Lattice field theory avoids virtual particles, which are mathematical conveniences. — jgill

Hmm, there seems to be an incommensurability between the lattice representation, and the continuum representation. Here's from Wikki' entry on lattice guage theory:

"When the size of the lattice is taken infinitely large and its sites infinitesimally close to each other, the continuum gauge theory is recovered...
...Such calculations are often extremely computationally intensive, and can require the use of the largest available supercomputers."

I think the issue with the lattice representation is that the designation of a quantum (discrete unit) of space is completely arbitrary, not based on any real attributes of space itself. Then it becomes just a matter of re-representing a spatial continuum as an infinity of spatial units. That an infinite number is required demonstrates the incommensurability. But when mass, forces, and motion are represented, there's probably no significant different from points and vectors, because it appears like they are just trying to reproduce this in a different form anyway.

I'm curious how you would express what you have said in the context of field theory. — jgill

I think that field theory gives properties to space itself, the electromagnetic field for example. But since the electromagnetic field is observed to react with massive objects like atoms, or even just electrons, through quanta, the tendency is to give the quantum of energy a particle-like existence, as a point. This is very similar to what I said above, that the object with mass is represented as a point (centre of gravity). It's a matter of simplicity, to interact with a particle with mass, which is represented as a point, the thing interacting is also represented as a point. As I said above, I believe this is inaccurate. So in as much as the representation of fields might in some way represent real spatial attributes, the points in the field, which are supposed to be particles are not adequate representations. But these points are needed to explain how the field interacts with mass which is represented as a point, a centre of gravity for the sake of simplicity. So what is needed is to get away from representing mass as a point. Then when the field interacts with mass in the way of quanta, it is not at a point in the field.

Consider the way that an electron interacts with a proton in an atom for example. The interaction does not occur simply between a point where the electron is, and a point where the proton is. The interaction is occurring everywhere within the orbital, so it is understood as the "electron cloud". It is not the case that at any moment, the electron is at some point in the cloud, it is the case that at every moment, the electron is everywhere in that cloud. This is because "the electron" does not exist as a particle at a point, that's just a representation which was made for simplicity sake, to show its mass as being at a point.

I'm not familiar with Richard Swinburne, but I will check your reference.

Isn't this something to do with the parable of the three horses, being the various appetites? That the appetitive part of the soul overwhelms the rational part? Would seem like 'plato 101' to me, but then what do I know.... — Wayfarer

Neither am I familiar with "the three horses", and I'm a bit thrown off by your use of "appetites" (plural) here. Aristotle had an "appetitive part", referring to bodily desires, and the source of action toward such desires. But "appetites" is more proper to Aquinas. He proposed two principal types of appetites, sensitive and rational and made further divisions beyond this. Each appetite is directed towards a "good". Notice that even bodily desires are directed towards "a good". This was to maintain consistency with Aristotle's separation between apparent good (sense appetite) and real good (rational appetite). The sensitive appetites would remain unintelligible if not directed towards a good, so that good is designated as apparent, and not necessarily real.

From Aquinas' perspective, the entirety of the living being, body and mind, has appetitive motivations. Appetite is the source of movement, in general. The problem which Plato inherited from the pre-Socratic idealists, was that the whole realm of intelligible objects, therefore the intelligible realm in general, was portrayed as passive, inactive, eternal objects, which could have no causal efficacy. This is often referred to by modern monists as producing the problem of interaction. Plato showed this problem to inhere within the theory of participation. So he introduced "the good" as the source of motivation, activity, and therefore causal efficacy in the intelligible realm. This made a clear division between bodily appetite and intelligible good.

Prior to this, causal motivation of human beings, 'appetite', had to come from the world of sense objects, therefore manifesting as bodily desires. This was the only source for active causation in the human being. But Plato recognized that the intellect itself had to have within it causal motive power, and this he proposed as "the good". Now he had a clear division between bodily motivation represented as sensual desire (appetite), and intellectual motivation represented as the good. From the latter developed the concept of "will", which became Aquinas' rational appetite. But Plato proposed a medium between these two sources of active causation, as passion or spirit. Passion could ally with the body to overwhelm the mind, or it could ally with the mind to subdue the body. In any case, passion is the medium between body and mind, which along with "the good" or Aristotle's "final cause" as the source of activity within the intelligible realm, resolved the problem of interaction.

Notice that following Aristotle all sources of motivation are represented under "good", whether real or apparent. This provides consistency throughout the entirety of the human being, so that there is no conflict between body and mind, as Plato represented the body and mind within a sort of conflict. This allows the intellect to smoothly rule over the body by making the bodily desires intelligible as "goods", and as Aquinas proposed, the intelligible goods of the will are equally "appetites".

The issue is that you get dimensionless points (no volume of space occupied by the points), in space, which have properties, as point particles. Traditionally, a point could not be a body with properties, but its mass might be represented as a point, the centre of gravity. So the point became a very effect way to represent a body's mass for calculations in physics. The centre of gravity. You can see though, that the point does not provide a very truthful, or even accurate representation of a body, which really exists in the area around the point, though it provides a very useful representation of its mass for many practises.

But when we start to break bodies apart, getting down to smaller and smaller parts, the concept of "mass" breaks down as well, being a feature of a body's way of occupying space as a coherent whole. That's why "density" is an important concept in relation to "mass". So for instance, if you propose to break apart a massive particle, like a hadron (proton, neutron) into its composite quarks, it's mass cannot be accounted for. The mass is more like a property of the space that the combined quarks are existing in, as a coherent unity, and this is known as the strong force. So further particles, gluons, might proposed to account for the existence of this force, but these would be represented as points, therefore not properly representing the area.

You ought to be able to see that the strong force is a property of an area of space, the area within which the hadron exists. That area is responsible for the existence of the hadron and its mass. So when it comes down to the nitty gritty of providing a true and accurate representation of mass, the point, as the centre of gravity, fails badly. In reality, "mass" refers to how a body is extended in space, so when a physicist tries to break a massive hadron into its composite point particles, its mass cannot be adequately represented.

If the physicist does not respect this difference between theory (representing mass as a point), and practise (the experiments demonstrate that mass cannot exist at a point), then the physicist will continue into that theoretical fantasy land, a fictional world requiring the assumption of "virtual particles", in a pointless attempt to maintain the representation of mass at a point.

I don't see the point. That "sacrifice" exists doesn't mean that sacrifice is good. In fact, an examination of most instances of sacrifices will probably show that they are generally misguided, and very often far from good.

I'm inclined to agree with Banno that on occasion one has to sacrifice one's happiness for good, implying they aren't the same. I'm shocked Aristotle missed such an obvious fact. — Agent Smith

As I said, this would require proving that there is something better than happiness, to show that one ought to sacrifice happiness for this better good. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness, therefore you ought to sacrifice your happiness for X does not suffice.

That's part of the reason why I disagree with Aristotle on that point. However, the argument is not as simple as Banno makes it look. To prove that point one would have to show how something is better than happiness. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness doesn't prove the point. That is the problem which Plato had with those who equated good with pleasure. You can't just stipulate that good is something different from pleasure, and leave it at that. That does not convince anyone. You need to produce descriptive premises concerning "good", and descriptive premises concerning "pleasure", and show how the nature of each of these differs from the other. As Plato found out, it's not an easy task to convince someone who already believes that good is pleasure.

The point though, was how Aristotle moved to put an end to the infinite regress you noted. The thing he named as the ultimate end (wanted for the sake of itself), was perhaps not the correct solution, but he showed a way toward that solution. We could name "the good" as the ultimate end, but that's completely intangible. Swapping "the good" for "happiness" provides us with something tangible, while being slightly more palatable than "pleasure".

Oh my. Whereas the simplest vector spaces (in R^2 or C) have vectors which can be represented by little arrows in the Euclidean or complex planes, most vectors in QM go far beyond this and cannot be so described. See Hilbert space. — jgill

The basic principle of the vector remains the same, but the vector space described is more complicated. The complexity of these vector spaces is what gives rise to the idea of "inner products". The use of "inner" makes it sound like these are properties internal to the point. In reality they are how the point relates to other points (by means of vectors), therefore external relations.

I fear that doesn't work. Why is happiness good? — Agent Smith

I disagree with it as well, but the reasons are given in the Nichomacean Ethics. Basically there is the appearance of infinite regress, as you described. So Aristotle looked for something "self-sufficient", wanted only for the sake of itself, because that would put an end to that regress. If X is good because it is for the sake of Y, and Y is good for the sake of Z, and Z for A, etc., he figure that there needed to be something final, that all the others would lead to, as ultimately being for the sake of that final thing. That's the ultimate end, wanted only for the sake of itself. This he assumed is the person's happiness.

I think it more correct to say judgement depends on, or follows from, an instance of willing, but one is not the other. An instance of willing is the immediate determination of an act, therein called a volition, in accordance with a feeling; to judge is to relate the correspondence of the volition to the feeling that caused it. — Mww

But would you class judgement as part of the reasoning process? Suppose reasoning is the feeling which causes a volition. Then, if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things, would a conclusion (judgement) come about naturally as part of the reasoning process, or is there a separate act of will required which constitutes the judgement or conclusion ?

This has a bearing on the nature of logic, because we say that logic necessitates the conclusion. But if a separate act of willing is required then one might suspend judgement even in the cases of logical necessity. And I wonder if this is possible. If a person understands, and apprehends the logic, is it still possible that they might reject the conclusion, or at least suspend judgement. On the other hand, if it is impossible for a person who understands the logic, to reject the conclusion, then it would appear like there is no separate act of willing between the reasoning and the judgement.

Ahhhh….possibly the greatest source of abhorrence in metaphysical practices, in which the warrant for a principle which is both entirely sufficient in itself and absolutely necessary as a merely logical terminus, yet completely unavailable to empirical justification, must be given a place in a sub-system of the human condition. It is here your loophole makes its appearance, as the very epitome of abstract rationality. — Mww

Isn't this just the nature of philosophy though, especially metaphysics, to seek an understanding of things which escape empirical justification. It is tied up with wondering "why". Socrates said philosophy is based in wonder. There is a type of empirically observable occurrence which appears to happen for no apparent reason, empirically. This is the act of will. Since there appears to be no material cause we ask "why" it happened, which implies an intentional cause. Once we accept the reality of this type of causation, the non-empirically justifiable cause, of an empirically observable activity, we can much better understand the mindset which posits God as the immaterial cause of the universe.

It’s abhorrent because to be useful it must be accepted as legitimate, and hardly anybody wants to merely accept anything carte blanche. Made worse by the stipulation that the thing requiring mere acceptance is never allowed to pertain to the system granting the acceptance. It’s the same as…conceiving a thing, but prohibiting that conception from acting on or even within the system that conceived it. How absurd is that!!!! Can you walk without moving your foot??? — Mww

It does pertain though. It's related as cause to effect. The actions of human beings are observable with the senses, yet the causes of these actions, will and intention, are not observable through the senses. The abhorrence, I believe derives from the simplistic idea that sense observation is the only cause of knowledge and knowledge is what leads to human actions. Not wanting to complicate things, people deny the causal role of intention and rational thought in the production of knowledge, so the suggestion that these things which are not observable through the senses, have real causal effect in the world, seems abhorrent to them. To put it simply, the attitude is that dualism is too complex, and monism provides me with as much as I need to know about causation; so don't try to pass your dualist ideas on me because I have no use for them.

The purpose of a will is to cause an end. It is the end itself that is judged, the willing of it be what it may. The secondary question would then be….what end does the will purpose itself toward, but the primary question must remain…how is the agent in possession of such a will informed as to does or does not the end he wills satisfy the need he feels. And TA-DAAAA!!!, there’s where your preference to….. — Mww

I think I have to disagree with this characterization of "will". I think that what is caused by the will is the means to the end, not the end itself. This puts the acts which are caused by the will into the domain of observable by the senses (material), while the end itself, as the desire or want, stays within the unobservable realm (immaterial).

So for example, you talk about feelings as what leads to an act of volition. Let's say that I have a sort of feeling within myself, which is thirst. I don't automatically go for a drink of water, as if the thirst causes the volition, I first use my mind to recognize the feeling as a need for water. Then I can produce the end , which is the goal of a glass of water. Or perhaps, my mind is habitualized so as to go straight from the feeling, to the end, which is to have the goal of getting a drink. Whatever the precise process is, the point is that the mind produces the end, then I believe it is the will which initiates my act of going to get a drink, and that is the means. I believe it is this separation between the end and the means, or I can express it as the separation between the intentions or goals, and the actions which are taken to bring about the goals, which allows for long term goals, and delay between judgement and acting. I think it's important to represent the real possibility of delay between setting a goal, and acting to fulfill it.

.meets its authority, but…..

I think will ought to be separated from judgement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

….is contestable on theoretical grounds, insofar as will remains connected to judgement of a certain kind, itself removed from the intellect as well. — Mww

I believe the will must be separated from judgement in theory, to account for the reality of the separation between judging and acting. As mentioned above, this is necessary to allow for the reality of long term goals and delayed actions. So perhaps we have the relation between judgement and will backward. If the will is active, continuously, all the time, then judgement is what prevents certain actions (this lead to the concept of will power) to allow for others. Then the human body is a continuous hive of activity, and the will is preventing all sorts of possible activities and this is allowing other activities to proceed smoothly. Then the whole idea that the human will initiates specific actions is sort of backward backward. If I want to get up off the couch, for example, I block a whole lot of internal energy flow, to allow this energy to flow smoothly toward moving my legs. What I think of as willing a particular action, and having it proceed from that act of will, would really proceed by way of block a whole lot of other internal actions, which induces that one to go ahead.

It is somewhat off topic, but we are within the theme of dualism, and discussing indirectly, the problem which Plato brought up in the Protagoras, the problem of "being overcome by pleasure". This is when a person acts in a way which is contrary to one's own judgement. You say here, that this action which is contrary to one's rational judgement would still involve a sort of judgement, but the judgement is removed from the intellect. I would characterize such actions as a lack of judgement. So I used the concept of "inertia" above. The person just continues moving in a way which requires the least effort, or will power, allowing oneself to go with the flow. So the person knows at the time that the action is bad, and the person does not want to do it, but they do not have the will power to prevent it from happening.

Inferring is not the same knowing as seeing the "object of perception", as MU said earlier in his post. Knowing through the object of perception means you actually use your 5 senses to get to know an object. You see a walking, talking person, you are perceiving that person as other person. — L'éléphant

To use all five senses to know an object requires that your mind unifies the information from each of the five. This would be a form of synthesis. The senses don't know anything, the mind does.

That is why Aristotle proposed "happiness" as the end which breaks the infinite regress.

But the issue is, what do these mathematical representations represent in the real material world? Or do we simply deny that there is a real material world? Perhaps our senses deceive us.

The problem with vectors is that they represent things (forces and movements) with one dimensional straight lines, when we know that in reality these things act in a multidimensional way. This produces a fundamental requirement of stacked vectors to represent a multitude of dimensions. Since the vector is a line segment, it fundamentally represents a relationship between points. However, through terms of usage which manipulate human thought, we come to believe that a vector represents properties at a point, forgetting that it really is a relationship between points.

So we get terms like "inner product' which appear to represent something which is internal to a point, when in reality it represents that point's relation to other points in a dimensional representation. Then there is a whole class of concepts such as "angular momentum" and "spin" which through the terminology used appear to represent something internal to a point, when in reality they are produced by relating that point to other points dimensionally.

The issue is, as I said at the beginning, the straight line of a vector does not accurately represent a multidimensional activity which has curves inherent within every infinitesimal point. So real movement from one infinitesimal space to the next is not accurately represented with straight vectors, and the longer the vectors are, the more the inaccuracy is magnified.

Sounds and smells. like the visual images and tactile sensations of objects are stimuli. but the former are conceived, and hence perceived, as being effects of the actions or processes associated with the objects we can feel and see. The idea of objects of the senses does not require that all sensory stimuli be conceived and perceived as objects; to claim that would be a lame argument indeed. — Janus

I can't agree with what you are saying. You are classing hearing and smelling as distinct from seeing and touching. But it seems to me that hearing and seeing are much more similar to each other as the reception of waves. So why would you separate them in categorizing types of sensations?

I think the traditional categorization is to place touch, taste, and smell together as tactile senses. The tactile senses are understood to operate through an action of molecules. Then hearing and sight are somewhat different because they operate through the reception of waves.

I think that if you want to talk about objects of sense, we'd be talking about molecules, because these seem to be the only objects which are actually sensed, and they are sensed by the tactile senses. That there are any objects other than these must be a conception of the mind.

You don't need to see every detail in order to a whole object from some perspective. — Janus

I can't agree with your definition of "whole" either. You imply that sensing some random parts constitutes sensing the "whole". So whatever parts constitutes "the whole" is just an arbitrary judgement you make for the purpose of supporting your argument. In reality, the whole is the complete, all there is, the entirety of something.

You can move around many objects so as to see them from all sides, and in principle you could do this with a star or even a galaxy. — Janus

And this is, is just a demonstration of sloppy thinking on your part. To imply that something which could be done "in principle" is what is actually done in practise is just a false premise.

You are completely ignoring what I said a number of posts ago. We cannot, even in principle, sense the boundaries of the things which we call objects. That is what I demonstrated with my examples of the sun and moon. We do not sense the gravity which is a part of the moon. Yet this part of the moon is right here on the earth, as we know by the tidal effects. Therefore the boundary of the moon must be beyond the earth, and not at all sensed by us. We do sense the light of the sun so this part of the sun is right here touching us. But we do not see how far that part of the sun extends, we don't see its boundary.

You're forgetting one thing -- you can't step outside the universe to observe it. — L'éléphant

I don't see how that's relevant. You cannot observe anything from outside of it. To observe it requires that it has an effect on you, and this means that part of it is touching you. If part of it is touching you, you are not outside it. That was the point of my example of the sun. I feel the warmth of the sun on my skin, therefore part of the sun is touching me. We know this as the sun's electromagnetic field. So, just like I am not outside of the moon because I am within this part of it which we call its gravity, I am also not outside of the sun because I am inside this part of it which we call its electromagnetic field.

Objects of the senses have visually or tactitlely determinable boundaries. Visual objects have edges and tactile objects have surfaces. Sounds and smells are not objects, but stimuli. — Janus

As I explained, those are not true boundaries, they are just what appears to be a boundary through that particular sense. And, since sounds and smells are sensed, but you say they are not objects, your whole general category, "objects of the senses"' breaks down. What is sensed is stimuli, as you now admit, not objects.

Then with our minds we decide which parts of our environment which we are sensing qualify as "objects". You, for no good reason want to disqualify "the universe" from being an object. Why? Do you have any reason for this desire, even if it's a bad reason?

You are just digging yourself a deeper hole with each post Janus.

We can look at distant galaxies and stars and see the whole of them — Janus

That's nonsense. I look at a distant hill and I can't even see the whole of it. I don't see each rock, each tree, each molecule, or each atom, and I don't see the whole back side of it. Your premises are terribly wrong. If you want to make a respectable argument, I suggest that you put a little more thought into your premises. And if you did that, you would see that you haven't an argument to make, because there are no true premises which would support what you are arguing.

then according to Protagoras what Socrates says is true, in which case what Protagoras says is false. — Fooloso4

I don't know about this. If what Protagoras says is false, then we cannot conclude that what Socrates says is true either. So it's just a vicious circle of nothing, which doesn't tell us anything about the truth or falsity of what either of them says.

On the second, however, I think I’d go with judgement associated with desire rather than will, in which case the judgement is aesthetic, in association with practical reason, but in accordance with a particular feeling, or perhaps more accurately, in accordance to some arbitrary degree of a general feeling. As has been hinted elsewhere herein, account must be made for necessarily different causalities corresponding to these thoroughly incongruent kinds of objects. — Mww

But isn't what you describe here really just an instance of willing? Judgement according to an arbitrary feeling, or according to logical reasoning, each, if it initiates action, is an instance of willing. But the problem I have, is that we can make a judgement that a specific act is needed, yet not proceed toward the action, as in procrastination. So that's why I thought a separation between judgement and will is required.

Ehhh….I’m reluctant to let the will be subservient to anything within the human condition. If there is any way whatsoever, in which the subject has even the slightest modicum of self-control, in which he is the arbiter of his own circumstance, only restrained by natural limitations, then there must be a means for it, and if that means is called will, so be it. It’s as simple and certainly as plausible as….we might think we can talk and swallow at the same time, only to find out we cannot, an altogether empirical determination, but we can always think a thing within our limitations we might do, then find out we can either cause or not cause the doing of it, which is a rational rather than empirical determination.
———— — Mww

I agree, that's why I think will ought to be separated from judgement. But then where does that leave will? Let's assume that the subject actually is "the arbiter of his own circumstance", yet is still "restrained by natural limitations". How could this be possible? The law of inertia says that a body will continue to move as it has in the past, unless caused to change by a force. It would appear like "natural limitations" would include the law of inertia, therefore the subject would have to act on itself, as a force, through the means of the will, to cause change to one's own motion.

Suppose the will is such a force now. How can it be directed as to where to act within the body, and when to act on that part of the body? This is the issue Aristotle approached with the powers (potencies) of the soul, powers such as subsistence, self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. These powers are not necessarily active all the time, so they must exist as potentials which must be actualized when required.

The soul itself is the fundamental principle of actuality of the living body. But I ask now, how can that fundamental actuality (what we're calling the will here) direct itself as to which potentials to actualize, to create activity? Acting as a force, from within a body, with some sort of choice as to which parts of the body it acts on and when, means that it must be itself, not behaving according to the law of inertia. This is why we can understand the soul, or the will, as immaterial, it is a cause which does not act according to the laws which apply to material bodies.

But even that is just a diversion, because I've still not addressed my own question, how can these actions be directed. The will is not moving according to the laws of material bodies, but can it be truly directing its own movements? So, I'll go back to the gap between "natural limitations" and "arbiter of his own circumstance". The natural limitations are the laws of nature, which enforce a specific order to actions. But there appears to be some sort of loop hole which allows for a type of random action, exempt from the laws of natural order. The soul can make use of this loop hole to make randomish acts in a sort of trial and error way. But still, trial and error requires some sort of judgement as to which acts are successful, and which are not, and success is measured in relation to an end. So I still haven't really freed the will from the need for an end, and the need for a judgement.

But if man means mankind a stronger argument can be made. — Fooloso4

This is addressed in the Theaetetus, discussed above. Some men, the followers of Parmenides, have standards which are completely incommensurable with the standards of other men, the followers of Heraclitus. So the idea that a unity of "mankind" could produce an uncontestable measurement is discredited. Then we are thrust backward toward the idea that true measurement is relative to the individual. But that subjective position cast doubt on the validity of measurement in general, making it completely relative.

You don't really mean to say this. The universe is not an object of the senses. You don't actually see the totality of everything. The universe is not a place. — L'éléphant

I don't see your point. To see something does not require seeing the totality of it. I look at my car, and I see it. Having a motor, transmission and drive shaft are essential parts of the car, but I do not see them. Likewise, "the totality of everything" is essential to the universe, but I can still see the universe without seeing the totality of everything. We could say "a multitude of H2O molecules" is essential to being a body of water. But I see a body of water without seeing any molecules of H2O. Your argument clearly fails.

That is a weak rejoinder. With any object of the senses the boundaries are determinable, and an object of the senses has a location. Where is the universe located? — Janus

It's your argument which is weak Janus. The true boundaries of a sense object are always indeterminable. What is the boundary of a smell? A smell consists of molecules which are sensed. How many molecules of the specific gas are required before it is smelled? Of course that depends on many factors. There is no determinable boundary to a smell. Nor is there a determinable boundary between blue and green, nor red and orange. The true boundaries of colours are indeterminable.

Your claim that any object of the senses has a determinable boundary is simply unjustifiable. How is it that I feel the heat of the sun on my skin? Am I touching the sun? If so, where is its boundary? If not, then where is the boundary which marks the edge of the sun? And how is it that the moon affects the tides in the oceans on earth? If we place a boundary at the edge of the visible part of the moon, between the moon and the earth, then is the moon's gravity not a part of the moon? If the moon's gravity is not a part of the moon, then what is it? And if it is a part of the moon how can it have an effect on earth if the boundary of the moon is between the earth and moon? That a sense object has determinable boundaries is just an assumption of convenience, which is not at all a truth.

These boundaries we refer to are not "determinable", but arbitrarily stipulated. Therefore the object's "location" is also arbitrarily stipulated according to the stipulated boundary. Then we position the object in relation to a number of other things to assign a location. Where is the sun? The centre of the solar system (consisting of a number of things). Where is the solar system? In the Milky Way (consisting of a multitude of things). Where is the Milky Way? Etc.. So when it comes to the question "where is the universe located?", we can make an equally arbitrary answer which positions it relative to a number of things. We can locate it as "everywhere". This is simply to say that its location is relative to the location of everything (consisting of a multitude of things). So we locate the universe relative to a number of things, just like we locate the sun relative to a number of things, and there is no fundamental difference.

You see, your argument has no strength. It is extremely weak due to unsound premises.

There's another thing which this brings to mind. It occurs with respect to 'akrasia', a term used by Socrates to describe the state of acting against one's better judgement, or weakness of will. It refers to a lack of self-control or discipline, where an individual acts on their desires or emotions rather than following their rational beliefs. Akrasia is often considered a form of moral failing or lack of virtue. Famously, in Protagoras, Socrates attests that akrasia does not exist, claiming "No one goes willingly toward the bad" (358d). If a person examines a situation and decides to act in the way he determines to be best, he will pursue this action, as the best course is also the good course, i.e. man's natural goal. — Wayfarer

I think this is a very difficult, deep and twisted subject. If I could make it intelligible to you you'd have to change my name to "the unmuddler". Augustine gave it much consideration and only progressed slightly. Aquinas gave some guidance by expounding on Aristotle's concept of "habit". "Habit" is a very strange concept, fundamentally meaning "to have" as a property or attribute, but the attribute is understood as a potential (being the propensity to act in a specific way), rather than something actual. This means that it's not a property in the sense of a formal aspect of a thing (describable in terms of form), it is a property of a thing's potential. So the habit, under Aquinas, becomes the property of potential, and it is very difficult, if not unintelligible, to conceive of something without actual existence having properties. It appears like the properties can only be imaginary. So I think we should not jump to any conclusions about what Plato is arguing in the passage you quote.

Notice I say Plato, rather than Socrates. This is because I believe that what Plato is demonstrating often varies greatly from what Socrates argues. Plato uses an argumentative form whereby Socrates will put forward a common fundamental belief, something which it appears like no rational person would doubt (perhaps even a Wittgensteinian bedrock or hinge belief). Then Socrates will show absurd logical conclusions which will follow from that belief if it is steadfastly adhered to as a premise. In this way Plato demonstrates problems with commonly held beliefs. In the argument of the Theaetetus, it is shown that if we adhere to the premise that knowledge is true judgement, then there is no such thing as false judgement.

The argument which you refer to in Protagoras is somewhat more difficult because there is a number of premises which are involved, which need to be isolated. Plato does not properly separate the premises to give a good indication of which ones are causing which problems. First, there is the general idea that pleasure is good and pain is bad (354-355). But this basic premise causes a problem because there is something known as "being overcome by pleasure", in which case the person acts badly. So if pleasure is good, being overcome with good (pleasure) could cause a man to act badly. That's nonsensical. This produces a discussion about how we judge immediate things relative to far away things, and the immediate appear bigger than the far away things, so skill in the art of measurement is required for judging pleasures near in time in relation to pleasures far away in time.

From here (357) there is difficulty because Plato has driven a wedge between pleasure and good (I believe this division is more evident in The Gorgias). The problem is that true pleasure occurs at the present in time, while knowledge and judgement are in relation to future pleasures. Notice that both the near and far away pleasures are each equally in the future. The future pleasures are not true pleasures, but potential pleasures, existing only in relation to the mind or imagination. So the separation between pleasure and good relies on having "good" relate to future possibilities, and "pleasure" refer to what occurs at the present. This allows one's judgement of "good" (measurement in relation to future pleasures) to be "overcome by pleasure"(which is occurring at the present), and the person acts badly. The difficulty is that now there is nothing real to relate "good" to, how to scale future pleasures. The supposed future pleasures which are compared, and measured by principles of knowledge are not real pleasures (pleasure being what occurs at the moment), they are "goods", what is desired for the future.

So from this point onward in the dialogue we have no grounding or basic principle for understanding the influence of what is occurring at the present moment (pleasure or pain), on our knowledge based judgements toward future goods. The division has been established to allow for "being overcome by pleasure" at the present moment. This is important toward understanding the quote you produced: "No one goes willingly toward the bad". The type of action referred to as "being overcome by pleasure" is characterized as something other than a willful act. It is not the manifestation of a knowledge based judgement concerning the future, it is the persistence of what is occurring at the present (bodily based, like inertia). We can call this type of act an act which is devoid of end, no view toward the future, just a living in the moment, and we must assume that it has real presence in human activity.

This separation becomes evident in the next part of the dialogue, concerning "courage". Protagoras separates courage from the other virtues, the others being knowledge based, courage is claimed not to be knowledge based. This is because the other virtues require will power to prevent being "overcome" at the present time, for the sake of future goods. "Courage" appears to be of the opposite type, requiring one to act swiftly at the present without a view toward the future. It involves turning away from what we know about the future (the fears this knowledge causes), to act against this knowledge. However, Socrates insists that "courage" has an opposite, "cowardice", one being an inclination to move toward what is feared and the other an inclination away from what is feared. So both are characterized as an inclination to act toward the future, therefore knowledge based, and distinct from "being overcome by pleasure" which is more like inaction.

Back to your quote now. "No one goes willingly toward the bad". The truth of this statement relies on how we define "willingly". If we define it as a knowledge based action derived from conscious judgement, the statement holds true. But then there is the tendency for bodies to persist in their movements, as they have done in the past (law of inertia), and these actions are distinct from knowledge based actions derived from conscious judgement toward the future. And this is where "habit" enters the scenario. People do move toward the bad, but it's not "willingly" by that definition, it's the continuation of past action, inertia, a body will continue to move as it has, unless forced to change its course. Notice we have the advantage of the concept of "inertia", which the presocratics did not have. .

But this opens a whole can of worms, because legally we need to hold people responsible for their actions even if they are derived from habit (inertial based rather than consciously willed). Therefore that definition of "willingly" or "willful" is fundamentally unacceptable, and we need to go back to the drawing board.

Socrates denies that it is possible to act against your better judgement. — Wayfarer

Based on what I wrote above, we need to be very careful in stating what Socrates affirms or denies. Many of his statements, as written by Plato, are expressed as a necessary conclusion which results if we adhere to specific premises. And, Plato is often questioning those very premises in a skeptical way. So he shows that by adhering to the premise which he doubts, a conclusion which is completely inconsistent with common evidence will result. In other words he is showing inconsistency between common conventional beliefs.

That it is impossible for a person to act against one's better judgement is one of those conclusions, absurdly contrary to common evidence. It is produced from the premise that virtue is knowledge. So this premise "virtue is knowledge" is what is at question. The common evidence which is contrary to the conclusion is what is called "being overcome by pleasure", in which case a person does act against one's better judgement. Now, "virtue is knowledge" is highly doubtful because virtue requires the capacity to resist being overcome by pleasure, which is the situation where knowledge actually does not rule one's activities. So in those situations where knowledge is not ruling, virtue requires something other than knowledge. No degree of knowledge can give one the capacity to overrule the reality that pleasure often overrules knowledge. This is why "the good" appears to be outside the apprehension of the mind, as ais arguing.

Now, we do have a compromised solution, the proper quote: "No one goes willingly toward the bad". But this only ties the willful act to the knowledge based act, producing the conclusion that all those instances of being overcome by pleasure are not willful or knowledge based acts. But this leaves a whole class of human acts which cannot be called "willful".

Judgement. All-important, hardly comprehensible. As in other things, the ancients didn’t attribute to judgement its due, while on the other hand, subsequent philosophies may just as well have made theoretical expositions regarding it, damn near incomprehensible.

At the very least, seriously complicated. Like…what is it, are there different kinds, from different sources, relating, and related to, different conditions. Is it its own faculty, or is it part of another.

All that being said, I’ve come to reject JTB as inadequate, and “knowledge as true judgement” as misplaced functionality. Which, of course, are themselves merely judgements of mine. — Mww

I'm in agreement. Judgement is not well understood, by anyone. And judgement is not the same as knowledge, nor is true judgement knowledge, whatever "true judgement" means. I like the approach of Augustine, which is a theoretical separation of distinct functions of the mind, or intellect. He proposes three aspects, memory, reason, and will, which seem fairly consistent with what I experience. But when I look at judgement it appears sometimes to be associated with reason, as logic forces judgement, and sometimes it appears to be associated with will, as I am free to make judgements without even employing reason. Aquinas shows a similar issue, will he says, is generally subservient to reason. But ultimately, in the absolute sense, will as the initiator of action must be free from reason, and this is why we can make unreasonable judgements.

Because there is this crossover of the categories, it is likely that those three categories are not formulated quite right. I think I would prefer to completely remove will from the intellect, leaving memory, reason, and judgement. Will, as the initiator of action must be separate from judgement to allow for the common temporal separation between judgement and action which results in things like procrastination.

The universe is an object of the senses. I see it anytime my eyes are open. That I don't see all of it doesn't mean that I don't see it.

Everything is not itself a thing, which means it is no-thing. So everything is nothing. But no-thing is not nothing. So everything is not nothing.

Also no thing is everything...there is othing that is everything, so...nothing is everything...QED

Wordplay! — Janus

Yes it is wordplay, but it's based in denial that there is such a thing as "the universe". Under conventional definition, the universe is a collection of all things. Hence if the universe is a thing, then everything is a thing, the universe. So only by denying that the universe is a coherent whole, as a thing, can the wordplay even begin.

The proposed answer, justified true belief, is Theaetetus', not Socrates. It proves to be inadequate. It faces the same problem. What justifies an opinion? After all, the Sophists were skilled at giving justifications for opinions, both true and false. In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief. — Fooloso4

Actually the problem with justification is laid out in the discussion of the relationship between the parts and the whole. Justification is said to be "an account", which is to break the thing into parts in analysis and explain the reason for each part. However, there is a need to assume base parts which are indivisible, to avoid infinite regress. But then these base parts cannot themselves be justified. Wittgenstein investigates this. The other issue is the question of whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. If so, then justification cannot properly disclose the true idea, and any account will fall short of accounting for the whole.

Since justification is shown to be inadequate Socrates falls back on true judgement, near the end of the dialogue, and asks how could justification add anything substantial to true judgement anyway. But true judgement has already been shown to be inadequate because it produces the conclusion that false judgement is impossible, therefore any judgement would be knowledge. So the dialogue ends without anything conclusive.

I’d even go so far as to say, for its time, both those guys thought deeper into the human condition than any one else ever has, at least those present in the historical record. — Mww

Well, there's always Thomas Aquinas as well, a very adept thinker himself, who showed a good grasp of both Plato and Aristotle. He worked very hard to prove consistency between the various thinkers who came before him, and he provided a synthesis of numerous different philosophers. That's not an easy task.

Sidebar: I would like to say there are no false judgements. Regarding….

the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible.
— Metaphysician Undercover

…..what was the conclusion? Are they, or are they not, possible? — Mww

As I interpret the dialogue, false judgement is shown to be impossible. But this conclusion is derived from the premise that knowledge is true judgement. So there's a dichotomy set up between knowing (truth) and not knowing (falsity), and its by adhering to this dichotomy, and allowing nothing in between, that the conclusion is produced.

But Socrates prepares us for this by discussing the difference between Parmenides (all that is is, and all that is not is not) and Heraclitus (all is becoming). Starting with dichotomous principles as the premises for understanding the nature of knowledge, as Parmenides did, would render knowledge as unintelligible if knowledge is a from of becoming. The principles of being and not being are fundamentally different from, and incompatible with, becoming. That's what Zeno showed. So I would say that the lesson to be learned is that describing judgements in terms of true and false, doesn't provide an adequate description of judgement.

The Aristotelian solution is to affirm that ideas, i.e. abstract objects, have potential existence prior to being "discovered". Discovery of abstract objects is the actualization of potential.

The use of "potential" here is very important to Aristotle's understanding of necessity and contingency. The point is that any potential, by its very nature of "potential", provides no necessity toward actualization or even the way that it is actualized. So in general, a potential admits to many possible different forms of actuality, being capable of being caused to be actualized, in numerous possible ways. That is the basis of "contingency". When a thing comes to be from potential, its existence is contingent on the causes which actualize it, making it that thing rather than something else.

Therefore, under the Aristotelian resolution, ideas and abstract objects have contingent existence rather than necessary existence. This is because they require this cause, the actualization by a human mind, to bring them from that realm of potential, to having an actual form (formula). And, because there is no necessity here, they may be actualized in different ways. So for example, the true nature of space and time is very difficult for human beings to understand, and is fundamentally not understood when approached by human beings. The mathematicians in the field of pure mathematics are free to produce axioms as they please. They are not constrained by necessity, and the axioms produced are contingent on the workings of their minds. But this this contingency turns out to be "necessary", in the sense of needed. The mathematicians may produce axioms freely, and the ones deemed as needed are adopted. This principle is very evident within the scientific method. A variety of hypotheses can be produced freely, and tried (the trial and error of the scientific method of exprimentation), allowing us to judge which of the freely produced axioms best match the reality of the universe.

When the mathematical axioms seem to work very well, and are assumed to adequately match the reality of the universe, we start to take them for granted, and assume of them, the status of "eternal truth". This feeds the illusion that they have always existed as such, and are "necessary" (in the sense of could not be otherwise), manifesting in the ontology of Platonism. But the real sense of "necessary" which is applicable here, is that these axioms are the ones which are deemed as needed for our purposes, and the adoption of these principles is based in pragmaticism. Therefore the specific ideas and abstractions which come into being in the human mind are contingent on the desires and intentions of free willing human beings, which act as the final cause of their existence.

"Final cause" is Aristotle's rendition of Plato's "the good", and Plato can be understood as refuting Pythagorean Idealism which is now called "Platonism". This begins in Plato's middle period where he proposes "the good" in The Republic as that which makes the intelligible objects intelligible. Modern day "Platonism" receives its name from a misunderstanding of Plato, which interprets Plato as supporting Pythagorean Idealism rather than rejecting it. Socrates was fascinated by Parmenides, and the Eleatics had a sort of contentious relationship with the Pythagoreans revealing fundamental faults in idealism. These were arguments like Zeno's which contemporaries dismissed as sophistry.

This rift in ancient idealism, I believe was the beginning of the demise of it, which Plato seized upon. The misunderstanding, that Plato supported this ancient idealism rather than exposing its weaknesses, has been propagating ever since the time of Plato through a form of Neo-Platonism. There are what Aristotle referred to as "some Platonists" who continued with Pythagorean Idealism even after Plato decisively replaced the mathematical Form of One with "the good" as the first principle. Placing "the good" as higher than any Form, and the prerequisite cause for the "discovery" of Forms, effectively dismisses that form of idealism. I believe it wasn't until Aquinas showed true consistency between Aristotle and Plato, that Aristotle became respected as the true follower of Plato.

Color is an interesting example for "natural code". The vast majority of the different colors which we experience are created by life forms, flowers for example. If there were no life forms, the colors of the world would be very bland.

What this implies is that if you want to include colors into a code of meaning, you need to include all life forms into your definition of meaning, so that colors can be properly represented as meaningful. The colors of flowers, as well as some ornate creatures, are very meaningful to their reproductive cycles. This is why colors have inherent or innate meaning as indicates. We have a natural tendency to see an array of colors, like a field of flowers, or a colorful bird, as beautiful. This recognition of beauty demonstrates the innate tendency to perceive colors as meaningful.

So, the "relativistic objectivity" which you refer to, needs to be adapted to allow that living beings other than the human ones, produce and interpret meaning. This would adjust "objectivity" relativistically to allow that beings other than humans employ a code of meaning which is displayed in their usage of color. The result is that the term "code" may not be appropriate. We ought to say that meaning is based in something other than code.

A crime is a crime without police, prosecutor or courts being involved. When someone steals your wallet, he's a thief and committed a crime. Miraculously, that's even true when he's not prosecuted. — Benkei

What if there are no stated laws? Would he be guilty in the eyes of God if he believed in God, and not guilty if he is atheist?

To say that nothing is everything, is to state a self-contradicting misconception.

That description does not match the language in the dialogue. Socrates directly refutes Cornford's statement, "The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition", when he corrects Theaetetus' idea that knowledge is perception: — Paine

I agree that Cornford's statement is inaccurate.

At 187a, Theaetetus takes a second shot and says opinion is knowledge. After Socrates shows that as inadequate, Theaetetus says: — Paine

Let me put this in context. Theaetetus claimed that knowledge is perception, and they had discussed the principle of Protagoras, "man is the measure of all things". This lead them to a discussion of the difference between the opinions of Heraclitus and the like, that everything is in motion, and Parmenides with his group, saying all is One, and at rest. This led to a bit of a digression which threatened to derail the whole discussion by dragging it into a bigger problem, so Socrates moved to get back to questioning whether knowledge is perception.

He successfully separated knowledge from perception by associating perception with sensing. Then he discussed how something other than a sense must distinguish colour from sound, and also make judgements about likeness, difference, equality, numbers, also what is and what is not. So Theaetetus agreed that knowledge is something different from perception. Determining what knowledge is not, is said to be at least some progress toward determining what it is (187a)

Next, they turn to "judgement", and there is an issue because judgement might be true or false. True judgement is said to be knowledge. But there is a problem with false judgement, it appears to be impossible because it would involve not knowing what we know (188-190). Then Socrates offers the analogy of a block of wax. Knowledge is imprinted in the wax, and this is related to perceptions in judgements (191-196). Again, it is concluded that false judgement is impossible.

Then it is revealed that the problem with these arguments is that they use "know", and the usage of that term assumes something about knowing which ought not be assumed. So he proceeds to analyze what "having", or "possessing" knowledge means. He presents the analogy of an aviary where a man hunts and collects birds. The soul is like an aviary full of collected birds (pieces of knowledge). There are two types of hunting here, one whereby the man hunts birds (knowledge) in the wild, to bring into the aviary, and the other where the man hunts birds (knowledge already within the aviary. False judgement would be a matter of grabbing the wrong bird from within. But again, this cannot be right because it would mean that the man has no way of distinguishing the correct piece of knowledge which he has already learned. And if we say that some of the birds are pieces of knowledge, and some are pieces of ignorance, then how is it possible that a man with knowledge cannot distinguish knowledge from ignorance? So the issue is not resolved

At 201 it is proposed that knowledge is true judgement with an account. But this proposal ends up circling back on itself because "an account" really adds nothing to "true judgement". Then we still have the same issue with "true judgement", which was already discussed.

The addition of an account does not repair the problem that true opinion is different than knowledge. Socrates statement here does stow, however, that true opinion can come from knowledge and good judgement. That is a far cry from not being able to rule out the "possibility of falsity." — Paine

I suggest you reread the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible. The problem revealed is that their use of "know" assumes that what is known is true. And this is what supports the arguments against false judgement. It results in the problem of not knowing what is known. So it is this criteria, that 'what is known is true' (knowledge is true judgement), which allows these arguments and leads to this problem.

Therefore it is an inverted type of argument. The argument demonstrates that false judgement is impossible. Simply put, it does this premising that knowledge cannot consist of falsity, and, that every judgement is based in knowledge. Therefore false judgement is impossible. The inversion comes about because we must reject the conclusion as inconsistent with the evidence. False judgement is possible. And so, as Socrates indicates, we have assumed something wrong about knowledge in the first place, and proceeded with an inaccurate presupposition. This must be the idea that knowledge cannot consist of falsity. it is true judgement or opinion..

In other words, insisting that knowledge must consist of truth (i.e. ruling out the possibility of falsity within knowledge), is what makes it impossible for Socrates and Theaetetus to come up with an acceptable definition of "knowledge".

But as I said, humans are self-aware beings. We can make decisions, decide on courses of action, plan to get or to avoid, and so all - all manner of things. Doing that, we constantly make judgements about what matters, what can be ignored, what must be acquired, and so on. That happens from from the autonomic level up to the conscious level, constantly. Sensory perception is only one element in this, the other being intellection or rational judgement (not to mention impulse, desire, emotion....) So what you're talking about is not something simple. — Wayfarer

Another good reason why the mind is radically different from a sense, and ought not be classed as a sense.

How would you deal with goals and intentions under this scheme of "bodies"? A body has a past, and by inertia tends to continue to be as it was, in the past. This is contrary to intentions and goals which seek change. So, from your perspective of "bodies", how do you relate to the desire for change?

For example, look at this quote:

The soul of the body of society can be conceptualized as its history. — introbert

The body can be conceptualized as the history, but the soul does not submit to such a conceptualization. From a conceptualization of the history of society we cannot get an accurate account of its goals. We can make some unsound inferences, but unsound inferences do not give us an adequate understanding of the soul.

It's at the beginning of Bk. 3, On the Soul. Basically, if there was one common sense (the sixth sense), which could receive the objects of multiple senses, sound and colour for example, that sense organ would receive both types of sensations through the same medium (the same organ), so that it would not be able to distinguish between a sensation of one type, and a sensation of the other type. So for example, it would not be able to distinguish that a sound is a different type of sensation from a colour, because both would be received through the same medium..

Therefore we must conclude that the mind, which has the capacity to distinguish one type of sensation from another type of sensation, is not itself another sense. This is basic to understanding "categories". The thing which separates or distinguishes one category from another cannot be classed as either.

My problem, everyone's except for a few perhaps, is that the only conduit for perception (both of ourselves and the world out there) is our senses (the 5 physical and the sixth, mind) and there's no reason at all why they should be truthful or untruthful. The reality of noumena is not as urgent an issue as the unreliability of our phenomena. — Agent Smith

Why would you class the mind as a sixth sense? The idea that the mind acts as a sixth sense was dispelled by Aristotle, a long time ago. The mind unifies the senses, it does not act as a distinct sense.

I'm not seeing your point. Socrates surely deals with JTB in the Theaetetus. The bulk of the problems confronted within in this dialogue concern the requirement for truth in knowledge, i.e. the requirement that the possibility of falsity be ruled out. The common notion of "knowledge" is that knowledge must contain only truth, and contain no falsity. But the members of the dialogue find no way that anything which is commonly called "knowledge" could have the possibility of falsity ruled out. So at the end of the dialogue it is revealed that this has probably been a mistaken approach.

This is nonsense. You have a reference to such a crazy definition from a consensus physics reference from the last century? What even is uniform existence? That a body must be the same everywhere? A carrot cannot taper? I presume you to be an absolutist and maybe get your definitions from the sites supporting such, but this is not the consensus definition as used by physicists. — noAxioms

"Uniform existence" is having an unchanging presence, as in not being acted upon by forces; what is described by Newton's first law, which is commonly referred to as "the law of inertia". Check the Stanford article I previously referenced:

The laws of Newtonian dynamics provide a simple definition: an inertial frame is a reference-frame with a time-scale, relative to which the motion of a body not subject to forces is always rectilinear and uniform, accelerations are always proportional to and in the direction of applied forces, and applied forces are always met with equal and opposite reactions. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-iframes/#QuasInerFramNewtCoroV\

No, not at all. I can for example reference the inertial frame of Earth when referencing the twins scenario. No duration is specified or necessary when identifying that frame. — noAxioms

That's a fictional "inertial frame", not properly formulated, so not an actual inertial frame. I could reference "the inertial frame of my right big toe", but unless it's properly formulated as an inertial frame, it's just fiction. Your terminology is not logically rigorous noAxioms. That's why I needed to point out your equivocation with "relative". Notice the above quote, "with a time scale". Any proposed inertial frame would be completely useless without a time scale.

One should bear in mind that what we do when we discuss metaphysics is not what Aristotle had in mind when he was discussing his views. — Manuel

What Aristotle proposed as the fundamental question of metaphysics, is the question of why a thing is the thing which it is, rather than something else. He dismissed the question of why there is something rather than nothing as somewhat incoherent, unintelligible, and replaced it with the question of why there is what there is instead of something else, as the fundamental question of being. This puts causation into its proper context by recognizing that the idea of something coming from nothing is fundamentally flawed.

I encourage any Q-physicist reading this post to consider enrolling in this course. — jgill

I would say, only if they are inclined to speculate about the true nature of reality. Otherwise they should be satisfied to carry on with the calculating.

This issue is very similar to the question of how long (temporal duration) the present is. Each of your three proposed beings has a different length of "now", or "present". You can see that having a different length of "now" results in having a completely different perspective on the universe. Because of this (and other issues with time) some philosophers have suggested that a true understanding of time would require a two dimensional time. The second dimension would provide a true representation of the width or breadth of the present.

On the contrary, just like many other conditions in the universe, perhaps consciousness has a goldilocks zone, that human consciousness falls directly in the center of.

If consciousness is fundamental it must operate on all magnitudes. If it is emergent, then perhaps we are the only things within the correct range of rate for such a property to emerge.

The idea that such starkly different consciousness could exist would make it very difficult to define what consciousness is.

Looking at a vine from human frame rate it appears motionless. But a time-lapse shows a writhing, swirling, active, feeling plant stretching out its tendrils, flexing its foliage and reaching for the skies. Very much alive. And much more sentient seeming. — Benj96

This is why it is necessary to have a true understanding of time in order to have any adequate understanding of consciousness or the universe in general. We need real principles as to exactly what the present is, and if it is necessary to assume a second dimension of time we need real principles to base that in. Until we discover these principles, any designation as to how long the present is, will be arbitrary.

The discussion in Theaetetus advanced well beyond where Cornford placed it. — Paine

What is exposed in Theaetetus is that all the conventional ideas about knowledge, and what knowledge is, are faulty. When they look for something which fits the various descriptions of "knowledge" by common belief, (such as JTB), nothing can actually fit, or fulfill the criteria of the proposed descriptions. So they conclude that they must have the wrong idea about what knowledge really is. Cornford sees this as an indication that we need to turn toward understanding "Forms" to produce a true understanding of the nature of knowledge.

Suppose I am a typical Q-physicist, following the mathematics but paying little attention to authorities in my subject babbling woo about interpretations. Please elucidate the training program in metaphysics I would need to complete to be considered competent in metaphysics. Be specific as possible.

Would I need to attend the University of Metaphysics? Would a bachelor's degree be sufficient? — jgill

I would say any university with a good philosophy program, and adequate courses in metaphysics. I'm not about to judge the merits of any particular university though.

Not quite. All motion can be specifed relative to a frame, specifically an inertial frame. Light speed is specified relative to (and is fixed only relative to) any inertial frame, so it isn’t an exception. — noAxioms

I think you've distorted the reality here noAxioms. An "inertial frame" is a theoretical derivative. It is derived from any situation with a body assumed to have uniform existence. Without the mass showing uniform existence there is no inertial frame. Therefore the body at uniform existence which provides for the inertial frame is prior to, and the defining feature of, any particular inertial frame. So there is at least one motion which is necessary and absolute to the inertial frame, therefore not relative to it.

You seem to see an exception when I don’t. Mathematically, how does this work? — noAxioms

As I said, the speed of light is relative to the passage of time, as is the inertial frame. By the basic principle of relativity (not special relativity) all frames employ the same passage of time, and their motions are relative. The inertial frame show no change over a duration of time. By special relativity, every frame is inertial relative to the motion of light, no change over a period of time, in relation to light. That is an absolute, hence the motion of light is exempt from the principle of relativity. Because of this exemption, the passage of time must be conceived of as unique to each frame. The mathematics is simple, the required length contraction and dilation of time. But the math gets more complicated when dealing with acceleration (general relativity).

You seem to see an exception when I don’t. — noAxioms

I've made my case. You insist otherwise, making claims supported only by equivocation. So I see no point in proceeding because you simply continue to insist on a perspective which cannot be supported.

It is exactly relative in that sense. — noAxioms

I explain how it is "absolute" and you say this is exactly how it is "relative". Yes, "relative" in that sense, but that is not the sense of the principle of relativity, which formulates all motion as equally relative. So when you say that the motion of light is always the same relative to any moving body, that claimed "relative" is an absolute, which is an exception to the principle of relativity.

Sounds like you’re now in denial of what an inertial frame is, perhaps suggesting that any inertial frame with something moving (or accelerating) in it isn’t a real one — noAxioms

An accelerating body cannot be the basis of an inertial frame the two are incompatible. The inertial frame is theory, therefore categorically distinct from any bodies. To speak of an inertial frame with something accelerating "in it" is just deception. The accelerating thing is not "in" the inertial frame, it is relative to it.

OK, this is pretty much rhetoric from the relativity denialist literature. You’re entitled to this opinion, but none of this is part of relativity theory. — noAxioms

You are clearly the one in denial. The characterization of simultaneity is the central aspect of special relativity. This is because both the "inertial frame" from the traditional principle of relativity, and "c" are grounded in the passage of time. This is how Einstein relates the motion of light to bodies involved in the relativity principle, by making stipulations about the passage of time and simultaneity. Rejecting facts simply because they are the facts reported in "relativity denialist literature" is not good academic practise.

OK, so where should light be at the rate of one hour per hour (just guessing at the rate)? IOW, what the heck does that statement even mean? What if time passed at one second per day? How would that affect where goes or what we see? — noAxioms

Your mind appears to be absolutely void in the conception of time. Do you agree that the passage of time is an essential aspect of the concept "inertial frame", a duration of time is necessarily implied by "inertial frame"? I think we'd better get agreement on this fundamental feature before we start to discuss whether that duration is a day, an hour, or a second, because we can go two ways toward determining the length of that duration, by relating that duration to the motion of bodies, or relating it to the motion of light.

What are the advantages of doing that? It seems absurd at face value. — frank

The advantage is versatility. This versatility is what allows things to be "equal in one respect and unequal in another", as Socrates points out in Wayfarer's quoted passage. Two things can be equal in weight, or height, or width, or type, or duration, whatever you want.

The perfect, ideal equality, which Socrates refers to as "abstract equality", gets reformulated by Aristotle as the law of identity, which is indicated by .

As Socrates argues in the Phaedo, no two things, being different by the very fact that they are two things, can obtain ideal equality. Therefore, as you argue, we as human beings have an idea of perfect equality which no two things can possibly display to us. So Aristotle looks at this idea of perfect equality, and determines that it can only describe something real if it describes the relationship which a thing has with itself. This is the law of identity, a thing is the same as it itself.

This provides us with the difference between "equal" and "same" (when we adhere to a strict definition of "same"). "Equal" is a relation between two distinct things. "Same" is proposed as the relation between an object and itself. It is important to notice that "same" is artificial, a human designation derived from the a priori, and it is not proper to say that an object establishes a relation with itself, as if it were two distinct objects. This is the problem with using "relation" to speak of identity, it implies two objects, when the law of identity is meant to strictly enforce the ideal identity, the separate and independent One.

What we can see, or at least what I think we can learn from this, is that Plato (Socrates) segregated the ideal, abstract "equality" from all the actual instances of usage of "equal". it's a perfection, or ideal, which falls outside the scale of usage. In a way it marks the limit to the scale of perfection, but it also leaves the scale unlimited because nothing which is measured by that scale can obtain that perfection, but anything can be measured. This is similar to the traditional us of "infinite" as an ideal. Then Aristotle takes this ideal, which doesn't appear to refer to anything real by Socrates' argument, only a phantom intuition in the mind coming from God knows where, and he assigns something very real to it, the particular, as expressing perfect equality by being "the same" as itself. Now the particular, an individual, independent object, as a unity, can be apprehended as the real ideal, One.

In this way the existence of such ideals, which neither Plato nor Socrates could explain, as appearing to come from somewhere within (through recollection), are validated as having a real and true referent. Aristotle does the same thing with the ideal "infinite". He shows how the sense of "infinite" employed by mathematicians lacks in perfection, being a potentiality rather than an actuality. This is similar to the way that the mathematician's use of "equal" lacks in perfection as shown by Socrates. Each use of "infinite" is derived from a failure to meet the true ideal infinite, which is "eternal". Then he separate "eternal" as the ideal, from "infinite" as the imperfect representation occurring in common usage, and shows how the "eternal" is real and actual as implying what is outside of time.

"Equal" is an arbitrary designation.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/777555