However, the dichotomy between "developed countries" and "developing countries" seems quite accurate to me. — Astorre

I disagree with the vise versa part. X is defined as Western values and Western narrative, and then Y is defined as not-X. The vise versa doesn't work, because then you would be defining X as not-Y, and there would be nothing to establish the relationship to Western values. So there is no vise versa in the definitions, there is X which is Western values, and there is Y which is not-X. X cannot be defined as not-Y or you lose reference to Western values.

However, the dichotomy between "developed countries" and "developing countries" seems quite accurate to me. — Astorre

This is not the dichotomy you have defined though. You have defined Western and non-Western. The dichotomy of Western and developing, is very outdated. That is because many non-Western societies are fully developed, but simply do not have the same values as the Western. We ought not class developed non-Western together with developing non-Western, and name them all together as "developing countries. That would be a mistake.

So, you have proposed a dichotomy of "Western" and "non-Western". In no way does this equate to developed and developing. It appears like you want to include non-Western, yet developed countries, in your category of "developing". Or you just want ambiguity. Why?

So let's say that we do have a radio receiver of that sort, and it's common to us all but the majority of people, (the normal people), condition themselves to tune it out, or maybe even turn it right off. I don't consider myself to be normal, so I am cognizant of that signal as I explained, but I also understand that I've spent most my life under the 'tune it out' program of conditioning. I didn't succeed in completely tuning it out, or turning it off, because it was too strong for my conscious mind to overpower. Now it really confuses me, even causing unnecessary stress and anxiety, because I don't know how to interpret or translate the meaning, having never taken the time to learn the language, yet it is so strong and seems to tell me that I ought to try.

If I want to try and understand it, what do you think would be my best approach? Should I first attempt to determine where it's coming from, and then after forming that understanding I would have an approach toward trying to understand what it is saying? Or, do you think that I should first learn to understand what it is saying, then, where it is coming from might sort of reveal itself naturally?

First thing first though, how can I know that it is really being received, and not just created by me as a form of self-deception? That's what I'm really afraid of, that it's a sort of self-perpetuating anxiety, like I am creating a problem for myself, and actively propagating the problem. The 'tune it out conditioning' tells me it is self-created deception and that's why it must be shut off. How can I convince myself of its reality, so that I can peacefully live with it, and so it resolves that anxiety of self-deception, rather than creating it? Is there a logical trick, like even if it is self-created, it must have a cause?

Contemporaries often use the term "global south" in the context of alternative associations like BRICS or G77. Although my understanding of the concept of "global south" is broader - it is "Developing countries", "periphery", "Third world" — Astorre

I can't understand this form of classification. It classifies a bunch of dissimilar and unrelated things together in the same classification, as not-X. So you start with "Western values and narratives", then produce a category of exclusion, "non-Western", and place all others into that category. But there is no principles by which the "others" ought to be placed in the same category, except that you want to exclude them from being in the category of "Western". How is that an acceptable form of classification? What could be the intent of such a form of classification?

For such a being, the experience of such an unusual event is very rare, perhaps once in the lifetime, or only for 1 in 10 people in their lifetime. What I’m saying, is that infact it happens more than we know, even regularly, but we either don’t see it, couldn’t appreciate the relevance, are conditioned to screen it out etc. essentially we are blind to it, except in certain very narrow circumstances determined by our life, heritage and conditioning.
For the mystic, or seer, this is fertile ground for exploration and contemplation. — Punshhh

I opt for "regularly". I tend to think that this sort of thing happens all the time, and it is a significant aspect of existence, but since it doesn't make sense to our deterministic way of understanding things, we have been conditioned to tune it out.

Here's an analogy, or another example of the "tuning out". There is talk and speculation about people who experience an "inner voice". Many people do not experience the inner voice. Those who do experience it, generally condition themselves to believe that the inner voice is simply a personal dialogue, talking to oneself. The self-conditioning occurs at such a young age we do not even remember it. It could be very confusing to think that I am talking to someone other than myself, internally, so I carry on a self-dialogue which effectively blocks out, tunes out, any external source from my inner voice. Talking to myself, internally allows me to block out any internal voice which is not my own, convincing me that the internal voice is simply my own. Any external sourced voice, in the internal, is pushed under the rug, and drowned out, therefore not noticed.

However, some do not succumb to the conditioning, and end up believing that the voice of another is speaking to them internally. These people are designated as psychologically challenged. That designation doesn't make the phenomenon go away, or make it any less real. So this feature, of having someone who is somehow not you (external in that sense), speaking to you internally, is very real, despite the fact that normal people shout at themselves internally to drown out or tune out, the "not you" aspect, and think of this as thinking.

Have you ever felt that? — Moliere

I'm having a hard time, felt what? The moment I saw the absurd, or the moment I saw multiplicity? Or is multiplicity absurd for you? I don't know if I've ever really felt either one.

However, hitting bottomlessness is absurd to me. Therefore, I suppose I can conclude that I have felt that moment of seeing the absurd, as "hitting bottomlessness".

However, theory (ontology) must be sought out again after ontology hits bottomlessness. — Moliere

But how does "ontology hits bottomlessness" make any sense? Suppose ontology progresses indefinitely, as "bottomlessness" implies. When would it "hit" bottomlessness; after two years, a hundred years, a thousand years, a million years? It doesn't make any sense to say that it has hit, or it hits, bottomlessness.

We can judge a specific ontology as groundless, or bottomless, if we think that the claims of that ontology are ungrounded, or unsound, but that would just mean that we disagree with the ontology. Then bottomless, or ungrounded, is just an avoidance. Instead of addressing what we disagree with, we simply dismiss the ontology as groundless or bottomless. So the charge of bottomless, or groundless, is just a nothing charge, useless and meaningless, while those who make the charge are acting out bottomlessness..

This is what he says about infinity. Philosophers talk about infinity, without recognizing that they are really acting it out.

The metacritical turn against prima philosophia [Latin: originary
philosophy] is at the same time one against the finitude of a philosophy,
which blusters about infinity and pays no heed to it.

Further, this is where "play" enters philosophy:

Against the total domination of method, philosophy retains,
correctively, the moment of play, which the tradition of its
scientifization would like to drive out of it. Even for Hegel this was a
sore point, he reproached “…types and distinctions, which are
determined by pure accident and by play, not by reason.”6 The non
naïve thought knows how little it encompasses what is thought, and yet
must always hold forth as if it had such completely in hand. It thereby
approximates clowning. It may not deny its traces, not the least because
they alone open up the hope of that which is forbidden to it. Philosophy
is the most serious of all things, but not all that serious, after all. What
aims for what is not already a priori and what it would have no statutory
power over, belongs, according to its own concept, simultaneously to a
sphere of the unconstrained, which was rendered taboo by the
conceptual essence. The concept cannot otherwise represent the thing
which it repressed, namely mimesis, than by appropriating something
of this latter in its own mode of conduct, without losing itself to it. — p25-26

Despite being the most serious thing, the pretense of truth in ontology, is just clowning.

here’s a growing belief that the prosperity of the West has come at the expense of the Global South, and that the status quo must change. — Astorre

What if the dictatorships of the global south are what the inhabitants of the global south want? — Astorre

What does "global south" mean in your usage. Can you define this?

For example; I have come to realise that extremely inprobable events and coincidences happen all the time. — Punshhh

I strongly agree. That's why there is sayings like "truth is stranger than fiction". I believe it has something to do with the variety of possibility. Possibility extends through such a vast array of features of a vast array of activities, far beyond the capacity of the most imaginative minds. That is why superstition extends to such a broad array of habitual activities. You'll find that people who work in a career where luck and chance are significant factors (such as sports games) pay very strong attention to the most minute factors of daily life. They are said to be superstitious. Very small things, which are not even noticeable to most people can end up having a large effect on what happens. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butterfly_effect

Secondly; for this event to happen, there was a collective action between all the people involved. So in a sense the crowd, including myself and the small chap, were acting as one cohesive organism. Which might suggest that we act as one organism more often than we might expect.

Thirdly; there was some kind of calling, need, requirement for the two of us to see each other and have our interaction***. I have had numerous encounters with people which involved exchanging of glances, as intense, or meaningful as this, indeed even more so. So have come to view such interactions as a window to the soul, or something like that. — Punshhh

These two features involve a non-conscious relation between individuals, which will act to amplify the minute factors of possibility, through multiplication.

Here's an analogy. Consider that a living body is composed of a multitude of small parts, individual cells, or even the smaller parts, parts of a cell and the parts that act between cells. Each part is acting out its own role, by what it is inclined to do by the deterministic laws of physics, while leaving open minute factors of possibility. That is, it is still free to make a different move, one which would appear to be chance, or random. Also, there must be an non-conscious relation between all the different parts, so that the possibility which is left open by each individual is multiplied by the possibility left open by each other, allowing for coincidental apparent chance or random acts. This "coincidence" acts to "amplify possibility". When the whole, as a group, does something unexpected, the effect of amplified possibility is realized. We observe this, "the effects of amplified possibility" every time a being makes an act which we designate as freely chosen.

Fourthly; and this point involves another encounter at the same event, aswell. The realisation that brief meetings between particular people can have a meaning, or significance, way beyond what we might expect. And that some kind of group communion is going on within populations. — Punshhh

This is analogous to the above referenced "butterfly effect" itself. However, there is a very big difference. Understanding of the butterfly effect is based in principles of chance, randomness, described by chaos theory. This theory demonstrates how the concept of "amplified possibility" is permissible in a deterministic world, if we allow that at a fundamental level, chance occurrence is real. The chance occurrence must be very real, for chaos theory to be real, so in reality chaos theory is a denial of the "deterministic world". People will claim that chaos theory is consistent with determinism, but it is not, because it requires chance, undetermined actions, at the basic level.

What you are indicating is that these supposedly "chance" occurrences, which form the base of chaos theory, actually have meaning and significance which extends far beyond the capacity of the conscious human mind to understand. This implies that within the "non-conscious relation between all the different parts", there is some form of what you call "group communion", which is some form of recognition of the underlying meaning or significance, and this acts to cause the amplification of possibility which is required for the individuals to act together as a whole, in a way which is non-deterministic.

I already gave good reasons why it isn't a case of premature judgement.

A tree produces a seed in order to produce another tree. If you just look at the seed and say "oh that's not a tree, obviously it failed let's destroy this tree" one quickly notices an error in judgement. Belief systems call this arrogance or pride. Society calls this impatience and prudence. Science calls this just being wrong. Remember that. — Outlander

I don't see the relevance. If the seed fails in producing a tree it demonstrates its own faultiness.

I'm more inclined to see this as a straight expression, but I don't know. It seems hard to reconcile the notion that Adorno is making fun of this idea while also noting how the place where ontology hits bottomlessness is the place of truth. — Moliere

Where's the difficulty? Think of it as I said, when ontology hits (the bottom of) bottomlessness, there it finds truth. In other words, ontology never finds truth. And, contrary to those who think that truth is never hidden from us, Adorno seems to think it is always hidden from us.

I have a hard time reading this like he's poking fun. — Moliere

Well he has already said that there is humour involved in philosophy.

Dont you see this as a suggestion, to "fall into the abyss"? Doesn't he say that those that don't do that, will turn to analytical and tautological statements? What is an abyss, if not something bottomless? — Pussycat

i don't see your point. When he says that, he is talking about those who think that truth cannot hide from us. That whole paragraph, from which you quoted, is all part and package of that sarcasm involving the relationship between truth and groundlessness. To avoid groundlessness we choose tautology, but tautology is useless, powerless. So metaphysics is nothing but the insane prattle of going from one extreme to the other.

Doesn't he say here that it is with mental acrobatics that one should approach the extremes? And that the herd will see these moves as nothing more than self satisfied rhetoric, as perhaps it was done with Nietzsche? — Pussycat

He's sarcastically making fun of metaphysics. It's mental acrobatics, yes, but it is doing nothing (Wittgenstein's idleness) but insane, ridiculous moves, which we might be entertained by (laugh at). These acrobatic moves are even beyond sophistry in ridiculousness, because at least the agility of sophistry is purposefully directed.

Thanks for that description.

Except that the reality demonstrated by the sciences is only demonstrable from the very same system of conception/perception representation, as the common Everydayman reality not the least concerned with the scientific version at all. — Mww

The point though, is that what is demonstrated is its own faultiness. You know, when a method fails in its capacity to reach the desired end, it demonstrates its own faultiness.

Activity is exactly as we represent it to ourselves, give appearances in compliance with our particular physiology alone. The fact it is a vastly oversimplified representation doesn’t make it false; it merely makes it incomplete, and that merely from perspective, iff given by a deeper scale of investigation. The point being, the completion of the representation, determined from such deeper scale, wouldn’t be a necessary addendum to our experience, insofar as knowing e.g., the distinct molecular composition of different kinds of forks, does nothing whatsoever for disturbing the already established activity of getting food to the mouth using one. Contingent with respect to future experience, certainly, for deeper-scale investigations make things like penicillin possible. Such is science, not as opposed but in juxtaposition, to metaphysics. — Mww

I completely disagree with all this. Perhaps, by the principle of relativity, activity is exactly as we represent it to ourselves, but I thing relativity is a means of avoiding truth. In general, oversimplification is falsity.

Of course. On the one hand, good things for me are not necessarily good things for you, hence each good of a thing is a subjective judgement. On the other hand, any of my judgements regarding what is good, insofar as they all arise in me alone, can hardly be termed subjective, in that there is nothing to which they relate except my own determinability. The good in such case, reverts to relative degrees of a necessarily presupposed good, rather than different forms of good itself. Such condition is the same for both of us, granting the commonality of our respective human inclinations and intellectual attitudes. — Mww

We seem to be losing any common ground for discussion.

Insufficient….for what? — Mww

Insufficient for truth. That is what I was talking about.

If the past and future are constituents of the present, then the present is not something pure, but something that does not participate in ousia or substance. — JuanZu

The point though, is that "substance", just like "the present" may itself be an illusion. So the issue is not whether the present is something pure, but whether the present has any kind of reality at all. And if it is real why would we think that it partakes of substance?

Your position fails, i think, when it demands precision, since you are seeking to differentiate between past, present and future by treating them as substances. — JuanZu

I treat past and future as substance, but I see no reason to assume any substantial existence of the present. The present is purely active, without substance. I disliked your proposal because it required three substances, instead of my two. by making the present something distinct from the past and future.

Something that interests me is knowledge acquired through the witnessing of events. — Punshhh

I believe it is important to the topic of this thread, to understand how intention guides attention, and knowledge is dependent on attention. So 'the created world' is a product of 'what we pay attention to', and 'what we pay attention to' is guided by our intention.

I can remember and visualise clearly, in memory, events that happened 30 years ago. In which I witnessed something unexplainable, something which defies credulity and which has broad ranging implications for how I think about the world and reality. And yet at the time, it was just something I noticed, experienced, for a split second. Something that happened so quickly and was over before I could react. I could have just carried on, walked past and not given it another thought. — Punshhh

I find it very interesting how different people will remember the very same event in completely different ways. So you might say, something incredulous happened, but someone else in the same area might just notice a mundane occurrence.

But my enquiring mind and curiosity latched onto it instantly and it is still with me now as though it happened yesterday. — Punshhh

In Plato's Theatetus, and Meno, Socrates said that curiosity, or wonder, is the source of philosophy. Being amazed is what inspires inquiry. Those who simply take things for granted do not notice all the potential sources of amazement, and do not aspire to philosophy.

Yeah, my fault, being facetious. I’m just having trouble understanding how anyone could feel physical pain from a “faulty idea”. You said objects were, or might be, just faulty ideas, a hammer, being an object represented by that conception, would fit the bill. — Mww

OK, I see what you are saying, and it exposes a misunderstanding of what I said, which I didn't notice before. Let me try again.

The idea of "objects" is a faulty idea. That you pick up a thing called a hammer, and start banging at things called nails, is a misconception, a faulty representation of the reality of the situation. It is just conception and perception which is supported facility and efficiency. It is very easy to understand reality in this way. To have objects which we name and talk about facilitates communication, and easy knowledge. However, sciences like chemistry and physics, prove to us that reality is actually completely different from this conception/perception representation. Activity is not at all as we represent it, as picking up objects called a hammer and nails, and hitting one object with another. That's a vastly oversimplified representation of what is actually going on, and really a faulty representation.

Why your pain reference is irrelevant, is that a person will feel pain after making the mistake which you describe as hitting one's thumb with a hammer, regardless of whether this description, "hitting one's thumb with a hammer", is an accurate description of what really happens, or not.

In the search for accurate representation, if not for the LNC, what other way is there to judge the relation between the object we perceive and the object we think? If logic doesn’t end the search, insofar all relations are determinable by it, it stands to reason the search for a relation wouldn’t end. But it always does, either in the affirmation or negation thereof, so the logic would seem to be working. — Mww

The LNC does not apply to the good of intention. This is why goods are often said to be subjective, different people can have contradicting goals, or goods. Even the same person will sometimes have conflicting goals. That is what makes deliberation necessary.

The "object we think" is created through the guidance of intention. As explained above, intention guides attention, which induces observation. The "object we perceive" as the result of observation, is therefore a product of intention. Since intention is the guiding factor, in the relation between the object we think and the object we perceive, and the LNC does not apply to intention, then LNC based logic is not what is required to end the search for understanding this relation. We must consider the type of logic by which we deliberate, and judge goods. This is a logic of priority and hierarchy, where things exist in a relation of order, rather than a logic of this or that.

There’s that faulty idea thing again. — Mww

Science demonstrates very clearly, that the conceptual structure based in objects of substance, physical objects, moving and interacting in space, is insufficient, and cannot adequately represent the reality of activity. This implies that it is a faulty idea. Please accept this as reality, instead of referring to mundane experiences in an attempt to make fun of the reality of the situation.

Furthermore, empirical knowledge is not of a physical object, but the representation of it, and the senses have nothing to do with representations, being merely the occasion for the possibility of them. — Mww

Right, with this understanding you ought to be in a very good position to be capable of simply rejecting this representation, that of "empirical knowledge". This representation has demonstrated to us that it has reached its limits of efficacy, and at that point it has shown itself, proved to us, that it itself, is based in faulty ideas. Therefore we need to start all over, from the bottom up, with something more reasonable as the foundation.

Yes. The good isn’t something to know; it is something to feel. That by which one feels anything is reducible to an aesthetic judgement, that by which he knows something is reducible to a discursive judgement. The formal ground of the one is pure practical reason, of the other is pure theoretical reason. — Mww

OK, now since the two, practical reason and theoretical reason, may contradict, and this will inevitably call into question the applicability of the LNC, we need to be able to hand priority to one or the other. Would you not agree, that "that by which one feels anything" is necessarily prior to 'that by which he knows something"? This puts practical reason as the higher, more conclusive form of judgement.

Kant supports this as well. The a priori intuitions of space and time, as the conditions of sensibility, are "that by which one feels something". Since these intuitions form the basis for theoretical reason, we must conclude that this type of judgement, practical reason, is a higher form of judgement.

Last but not least, that by which one merely comprehends the possibility of knowledge, is pure speculative reason, upon which is constructed the transcendental philosophy of German Enlightenment idealism. — Mww

The category of "speculative reason" is completely unnecessary, created and referred to, as a distraction. Rather than accepting the reality that practical reason is higher than theoretical reason, and that theoretical reason is subordinate to it, another category, speculative reason, is proposed as higher than the two. However, when we recognize the reality that practical reason is actually higher than theoretical reason, and that practical reason is by its very nature speculative, then there is no need for that further category.

Anyhow, the question is whether the groundlessness is real or not, contradiction also, and what is ND's stance against it. — Pussycat

Try the following.

I think what I'd say wrt Heidegger is that he hits groundlessness, but the fascist objects to groundlessness and so posits a sphere of absolute origins. — Moliere

How would one ever "hit groundlessness"? Adorno claims that Heidegger hits bottomlessness, but that really doesn't make sense. One can hit the bottom, but if there is no bottom you'll keep falling endlessly without ever hitting bottomlessness. So, if Adorno says that Heidegger "hits bottomlessness" that's just a judgement or criticism which we throws at Heidegger. It's not what Heidegger actually did, or thought he was doing. And, since "hits bottomlessness" really makes no sense at all, he's casting it as a joke, a piece of sarcasm.

The other translation provided by Pussycat above, is even more telling: "...Heidegger, starts banging away at groundlessness...". I believe Adorno is actually making fun of this idea of groundlessness, or bottomlessness, talking about it as if it is something concrete, something one can bang away at, or hit upon, like the ground, or the bottom. It's like the concept of infinity, and making fun of it by saying something like 'so and so counted an infinity of these items, and an infinity of those items', etc.. That's the joke of "hitting bottomlessness". Banging away at bottomlessness, is like repeatedly reaching infinity in a count.

The truly groundless move here would be, after hitting groundlessness, to shirk back and create some absolute beginning in order to cover up the truth. — Moliere

So, this phrase "...after hitting groundlessness...", really makes no sense. It's like saying "after I reach infinity". And Adorno is really making fun of this entire concept of groundlessness, or bottomlessness. And, if Adorno says, truth is reached when we hit groundlessness, he means truth is never reached. When ontology hits bottomlessness [something which is self-contradictory and therefore impossible] there it finds truth.

After making this point that unlike some who believe truth cannot hide from us, the opposite is actually the case, truth is always hidden from us, he proceeds to explain the fragility of truth. "It sways gently", meaning it's a moving target, due to its temporal content.

The open
thought is unprotected against the risk of going astray into what is
popular; nothing notifies it that it has adequately satisfied itself in the
thing, in order to withstand that risk. The consistency of its execution,
however, the density of the web, enables it to hit what it should.

Notice, "truth" which has been dismissed as being equivalent to bottomlessness, has been replaced with an end "to hit what it should".

Do you realise that you have just said that we know nothing, in particular. Well apart from what we have evolved to deal with. — Punshhh

This really depends on how you would define "know". Unlike some epistemologists, I don't think that truth is a requirement for "knowledge". Plato, in The Theaetetus, demonstrated that we cannot actually ensure truth, so a determination of truth is not necessary for us to call some information "knowledge". So I'm not saying that we know nothing, I'm saying that truth isn't really part of our knowledge.

I would go further and state that we cannot say anything positive, or negative about anything other than our world (except through revelation), welcome to the ranks of mysticism — Punshhh

I tend to enjoy your mystic perspective.

Ohfercrissakes. Obviously, my point is your thumb will be just as wounded by a mis-directed “faulty idea” as mine is by a hammer. — Mww

Sorry Mww, but I still don't get it. Whether or not a person understands how one received a wound, or even what it means to be wounded, is irrelevant to the feeling of being wounded. It seems like you are trying to say that fi one doesn't know how they got wounded, then they cannot feel the wound. If that is your point, then it's not valid.

well, good luck with that, I say. — Mww

Thank you, as you seem to understand, we need as much luck as we can possibly get, with this endeavour.

Now, you might say the comparison is always just between your own representations, a succession predicated on changes in experience, which, ironically enough, is precisely what every cave-dweller since Day One, has done. But there is never in the manifold of successive changes in your own representations the implication of the unconditioned, that from which no further change is possible and from which the only logical notion of an accurate representation, is given. — Mww

You seem to be saying that the process would go on forever, infinitely. I disagree, I think there would be an end to it. Whether the end comes in a good way or a bad way is another question, but I think the good way would be better than the bad way.

Which leaves you with….(sigh)…..only those that don’t contradict each other, and from which it is clear the form of truth, that in a cognition which conforms to is object, already manifests an accurate representation, and justifies logic as the necessary criteria for the form any truth must exhibit. — Mww

You are completely neglecting the reality of possibilities, and our inclination to judge some possible outcomes as better than others. It is not contradiction, or lack of it, which forms the basis, or grounding of our judgements, it is better and worse, good and bad, which provides that base. And these have a view toward the future, rather than the view toward the past which empirical representation has. Therefore real truth is grounded in the principles by which we judge goodness, as the basic form of all judgement.

Given as established the conditio sine qua non form of truth, that in a cognition which conforms to its object, and the impossibility of exceeding empirical knowledge with respect to experience of the objects contained in those cognitions, which is always that to which the form of truth relates, it follows there is no universal criteria for the fact of truth available to the human being. — Mww

Do you recognize two very distinct meanings of "object"? One is a physical thing, an object of sensation, empirical knowledge. The other is a goal, or end, the good. Since the physical object of empirical knowledge is demonstrably a faulty concept, produced by the deceptive nature of the senses, then we must consider that the true "object" is the goal or end, the good. Therefore "the form of truth" relates to the good, as the true object, the goal for the future, and not to the false "object" which is the object of empirical knowledge. The "object", as the goal, or end, the good, cannot be known by empirical knowledge, and this is why we must exceed empirical knowledge for real truth, to understand the real object, as the good. That is the principle of the is/ought divide.

There may be considered sufficient reason to exceed empirical knowledge insofar as the empirical knowledge we have does not afford us truth as such. But considering sufficient reason for an impossibility, is incomprehensible. — Mww

Do you classify knowing the good as impossible?

But it’s more complicated than that... — Punshhh

Yes, i think it's very complicated, and the trend for us is to simplify. We even have evolved in a way which has us sensing a very small bit of reality. So it is intuitive for us, as built into the fabric of our very existence, to simplify things. Consider for example, that our eyes are only sensitive to a small portion of the electromagnetic wavelengths, one octave so to speak. We've simply evolved in a way to focus on a very small, but very relevant part of reality.

The simplification helps to keep us focused directly on what is important and purposeful to our little corner of being, but it misleads us into thinking that this is representative of "the universe" as a whole. Ontologies like monism are an extension of this misleading trend toward oversimplification.

As for the “activity of something else”, presumably we are talking of distant, or large objects, acting as poles. As in electrical, or magnetic poles? — Punshhh

Not necessarily distant or large. If for example, we understand electromagnetism as waves, then there must be substance which the waves are active in (common called aether). That is simply the nature of a wave, it is the activity of the particles of an underlying substance. In our trend to simplify things, it seems like we overlook this need for an underlying substance which is active as waves, in our representations of electromagnetism. But then we end up with a wave function, or something like that, which accounts for the energy of the waves in their capacity to interact with assumed particles of matter, without providing any real representation of the waves.

The issue of poles is a further problem which I don't think can even be approached without a true representation of the waves. To look for the poles without first representing the waves would be like looking for a cause without first knowing the effect which you are looking for the cause of.

it's really very interesting. — Wayfarer

I believe that. But Heidegger is quite difficult. Good luck!

Tell that to my thumb, after getting whacked by a mis-directed hammer. — Mww

At the time of injury, I would never be thinking about ontology. What's your point here?

Doesn’t have to be an accurate representation; it is only necessary such representation not contradict either Mother Nature, at the same level, and not contradict antecedent experience on any level. — Mww

Speak for yourself. Some of us are interested in truth. That's what I believe philosophy is all about. And for truth accurate representation is necessary, lack of contradiction doesn't fulfil the the criteria for truth. That we don't have truth is forgivable, as you say, but that doesn't mean we ought not seek it.

Your reasoning is exemplary; it just exceeds the criteria for empirical knowledge of things on a common everyday scale. I mean….when was the last time you approached the SOL in anything with which you were consciously engaged? We’ve all perceived the alignment of susceptible particles into the shape of a field, but none of us have perceived the field of which the particles assume the shape. — Mww

I think i said already, that a key point in Plato's philosophy is the failings, or deficiencies of sensation as a guide toward truth. To find truth we must exceed empirical knowledge. The "common everyday scale" is the life of the cave dweller. Truth is about escaping that common everyday perspective.

I'm unsure how best to to get this across, but you cannot have a shadow without a physical object physically blocking light, even if we can never access that object. — AmadeusD

This argument is based on a specific assumption about what "a shadow" is. If that assumption is wrong, then the argument is unsound. I believe the assumption is wrong, therefore I believe your argument is unsound. I'm unsure how to best get this across to you.

This doesn't make much sense. A person is not perceiving if they are imagining, which seems to be what you're talking about. — AmadeusD

My argument is that a person may misjudge what one is perceiving, and this does not imply that the person perceives nothing. That was to counter your claim that if a person is not perceiving objects one is perceiving nothing. It may be the case that the person judges oneself to be perceiving objects, but is not perceiving objects, yet still is perceiving.

Fascinating line of thought. — Wayfarer

It all relates to the distinction I make between past and future. "Things", as physical objects, are a product of sense knowledge, empirical evidence. However, despite the fact that people claim that sensation occurs at the present, all sensation is always in the past from the perspective of the sensing subject. This means that "things", or "physical objects" refers only to the past. And when we realize that the future consists of possibilities rather than things, or physical objects, this forces us to totally reconceptualize what exactly exists at the present, or more precisely, what is actually happening at the present.

I agree, bottomlessness, and groundlessness have pretty much the same meaning for me. "Bottomlessness" however is more illustrative, and better suited for criticism of Heidegger because of the image of endless falling, never hitting the bottom. So I believe that "groundlessness" is the charge made against negative dialectics, as a philosophical principle, without grounding, unsound, no foundation. Then Adorno turns this around to say that groundlessness is really better understood as endless falling (never hitting the ground) and this is the vertiginous position which absolute Spirit gives us.

So far we agree of what negative dialectics would say of others, but what would it say of itself? — Pussycat

I think that Adorno believes that the property of "groundlessness" is not good for a philosophy, as indicated by "its fascist fruits", therefore he wants to escape this charge. That is why, in the lectures he very deliberately posited the determinate negative. That posit gives negative dialectics a position relative to positivism, as the philosophy which will determine its mistakes. That is what grounds it.

Wouldn't you think that, as long as subject and object cannot be reconciled, as in Hegel, then an abyss would form between them? And that this abyss would be manifest in any grounding attempts? — Pussycat

Remember, the grounding is a negative grounding. Negative dialectics is grounded in the deficiencies and faults of the philosophies which it criticizes. Therefore the abyss between subject and object which may be evident in Hegel, would in fact be a grounding for negative dialectics.

What I am saying is that the idea that there is "a thing" which is perceived is a faulty idea. So, I'm saying that all these supposed "things", forest fires, balls, and clouds, could be better understood if we simply accept that the perception of them as things is mistaken and misleading. It doesn't matter that all types of critters act as if they are perceiving things, because they all evolved in a similar way, and that was in a way which conditioned them to act as if they are perceiving things, just like us. The claim that we all perceive the same "things" is just as effective to argue that we all make the same mistake, as it is to argue that it must be the truth, because it is common.

So here's an example. We describe the way that electromagnetic energy interacts with 'things', as the photoelectric effect. Because we understand electrons and atoms as things existing in spacetime, this forces us to conceive of electromagnetism as things, photons, in order that we can understand this interaction. However, much evidence indicates to us that electromagnetism actually exists in the form of waves, rather than as things called photons. Further, there is also much evidence which indicates that the interaction between the supposed 'things', photons and electrons, would be better understood, if we represent these things as waves in a substance, rather than as things in spacetime. Therefore the evidence indicates that we are moving in the wrong direction, toward misunderstanding rather than toward understanding, by representing the wave activity of electromagnetism as things, photons, instead of representing the supposed physical things as wave disturbances, to establish the required compatibility to understand interaction.

As an analogy, consider how we understand hearing. We know that when a supposed thing makes a noise, we don't sense the noise as physical particles of noise being emitted from the thing making the noise, and being received by the ear. We understand it as a wave activity of molecules. But then we must understand that the supposed thing emitting the noise, and the supposed thing receiving the noise, are not actually things at all, but a collection of particles, molecules. The idea that there is a thing which emits the noise, and a thing which receives the noise is very misleading because it does not allow the proper understanding, which requires that the supposed 'things' must be understood as really the activity of something else. The true understanding is that the supposed 'thing' is not a thing at all, but some other activity of something else, which appears to us as if it were a thing.

That's the key to understanding how the conception of 'things' is misleading. The supposed 'thing' is really a bunch of underlying activity, and insisting that it is actually a physical thing debilitates our capacity to understand the reality of it. That is the point of process philosophy in general. Modeling reality as consisting of things which are perceived by us is not an accurate representation, and very misleading to anyone who wants a true understanding.

I don't see wallabies as to be eaten but as to be preserved, but I have hit and killed one with my car ( on the road, not on the property I dwell on), which I subsequently ate (not my car, the wallaby, just in case I've been obscure again). — Janus

At the base level, there's nothing wrong with eating roadkill.

Wouldn’t you agree it’s possible for a human and some other kind of intelligence to have a common perception? — Mww

No. I would say that a perception is unique to the being that perceives it. This is due to a multitude of factors, unique spatial temporal perspective, unique features of the perceiving body, etc.. So I believe it is impossible that two beings could have a common perception.

Your second paragraph is missing a crucial, unavoidable and clearly required aspect. That is the objects which engage our perception. — AmadeusD

Why do you assume that there is an object which engagers a person's perception. Like I said, the perception is a creation of the perceiver. Therefore the perceiver creates the object.

Otherwise, we are perceiving nothing. — AmadeusD

This is an unjustified conclusion. A person can be wrong in what they believe they are perceiving, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are perceiving nothing. So, a person can wrongly believe that they are perceiving objects, when in fact they are not perceiving objects, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are producing nothing. They might simply be perceiving something other than objects, and falsely believe that what is perceived is objects.

That's clear. — AmadeusD

As explained above, what appears to be clear to you is completely illogical.

Have bene over this several times with several people and it is, to me, obviously and somewhat incredibly, wrong. — AmadeusD

it's incredibly wrong to you, because you have an illogical thinking process.

He refers to Kant's transcendental hylomorphism, by which he means that Kant transposes Aristotle's form and matter relation to the register of cognition itself (where form is supplied by the a priori structures of sensibility and understanding, and matter by the manifold of intuition). — Wayfarer

This is exactly the crucial thing to understand about Kant. He brings the potential of matter (by Aristotle's principles) right into the conscious mind as "the a priori structures of sensibility". Accordingly, since "matter" refers to the unintelligible aspect of reality, Kant makes the unintelligibility of reality a feature of the mind rather than a feature of the independent reality. A deficiency of the mind is the cause of the unintelligibility of the mind. Simply put, it is the minds dependence on the senses. This is distinctly different from the Neo-Platonic perspective which assigned perfection to the mind, as immaterial anmd independent, making the reason for unintelligibility something separate from the mind, matter. In a sense, for Kant, mind is already corrupted by the presence of matter, as the a priori intuitions.

I appreciate and admire efforts.

Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby". — Janus

But what is it that you call "the wallaby"? Is it the colour? No, because then the dogs wouldn't be seeing the wallaby. Is it the shape? Why would you think that the dogs see the same shape as you if they do not see the same colours? Colours outline the shape. What exactly is it that you are seeing, which you think the dogs are also seeing, which makes you conclude that they see the same thing as you? That you insist it is "undeniable" that they are seeing the very same thing, which inclines you to say "wallaby", is simply ridiculous.

In reality, you are just seeing something and assuming, or concluding that there is a thing there called a wallaby. But the dogs are neither assuming nor concluding a thing called a wallaby, so why would you conclude that they are seeing a thing called a wallaby? They are seeing something, and perhaps they are even assuming something about what they see, but they are not assuming "a wallaby". So what makes you think that they are seeing "the wallaby"?

You are merely forcing your own subjective conclusion onto the other (dogs in this case). Without even discussing it with the dogs, you simply conclude that because you see what makes you think "wallaby", and the dogs are seeing something, then the dogs must also see the very same thing which makes you think "wallaby". But this is so obviously illogical, not having the premises required for that conclusion.

You even admit that what you are calling "the wallaby" "may look different to the dogs". So, unless you can say what you see which inclines you to designate "the wallaby", and show how the dogs are also seeing the very same, so that they would also be inclined to designate "wallaby" in the same way that you do, your claim is completely unsupported. It's just an arbitrary assertion, perhaps designed to support a very likely ill-conceived ontology.

Take it as it stands: a true ontology is a bottomless ontology.

He is criticizing attempts to secure the bottomless abyss with tautological absolutes, whereas he'd rather leave the chasm open, engaging with it with mental acrobatics. — Pussycat

We'll just have to disagree then. I think what he says, is that this form of ontology, absolutism, hits bottomlessness, and that is the truth. He is not saying that any true ontology would hit bottomlessness. Further, the bottomlessness spoken about is a form of untruth, "to be recognized by its fascist
fruits", as described in the prior section. So the truth is that this ontology, absolutism, is untrue. You seem to be neglecting the negative aspect of the dialectics, truth is to reveal what is untrue. Look at the full sentence:

The objection of
bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle
which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however,
where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is
the place of truth.

Notice, bottomlessness is hit by this absolutism. The point is that bottomlessness is a feature of this ontology, not a feature of negative dialectics. That the objection of bottomlessness is incorrectly directed at negative dialectics was the point of the prior section.

Are you familiar with the book Incomplete Nature by Terrence Deacon, a biological anthropologist. He develops the idea of absentials, which are ‘constitutive absences’ - a purpose not yet achieved, such as a seed aiming to become a plant, or the absence of a specific structure, like the cylinder in an engine that channels force, which gives it causal power. or the axle hole which allows the wheel to spin. — Wayfarer

This is similar to the idea that knowledge progresses through a determination of what is impossible. In a world of possibility, the impossible constitutes necessity. A multitude of impossibilities may be shaped or formed as constraints, which leave a designed "hole" allowing for only a specific type of possibility.

With modern computational capacity, to collect and classify statistics, the focus has moved away from impossibility, to deal with possibility directly under the concept of probability. However, probability does not obtain the same degree of certainty as the necessity of impossibility.

From my point of view, the division between past, present, and future is like a painting where three colors are differentiated without there being a clear division. — JuanZu

Using your colour analogy, my perspective is that past and future are distinct colours, like yellow and blue for example, and the present is a mixing, or overlapping of the two, green. Like yours, there is no clear division apparent to the observer at the present. However, unlike yours, I assume that there is actually a clear division which can be discovered through analysis of the elements at the present, to reveal which are blue and which are yellow. The issue being that intuition tells us that the past is of a completely different type from the future. Therefore the mixing must only be apparent, a deficiency of the observation tools, and there is a true distinction which lies underneath, waiting to be revealed. The mixing of black elements and white elements produces the appearance of a grey area.

There is a difference between past and future, but the difference is not clear. — JuanZu

When the categories are properly created, actual and possible, the difference is very clear, like black and white.

The discontinuous view of time requires punctuality in which each moment stops, and we would see how everything stops at each moment. But experience shows us the opposite — JuanZu

This is the critical point. The Platonic tradition in philosophy holds the basic principle, 'the senses deceive us'. This is the "deficiency of the observational tools" I refer to above. Experience shows us a continuity of activity, and we do not see that everything stops at each moment, but that does not necessarily mean that this is the reality of the situation. We know that a progression of still frames can produce the appearance of continuous activity. The binary on/off of "everything stops at each moment" could be a fundamental vibration of reality.

I speak of guaranteeing the unity of experience simply because I am talking about consciousness and how time passes through it. In this sense, the time of consciousness is analogous to that of the world, but it is not strictly that of the world; it is only a point where a little time flows, so to speak. A small number of events compared to the vastness of all events in the universe. — JuanZu

I think you should pay close attention to how you conceptualize "the world", and "the universe", especially in relation to the subject of the op. There are two ontologically distinct ways of conceiving "the world". In one way, "the world" is a large external unity, sometimes called "the universe", of which each person is a part of. In the other way, "the world" is a mind-created concept, held by the subject. Of course both are described as "distinct ways of conceiving" therefore the only one which could be true is the latter.

From this perspective, "the time of consciousness" is not "analogous to that of the world", it is that of the world. Any conception of an independent "time of the world", is just an extension of, or projection from "the time of consciousness".

So when you say "it is not strictly that of the world", there is untruth to this because "that of the world" is really just an extension of the time of consciousness. We can assume that there is a distinct 'time of the world', independent from the one we conceive of as an extension of the time of consciousness, but in doing this we must be prepared to accept that it may be completely different from our current conception of time, due to the deficiencies of our observational tools.

For me, the past and the future do not belong to being, so I cannot say that they are substances and therefore I cannot say that there is any dualism. Ousia is precisely present, and this can be found in Aristotle's physics. And when I speak of non-presents, I am speaking of something that is neither ousia nor substance. As I see it, we must opt for a category other than being and substance. Something other than substantialism. Derrida calls them traces, as things that are not present, but never totally absent, since we come into contact with them and they constitute us. According to this, we are made up of traces of the past and the future. — JuanZu

This is why we have to look very closely at "the present", our personal being at the present, and things like that, to question which propositions about the nature of the present are logically consistent with our own conscious being.

Consider the difference between your representation, of three distinct colours, and my representation of two distinct colours producing the appearance of a third, through mixing. The problem with yours is that it produces the need for two distinct boundaries, one between present and past, and one between present and future. This is what is required to isolate the present as distinct, and the only true "substance". That, I see as an unnecessary complication, actually producing three distinct substances. You class the two, future and past together, as other than being. But this is incorrect, because the difference between future and past disallows them from being classed together. The problem with mine is that it produces the need for skepticism and doubt concerning our "experience of the present". There is an appearance that the present is distinct, and separate from the past and future, as the substance of being, but that appearance is misleading. Which do you think i more logically consistent with your own conscious being, yours or mine?

I think you read it slightly wrong. My take is that Adorno says that identity philosophy despite claiming bottomlessness with its absolute, solid grounds, and scolding negative dialectics for lack of bottom, is in reality the epitome of bottomlessness. The fact that it doesn't recognize this, consists in its untruth. This is why he says that the objection of bottomlessness "needs to be turned against the intellectual principle which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins", it's a turntable, ah you said so yourself. And so the untruth lies in the claim, not in the bottomless itself. — Pussycat

This is very consistent with my reading, except I read bottomlessness itself as untruth. It's like an infinite regress of indeterminacy. The accusation that negative dialectics is bottomless is untrue for the reason I explained. And, the assumption of the absolute, which creates bottomlessness, is an untruth. I don't know how to take the following sentence, maybe "is" is a typo which should be "in"? If so, then bottomlessness is clearly an untruth itself.

"Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is the place of truth."

So it seems that he is really against any absolutizations, then, one would say that he is a relativist, since you must either be the one or the other. — Pussycat

I don't know about that. If one does not take a positive stand, but remains critical, it would be possible to be against both, absolutism and relativism.

But the flow of time implies that the relation with the past and the future is not discontinuous. — JuanZu

I don't think we can make this conclusion. The flow of time itself appears to be continuous, as a continuous activity, but consider what is happening. Future time becomes past time. August 29 will change from being in the future to being in past. In the meantime, it must traverse the present. What I propose is that the present acts more like a division between past and future, than as a union of the two. Therefore the relation between past and future is discontinuous.

Here you lost me. Can you explain this? — JuanZu

The difference between the deterministic world view, and the free will world view, is that the deterministic perspective assumes a continuity of existence, from past, through the present, to the future. This is what is supposed to be a necessary continuity, stated by Newton's first law. Things will continue to be, in the future, as they have been, in the past, unless forced to change. Any change is caused by another thing continuing to be as it has been, so that any change is already laid out, determined. That support a block type universe.

The free will perspective allows that as time passes, there is real possibility for change, which is not a continuity of the past. This violates Newton's first law. But in order to allow, in principle, for the possibility of this 'real change', we must break the assumed continuity of existence, past through present, into future. We must allow that at any moment of passing time, Newton's first law, the determinist premise, may be violated. This means that the idea of a thing having equal existence on the future and past side of present, would have to be dismissed as wrong. What this implies is that an object's existence is recreated at each moment of passing time. This is the only principle which will allow that a freely willed act can interfere in the continuity of existence, i.e. the continuity of existence is false. Of course, this is not difficult to accept, for those who believe that objects are a creation of the mind, anyway. The mind can only create the object as time passes.

They cannot be two consciousnesses as two substances. Because we have to guarantee the unity of experience, for example that the past is a past of mine just as the future is a future of mine. In this sense we are body, where non-presents and non-consciousnesses constitute us. This body is the world that constitutes us. — JuanZu

Why do we need to guarantee such a unity? From the free will perspective this proposed unity makes no sense. Experience is entirely past. We have no experience of the future. We think of the future in terms of possibilities, but it is irrational for me to think that all possibilities will come to pass, and be a part of my experience. Only those possibilities which are actualized will be experienced. Therefore we cannot say that the future and past are united in experience. Only the past has been experienced, and future possibilities always remain outside of experience.

It is not a dualism it is simply two dimensions that relate to the present. But the important thing is that they are constitutive and non-present. In that sense consciousness is constituted by that which is not it. We do not perceive these dimensions in themselves unlike the present. There is something that is not conscious that constitutes consciousness. I call it the form of the world because we normally understand the world as something beyond consciousness and distinct from experience. There is an analogy with the non-present and the non-conscious. — JuanZu

I agree with this, except there is one big problem. The problem is that we understand the non-present to consist of two parts which are radically different, the past and the future. We know that with respect to the future there is real possibility in relation to what we will do, and what will come to pass. And, we also know that with respect to the past there is an actuality as to what we have done, and what has come to pass. So, if we accept this as a reality, that the past consists of actuality, and the future consists of possibility, dualism is unavoidable.

You call this "something that is not conscious that constitutes consciousness", "the form of the world", and I am pointing out to you, that the form of the world consists of two very different aspects. And because there are two very different aspects which constitute the form of the world, we need a dualism to understand the world.

Thanks to Husserl's analyses, we understand that consciousness is constituted at this level by diferences in protensions and retentions. — JuanZu

Protension is the way that we relate to the future, and retention is the way that we relate to the past. As being at the present, we recognize a significant, even substantial difference between the two, past and future. Deterministic principles serve to dissolve this difference.

Whitehead, in his process philosophy, uses the concepts of "prehension" and "concrescence" to explain how a being at the present can experience the flow of time.

This implies that there is always a non-present side with which consciousness is continuously in contact. This non-present is precisely the form of the world, as something not given in consciousness. — JuanZu

The non-present, which is "the form of the world", must necessarily be divided into two, to accomodate an adequate understanding of it. This is due to that substantial difference between past and future, and the result is that some form of dualism is necessary in order to derive an appropriate conception of "the world". Again, deterministic principles serve to dissolve this requirement.

But that non-present is fundamental to consciousness and its functioning. — JuanZu

We can understand that within the conscious being, the two distinct substances of past and future, are united into one, as retention and protension, and this constitutes conscious being at the present. This implies that being at the present, consciousness, "is constituted at the most fundamental level", as a combination of these two distinct things, past and future.

There's no reason to deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects. — AmadeusD

This is a very fine example of the faulty deterministic perspective derived from the overextension of Newton's law.

In reality, the activities of the living being are caused by the being itself, not some external forces. Perception is an activity of living beings. Therefore, we have a very strong reason to "deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects".

That is why your interpretation of Kant is like Sushi says, "flat out wrong". Kant proposes that the a priori intuitions of space and time are put to work by the human being, like tools in its production of the phenomenon you call "perception of physical objects", rather than perception being caused by what you call "physical objects".

He doesn't say that bottomlessness relates to untruth, rather the opposite, that the acknowledgment of it is what touches truth. Negative dialectics, being foundationless and non-unitarian - better, a dialectics which is no longer “pinned” to identity - will be either accused of: — Pussycat

I agree with this to an extent. Acknowledgement of the bottomlessness is what touches the truth, but it is an acknowledgement of bottomlessness as untruth. What actually constitutes bottomlessness, is the untruth, and this is what negative dialectic sees in identity philosophy. And, the charge that negative dialectics is bottomless, is itself an untruth. This is evident in the last statement of the section. The bottomlessness of the untruth creates the vertigo which is the index of truth, in the negative approach. In general, the untruth of identity is the truth.

The vertigo which this creates is an index veri [Latin: index of truth]; the
shock of the revelation, the negativity, or what it necessarily seems to
be amidst what is hidden and monotonous, untruth only for the untrue.

As explained in the lectures, negative dialects is actually pinned to positivism, or identity, in a negative way. It is pinned to the falsity of positivism, and this constitutes the determinate negative. Otherwise negative dialectics would be completely indeterminate, negating anything, and everything, therefore useless. The subject of negative dialectics is the untruth of positivism and identity philosophy, and in this sense it actually is pinned to identity, in a way which allows it to escape the bottomlessness which is actually a part of the identity philosophy it resists.

Here I think he is alluding to Heidegger, not Hegel. — Pussycat

I think it applies to both, the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. I mean, Hegel is mentioned, as the philosopher who wished to have his dialectics as the "prima philosophia". He put the "identity-principle" as the "absolute-subject". So we cannot remove Hegel from this category of absolutism which Adorno is criticizing, even if Heidegger is cited as the prime example.

The key point being that "bottomlessness" is really characteristic of this absolutism. This is why the accusation of bottomlessness, although charged against negative dialectics, ought really be turned against this absolutism. Heidegger is the best example. The bottomlessness which is supposed to be truth, is really untruth.

Heidegger, by throwing away first principles, arrived at Being. But this Being, according to Adorno, is neither absolute, nor free in itself, it is still dependent on what is thought. When philosophy forgets this and hypostasizes its own creations - without relation to what is being thought - it becomes irrational, null and stupid. — Pussycat

I think it is important to note that this is described by Adorno as untruth. "The falsity of the jettisoned rationality which runs away from itself..." It is falsity because it dissociates thinking form its content, to make thinking, or as you say "Being" absolute. But content is necessary to thinking, so this way of absolutizing Being is a falsity. Therefore the "rationality which runs away from itself" by accepting this false impression of itself, as an absolute, is really irrational.

One of the many reasons why relativity theory ought to be rejected as false and misleading, it assumes there is no difference between being at rest, and being active.

I am saying that the apple remains on the table because the table is exerting an upward force that stops the apple from falling — RussellA

Now you are assuming a force without acceleration, a force which is counteracting gravity to create an equilibrium. That negates the point of your argument, that the apple is accelerating.

Being intellectual they are entirely abstract and an invention of the human thinking mind. So we cannot say anything about what they are, or aren’t. But they are inferred because if we experience appearances, then they must be appearances of something. Something which is inaccessible to us, because if they were accessible to us, they would be appearances. — Punshhh

I don't think the conclusions you make here are logical. First, if "they are entirely abstract and an invention of the human thinking mind", then we cannot conclude that "we cannot say anything about what they are, or aren’t". The proper conclusion is that we can say whatever we want about what they are or aren't. Next, we cannot initially make any conclusions about how they are related to our experience of appearances.

We might consider that our construction of mathematic concepts is an attempt by us to represent noumena as intellectual concepts (traditionally understood as independent Forms). Notice that the pure mathematician is free to use whatever axioms one wills. This is the act of saying whatever we want about the noumenon. At this point of production we cannot make any necessary statement about any relations between this proposed representation, and our experience of appearances. Then, after practise, experimentation, application of theory, we can start to make some conclusions about such a relationship. In this way, the field of practice, application, and the world of phenomenal appearances in general, always stands as medium between our representations of the noumenon and the noumenon itself.

The important point being that we cannot judge our representations of the noumenon by means of a comparison to the real noumenon, because of the inescapable brute fact that the world of phenomenal appearances forms an unsurpassable boundary between the two.

The question is, why do you assume that absent the effects of sensation, there are "objects", plural. Division into distinct objects is a part of sense perception.

Only the elements are apart of the set. — Banno

If the set really was "only the elements", then the empty set would be impossible. No elements, no set.

According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating. (Wikipedia - g force) — RussellA

I think we had this discussion before. In general relativity, gravity is not a force.

The question is if things - objects - have a nature independent of our (a way of being or existence). I think they do, but if they do, the way they exist must be completely incomprehensible to us. — Manuel

I think that by asking about "things", "objects", you've already assumed more than what is granted by the premise of "the in itself", or "the One". You've already assumed a multitude of distinct things. In effect, you've succumbed to the influence of sensation.

Please don't take this personally, but the reason I often don't respond to your posts is that it seems as though your interpretation of what I've said that you're disagreeing with seems to me so far from what I intended that I find it difficult to get enough purchase on what you are saying to respond. — Janus

So you say, but as I observed yesterday:

You keep saying things like this, but it is so clearly false. — Metaphysician Undercover

My disagreement is with things you repeat over and over, which are false. Since these are repeated statements of yours, it's highly unlikely that I interpret them incorrectly. What is actually the case, is that you really don't know what you are saying, and this is why my interpretations are not consistent with what you intend. You intend to express your beliefs, but your statements betray the falsity of them. You do not intend to express false beliefs, so the interpretation of what you say is unintelligible to you.

It appears like after I point out to you the meaning of what you stated, and the falsity of it, you decide that it is not what you wanted to say. Then, since you cannot determine in your own mind what you actually wanted to say with those words, other than what you did say, and my interpretation which demonstrates the falsity of what you said is the only interpretation of those words which makes sense, you simply dismiss my reply as unintelligible to you.

In other word, since I demonstrate to you, that the fundamental principles you repeatedly insist on, are very clearly false, instead of addressing the meaning of those words which express those principles you strongly believe in, to understand why your fundamental beliefs are false, you insist that the conventional interpretation of those words which express those strong beliefs, is nonsense