and then you ask me to consider another of your 'interpretations,' of what the experiment shows. :lol:
We have reached impasse! — universeness

Look at the graph, and tell me how you would interpret that first 1.5 seconds in any other way than a total energy loss of approximately .15 joules, prior to any collision.

card(reals) = aleph_1 is the continuum hypothesis. It is not provable in ZFC. It is thought to be true by some mathematicians and false by other mathematicians - an unsettled question. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It's unsettled because there's a problem with what constitutes a "countable" cardinality. As soon as we define "countable" such that an infinite set might be "countable", we create incoherency.

This ineffable thread surely is effing along nicely — Heracloitus

Canada coach John Herdman wasn’t trying to be disrespectful when he said the next mission for his squad was to “eff Croatia", he was just setting the tone for the F match.

https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/canada-coach-john-herdman-eff-croatia-comment

And so the Croatian coach replied with everyone has their own communication style. I'm not sure it's a nice thing to say but that's his right.

If "eff" was hate speech, the right to use it would be denied, and "eff" would be officially ineffable.

…..and when we accept the natural limitations of a given system, we don’t need to lament what it can’t do. — Mww

For a philosopher with the desire to know, the idea that there might be things which are impossible to know is cause for lament.

….but can never evolve out of the kind of system it is. (Remember….dialectical consistency) — Mww

As I said, this is a semantic issue. How would you define "the kind of system it is"? Remember, it is common knowledge that human beings evolved from single celled organisms. So if it is the case, as you say, that the system which comprises the human capacity to understand has natural limitations as to how far it can evolve, you must bear in mind how far it has already evolved. It appears to me that thus "kind of system", one which has evolved from a single celled organism to the extremely complex reasoning human being, doesn't have a whole lot of natural limitations.

….an unjustified assertion, insofar as it is impossible to know all the things there are. The very best to be said is the mind has the capacity to know all things presented to it. — Mww

Sure, this is my "unjustified assertion", that the human intellect has the capacity to know all things. And your "unjustified assertion" is that there are things which can never be apprehended by the mind because they will never appear to it. The difference is that my unjustified assertion provides a good healthy inspiration for human beings to seek out and try to understand all aspects of the universe. Your unjustified assertion is like a degenerative disease of the human being, because it inclines the reasoning being to think that everything which is hidden from it at the present time will always be hidden from it, thereby extinguishing the human being's motivation to learn.

….it is absurd to suppose understanding of all things. The occasions in which some things are misunderstood verifies limits. Nothing ever being misunderstood is the only sufficient ground for the possibility of understanding all things. — Mww

I can't see why you think that this is an absurd goal. Yes, it is a lofty goal, but why dismiss lofty goals as absurd? If a youngster comes to you and says my goal is to some day win the World Cup, would you tell the child that this is absurd, and send them home crying by shattering their dreams? I don't think you would, because the proper action is to encourage the child who has lofty goals. Philosophy is similar, except that we are grown up, so we make goals which are not personal but communal. We have very lofty goals which a philosopher knows will likely never be fulfilled in his or her lifetime. But each small step taken is a step toward that lofty goal, which would only be a step taken in vain, therefore not inspired to be taken at all, if the goal was designated to be absurd.

On and on it goes. Give it up and go have a turkey leg or something. — Mww

There you go, making your defeatist attitude explicit.

I see it is pointless discussing this with you. You are in complete denial, and refuse to even attempt to understand some simple physics.

However, I will ask you just to take a quick look at one thing in the article. Look at the graph where they plot potential energy, kinetic energy, and total energy altogether on one graph. Now look at the plotted total energy over the first 1.5 seconds of time. This time period represents the first drop of the glider, prior to any collisions. You'll see that the total energy drops from approximately .9 joules to approximately .75 joules, over this time period. This is a loss of total energy of more than 15 percent, over a time period of 1.5 seconds, and that was prior to any collision.

No the concerns you raise are again, exaggerated. There were no 100 km/h winds during the experiment and friction from (within the wheel??) and/or the axle will be negligible. — universeness

Do you consider a total energy loss of 15 percent, in a 1.5 second time period to be negligible? That's ten percent per second of time! I really can't see how you would say that this is negligible.

I was advocating the truly ineffable, which manifests as a certain impossibility of the mind. — Mww

OK, so here's the difference which led me to think you were being inconsistent. I suggested the possibility of something which is completely inapprehensible to the mind. So I thought you were advocating this as a possibility. Now I see that you advocate it as an actuality, a reality that there are things which are completely inapprehensible to the human mind, due to the deficiencies of the human mind.

Your position then, if it is as I state above, is the position which I dismiss as self-defeating, counterproductive, and unphilosophical, as intellectually repugnant, because it accepts the reality of something fundamentally unintelligible (like infinite regress for example), and this assumption discourages the philosophical mind which seeks to know.

To believe in THE ineffable is to believe in things that are ineffable. If truly ineffable is only the condition of the mind for the reception of certain things, what point is there in believing in the very things the mind could never receive? — Mww

OK, this is interesting. We premise that the human mind (I'm trying to be careful to qualify "mind" with "human" because you have deemed this to be a problem with the human mind while allowing for the possibility of other minds to which it wouldn't be a problem) is deficient therefore there are some very real things which the human mind cannot grasp.

It appears to me, that it is the premise, that the human mind is deficient, which forces the conclusion that there are real things which are inapprehensible. It cannot be the other way around, because these things can be in no way apprehended, so the existence of them in the mind cannot force the conclusion that the mind is deficient. Therefore, it is a logical conclusion produced from the premise of human deficiency, that there are things which are inapprehensible, and because it is necessitated by logic, we must believe in the things which the mind cannot receive. This is to say, that as soon as you accept this premise, that the human mind has this deficiency, it is logically necessary that you believe in the things which cannot be received by the human mind. So it is not a matter of "what point is there" in believing in these things, as you state, it is a matter of it being logically necessary that we believe in such things. When we accept that premise of human deficiency it is necessary that we believe in things which cannot be grasped by the mind.

So this is where my notion that this perspective is unphilosophical, and intellectually repugnant comes from. If the philosophical mindset is the desire to know, and understand all things, then what is the point to accepting a premise (human deficiency) which forces the necessary conclusion that there are things which cannot be known? This premise is directly incompatible with the goal of philosophy which is to seek out and understand all aspects of reality.

To state the existent of a thing as not impossible, is not to advocate that it is. There’s no logic in positing a possible existence when it is absolutely impossible to form a judgement with respect to it. How could we ever say a thing is possible if it has absolutely no chance of ever being an object met with our intelligence? What could be said about a thing for which we couldn’t even begin to speculate? To say such is not impossible carries more truth value than to merely say such thing may be possible. — Mww

As we have been discussing, "possible" must refer to the idea that there are things which cannot be apprehended, in the sense of logically possible, this is a logical possibility. In this context, "possible" does not refer to the thing itself, as if it were a possible thing, because that would imply that the thing necessarily has existence, and calling it a possible thing would be contradictory. So we cannot assume that these inapprehensible things exist, and speak of them as possible things, we can only assume a logical possibility that they may exist.

From here, we can take your premise, that the human mind is deficient, and conclude that they necessarily exist, and give up on the enterprise of increasing human knowledge whenever it appears like something is unknowable, concluding that it is unknowable, or we can maintain the premise that the human mind can potentially know all things, and continue with the effort to know all things.

We DO know we can never understand the unintelligible exclusively from the reality of that which IS intelligible. Pretty simple really. If intelligibility is this, anything not this is unintelligible. Besides…doesn’t “unintelligible” factually denote a non-understanding? Absurd to posit the unintelligible, then turn right around and say maybe we just don’t understand it. There may be a veritable plethora of reasons for not understanding, but the irreducible, primary reason must necessarily be because it was unintelligible to begin with.

THAT is what the ineffable is all about. Hasn’t a gawddamn thing to do with things, but only with the limitations on the system that comprehends things. — Mww

You are completely neglecting my use of "appears" in relation to unintelligible. I was talking about things which appear to be unintelligible. If, whenever something appears like it is unintelligible, we designate it as actually being unintelligible, then we will never make the effort required to understand it, and prove that the unintelligibility which appeared, was just an appearance. Therefore, I clearly did not "posit the unintelligible" in that context, as your misrepresentation indicates, I posited a situation in which something appears to be unintelligible. And this is completely consistent with what I've been discussing, the possibility of something which is inapprehensible.

The appearance that something is unintelligible presents us with the possibility that there is something inapprehensible to the mind. From there we can adopt what I would call the philosophical premise, that the human mind has the capacity to know all things, and proceed toward understanding, and proving that this is just an appearance, or, we can adopt the premise that the human mind is deficient, and this appearance of something unintelligible is proof that there really is things inapprehensible to the human mind.

I believe that the key to unravelling this little problem is to understand what is meant by "the system that comprehends things". This, the human mind is a continually evolving system. So if we propose to put a limit on "the mind", by qualifying it with "human mind", how do we allow for evolution of the human mind? At what point in the evolutionary process is the mind definitively a "human" mind? And if the definition of "human mind" is produced so as the thing called "human mind" is allowed to evolve in the future to a point where it might apprehend things which are currently inapprehensible, and still be called the "human mind", then the problem is simply semantic. You might argue that this mind no longer qualifies as a "human mind", seeking to separate the "human mind" which is deficient, from these future minds which do not have the same deficiency. Then the philosophical mindset, which is the desire to know becomes an effort to evolve the mind so as to understand things which appear as if they are unintelligible.

So, the PE is the same at a height of 80cm as it would be if it were at height = 0, so, mgh becomes 0 at the start and becomes negative as the glider travels down the slope. — universeness

This is where the begging of the question occurs, in how the mgh (mass x gravitational constant x height) is set to zero. It is done by defining total energy (E) as KE-PE, and stipulating that E must be 0 at any height. This necessitates logically, that there is always a perfect conversion between PE and KE according to the law of conservation.

That makes the true value for PE ("true" meaning produced from the formula mgh) completely irrelevant, as PE can be set to zero for any height, simply by making it the inverse of the KE. Then, through the process you described, PE is made to be a function of the KE, as the negation of it in the statement of total energy, E=1/2mv(squared)-mgh. Therefore it is simply assumed that the PE is the direct inverse, (negation), of the KE, and vice versa, as per the law of conservation, regardless of any "true" determination of the PE according to the formula mgh. So the PE is calculated as a direct function of the KE, its inverse, in the formula used instead of mgh, and this is simply begging the question. The energy is necessarily conserved in the conversion of PE to KE, because the PE is calculated as the direct inverse of the KE.

Furthermore, this renders the entire experiment invalid because there is no way to separate, distinguish, energy loss during the conversion of PE to KE in the fall (and KE to PE in the rebound) from energy loss due to the inelasticity of the objects.

You might find the references section of the article helpful as well, especially:
2. Energy Conservation on an Incline. Available from: [Online]
http://www.physicsclassroom.com/mmedia/energy/ie.cfm — universeness

You do not produce high quality references universes. The experiment is completely invalid, and this one is even worse. Notice that they say this :

The force of friction does not do work upon the cart because it acts upon the wheels of the cart and actually does not serve to displace either the cart nor the wheels. The friction force only serves to help the wheels turn as the cart rolls down the hill. Friction only does work upon a skidding wheel.

They completely neglect the fact that there is considerable friction within the wheel or axle bearing, no matter how well built or lubricated it may be.

Furthermore, they dismiss energy loss due to air resistance as "a small amount of energy loss". Have you ever seen the physical damage that a 100kmh wind can cause? You can assure yourself that air resistance is not "a small amount of energy loss".

So we have two significant sources of energy loss in the cart example, friction and air resistance. These two can be reduced to one, in a free fall. We can say that air resistance is a type of friction. Further, we can say that this friction is a type of collision, the object collides with air molecules. Now, we might move on to more professional experiments, where the collision with air molecules is controlled for with vacuum.

Experimentation has been done within a vacuum for a long time now, and there is much discussion as to energy loss when a collision occurs in a vacuum. But, as in the simple experiment with the glider and the bumper, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish energy loss in the simple motion of the object in its conversion of PE to KE, from energy loss due to the inelasticity of the colliding objects. The tendency is to assume that one is ideal, and attribute the energy loss to the other, as in the experiment, the conversion of PE to KE in the movement of the glider is assumed to be ideal, and energy loss is attributed to inelasticity. So the experiment can teach us something, that assuming the ideal can often produce misleading conclusions.

Yep. What I’ve been advocating. There’s even an example of what something like that would be. Those cannot be named as existents, simply from the thesis that our manner of naming things could not possibly be applied to them. It is tacit acknowledgement that we have no warrant to claim our intelligence is the only possible kind of intelligence there is, from which follows that we cannot declare such things are impossible in themselves but only that they are absolutely impossible for our kind of intelligence. And it isn’t because we don’t know how, but that we are not even equipped for it.

What would be the point in believing in the ineffable then?
— Metaphysician Undercover

I can’t think of one. If a thing is already impossible, what’s the point in calling the same thing something else? — Mww

Wait, you seem to be showing inconsistency here Mww. Let's say that it is possible that there are things which could never be brought into the mind, cannot be known by human intelligence. And lets respect this as simply a possibility. Now here's the tricky part. You say that you've been advocating this possibility, yet you then say that you see no point to "believing in" it.

We have three important terms here which we need to know the meaning of and how they relate to each other, "possibility", "advocating", and "believing in". So, it appears like you have stated that you are advocating something you don't believe in. But the thing you are advocating is a possibility. Are you advocating that we respect this as a possibility, rather than being impossible, yet you don't actually believe in it because you think that this possibility is not likely? Or what?

Here's the issue I raised. It might be the case (it is possible) that there are things which could never be known to the human intellect. But if we assume this possibility, we might be inclined not to reach our minds into the dark corners of reality, assuming that the things there simply cannot be known, and therefore this would be a waste of time. But the things there might actually be knowable, just requiring effort. Furthermore, we will never know whether we can actually understand things where it appears like they might possibly be unintelligible to us, unless we try. So why would anyone advocate for the possibility of the existence of something which the human mind cannot apprehend? Isn't it better just to assume that everything is potentially intelligible to the human mind, and keep us trying to figure it all out? What is the point to believing in the possibility that somethings can never be grasped? Maybe it's better to believe that everything can potentially be grasped.

The underlined section in your above quote appears in the section titled 'Abstract,' not Introduction.
In the introduction, the words are "For the first task, we simply observed that during the first downward motion of the glider the total energy remained constant throughout the motion." In the Results and conclusions section the words "For task 1: we have found that total energy remains constant during the motion of the glider until the collision occurs". are used. — universeness

The main point though, is that the conservation of energy in the conversion of PE to KE in the downward motion, is simply manufactured by designating the original PE as equal to the maximum KE. The experimenters even admit this by referring to the arbitrariness in the value of PE. So there is no proof made, just a begging of the question. The original PE is stipulated as equal to the KE when the glider reaches the bottom, and low and behold, all the PE is converted to KE when the glider reaches the bottom, according to what the stipulation necessitates.

So, it seems to me, the COR is only relevant to the issue of the collisions being elastic or inelastic. — universeness

All I can say, is reread the article. The value of PE is simply stipulated to match the kinetic energy at the bottom of the drop. This sets the balance between potential energy and kinetic energy at zero. There is no experiment to prove that there is no energy loss in the drop, the value of PE is simply stipulated to match the value of KE (so there is no energy loss by the stipulated value of PE) Here's what's stated in the conclusion. "Also, we showed that by using the arbitrariness of the value of PE we can set the total energy of a sliding object to be zero". And here's what's stated in the section called Data and Analysis: "PE was defined to be zero on ground level."

Yes, just as we do for every single word ever. Which leads inevitably to….under what conditions is it impossible for a word to be invented, such that the object the word would represent, remains impossible to talk about. Then and only then, does the notion of ineffability attain its logical validity. — Mww

Having gotten that (this false ineffable) out of the way, we can now approach the true ineffable, with the issue of conception. If something never comes to your mind, you cannot put a word to it. So, let's assume the possibility, that there is a huge part of reality which is completely undisclosed to our senses, and never comes to anyone's mind in any conception, sense image, or anything like that. Would you agree that this logical possibility validates the notion of ineffability?

Further, we have mathematics which produces evidence of this large part of reality which is not sensed, nor has it entered into human minds, concepts like spatial expansion, dark energy and dark matter. Except, now we have an issue, the use of mathematics has allowed some of these ineffable things, those just mentioned, to enter the mind. Now they are no longer ineffable, because we see that although they were ineffable at one time, they no longer are now, they have some conception and words for them. So all we've done is produced another sense of false ineffable. It's not truly ineffable because for everything which hasn't yet entered the mind there is a possibility that it may.

One false ineffable was the things which no one has a word for, and that was rectified by creating a word for them. The other false ineffable was the things which have never entered into the mind, so they could not have a word for them, nor could we produce a word for them, because they were not there in the mind. However, we see that the application of mathematics and speculation bring some of these things into the mind, so they are not really ineffable in a true sense either. Is it possible, that there are such things which could never be brought into the mind, not even though the use of mathematics? This would imply that there are limitations to the mind, to the use of mathematics, and human knowledge in general, which would make it so that there are things out there, aspects of reality which cannot ever be brought into the mind. It would be absolutely impossible for the mind to apprehend them, by any means. That might be the true ineffable.

What would be the point in believing in the ineffable then? If the human inclination is to learn, advance knowledge, toward knowing all that there is to know, what would be the point in positing somethings which are impossible to know? That would be self-defeating. It would kill the desire to know, because we would quit the enterprise, believing that it is impossible to know these things. So I belief that the ineffable is a logically valid concept, but it is unphilosophical. Classically, it's said to be repugnant to the mind, because it validates unintelligibility, like infinite regress. It is contrary to the philosophical mindset, which is the desire to know, and therefore it is an unphilosophical concept. In reality, it amounts to an intellectual laziness; there are aspects of reality which we do not know about, but since we cannot ever know about them, there is no point to trying to understand them. This is the issue which Aristotle pointed to with the proposed apeiron, or prime matter. This is the proposal of a fundamental unintelligible base, upon which all the universe is supported. It is an unphilosophical principle which is self-defeating to philosophy because it stipulates that the foundation of the universe is unintelligible, thereby discouraging any attempt to understand the foundation of the universe. That is an unphilosophical metaphysics, to simply say that the universe is based in some fundamental randomness which is impossible for the human mind to grasp, or understand in any way, therefore forget about it and think about something else.

On the other hand, if I already know what “box” means, I also understand it isn’t a universal conception, because I know it is a particular thing and the Principle of Complementarity tells me the one can never be the other. — Mww

The point though, was that you know I am referring to a particular called "the box", not because I have not pointed out this particular and given it that name, but because you know the type of thing which is called a box. So in order for the word to do its job, you need to respect both, that "box" refers to a universal, and that it refers to a particular. And the need to know both is required for one specific instance of use.

And if I do know what the word “box” stands for, which means your signification and mine are congruent, I know what I’m expected to get. — Mww

But the congruency in many cases is a feature of the conception, rather than pointing out a particular, and the conception is what allows you to identify the individual. Maybe that example wasn't clear, so here's another. I pass you my car keys, and tell you to get my car, it is the black Civic at the far corner of the lot. I am referring to a particular, my car, but I lead you to it through an understanding of the conceptions, "black", "Civic", "far corner of the lot", not by physically pointing out the particular. So the words really have a conceptual reference in your mind, but through that conceptual reference you are able to pick out the particular which is the 'real' referent.

It might be better for you to start a new thread on a physics forum, which employs the detailed results, from an actual conservation of energy experiment. You can challenge physicists, based on your interpretation of the results from the experiment. There are some straight forward examples available online, such as:
https://www.ukessays.com/essays/physics/experiment-study-conservation-energy-8335.php — universeness

I'm not a physicist, and do not pretend to be one. However, anyone can read the reported experiment, and attempt to understand what was carried out. I have read it from the point of view of a philosopher, and I will report my findings here, in a philosophy forum.

The experiment verifies very clearly what I have written. First, even with simple downward motion where the potential energy is simply converted to kinetic energy, through the acceleration caused by gravity, there is a loss of energy, as stated in the introduction: " For first task, we found that kinetic energy increases as potential energy decreases during downward motion of the glider but the total energy remains almost constant". Notice the experimenters state "almost constant", in the introduction and "remains constant" in the conclusion which you've quoted, It appears like they contradict themselves. So what happened here?

The first task is an indication of the theory of gravity. Potential energy is calculated through the measured mass of the glider and the theoretical force of gravity which has the capacity to accelerate the glider as it falls from a height. We know that as things fall, acceleration rapidly decreases due to things like air resistance, so there is a substantial loss of energy occurring with a falling object. There is no indication that the experiment was carried out in a vacuum, or any means were employed to measure all the different losses of energy which might occur. How did the experimenters account for all this loss of energy, which actually occurs in practise?

Of course, they applied a "coefficient of restitution", and this coefficient varies according to the measured parameters, height and mass. That is demonstrated in task two. There is an arbitrariness to the setting of this coefficient, and this is what allows them to make the total energy equal zero, by adjusting this coefficient. In other words, that there is a perfect balance between potential energy and kinetic energy, and this is reported as remaining constant, is simply a product of the coefficient of restitution, which is a manifestation of "the arbitrariness of the value of PE": as stated. Notice that the coefficient of restitution which was required varied according to mass and height, but in this experiment it was very significant, between .63, and .77. In other words, the theoretical potential energy, which would be directly produced from the theory of gravity, needed to be reduced by about a quarter or a third, to match the determined kinetic energy in the falling glider. That's a significant loss of energy.

Furthermore, in task 2, where the energy is actually transferred from one object to another, through collision, there is a further loss of energy, which needs to be accounted for by something other than the coefficient of restitution. The coefficient of restitution just accounts for the loss of energy within the falling object by arbitrarily adjusting the potential energy of gravity, but now there is a further loss when there is a collision of the object. Here, the bumper is said to be "inelastic". This means that the movement of the bumper, and the rebound of the glider, cannot account for all the kinetic energy of the falling glider. There is much energy that is lost. They account for this loss through the "inelasticity". We might assume that the bumper absorbs some as heat or something like that. Nevertheless, energy is lost, which cannot be accounted for, and this is written off as "inelasticity".

Notice the use of terms, elastic, and inelastic. An elastic object would demonstrate one hundred percent transferal of energy in its movement. But again, this is an ideal, like Banno's closed system. There is no such thing as an absolutely perfectly elastic body, just like there is no such thing as an absolutely closed system, and no such thing as a perfect eternal circular motion. The field of physics is rife with such fictitious ideals. We could consider also the use of the "blackbody", and the "symmetry". And so the experiment showed a loss of energy which they attribute to inelasticity, the bumper could not demonstrate an ideal conservation of energy.

In conclusion, the experiment showed significant loss of energy in the falling glider which was accounted for with the coefficient of restitution, and it also showed significant loss of energy in the collision which was accounted for by inelasticity. Do you agree that the experiment completely supports what I've been arguing?

Sure there’s a difference, but there’s nothing ineffable about it. The word representing a universal conception won’t refer to a particular example of it. — Mww

The issue though is why, or how. Suppose I write here, the word "box", and I tell you that this word signifies something, it stands for something. How do you know whether it signifies a particular which I have named, or whether it is a concept which the word refers to. You say it can't be both, but why not? I think that in most common usage it actually would refer to both. If I say "get me the box", I refer to a particular, but you know what thing to get me because of the concept. So I must be using the word to signify both. Now we have no dichotomy of one or the other, we have both. The word actually signifies a sort of unity of particular and universal. How can we describe this unity? Is it even correct to call it a unity?

True enough. Herein is the limit of metaphysical reductionism. Conceptions represent thoughts….but there is no justifiable hypothesis for the origin of thoughts. If one wishes to call the origin of thought ineffable, insofar as there are no words to describe it, that’s fine, but we’ve already understood we just have no idea from whence come thoughts, so why bother with overburdening the impossibility with ineffability? — Mww

The issue was that there is a difference between the representation and the thing represented. But this led me into a problem with boundaries, so perhaps "difference" was not the right word. In the above paragraph I described a "unity", and this is probably a better word than "difference". Now it's not a difference between the representation and the thing represented, but a unity of the two. The issue of "ineffability" is evident because I can use these words freely, "difference", "unity", "boundary", or whatever, and it really doesn't matter. I'm just choosing a word to talk about something which doesn't already have a word for it. That's common in philosophy. But some would say that if there is no word for it, we cannot talk about it. That's not true though, we just get a more free choice in our words when we approach the supposed ineffable. There aren't any words for the thing to be talked about, making people think that it can't be talked about, but really we're just free to make the words up.

Truth be told, I don’t agree that’s what we’re doing. You say the problem is we try to do this thing we can’t do, I say we can’t even do, in any way, shape or form, what you say we’re trying to do, so the problem itself you say we have, should just disappear and along with it, the very notion of ineffability. — Mww

Sure, trying to do something I can't do is a problem, but it can be overcome. That's the point with learning, advancement of knowledge, and practise. So, I can often do at a later time what I could not do at an earlier time. And this is an issue with the concept of the ineffable. What is ineffable at one time may not be at a later time. But some people do not see that language evolves, and we learn to overcome problems, and that's how knowledge advances. For them, the ineffable might appear like a wall which we cannot get past, or a problem which cannot be overcome. I see it as a temporary inconvenience, and a good reason to use words very freely.

This is just as much fun as trying to fathom why some of us are right-handed and some are left. Why some of us like spinach and some of us gag on it. Only product there can be is fun; we ain’t gonna solve anything here, are we. — Mww

For some of us, using words freely is fun, so the ineffable presents us with a good source of entertainment.

This from a gentleman who questions 1+1=2 is a surprise. — jgill

Yes, I do question this phrase, "1+1=2". And I just state the obvious, that "1+1" does not say the same thing as "2" does. So those who claim that "=" means the same as, are mistaken.

This sign, "=", actually gives us a lot of freedom of expression. We are allowed to, arbitrarily point to two distinct things, assign them the same value as each being "one", and make the conclusion that each, as one, is equal to the other. Of course they are not the same as one another, but by designating them as equal to each other, we can perform all sorts of magic tricks of transposition. I don't practise math, but I bet that's fun.

In the context of your link, the term Energy Loss refers to the energy that "is converted to a different form". — EricH

Look at the first sentence in the article: "When energy is transformed from one form to another, or moved from one place to another, or from one system to another there is energy loss." So, any time there is an interaction of things (energy is moved from one place to another) there is a loss of energy. In other words there is a continual loss of energy.

I am not making any claim about the truth or falsehood of the Law of Conservation here. I am simply pointing out that your example does not lead to your conclusion. — EricH

I think it states exactly my conclusion, contrary to the law of conservation, there is always energy loss.

No measurement of a quantity is ever 100% correct. distance, time, density, none are 100% correct.
Is the distance actually 1cm or 0.999999999999999999999999912.......... cm.
You are over burdening the word LAW. — universeness

This is not a matter of .0000000000000000000001 per cent, or something miniscule like that. The energy loss in any transaction is significant. If you can show me a system with an efficiency which is considerably higher than ninety nine percent, I will take your point. I'm very confident you will not though. Efficiency rates are much lower.

The problem is that we tend to think a certain percentage is lost to friction, some to heat, some to this, some to that, but is we try to measure all the losses we can never measure it all. That would imply that we had a system which captured all the energy, one hundred percent efficiency. But we know this is impossible. So we just write off the losses as inefficiencies.

No, that's why science uses error bars! It is not a falsity, it just does not claim 100% accuracy. — universeness

Error bars are irrelevant. We are not talking about error in the measurements, we are talking about error in the law itself. The law of conservation is an ideal principle which does not correspond with reality. Therefore it is a false principle, just like my example, the ancient ideal that the planetary orbits are eternal circular motions. These are both equally false principles.

The principle was not false, it was just that some of the assumptions and projections were wrong. Many planets do orbit on a path which is 'almost' circular. — universeness

It is very obviously false. The planetary orbits are not perfect circles. Therefore they are not eternal. That ideal was false. Likewise, the ideal that energy is conserved as time passes is also false. And all that follows from this false premise is also unsound.

No, physicists are fully aware, that the language used to describe the structure and workings of the universe is not IDEAL, not perfect. — universeness

The law of conservation of energy is very clearly IDEAL. It states that energy cannot be destroyed, it only converts from one form to another. Therefore "energy", by this law exists in an eternal and unchanging quantity. That is a perfect, unchanging quantity. If this is not IDEAL, then what is IDEAL?

A system has an energy equivalence of 50 joules. It then goes though energy transformations, and the resultant system has an energy equivalence of 50 joules — universeness

Show me this system which has 50 joules, and maintains 50 joules after energy transformations. That's 100 percent efficiency. No system has 100 percent efficiency, according to the article I linked, so I think you are just making things up, to support what you believe.

By definition a closed system is one in which energy is conserved. — Banno

Yes, this is the Ideal, the closed system. In reality there is no such thing as a closed system, by this definition, there is no existing system in which energy is conserved.

We can look at the consequences, or conclusion, of this reality (that there is no such thing as a closed system) in two different ways. We can conclude that it is physically possible to have a closed system, therefore the definition actually describes something real, a situation in which energy would be conserved, accepting this as a real possibility, and this seems to be the way that everyone here, other than me looks at the law of conservation. They think that a system in which energy is conserved is a real possibility.

Or, we can conclude as I do, that it is physically impossible to have a closed system, a system in which energy is conserved, and look at this as a feature of the universe, that there is no such thing as a closed system, and there cannot be such a thing as a closed system, and energy is not ever conserved. With this comes the conclusion that the law of conservation is a falsity. This is just like my example of the ancients who believed in the Ideal, that the planetary orbits were eternal circular motions. It wasn't until Aristotle demonstrated that an eternal circular motion is physically impossible, due to the role of matter in any circular motion, that this ideal (eternal circular motion of the planets) was finally rejected. Likewise, we need to reject this idea of a closed system, to understand the true nature of the universe.

Okay, then cite some of those "experiments" (or the relevant literature) to which you're referring. — 180 Proof

Why are you so helpless 180?
https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Energy_loss#:~:text=When%20energy%20is%20transformed%20from,form%20of%20energy%2C%20like%20heat.

Notice, there is always energy loss, and "Energy losses are what prevent processes from ever being 100% efficient." Hence the inductive conclusion I made, the law of conservation has been proven to be false.

I think this is the main difference between us. I choose not to try to fill in gaps in our knowledge, with unnecessary terms like god(I am not suggesting YOU have employed this term), immaterial or dualism. The 'perfect' measure of the speed of light in unattainable. So is achieving human omniscience. To me, if we ever achieve the omnis, then our existence would become as ridiculous and pointless as any conception of god.
Let's continue to debate and confirm what we know and where we can go from here. Let's resist any temptation to plug gaps or incompletions in our scientific knowledge, with useless (imo) concepts, such as immaterialism, dualism or god. The conservation of energy is not false it is just imperfect. — universeness

I can't agree to this framework you've proposed here, because we cannot designate the law of conservation as "imperfect". The problem is that it is exactly opposite to this. The law is an ideal, a statement of perfection in the conservation of energy. In reality, in practise, there is no perfect or ideal conservation of energy. Yet we keep talking about this law, of a perfect or ideal conservation, as if it is a true representation, and we are led to believe that the reason why there is no perfect conservation in our practise is because we are no able to perfect our practise apparatus.

So here is the problem. Instead of recognizing that the principle itself is false (an ideal representation of an imperfect world), and recognizing that the world is simply not a type of world where "energy" as we conceive of it, is conserved, we delude ourselves into thinking that in the world energy actually is conserved, and our practises are just not capable of detecting what happens to all the energy. Therefore we are engaged in self-deception. We have a conception of "energy" whereby it is stipulated that in the world, energy is conserved, when we know that it is not conserved in the imperfect world. We then attribute this latter fact, that energy is actually not conserved, to our observational capacities and practises, as being "imperfect", rather than attributing the imperfection to the whole world itself.

So I suggest to you, that the imperfection here involves the way that our concept of "energy" corresponds with the reality of the world. And this type of imperfection (misrepresentation) is most properly called a falsity. We disguise this falsity, this fact that our conception of energy is false, with the self-deception described above, by saying that this ideal, perfect, conception really is a true representation, and only our practises are less than perfect. But in reality the conception is a perfect, ideal, and the whole world itself is less than perfect. There is no ideal conservation in the world. So the energy loss which is evidenced by the fact that we cannot obtain perfect efficiency is a real feature of the world, there is not one hundred percent conservation anywhere, and our conception of energy is simply a misunderstanding. But we delude ourselves by saying that the concept is true and only our practises are imperfect, while the rest of the universe behaves in that perfect ideal way.

Here's an example by analogy. In ancient philosophy, idealists like the Pythagoreans held on to the idea of a perfect circular motion. An object moving in a perfect circle retraces the same path over and over again without any wavering and therefore has no beginning or end, and this constitutes an eternal motion. This idea came to Aristotle through Plato, and it was used to justify the idea of an eternal immortal soul. Only a soul, or mind, could be said to be the cause of the eternal circular orbits of the planets, and so this soul was therefore itself eternal and immortal.

So Aristotle exposed the problem with this idea in his book "On the Heavens". Yes, he said that eternal circular motion is possible, and, it is true that if there is perfect circular motion it would be eternal. But, he said that the orbits of the planets are not like this, and the planets are not eternal in their motions. The planets are material and as such have a beginning and ending, therefore it is impossible that the orbits are eternal circular motions.

Please take note now, of the lesson to be learned here. It was only by determining the falsity of the principle, the ideal, eternal circular motion, that astronomers could move forward, and model the orbits as other than circular, which led to the modern understanding of the solar system. It was imperative for them to recognize the falsity of the principle, that the perfection of the ideal did not exist in the real universe, for them to be able to move toward a true understanding of these motions. Now we have a very similar situation with the concept of energy. We have a similar false principle, an ideal, eternal energy conservation. Only by recognizing that this perfect ideal is false, that energy is not actually conserved in reality, in the true motions of things, that we will be able to move forward with a true understanding of time, motion, and all the real things involved in the concept of energy.

In his book 'The Biggest Ideas In The Universe (space, time and motion,)' Sean Carroll writes about the conservation of energy.
"Both momentum and energy are conserved in classical mechanics, but kinetic energy by itself is not, since it can be converted into (or created from) other kinds of energy."
"Noether's theorem states that every smooth, continuous symmetry transformation of a system is associated with the conservation of some quantity."
"Our universe is expanding; faraway galaxies are gradually moving away from one another as time passes. Consequently, there is a sense in which energy is not conserved in an expanding universe."

I think Sean demonstrates some of the imperfection present in the conservation laws. — universeness

This is good example, as a starting place. But notice the mentioned "symmetry transformation". "Symmetry" is such a perfect ideal which is actually false. So we have a whole class of these ideals, which are actually false, which have emerged out of this false ideal of energy conservation, which are simply misunderstandings, but can be very misleading to undisciplined metaphysicians.

Yoi claim there have been many experiments that falsify these "laws", so cite one. :chin: — 180 Proof

My claim is not that any particular experiment has falsified the law of conservation. My claim is that all experiments, each and every one of them has demonstrated that not all the energy conserved. There is always some lost. So the reasoning is inductive. Each and every experiment demonstrates that some energy is lost, and we believe that this will always be the case. Therefore the law which states that all the energy is conserved has been proven, through inductive reasoning, to be false. You might want to dispute the value of inductive logic, but then what would be the point to experimentation?

You do not need a standard for comparison that is universal with regard to speed and time. Everyone going at whatever velocity will have their own experience of time which differs from people going slower or faster then them. Just as there is no universal standard of size, there is none for time. An elephant is bigger than a mouse because of the environment it's in; if there was no space, but only an elephant next to a mouse, they would have the same size. As for moving in an instant, the instant represents the point that is covered which is yes zero. But these sum to a positive. This is something Aristotle never understood. Motion has a forward momentum. Air doesn't move an arrow as he thought. Motion is dynamic — Gregory

How is this relevant to determining a quantity of energy?

Does it not follow, if all that’s needed is sufficient context, rather than entire context, that the claim “ineffable” is invalid? — Mww

No, I don't think so, because the part of the context which is not reachable, is still real. So it's like you are saying that we never need the ideal, we don't need perfection, and so we should settle on whatever is sufficient. That's fine, but settling on sufficiency instead of the absolute does not make the difference between these two disappear. And we can live very well without ever even thinking about the ineffable, but that doesn't mean that it's not there. Nor does it make the claim of ineffable invalid.

If it is the case that all thoughts are conceptions, and all conceptions are represented by the word(s) that refer to them…..how can any conception be too great to be described? The representation just is the description. How can any conception, then, be ineffable? — Mww

It's not the conception that's ineffable, nor any part of the conception. It is the difference between the conception of what the word refers to, and what the word really refers to in a particular instance of use, which is ineffable. There is a number of ways to look at this. If the conception is a universal, and what the word refers to is a particular, there is a difference between these. If the conception is a representation, and there is something represented, then there is a difference between these. Those are examples. If we use categories, there is a difference between one category and another. To produce more categories in an attempt to describe the difference between categories, still leaves us with an unexplained difference between the new categories. We might try to say this difference consists of boundaries, but it isn't really boundaries between things, because things overlap.

So that which is ineffable has no word by which it is referred. For that of which there is no word, there is no conception that is the necessary presupposition for it, for otherwise, there must be conceptions without representation, which is self-contradictory, hence, unintelligible. — Mww

Yes, I would agree. And because of this, even to put the name "ineffable" to it, is to refer to something, and it's either a particular or a conception. So this is really a self-contradicting thing to do. It's better just to recognize the reality of this problem, and understand that no matter how far we proceed toward perfection in our understanding, toward the ideal, there will always be a deficiency.

Imagination is that which presents objects without there actually being one. Imagination can present any thinkable object, which makes explicit imagination can present any thing that can be conceived, can be represented by words, can never be too great to be talked about. — Mww

But the matter is not an issue of what can be conceived but not talked about, it is an issue of what cannot be conceived, and because of this it cannot be talked about. We avoid the problem to a great extent by talking about possibilities, and probabilities, as this allows for the reality of whatever it is which we are uncertain about. But the usefulness of possibility and probability is just evidence of the reality of whatever it is that we cannot conceive of, and therefore cannot talk about. It really skirts the issue because we pretend to have conceptions of the unknown, by showing off prediction skills, but these are just mathematical skills, and there are no hidden concepts here, just applied math.

neffable: a useless euphemism intended to obfuscate the fact it is impossible to conceive anything too great to be talked about. — Mww

I think you may have this backward. The problem is that we try to talk about things which we cannot conceptualize. That is the ineffable, we try to talk about something which we cannot talk about, due to a lack of conceptualization. The lack of conceptualization is what makes it so we cannot talk about it.

This is evident with the application of mathematics in the sciences. Through math we, in a way, talk about things, but it's only really an attempt to talk about them. The things supposedly talked about are not conceptualized, it is just a matter of applying general mathematical principles. So the talk is really about the mathematical principles. Thus mathematics creates the illusion that we are talking about things. But these are really things which we cannot conceptualize, those things which the mathematics is supposedly talking about, so we're not really talking about anything, just applying mathematics to the unknown.

Through this procedure though, applying mathematics to the unknown, I believe we can bring the unknown around to being known, therefore conceptualized, talked about, and properly described. That's why I said earlier in the thread, that we apply mathematics to the ineffable (what we cannot talk about because we have no conception of). Then through the application of math we produce an understanding, conceptualize, and start being able to talk about what was prior to this, ineffable.

Its relevant only in that I am able to distinguish between a big force/explosion and a small one.
I can also use sensory info to be able to perceive quite a range between big and small, without having to employ actual measured, unitised, accuracy via formulae. I can therefore perceive and detect 'material' aspects of 'energy' or force using something as simplistic as my own sensory input and without application of formulae. — universeness

This is in no way a case of measuring energy.

So, if we can't detect every Planck sized unit of energy, to confirm that the original hot/cold area has the exact same amount of energy as the area now in thermal balance, then this does not mean we have to start to employ words like immaterial or dualism. — universeness

We can never detect all the energy. We never have and we know we never will, you seem to agree with this. And this effective disproves the law of conservation, as a falsity. If energy was actually conserved we'd be able to, at least in principle, detect it all. We cannot, and we know we cannot, so it is not even detectable in principle, therefore not even conserved in principle. We need dualism if we want to assume that the conservation law is true, to account for the energy which we know can never be detected by us.

To me, it's akin to the accuracy of pi or the speed of light in a Vaccuum. We will never get 100% accuracy, will we? That doesn't make pi or the speed of light or the conservation of energy laws, wrong in any way. — universeness

Right, it does not make these laws wrong, it makes them false. They can still be correct, as long as we invoke some sort of dualism or something like that, to account for the incommensurability between our principles for measuring the world, and the reality of the world.

Since when has the popularity of beliefs become an accurate indicator of their truth-value? — javra

No one said it was. — Banno

Banno seems to have a very big problem with this, continually insisting that it is unreasonable to reject or be skeptical of the foundational conventions of mathematics, physics, and other sciences. But the only reason Banno can give for accepting these principles is that they are the accepted principles, and they work, even though some are demonstrably inconsistent, therefore necessarily false. Then Banno will turn around and say something like this, above, demonstrating complete hypocrisy. The hypocrisy displayed is the reason why I am repeatedly inclined toward the charge of dishonesty against Banno.

First, I think you can show me the experience. If you prick your finger with a pin, you can show me the experience by pricking me with a pin. Are the experiences the same? Well, there’s no numerical identity, but there’s some level of qualitative identity. There can’t be total qualitative identity because that would be equivalent to numerical identity, and that would require that I experience the pinprick as you, which is just to be you. I don’t think it’s right to describe this as ineffability. — Jamal

But what is this difference, the difference between your pinprick and my pinprick? Isn't it the difference between these two, the difference which makes them not numerically identical, yet still qualitatively identical, what is supposed to be ineffable? We know what it means to be one and the same (numerically identical), and that is to exist in the same context, no difference. And we know what it means to be of the same type (qualitatively identical), similar in some way, yet still separate, or different.

Now, in the case of the two pinpricks, the separation, or difference is a matter of context. The two things are called the same, "pinprick", yet the difference is that they each have a distinct context. This, "context" is where the ineffable is supposed to lie, it is what makes the two different. And it is what gives each particular instance of word usage its own unique meaning. If we attempt to bring the context into the statement, by describing it, we simply reformulate the context as part of the content, thereby making it not context any more, but content. However, there is always a part of the context which is missing from any such description or transformation, no matter how hard we try to include the entire context into our description of the difference between the two particular pinpricks. This inability to account for the entirety of the context is what validates the claim of an "ineffable".

Do you ascribe to QFT then? If you accept a photon as a field disturbance/excitation/vibration, you still have the result that the excitation travels at a constant speed with no initial acceleration.
This is backed up by the fact that the property of mass prevents light speed motion.
Electrons don't travel at light speed as they have some mass. — universeness

I think QFT has obvious problems. And, as I said to Banno, I believe that potential energy and kinetic energy, are fundamentally incommensurable, hence your problem with "initial acceleration". It is a problem inherent within our conception of mass.

If you consider something like maxwells demon, when it opens the massless door between the two chambers based on the speed of each particle it observes, would you still insist it would be applying a formula, to make its measurements? Is it not just basing it on 'fast,' 'slow.' How about when you touch something to decide on its temperature? are you applying a formula or taking a sensor reading?
Is sensing the presence of a property of something like relative position, the application of a formula?
Ignoring a measure of actual distance for a moment, simply observing the position of an object as north, south, east, west etc, is the gathering of such information formula based? — universeness

I went through this already. "Energy" has a very specific definition, the capacity to do work. In no way is touching something and feeling its heat, a case of measuring its capacity to do work. Even if you determine, with your senses that a particular object is moving, and you construe this as taking a measurement of its motion, you do not produce a determination of a quantity of energy without applying a formula to your measurements. This would convert your measurements of motion, to a quantity of energy. Then there's potential energy, which is not even motion itself, but the potential for motion. This is what I mean when I say that any determination of a quantity of energy is dependent on a formula. It's not simply measurements, it's measurements plus an application of a formula. This is because the concept of energy relates the thing measured to other things, and therefore requires a formula for the comparison.

I would suggest that base sensory information is not based on formula. I see, touch, taste, hear, smell and even think before I apply any formulae to measure scalar (magnitude) quantity or vector (magnitude and direction). Is information such as 'I see there is a car there' not just based on me comparing stored images with what I see? I would not call such 'shape/pattern recognition,' a formula application, would you? — universeness

I agree, sensing cannot be described as applying a formula. But in no way is such activity (simple sensing) a case of measuring the energy of something. I don't see how you think this is relevant to "energy".

I think we can observe a property of a motion as relatively fast or slow, enough to be able to know when to jump out of the way for example, and there is no formula-based calculation, involved, just a use of instinct and sensors. — universeness

Again, how is this relevant? "Energy" has a very specific definition. In no way is looking at the motion of something, and making the judgement to jump out of the way, a case of measuring the energy of the thing.

Furthermore, look at your use of "relatively fast or slow". Such a judgement would require a comparison, fast or slow compared to what? And this would require that we posit a standard for comparison. Therefore such a judgement actually would be formula based. But this is just the result of your faulty description. We do not need to make such a comparison when deciding to jump out of the way of a moving object, there need not be any formula based judgement at all.

When you see your physicists again, explain to them how energy disappears and how 0.9˙≠10.9˙≠1. They will be so grateful. — Banno

Unlike you, reasonable people recognize these useful mathematical fictions as fictions, so these explanations are not even needed. Some of the mathematicians on this forum, who being quite reasonable themselves, recognize that such propositions are not true, like to deny the true/false dichotomy which is commonly applied to propositions, claiming mathematical axioms are neither. In that case we might conclude that the axioms prove to be useful, but neither fact nor fiction. You, I've noticed, seem to like the utility of bivalence, so you don't have the same recourse unless you release that conviction. Maintaining bivalence, and not wanting to admit that falsity enters into physics by way of mathematical axioms, you deny the obvious.

So are you claiming that this:
Since a photon is a particle of light, this means that it does not need to accelerate to light speed, as it is already travelling at the speed of light when it is created. A photon does not rest and then reach the speed of light at a certain length of time, or even instantly. A photon is always travelling at the speed of light, from the moment of creation.

From a website called Ask an Astronomer, is wrong? In electron, positron annihilation, when two photons are created, there is no acceleration to light speed. — universeness

I can't say I agree with that because i do not really believe there is such a thing (meaning a real object) as a photon. So it really makes no sense to talk about a fictional particle (photon) speeding up and slowing down. However, if there is such a thing as a photon, then I would agree, that it must always be travelling at the speed of light, by definition.

If you see what I wrote earlier, I believe that there is no such object as a photon. The photon, being a unit of energy, is like all instances of energy, the product of measurement. We measure certain spatial-temporal aspects (motions), apply calculations using various principles, and conclude a quantity of energy. So "the energy" which is said to constitute a photon, is a product of those measurements with the required calculations. In simple terms, we do not ever measure energy directly, we apply a formula to calculate "energy", so energy is calculated, not a property of the movement itself. And since a photon is nothing more than a quantity of energy associated with a specific type of activity, the photon has no real existence, it is the product of a calculation. This is what I wrote earlier in this thread:

This is the mistaken interpretation which I referred to above. The sensor registers a physical change, and through the principles employed, it is calculated that this change is equivalent to a quantity of energy represent by "a photon". The photoelectric sensor does not actually detect a photon, it just undergoes a change, an effect which we calculate as the effect of a photon's worth of force. That the sensor detects a photon is a common misinterpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Left speechless, as usual.

Metaphysician Undercover doesn't believe in instantaneous velocity. Hence it is not wise to spend time considering his views on matters involving physics. — Banno

Ha, ha. It's very obvious that Instantaneous velocity is really an oxymoron. No time passes at an instant, and velocity requires a period of time, so velocity at an instant is impossible.. I've spoken to more than one physicist about this, and they clearly recognize this fact, but accept "instantaneous velocity" as a useful principle provided by mathematics. In philosophy some call this a useful fiction. However, some inept philosophers like you Banno, don't seem to recognize these useful fictions as fictions, and can't get beyond the idea that if physicists use the principle it must be a truth. But that's simply the influence of mathematics on physics, mathematics has no respect for truth or falsity.

asically, if spirit does anything, what it does would be measurable. — Banno

Just like in the other (ineffable) thread, what spirit does, is what is taken for granted. Newton's first law of motion for example. That a body will continue moving in the same way that it has in the past, onward into the future, is something taken for granted. But the universe doesn't necessarily have to be this way, there could be randomness in the movement of bodies. So Newton said his first law is dependent on the will of God.

That's an instance of Spirit causing what is taken for granted. But since Newton's first law is taken for granted we do not apprehend this activity described by it as requiring a cause, that activity is taken for granted. Newton saw it as requiring a cause though, and he attributed that cause to God.

That's the downfall of dualism, you can't insist that there are two distinct incommensurable substances and then say that one can move the other. — Banno

There is no such problem. That the two are incommensurable does not mean that they cannot interact. It just means that the interactions cannot be properly measured, because the activity of the one cannot be measured with the same form of measurement as the activity of the other.

The difference between potential energy and kinetic energy may actually demonstrate the interaction of incommensurables. The two, potential and kinetic energy, affect each other. But that they are most likely incommensurable is evident from the fact that when one is said to convert to the other, there is always some energy missing, as per the second law of thermodynamics. This makes the claimed conversion a fiction, and demonstrates that the two must be in some way incommensurable. That's why the law of conservation is not true, it tries to establish commensurability between two incommensurables, potential energy and kinetic energy, and this just can't be done.

This thread is about whether the principle of conservation is compatible with duaiism. Is A compatible with B. I have argued that they are. — Bartricks

Let me remind you though, your argument is based in the premise that the law of conservation is true.

First, note that the evidence that the principle of the conservation of energy is true is empirical evidence and no empirical evidence will ever conflict with dualism.

Second, in order for the principle of the conservation of energy to be violated, some energy would need either to disappear or be introduced into the picture by the addition of event B. But event B does not do this. We have no more or less energy in the system than if one supposed A caused C directly. Thus, there is no violation of the principle. — Bartricks

Since the law of conservation is not true, your argument is unsound. Therefore I've requested that you produce a better argument, one which represents the law of conservation as a useful principle, but not true unless employed in conjunction with other principles, like the second law of thermodynamics. Representing the law of conservation as true by itself, is the false premise of your argument Bartricks. You strawman the law of conservation as a stand-alone truth.

Why did you name the thread "The philosophy of anarchy", when the op is only talking about the philosophy of governance. Are you ready to get on topic, and talk about an absence of government, rather than talking about governance?

Suppose we remove all forms of governance. Could we proceed to live in this way? Would there be problems? If there is foreseeable problems, how would we deal with them without any form of governance?

If the most detailed possible list of instructions for riding a bike does not give one the knowledge of how to ride, then there is a gap between saying how to ride a bike (via a detailed list of instructions) and knowing how to ride a bike, which means that there is something about riding a bike which is known but which cannot be stated and included in the instructions. Which is just to say that there is something ineffable. — Luke

The missing ingredient is that little bit of inspiration which gets you up off the couch and out to the bike, and continues to guide your movements at every step of the way. Sometimes its called spirit, motivation, ambition, or even determination. We all know how to use this feature of one's psyche toward getting what is desired, but since it only exists in the most general way, being able to be directed in any way whatsoever, it does not enter into any specific instructions. It is taken for granted.

E.g.: first, direct your attention toward the bike. Next, make your body move toward the bike. I think the majority of the processes occurring here are left undescribed. We easily cope with the ineffable by taking things for granted.

But knowing how to ride a bike does require being able to ride a bike. Claim that you can ride a bike all you want, the proof is in the riding.

The point, again, is that there is nothing that is not said, nothing that we can add to the list; only something that has not been done; hence there is nothing that is ineffable. — Banno

To be able (knowing-how) to ride a bike, is not the same thing as riding a bike. When I say "I know how to ride a bike", it does not mean the same thing as "I am riding a bike" means. And this is contrary to what you claimed here:

but there is no difference between "knowing how to ride a bike" and "riding a bike"; we don't have two things here, one being bike riding and the other being knowing how to ride a bike. — Banno

Since there is very clearly a difference between these two, we need to respect this difference, and when we attempt to analyze, and describe the difference, we hit the place where the ineffable supposedly lies. How is it that knowing how can be something different from actually doing, and how is it that knowing how readily transitions, or translates, into actually doing in practise, when the two are so different.

We can start by inquiring exactly what the difference in meaning is, between the two phrases. So, "riding a bike" means to be actively involved in the named activity, at the present time. But, "knowing how to ride a bike", is quite difficult to determine the precise meaning, because it divides in two ways. One way references past acts, and the other references possible future acts.

We can refer to the past, and say that the person has demonstrated one's ability, through past actions of actually riding. This is Wittgenstein's preferred method. It is somewhat faulty though, because it requires a logical inference similar to the following: 'if one has carried out the activity, then the person knows how to do it'. So Wittgenstein approaches this little problem with the question of how many times must one successfully carry out the activity before it constitutes a demonstration of knowing how. Since there really is no adequate answer to this question, we can see that this way of determining the meaning of "knowing how" is really faulty, so we must turn to the second way.

The second way is the more common way, the way of what people normally mean when they use the phrase. This is to refer to possible future acts. Now, "knowing how to ride a bike" means that the person can in the future, successfully carry out the activity referred to, at will (with proper respect for natural restrictions). I would urge you to recognize this as the proper meaning of "knowing-how" (according to common usage), regardless of Wittgenstein's attempt to cast "knowing-how" in a different light, having demonstrated the capacity.

To correctly understand "knowing-how" we must refer directly to future acts, and not allow past acts to confuse us. This is because there is a multitude of different ways to learn how, and if ever we set a definition of what constitutes an adequate demonstration, we might always find something outside this. That's the problem Wittgenstein approached with the question of 'how many times' constitutes a demonstration of knowing-how. There really is no answer to this question because it varies from person to person, and as pointed out, a person could very well learn how through an instruction manual, or even simple observation. Then the person could actually know how, without ever having demonstrated one's capacity. So we must relinquish the idea that we can explain knowing-how through reference to past acts.

Now we can approach the supposed ineffable, the future action. The future action does not exist yet, so we cannot describe it. Any attempt to describe it will be imaginary, fictitious, because there is no action yet to describe, and we only have prediction, and hope that the action goes as predicted. To aid us in this attempt to describe what cannot be described, because it does not exist, we turn to probabilities, statistics, and mathematical principles. Now we can describe a future action with words, and determine the probability of occurrence, concerning the different parts of the act. However, when discussing future actions, there is always a hole in our understanding which presents as a probability instead of as a certainty. This is the supposed ineffable, it is unknown therefore it is not talked about, and cannot be talked about, unless we alter our understanding such that the unknown no longer exists. However, that would require removing probability from the future act, which is probably impossible.

We don't know what energy IS — universeness

I would say that there is no such thing as what energy is, and trying to make such a determination would be a mistaken venture.

A photoelectric sensor can 'detect' a photon, which to me, is evidence that it is not immaterial. — universeness

This is the mistaken interpretation which I referred to above. The sensor registers a physical change, and through the principles employed, it is calculated that this change is equivalent to a quantity of energy represent by "a photon". The photoelectric sensor does not actually detect a photon, it just undergoes a change, an effect which we calculate as the effect of a photon's worth of force. That the sensor detects a photon is a common misinterpretation.

n what way are you using 'immaterial' here? as a synonym with supernatural? If not, then do you have other synonyms you would accept for 'immaterial' as you use it here? — universeness

I really can't understand what you are asking. I am using "immaterial" in the common way, as non-material, such as we would say that concepts have immaterial existence. Energy is nothing more than a concept. There is absolutely nothing in the world of matter which "energy" represents. It is very similar to "time" in that respect. We use the concept freely, but there is nothing material in the world which is represented by it. So if we try to reify it, to say that there is something real which is represented by it, we end up being forced to say that there is something real which is immaterial. That's what happens when we try to reify concepts.

Do you have any 'descriptions' or even 'attributes' of that which you perceive exists 'outside' of this universe. — universeness

No, I have no such description. It's simply the case that the way that we conceptualize "the universe" produces from logical necessity, the conclusion that there is something outside the universe. In other words, that there is something outside the universe is a logical conclusion produced from our current conception of "the universe". To determine some logical principles concerning the nature of what it is which is outside the universe would require that we analyze closely the premises which lead to this conclusion, such as the premises involved in the concept of energy.

It is possible that we might conceptualize "the universe" in a different way, but such a conceptualization might not be as useful to us. A supposed "true conceptualization" of the universe might be able to represent all of reality as "the universe", but this conceptualization would be very different from the useful conceptualization which we currently employ.

Can you refer to 'outside' this universe without suggesting an existent which we would currently label 'supernatural'? — universeness

Do you label concepts, being artificial instead of natural, as supernatural?

So whether you view the annihilation of a particle-antiparticle pair into a pair of photons the “destruction of matter” or just a conversion from one form of matter into another is, to a large extent, a matter of taste. — universeness

I guess the nature of matter is a feature of which flavour of quark you prefer.

That is, "Some things you have to learn on your own" looks like it is about an ineffable entity we might call "knowing how to ride a bike", but there is no difference between "knowing how to ride a bike" and "riding a bike"; we don't have two things here, one being bike riding and the other being knowing how to ride a bike. — Banno

Yes there is two distinct things here, as correctly points out. And, you ought not neglect this difference as it is a manifestation of the difference between potential and actual, which is the substance of Aristotle's biology. Knowing how to ride a bike does not require that one is actually riding a bike. The knowledge resides in a type of dormancy, as a feature of the memory; it is a potential which is only expressed as the action of actually riding, from time to time. Therefore knowing how to ride a bike is only the potential to actually ride, which is clearly distinct from the act of riding. All of the so-called "powers of the soul", self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, intellection, are all understood in this way, as not active all the time. They are understood as a continuous potential, which is ready, and able to be activated at any moment, in a punctuated, discontinuous way.

And if this is right, then there is nothing here that is ineffable. Or if you prefer, what appeared to be the ineffable bit is just the doing, the getting on the bike and riding it. — Banno

The ineffable bit, for us because we have yet to figure this out, is the actualization itself. Knowing how to ride, as the potential to ride, we can talk about, and know about. Actually riding, we can also talk about. But the difficulty lies in the bit in between, the impetus, which is the actualization of the potential. This is where we find free will. But it is only "ineffable" because it does not very well fit into our categorization, and so it is something not understood. And since it's not understood we can't talk about it. It's that instant in time when something changes from being at rest, to being in motion, where acceleration must be infinite, we haven't figured out what constitutes this so we cannot sensibly talk about it.

If the goal of the thread is to just make assumptions with no respect for whether or not they are true, then why don't we just assume that the law of contradiction is compatible with dualism, and get the thread done with.

Your response seems disingenuous. On the one hand you claim that Planck units are "fictitious" and then on the other you claim that "falsity often works well". :roll: — 180 Proof

You think I'm disingenuous, then you must actually believe that falsity may work well, and you are guarding yourself against it. In reality falsity works very well, far more often than it ought to. That's why there's such a thing as deception.

There's obviously no logic which allows you to proceed from "it works well", to "therefore it's true". Mathematics, which works well as a tool, is categorically separated from propositions which state truths. So, as any mathematician will tell you, their axioms are neither true nor false. Therefore by introducing "it works well" as evidence of truth you have simply demonstrated a category mistake.

My premise is "Ouch that f*@king hurt.

Physicist why did it hurt?"
Physicist :" because it contains a lot of kinetic energy (heat)"
Me: Ah okay so hot (subjective/my experience of heat) =energy, and that energy is being transferred to my hand by "kinesis" (movement)?"
Physicist:" yes that's right, movement from molecule to molecule. Which you can measure with your hand or an instrument.
Enter Metaphysician: "you can't imply that reasoning. You need a premise. — Benj96

OK, so you gave me the premise right here, the physicist told you so. I never said that you couldn't infer the conclusion with a premise, I said you couldn't infer it without the premise. Now you gave me the premise, and your conclusion, that energy burns your hand, is valid, but only if we do not consider your appeal to authority to be a fallacy, and we exclude your premise on that basis.

But saying ""Ouch that f*@king hurt." does not qualify as making a measurement, by any stretch of the imagination. To touch something is to measure it? Come on Benj96, your reaching for straws. And how would you know that it is energy you are measuring, except that someone told you? So, you know that you measured energy, because someone told you that this is what tyou did when you touched the fire. And how much energy did you measure?

If you don't believe it go put your hand in the fire and measure it yourself. Tell me what you feel. — Benj96

Sorry, Benj, I will not oblige you and stick my hand in a fire. I will tell you quite honestly though, that doing such is not an act of measuring the energy which is there. If it were, you'd be able to tell me how many calories were transferred from the fire to your hand when you touched it.

Or don't, and we can just assume that energy is hot as a decent conclusion. And things with more energy in them are hotter (furnaces, nuclear bombs, sun, supernovae etc). — Benj96

That's not a decent conclusion at all. Things are loaded with potential energy, which are not hot at all. Remember tht famous equation, E=mc2? Anything with mass has a heck of a lot of energy within it. Remember the atom bomb? The mass does not need not be hot to contain a lot of energy.

I really must tell you, you have some very strange notions about energy, Benj.

Am I correct in assuming that at this stage in the argument your only motivation is to prove me wrong? — Benj96

The idea behind this type of discussion is that we both learn. The problem which has developed is that you don't seem to have much which you can teach me in this subject. So at this stage it's pretty much me teaching you. However, you seem to be a very reluctant student, very skeptical so the process has become very slow, and maybe we've gone beyond the point of making any progress at all.

Are you stating this as a scientific fact? and if you are, can you give me references from experts in the field who have stated this as fact or are you just offering the statement above as a valid/convenient way to 'envisage or personally perceive' what energy is. — universeness

All you have to do is take a look at what energy is, and you'll see that it is not something directly measured. The quantity of energy which is said to be attributed to any object or any specific location, is always the product of a calculation. Look at the famous equation E=mc2. In this case, the amount of energy is derived from a measurement of mass. And when kinetic energy is assigned to a moving object, the equation is 1/2mv2. So kinetic energy is derived from applying that formula to measurements of mass and velocity. It's just a simple fact, that the quantity of energy is always derived from applying a formula to measurements. Energy is not something directly measured, it is calculated. Contrary to Benj96's claim, that he sticks his hand into a fire, and feels the energy in the fire, energy has no empirical existence. It is in no way sensed.

Perhaps we really would have to be able to 'see' a photon to better know what energy IS. — universeness

This is the point, we do not sense energy at all. Notice that we see rainbows, and other instances of refraction, and interference patterns, being the wave property of light, but we do not see the photon, which is supposed to be a unit of energy. The photon is a calculated unit of energy, not a sensed unit of light.

Would you agree that energy is material as opposed to immaterial? — universeness

No, I would obviously not agree to that. Since energy is never sensed, it is only the product of a calculation, it must be immaterial, as a conception only.

For you, if you think that the energy conservation laws are fundamentally incorrect then are you forced to also suggest that something must exist 'outside' of this universe or do you envisage some other way for energy to become 'non-existent' rather than 'changed form.' — universeness

Yes, I think there is necessarily a beyond the universe. This is because "the universe" is a materialist conception, based on all that is material, and sensible. But we can understand, through the concept of energy, that there is necessarily an immateril aspect of reality.

Yes it is, it is just that, like most, you don't read the OP carefully - you just see 'conservation of energy principle' and think 'I can say something about that' and then you say it, regardless of whether it is relevant to the argument. — Bartricks

Did you not read the part of my post, where I described explicitly the problem with your op? You said "note that the evidence that the principle of the conservation of energy is true is empirical evidence". This is incorrect, as I explained. All empirical evidence indicates that the law of conservation is false.
Therefore you need to correct this.

But correcting that would create an even bigger problem for your op, because you then go on to say: "in order for the principle of the conservation of energy to be violated, some energy would need either to disappear or be introduced into the picture by the addition of event B. But event B does not do this. "

Now, you need to just face the facts. The law of conservation is always violated, all the time, and so, in the event of B, energy must disappear, according to the second law of thermodynamics. Therefore, if you maintain your assertion, that no energy disappears in the instance of B, then B is not a real empirical event, and your claim of compatibility fails.

Is this sufficient as a reply to your issue of compatibility?

The belief that those thermodynamic principles are true are the foundation from which we have standardised and built virtually all newtonian physical laws and formulas. — Benj96

This is completely untrue. First, Newtonian laws are prior to, in time, and therefore not derived from thermodynamic principles. Furthermore, Newtonian laws of physics are distinct from, and in a completely different class, from the laws of thermodynamics. Newtons laws relate to the activities of individual things with one centre of mass, and the interactions between these things. The laws of thermodynamics relate to the energy of a system with multiple centres of mass. The issue is that a system is not a thing, it's a conceptual structure which is be applied toward a group of things. So Newtonian laws apply to the interactions of things, which may be assumed to be a part of a system, whereas the laws of thermodynamics apply to the system as a whole, but this whole does not have a centre of mass, as a Newtonian object does.

Now, the important aspect which are not grasping is that Newtonian laws, taken individually are believed to be true, each being supported by empirical evidence. But the laws of thermodynamics are not. The law of conservation is not supported by empirical evidence, it requires an amendment, the second law, to account for the empirical evidence. So the law of conservation, on its own is not believed to be true, because it is known to be false, and that's why we all scoff at the idea of perpetual motion. Nor does the truth of this law provide the foundation for any other laws of physics, because we know it to be untrue, and we know that the second law is required to amend its untruth. So the two laws must be taken in unity.

How did we gain such predictive power, knowledge and technology based off something fundamentally incorrect? — Benj96

Predictive power does not require truth, it is provided for very well with statistical mathematics. But I think what you are really missing is the necessity of the second law to provide the amendment which accounts for the falsity of the first. If we simply had the first law, we would always be looking for that little bit of missing motion, never being able to find it, and we would have to conclude that the first law is not supported by the empirical evidence. Empirical evidence would always show some missing motion. So we simply initiate a second law, which accounts for that little untruth.

Now, with the unity of the first and second together, we have the appearance of truth, energy is conserved, but some of it just ends up being unaccountable for. But this appearance of truth is really just an illusion of deception, because it relies on the assumption that energy is something real, in the world, which can exist independently from our measurements and calculations. But as I've explained to you, energy is really just a product of our calculations, not something existing independently.

What you have argued for based on the falsity of thermodynamics laws is rationally consistent throughout your argument and well composed. But it is confined to Materialism - We can only infer the existence of energy from measurement/ calculation of other physical things. — Benj96

That's because this is what energy is, by definition, and this is an important point. We use formulas to produce a conclusion concerning the "energy" of an object, or a system. It is something which we assign to the thing as an attribute or property, which is non-empirical, never directly sensed. It is abstract, and since it is never sensed, it cannot be verified, as it is simply a creation of the mind. So, if we want to get to the point of reifying energy, saying that it is something real in the world, we need to get beyond materialism, because energy is not a material thing. If we adhere to materialism, then energy is simply a product of calculations, it has no real existence other than as an idea of the mind, and the lost energy which is described by the unity of the first and second laws is necessarily due to faulty principles of the mind. But if we allow for the real existence of the non-material, we might allow that there is real "energy" existing in the world, as an immaterial existence, and the lost energy referred to by these laws, is actually out in the world somewhere, where we cannot locate it (energy escaping sense detection). Then, these united laws are actually correct, and there is a real immaterial existence of energy which we will never be able to find. That's what these laws imply, if taken as the truth, that there is energy existing in the universe which will never be revealed to us. This energy must be truly immaterial, therefore forcing dualism on us.

However what I argued, that you don't need to measure energy to know it's there - and I gave a first person account to prove that - I don't touch fire coz it's hot as. — Benj96

This is not an argument at all. You don't touch the fire because it's hot. This in no way implies that there is energy there. You need a premise which relates being hot to being energy, in order to conclude that being hot implies energy. This is because energy is really not the thing you feel, and you only know that there is energy where you feel heat, because there are logical principles which relate the two. That's why energy is an abstraction, it is not something sensed. We sense things, we measure them and we determine the energy. Because we have the logical principles which relate these, you can say that if I see motion, I know that there is energy there. And, I don't need to measure the motion to know this, but the knowing is based in a logical implication, dependent on certain principles, it is not directly derived from sensing motion.

how did I admit that? — Bartricks

You used a definition of "philosopher" which is not consistent with anything printed that I've ever seen.

I am using the term to refer to someone who is extremely good at philosophy. — Bartricks

But that's not consistent with the definition you produced, you did not say anything about being extremely good.. You said someone who teaches philosophy at a university, and who has articles published in peer reviewed journals. This excludes all the extremely good philosophers who are not teaching at a university, and allows for all the extremely bad philosophers who teach and have published bad philosophy.

You think that's not clear in the OP? The conservation of energy principle says that the level of energy in the material world will remain constant. Resist the temptation to say that you think the principle is false- that's philosophically inept. — Bartricks

It's definitely not clear in the op. There is no indication as to what "energy" refers to, and how any quantity of energy is determined. These are very important issues otherwise people might just assert that there is the same quantity of energy now, as there was before, therefore energy is conserved. Or, people might produce a mathematical formula which will necessarily, whenever applied, always result in the same amount of energy being determined, regardless of what exists in reality. This is why it is important toward your discussion, to determine what "energy" refers to, and how any specific quantity of energy is determined. Otherwise we have no indication as to how the law of conservation relates to anything, it might just be something that people assert while it has no real relation to anything whatsoever. Then your question is pointless.

Dualism, as explained in the OP, is the view that our minds are immaterial things that are causally interacting with the material world (the latter is interactionism - strictly speaking one could be a dualist and deny it - but by hypothesis that is not the case with the kind of dualism under consideration). — Bartricks

OK, since you want me to focus on the op, here is the part which is problematic:

But how? First, note that the evidence that the principle of the conservation of energy is true is empirical evidence and no empirical evidence will ever conflict with dualism.

Second, in order for the principle of the conservation of energy to be violated, some energy would need either to disappear or be introduced into the picture by the addition of event B. But event B does not do this. We have no more or less energy in the system than if one supposed A caused C directly. Thus, there is no violation of the principle. — Bartricks

As is very evident, and what I've been explaining to Benj, the law of conservation of energy is not true, and, in transactions, some energy does disappear so the addition of event B would cause a disappearance of energy. You assert "But event B does not do this". You are wrong, every event causes some energy to disappear and that's what the second law of thermodynamics accounts for, the energy which disappears when an event occurs.

The issue is that the law of conservation is a useful principle which is not true, and the second law accounts for the untruth of it. But in your comparison with dualism, you are assuming that it is true. Furthermore, as indicated by the passage quoted, the assumption that it is true constitutes a significant part of your comparison with dualism. Since this assumption is incorrect, as I've been arguing, the comparison in the op is completely wrong. And the op, as stated, is completely pointless.

So, you need to reformulate your comparison with an accurate representation of the laws of thermodynamics. You need to allow that the law of conservation is false, and bring in also its relation to the second law which accounts for this falsity, and perhaps even the third law, which describes the consequence of that falsity, in order to make a proper comparison between the laws of thermodynamics and dualism. Your proposal is nothing more than a misleading oversimplification of these laws, which clearly misrepresents the first law in a way which is completely inaccurate. Your op therefore, is not worth considering, as is.

I am using the term 'philosopher' to refer to someone who is employed to teach philosophy in a university and who has a track record of publishing in philosophy in peer review journals. — Bartricks

Ok, so you admit, you are just defining the term to suit your purpose.

Now, is the principle of the conservation of energy compatible with the dualism? — Bartricks

Before we can proceed with this inquiry, we must determine the truths and falsities concerning what "conservation of energy", and "dualism" mean. Otherwise, as I said, people will just be defining the terms to suit their preference. And that's a pointless exercise.

Are you a philosopher? — Bartricks

You have a very strange definition of "philosopher". It looks like a definition which you manufactured for your purpose.

Have you never heard of Platonic dialectics? It's all about finding the true meaning of the words we use, the true idea behind the word. Obviously this is necessary before we can make any meaningful judgement concerning compatibility.

If someone says A is compatible with B, then you should focus on whether that's true - that is, you should focus on the compatibility claim - not on whether A or B is actually true. — Bartricks

No Bartricks, before focusing on whether A is compatible with B, we need to determine what A and B mean. And this is a matter of truth, otherwise one will define A and B so that they either are, or are not compatible with each other, according to one's preference. In other words, one will make fictitious definitions of A and B to make them either compatible or not. And that is a pointless exercise. So we ought to proceed with determining the truth about A and B.

As you see above in the definitions of "different" and "distinct," the two words are synonyms, thus your claim I "identify wrongly; mistake" "different" as "distinct" is false. — ucarr

Wow! Now I've seen everything in an attempt to argue a point. Equivocation at it's worst, right here.

As I understand the above, you're claiming humans insert partitions that break up a continuum into (artificial) parts. In line with this configuration, you're fusing three different states: steam, water, ice into one continuum, H2O. Breaking up H2O into three different states or fusing three different states into H2O, either way, human performs a cognitive operation. Share with me the logic you follow to the conclusion that the fusion operation is more valid than the separation operation. — ucarr

Sorry, I don't understand what you claim I am saying. I just can't place your reference to fusion. You clearly haven't undertsood me, or else you are intentionally creating a straw man. So be it.

In your own words, cited in my previous post, you establish your understanding of yourself as a consistent POV who transitions through different states of being across a continuum of time. This is a confirmation of human individuality - yours - not a refutation. — ucarr

I'm finding you very difficult to communicate with. It seems you willfully misrepresent what I say. That's a shame, it makes discussion pointless.

An example of a pertinent answer to my question "How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?" would have you telling me what I'm thinking based upon your ability to read my mind. Your ability to read my mind follows logically from your claim "there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation..." — ucarr

Again, I just cannot follow what you are trying to say here. Sorry, but your misuse of words is just annoying and I am unable to pay attention to drivel, it grosses me out.. Even though I am apparently reading your mind, communication with you is impossible because your mind is just so confused. Surely you must find yourself to be incorrigible.

So it's your position then, MU, that the Planck constant is not (and any other constants derived from it e.g. Dirac constant), in fact, a fundamental physical constant? And therefore that quantum mechanics does not work (i.e. likewise is "ficticious", extreme precision notwithstanding, instead of approximative)? Because, so to speak, this theoretical map is not identical with the real territory? — 180 Proof

I don't see what being a "physical constant" has to do with this. Being, a constant of physics, which works in its application, doesn't mean that it says something true about the world. It just means that it's a useful principle. Falsity often works very well, as you seem fully aware of.

So, physics defintion of Electric potential: the amount of "work needed to move a unit charge from a reference point to a specific point against an electric field.

Physics definition of" work": In physics, work is the "energy" transferred to or from an object via the application of force along a displacement.

Oh gosh look what we have arrived at? So it seems electric potential is, hmm, energy. Who knew? Physics did. — Benj96

I can't believe that you cannot grasp what I am telling you, and you just instinctively want to dispute everything I say. Energy is the capacity to do work, and energy is said to be "transferred" from one thing to another, in the instance of doing work. Now look at your definition of electric potential, it is the amount of work needed to move a unit charge. This amount of work could be supplied in numerous different ways. That is why a conversion formula is always required when determining energy, it is not a simple property, it is what is transferred from one object to another, and the same amount of work might be provided in numerous different ways. So it is not the work (energy) which is measured, only the before, or after are measured, and the work is calculated, as a universal.

Which retrospectively confirms my reasoning about measurement devices requiring not only energy to run them, and energy to be them (matter, bonds, forces that hold its molecules together), and what do they measure? Energy. — Benj96

As I said, your claim is false. One cannot directly measure the energy of something, and I don't see why you can't understand this. A calculation is required, to relate the motion of that object to other objects, to determine the object's capacity for work. Consider the simple formula for momentum, mass times velocity. You can measure an object's mass, and measure it's velocity, but you need a further principle to calculate it's momentum. it's not measured. Furthermore, to predict how the momentum will affect another object another formula. This is the transferal, mentioned above. So we have a formula for force, force equals mass times acceleration. Now, the important thing for you to notice in the context of our discussion here, is that force is not directly measured. Force is inferred, through the difference in the measurements of velocity (giving acceleration), and the measurement of mass. Therefore the "force" which is a description of the transferal, the energy involved, is calculated from that formula, it is not directly measured.

Look at your definition of electric potential now, for example. It is the amount of work needed to move the unit charge in a specified way. So, when the unit charge is observed to have been moved in that way, it is inferred that this amount of work has been applied, according to that definition. The amount of work is not measured, what was measured was the movement of the charge. The amount of work, is inferred through the application of the definition.

It seems like you don't really want to attempt to consider any alternative explanation as you had your own answer (assumption) from the beginning. — Benj96

You have not given me anything to consider, except a clear indication that you do not understand the principles involved. If you gave me something reasonable to consider, rather than off the wall assertions which amount to nothing more than misunderstanding, then I would consider what you say.

Out of curiosity, if energy is "wasted" or "disappears" or somehow "ceases to exist" as you say, then where did it come from in the first place? — Benj96

Look Benj96, energy is something calculated. We say that a specified moving object has a certain capacity to move other objects (do work), because we can make measurements and calculate this capacity. What sense is there in asking me where this capacity to do work came from, or where it goes after it is spent. Am I coming across as so extremely intelligent that I appear to be God or something like that?

I constantly tell my students that compatibilism about free will is not the thesis that determinism is true. Nor is it the thesis that we have free will. It is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. And yet every year about 90% don't get this and proceed to tell me how either determinism is false or that we do not have free will, totally oblivious to the fact they're doing nothing whatever in terms of assessing the credibility of compatibilism. — Bartricks

I think that compatibilism involves necessarily a misunderstanding of either free will, determinism, or both. And assessing the credibility of compatibilism necessarily involves determining the truth concerning free will and determinism. I mean, one could easily define "free will", and "determinism" such that these are compatible, but there is absolutely no point to this. So your example does nothing for me.

So do not question whether the c principle is true or whether dualism is true. Ask 'are they compatible?' — Bartricks

To understand the meaning of the c principle, and the meaning of dualism, requires necessarily that one understands how these names relate to reality, and that requires an assessment of their truth. Whether or not the two are compatible can only be judged after this assessment. Otherwise, one will conform the meaning of the terms (create definitions) so that they are either compatible, or not, depending on what one prefers. What's the point to this exercise you propose, of defining terms so as to support one's belief, rather than looking at the truth and falsity of the matter?

So, to assess the claim, for those who don't know, you need to assume the principle of conservation of energy is true, and then see if what I have said is correct. — Bartricks

What is the point of assuming to be true, a principle which is demonstrably false? Anything which follows from this discussion will be irrelevant to the reality of the situation, as is the case when we assume a false premise to be true. The conclusions which follow are unsound and do not have any useful meaning.

Yes you're right the energy is released elsewhere than where the measurement tool is being used. Just like we argued about the room releasing heat to the environment. — Benj96

This is a statement drawn from your false assumption, that all the missing energy still exists as energy. You say "the energy is released elsewhere". The problem is that energy is a feature of the measurement not of the thing measured. As I explained, we measure the motion and proceed to calculate the thing's energy. So if the missing motion cannot be located and measured, and the energy calculated, it is a faulty assumption to say that the energy is elsewhere.

What I'm saying is "wasted" because it wasn't measured is the wrong word.
It's gone elsewhere. Just because I can't measure every molecule of water that goes over niagara falls per second doesn't mean what I couldn't measure is "wasted"... "lost" "disappeared". — Benj96

The issue is that all attempts to locate all the missing motion and energy have failed. And, we conclude that it is impossible to locate all the missing energy, as indicated by the second law. Therefore the assumption that this motion exists, and could be located, measured, and assigned a value as energy is simply false. We know that this is not the case, as expressed by the second law.

So this is not comparable to water over the Niagra falls. In this case we assume that we could set up a collection basin, and measure all the water coming over the falls, without a drop being missed by that measurement process. In the case of energy, we assume the exact opposite, that it is impossible to detect al the motion, measure it all, and assign a value as energy, because we assume that some will always be lost, as per the second law. Therefore we have no good reason to believe that this motion exists at all, and no good reason to believe that the law of conservation is stating something true. It is a simple falsity, which we can clearly see as a falsity, and know it as a falsity, but we use it because it is useful.

Heat disperses outwards and as it does it heats up the environment its spreading into, the further it spreads out the less amount it heats up each part. But it still heats them up by ever more minute amounts.
Absolute zero when reached is a timeless state of no change (no heat/kinetic motion) where all energy is only "potential" again. The exact same conditions as at the big bang. Alpha state = omega state — Benj96

These two statements directly contradict each other, as incompatible, inconsistent. In the first, you say that heat spreads out, and heats less and less, but continues to heat, implying an infinite regress in this continuity of heating less and less. In the second, you suggest an end to the infinite regress, "absolute zero". But clearly, what you describe in the first denies the possibility of the absolute zero which you speak of in the second.

It definitely is. If I punch a punchbag at a fairground, the force of the impact (the momentum of my arm) is measured digitally in a number scale. Which can be compared to others - maybe a professional boxer. — Benj96

No, the force is calculated from some measurements, as I described, through the application of some principles, such as f=ma. The exact principles employed in each instance is irrelevant, and whether the calculations are carried out by a human being with pen and paper, or by a computer using algorithms, is irrelevant.

The measurement must use some of the energy in its measurement. Otherwise how exactly can it function as a measuring device? Are measuring devices somehow magically outside of all cause and effect relationships/energy transfer and the information those hold? — Benj96

Sorry, I cannot grasp what you are saying here. There are different ways of measuring motion, in some cases the measuring instrument absorbs the motion, such as your punching bag example. Some measuring techniques simply observe and make comparisons from numerous observations. Which is more accurate is irrelevant, because no matter which one you use, you will still have to make adjustments for inefficiencies, therefore energy which is lost during the activity being measured.

I don't think so.
The device converts kinetic force into a voltage and the measurement of that voltage is a measurement of the energy that generated (converted) into it. — Benj96

You're still wrong Benj96. Voltage is a measurement of electric potential, and some principles of conversion must be applied to state an energy equivalent to the voltage measured, joules or something like that.