sensed? How then is the "form" which comes from this abstraction "the same form" as the "form" which we call the actuality of the sense object?

Your Lockean prejudices — Dfpolis

First I was Kantian in my bias, now I'm Lockean.

our Lockean prejudices make you think that we know ideas, rather than objects, in the first instance. Yet, <This something is six-legged> is not a comparison of concepts, but of the source of concepts. The judgement means that the object that elicits the concept <This something> is the identical object that elicits <six-legged> -- not that the concept <This something> is identically the concept <six-legged>. — Dfpolis

By your own description above, it is not the sense object which elicits the concept, it is "awareness" of the object which does that. Awareness is a property of the subject not the object. So you are being inconsistent, unless "object" now refers to that property which the subject has as "awareness". Now, don't equivocate with "object" and say that this object which is a property of the subject, and is divided in analysis and abstraction is "the same" as the sense object.

So we need to know intrinsic properties prior to judging their type. — Dfpolis

Let's place these "intrinsic properties" now, which you keep referring to. Since the content, "awareness" is what is abstracted in the described analysis process, the "intrinsic properties" are intrinsic to the awareness. Do you agree?

I suggest that you reflect on the state of mind called "invincible ignorance" in which the will closes the mind to evidence that would undermine a prior belief. — Dfpolis

I am well exposed to this phenomena, having spent much time here at "The Philosophy Forum". You, are turning out to be a fine example. Maybe you'll address the above in a reasonable way, rather than totally misrepresenting all the evidence and arguments against your prior belief, as you are starting to do, and turn your ship around.

Yes, it does, because the vehicle of intelligibility is the phantasm or neural state encoding sensory content -- and it is identically the action of the sensible on our nervous system. So, it is the form or first actuality of the object, as expressed in the object's action (its second actuality), that the intellect grasps. — Dfpolis

Again, you are being inconsistent. According to your explanation above, (2) is not "sensory content", it is "awareness". And, it would be completely wrong to classify "awareness" as simply "sensory content", because awareness consists of many things, including memories (past) and anticipations (future).

You need to respect your own premises, and see how they are not consistent with your conclusions. The behaviour which you are starting to demonstrate though, is that you simply alter and reproduce your premises in a way which is intended to support your conclusions. This will leave your premises further and further away from what you truly believe, or what anyone truly believes. That's the problem which is the manifestation of "invincible ignorance", the sufferer will continue to describe the evidence in a more and more unreal way, as the willful means of supporting prejudice.

It is the first time I've seen you appealing to Kant. Had you done so earlier, I would have pointed it out earlier. Do you prefer "closet Kantian"? — Dfpolis

I really don't care how people classify me, but there's a lot worse names to be called than "Kantian". To me, name calling is a form of humour, to be laughed at. Perhaps that puts me on the side of the bully, who makes fun of others through name calling, but if I can't join in on the fun, where would that leave me?

I hate this piecemeal sort of reply. — Paine

Is the following ok, even though I put it in the same post as my reply to Dfpolis?

I did so here in response to: — Paine

The quotes in those posts showed no objection against what I had said. Eternal causes are actual, a sort of independent "form", and not natural, as I've been saying. The world, as well as the planet and stars (according to On The Heavens) are natural bodies and consist of matter. Therefore they are not eternal. Show me where you think that there is inconsistency between what I have said and what Aristotle has said, so I can determine whether this is due to your misunderstanding, my misunderstanding, or as in the case of fooloso4's references, inconsistency in the texts.

This does not make sense of much of what Aristotle has said. I am getting off the merry-go-round now. You do not recognize my efforts as efforts. I will make no more of them. — Paine

Have you read "On The Heavens"? He spends most of the first book demonstrating how the stars and planets which move in circular orbits must be material, natural bodies, generated and destructible. Here are some conclusions stated at the ends of the chapters. Ch 5: "We have now shown that the body which moves in a circle is not endless or infinite, but has its limits." Ch 6: "That there is no infinite body may be shown, as we have shown it, by a detailed consideration of the various cases." Ch 7: "From these arguments then it is clear that the body of the universe is not infinite." Ch 8: "We have now said enough to make plain the character and number of the bodily elements, the place of each, and further, in general, how many in number, the various places are." Ch 9: "Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal. " Following this there are three chapters dedicated to discussion of whether the heaven is generated, destructible, or not. The last lines of Ch 12: "Whatever is destructible or generated is always alterable. Now alteration is due to contraries, and the things which compose the natural body are the very same that destroy it..."