I personally don't think all objective laws are fictions. And I think you are correct that Adorno also believes in objective laws and truth. There must be a reality in the first place for the project of negative dialectics to make any kind of sense. — NotAristotle

Assuming that there is an objective law concerning social relations, how do you think it would it look? Traditionally, this would be God's law, and I discussed this briefly with Jamal earlier in the thread. But "God" is actually very simplistic, and just an easy principle which facilitates the assertion of objective law. As much as this principle is readily accepted by the followers, the sheep, it's not very appealing to the rational speculative mind, because it's really more of an avoidance of the problem rather than addressing it. Hegel attempted to provide a more rational principle with the Idea, or the Spirit, but it's not well grounded.

This way that "God" is unappealing to the rational mind is very interesting to me. God is an ancient idea, and as such it is ultra simplistic, and it actually becomes repugnant to the modern mind. Rational human beings rebel against this idea because it is ancient, simplistic, and produced by uneducated beings. This is how I see the movement of Jesus and his followers as a resistance against "God". They rebelled against those who held on to "God", and rebelled against the prevailing idea of "God". However, the human population in general, was not readily for this revolution, and Saul/Paul subverted the whole process, rendering Christianity, which was intended as a revolt against the God fearing religion, as a God serving religion. Some claim Jesus failed.

We can see a similar situation today. rational human beings rebel against the idea of "God" and desire to rid us of this artifact left behind from the uneducated. However, we can notice from the state of the world today, that the human population is generally not ready for this.

But this is where "objective law" is the crux. Anyone can offer up a version of "objective law" which is fictional, but over time the fictitiousness will be revealed, and the movement will be fruitless. There is however, one which always seems to escape this fate, God. So in this particular set of circumstances, charging that God is fictional, just like all the other fictional objective laws doesn't work, because we generally believe in objective laws and truths, and the habit is already, to fall back on "God". This means that a better, more true, or less fictional, objective law is required to avoid this trap.

I could be wrong but that's how I understood that section, at least. — Moliere

As usual, we disagree in interpretation.

I'm interpreting Adorno as noting a performative contradiction in the relativist. The consciousness must adhere to the law of exchange, but if the entrepreneur were to do that then there is not an equality between labor-power and a wage unless the entrepreneur were to erase himself from the equation. — Moliere

Why would you assume that there needs to be an equality? The inequality is what the capitalist lives on, and it is the basic feature of relativism.

But the capitalist is no relativist, after all -- there is only a very small part of thought which the capitalist relativizes, namely the Spirit and anything that has nothing to do with the productive process, such as the qualitative rather than the quantitative. — Moliere

The capitalist is the relativist:

The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys
the objective law of social production under private ownership of the
means of production. Bourgeois skepticism, which embodies relativism
as a doctrine, is narrow-minded.

You're skipping over my key point, in that quote:
that philosophical issues can generally be dealt with while ignoring ontology. Ontology could be more of a distraction. — Relativist

Philosophical differences are always deeply rooted, and unless the difference is very mundane (making it not a real philosophical issue) the differences cannot be resolved without addressing ontological principles. As you yourself admit, ontology provides grounding. And philosophical difficulties are issues with principles, premises, which require analysis of the grounding, to resolve the differences. You might have noticed that discussions at TPF generally end up becoming disputes over ontological differences.

This is a strawman simply because we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to "how the universe truly is" than science. — Janus

This claim could only be justified by begging the question. If you restrict your definition of "universe", to that which is studied by the empirical sciences, then the claim is true. But if you allow that "universe" extends to all those aspects of reality which are hidden from the empirical sciences (a very large part of reality as Wayfarer has proven), then your claim that "we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to 'how the universe truly is" than science', must be blatantly false.

The falsity is due to the fact that we need to include within our guide to understanding how the universe truly is, all the aspects which are hidden from the empirical sciences. Therefore the guide must include evidence from the empirical sciences, but not be restricted to those principles, thereby employing a method which extends beyond them. A common example is "metaphysics", which by its name goes beyond physics. This allows that the knowledge derived from physics gets incorporated into a larger field, ?metaphysics", which would provide a more reliable guide to how the universe truly is, by using the knowledge derived from physics, other sciences, as well as other fields.

The way I'm understanding that paragraph:


"... must calculate so that
the unpaid part of the yield of alienated labor falls to him as a profit,
and must think that like for like – labor-power versus its cost of
reproduction – is thereby exchanged"

is the law so described. "Like for like" is exchanged -- so a wage is set such that labor-power is sustained and reproduced and the wage is below the value being produced.

Ideologically "A fair days labor for a fair days pay" -- a falsity because if it were true then there'd be no profit, and thereby no entrepreneur. — Moliere

But Adorno clearly says: "it can just as stringently be shown, however, why this objectively necessary consciousness is objectively false". So isn't it the case that he is rejecting the Marxist characterization of the capitalist form of the "objective law of social production"? If so, what is he proposing to replace it with?

Clearly he is saying that it is some form of "objective law" which produces the "whole", which we know as society:

In truth divergent perspectives have their law in the structure of
the social process, as one of a preestablished whole. Through its
cognition they lose their non-committal aspect.

The described law, Marx's social production is a law of competition. So when Adorn says that it can equally be shown to be objectively false, therefore sublated, I think he means that we could equally replace it with a law of cooperation. Competition and cooperation are opposed. But the law of competition is the one accepted by the bourgeoisie which embodies narrow-minded relativism.

Then he goes on, in the final paragraph, to explain how this really is hostility to the Spirit. There is a concept which rationalizes these relations of social production, it may be "the idea of the autonomy of the Spirit". But this idea produces a self-loathing, because it has actually ended up inhibiting the development of freedom. So this is what actually refutes relativism, the proof is in the pudding, the consequences of what its own existence has brought upon itself "the proof of its own narrowness crushes it".

The objectively necessary consciousness is the thinking that goes in to sustaining the non-thought objectivity - that is, the ideology. That ideology could be capitalism as much as it could be Marxist communism. — NotAristotle

Right, I think that the "objective law" could really be anything. But then, are we speaking any sort of truth when we refer to the "objective law"? If we want to acknowledge "fictions as fictions", then why would we even talk about the objective law, if all objective laws are actually fictions. Notice the quote above, "In truth ... a preestablished whole". I think we ought to conclude that Adorno thinks some form of "preestablished whole" is the truth, but the question is, what form of objective law supports the reality of this whole. He doesn't believe that all objective laws are fictions, because there must be a true one to support the existence of the preestablished whole.

Only in situations where one has a choice of hypotheses is the degree of certainty needed. — Relativist

In this case, you have what you called good reason to believe that the hypothesis is false. How would this affect the degree of certainty? I think it is irrational to choose a hypotheses when there is strong evidence (good reason) which indicates that it is false.

However, the issue is really much more complicated than what you describe. What happens often, is that a person will select a hypotheses with incomplete data, as you suggest. The extent of the data which is unknown is itself unknown, so the certainty level may be higher than it ought to be. The relevance of the unknown data cannot be accounted for, because the data is unknown. Therefore the data which is judged is arbitrarily weighted relative to the unknown data.

Then, as time passes more data will become available to the individual(s) who made that judgement. The data may actually be directly contrary to the accepted hypotheses, but since the hypotheses is already accepted, and plays an active role in the lives of those who accept it, they simply adjust, make an exception to the rule to allow for the now evident contrary data, and continue to work with the hypotheses, which we now have data that confirms it is faulty. In other words, the hypotheses is judged with incomplete data, it is put to use, and with use, data comes out which falsifies it. But since it has become so useful, instead of going back to the original judgement and reassessing, we simply make an exception which allows us to work around the faultiness of the hypotheses. This is actually very common in physics.

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. It's a gross caricature to suggest this means physics can replace epistemology. — Relativist

Yes, physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. However, epistemology is what ontology grounds. Therefore it is you who speaks nonsense here.

You interpreted "good reasons" to entail facts that contradicted my prior judgement. I explained this was not what I meant by the phrase. I have identified no facts that contradict physicalism. If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored). — Relativist

Your use of "facts" here is misplaced. You have talked yourself out of the usefulness of "facts", by insisting that beliefs are judged by degree of certainty. So if there is such a thing as a fact, it is irreleavnt because you do not consider any beliefs to be facts.

You have identified beliefs which you have, which contradict physicalism, i.e. that you have reason to believe that the mind has a nonphysical aspect. Therefore you believe contradictory things. To resolve the contradiction within your own beliefs you need to either demonstrate to yourself that the mind is physical, or else reject physicalism.

Yes, as you say, you have "relevant information that should be taken into account". That relevant information is that you now believe yourself to have evidence which contradicts that judgement you already made.

"Proven?" Do you mean that you judge some cosmological argument to offer irrefutable proof of God, or do you draw a less certain conclusion? — Relativist

Yes, I believe the cosmological argument provides irrefutable proof of God. In case your not familiar with it, here is a simplified version.

We observe that it is always the case that the potential for the physical object is prior in time to the actual existence of any physical object. We also know that something actual is required to actualize any potential. Therefore we can conclude that there is something actual which is prior to every physical object. That is what is known as God.

Does the fact I proved you wrong about this lead you to reevaluate your conclusion, or is this irrelevant to the particular cosmological argument you embrace? — Relativist

Duh. Your "proof" was the following:

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. — Relativist

I think Adorno would say social process is equivalent to ideology. In that way, it is most distinct from Hegel's Absolute Spirit because Absolute Spirit thinks itself to have achieved objectivity. — NotAristotle

I don't see the difference. How do you explain the following?

"The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys the objective law of social production under private ownership of the means of production"

He explicitly says "the objective law of social production". So he is claiming objectivity just as much as Hegel does with Absolute Spirit. "Social production" has replace "Absolute Spirit".

Further, when you say "social process is equivalent to ideology", the specific ideology being referred to is the ideology of Absolute Spirit. This is what inclines the individual, divergent perspectives to lose the non-committal aspect. It is true that the ideology which serves this purpose could be something other than Absolute Spirit, but what would that be? Well, it's "the objective law of social production". But now we need to understand how this law could be objective.

I read that in a Marxist sense. So the entrepreneur must pay a wage which is below the value produced by the labor-power he employs, else he will not be an entrepreneur for long. "social process" I take it to mean "Capitalism" in the age he's writing in, but as Marx describes it. — Moliere

Then he says about this capitalist attitude, "it can just as stringently be shown, however, why this objectively necessary consciousness is objectively false". And so I ask, how does he show it. And he claims "The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys the objective law of social production under private ownership of the means of production". And I do not understand what he means by this. What is "the objective law of social production"?

So, in fact, we can't all just "have our own truth", at least in accord with this particular relativism, because there is one truth that we must insist upon -- which, more generally, I'd take from the Marxist notions to think about so the economic superstructure of some kind. — Moliere

"Economic superstructure of some kind" does not equate with "objective law of social production". If such a law exists shouldn't it be describable?

The problem with saying "physicalism might be the best ontology" is that it fails to communicate that I have made a judgement. Judgements are fallible, and only as good as the basis on which they are made. — Relativist

OK, now you need to recognize two distinct judgements here. One, the judgement that physicalism is the best ontology, the other, the judgement that judgements are fallible.

You seem to say "I believe X" only if you're certain of X. This suggests either: there are few propostions you "believe" (in your terms) or you have an unjustified certainty in your positions. — Relativist

As I said, "certainty" is a distraction which you are throwing in. You believe judgements are fallible, so do I, therefore certainty is irrelevant.

I apply the word "belief" to all propositions I have judged to be true, irrespective of how strong my justification is. But, as I said, my attitude toward the proposition is more nuanced: there is a level of certainty attached to it. — Relativist

This is where I think you are making things up. I do not believe that you attach a "level of certainty" to everything you believe. In general when justification suffices, people pass judgement, and the matter is concluded. We no longer have to deliberate. That is the benefit of passing judgement. If a person was still undecided they would not pass judgement, and deliberation would continue.

I agree that you may have made a judgement that all judgements are fallible, and you may respect this at each instance of passing judgement, but I do not believe that you attach a level of certainty to each judgement you make. To determine the degree of certainty would be very time consuming and not worth the effort. The reason i say this, is that judgements are made for the purpose of acting, and you are going to act on the judgement, with a healthy respect for fallibility, whether you are 75% certain or 85% certain. In the vast majority of judgements, to figure out the degree of certitude would be a totally useless waste of time, therefore it is not practised.

These aspects (entirely nature + nurture) account for the subjective nature of judgement, consistent with physicalism. — Relativist

I do not believe that the subjective nature of judgement is consistent with physicalism which holds that everything is potentially understandable through the objective science of physics. To be consistent, you'd have to say that judgement appears to be subjective, but this is really an illusion. Nature and nurture could account for all aspects of judgement so that the judgement would be objective without anything truly subjective about it. Determinism.

I don't regard it as "wishy washy" to honestly explain the basis of my judgement, and admit fallibility, and be open to reasonable criticism. That's all I'm doing.

I have argued that most of our beliefs (my definition) are based on judgements made on incomplete data. The best we can do, in most cases, is inference to best explanation. — Relativist

The point though, is that you have gone beyond making a judgement with incomplete data, along with a healthy respect for fallibility, to making a judgement when you explicitly state that there are good reasons for the very opposite of what you have concluded in that judgement. This is not a matter of "incomplete data", it is a matter of ignoring evidence which is contrary to your conclusion. "Incomplete data" implies nothing contrary to your judgement, yet not enough data for certainty. Here it is a matter of contrary evidence. That is why I said your position is irrational, and contrary to objective science. And since this particular judgement is not required for the purpose of any immediate action, the rational response is to suspend judgement and deliberate longer. It is irrational to make the judgement in spite of contrary evidence.

Over time, I've come to conclude that a creator-god is implausible, so I now label myself as atheist. It's nevertheless logically possible such a being exists — Relativist

Sure, but in the case we are discussing, it is not only logically possible that the truth is contrary to your judgement, but also you admit that there is good evidence for what is contrary to your judgement. There is a big difference between something merely being logically possible, and there being good evidence for that thing. When there is good evidence which is contrary to what you believe, it's time to reconsider your belief.

With your semantics, I don't see how you could be anything other than agnostic - unless you base your certainty of God on "faith". Neither God's existence nor non-existence can be proven, so both are possible. — Relativist

I disagree. I believe that the reality of God has already long ago been proven, by the cosmological argument.

"Degrees of certainty" are key to the "modest Bayesian epistemology*" that I advocate. — Relativist

OK, that makes it clear then, You are admitting that you do not believe that physicalism is the best ontology, you believe that it might be the best ontology depending on how reality is understood.

The level of certainty is relevant to how one evaluates other, related information to draw conclusions. Consider a valid deductive argument from premises you considered possible, but unlikely, vs a conclusion drawn from premises that you consider highly likely. — Relativist

And your claim that it is probably the best ontology is very subjective, base on cherry-picked principles. Do you recognize that the fact that your judgement in this matter is very subjective, is very strong evidence that physicalism is not the best ontology? This is because physicalism does not account for the subjective aspect of judgement, and you are assigning principal position to it?

This is the point I have been driving at: the issue of degrees of certainty as attitudes toward propositions, and the effect this has on further epistemic analysis. The distraction was your quibbling about the use of the word "belief" - because your only focus was to tell me I'm wrong, rather than making an effort to understand my point. — Relativist

This is the point I've been driving at. The fact that you judge ontology in this way, is very indicative of a nonphysical reality. Therefore your claim to believe in physicalism is hypocritical. If you really believed in physicalism you would be certain, due to the objectivity of what you believe in, rather than wishy washy as you demonstrate. For analogy, if you claim that you are atheist, then be atheist, rather than agnostic.

4. Divergent perspectives have their truth in the social whole -- by cognizing this preestablished whole divergent perspectives lose what is non-committal. The capitalist must, lest he be eliminated in the social process, obtain a profit from his workers and treat the exchange of money for labor as an equality. So the individualistic relativism of the bourgeois entrepreneur can be revealed as objectively false, given the equality between wage and labor-power that he must assume, so he follows the objective process that follows from the private ownership of the means of production -- thus is revealed how narrow this skepticism is. — Moliere

This is the paragraph that I asked about. What is "the social whole"? This concept appears to form the basis of Adorno's argument against relativism. The opening sentence of the paragraph reads like this:

"In truth divergent perspectives have their law in the structure of the social process, as one of a preestablished whole."

There is a lot to unpack here. There is a "preestablished whole". And there is a "social process". There is a multitude of divergent perspectives, each with its own "law". The question is, how does he leap from the multitude of perspectives to a unity, the "whole"? He has already denied the usual principle, which is the "absolute Spirit". So now he appears to propose a unifying function of "the social process".

He then proceeds to explain the unifying function of the social process, and that's where I get lost. It appears like he starts by saying that cognition of the preestablished whole (that would be absolute Spirit I assume) causes the divergent perspectives to lose their "non-committal aspect". So I assume that they each become committed to the whole, that being supported by cognition of the preestablished whole, absolute Spirit.

We then have an example of an entrepreneur, which he says can be interpreted in two distinct ways. But he concludes with "The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys the objective law of social production under private ownership of the means of production."

Now the question is, what is the mentioned "objective law of social production". This appears to be the unifying principle of "social process", whereby the inspiration of commitment, causes the forfeiture of the distinct laws of the divergent perspectives, in favour of the objective law of "social production".

Is this an acceptable alternative to absolute Spirit? It appears to me as if it may just be a different way of describing absolute Spirit. Instead of being indoctrinated through the dogmatic ideologies of absolute Spirit, the individual is inspired through cognition of the "preestablished whole", which is just a different way of saying "absolute Spirit". isn't it?

Answer this: when you say "I believe X", does this mean you are certain of X?

If not, then how do you verbally describe your uncertainty, to distinguish it from statements that you do feel certain about? — Relativist

When I say "I believe X" it means that I think X is the case, I think it is true. When I think X may be the case I say "I believe that X may be the case", or "X is possible". Do you recognize the difference between these two?

Neither says anything about certainty or uncertainty, and you bring this up as a distraction. We were not talking about certainty and uncertainty, we were talking about what we believe, whether you believe in physicalism, or you believe that physicalism is possible. When i want to describe my certainty or uncertainty, I use those words. Do you recognize the difference between "I believe X", and "I believe X is possible", regardless of the degree of certitude?

There exists more than one interpretation where you have point particles in definite configurations that reproduce all the predictions. — Apustimelogist

Point particles with intrinsic properties is itself an incoherent idea. Therefore you wrongly classify your interpretation as coherent. "Point particles" is just a mathematical facilitation, which physicists know does not represent anything real, due to that incoherency. Therefore it does not avoid the so-called measurement problem, it's just a fiction which simplifies some calculations.

I saw no reason to state the obvious. You figured out exactly what I had in mind (your stated example), as I expected you would. — Relativist

I take this as an admission of your own self-contradiction then.

Acknowledging there are reasons why I might be wrong is being intellectually honest; that is not a contradiction. — Relativist

Intellectual honesty would be to admit that you were wrong in the claims you made about physicalism. Are you ready for that yet?

On this particular example, I indeed believe a single person acted alone. But I read awhile back that there was auditory evidence of a second shooter. This evidence is "good reason" to suggest I could be wrong, however it is not a good ENOUGH reason for me to change my mind. Suppose I encountered 5 additional bits of evidence to support a second shooter. THEN I would change my mind. Individually, each bit of evidence is "good" in that it is relevant information and could contribute to drawing a different inference. It is the totality of available evidence that the conclusion should be based on and that totality can change over time as additional facts are learned. — Relativist

You are wrong here. If you admit to the possibility of a second shooter then you cannot claim to believe that there was only one shooter without contradicting yourself. In other words, if you truly believe that it is possible that there was a second shooter, you cannot, at the same time, truly believe that there was only one shooter. The two beliefs exclude each.

If you believe that X might not be the case, you do not actually believe in X, though you might believe that X is probable. The issue here is that physicalism excludes the possibility of the nonphysical. Physicalism does not posit that the nonphysical is improbable, it excludes the nonphysical. It is not a matter of saying that the nonphysical is improbable, it is a matter of saying that the nonphysical is not. The nonphysical is unreal. Now this is a big difference because once you allow for the reality of possibility, which is required to account for your attitude of "probable" rather than certain, you need to be able to find a position for possibility, and probability within your reality.

What kind of physical existence would possibility, or probability have? You could deny the reality of possibility, but then you self-contradict, if you claim that physicalism is probable, because physicalism has no place for possibility within its proposed reality. This is what "physicalism" entails, denying the possibility of the nonphysical. If you believe that the nonphysical is a possibility, you do not believe in physicalism. That's plain and simple. So, I'll ask you, do you believe in physicalism, or do you believe in possibility?

I believe Oswald acted alone, but I know I'm possibly wrong. — Relativist

This is blatant contradiction. If you think that it is possible that Oswald did not act alone, you do not actually believe that he acted alone. You are simply saying that you believe both, without considering the meaning of what you are saying. People can say all sorts of contradictory things, but please think about what you have said, and apply a true form of "intellectual honesty". Do you believe that Oswald may not have acted alone? If so, then you do not believe that he acted alone. How could you honestly say "I believe that Oswald acted alone, and I also believe that he might not have acted alone". Which of the two do you honestly believe?

So he is acknowledging that there can be "good reasons" for a position one disagrees with, since he's complaining that these naturalists won't even acknowledge that. — Relativist

You got that backward. He is saying "no good reason". That is what "physicalism" implies, because of the necessity which is associated with it, that there is no good reason to consider the nonphysical. To believe in physicalism is to believe that there is "no good reason" to think that the mind could be anything other than physical. That's why "good reason to think that the mind has nonphysical aspects" contradicts physicalism.

The problem though, is in your statement that physicalism is the best ontology and the one you believe in . And physicalism explicitly excludes the possibility of the nonphysical. In the JFK example you are not claiming that one is better than the other, and the one you believe in.

To make the JFK example comparable, you'd have to chose one as the best explanation, as the one you believe, then also claim that there is good reason to believe the other. For example, the best explanation, and the one I believe in, is a single person acting alone, however there is good reason to believe in more than one person.

Once you chose one, as the one that you believe in, you cannot claim that there is good reason to believe the other, without contradicting your own belief. So you cannot believe in physicalism yet also believe that there is good reason to believe in the nonphysical without self-contradicting.

I suggest you adjust your claim to "it is possible that physicalism is the best ontology". This would be recognition of your uncertainty in the matter, just like your JFK example indicates uncertainty.

Physics concerns what we can say about Nature.' — Wayfarer

More precisely, physics is restricted to what we can say about nature. But metaphysics determines what we can say and is therefore not restricted in that way. That is why those who believe things like "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" are mislead into philosophies like physicalism, which assume that we are restricted in such a way, so that when physics reaches the limits to what we can say about nature, so does human knowledge.

The problem you present with "the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism", is that reality extends beyond the capacity of physics, and empirical science in general, to represent. If we are limited in our capacity for knowledge, to "what we can say about Nature", and we find that Nature extends beyond this, then the appearance is that a part of reality cannot be understood.

The true philosopher sees that when we hit what we cannot say, then we must find a new way to speak, if we want to talk about that. The reality is, that the means are adapted to end, therefore the method is restricted by the end. But the end is not restricted by the means. If the conventional end is, "what we can say about Nature", and we've reached that limit without satisfying our need for knowledge, then the goal must be changed. With that comes a change of means, method, allowing us to get beyond the boundary presented by "whereof we cannot speak". If "whereof one cannot speak" was a true barrier, knowledge would never get beyond infancy. Even Wittgenstein came to understand the falsity of that statement as exposed in his Philosophical Investigations where he inquired into the method by which we learn how to speak.

It appeals to physics as the basis of its ontology, but when presented with the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism, it will say it is 'not bound by physics'. — Wayfarer

We ought to recognize this as the end of the rule of science. Physics has determined the limit to the usefulness of the scientific method. And what has been revealed is that there is a vast expanse which lies beyond that limit.

I don't know. The book is a confusing way to look at it, differing from the movie analogy, but it seems just as valid. The movie moves by itself, but not the book, which makes the movie comparison reflective of a mind independent reality that reveals seen or not. The book though requires a page turner. I guess if you pick the book comparison you impose a greater role of consciousness dictating reality than the movie. — Hanover

I see the main difference being that the page turner is the individual subject, so each person would turn the page at one's own pace. The movie doesn't really move by itself though, because there is a mechanism which moves it for everyone. The difference being that one is subjective, the other objective. But even the movie requires some sort of operator, and designer of the equipment, so some form of consciousness behind that system cannot be completely ruled out.

The more important question though, is whether such an analogy is adequate. Each of the two suggest determinism, reality is dictated by what is on the film or the pages. But if we are to allow for free will, then what is being rolled out by the projector, is possibilities which we can act on. This makes the matter extremely complex, because the objective mechanism would be providing us with possibilities, and the conscious mind could choose what actions it desires to actualize, and roll into the past. Of course one could solely observe, but without opting to take part ion the smorgasbord, you'd be rolled into the past yourself.

I think it's a combination of the two then. The movie machine is rolling out possible pages to turn, while the conscious mind is selecting which ones to turn.

Privilege of Experience:

This section discusses the importance of the subject, to philosophy.

Experimenting implies a relationship with the future, and so we create the conditions for an experiment just as we create a measuring device. — JuanZu

Correct, but that relationship between the past and the future is discontinuous. That's why "the prediction" is never a statement of necessity, and this is fundamental to experimentation.

Your example entails a contradiction, mine does not. — Relativist

Yours does entail contradiction, that's the point, just like my example. Please explain how you think the two differ, other than simply saying one is contradiction and the other not. To me there is no real difference What do you think it is about the one, which makes it contradictory, while the other is not?

My view is that each belief has a level of certainty. Believing an analytic truth, or the Pythagorian theory would be an absolute certainty — Relativist

How could the Pythagorean theorem constitute absolute certainty, when the hypotenuse of a square is irrational? That's like saying that the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, pi, is an absolute certainty, when it's precise value cannot even be stated.

You continue to practise your contradictory ways. An instance where the reality of uncertainty has been proven, an irrational ratio, you claim is an example of absolute certainty.

I have been pursuing a similar line of thought ever since joining philosophy forums. You’ve basically discovered one of the key ideas of Platonism. Plato can never be explained simply or reduced to an ‘ism’, but Plato’s ‘ideas’ (eidos) are probably the most important single element in the philosophical tradition. Not for nothing did Alfred North Whitehead say that Western philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. — Wayfarer

And some people believe Plato is outdated. Shame on them!

Our intentional acts, as they are thrown into the possible and the non-given of the world, imply operationally a continuity between the measuring apparatus and that which is measured. — JuanZu

I don't dispute the continuity between the measuring device and the physical world being measured. Both are part of the given world. The discontinuity is between the non-given possibilities of intention, and the givenness of the sensed world.

Nor do I dispute that there is a "relationship" between the non-given and the given. However, I assert that the relationship is one of discontinuity. In fact, the description as two distinct things, given and non-given, with a relationship between the two, itself implies a discontinuity. If there was continuity, it would be one continuous thing.

There is no place here to talk about the past, since conscious and intentional acts occur in relation to a possible future. — JuanZu

How can you say this? The reality of what you refer to as "the measuring apparatus and that which is measured" is supported by their existence in the past, and sense observation of them, in the past. Without their past existence, they are only future possibilities, needing to be created in a physical presence. "Physical presence" is a product of past observation, having no reality without past observation.

Any "measurement" itself, as the "quantity" or "value" derived, exists in the realm of intentionality, the non-given. And, there is a discontinuity between this, the non-given, and the givenness of the apparatus and object to be measured

But use a book instead of a film for your example. The entirety of the book is happening at once. All the pages are there at all times, as opposed to the film that requires movement across the light. This would suggest that "happening" references conscious perception of the thing as opposed to anything to do with the thing. — Hanover

Are you suggesting that conscious beings actually turn the pages of time? or would it be just one conscious being who does this, God?

But this issue is just one factor in my overall IBE exercise, and I judge it insufficient to counter all the virtues of physicalism. — Relativist

I think your judgement is unreasonable then. Since you have "good reasons" to believe something which is contrary to the essential nature of a specific principle, it's irrational to maintain that principle. What did you think of my example? If I have good reasons to believe that some of the world's problems will never be solved, don't you think it's irrational for me to also believe that all the worlds problems will be resolved.

Here's what I think. I think that you really do not believe that there is good reasons to believe that some aspects of mind are not physical. You really believe in physicalism, but to avoid having to face issues like "the hard problem", you simply say 'well maybe the mind is not physical'. So you really do not believe that there are any good reason to accept that something is not physical, you just say that there is good reasons, in contradiction to what you truly believe, to avoid the problems which arise from what you truly believe.

The "good reasons" indeed give me reason to have some doubt about physicalism, but I have a pragmatic epistemology: practically nothing is certain, and there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs — Relativist

That directly contradicts what you said before, when you rejected extreme skepticism. You said there is uncontroversial facts. Now, you take the position of extreme skepticism, claiming "there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs". If there is reason to doubt all your beliefs, how can you say that any of them represent "uncontroversial facts"? If you judge something as uncontroversial fact, then you are judging that there is no reason to doubt it.

What do you take to be the difference between "always some reason to doubt one's belief", implying extreme skepticism, and "good reasons" to believe in something? i assume you do recognize a difference.

The "good reasons" are not established facts that falsify physicalism, as you seem to be implying. — Relativist

No, that's not at all what I am implying.

I am wondering why you think physicalism, which holds that all is physical, is the best ontology, when you also see good reason to believe that there is something nonphysical. Your beliefs seem self-contradictory to me.

Here's an example for comparison. You believe that all the problems of the world will be resolved. But you also see good reason to believe that some problems will never be solved. How can you hold these two beliefs at the same time?

We only know that something is a "proper" expression if it is consistent and coherent. The latter are the criteria for the former, not vice versa. If there are sveral consietnt and coherent usages of a term . then there would not be just one "proper" usage. — Janus

That is demonstrably incorrect Janus. And this is why you need to keep your categories clear, and ensure that you understand the broader category, being the defining feature of the narrower, as necessary for, therefore prior to, the narrower. In Aristotelian terms, the broader category, as the defining feature, is "within" the narrower. So for example, "animal" is within "human being" as a defining feature. This means that if it is a human being, it is necessarily an animal, but not vise versa because "human being" is not within "animal" as a defining feature. So "animal" is logically prior to "human being", meaning that "animal" can be understood independently from "human being", but "human being" cannot be understood independently from "animal". Animal is an essential, necessary, aspect of the concept human being while human being is contingent on animal.

In the case of your statement above, "proper" is the broader category from the narrower "logically coherent", or "logically consistent". "Proper" is a defining, essential feature, of "logically coherent". To be logically coherent, properness is necessary. So "proper" is logically prior to, as necessary for logical coherency. On the other hand, "proper", being the broader category, affords all different types of properness, which do not necessarily involve logical coherency. So we have many different types of social norms, mores and morals, rules and regulations, which describe different types of properness, and we can place "logical forms" as one type of properness. If we follow those specific rules of logical properness, we have logical coherency. So properness is clearly prior to logically coherent, as necessary for logical coherence. But logical coherence is not necessary for properness as there are other forms of properness. In relation to each other then, properness is independent from, but necessary for logically coherent, while logically coherent is contingent, as dependent on properness.

Therefore the exact contrary of what you say here is what is really the case. Since there are many forms of properness, a "proper expression" does not require logical consistency or coherency. It may be "proper" in the sense of following a moral principle, or some other form of correctness, properness being determined by that context. On the other hand, a statement must be proper in the sense of following logical rules, for it to be judged as logically consistent, or coherent. Therefore, contrary to what you say, we know that the statement is consistent and coherent, by judging it to be proper. That is, we refer to that specific type of properness, found in logical forms, and if the statement conforms to that type of properness, we judge it as consistent and coherent.

I disagree―I think that words can be synonymous within one context and not within another. — Janus

This makes no sense at all. It is impossible that two words appear in the very same context. the person would be using both words at the same time. Instead, the person must chose one word or the other. And if one word is chosen over the other because it has different meaning from the other, in a different context, then that difference carries into the new context, by the very fact that it was chosen for that reason.

I'm not a believer in properness, but rather in consistency and coherency. — Janus

Properness is a requirement for consistency and coherency. Ambiguity produces equivocation. So if you really believed in consistency and coherency, you'd believe in grammar as well.

If we have all the appropriate conceptual distinctions is it really all that important what words we use to frame them? — Janus

Yes, obviously it is all that important. If we don't use the words required to frame the conceptual distinctions, having the distinctions is pointless. You can say for example, 'I can easily distinguish between a rock and a human being', but if you just always refer to them both as "beings", what good does your ability to distinguish serve?

But since such entities are existents and to exist seems to be synonymous with 'to be' I see no inconsistency in referring to the moon as a being. — Janus

It's generally not productive to say that two words are synonymous. This dissolves the difference between them making the choice of using one or the other insignificant, despite the fact that there is at least nuanced differences between all words.

The most common difference between two words which might appear to be synonymous, is a difference of category. Sometimes one word will define the other, and actually signify a broader category, while the inverse cannot be the case. This allows that there are others in that broader category, making the words not synonymous. For example, "man" and "human being", might at first glance appear synonymous. However, we know that "human being" is actually the defining term for "man", as the broader category, because "man" properly refers to the male members of the category, and there are also female members.

Since "being" is most often defined by existing, and "existing" is usually defined by something further, we ought to consider that "existing" is the broader term. This would imply that all beings are existing, but not all existents are beings, because "existent" could include things which are not beings. Subtle distinctions allow us to keep our categories clear, and categories are conducive to deductive reasoning.

The "data" consists of all the uncontroversial facts of the world. — Relativist

If you are acquainted with skepticism, you'll understand that there is no such thing as uncontroversial facts of the world. So this proposal is a nonstarter.

This presupposes that something nonphysical exists. That is hypothesis, not an uncontroversial fact. There are metaphysical theories that assume this, but it's nevertheless a controversial assumption (there are clearly professional philosophers who deny this). That's why I stress that it is the uncontroversial facts of the world that need to be best accounted for. — Relativist

The point though, is that it answers your challenge, how we could possibly know something nonphysical when there is no empirical evidence for it.

In case you didn't understand, here's an example. Suppose piece of knowledge A is "2+2=4". For the sake of argument, this is taken to be something nonphysical. There is much empirical evidence for this, all we need to do is take two things and bring another two, and see that this makes four. Now, by applying nonphysical principles of logic, we can conclude piece of knowledge B, "2,000,000,000,000+2,000,000,000,000=4,000,000,000,000". At this point, it is not necessary that we put together 4,000,000,000,000 things, or even 2,000,000,000,000 things, we can know this thing B, without any empirical evidence of it.

So we can know B without any empirical evidence of B. If B is something nonphysical, that is an example of how we could know something which is nonphysical, when there is no empirical evidence for it. This is actually very common in mathematics, and in fact it is why applied math is so useful. With the application of mathematics, we can know many things without any empirical evidence of these things. Basically that is how successful prediction works. We know that things will occur, before there is any empirical evidence of the thing which will occur. You might prefer to call this magic, but it's really just the nonphysical in action. When we describe an event which has not yet occurred, isn't it accurate to describe this event as having no physical existence, i.e. nonphysical?

You should publish a paper that proves there are non-physical objects, so that the physicalist philosophers can learn the errors of their ways and start working on something productive. — Relativist

Actually there is a lot of such material already published, so no need for me to do that. The problem is that physicalists tend to be very closed minded, and don't bother studying, and learning, the things which disprove their physicalist beliefs.

Non-sequitur. Suppose we take as a premise that there exists something nonphysical. That does not imply that every existing is (at least) partly nonphysical. We only need to account for the things (and their properties) that we know (i.e. have strong reasons to believe) exist. — Relativist

It's not a non-sequitur. The point is that physicalism cannot account for anything in completion. To "account" for a thing requires a complete description. If you cannot describe every aspect of the thing, you have not accounted for the thing. Otherwise "accounting for" would be completely subjective, and an arbitrary description of whatever aspect of the thing which one feels like describing.

The simple fact is that the human sensory system is somewhat deficient. The senses miss some aspects of everything. This means that empirical principles cannot provide for us a complete understanding.

You are obviously unfamiliar with the concept of immanent universals. Example of this view: a 45 degree angle does not have some independent existence; rather, it exists in its instantiations. It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects. — Relativist

"45 degree angle" is a geometrical description. Yes, it is true that "It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects", but "reflects" does not mean "is". Therefore your supposed "account" provides no information about what "a 45 degree angle" actually is, just an account of what it reflects. Nice try Einstein.

It is not an ontological relation; it is semantics: the definition of "truth" expressed as a pseudo-relation between a statement and some aspect of reality. — Relativist

Yes, semantics is meaning, and meaning is nonphysical. Therefore, as I said, the relation is nonphysical.

You have demonstrated that your arrogance is rooted in ignorance - you seemed unaware that there are views that differ from your own, that respected philosophers hold to - not just "dimwits" like me. On the other hand, you've mentioned nothing that I wasn't already aware of. — Relativist

I am fully aware that there are views which differ from my own. Many of which are ridiculous. Most forms of physicalism fall into that category. I'm still waiting for you to produce something reasonable, in your claim of a view that differs from my own. Until you produce something reasonable, I'll continue to classify yours as ridiculous.

It seems obvious that all percipients have some kind of "first person perspective", so of course beings can be classed as living and non-living, sentient and non-sentient, and even sapient and non-sapient. None of that has been forgotten or is even controversial, though. — Janus

Sure, we can propose a division between living and not living. But, by what principle do you propose that both are properly called "beings"? I believe that is the issue. What does "being" mean to you, and is it proper to call the moon a being?





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Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. — Relativist

Then clearly it is illogical for you to believe that physicalism is the best ontology. You are logically inconsistent because you define physicalism as "the theory that everything that exists, is composed of physical things, and that they act and assemble entirely due to physical forces due to laws of nature". Then you say "there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity". Obviously, you have good reasons to reject physicalism, yet you do not. Why not just reject physicalism and get it over with? Why not move along to better ontologies which recognize the "good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity."

That’s close to what I mean. But it’s also an observation about the peculiarity of the modern sense of existence. David Loy, independent Buddhist scholar, says ‘ The main problem with our usual understanding of [secular culture] is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Most of us assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed.’ — Wayfarer

i would characterize this "usual understanding" as the lazy way. It's "the lazy way" because superstitious beliefs, spirituality, and even the freedom of choice, all relate to the extremely difficult aspects of reality to understand. The common, or usual understanding, of reality, will remove these as either unreal or irrelevant. This means that the most difficult aspects of reality to understand, are simply ignored by the common or usual way of understanding, producing "the lazy way".

An intention is a disposition to behave in some general or specific way. It reflects some mediation between stimuli and response. — Relativist

This is not an accurate explanation of "intention". Intention produces completely novel things. Therefore it is not an inclination in a general or specific way, but an inclination toward a particular act. And, since the intentional act is toward something completely new, it cannot be said to be a mediation between stimuli and response. It produces a new thing. If it is to be described as a mediation, it is the mediation between the agent and the act. The agent being free to act in a multitude of ways, will act in a particular way, and intention is what produces the particular way which is produced, rather than another way.

Ontology is the general study of being, of what it means to be or to exist. Once the general characteristics shared by all beings are decided then what can be counted as a being can be
established. — Janus

I believe the issue which Wayfarer is trying to bring to our attention, is that there is a specific type of characteristic of being, which is only provided by the first person perspective, I, or myself. Since this is a real characteristic of the being which I call "myself" we need to determine whether it is a characteristic of all beings before we can make any conclusive judgement about "the general characteristics of all beings".

But "x is y" is not an explicit assertion of being as such, but an assertion about some being's characteristics. That it exists is already implicitly given. — Janus

That is a mistaken approach. The predication is made of a subject, and the subject need not exist. It might be imaginary, a possibility, or a misapprehension. Until we determine what it means to exist, we cannot take existence of anything for granted.

Why look back to the ancients when they did not have the immense benefit of our prodigious scientific knowledge and understanding? Ontological enquiry should be about what it is reasonable to think about being today, not two thousand years ago. — Janus

I believe, the relevant point is that many ancient philosophers practised introspection, and had very good understanding of the first person perspective of being. Scientific knowledge is based in empirical observation, and does not include that first person perspective, which is sometimes called "subjective".

To be clear, a being only has direct, immediate access to the internal composition of any being, through itself. Any other attempt to access the internal composition of a being is always mediated, either by dividing a being, to see its internal parts (in which case we lose the principle of unity), or through the use of some tool (in which case the tool contaminates the observation). The only way to truly observe the internal aspects of any being directly and immediately, is through self introspection, which is "subjective". Therefore subjective knowledge is a very valuable part of the knowledge of being.

Since it is necessary to consider this first person perspective, subjective knowledge, before making any conclusive judgements about "the general characteristics of all beings", we need to look beyond scientific knowledge and understanding. This is not to say that we ought to exclude scientific knowledge, but that it is necessary to consider other knowledge beyond scientific knowledge. In doing so we look for the best sources, and these tend to be those which have stood the test of time, ancient sources which have been tried and accepted in practise, and which remain relevant today.

Yes, with the qualifications I described. If you believe I'm wrong, then please disabuse me. How can we know anything about aspects of reality that cannot give us one bit of empirical evidence? — Relativist

Sorry Relativist, I cannot disabuse you because the abuse is self-inflicted. You'll have to take up that task yourself.

"Evidence" is a loaded term. What qualifies as "evidence of X" for me does not necessarily qualify as "evidence of X" for you. This is because the proposed piece of evidence, Y, will either be considered as evidence of X, or not considered as evidence of X, depending on the apprehended relation between X and Y.

Accordingly, the evidence, Y, may be empirical, and the thing which it is evidence of, X, may be nonphysical. Therefore there is no need to assume that there cannot be "one bit of empirical evidence" for the nonphysical. For those who understand the relation between the physical and nonphysical, every physical thing is evidence of the nonphysical. And that is why the theologists commonly claim that each material thing is evidence of the immaterial God. But if you do not understand that relation between the physical and the nonphysical, you will not apprehend the physical as evidence of the nonphysical.

Now, once you get beyond that mental block, which is preventing you from seeing the physical as evidence of the nonphysical, then you can start to understand the reality of many different nonphysical things. And, one nonphysical aspect, A, will serve as evidence for another nonphysical aspect B. Under these circumstances, we can know something about the nonphysical aspect, B, without one bit of empirical evidence for that knowledge. The empirical evidence is for A, and A is nonphysical, but it is evidence of B. The relation between A and B, which allows A to qualify as evidence of B is also nonphysical, being a logical relation. Therefore we can know about B without one bit of empirical evidence for this knowledge.

Physicalism can account for a good bit, but (as I've acknowledged) not everything. — Relativist

Well, unless it can account for every aspect of one thing, any one thing, absolutely, 100%, then it does not account for anything. It would only partially account for things. Since physicalism does not account for any one thing, in any absolute sense, then we can conclude that physicalism cannot account for anything. The best it can do is provide for a partial accounting. So, to have a complete account of anything, we need to include the nonphysical.

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. — Relativist

Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause. Then that cause requires a previous cause as well, ad infinitum. Therefore physicalism does not "account for causation", it simply takes causation for granted.

Seriously, it sounds like you don't understand physicalism. Law Realists suggest that laws are ontological relations between universals. Every instantiation of the relevant set of universals will necessarily instantiate the same effect. — Relativist

A "universal" is nonphysical, as are the relations between universals.

A truthmaker is something that exists in the world, to which a true statement corresponds. — Relativist

The relation between a statement and "the world" is nonphysical..

You COULD ask, instead of pontificating. — Relativist

I apologize for my attitude, but sometimes it's enjoyable to play the pontiff. You should try it sometime, you might enjoy it too, haha.

I was serious that I'm open hearing better theories, and particularly interested in understanding how you think we could actually learn something about the presumably nonphysical aspect of mind. Why have you not addressed this? — Relativist

I didn't answer, because I couldn't believe that someone could seriously be asking such a dimwitted question. Have you never tried introspection? Introspection is by definition, the examination of one's own mental and emotional processes. This is not a physical examination. Do you honestly believe that a person could learn absolutely nothing from such an examination?

Once again, I apologize for the attitude. However, I just cannot take you seriously when you ask questions like this. Then, you top it off with "I was serious that I'm open...". . That's the biggest piece of bullshit I've been hit with today. Your mind is closed tighter than a drum. You've locked yourself out, so that you cannot even get into your own mind. Oh my God! What can we do for you?

Dialectics and the Solidified:

I believe, "the solidified" is the opposite to groundless, or bottomless, what is solid, substantive. It appears to me like Adorno is saying that substance, solidity, is in some way equivalent to immediacy..

The confidence that the whole seamlessly emerges out of that
which is immediate, solid and simply primary, is idealistic appearance
[Schein]. To dialectics immediacy does not remain what it immediately
expresses. It becomes a moment instead of the grounds. At the opposite
pole, the same thing happens to the invariants of pure thought.

Against Relativism:

The substance of his argument against relativism is pretty much confined to one paragraph. It's a little hard for me to understand and interpret so I'll put up the whole paragraph here.

In truth divergent perspectives have their law in the structure of
the social process, as one of a preestablished whole. Through its
cognition they lose their non-committal aspect. An entrepreneur who
does not wish to be crushed by the competition must calculate so that
the unpaid part of the yield of alienated labor falls to him as a profit,
and must think that like for like – labor-power versus its cost of
reproduction – is thereby exchanged; it can just as stringently be
shown, however, why this objectively necessary consciousness is
objectively false. This dialectical relationship sublates its particular
moments in itself. The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys
the objective law of social production under private ownership of the
means of production. Bourgeois skepticism, which embodies relativism
as a doctrine, is narrow-minded.

Anyone want to take a crack at explaining that?

That's only part of it, but I'll try to be more precise. It is my (fallible) epistemic judgement that it is unknowable. The basis of my judgement is:

1) it is currently unknown to me.
2) If the question had been definitively answered, there would be no controversy about it among professional philosophers (& philosophers rarely settle anything).
3) I can conceive of no means to draw a definitive conclusion about it.

If you have the answer, and can make a compelling case for it, please share it.

If you have an idea about how a definitive conclusion could be drawn, please share it.

If you simply object to the strong wording I used, I'll acknowledge that I wasn't asserting it to be impossible that a definitive answer can be found. Rather- given the absence of any means to settle the matter at hand, nor any hint about how to proceed to do so, then for all practical purposes, it is impossible. Nevertheless, I will be forever in your debt if you can show that it is more than a bare possibility that the answer can be determined. — Relativist

It is you who has made the definitive judgement, that the nonphysical is unknowable.

Physicalism is still the most successful metaphysical system there is; successful because it depends on the fewest ad hoc assumptions, it primarily depends on things we know about the world through direct experience and through science, coupled to the most parsimonous ontology. It accounts for causation, universals, laws of nature, and a theory of truth. — Relativist

This is obviously false. Physicalism cannot explain the reality of the nonphysical, which we all experience daily, therefore it is clearly not the most successful metaphysical system.

It accounts for causation, universals, laws of nature, and a theory of truth. — Relativist

This is totally wrong. Physicalism does not account for causation. Physicalist causation leads to infinite regress, and that does not qualify as accounting for it. Physicalism does not account for any laws, as they are themselves, nonphysical. And, I have no idea what type of "truth" you'd be talking about here, if you are not talking about correspondence between Ideas (nonphysical), and physical reality. What kind of "theory of truth" does physicalism support?

The things that you claim physicalism can account for, it obviously cannot.

My statements were not a judgement of anyone else's rationality. But it would be irrational for me to drop physicalist metaphysics in total just because of the negative fact you repeatedly discuss: the mind is not entirely physical. I do not insist the mind is necessarily 100% physical (I'm not dogmatic), but whatever else it might be seems unknowable - and therefore the possibilities I've seen discussed simply seem like speculative guesses. You certainly don't have to agree with me, but if you believe my judgement (rooted in my backrgound beliefs) is misguided (irrational), then please identify my errors. If you don't wish to, then just agree to disagree and stop reacting negatively when I describe my point of view. — Relativist

Let's see. You admit that the mind is not 100% physical. Then you state that the nonphysical part "seems unknowable". But instead of trying to get beyond the way that things "seem" to be, and actually develop some knowledge about the nonphysical, you conclude that any such approach would merely be "guesses".

How does this validate physicalism? You blatantly admit that physicalism is wrong, by accepting the reality of the nonphysical. Then instead of progressing toward where this leads, making an effort to understand the nonphysical, you steadfastly cling to physicalism in a hypocritical way, as if the nonphysical, which you clearly recognize, yet fail to understand, is irrelevant.

Surely this identifies a significant error, and misguided, irrational judgement.

How does a mysterious/unknowable unphysical aspect of mind help us understand our nature or that of the universe?

Certainly, it opens up possibilities - but they are unanalyzable possibilities. — Relativist

Clearly, your problem is in the assumption that the unphysical is unknowable. What justifies this assumption? You recognize the reality of the unphysical, so by that very fact, you know it to some extent. How is it possible for you to recognize something then proceed to the conclusion that the thing you recognize is unknowable? That conclusion is completely unsupported. Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable.

I suggest that you are proceeding from a faulty assumption about what constitutes "knowable"...

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You should accept the premise of the possible world, since in our relationship with the world, it is shown as something that is not given once and for all (the future is not given). — JuanZu

That's exactly why there is discontinuity. The past is given, the future is not. As you say, "the world is not given once and for all", only the past has been given. Therefore the present constitutes a discontinuity of time.

Your post discusses only the future and the possibilities of the future. Now, what about the actuality of the past, and the discontinuity between the possibilities of the future and the actuality of the past?

Not in the world just like that, but in a possible world. — JuanZu

The horizon of the world does not include possible worlds. The opposite could be true, that possible worlds could include the world. But inversion is not permissible because this would allow that the contradictions of the different possible worlds would co-exist within the world.

And even if we assume the premise that the world is one of the multitude of possible worlds, then we need a completely distinct principle by which the actual world is distinguished. It is because of this that discontinuity must be assumed.

That is why possibility has a horizon of realisation, and the world is realisation, possible, actual or not. — JuanZu

See, even you have turned things around now, inverted your claims. You have now assigned the horizon to possibility, instead of to the world. You now refer to "the horizon of realization", which possibility has, and the world is the realization, instead of your former claim that possibility was within the horizon of the world.

So, as I explain above, we need a completely distinct principle which forms the "horizon of realisation" which possibility has. This principle must be distinct, forming a sort of boundary to possibility, and not being a possibility itself, and that's why we must conclude discontinuity. "The world" is on the other side of this boundary, as something completely distinct from possibility formed by the reality of the boundary. This is what allows for the reality of "truth".

The world is inscribed in the concept of possibility, which is why I say that it is its inherent horizon. — JuanZu

No, this is explicitly false. Within the concept of possibility there is nothing which distinguishes "the world". This is why possibility is often understood as possible worlds, plural. And to allow that all the possible worlds are truly possible, there cannot be one which is "the world", or else that would deny the possibility of those which contradict "the world". So the principles which determine "the world" must be external to the concept of possibility, as those principles which designate truth, usually according to correspondence with empirical fact.

What is actual is at once possible but neither necessary nor impossible. The world thus, a world of pure possibility, is in continuity with the consciousness of possibility. — JuanZu

This is the incoherency which results from your insistence that 'the world" is a continuous aspect of possibility. You have denied any meaning from "actual", by stating that its meaning is neither derived from "necessary", nor "impossible". Therefore you have no principle whereby you might propose an reality of "the world". Accordingly you propose that "the world" is pure possibility, and this implies that it is an infinity of possible worlds. So you have no principle whereby "pure possibility" is one united entity as "the world". It can only be conceived as an infinity of possible worlds. Therefore you have no such thing as "the world" and you have not closed the gap between the world and possibility.

If you look closely, its possibility is determined by the horizon of the world. How can something be possible if it does not mean possible IN THE WORLD? This shows that its nature of possibility has the world as its horizon. — JuanZu

Possibilities are determined by minds, and it is commonly recognized that possibilities are distinctly determinations which are NOT IN THE WORLD. The world consists exclusively of what is actual, or else we'd have all sorts of imaginary things existing IN THE WORLD. Minds determine what is possible, and these same minds recognize that these possibilities are NOT IN THE WORLD, they are simply determinations of the mind.

Whether the minds are correct or not in their determinations is another issue. Even if they are mistaken in there determinations of "possible", this does not mean that there is some other form of "possible" which is not determined by a mind and is IN THE WORLD. It just means that the mind which makes the mistaken determination of what is possible, misunderstands what is actual. A mistaken determination of what is possible simply reflects a mistaken understanding of what is actual.

This very break between what is actual and what is possible is the reason why we must assume discontinuity.

The fact that there are many possible ends does not change this continuity at all as long as it remains on the horizon of the world. — JuanZu

I have no idea how you are using "continuity" here. The possible ends, or goals are clearly not on the horizon of the world, as they are distinctly possible, and the horizon is the boundary of the actual world. Therefore the possible ends are outside the boundary or horizon of the world, and that is why there is a discontinuity.

There is a hidden dualism in your position. — JuanZu

Why do you say that the dualism is hidden? I don't think that free will and intention can be understood without dualism so the dualism is blatant. Those compatibilists who think that free will can be real within a reality which is defined by a monist determinism practise self-deception.

You think of a kind of purpose and intentional acts that have nothing to do with the world and its operational demands. — JuanZu

That's right, we commonly come up with goals, intentions which are completely unrealistic, fantastic and imaginary, having nothing to do with the world, and totally beyond the operational demands of the world.

As I have said, our intentional acts (including madness) have the world as their horizon. — JuanZu

How could you possibly justify this claim? Since the goals of intentional acts are always simply possible, and never something actual in the world, until the goal is realized, how could a goal have the actual world as it's horizon?

It appears to me that the exact opposite of what you say, is what is the case. It is impossible that an intentional act could have the world as its horizon, because "the world" refers to what actually is, and the intentional act is directed toward something apprehended which is lacking from the world. It is directed toward what is desired, the thing which the act is intended to brings about. Therefore the intentional act never has the world as its horizon.

If it is purely conceptual, then it is impossible to explain how, operationally, there is a correspondence between our concepts (language) and the world. — JuanZu

Isn't this the point which Kant tries to make, that such is reality? But I don't believe "impossible" is the necessary conclusion here. I believe that the relation can be understood through purpose, or the good. Plato investigated this route, but Kant did not. The proposed "correspondence" between our concepts and the world is a relation of usefulness, and this implies that we are intentional beings acting with purpose.

Your use of "operationally" indicates that we have a common ground here. However, it seems that I recognize intention as a discontinuity, whereas you attempt to sweep it under the rug, and claim "continuity" regardless of the break which intention produces between concepts and the world.

Thus, your idealistic and anti-realist position fails to account for the usefulness of concepts and ideas, and above all, it cannot justify why, when we deal with the world through ideas and concepts, we are even able to predict future events. Your position is anti-realist, while mine is pragmatic and operational. — JuanZu

"Usefulness" is relative to the end, what is desired, "the good", and your employment of this necessitates that we account for the reality of intention. Concepts are deemed to be useful if they facilitate in getting what we want. And if what we want is the capacity to predict the future, then the ability to predict the future determines the prevailing relation between concept and the world.

In the case of quantum physics, statistics and probability are employed toward predicting the future. However, the use of such does not provide an understanding of the events which are predicted. For example, from watching the sunrise every day, one could predict exactly when and where it will rise tomorrow. But this predictive capacity provides no real understanding of this event. The same person who makes this prediction, might also claim that a dragon carries the sun in its mouth, every night, around from sunset to sunrise, in an habitual way. That would be a case of misunderstanding enabled by prediction.

So "ability to predict" is just one of many possible goals which could be desired. It may be many ways consistent with, and productive toward, the goal of understanding, but it doesn't necessarily produce understanding because understanding requires more than just the ability to predict.

So when we deal with the quantum system, we are not simply inventing concepts and ideas that happen to be adequate by pure chance, but there is an operational continuity that allows us to deal accurately with different phenomena in the quantum world. — JuanZu

Clearly you have made an invalid conclusion. The fact that "we are not simply inventing concepts", and that we are also trying them, testing them for usefulness, does not lead to the conclusion of "an operational continuity". There is still the matter of the goal, or end by which they are tested for usefulness, and this end presents a discontinuity. It is a discontinuity because of the lack of necessity in relation to ends. There are many possible goals and not one can be said to provide the necessary relation required for continuity.