Sounds like a plan. — apokrisis

There's method to the madness.

No. Substance can cause events. If all events are caused by other events, you get an infinite regress of events. So, some events must be caused by non-events, that is by things. And that's called substance causation. — Bartricks

I didn't say "event", I said "act". Some acts are not events, but cause events, like an act of will, it causes an event but is not itself an event. That's how the infinite regress is broken, the first cause is an act of will (God's will), and the will is free, uncaused in its acts.

You still haven't given any indication as to what you mean by "substance causation". "Substance" is passive, like matter. Matter doesn't cause anything, neither does substance. You've only provided an incoherent example, a ball is on a cushion, and you propose that there is no time when the ball was not on the cushion. It's incoherent because balls and cushions are known to come into existence in time, so there is necessarily time before the ball and before the cushion. This means that something caused the ball to be on the cushion.

The ball is always on the cushion. — Bartricks

This is the premise which is incoherent.

Oh lordy! Once you get set to digging yourself a hole, you never give up on the project, do you? — apokrisis

I'll dig as deep as necessary, until you recognize your mistakes. And from my experience, that will be very deep.

Sure, that will work in you live in a flat world. But the flatness of the world itself is what we want to check here. — apokrisis

No, that technique I described definitely would not work in a flat world, because the thing being measured is assumed to be curved. The curve is what is being measured. Only the measuring tool, the ideal, is flat or straight, not the curve which is being measured with the use of the straight lines and angles.

And, the flatness of the world is clearly not what we want to check, (unless you give credence to the flat earthers), because we already know that the world is not flat. We've come way beyond this assumption of flatness in the world, so there is no need to check it. We know that flatness is an ideal only. Yet flat, or straight measuring devices, and flat or straight ideals, like vectors, are still very useful. We just need to know the proper techniques of application, to apply straight measurement principles to a curved world, and how to compensate if a real world measurement instrument, turns out to be not as straight as it was thought to be.

No, that's quite wrong. You seem to think that our convictions determine how things are with reality. No. — Bartricks

That's clearly not what I said. I said conviction is our means of understanding. Without conviction we suspend judgement indefinitely, on everything, and have absolutely no understanding. I didn't say that our convictions determine the way things are in reality, I said that our conviction determine the way that we understand things.

Substance causation is causation by a substance rather than an event. But when a substance causes an event it does so directly. There is not some prior act on the part of the substance that causes the event. The substance causes the event. Thus the causation is simultaneous. If you think it isn't, then I think it must be because you are confusing substance causation with event causation. — Bartricks

Causation is always an act. Substance itself is passive, but acts might be attributed to it, such that an act of a substance could be a cause. That's why your claims are incoherent to me, substance causing something with out an act makes no sense.

It's not incoherent! Look - either time had a beginning or it did not. Or do you think there's some other option? — Bartricks

What's incoherent is your proposition that there was no time when the ball was not on the cushion. Both balls and cushions are temporal objects which are produced, and destroyed in time. It is incoherent to say that there was no time before the ball and the cushion.

Also, you are confused about contingency - a contingent thing is a thing that 'can' not exist. It doesn't have to have not existed at some point. It is sufficient that it is metaphysically possible for it not to exist. — Bartricks

A contingent thing is a thing whose existence is dependent on something else. It's existence is contingent on something else, as a cause of that contingent thing's existence. Both balls and cushions are contingent things. This means that there was necessarily time before their existences, because their existences require temporal things before them, as the causes of their existences. This renders your proposition as incoherent.

And how are you measuring that degree of curvature exactly? What is your non-arbitrary yardstick? :rofl: — apokrisis

I'd measure in the same way that curvature is normally measured, classically, relative to a central point. That's why I said, replace your "negative and positive" curves, which are completely arbitrary, dependent on the arbitrary placement of a straight line, with something more real, "internal and external". Toward the central point is inward, away from the central point is outward.

Let me check. So to be flat is to lack curve. And to be curved is to lack flat?

Thus we agree? :up: — apokrisis

Yes, we agree on this. But you proposed degrees of each, when in reality there is no degrees of straightness because it is ideal, and cannot vary from the ideal, and there is only degrees of curvature, because curvature does not meet the standard of "ideal".

All that remains is for you to explain how you measure the difference in some non-arbitrary metric basis. — apokrisis

When you come to accept the fact that straight lines are not at all curved, and are therefore categorically distinct from curved things, (straight lines being purely theoretical, ideal), you might be able to understand that straight lines are used as a tool for measuring curvature. Further, the degree of curvature is measured with straight lines relative to a point determined as the centre. Classically, we'd assume a circle, and assign an arbitrary number of degrees (360) to the circle. Any point on the arc or curve would demonstrate equal distance from a central point, and the degree of curvature would be determined that way.

However, we know that pi is irrational, and perfect circles are unreal, so some small degree of arbitrariness will enter into the act of designating the centre point. But the larger the number of points on the curve which one uses, the more accurate the determination of centre point will be. And since the centre point is an attribute of the curve itself, as a defining feature of a circle, the measurement is non-arbitrary in a fundamental way.

You say that a lot. — Wayfarer

Banno is not even willing to consider as relevant, thoughts which are only two hundred years old, that implies no understanding of, or complete rejection of "the test of time".

Yes, it is a dogmatic conviction. You can show me to be wrong by providing an argument for what you have just asserted. — Bartricks

I don't deny this, I think pretty much all use of words is dogmatic conviction. However, that's how we understand things, through such convictions.

Substance causation is coherent. And when a substance causes an event, the event is simultaneous with the cause. — Bartricks

I'm still waiting for you to demonstrate this. So far, what you've produced seems very incoherent to me.

For the simple fact is that whichever one is true the ball was always on the cushion. — Bartricks

As I said, this is incoherent. Balls and cushions are contingent things, they come into being, they each have a beginning in time. This simple fact is contradicted by "the ball was always on the cushion".

What contradiction? Even in ordinary language, flat and curved would be a pair of dichotomously opposed limits - two extremes of the one spectrum. Something would be flat to the degree it wasn't curved, and curved to the degree it wasn't flat. — apokrisis

"Two extremes of one spectrum" is not a proper description. It is not what you told me, nor is it what your Gaussian curvature exemplified. A flat thing has zero curvature. And anything which is not flat has some degree of curvature. They are not two extremes of one spectrum. Being flat (zero curvature) excludes any degree of curvature. And any degree of curvature excludes being flat. So all degrees are degrees of curvature, and flatness has no degrees, flat is zero degrees of curvature

The question for maths is how to go about measuring the relative curvature of a smooth manifold once you have got past the naive Euclidean view that space is some kind of absolutely flat backdrop.

You might rant and rave in defence of this antique view. But geometry has just got on with developing the means for modelling spaces where perfect flatness only means an extreme constraint on any intrinsic curvature.

It would help to learn more about this subject before mouthing off further. For this purpose, I would suggest Wildberger's lectures on hyperbolic geometry.

The pertinent bit is how he shows that the Euclidean yardsticks developed for measuring spaces without curvature - distance and angle - must be replaced by the new dichotomy of quadrance and spread when dealing with hyperbolic "flatness".

So there is nothing arbitrary going on as it is all motivate by the rigorousness of dialectical argument.

And Appollonius had already worked out the basics for this approach back in 200 BC.

So even if your knowledge of maths is still rooted in distant antiquity, you ought to know better.

See Wildberger's lecture series - https://youtu.be/EvP8VtyhzXs — apokrisis

I agree, that if we are going to work with curvatures, we need to get past the "absolutely flat backdrop".
But it's you who is not willing to let go of the flat backdrop. You insist on a "zero curvature", which I've shown is nothing but contradiction. And from this contradictory premise you produce positive and negative curves, which only have meaning relative to that contradictory premise, "zero curvature", which is nothing but the manifestation of your refusal to get "past the naive Euclidean view that space is some kind of absolutely flat backdrop". If you'd discard that flat backdrop, "zero curvature", then you could get on with a real understanding of curvature, rather than one based in contradiction.

For whether time began or not, there was no time when the ball was not on the cushion. — Bartricks

This is what is incoherent. Your phrase "there was no time when..." implies that the described scenario was real when there was "no time". Therefore you imply that time began when the ball came to be on the cushion. "There was no time when the ball was not on the cushion" implies that before the ball was on the cushion there was no time, therefore time started when the ball came to be on the cushion.

Regardless, both the ball and cushion are known to be temporal objects, they exist "in time", and this means that there is time before each of them and time after each of them. They are each produced and destroyed. This is contrary to your phrase "no time when...". And there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that they could have both come into existence at the exact same time, with the ball stuck to the cushion. That's a nonsensical proposal.

Now, 'when' does a substasnce cause an event? Well, at the time at which the event occurs. So substance causation is simultaneous causation. The only reason to deny this is a dogmatic conviction that the causation must precede its effect. — Bartricks

This is a faulty description. The cause of an event is prior in time to the event itself. You can call that "dogmatic conviction" if you want, but it's simply the convention we follow as to the meaning of "cause". You go outside the convention and you start to sound nonsensical. Simultaneous events are better known by the term "coincidental", not "causal".

You are disputing about the most significant step forward in modern geometrical thought. — apokrisis

Is your appeal to authority supposed to impress me? Did you just meet me yesterday? Are you going to defend your assertions or not? Can you justify your claim that space is the type of thing which can be both curved and not curved at the same time? Will you resolve this contradiction?

Can't parallel lines on a sphere intersect? — Haglund

I see this as incoherent. A sphere is a 3d curved surface. It requires 3D. Parallel lines require a flat 2D surface, a plane. The two are incompatible, and there cannot in any way, be parallel lines on the surface of a sphere. A two dimensional object is incompatible with a three dimensional object because the one has a premise which the other is lacking, the third dimension.

What is at issue in apokrisis' representation is the claim that the premise of the third dimension might be present within the two dimensional representation as 'the flat plane has "zero" extension in the third dimension'. But that's nothing more than the blatant contradiction of saying that the object is both three dimensional, and not three dimensional (the plane is curved and not curved) at the same time.

A 2D surface can have positive or negative curvature, like the sphere and saddle. — Haglund

This again is incoherent. A 2d surface is a flat plane. To give that plane any type of curvature requires a third dimension. You could give a line (1D) curvature, with a second dimension, but then what you get is a circular plane.

When there was no time, the ball was on the cushion, causing the dent. — Bartricks

That's an incoherent sentence. The ball and cushion are observed to be in a situation now. In the time before now, the ball and cushion are presumed to have been in the same situation. You are proposing that before that, there was "no time", and the ball and cushion were in the same situation. So you are proposing that there was a change from "no time" to "time", and the ball and cushion were unaffected by this change. But that's impossible because the ball and cushion are known to be temporal objects.

Note, if you think that all cause must precede their effects, then you would have to assume infinite time or else admit that there can be effects that are not themselves caused by a prior event. But if you admit - and I think we all should - that there can be causation by objects rather than events, then you should also admit that there can be simultaneous causation. For the event that the object causes would occur at the same time as the object causes it. — Bartricks

The idea that there is an event which an object causes, which is co-existent with the object it itself, is incomplete, and does not account for the existence of the object nor the existence of the event. You want to say that one is the "cause" of the other, but you can only make such a choice arbitrarily, because you've stipulated that they co-exist and one is not prior to the other. This would render "cause" as completely meaningless, because you could arbitrarily assign it to one or the other.

There is what I see as a much more intelligible, and reasonable way of dealing with this problem, the one employed by classical metaphysics, and theology. We say that the conception of "time" which makes time dependent on, and following from, the movement, and existence of physical objects is a faulty conception. Instead, we conceive of the passing of time as necessary for, therefore prior to, the movement and existence of physical objects. Then we have the necessary premise to conceive of time passing when there was no physical objects. We propose a non-physical cause (God) operating at this time, which causes the existence of physical objects and their motions.

I suggest you read up on intrinsic curvature and stop making a fool of yourself.

The relation between positive and negative curvature is not about a contradiction but our old friend, the dichotomy - the reciprocal relation, the (inverse) unity of opposites. — apokrisis

The mathematics is irrelevant, because as I've explained to you numerous times, and you persistently ignore, the measuring system employed (i.e. the mathematics) is arbitrary. The fact that the measuring system is arbitrary allows you to apply contradictory measuring systems, the system for a flat surface together with the system for a curved surface, then you speak of "space" as if it has contradictory properties.

The reality is that the contradictory systems are really incommensurable, and this incommensurability produces the illusion which you suffer from, the illusion that there is a real, substantial difference between negative curvature and positive curvature. That difference only manifests as a result of applying the premise that "zero curvature" is a real possibility, for curved space. Of course it is not, because curved and not curved are contradictory.

The depression in the cushion is being caused by the ball on the cushion even if both call and cushion have been in that arrangement for eternity. Thus in this case we have simultaneous causation. The depression is being caused by the ball, but there was no time when the ball came to be on the cushion. — Bartricks

One of the problems involved in assuming infinite time. When two things are assumed to co-exist, forever, it makes the existence of each of them unintelligible. Resolution: reject as incoherent, the idea of infinite time.

What’s arbitrary about it? Parallel lines converge in the one and diverge in the other. — apokrisis

There's no such thing as parallel lines if space is curved. As I keep saying, that would be contradictory. So your reference, parallel lines, has no place here in a curved space. And your supposed concrete differences are just a product of contradictory premises. I suggest that you look at the differences you allude to, as the difference between internal and external, but the boundary between the two cannot be a straight line. What would constitute the difference between inner space and outer space?

You have talked right past the point in your usual fashion. The uncurved line is what neatly separates the lines with positive curvature from those with negative curvature. Kind of like how zero separates the positive and negative integers.

So what is important is that it lacks curvature of both kinds. — apokrisis

Right, but "positive" and "negative" curvature is an arbitrary convention of measurement, just like the number of degrees in a circle. And as I said, to attribute both curved and uncurved to space, is contradiction, unless you can show how space changes from being curved to being uncurved or vise versa. Or perhaps you can show how space changes from being positively curved, to being negatively curved, to justify this convention as other than arbitrary.

It is the bounding limit on curvature. — apokrisis

Right, so to actually be at that limit, as in having zero curvature, would be contradictory to having any degree of curvature at all. Kind of like dead is the bounding limit to life, and to actually be at that limit would be contradictory to being alive.

To be flat is simply to have zero curvature. — apokrisis

Right, and to have zero curvature is to have no curvature at all, which is a direct contradiction of having curvature, being curved.

That’s where we started. Draw a triangle and see if it indeed adds up to 180 degrees. — apokrisis

Drawing a triangle won't show me that the angles of the triangle add up to 180 degrees. The angles need to be measured. And my point was, that the numbering system, by which the degrees are measured, is completely arbitrary. A circle could have been assigned 400 degrees, 100, 1000, any number of degrees in the circle. Therefore a triangle might have any number of degrees. So drawing a triangle doesn't produce 180 degrees. Arbitrarily assigning 360 degrees to the circle ensures that a triangle will be measured by that convention, to have 180 degrees. But we could adopt any convention.

Plainly language evolved to switch behaviours on an off in a social setting. That is what communication boils down to. Getting folk to act in coordinated fashion. — apokrisis

Wow, I'm really surprised that this makes sense to an intelligent person like yourself.

The problem is that you failed to interpret the words correctly. That shows how human language indeed creates ample scope for ambiguity, disagreement, personal freedom, along with clarity, agreement and communal wisdom. — apokrisis

Look apokrisis, the fact that I can interpret the words incorrectly, is clear evidence that the sign does not do the work, as you represent Pattee's position on the matter. I do the work of interpreting the sign. If it was the sign which did the work, then whenever it appeared like a person misinterpreted a sign, we'd have to say that in reality the person received a different sign. The work done by the sign to have itself understood was different, therefore it must be a different sign because it's doing a different thing. But clearly you and I can read the very same piece of written information, and we can each interpret a different meaning. So the work is not being done by the sign, the agent is an independent reader of the sign.

Likewise we can say the universe could have been different without insisting that it wouldn't have been our universe. — frank

I don't think so. When we look back in time, as is the case with "could have been different", it is impossible that things could have been different without altering what is now. "Our universe" refers to what is the case now, so it is impossible that things in the past could have been different without making "our universe" now, a different universe.

When we look toward the future though, instead of toward the past, we see real possibility as to what could be in the future. Because of this, the "our universe", now, which is a necessary product of the past, has numerous possibilities as to what it may lead to as "our universe" at a future time. So the one and the same universe, which is "our universe" right now, has many possibilities as to the universe it will become, at a future time. Therefore there are numerous different universes which "our universe" could become in the future. This is why free will is a valid concept, because the free will can influence which of the numerous possible universes will become "our universe" in the future.

That there could have been a different universe is true; that this universe could have been different is not true. — Mww

This is the sort of strawman often used to "refute" free will. The determinist will characterize the free willist as saying "What I did, could be different ", and then ask for a demonstration.

Observation all happens within the imagination?

The flatness of space is defined by the constancy of the ratio between a radius and a circumference. Only in flat space is this ratio a constant - pi. In curved space, it ranges from the 2pi of the sphere to the infinite pi of a hyperbolic geometry.

So only in flat space does some particular angle retain that value over all its scales of extension. And should you choose, instead of degrees, you can talk about angles using a more fundamental pi-based unit like radians. — apokrisis

You appear to be contradicting yourself apokrisis. You reify space, by talking about "flat space" and "curved space", implying that space is a thing with these properties. However, to say that space is both flat and curved is contradictory. Therefore you appear to be contradicting yourself by talking about both, curved space and flat space. Or do you know a way to distinguish between some space which is flat, and some space which is curved? How would we sense the difference between the two?

Otherwise, I'd say that it is a mistake to reify space in the way that you do, implying that it is a thing which may in some cases be flat, and in some cases be curved. And I would say that these are just different measuring techniques. If this is the case, then why the radical difference in measuring techniques?

But Pattee's biosemiotics stresses that a sign does the work. It actually switches the state of some material process. The meaning of a sign lies in the physical way it stops the world doing this, and thus counterfactually directs it towards doing that.

...

Pattee is correct. The sign is really a switch. It has its feet straddling the two sides of the divide. It is both informational and physical. It connects the logical necessity to the physical causation in a way that is autopoietic or cybernetic - a working feedback loop.

Biosemiotics-lite just wants to treat the sign as a passive mark - something that is physical in being a mark, but then not physical because it doesn't change the world on which it is written in some directly meaningful way.

But a switch is a logical device that both represents the world - some enzymatic process is either on or off - and regulates that world. Flip the switch and you turn that process back on or off. — apokrisis

This is inconsistent with language as we know it. The sign is an independent, somewhat passive thing, a physical object in the material world, which is interpreted by a mind. That's how we communicate. The sign does not interpret itself. And if this were the case, a fundamental feature of language, ambiguity, and misunderstanding would not be possible. Further, another fundamental feature of language, communication between two distinct entities would also be impossible, because there would no longer be a difference of interpretation between two people. So this would necessitate that you and I, and every other human being who communicate with each other are one entity. But we are not, and that's why there is such a thing as ambiguity in language. Therefore, I do not see the basis for your claim, "Pattee is correct."

In other words, biology invented the molecular switch. Suddenly physics could be turned on and off "at will". Nothing like this had ever been seen before in nature. A whole new biosemiotic game had been invented. — apokrisis

Let me show you the problems here. Placing both "the switch" and "the will" as internal to the sign denies the possibility of "free will". It denies the possibility of doing other than what the sign tells one to do, and this is hard determinism. On the large scale, it denies the possibility of random mutations which are an essential part of evolution. Also, it denies the possibility of ambiguity, as mentioned above, and this is essential to indecisiveness, skepticism, and philosophy in general. So the problems with Pattee's proposal are numerous.

If the angles of triangles didn’t add up to 180 degrees, we would know the universe wasn’t flat. — apokrisis

The number of degrees in a circle is arbitrary. It could have been a hundred, four hundred, a thousand, or any number. 360 was a convenient number because it's pretty close to the number of days in a year, and the astrological calendar used a circle, so a day was a degree. Maybe 365 1/4 would have been a better number. But then the right angle, and the number of degrees in a triangle, would have been a more difficult number to work with.

General relativity actually can be applied to the quantum scale and directly leads, in combination with quantum fields, to Hawking radiation. The virtual particles around a black hole are real particles as seen from far away because of the equivalence principle. — Haglund

I'm surprised that you don't see the problem with this statement. The nearest blackholes are more than a thousand light years away. You cannot call this a quantum scale observation.

When "necessity" is understood in the sense of required, needed, necessary for, then logical necessity and the necessity of causation are the same type of "necessity". The purpose which validates the requirement, is understanding. Why is it necessary that we accept valid logic as valid? For the purpose of understanding. Why is it necessary that we associate a cause with an effect? For the purpose of understanding. The two senses of "necessity" are the same in the sense of what is needed for understanding.

It's only when we propose a sense of "necessity" which is supposed to be independent from the wants and needs of the human beings, that we find a different form of "necessity". This is the sense of "necessity" which is supposed to support the philosophical position of "determinism". Philosophically, it is important to note that this form of "necessity" is not well supported by evidence, as indicated by Hume and others. It's basically just an assumption or assertion which people make for one purpose or another, which has no justification.

This form of "necessity" is a tool which we use for the application of theories, making the theories work for us. But we need to understand that it is completely unsupported, and is only a useful assumption supporting our mundane activities. In times past, this form of "necessity" was supported by "the Will of God". The consistency of God's Will supports the continued truth to inductive conclusions that form the laws of physics. The best example is probably Newton's first law. That a body in motion will persist in its motion in a continuous way, unless being acted on by a force, is a "necessity" which we take for granted in an atheist society. But Newton was religious and said that his first law of motion required the Will of God, to ensure its truth.

What's evident is a difference between the atheist way, and the theist way of understanding causation. The theist way requires that any form of consistency, or temporal continuity of sameness, requires a cause. The cause of this continuity of existence is God. And without God there would be absolute unintelligible randomness from one moment to the next in time, even the idea of one moment to the next would be nonsensical. Absolutely everything would be scattered randomness.

The atheist way takes the fundamental consistency describable by laws like Newton's first law of motion, for granted, i.e. not requiring a cause. This fundamental assumption produces the necessity of determinism, by denying the basic level of causation represented by the Will of God. Then nothing is required to establish consistency in the universe, that consistency simply "is", and it is taken for granted. Therefore the fundamental consistency itself, is understood as "necessary", rather than as caused by the Will of God. Instead of saying that God is necessary, as "required for" the fundamental consistency, we simply say that the fundamental consistency is "necessary". From here, the first level of causation is the cause which is required to change the basic consistency, continuity of existence, which is taken for granted as "necessary" rather than as caused by God. Then the primary form of causation, is the force that changes the inertia of continued existence. But this force must be derived from some other inertial activity, and we get trapped in the circular logic of determinism.

It's science until the attempt to verify the changes to the theory are investigated and not confirmed. If, at that point, people don't acknowledge that the theory is faulty, then it stops being science. Or at least it stops being good science. — T Clark

That's exactly the problem, it isn't science at all, because instead of acknowledging that the predictive failures of the theory are due to a faulty theory, people will assume the real existence a phantom entity, dark matter, as the cause of the unpredictable behaviour. It's no different from saying a ghost did it, or attributing the failings of the model to a dragon.

Why did the planet not move exactly where the perfect circular orbit predicted it would move to? Instead of designating the model of perfect circular orbits as wrong, and producing the true elliptical orbit model, I simply say that the dragon who moves the planet has a will of his own, and doesn't necessarily have to follow a perfect circle. And we have the same situation with dark matter. Light doesn't necessarily have to move in the way predicted by general relativity theory, because there's some otherwise undetectable matter scattered around throughout the universe, which causes the light to behave in the unpredictable way.

General Relativity has been an incredibly successful theory for 100 years. You get to tinker under the hood for a while before you buy a new theory. — T Clark

Actually general relativity has been demonstrated to be extremely limited. It is not applicable at the very small scale, quantum level, and it is not applicable at the very large scale where the existence of dark matter is called for. It has a very narrow range of applicability which is closely limited to the human sphere of spatial-temporal activity. Since we are human beings, living in that very narrow spatial-temporal zone of activity, the theory is very useful to us. But since the applicability of the theory is limited to this very narrow range, we can be sure that it does not provide a true representation.

You call it trickery, I call it science. — T Clark

Making exceptions to the rule stipulated by the theory, whenever the theory fails in its predictive capacity, to account for these failings, instead of acknowledging that the theory is faulty, is not science.

Someone proposes dark matter as a solution to an inconsistency, so people go looking for it. Eventually, they find it or, if they don't, they have to change models. Isn't that the way it's supposed to work? — T Clark

Dark matter is posited as such an exception to the rule. Where general relativity fails in its predictive capacity, dark matter is posited to account for that failing. There is nothing to look for except the reasons why general relativity fails in its predictive capacity, i.e. the faults of the theory.

If the way things are seen and apprehended change, the experience of those things must change. — Mww

This is not necessarily the case. We just need to accept what Plato tells us, that the senses deceive us, and we obey reason instead of the senses. So we do not alter the experience, we simply accept with our minds, that the experience doesn't give us the truth, and we base our logic in something other than what sense experience gives us.

In a different thread I am discussing a good example of this, the heliocentric model of the solar system. Sensation gives us the experience of the sun coming up and going down, rising and setting. But we must move beyond this sense experience and accept that the earth is really spinning, and the sun is not revolving around the earth. To accept this, it is not required that we change our fundamental experience of the sun coming up and going down, we just need to accept that this fundamental intuition is actually wrong, discard it as a premise for our logic, and move along toward a better understanding. The better understanding is provided for by the fundamental assumption that our sense experience misleads us, but changing that experience is unnecessary.

And if it is the case I am not presented with exactly the same thing because the base intuitions might be altered, then how am I to explain, e.g., my experience of a pencil that is subsequently, merely as a condition by some other time and place, experienced as something not a pencil? — Mww

So it's not at all a matter of learning how to experience something like a pencil as something other than a pencil, its a matter of recognizing that the empirical representation is fundamentally misleading. This is what modern science shows us very clearly. The thing you experience as a pencil is really molecules, or atoms, or protons, neutrons, and electrons, or fields, or whatever, which is way different from your sense experience of a pencil. When the reality of the heliocentric model was revealed to us, it opened our minds very widely to the fact that the way things appear through sensation is not at all like the way things really are. And the Platonic mantra "the senses deceive us" was given real credence allowing for philosophy like Descartes' "Meditations" to be taken seriously.

But it isn’t; the human intelligence is experientially consistent. For any individual, a pencil apprehended today is apprehended as a pencil tomorrow, all else being given. It must be that either the Kantian notions of a priori intuitions as the unavoidable way we see and apprehend things is false, or, such notion is the case but rather, the idea that alteration of those intuitions into something deeper and more real, is false. — Mww

So this is not an acceptable dichotomy. There is some degree of consistency in experience, and as I said, consistency is cultured, propagated. However, there is also some degree of inconsistency, and even a small degree of inconsistency is evidence of something faulty within experience. The fact that there is inconsistency is evidence that intuitions can change over generations. And evolutionary theory supports this as well.

It still must be considered, how it is that you and I, and humanity in general, no matter the particular word used to represent it, see and apprehend this one thing, say, a pencil, and agree that it is an experience common to all of us. — Mww

But I don't agree with this. I focus on the differences between individuals, and I argue that these differences are very clear evidence that the fact that there are similarities between us does not justify the claim that we have "the same" experience. And because we cannot say that we all have "the same" experience, we also cannot assert as you do, that there "is an experience common to all of us". That's a false assumption, so no inquiry as to how it is possible is warranted. The appropriate inquiry is as to why we have similar experience. And my answer to this, is as I said, it is propagated, and cultured, intuitively. So the true "deeper" intuition which is common to living beings, is the tendency to create sameness, similarity, within unique and particular individuals, whose true essence is to be different from each other.

I’m surprised that you, of most participants herein, would advocate the alteration to a deeper level, of that which is already given as a basic foundational conception. To suggest the reduction of a fundamental is self-contradictory, is it not? Furthermore, and possibly even more surprising, is what could space or time be altered to, such that there is a deeper level to them? — Mww

The problem is that the "basic foundational conception" is wrong in a very fundamental way, as described above, "the senses deceive us", as described above. Therefore we must go to the deeper level to get a true understanding, a level deeper than sensation itself to get beyond the deceptive intuitions produced by sensation.

Then, too, if basic a priori intuitions are given as limits for seeing and apprehending things, which does seem to be the case, then to alter them to a deeper level implies the possibility for removing such limitations, which is also self-contradictory, insofar as we are certainly limited. — Mww

It's not contradictory, it's a matter of seeing these intuitions as wrong, and overriding them with the conscious mind, as described above. It's only if you subscribe to some form of naturalism, within which you would say that what "nature" provides us with is what is good, or correct, then you would say that the will to override these intuitions would be contradictory. But Plato thoroughly demonstrated the failing of such a naturalism. The natural tendencies are bodily tendencies, and we must use reason and will to get beyond these faulty tendencies.

Your dragon causing the sun to go around the Earth didn't really allow any predictions at all beyond that the sun would come up, which everyone already knew by keeping track of the behavior of the sun. — T Clark

That the theory doesn't allow any predictions at all, is exactly the point I was trying to make. The mathematics applied to an observed pattern provides the prediction. The trickery I referred to, involves associating a theory with the mathematics so as to create the illusion that the predictions support the theory.

We can see the same trickery with the Ptolemaic system. We can model the sun and planets as making orbits around the earth, and employ geometry and mathematics within that theory, to make predictions. The predictions will be accurate to a large extent. But then there will be a small percentage of fringe cases, retrogrades, etc., anomalies where the normal prediction procedure will fail, so a special rule will need to be created to deal with each anomaly. This is where the trickery lies. Instead of recognizing, and accepting that when the model fails at the fringes, this means it is wrong, we produce "excuses" for the failings, exceptions to the rule.

We can see this in modern physics and cosmology with the general relativity theory. At the very small, local scale, quantum mechanics, the theory fails. Also, at the very large scale, it produces anomalies when dealing with cosmological spatial expansion. The anomalies are dealt with by positing things like dark matter and dark energy. (The dragon accounts for the failings in the predictions, because it has a mind of its own and doesn't follow the law every single time, exceptions to the rule). The desire to hang on to the theory, despite its failings produces the trickery.

In the case of the Ptolemaic system, it is my understanding that it was believed by many to be wrong, long before Copernicus demonstrated it to be wrong, even before Ptolemy produced the actual model. The idea that the real truth was that the planets orbited the sun was revealed thousands of years ago because of the nature of the observed retrogrades. The correct heliocentric model could not be formulated though because geometers worked with circles. Circular orbits produced predictive failings which could not be corrected for. However, the failings of retrograde motion could be corrected for, in the geocentric model, so it remain prevalent. It wasn't until Copernicus exposed all the exact failings of the circular orbit model, that elliptical orbits could be presented as the solution.

ust wonderin’.....if a base a priori intuition informs unavoidably, how might it be altered? Wouldn’t experiential consistency be questionable? — Mww

I think experiential consistency is questionable. That's why we have difference of intuitions, differences of preference, and so on. These are the peculiarities of the individual. We can see that in standardized moral training, and standardized education in general, we attempt to create consistency. I believe this tendency to produce conformity is itself deeply intuitive. It's the reason why evolving living beings exist as distinct species, rather than just a whole bunch of different varieties.

Take my cat: The term 'cat' is arbitrary: you know, the noise we make and the knowledge we have of those furry living things never gives us something indubitable, not that is is wrong to think of it as a cat, but that this kind of knowledge has no determinate foundation. It is up in the air when questions about it are the most basic.
But what happens when we remove ourselves from this, if you will, ready to hand environment of knowing and we ask ontological and epistemic questions, not just in academic curiosity, but existentially, apart from the text, IN the world? Can we meaningfully say that because our language is indeterminate, then, say, my cat does not exist? So here: there is something intuitively absolute, "pure" even, about the givenness of the presence of the cat that is not language bound, and this is a kind of "knowledge" that exceeds the usual contextualized knowing. — Constance

I can't see how the analogy works. You can point to your cat and say "I know that's a cat, but I don't really know what a cat is". But you cannot point to an are, and say "I know that's an are, but I don't really know what an are is. That's the difference, you can point to a particular cat, as an example, but you cannot point to an example of "are" because it's purely universal.

I think a better example would be the Ptolemaic cosmological system. It was very complicated and it turns out in the end it was wrong, but it worked well until Copernicus and Kepler came along. Their theory eventually superseded Ptolemy's. Ditto with Newton and Einstein. I guess Newton was wrong, but we still use his theories for non-relativistic applications, which is most of what we deal with. — T Clark

Yes, you're probably right, it's a better example because it's a real example. I just went to a ridiculous example to make the point more obvious.

The OP provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the boundaries of religion. — Agent Smith

Who do you propose could set the boundaries to religion? Such boundaries could only be set by God, or the gods, because only these divinities might have access to that knowledge. If human beings tried to set such boundaries the human beings would be claiming to know what could only be known by God, and that would necessarily be mistaken. Reminds me of "The Euthyphro". An adventure which is a mistake from the outset.

Can't we think about being without the limitations of the human condition? A transcendental state can set us free from these limitations. The static whole of the transient, transgressive, changing, differentiating, or becoming nature of subjective being can be experienced as a solid, static, transcendental state of eternal, infinite, and objective, absolute essence, dissolving all distinctions, boundaries, perspective, and diversity in still unity. — Haglund

No, this is exactly what we cannot do. We must respect the fact that thinking about anything, is, by its very nature something limited by the human condition. So it is absolutely impossible to "think about being without the limitations of the human condition". "Thinking" is fundamentally limited by the human condition therefore these limitations inhere within the thinking. So if we want to take the perspective of some sort of disembodied being, we are not even talking about "thinking" anymore, nor would this disembodied being be properly called an "intellect", as "intellect" is attributed to a thinking human being. We can't even properly call it a "being"

That's why this whole approach is fundamentally flawed. The appropriate approach is to recognize the reality of our limitations, attempt to understand them and determine how they influence our thinking. So from the Kantian perspective for example, we should see that these fundamental limitations are described as the a priori intuitions of space and time. These base intuitions inform the way that we see and apprehend things, in a way which we cannot avoid. When we come to understand this basic reality, we can move beyond these intuitions, to a deeper level, to see how these intuitions themselves, might be altered toward something more real, by locating the basic limitations at an even deeper level.

You misunderstand the nature of science; hypotheses are never proven, — Janus

Isn't that exactly what I said, predictions do not prove hypotheses? So why do you think it constitutes a misunderstanding?

We (the community of inquirers) accept theories for as long as observations continue to manifest what is predicted of those theories. — Janus

What you express here is a mistake. As in my example, it's a mistake to accept hypotheses solely on the basis of successful prediction, because it's not the hypothesis which enables the prediction, it's the mathematics which does. There's a common form of trickery in which the deceiver uses mathematics to make predictions, and claims that the predictions support a pet hypotheses. Anyone who does not apply the required analysis, and rigorous logic, which is usually very arduous, may be deceived.

Therefore it is a mistake for us to accept theories just because observations "manifest what is predicted of the theory". The fault here is in your notion of "predicted of the theory". It's not theories which make predictions, it's human beings.

But this line of thinking simply denies that there is anything "there" in some emphatic, irresistible way. I may not know what things are, but THAT they are, notwithstanding "are" being interpretatively indeterminate, is impossible to deny. — Constance

This really makes no sense. You say "I know that things are", but "are" you say, has a completely indeterminate meaning. How can you possibly know that things "are", when you cannot know what "are" means. Your statement is basic contradiction "I know that things "are', but I don\t know what 'are' means".

We can think in terms of causation and imagine ways in which the things of the observed world and their observed parts and functions might work. Then we can think of what we would expect to observe if our hypotheses were right, and if, on experimentation, we do observe what we predicted, then we accept our hypotheses, and they become established as theories. — Janus

I think you're missing something here. When a hypothesis produces a prediction which works, this does not necessarily mean that the hypothesis ought to be accepted. Prediction is mostly produced from observation of temporal patterns, statistics, and mathematics, and a hypothesis generally goes far beyond the simple mathematics. So for example, imagine that I watch the sun rise and set day after day, and I produce a hypothesis, that a giant dragon takes the sun in its mouth around the back side of the earth, and spits it out every morning. I might predict the exact place and time that the sun will rise, and insist that my theory has been proven by my uncanny predictions. Clearly though, the successful predictions are nothing more than successful predictions, and my hypothesis hasn't been proven at all.

Therefore we must consider the logical relationship between the hypothesis and the prediction. It's very easy to be fooled into thinking that a certain prediction proves a specific hypothesis, when in reality we have to rule out all other possible competing hypotheses which could equally be said to be proven by the same prediction. This is a logical process which is crucial in designing experiments.

Okay, we accept it as granted, no need for proof right? Now, how did we arrive at this conclusion, is it from a particular kind of mathematics? Or is this more from logical inference? — chiknsld

It's metaphysics, theory, hypothesis. I wouldn't really characterize it as a conclusion, more like a proposition.

Very interesting, I suppose this is the ultimate reason for what you said previously -our intellect or consciousness which seems to be made of immaterial substance. — chiknsld

Yes, see Wayfarer was talking about memory consisting of a multitude of points, which are somehow united. The relationship which unites them does not appear to be a spatial pattern. What relates them may be a non-spatial pattern.

Dark energy is fascinating indeed. You're saying that dark energy has something to do with the same counterintuitive nature of our immaterial intellect, that same counterintuity is reflective in the current peculiarities of the universe? Very interesting. :) — chiknsld

I would not say that it's counterintuitive. As I said, the reality of the immaterial aspect of the human being, free will, spirit, etc., is very intuitive. It's just that the modern trend toward physicalism and scientism has suppressed this intuition in an unnatural way, making it appear to be counterintuitive. But when you look at the reality of the situation, you ought to be able to see that this physicalist attitude is acquired through the current educational institutions. It is not an intuition at all, but an attitude acquired in our educational process, and this attitude suppresses the natural inclination toward spirituality.

When you say ‘human’ do you have in mind an a priori ala Kant? To be human is then to be possessed of a prior categories. This makes humanity a divine notion. — Joshs

No, I do not agree with Kant's a priori category. What I think, is that the mind operates in unison with sensation in specific preestablished ways. This means that there is something prior to mental experience, similar to Kant's a priori, as the conditions for such experience, but this, whatever it is which is prior to experience, cannot be conceptual in any way. So Kant calls them "intuitions". Well, I find "intuition" as an equally faulty word, because that word as we normally use it, has mental experience implied within. That's why when Aristotle investigated the nature of intuition in his "Nicomachean Ethics" (what he considered the highest form of knowledge, incidentally), he concluded that it is a combination of innate and acquired features. Therefore, I believe that to properly characterize what is prior to mental experience, as the condition for such experience, we need to go beyond "intuition".

That is the very claim which Kant refuted. — Janus

This wasn't a refutation at all, just a simple assertion. But it's really a defeatist attitude. If we say that reality extends beyond our capacities of sensation (and what science shows us is that it does), yet we claim that reason has not the capacity to understand this reality, then we render science as impotent. Science uses hypotheses to understand what is beyond the limitations of sensation.

But this is also why we have to be wary of scientific conclusions, and duly subject them to skepticism. We tend to fall under the illusion that scientific theories are verified by sense experience, and therefore in some sense cannot be wrong, providing us with certainties. The problem though, as the ancients indicated, is that sense experience is what leads us wrong in the first place, and the goal of science is actually to access that true reality (noumenal) which is beyond sensation. If science's verification is provided by sensation, then we have the potential for a vicious circle within science, such that the deceptions of our senses are used to verify deceptive theories.

At issue in the way that line of thinking developed, was the fact that through the faculty of reason, you could know something with apodictic certainty - mathematical certainty, as we like to say. — Wayfarer

I would say that what Plato demonstrated, and especially Aristotle, is that this form of certainty, which you call "apodictic" is really an illusion, a false certitude which is nothing more than sophism. As Aristotle demonstrated, mathematical axioms and geometrical constructs, which are proposed for various purposes, what Plato called "the good", are forms which are property of the human mind. When "the good" wanders, strays from truth and honesty into pragmaticism, then persuasion may become the principal goal involved with such proposals. Then we have mere sophistry. Einstein for example, was a master at this type of persuasion, in his presentation of the nature of time. He presents a conception of "time" which is pragmatic rather than truthful, and offers numerous different persuasive arguments as to why this conception of time ought to be employed.

So, from the empirical perspective it is of course true that the Universe precedes our existence, but from the perspective of transcendental idealism, ‘before’ is also a part of the way in which the observing mind constructs the world.

My tentative, meta-philosophical claim is that this implies that in some sense, the appearance of conscious sentient beings literally brings the universe into existence. Not that ‘before’ we came along that it didn’t exist, but that the manner of its existence is unintelligible apart from the perspective brought to it by the observer. We can’t get ‘outside’ that perspective, even if we try and see the world as if there’s no observer. (Sorry for the length of this post.) — Wayfarer

This is exactly the point, and it's very well said here Wayfarer; nice job. Wittgenstein likes this example too, the earth existed before me, he implies that it's something which cannot be doubted. Actually though, it's a very good example of precisely why we need to doubt such things, which we otherwise would tend to take for granted.

We see "the world" is a human construct, a conception, how we understand our environment, what's around us, enveloping us. So if "the world" refers to the way that I understand my environment, then it's impossible that the world existed before me. That's a basic fact. Now, to move to this belief, that the world actually existed before me, I have to accept the truth (correspondence) between this conception of my environment, which envelopes me, "the world", and the actual reality of my environment. Once I accept this as a truth, then all the temporal, spatial, and mathematical conceptions implied by this concept "the world", as logically prior to that concept (necessary for it), are implicitly accepted by me as well. These become true conceptions, as necessary for rendering truth to "the world existed before me". The problem is that we readily accept "the world existed before me", because it is extremely intuitive, without taking the time required to understand exactly what that proposition entails.

So you can see that the simple proposition "the world existed before me" involves a massive web of temporal, spatial, and mathematical conceptions all tied together, as necessary to ensure the truth of that proposition. If any of these conceptions might be inaccurate, then the entire proposition is cast into a shadow of doubt. The most obvious problem is the term "before". Our conception of time is so primitive and obscure, that we do not know with any degree of certainty what "before" actually means. And so, in setting a relationship between myself and my environment, which includes the concept "before", I have to approach with much skepticism.

-No, how do you prove that? — Nickolasgaspar

Ok, rather than call what is outside of natural "supernatural", would you prefer "non-natural"? I don't really care about the terminology. If you dislike the term "supernatural" let's just call it "non-natural".

What natural things are necessary of is irrelevant to how we establish and verify possibilities.The possibility of the supernatural must be demonstrated, not assumed. — Nickolasgaspar

When it is demonstrated that there is something other than the natural, then we must call it something. You defined "natural" as what manifests through verified building blocks, so the manifestation of the building blocks themselves must be something other than natural. Can we call this the "non-natural"?

-Sure, our will is a real phenomenon......declaring it "fee" is scientifically ignorant because none of our choices are really free from the system we are in. — Nickolasgaspar

A "system" is a human construct. This statement makes no sense.

You need to demonstrate that supernatural causality is real and that it is required for A. — Nickolasgaspar

It's already been demonstrated. According to your definition of "natural", nature builds things from building blocks. But obviously the building blocks are necessary for whatever nature builds. And whatever produces the building blocks is outside of nature, not natural, according to your definition. Yet it is definitely a requirement for whatever nature builds, because nature requires the building blocks to build stuff. If you do not like the term "supernatural" we'll just call it "non-natural". I'm not partial to "supernatural" myself.

Whether a supernatural explanation is relevant,that is on you do demonstrate sufficiency and necessity through objective positive evidence in favor of the supernatural...not by making arguments through the use of gaps in our epistemology. — Nickolasgaspar

I've demonstrated the necessity to assume a cause which is not natural, by your definition of "natural". If you do not want to call it "supernatural", because "supernatural" means something else to you, I really don't care, we can just call it something else. How does "divine" sound to you? That's got a much better ring than "supernatural".

In Science Natural is every process or phenomenon that manifest in reality through verified building blocks of the physical would and or their advanced properties. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, the "Natural" is everything which manifests "through verified building blocks", but we still need to account for the existence of these so called "building blocks". That's what we deal with in metaphysics. If "Natural" is whatever is constructed with the building blocks, then whatever constructs the building blocks must be supernatural. Do you agree?

No, since, we as human produce artificial things, but they are not supernatura because in order for them to exist a long line of natural processes must take place first. (i.e. QM, emergence of atoms, emergence of molecules, emergence of chemical properties, emergence of biological properties and structures, emergence of mental properties, emergence of skills through training....thus production of a artificial things (i.e. jewellery). — Nickolasgaspar

That natural things are necessary for the effect A, does not exclude the possibility that supernatural things are also required for the A effect.

In order for an artifact to be supernatural that would demand the existence of mind properties non contingent to the causal line described above somehow interacting in matter and producing the artifact. — Nickolasgaspar

Yes, remember I mentioned "free will". And the hypocrite that you are, chose to reject the reality of free will.

Sure it is, and by the time we introduce our scientific knowledge we realize that we are not really free to make free choices.
Our biology, our peers, our given needs and circumstances limit our free will in really mundane choices. — Nickolasgaspar

That the extent to the freedom of the will is limited, does not necessitate the conclusion that it is not real. Look at the above, natural causes are required for the occurrence of A , and also supernatural causes are required for A. If it is a fact that the natural effectively restricts the supernatural, this does not necessitate the conclusion that the supernatural has been excluded.

Really , you can demonstrate impossibility and distinquish it from personal incredulity? How would you do that???? — Nickolasgaspar

We use logic to demonstrate impossibility.

No evidence means.... no evidence, it doen't mean positive evidence or even indications for a magical realm. — Nickolasgaspar

No evidence of X, means no evidence of X, but no evidence of X might still be evidence of Y. No evidence of X does not mean no evidence absolutely as you imply here. You seem to be ignoring what I've reiterated numerous times, that "natural" requires a definition.

You don't know if we have all the facts and if advances in our technology will allow new observations to produce additional facts that could support our evidence for a mechanisms. — Nickolasgaspar

Are you suggesting that we change the definition of "natural" in the future, to allow for what would now be necessarily supernatural.

There isn't anything to understand about the supernatural because it's a made up bin where magical thinkers through everything we currently don't understand in there. The supernatural is ill defined so it has no explanatory power. We don't observe or verify supernatural causation and we shouldn't use it on things we currently do not understand.
Imagine if we stopped searching for the cause of diseases because our superstitious ancestors came up with supernatural explanations like gods and theodicy,evils spirits , evil eye, cursing etc.
Again your arguments are superstitious and outdated. — Nickolasgaspar

I propose we define "natural" in the common way, as "not artificial". Do you agree that artificial things must be supernatural?

Superstitious beliefs in the supernatural is NOT philosophy.
Philosophy should produce wise claims to assit our understanding of the world....not to point to mystery worlds we have to way to testing them...lol

The supernatural is Pseudo Philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

A discussion of free will is philosophy. And any hypocrite who denies oneself free will is incapable of understanding reality. So until you change your attitude, it's pointless to discuss philosophy with you.