But insight is present or it is absent, and there is no method, or training, or process or 'way' towards it. That is mere knowledge that is accumulated over time. — unenlightened

Well, it's like I said, I don't really understand what you mean by "insight". How can there be no way or process toward it? Is its appearance magical? Or are you saying that it's something one is either born with or not? If so, would a young child have insight? And if a child cannot have insight, how is it developed, if not through magic?

Of course they are. Simple arithmetic is too. I didn't say they aren't. I said "Using probabilities and statistics in any framework of thought, philosophical or other, is not mathematizing." So, you should most probably check the meaning of the word "mathematize".
It's one thing to use use probabilities in discussing a subject and another thing to consider or treat a subject as a mathematical one (i.e, "mathematize" it.) Because then, all mathematical questions and problems could be considered also as philosophical ones! — Alkis Piskas

So if using mathematics in a field of study does not constitute mathematizing it, then what does? Is physics mathematized? Is music mathematized?

Give me a break. Are you going to produce your offer or not?

The offer made to 'Praxis' is open to anyone who wishes to take me up. He couldn't, but maybe you can? let's have some fun on neutral grounds — skyblack

I'm game. What's this offer to Praxis?

You're no fun. Every time you think you see a weasel you run and hide.

I assume that everyone I converse with here is a person, so "I" is very relevant because a person has personality. And if you are a bot, or in some other way not a person, then "I" in that case, is even more relevant.

The measurement of what you are saying ( a response to what i had said) is determined by the motive behind any 'amendments'. If the amendments are done to upgrade one's weaponry, or to create a patched blanket to weather the assault of debate/regimentation, or to create a mental intellectual crutch etc.....which are the usual reasons why weasels amend.... are usually done to strengthen the image that one has it down. And to project that image outwards. — skyblack

You are characterizing the person who changes one's position as a "weasel", instead of seeing the person as open minded, and ready to accept change. There are two principal reasons for changing one's position, one is the "weasel" reason, the other the open minded reason.

However, considering the rarity of the second possibility, as evidenced by observing what is going on around us (an observation available to all), the likelihood of the second possibility was discarded in light of the common occurrences of the first possibility. — skyblack

Ever think that perhaps you misinterpret the situation around you? You see people all around you changing their positions, and you conclude that they are all weasels, because you have some predisposition to judge them this way. The weasel changes its position, therefore the person who changes position is a weasel. But in reality many of them are just open minded people.

What would cause you to see these people in this way? Is it because that's the reason why you would change your position, you are a weasel?

That some complex thoughts use words does not mean that all complex thoughts use words.

mostly motivated by material gain for their religious organizations but not the "true believer" foot soldiers – "the flock" whipped-up and driven to slaughter with consecrated fairytales about defeating the infernal conspiracies of Them "evil-doers" that's preached by their "Shepherds" – sheep converted into rabid wolves against "the hounds from hell". — 180 Proof

These people "the flock" are murdering for the purpose of material gain of the organization, as you state. That they are brainwashed fools, and think that they are murdering for some other purpose, is beside the point.

my point here concerns religious true believers who have always willingly martyred each other and each other's children for their respective Holy Lies. — 180 Proof

But these people, the brainwashed fools, do not know that what they say is untrue, because they believe it. Lying is deceiving, i.e. knowing what one is saying is not the truth. These people believe it to be the truth, so they are not lying, and you cannot say it's "their respective Holy Lies". The lying is being done by those "High Priests" who are motivated by material gain rather than true religion (actually True Religion is a brand name). So they are not properly characterized as "Holy Lies", they are better called "materialist lies".

Using probabilities and statistics in any framework of thought, philosophical or other, is not mathematizing. — Alkis Piskas

Could you explain what you mean here? Aren't probabilities and statistics mathematical?

so these assessors with their many diseases, physical and mental : broken, fragmented, compromised… think they can just put together bits and pieces of collected information from here and there, shifting their positions like weasels, as they glean from others and change their vocabulary, have the audacity to think they “have it down’? — skyblack

Why do you think that one who is constantly changing positions, would think that they "have it down"? Wouldn't the person who thinks oneself to "have it down", never change positions? And the one who is always changing positions does so because that person does not assume to "have it down".

But if you have an insight that I do not, then I will always mistake that which is in you for that which is in me when they are not at all the same. I will be like a blind man using the word 'see' and understanding it as a metaphor "I see what you mean", but can only understand "I see a car coming down the road"as some kind of superior directional hearing type thing, or remote touch, or... — unenlightened

I must say that I don't know exactly what you mean by "insight", but wouldn't it be possible to show someone else how to have the same insight as yourself, even if that person does not presently have that insight? Then the two of you could talk about it.

I think that the blind analogy is not quite applicable, because the blind man does not have the capacity to see, and cannot be shown how to see something. The person who does not have the same insight as another might still have the capacity to have that insight, if the way is shown.

Even if that's true, given just a little thought, MU, the religious kill each other in the name of Holy Lies which command "thou shalt not kill" and "love each other" whereas the so-called "materialists" are not nearly as murderously – sacred-ends-justify-profane-means – hypocritical and dishonest about their motivations. Faith in (demonstable, hearsay) falsehoods facilitates vicious self-deceptions, as Voltaire points out — 180 Proof

I think what I said, or at least meant, is that the materialists kill for material gains, and they claim this killing to be in the name of God, i.e. for an ideological purpose. These are the ones who are "hypocritical and dishonest about their motivations". You may have observed, or heard about these people who kill for materialist purposes, and heard how thy claim to be killing for an ideological divinity, and wrongly concluded that they were hypocritically killing for that divinity, when in reality they were killing for material gains.

...whereas insight is immediate and present. One cannot share insight, but only relate it as experience from the past, so what one shares is knowledge. — unenlightened

"Immediate and present", I wonder what that means. I think I see why you say it's that whereof we cannot speak. By the time we speak of anything immediate and present, it is in the past, and not present. And if we speak of the present itself, as a boundary between past and future, it seems like it must consist of a little of both. But that's contradictory. So it appears like there is some validity to your claim concerning an incapacity to speak about this.

But I still think there must be a way to talk about things which are in the past and the future at the same time, or are neither in the future nor the past, and other insightful things. And if we haven't figured out how to speak that lingo, we might be able to learn it, if we try. We could study the spiritual masters, and learn how to speak that sort of language which shares insight rather than sharing knowledge. To begin with, I would say that it doesn't involve thinking up different words, special jargon, or anything like that, it's just a different way of using the well-worn words which we already have

Rather I would place the spiritual in that place 'whereof one cannot speak'. — unenlightened

I look at all those places "whereof one cannot speak" as challenges, to find a way to speak about them. What "whereof one cannot speak" refers to is only temporary, as language evolves.

The latter is the smart (sane) bet; yet the world's always been overrun by gullible suckers who are ready at moment's notice to get off their calloused knees just long enough to go murder or be murdered by each other's children in order to "defend" one Holy Lie "against" some other Holy Lie. — 180 Proof

I think a proper analysis would reveal to you that most of the killing which has occurred in the wars we have seen is materialist based, the desire for property, territory, land, rather than based in an ideological Holy Lie. But the killers might claim the name of God in an attempt to justify their materialistic greed.

The mind-independent world is necessarily thought as being external to the mind (and body). — Janus

As I explained earlier, external and internal are spatial terms. We tend to set, or assume a boundary between mind (and body) and the external, but we assume no such boundary between mind (and body) and the internal. Why not? The activities of the mind (and body) are intermediate between the proposed external world, and the internal soul. If the external world is supposed to lie on the other side of a boundary, then for consistency sake, we ought to assume that the internal world also lies on the other side of a boundary.

If we take a sphere, we assume an external circumference, as a defining boundary. The dimensionless "point" at the centre of the sphere though, is indefinite due to the irrational nature of pi. To properly understand the reality of "the centre", as a proposed non-dimensional point with a specific location in a spatial entity, we need a defining boundary between the dimensional and the non-dimensional. In mathematics it is represented by infinitesimals. In practise, this is the boundary between the dimensional (external), and the non-dimensional (internal). But if we propose a boundary between human activity and the external, we need also to propose a boundary between human activity and the internal.

So if we proceed from here to ask which is the real "mind-independent world", the external or the internal, there is no necessity to conclude that it is the external. And this is why dualism is so appealing, it allows us to conceive of the reality of both, the internal and external "mind-independent" worlds. And the supposed "interaction problem" is left without bearing, because the mind (and body) is the realm of interaction.

Maybe that shit which Banno referred to was the fire and brimstone of God's wrath.

Take the usual examples of a pencil balanced on its point, or Newton's dome with a ball perfectly balanced on the apex of a frictionless hemisphere. The pencil and ball are objects in a state of symmetry, being at rest with no net force acting on them, so they should never move. But then we also know that the slightest fluctuation - a waft of air, the thermal jiggle of their own vibration, even some kind of quantum tunnelling – will be enough to start to tip them. The symmetry will be broken and gravity will start to accelerate them in some "randomly chosen" direction. — apokrisis

Such symmetry is pure fiction, a useful principle employed by mathematicians with no corresponding reality in the world. The type of things that you cite, which would break the symmetry, would never allow such a symmetry in the first place.

So metaphysically, this is quite complex. Some history of constraints has to drive the system to the point that it is in a state of poised perfection. The symmetry has to be created. And that then puts it in a position where it is vulnerable to the least push, that might come from anywhere. The sensitivity is created too. The poised system is both perfectly balanced and perfectly tippable as a result. The situation has been engineered so randomness at the smallest scale - an infinitesimal scale - is still enough to do the necessary.

All this is relevant to the OP - as the Big Bang is explained in terms of spontaneous symmetry breaking. And thus the conventional models have exactly this flaw where the existence of the "perfect balance" - a state of poised nothingness - is just conjured up in hand-waving fashion. And then a "first cause" is also conjured up in the form of "a quantum fluctuation". Some material act - an "environmental push" - tips the balance, as it inevitably must, as even the most infinitesimal and unintentional fluctuation is going to be enough to do the job of "spontaneous" symmetry breaking. — apokrisis

So this entire proposal of "spontaneous symmetry breaking" for the creation of the universe is pure "hand-waving" nonsense in the first place. The proposed "state of poised perfection" is an impossible ideal, which could have no corresponding reality, and the entire proposal is a non-starter. This is just an attempt to validate platonic realism, by placing a mathematical ideal, "symmetry", as prior to the physical universe.

If you think that what is apparent to us constitutes evidence either way, then it is the case that the vast bulk of observational evidence suggests the existence of a mind-independent world. — Janus

The issue I pointed to earlier in the thread, is the nature of the assumed "mind-independent world". This world is not necessarily external, it might be internal, and we simply model it as being external.

If what is apparent to us does not constitute evidence one way or the other regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, then QM like the rest of science and empirical observation and investigation, is neither here not there in that connection. You can't have it both ways. — Janus

I can\t imagine how "what is apparent to us" could possibly not constitute evidence regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, in one way or another. It appears to me, like such a claim would be the result of not interpreting "what is apparent to us" in relation to the issue.

Not necessarily; it depends on whether the observational evidence is relevant to the metaphysical perspective in question and it is never the bare observation that is relevant in any case, but some interpretation of it, which rather begs the question. — Janus

The point was that since metaphysics concerns being, or existence, in the most general sense, all observational evidence is relevant to any metaphysical perspective. To dismiss the evidence as "unsupportive" rather than "undermining", and insist that it is not relevant, is simply denial.

unless change is part of the thing's identity, as a whirlpool for instance, or the human body's continuous process of food intake and subsequent evacuation. — Art48

These are activities, not things. Activities are attributed to things, as what a thing is doing, so the law of identity doesn't apply. This is partly why it is very difficult for us to gather a complete understanding of activities.

That metaphor is probably as old as humanity, describing the rebirth of the soul, after an individual's death. When one dies it is replaced by another. I believe Christians tried to adapt the metaphor to symbolize Christ's resurrection, but it doesn't really work, because the point of the Phoenix is that the dead one is replaced by a new, distinct one, not a resurrection of the old.

You appear to conflate two difference senses of "realism". In the context of the phrase "scientific realism" it's contrasted with "scientific instrumentalism". Scientific realism says that scientific theories are "true" in the sense that the world is as the theories say, whereas scientific instrumentalism says that our scientific theories are just useful or not. — Michael

This is a very good point. Isaac and I spent days arguing the accuracy of systems theory, only to find out in the end, that Isaac was arguing the usefulness of systems theory, and I was arguing that systems theory does not give us truth. I thought Isaac was arguing the truthfulness of systems theory. But there was really never any inconsistency between us, because usefulness is not the same as truthfulness.

I think it's more the case that quantum physics does not seem to offer a realistic picture of what is going on at the "fundamental" level; but that does not equate to "undermining scientific realism", it' seems more that it just doesn't appear to support it. — Janus

When the observational evidence does not support a particular metaphysical perspective, isn't this a case of undermining that metaphysics? Metaphysics, as speculative, is not "proven" per se, it is supported or not supported. How much evidence inconsistent with a particular metaphysical perspective is required before one accepts that the metaphysics is off track? Since metaphysics deals with everything, being, or existence in the most general sense, evidence which does not support a perspective, is evidence of a different perspective, therefore necessarily undermining to the former.

Metaphysical wisdom moves forward by determining which proposed perspectives are not accurate, and are therefore unacceptable. This is a process of elimination. We find that certain perspectives are unacceptable because the evidence does not support them, so we dismiss them as not rational possibilities.

When the world is modeled as consisting of possibilities, the premise of the model denies that there is such a thing as "what is the case". However, from the many possibilities, we can proceed to determine what is impossible. "What is impossible" is a determination of "what is not the case". And since "what is not the case" (what is impossible) is diametrically opposed to "what is the case", we let "what is the case" in, through the back door. So we could call this a back door realism, "what is" consists of all the possibilities which have not been excluded as impossible.

You can’t question what is observed - that is the empirical fact. — Wayfarer

Actually, as philosophers, we can and ought to question what is observed. There are two principal facets of observation. First, the person prepares oneself into a position to observe. This is the perspective one takes, and the perspective greatly influences what is observed. So for example, observations in quantum physics are done through the means of instruments. And we ought to question the observational capacity of these instruments. Second, an observation is what is noted. So an observer notes what one thinks is important, and chooses one's words to describe what is observed. So we can question why somethings are noted, and others not, and we can also question the observer's choice of words in describing what is observed.

I have no idea what a systems theory ontology might be. Systems theory is a modeling tool. It makes useful predictions and sets up the parameters of useful frameworks. It doesn't bring things into existence. The cell pre-existed systems theory, which merely describes how the cell functions in statistical terms. — Isaac

Oh good, because when you say things like "The only truly closed system is the universe so any part of it decreasing entropy is not defying the second law", and ""Everything within the cell membrane is the system, everything outside of it is not", you give me the impression that you think that things like the universe, and a cell, actually are, each, a different type of "system".

Now that we're clear on what a "system" is, a predictive modeling tool, do you see from the evidence I've provided you with, that systems theory would be a very flimsy sort of tool for modeling the true reality of things like the universe and a cell? Really, systems theory is not a good tool for modeling the true existence of any type of object or thing. As a simple predictive tool its usefulness is very limited to simple predictions, therefore there is no real place for it in ontology.

That's the point. They seem external. The authors identified the models associated with them seeming external, but they are not actually external. — Isaac

All the things we hear, see, touch, and otherwise sense, "seem external", but this does not necessarily mean that any of them actually are. That is the point.

As usual, I have no idea what you're talking about. The Markov boundary is a statistical feature of a network. It's not an object. It is at the membrane, not the membrane itself. — Isaac

So if I look at a cell membrane through a microscope, I will see a "statistical feature of a network" there "at the membrane"? If not, then what do you mean by "it is at the membrane"?

It seems to me, like you are stuck in a huge category mistake, and instead of accepting this you dig yourself deeper in. The "network" is supposed to be the thing being modeled, the statistics are the modeling tool.

Do you see, that in systems theory, a "system" is a model, not the thing being modeled. They take a natural thing, and assume that the thing can be compared to a system a true system being an artificial thing, not a natural thing). So they create a model of a system which is comparable to the natural thing. But the natural thing cannot be called a system because systems are artificial.

The reason why I say systems theory is flimsy, is that instead of recognizing how big the differences are between the actual natural thing, and the model system which it is compared to, systems theory ontologies tend to find ways to dismiss or overlook all these big differences, and insist that the systems model provides a good representation.

The rest doesn't mitigate your contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sorry Tones, You have not pointed out any contradiction. If I remember correctly, you define contradiction as saying 'is' and 'is not' of the exact same proposition. "I cannot agree to abstractions as objects, without specific restrictions", does not contradict with "I can readily conceive of abstract objects". All conceptions require restrictions, that's what conception is, understanding the specified restrictions.

So, 1) the science of Markov blankets doesn't directly address the philosophical issue of subjective experience (as explained in the first paper) and 2) colour terms like "red" don't (only) refer to some property held by some external world cause but (also) by something that happens "in the head" (even if you want to reduce qualia/first-person experiences to be something of the sort described in the second paper). — Michael

The problem with this way of modeling is that it sets a boundary to the outside of the system, but it does not set a boundary to the inside. As Isaac describes, everything inside the boundary is designated as inside the system. This means that causal influences which change the system must come from outside the system. The only change caused from within could be the cause of the entropy of the second law of thermodynamics.

Consider a sphere, and all within the sphere is internal to the system. Now suppose there are changes to the system which cannot be accounted for by outside influence. A simple example could be the cause of existence of the system itself. We cannot say that it is the system which causes these changes because the system on its own can only follow the second law of thermodynamics. And in the simple example we'd have to conclude that the system caused itself.

But if we put a boundary to the inside of the system, suppose an infinitesimally small centre to the sphere, and we allow that this "internal" is not a part of the system itself, that problem is resolved. We can now have internal causation to the system, which is not a part of the system proper.

This is why systems theory is not very good for this type of modeling, it only imposes one boundary, between the system and everything else. In reality though, we need two boundaries, one between the system and the external, and one between the system and the internal, because the system is always going to exist as a medium between the two extremes, which are not part of the system itself.

You quote the first line of a post and you ignore the rest. I see no point.

These ideas are not up for debate in math. — Real Gone Cat

Sorry to disillusion you Real Gone Cat, but this is a philosophy forum, not a math forum.

No. It's part of the cell, so part of the system. — Isaac

Now you contradict yourself. You said very distinctly and explicitly: "Everything within the cell membrane is the system, everything outside of it is not". Now you say the boundary itself is inside the system. Or are you saying now, that the membrane is inside itself, being both inside the system, and the thing which everything within it is inside the system? The membrane is inside itself?

So let me get this straight. The membrane is not the boundary, as you said earlier, the membrane is inside the system, therefore part of the system, and inside any proq|aaposed boundary. What is the boundary then?

I suggest that you do not have a "boundary" at all, just principles whereby you judge some things as part of the system, and other things as not part of the system. And unless your principles are stated as spatial principles, your use of the spatial terms "internal" and "external" is misleading. The parts of "a system" may be scattered around the world, like a network of microwave communications, certain things being designated as part of the system, and other things as being not part of the system, and to use spatial terms like "internal" and "external" is rather misleading, because the things which are not a part of the system are intermingled with the things which are.

Would you agree with this characterization? If there is not a spatial boundary which circumscribes an area of inside, leaving another area as outside, then really what you have is a judgement as to which things are a part of the system, and which things are not. And the things which are not a part of the system could be physically inside the system, or they could be physically outside the system. So for example, the molecules which pass through the cell membrane in the process of osmosis, may or may not be part of the system both before and after they pass through the membrane, depending on how one models "the system", how things are included as part of the system. Being inside or outside the membrane is an arbitrary difference, if the membrane is assumed to be part of the system, because the membrane is not a boundary in this sense.

So? They only need to be defined systems for the model to work, not closed ones. — Isaac

I have no doubt that such models may work. I've repeated that already, they are created for specific purposes, and are adequate for those purposes. What is at question is the truth or falsity of the models, in the sense of correspondence, and that is whether the models are a fair representation of what is supposed to be being modeled. Mathematics can be used, with statistics and probabilities, to create predictive models, with the models being symbolic (having predictive significance), without representing the activity being predicted.

Who says the definition is not represented in reality? — Isaac

I said that. That is exactly the evidence I have been giving you, and arguing. Have you not been paying attention to the evidence I've given you? What's the point to this type of discussion, if you just pay attention to the parts of what I say that you want to?

Overlapping and sharing in no way prevents a system for being defined, and it only need be defined to have internal and external states, to have probability functions performing gradient climbing equations against entropy. — Isaac

You are not paying attention to what I write. I clearly indicated that overlapping does not prevent a system from being defined. I said it prevents a system from being defined as "discrete", which is the word you used.

Easily thus. "Everything within the cell membrane is the system, everything outside of it is not". Nothing about the fact that my newly defined 'system' exchanges molecules with the system outside of it, prevents it from being defined as a system and therefore being modelled as performing this gradient climbing function. If you can't explain how you think the openness of systems prevents this model then simply repeating that it does doesn't get us anywhere. — Isaac

Good example. Now do you see that the "cell membrane" in your example is a third thing? It is neither within the system nor is it outside the system, according to your statement. Does your model account for the existence of this third thing, the boundary, which is neither within the system nor outside the system?

Of course the nature of the boundary is extremely important to the nature of the system because it has a very important function in relation to the "openness" of the system. And in your example, the activity called osmosis demonstrates this fact.

Internal states are literally defined as those which are not hidden. It's just the definition of the terminology. — Isaac

I know, that eternal states are defined that way, you've stated that. What I am arguing is that the definitions employed by systems theorists are false premises, and that is why systems theory is flimsy. So, the point is that "internal states" is literally defined as those which are not hidden, bit this false definition literally hides the fact that many internal factors of any system, actually are hidden.

Then it is an external state as far as the system is concerned. — Isaac

Again, you were not paying attention! The possibility that it is an external state can be excluded through observation. The influence on the system, of external states can be observed. But when the system acts in a way such that it is influenced (caused) to behave in a way which is neither the result of observable external causes, nor the system itself (2nd law), then we ought to conclude internal causes which are not part of the system itself. To conclude "hidden" external causes is a false conclusion, because properly designed experiments have the capacity to exclude the possibility of unobservable external causes.

Now, refer back to the "cell membrane" which is neither inside the system nor outside the system. Clearly it has an influence on the system. Is that influence better classified as from inside the system, or outside the system. Since it is an integral part of what composes the system, it must be inside the system, so we cannot truthfully say it is outside the system. But by your description, it is not inside the system, it is the boundary.

Two posts now I've attempted compromise, but you still haven't addressed my proposal. It appears very much like you are the one incapable of giving fair consideration.

Sure, you can't conceive of an empty set. But lots of people do.

But the problem is more fundamental with you. You can't conceive of abstract objects.

Here's a difference between you and me: You're a dogmatist. I am not. — TonesInDeepFreeze

As I explained, I readily conceive of abstract objects, but I maintain a difference between abstract objects and physical objects, as necessitated by sound ontological principles. You it appears, do not seem to be ready to accept the dualism required for a true understanding of "abstract objects". That's the real difference between you and me, I understand abstract objects from sound and consistent metaphysics, while you simply assume "abstract objects" for the purpose of mathematics, without any kind of understanding of what an abstract object might consist of.

In these kinds of matters, you cannot be bothered to give fair consideration to frameworks other than your own. — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is untrue. I've given you adequate opportunity to explain the principles that you adhere to, which I find contradictory. I'm very willing to proceed with you, but not until we resolve apparent contradictions in your primary principles. I refuse to proceed from faulty principles. That would be nothing but unsound logic and a waste of time. So I give you fair consideration, but it is you who has not given fair consideration to the ontological problems I have raised. Instead of addressing my concerns, you now insist that I ought to just drop them, and take up some "different perspectives", even though I still apprehend your perspective as based in contradiction because you have done nothing to resolve this problem.

So, as I proposed, we can have an empty set, so long as "set" refers to the category, or type of thing which is going to belong to the collection, not the group of things itself. If the group had no members it could not be a "set" if "set" referred to the group itself. No members, no group.

This proposal allows that we could have a type, but no things of that type. Would you agree with this as a compromise principle? Then the "set", which is a category or type, is not a group, so that it can be empty, and the members of the set have a distinct kind of existence from the set itself, being the things which are categorized as being members of the set. So we have sets, and we have members, such that there are these two aspects of any set, the set (category), and the members (things classed as within that category, and there might not be any. And, we might even classify sets as things of a sort, such that we could have a set where the members are sets. But the set which has sets as members, would be a special type of category. So for example, "colour" could be a set which would have sets as members. The members would be "green", "red", etc., each being a category, or set on its own.

If sll you meant was that yhr boundaries overlap, then I don't see how that forms a criticism. Systems can be defined. They therefore had thst which is the system and thst which is not. If they don't have those two categories they are not defined. — Isaac

Sure, you can talk about different systems in that way, and even "define" what would make one system distinct from another. But if in reality, there is an overlapping of the things which you are applying the theory to, then these things cannot be adequately understood as discrete systems.

That is the whole point which you do not seem to be grasping. You can "define" anything, anyway you want, but if that definition is not represented in reality, then the definition is just a falsity, which becomes a false premise if used in any logical proceeding. So, you define systems as being distinct or discrete, but the things which you apply the theory to are not really that way, they overlap, and share, etc., so your systems theory is just giving you false premises, i.e. that the thing identified as A is a discrete system, and the thing identified as B is a discrete system, when in reality they are not discrete. And, the need to assume "open systems" demonstrates very clearly that this is a falsity

Christ! Is this going to be one of your stupidly arrogant "all maths is wrong" arguments all over again. The second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy increases during any spontaneous process in an isolated system. Living systems are not isolated systems. The only truly closed system is the universe so any part of it decreasing entropy is not defying the second law. This is physics basics I learnt in school. — Isaac

You're really not making any sense Isaac, we're not talking mathematics here. We're talking ontology. You insist on "discrete systems", but now you deny "isolated systems". How could there be a discrete system which is not isolated from other systems? To make it discrete there must be a boundary which separates it from others, or else the many supposed systems really exist together as just one continuity. If there is a boundary then it must consist of something real, which would separate one system from another, thereby isolating them from each other. Otherwise the boundary is purely theoretical, and absolutely arbitrary. Arbitrarily placing theoretical boundaries, within a continuity, does not produce discrete entities. The hour existing between one o'clock and two o'clock is not a discrete unit of time, it's just created from theoretical, arbitrarily placed boundaries

Mathjax error, my apologies. I've corrected it, so thanks for pointing it out. The Mathjax 's' is the hidden state, not the normal type 's'. — Isaac

Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that we need to assume internal hidden states as well, for the reasons I explained. The composition, or constitution of the system doing the inferencing is hidden from it. The system does not apprehend its own composition, and this is internal to the system.

Ha ha, nice try Tones. Ernst's proper reply would be: "I have no collection of rocks. I sold all my rocks".

OED, collection: 1. the act or process of collecting or being collected. 2. a group of things collected together, esp. systematically. 3. an accumulation; a mass or pile (a collection of dust)."

I really don't know how you can conceive of a group of thing, or a mass or accumulation, without anything there.

Your source claims that systems are open, not that they have no definition. In fact he claims the exact opposite. — Isaac

When did I say systems have no definition?

He suggests that biological systems reverse the direction of the second law, the flow uphill of it. — Isaac

Right, therefore contrary to your claim, these supposed "open systems" are not subject to the laws of physics. The second law of thermodynamics being a law of physics. This is a very good reason why systems theory is, as I said, very flimsy. Within the parameters of systems theory, we need to assume "open systems", which are incompatible with the laws of physics, in order to account for the existence of living beings.

It is temporary and doesn't defy any physical law. — Isaac

Isaac, you are not making any sense. You admit that the biological "system" is contrary to the second law, yet you also claim that this does not defy any physical law. Is the second law of thermodynamics not a physical law in your mind?

The system and the internal are the same thing. — Isaac

Yes that is exactly the problem I described. The internal and the system "are the same thing". This is another big defect of systems theory. You have a boundary which separates "the system" from the external, but no boundary to separate "the system" from the internal. Therefore you have no way to account for changes to "the system" which are not from an external, observable, cause, and are not caused from within "the system". "The system" changes in a way which is not caused by "the system" itself. Such a change would be consistent with the second law. And, "the system" must follow this law of physics or else it cannot be classed as a "system". A "system" is a human construct. Further, there is no observable external cause of these changes. The changes must be internal, because external causation can be excluded. But they are not from within "the system" because "system" does not allow for changes which are contrary to the laws of physics. If it changes in a way other than by the laws of physics, it cannot be understood as a "system". So these causes of change which are contrary to the laws of physics must be excluded from "the system". They must be caused by something not within "the system" yet they cannot be classed as external, because such causes can be excluded through observation. Therefore we need a boundary to the internal, as well as a boundary to the external, so that these changes can be properly understood as not having an external cause, nor being caused by temporal changes to the system itself (2nd law).

No, there are no hidden internal states. Internal states are definitionally those which are not hidden. — Isaac

Clearly there must being internal hidden states, when "hidden states" is described as you did. You said that they are states hidden from the system doing the inferencing. The constitution of the system doing the inferencing is hidden from that system. Look at the diagram you provided a few pages back, (which doesn't copy in the following quote). Notice that it shows both internal and external "S", when you say "S" is a hidden state.

A 'Hidden State' in active inference terms is just a node in a data network which is one (or more) node(s) removed from the network carrying out the inference.



'S' are hidden states. They're not hidden from 'us' (the organism), they're right in front of us, I can see then touch them, feel them. They're hidden for the network doing the inference because that network can only use data from the sensorimotor systems ('o' and 'a' in the diagram) with which it has to infer the cause of that data (the external states). I probably should use the term 'external states' but that gets as much flack from the enactivists who then bang on about how it's not really 'external' because we form an integrated network with our environment. So I could call then 'nodes outside of our Markov Boundary', and no-one would have the faintest idea what I was talking about...So 'hidden states' seemed the least controversial term... Until now. But this... — Isaac

I've no interest at all in being lectured with a series of random assertions from nobodies off the internet. Provide arguments, cite sources, or at the very least show a little humility if you don't. I can't for the life of me think why you'd assume anyone would want to learn what some random people happen to 'reckon' about cognitive science and systems theory. — Isaac

I cited the source, Ludwig von Bertalanffy. If you're into systems theory you ought to know him.

Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy (19 September 1901 – 12 June 1972) was an Austrian biologist known as one of the founders of general systems theory (GST). This is an interdisciplinary practice that describes systems with interacting components, applicable to biology, cybernetics and other fields. Bertalanffy proposed that the classical laws of thermodynamics might be applied to closed systems, but not necessarily to "open systems" such as living things. His mathematical model of an organism's growth over time, published in 1934,[1] is still in use today. — Wikipedia

Your claim was that neurological "systems" follow the laws of physics. Bertalanffy's claim is that "open systems" (biological systems) do not necessarily follow the second law of thermodynamics.

Also I have no interest in being lectured by another dry, opinionated academic who thinks that cognitive science and systems theory have any priority, beyond their own personal set of prejudices, in respect of philosophical questions. — Janus

That\s exactly the problem I pointed to, with the application of systems theory. Boundaries may be so arbitrary, that people can use "systems" to support any hypothesis that they want to support.

One step back. The declaration of an internal state and an external state (necessary simply by declaring the object of our thought to be this and not that) Requires that there is what we call a Markov boundary between the internal and the external states. This is (again no ontology yet) simply a statistical feature of there being internal and external states, there simply must exist in any network those nodes which connect to the external states and the internal states. These are the Markov boundary (and anything within them is inside the Markov blanket). — Isaac

The problem with your internal/external boundary is that you employ a boundary between the system and the "external", but you do not employ a boundary between the system and the "internal". And since there are internal hidden states as well as external hidden states, you need a boundary between the system and the internal, to account for the reality of these hidden states. The living "system" is best understood as a medium between the internal and the external, as pointed out by Wayfarer earlier in the thread. As Plato indicated, living acts are best understood as carried out by the medium between soul and body. This is why we can say that Plato resolved the interaction problem which is commonly attributed to dualism.

That is why systems theory is very flimsy. You employ a boundary between the system and the external, but you do not employ a boundary between the system and the internal. The "system" is a human construct, a model. The unknowns are not accounted for by "the system" because they are unknown. In modern formalism, unknowns are allowed right into the logical system. There is no boundary to separate the unknowns which are within the system, from the system itself. So we think that all the unknowns are external, coming from outside the boundary, when there is really a lot of unknowns within the system, and having no boundary to exclude them from the system on the inside. The consequence of this, in modeling biological systems, is that there is no way to distinguish between internal causes and external causes. Epistemological deficiencies appear like ontological issues, and there is no principles allowing us to distinguish these from each other.

Correct use of language is determined by the community using the word, not by some subset. — Isaac

This makes no sense. Do you propose that we hold the entire community to a vote every time we wonder whether language has been correctly used or not? Even if we did that, unless the vote was unanimous, we'd still be left with only a subset saying that the use was correct. Clearly, "correct" language use does not require such unanimity. It only requires that the one spoken to understands the one speaking.