The claim is the meaning of the symbols or vocalizations, not the symbols of vocalizations themselves, and a claim can indeed be a true or false. — Dan

The meaning of symbols, is as interpreted by an individual mind, and is therefore subjective. Therefore true or false is a subjective judgement. I explained this already, with the examples of the meaning of "understand", "truth", and "world". But you don't seem to understand.

When someone says it, that is them making a judgement. But whether it does or not is not a judgement, but a fact. — Dan

This would be a useless fact, if true. Whether or not the claim actually does correspond, as "fact", would be impossible for anyone to know, so even if this were true, these "facts" would be useless and irrelevant to our discussion. Furthermore, also if what you claim is true, then as human beings, only having access to our subjective judgements, we could never know whether it is a fact that what you claim is a fact. So the claim does nothing for us.

So we have a dual level of irrelevance. We could never know the truth (the fact) of any claim, so our subjective judgements would guide us anyway. On top of this, we could never know whether the claim that there is such facts is itself true. So the claim is completely useless and does nothing to aid us in finding truth because it makes truth necessarily beyond our grasp.

When I claim the world is round(ish) that is a judgement, but my claim is either true or false depending on the actual shape of the planet, and would be true or false regardless of whether I (or anyone else) judged it as such. — Dan

You are completely ignoring what I explained. The words "world", "roundish", need to be defined, interpreted for meaning, and the reality itself needs to be judged as fulfilling the conditions of the interpreted meaning. Therefore your claim here is completely incoherent.

No, I am saying that in circumstances that were identical from the point of view of the actor (since the doctor didn't know about the weird niche circumstances at play here), the same action (by which I mean the same in all relevant regards) would not be wrong, but right. — Dan

Then it's incoherent to judge the doctor's actions as wrong. By "all relevant regards" the doctor's actions were right. See, you excluded the consequences, (the patient's death) from "all relevant regards". However, it is the consequences by which you made the judgement "wrong", so clearly the consequences cannot be irrelevant. You are providing a very good demonstration of incoherency, and why you need to accept the fact that you employ two distinct, and incompatible, valuation systems..

A lot of what you are claiming seems to be steeped in highly dubious meta-ethical assumptions, possibly ontological ones as well. So I'll ask you again, what are the assumptions that are hiding behind these points? Are you claiming that there is no objective truth at all? Or that there is simply no objective truth regarding morality? — Dan

The ontological principle involved here, is the conclusion that the assumptions of "objective truth", and "objective right", require God for justification. This conclusion is derived as I've explained, from the true premise that "true" and "right" are judgements. I invite you to propose another form of justification, other than God, but simply asserting that this is "fact" is not justification.

We can make a judgement of whether some claim is true, but whether it is true or not is a fact about that claim, not merely a judgement made by us. — Dan

As I said, this is incomprehensible to me because whether or not a statement of claim is true, is dependent on interpretation of the statement, and comparison with reality. Such comparison only minds can perform.

As I said, whether a statement of claim is true or not is a judgement. In no way can truth or falsity be understood as the property of the claim itself, which is simply an ordered collection of symbols.

If someone was using terms in such as way as to make their claim meaningless, then you might point this out, but generally speaking what is much more interesting is to focus on the substantive claims being made. — Dan

You seem to be missing the point. What I claim is that you use terms in such a way as to make your claim valid, but if analyzed, the meaning required is really unintelligible, such as your use of "true" above.

If you defined "world" in that way, then I might well point out that it's a very strange definition that isn't connected with how we normally use the word. — Dan

Right, and that is what I am pointing out about your use of "understand", it is not comprehensible. And now, your use of "true", and "right", are simply unintelligible.

I am using "truth" in a fairly general sense, but I think I'd be happy with something like "corresponds to reality" as a basic definition for the purposes of this discussion. I don't think it's strange to suggest that claims really are true or false, and that this isn't merely a judgement made by people. — Dan

Can you not see that "corresponds to reality" refers to a type of judgement? Whenever someone says "that corresponds to reality", this indicates a judgement. How could it mean anything other than this?

it is entirely consistent to say that this person acted wrongly but that we still want people to act the same way in the future. — Dan

OK, you're saying that you want people to act wrongly. That's exactly why I am arguing that this type of consequentialism really does not suffice for providing moral guidance.

Sorry, do you not think that things are objectively true at all? Or do you not think moral claims are objectively true (or false)? There is a big assumption hiding behind this statement, and I'd like to get it out in the open. — Dan

As I said, such objectivity requires God. Since truth is a judgement, we need something other than a human mind to make that judgement, if we assume such "objectivity".

The issue is not whether or not I agree with objectivity, the issue is that it is incoherent to believe in such objectivity, without a belief in some type of god for ontological support.

I'd like to get this assumption out in the open, because I think I've been pretty clear about my meta-ethical assumptions here. — Dan

You've been clear, but the assumptions which you clearly assert prove to be incoherent.

So, could you please state for the record what your meta-ethical position is. Do you think morality is constructed? Subjective? Relative? What's the story? — Dan

This is not about what I believe, we are discussing the coherency of your theory. My beliefs are only relevant so far as they bear on your theory. Whether or not I personally believe in God is irrelevant here.

Also, as linguistic claims go, "right" and "wrong" being objective facts about actions is probably the standard usage. I think moral objectivism is still the standard pre-theoretical position, though I will admit that this is in flux at the moment with a reasonable amount of relativist nonsense floating around. — Dan

Again, "right" and "wrong" are judgements. If you want to provide support for your claim that a judgement can be objective, without a God who makes that objective judgement, then be my guest.

HUGE yikes. — AmadeusD

HUGE yilkes,
Is what I LIKES

I am not assuming any gods at all. What I am assuming is that there are moral truths objectively of our views. When we claim that something is right (in the moral sense), I suggest we are making an objective claim about that thing which can be either true or false. — Dan

"Truth" is a judgement we make of a statement. Without a god, who do you propose, makes these statements and judgements?

It appears we may have a similar issue with "truth" to the issue we had with "understanding". You assume a meaning which is completely incoherent to me, and continue to use the word that way as if I ought to understand you.

It isn't a subjective judgement though. It is a claim that can be objectively correct or incorrect. As a simple example, if I say that the world is round (or you know, roundish) and you say it is flat, we aren't both right. — Dan

I don't see how the example serves the purpose. In order for one of us to be correct, we need someone to judge the meaning of "world", and the meaning of "round", "flat", etc.. It is actually very possible that we both are correct, because I could be using "world" to refer to something which you would never agree to.

This is exactly what has happened in this thread. You use "understand" and "truth" in a way which makes no sense to me. And, you might actually be correct in your argument based on that meaning. The meaning is like a premise though, so to prove your argument unsound, I must prove the falsity of your meaning.

So in your example, if I say "the world is flat", and I hold a conception of "the world" in which it is flat, then "the world is flat" is correct, and to prove me wrong you need to prove that my meaning (conception) of "the world" is false. Likewise, to prove your moral position to be unsound, I am faced with the task of proving that the meaning you assume for words like "understand", and "truth" are false. This is a sort of dialectics. But if in such a debate, a person adheres to the false definition, fails to understand the falsity of it, or for some reason refuses to accept the falsity of it, argumentation becomes pointless.

This is another case of you getting very concerned with language where it really isn't necessary. — Dan

Based on what I presented above, "getting very concerned with language" is necessary. I can define "the world" as what can be seen within the horizon that extends 360 degrees around a person, and the world is "flat" by that definition, even if "the world" of multiple people overlap to make a universal flat world. Likewise, you can define words like "truth", "understand", and "same", in absurd ways to support your theory. The only way to show you that your theory is wrong, unsound, is to demonstrate that your use of language does not reflect reality, is therefore false.

I could instead say that we should praise the initial action because we want other people in situations that seem identical with regard to relevant factors to act in the same way with regard to relevant features of the action. — Dan

Sure, but if this is the case, then on what basis do you say the action was wrong? You are saying that people ought to be taught to always act "the same way" in any situation which appears to be to a significant extent "similar". But then you are also saying that in this particular case the person's act, who acted "that way" was wrong, yet you are using it as an example of how people ought to act. Can you not see the inconsistency? It's blatant, and blatant inconsistency is not productive in teaching because people dismiss it as ridiculous, and counterproductive.

I agree it is a big problem for such theories. — Dan

Another nail in the coffin. At what point do you give up on providing exceptions to the rule, trying to prop up a deficient rule, and simply bury the faulty rule?

No, you don't need to consider any of that. If someone does the right thing for the "wrong reasons", it's still the right thing. — Dan

That's a faulty judgement, based in your misunderstanding, of an objective, independent "truth", or "right", outlined above. You really need to work on this misunderstanding, figure out the reality of the situation.

It seems pretty clear that the doctor could have given the patient a physical exam which, in this example, would have led to them discovering the problem. And, in this case, based on what happened, it seems reasonably to say that they should have (on an actual-value view. — Dan

That is not clear at all. The person was dying. The doctor acted in an emergency situation. You only say that the doctor could have, and should have, "given the patient a physical exam" because that is consistent with discovery of the information, according to the contrived example. Maybe in another example, the patient's spouse was standing in the hall with the information, and the doctor 'could have and should have' asked the spouse. The problem is glaring. The doctor has no way of knowing which of the countless possible options are going to reveal the information, and cannot proceed toward pursuing them all until information is revealed, or the patient dies.

I mean, this is surely obvious. What's right is right regardless of whether there is a rule that says its right. What's wrong is wrong regardless of whether it is prohibited. I find it very difficult to believe that you haven't heard that sentiment before. — Dan

Again, clear indication of a faulty use of "right". I'll be waiting for you to either dispense with this idea altogether, or support it with some sort of god. I mean you might try to support it otherwise, but I've seen enough of that to tell you it's all smoke and mirrors of sophistry. So rather than have me make fun of your attempts, let's just get on with the either/or option.

As a fairly easy-to-understand example, do you think that killing a child for fun would become less wrong if the laws prohibiting it were repealed or the social norms prohibiting it were no longer held by the majority? — Dan

This is a question of do I believe in God or not. If I believe in God, then I assume an independent God who interprets, understands, and upholds judgement on this rule, "killing children for fun is wrong", as correct, regardless of what human beings think. If I do not believe in God, then so long as not every human being agrees that killing children for fun is wrong, then the proposed rule remains debatable. So the issue is more complicated than the way you present it, because even if the majority thinks that it's not wrong, and the laws are repealed, then it is not wrong by those laws, but to the minority who do not agree, it is still debatable.

I don't see any other possibility.

No. What people are okay with and what is right are very often different. What's right is right regardless of whether people agree. — Dan

That "X is right" is a judgement, just like "this thing I'm typing on is a keyboard" is a judgement. Are you assuming "God" to make this judgement "regardless of whether people agree? If so, I will dismiss it, just like you dismissed my reference to religious principles earlier in our discussion. Therefore there is nothing to justify your claim "What people are okay with and what is right are very often different".

In the same way there is often a difference between what people think is true and what is actually true in any other context. — Dan

Again, "X is true" is a judgement. So this statement is dismissed on the same basis as the one above.

I mean, it's the same in terms of relevant factors used to make the decision. I think that's what we'd normally call the same situation. — Dan

We cannot use an appeal to common vernacular in the use of "same" to support rigorous logic. This is why we have a "law of identity" to support logical procedures.

The doctor acted wrongly because their actions led to bad consequences that were avoidable had they acted differently. On an actual-value view of consequentialism where an action is judged based on the actual value of it's consequences, this makes the action bad and also wrong (in that the doctor should have done something different). — Dan

This is untenable as a working principle. If this was an accepted moral principle, then any time which someone could apprehend a better possible outcome than what actually occurred, they'd have grounds to say that the action had "bad consequences", and was therefore wrong. And since there are always accidentals involved in any situation, every act would be arguably "wrong". Therefore, as a moral principle, your proposed "actual value" perspective is completely useless.

It's very clear that this type of consequentialism is absolutely inadequate to provide principles for moral judgement. What is actually required to make a moral judgement is to consider the situation of the person prior to the choice, one's intentions, the specifics of the circumstances, along with the consequences. As is very evident from your example, basing judgement solely on consequences is woefully inadequate, and may be considerably misleading.

In this case, the doctor gave the patient something to which they were deathly allergic and which led to their death, and the doctor could have learned this and acted differently. So, the action turned out to be wrong. — Dan

You paid no respect to my counter example. If "the doctor could have learned this" is a principle acceptable to the judgement of whether the doctor acted wrongly or not, then we'd have to allow that the doctor should have gone off and rummaged through the patient's car, one's house, all files on record anywhere, even keep searching all information in the universe, before acting. This principle is nonsense and completely unacceptable.

Again, following protocol is not a reason to think an action is right. Protocol has very little to do with right or wrong. — Dan

Wow! I've never heard that before, not even in the "In praise of anarchy" thread. Following rules has very little to do with right or wrong? What planet are you from Dan?

Do you mean something non-normative by "morally acceptable"? I mean, it's very clear that following the standard procedure is not always morally acceptable in the sense that it is morally permissible, but perhaps you mean something like "people will generally be okay with it" or something to that effect. Is that the case? — Dan

There's nothing non-normative on my part. You are the one who has already admitted to having non-normative principles. Look, if people are ok with it, then it is morally acceptable. Isn't that obvious to you?

Surely you would agree that what people would accept, or what people would think is the right thing to do, is not the same as what actually is the right thing to do, right? — Dan

No. How could there be a difference?

I mean, the consequences of praising the action are going to depend on the future actions of those that find themselves in the same situation, so their perspective is very relevant. Also, yes, the situations wouldn't be completely identical. They would be happening at different times for a start. But they may be identical in terms of relevant information that one might use to make the decision at hand. — Dan

If the situations are not identical, then it is false to refer to them as "the same situation". You just contradict yourself by saying "the same situation... wouldn't be completely identical".

If you call it what it is, "a similar situation", then you ought to understand that what I said earlier applies.

What is required is to analyze the action and separate the good from the bad, such that the good can be praised and the bad condemned in order to avoid similar wrongful actions. But analyzing and separating good from bad is completely different from simply praising the wrongful action.

To use the same example I gave before, perhaps the call that the doctor made would be correct most of the time and, in the time-sensitive situation they find themselves in, checking for the niche circumstances which caused it to be the wrong call here would cost more lives than it saves. I'm not really sure what you are finding difficult about this. — Dan

You haven't provided me with the principle by which you judge the doctor's action to be wrong. You simple assume it to be wrong, and say that it is wrong by "an actual-value or some expected-value view", but this gives me no principle, therefore no reason to believe it was wrong. As far as I can see, the doctor followed protocol, therefore we can judge the actions as right, even though the person's life was not saved.

Are you suggesting that a doctor ought to look to see what is tattooed on the bottom of one's foot before attempting to save a person's life? What else do you think the doctor ought to do before proceeding, look through one's car, go to the person's house and rummage through all files and bookshelves? Your conclusion that the doctor's action was wrong makes absolutely no sense at all. The person died, but that does not make the action of the doctor trying to save that life, wrong.

You need to provide a reason why you think the doctor's action was wrong. I gave you the reason why I think the doctor's action was right, the doctor followed protocol. Now you need to give me the reason why you think the action was wrong. That the person died accidentally while the doctor was working, does not make the doctor's actions wrong. Otherwise every time a person died in surgery the doctor's actions would be wrong. A doctor's actions always involve risk of something bad happening, so probability dictates that a bad thing will happen from time to time. Unless there is negligence the doctor's action is not wrong.

s it possible you mean something non-standard by protocol? Like, something like "the best available methods of achieving the desired ends based on all known information" or something to that effect? I mean, I think you'd still be wrong, but that would be at least less egregious than suggesting that following a protocol was the same thing as acting rightly. — Dan

No, "protocol" means something like "standard rules for any procedure". It does not mean "best available method", just the conventional or standard method. There may be other ways available if one seeks them, judgeable as better or worse.

The issue is that this is the common practise in many cases, to simply follow protocol. Since it is the common practise, and it is also very "morally acceptable" that it is the common practise, this means that it is "morally acceptable" to just follow standard rules rather than considering whether the standard rules represent the "best available method". Protocol therefore is the means by which we simplify decision making, and we increase efficiency of actions. by accepting that seeking other options is unnecessary. And, as I've been arguing, while you seem to disagree, following protocal is very clearly morally acceptable.

Compare this to what I said earlier about "habit". Following protocol is a sort of habit, a habit designated by social constructs as a good habit. What I said was that habit restricts our freedom, by inclining us away from considering options. What we have here is that the person follows protocol (acts by habit), and since this is the morally accepted way of acting, the good habit, it is morally acceptable that the person does not consider whether this is the "best available option". The person simply does not even consider other options, and therefore has one's freedom to choose other options restricted. By choosing "protocol", the person disallows other options to enter one's mind, to be considered, and therefore the choice for actions in the situation are restricted to the actions indicated by the protocol.

The point now is that the choice of using "protocol", which is a self-limiting of one's freedom to choose, is very much morally acceptable. In fact, it is often the norm. And, the things which we call "norms" often serve as a sort of protocol. So I think it is pointless for you to argue that following protocol is not the right thing to do, as what you claim is not consistent with reality. Any situation where it is claimed that protocol is wrong would require that such a claim be justification, because the correctness of protocol is otherwise taken for granted.

I mean, I've already explained this. They wouldn't seem like different actions from the perspective of the actor because they would have identical information. — Dan

I think this is impossible. Never does a person find oneself to be in the exact same situation twice. Even the experience of Deja vu has some differences. Furthermore, we are talking about the perspective of the person who is supposedly judging the act to be both wrong and praiseworthy, so this would be irrelevant anyway.

No, I am suggesting that in some cases we may conclude that the wrongful action should be praised and we should not try to avoid it happening again because doing so would have worse consequences. — Dan

This makes no sense. If not allowing the action to happen (I cannot allow the qualifier "again" because the same action cannot happen twice) would have worse consequences, how could the action be judged as "wrongful" in the first place. You explicitly state that not allowing it to happen would have worse consequences. Therefore we need to conclude that the action produced the best possible consequences, when the choices are restricted to 'make action A or do not make action A', and therefore it cannot be judged as wrong.

The only way to make it wrong is to propose that there was a better course of action. But this implies that the action is not praiseworthy.

. A consequentialist would say that the way we should make our moral decisions is by reference to their likely consequences. — Dan

If there is relevant protocol, the method for producing the desired consequences is to consult protocol. If in situation A, and desired outcome is Z, then protocol M is to be followed. That is the purpose of protocol, it is the convention for producing the desired consequences.

I don't understand how you can argue that protocol is irrelevant in decision making. Protocol is produced from experience with consequences. It's a form of science science, empirical evidence from experimentation.

Then, since praising it is a seperate action (that will have consequences for future actions conducted in different circumstances) we can determine that praising this action will likely have good consequences and so praise it. — Dan

This is incoherent. If the action is evaluated as "wrong", it is impossible to conclude that simply praising that action would have good consequences. Thi is because the elements which make the action wrong are praised equally with any other elements. "Future actions conducted in different circumstances" are irrelevant in this context, because "different circumstances" implies different actions.

What is required is to analyze the action and separate the good from the bad, such that the good can be praised and the bad condemned in order to avoid similar wrongful actions. But analyzing and separating good from bad is completely different from simply praising the wrongful action.

We have significant differences of belief concerning "meaning" and "understanding" which makes further discussion on that issue rather pointless.

I agree that those are two different evaluation systems, but when making moral decisions, we don't need to consider how closely some protocol was followed, we just need to consider the consequences (or possibly the expected consequences) of the action. — Dan

The glaring problem here, is your reference to "how closely some protocol was followed". This means a judgement after the fact, as does "consequences". However when judging a person's decision, and the decision making process, we must acknowledge that the person decides to the act before the act occurs. In the person's decision making process, and consequently in the judgement of that decision, protocol is very important.

You can limit "moral decisions" to judgements made after the fact, and exclude the relevance of protocol, but this will not provide us with principles for decision making. Your morality will consist of after the fact judgments, essentially excluding the possibility of "ought" statements (being the basic protocol), if you insist that whether or not protocol is followed is not relevant to moral decisions.

It could. I am very much saying that the same evaluative system could say that an action was wrong, but we should nevertheless praise it. Not praise a different action, praise the action that took place in this instance, regardless of the fact it was wrong. — Dan

This is incoherent. And, your explanation for it referred to the same act in different circumstances. As I explained, different circumstances make for different acts. You could mean "the same type of act". Otherwise you still have not provided any explanation as to how this statement might be coherent.

No, it does not need to be a desired thing. Someone might not care about whether they continue to experience things or not, but still understand that their death would stop them from doing so. — Dan

But that's not knowing what the choice "means" which is your definition. "Meaning" is defined in relation to purpose, intention.

I mean yes, you could absolutely do that. The point is that if the person doesn't understand that if they die, they can't keep doing stuff, then they haven't really understood what death is. — Dan

Again, this would be not knowing what the choice "means", consequently not "understanding", by your definition.

This is profoundly incorrect. Following protocol is very much not the same as acting rightly. Protocols are often wrong, as you can see by simply looking at protocols through history that were based on terrible reasoning or poor understanding of the world. Even when the protocol itself is good, it may not have taken account of the circumstances people find themselves in or may be designed to avoid the dodgy judgment of idiots. — Dan

This just demonstrates the dual evaluation you employ. Notice that you replaced "right" with "good", later in the paragraph. "Good" and "right" are not equivalent. The doctor is right, correct, not mistaken if protocol is followed, but the protocol itself maybe judged as bad. Notice the two valuation system. 1) How closely was protocol followed? 2) Is the protocol good?

Consider the difference between the validity of a logical argue, and soundness. Validity requires only that the protocol (rules) be followed. But soundness requires also that the premises be judged for truth. Judging the logical procedure for validity, and the judge the premises for truth, are two distinct types of judgement requiring two distinct evaluation systems.

There aren't two systems of evaluation. There is one system that is evaluating both the rightness or wrongness of the initial action and the rightness or wrongness of praising that action (which is another action). — Dan

If this were the case, it would be impossible to say that the same act was both wrong and praiseworthy. The same system which judges the act as wrong could not also judge praising the same act as right, without self-contradiction. Your examples are faulty because you replace "the same act" with "the same type of act in different circumstances". So in the case of your examples, the praising is of a type of act, it is not a praising of the act which is judged as wrong.

I would say I am using language pretty clearly and consistently. I've tried to explain things in several different ways when you don't understand the first time, but perhaps you are having trouble because we are discussing too many points at once. Would it be easier to prune this discussion down and tackle one point at a time? — Dan

I don't see any point. We simply disagree on fundamental principles and progress appears impossible..

Omg! Apply it to them. As I said, I can't really discuss things with someone like you. — Clearbury

I've noticed that. I want to focus on reality, talk about the way things are, and allow that to have due bearing on the propositions we make. But you want to keep your mind within your fantasy, and not allow reality to impose itself in any way. Of course that leaves you in no position to discuss anything with someone like me.

People like that aren't worth the bother because they're just a lot of work - one has to try and educate them, which isn't why I'm here - — Clearbury

If you are not here to educate us on why anarchy is praiseworthy, then why are you here? I mean simply praising anarchy is rather pointless, unless you can show why it ought to be praised.

In being an educator you need to assume that the person to be educated has no knowledge of the subject which you profess. Therefore you need to start from the basics, make them very clear, and then move on to the specifics. You are doing the opposite, starting form some very specific assumptions, but then you cannot show any general principles which would support these specific assumptions. So you appear to be lost.

Most people have no idea just how bad the police are at solving crimes, — Clearbury

The assumptions you make are glaringly false, often to the point of being ridiculous. There is no "lack of competition" in the work of solving crimes. Have you not heard of "private investigators"? Anyone can take of the task of solving crimes, there is no monopoly here. So if the police are terribly bad at this task, it is not the result of no competition.

yes, because those street battles between competing supermarket chains and banks are really common — Clearbury

Did you read my post? I didn't say anything about competing supermarket chains, or banks. I said something about individuals who hire competing private security companies for private interests.

Battles are expensive. The private sector hates them. Politicians love them....
Price wars is what you'll get. — Clearbury

You just spout random ideas with no grounds in reality, Clearbury. Why don't you actually think about some of these things for a while? How could banks or supermarket chains even exist without governance? These entities are features of the type of state that we live in.

What you seem to be doing, is taking all the aspects of our type of state which you dislike, taxes, violence by police, etc., and separating them from the aspects of our type of state which you do like. Then you claim that if we get rid of the governance, "the state" itself, we will rid ourselves of all the negative aspects, and be left with the positive.

Sorry to have to burst your bubble, shatter your illusion, but reality just is not like this. Many "things" have both desirable and undesirable aspects. Annihilating "the thing" which supports these properties does not leave you with the desirable properties, while ridding you of the undesirable. You need to provide for yourself, a more sophisticated approach to this problem, if you want to address it seriously. Have you read Plato's "Republic"? It's very educational, concerning different types of states, different types of people, and justice in general.

What if, as a private security company in an anarchy, I decide to extract payment with menaces? That is, I operate like a mafia? Well, those whom I threaten would hire another security company to protect them - to protect them from such menaces. — Clearbury

Yes, I'll hire my private security company, you hire yours, Moliere will hire another, ssu another, etc.. Then these companies will each be operating for different private interests and a street battle will be inevitable.

We don't have state issued shoes. If we did, they'd be awful.. — Clearbury

Have you ever seen army boots? These are top quality, as is the case with most stuff issued by the military. Why do you think that products issued by the government are necessarily "awful"?

Imagine there are two supermarkets near you, one is run by a really nasty piece of work. It pays its employees poorly and has a reputation for treating them badly and for treating customers badly as well. The other doesn't. Which one would you shop at? The nice one, of course. Most nice people would, anyway. — Clearbury

Are you saying that the government pays poorly, and treats their employees badly? Which government behaves like this?

The private sector will provide all of those things. Anything a government provides, the private sector can provide. There is no invisible obstacle preventing private companies from building prisons. If enough people want to pay a company to imprison some people, a private company - private companies - will emerge that will bid for their business. Or, chances are, some much more efficient way of dealing with rights transgressors will be developed. — Clearbury

I am still waiting for you to address the issue of building roads, expropriating property, and land ownership in general. How is the private sector going to provide for ownership of land? Is each person just going to claim a section, and hire their own private security company to defend it? What happens when I want the same section you want, and there's no deeds? Would we each have to hire our own private company to provide us with a deed?

It's people who come up with solutions, not governments. And violence is something people are capable of using. The point is that it will be used more sparingly and justly in an anarchy than it will be if we all decide instead that just one tiny group of people get to determine when and where to use it. — Clearbury

You must be joking. There would be no prisons, why go through the trouble of trying to organize and maintain prisons, when it's so much easier to shoot first and not have to worry about answering questions later? Your naivety is overwhelming.

Look at what you are saying. You are saying that if every person gets to decide when and where to use violence, there will be much less violence then if only a few people get to decide this. And, I'll add, the government hired "tiny group" have special training.

So, you think that if 100,000,000 people are free to use violence, whenever and wherever they determine it's needed, this will result in less violence overall, than if only 100 people are free to use violence wherever and whenever they determine it's needed. I assume you have some evidence or statistics to back this claim up?

I think there's an argument similar to this which promotes the right to own firearms for defense. The proponents say, that if more people own firearms then there will be less incidences of firearms being used for crime. You should check the statistics on this:
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/more-guns-do-not-stop-more-crimes-evidence-shows/

In the child's case, it is a matter of not understanding what the choice entails, what it means to make that choice. In the case of the person buying the shirt, so long as they understand what it means to buy the shirt and understand that they are buying it without knowing that it is 100% cotton, then the choice is understood. — Dan

"What it means to make that choice" in the case of the child, is to acknowledge an end to experiences. That's what you said. "Experiences" is the desired thing, and if it were not, it would be irrelevant to knowing what it means to make that choice. It is only by being the desired consequence of staying alive, that experiences are relevant to the child's choice of dying, and therefore essential to "understanding" what it means to make that choice.

Otherwise, you could replace "end of experiences" with end of anything which the child does, eats, cries, sleeps, etc., and claim that understanding the choice requires understanding any one of these. This means that the child might think that what the choice means, is the end of crying and suffering. Generally, we'd call this "misunderstanding". That's why you framed "understanding the choice" as recognizing it to mean the end of experiences, because experiences are what is desired.

Likewise, "what it means to buy the shirt" is to understand that buying it is contrary to the desired thing, to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton. The two cases are very similar. In each case, there is a choice which is contrary to what constitutes the desired thing; 1) continued experiences, 2) to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton. "Understanding" of the choice, i.e. "what it means to make that choice" describes the situation in which the person recognizes that the choice is contrary to what is desired.

Sorry, are you genuinely suggesting that if someone follows protocol, their actions cannot be wrong? I mean, I have a lot to say about what a silly view that is, but I just want to confirm that this is actually what you are suggesting before I start tearing into it. — Dan

Yes, by definition, to follow protocol is to act in the right way.

I'm not suggesting we condemn the action. You're bringing condemning into it. Condemning, like praising, is another action we can take after the fact, which might be right or wrong based on its own consequences. The action can be wrong, and yet praiseworthy. That is also seperate from whether the protocol is praiseworthy. It might be that the doctor followed protocol and it is a sensible protocol and we should praise their actions but, nevertheless, their action in this case turned out to be wrong (on an actual-value or some expected-value view). It might also be the case that the doctor didn't follow protocol because the protocol is stupid, and we should praise their actions, but they were still wrong in this case, and we should condemn the protocol. There are not multiple systems of evaluating here, there are multiple actions to evaluate. — Dan

Your use of these words is amazingly confusing. That's because you do not stick to definitions, and you introduce ambiguity.

There clearly is multiple systems of evaluation. There is one by which you judge the act to be praiseworthy, and another by which you judge the act to be "wrong", what you call the "actual-value view". You clearly say "the action can be wrong, and yet praiseworthy". Why can't you acknowledge that such a statement requires two systems for evaluation?

That it is an act which judges praiseworthiness, and this act can itself be judged, is irrelevant to the fact that this is an act of judgement, which requires a system of evaluation. Without a system of evaluation, the judgement of praiseworthy would be random and irrelevant for that reason. But it clearly is not irrelevant in what you write. Therefore the judgement must be based in a system of evaluation.

I think all the anarchist conclusion really requires is that it is wrong to extract payment with menaces for deciding - without being commissioned to do so - to protect another's rights. — Clearbury

So this is the motivation for your anarchism, you dislike taxation?

Well, the solution lies with individuals recognizing that government is not needed — Clearbury

Who is going to maintain the roads and all the infrastructure?

For instance, food production distribution is almost entirely conducted by the private sector, at least in first world countries (and that's partly what makes them first world). — Clearbury

But of course, distribution is done through the use of roads maintained by the government. Sure, you might claim that the private sector could build roads, but who is going to collect funds for this, and what force will they use to collect money from those who do not wish to pay, claiming that they will not use the roads? And who will be in charge of expropriating the required land for such infrastructure?

Speaking of land, without the government and its keeping of official records like title deeds, how are we going to know who owns what land? I guess we just fight it out? Oh no, no one would ever resort to violence over a property dispute, that would be irrational.

This is what I think of as one of the fundamental philosophical problems for anarchy: the problem of warlords is such that no matter what path to abolishing the state that you take the "bad" kind of anarchy will arise — Moliere

Clearbury seems to have no grasp of the concept of land ownership.

Engage with the arguments I make and not strawmen. — Clearbury

The problem is that your arguments are based in premises which are far removed from reality, i.e. false. Therefore it is necessary to demonstrate the falsity of your premises, rather than engage with the logic of your arguments, in order to demonstrate that your arguments are unsound.

If replacing your false premises for true premises constitutes making a strawman, to you, then so be it. You can continue to live in your "hypothetical" world of "hypothetical" contracts, and ignore the abundance of signed documents which are all around you, (birth certificates, other forms of identification, title deeds, bank accounts, insurance, etc..) indicating that said contracts are very real, and not merely "hypothetical", if that is what you wish. But what is the point to ignoring reality, just because it is inconsistent with the premises of your favoured argument? Don't you see how such behaviour only misleads you?

Think for a while of reality... — ssu

Careful what you ask for. Clearbury is prone to designating anyone who asks for such as irrational, and then proceeding to ignore that person for engaging with the reality of the situation, rather than Clearbury's hypothetical situation.

The problem is that this is a hypothetical contract and hypothetical contracts are worthless and do not justify treating others in the hypothetically agreed-to ways. — Clearbury

You seem to be quite adept at ignoring all the aspects of reality which are not consistent with your argument.

A person does not choose to be born into the situation they are born into. That there is a (hypothetical) contract over your head when you are born, is just a brute fact, just like there is a sun over your head. The contract is signed at the time of birth, by the baby's parents and the doctor, it's called a birth certificate. The person is just a baby, so the parents need to make all the required signatures for the baby. Once the documents are signed, you cannot escape this reality, that the contract is signed, and the paper trail is created. You may run and hide though, perhaps in a different country or something like that.

You can argue against the right that your parents have to sign these documents which make you identifiable to the powers that be, as a legal subject just like you can argue against the right that your parents have to even provide you with a place in this cruel world, in the first place, but what's the point? It's already too late for that, just like it's already too late to preach anarchy as a means of getting out of the contract your parents signed for you. In reality, you have no right to live at any particular location on this earth, unless you have that signed document, because you have no right to any real estate.

magine a child claiming that they want to die. However, the child does not understand what it means to die, they do not appreciate that such a thing is permanent and that it means an end to all experiences. This child does not understand this choice because they don't know what it means to make it. — Dan

I do not see how this is substantially different from the shirt buying example. The child does not know that death is contrary to what is desired, more experiences. That is what you describe as not understanding the choice. This is equivalent to the shirt buyer not knowing that choosing the shirt of unknown fabric is contrary to what is desired, only to buy 100% cotton. In both cases, what is called not understanding one's choice, is a matter of not recognizing that the choice is contrary to what is desired.

I mean, I think I probably can imagine this sort of agent, but that doesn't really matter as what you are describing is different from the kind of agent I posited. Specifically, the agent I described does not need to actually choose, it just needs to understand the choices it has. — Dan

I don't follow, and don't see how this makes a difference. To understand the choices which one has, requires that the person put them into the context of the desires which one has. This is exemplified by your example of the child who wants to die, and fails to understand this choice by not putting it into the context of wanting more experiences.

Can you really not imagine actions that led to bad consequences but which would, under most circumstances, lead to good consequences? — Dan

No, as I said, this statement demonstrates a failure of identification. All actions are context specific. An action under one set of circumstances is a different action from an action under a different set of circumstances. The doctor who acts without checking information within the file does not make the same act as the one who acts after checking the file but not the foot. You talk as if the same act could be bad under one set of circumstances, and good under another, but clearly these would simply be two different acts, one praiseworthy the other not.

You can produce all the examples you want, but I think that once you start trying to describe these various acts, you'll quickly understand what I mean. The praiseworthy act requires a different description from the condemnable act, to justify these distinct judgements, and is therefore a completely different act.

We are presumably praising the action because we want people who are in identical-appearing circumstances to act the same way. — Dan

How is this logical. The act was judged as wrong. How could it be possible that we would want to encourage people in identical-appearing circumstances to act the same way? That's totally illogical.

If the person performing this action did not know about the reasons why it would turn out to be wrong, and we would not want people in future to take the time to check for those specific circumstances (perhaps the action in question is time-sensitive), then praising that action seems entirely reasonable. — Dan

If you bring into the discussion other circumstances, which were not apparent to the decision maker, then you are not dealing with "identical-appearing circumstances". You are introducing other circumstances.

How could you ever conclude that praising the action of the person who failed to take the time to check the specific circumstances, and this resulted in a wrongful action, is a reasonable thing to do? It's completely illogical.

I do not have such an agent. I have one that understands choices without having desires. — Dan

That is what I insist is impossible. To understand that a choice is "a choice" is to associate it with what one wants or desires. Without any desires or wants, an agent would not apprehend possibilities as "choices" because there would be no motivation for the agent to select anything.

praising wrong action because in most circumstances doing the same thing (or, you might say, performing the same action) would be right — Dan

Again, this suffers a failure to properly identify the supposed action, and it is completely illogical for the reason I explained. In another set circumstances it would be a different action, and that different action might be praiseworthy. The other action, in the other set of circumstances, which is judged as wrong, is not praiseworthy.

For a simple example, imagine a doctor administering a medication to save a patient that is rapidly dying. This patient, unbeknownst to the doctor, is deathly allergic to that medication. That information was not on any of their charts, but instead tattooed on the sole of their foot. Assuming that we don't want doctors to be checking patients' feet for tattoos in the future (due to any delay potentially proving fatal), we might well praise what the doctor did in this scenario. Their action led to bad consequences (the patient died), so on an actual-value view (and some expected-value views) of consequentialism, what they did was wrong. However, in seemingly identical circumstances, we would want doctors to act in the same way, so we praise the initial action as the best call available given the information that the doctor had. — Dan

This example demonstrates very well the illogical nature of your dual evaluation system approach. In reality, the doctor has a standard protocol to follow. If the doctor follows the protocol the actions were correct and praiseworthy. If the patient then dies, this does not mean that the doctors actions were wrong. You are judging "wrongness" here by a different valuation system. You are saying that the patient died, and this is bad, therefore there must have been something wrong about the doctor's actions. But if the doctor followed the proper protocol then the actions were not wrong, and so your "actual-value view" (the second evaluation system) is completely irrelevant.

Do you still not see how these two systems for evaluating acts, are fundamentally incompatible, leading to contradiction such as the one in this example? Since they are incompatible, they are incommensurable, and it is illogical to attempt to bring one to bear on the other. Either we praise the doctor's actions for following protocol, or we condemn the doctor's actions from an "actual-value view", but to do both is illogical. Another option you might be interested in, is that we praise the doctor's actions, but condemn the protocol, arguing that a doctor ought to take stricter measures on determining such information. But condemning the protocol is distinctly different from condemning the action of the individual as wrong.

In the part I've just quoted: I find consistency and correspondence/conformity to reality to be deeply entwined. This in so far as reality, whatever it might in fact be, can only be devoid of logical contradictions (for emphasis, where an ontological logical contradiction is a state of affairs wherein both X and not-X both ontically occur simultaneously and in the exact same respect). For example, if reality is in part tychistic then truths will conform to this partly tychistic reality in consistent ways - thereby making some variant of indeterminism true and the strictly hard determinism which is currently fashionable among many false. — javra

The point I was trying to express, is that reality is what we make it to be, as in the the op, mind created world. So to correspond with reality means to be consistent with the principles we state as being those which describe reality. This puts logic in a sort of awkward place. We might say that reality is such that it is devoid of logical contradictions, but what this really means is that this reality which is devoid of logical contradiction is the product of a desire to maintain the law of non-contradiction. Ontologies have been proposed in which the law of non-contradiction is not necessarily true. This would mean that these principles give us a different reality.

It's a whopper of a metaphysical claim that realty is devoid of logical contradictions - although I so far find that everyone at least implicitly lives by this conviction. But, in granting this explicitly, then for any belief to be true, in its then needing to conform to reality to so be, the belief will then necessarily be devoid of logical contradictions in its justifications (which, after all, are justifications for the belief being conformant to reality, or else that which is real). So if a) reality is consistent (devoid of logical contradictions) and b) truth is conformity to reality then c) any belief which is inconsistent will not be true. — javra

So this is where things get difficult. Let's say that we assume a reality which allows for logical contradictions. Then, logical contradictions may be consistent with reality. Therefore a true belief may be logically inconsistent. But remember, we create reality by naming the principles which describe it. So if we think it's a better reality, we can insist that contradictions be avoided. Aristotle for instance saw a need to allow for violation of the law of excluded middle to create a reality including potential and possibility, but he insisted on maintaining non-contradiction.

If non-physicalism, then the numbers made use by maths could in certain situations represent incorporeal entities, such as individual souls or psyches. In the here very broad umbrella of the latter, one could then obtain the proposition that "one incorporeal psyche added to another incorporeal psyche added to another incorporeal psyche can via assimilation converge into one possibly grander incorporeal psyche" - thereby holding the potential of producing the 1+1+1=1 proposition, which will contradict the 2+2=4 proposition — javra

This is sort of what Platonism does. A numeral represents an object known as a number, so one object plus one object equals one object. However, the objects each have different values, and the value is represented by the numeral, so we do not have 1+1=1.

So as to not overly focus on Chistian beliefs, I should maybe add that the non-physicalist understanding of numbers as I’ve just outlined it pervades popular culture at large: from the notion that (non-physical) being is one (as in the statement, "we are all one," or the dictum of "e pluribus unum") to the notion that in a romantic relationship the two can become one. With all such beliefs being disparate from the stance that 1+1 can only equal 2 in all cases. — javra

Platonism pervades mathematics. We learn in school the difference between a numeral and a number. The numeral "2" signifies an object, which is the number two. Then what is important is the value assigned to the object. So two really does become one, but that one has a distinctly different value from what the other two each have. And in a fundamental way it is consistent with the physical approach in the sense that the values indicated are the same. However, there is a non-physical object which is added in.

Yes, it certainly is pivotal to what my argument for global fallibilism consists of.

But, again, I find no reason to doubt the truth of 2+2=4 in the absence of inconsistencies. And 2+2=4 is certainly consistent. — javra

There is more to truth than consistency, there is also the matter of correspondence with reality. This is why interpretation is pivotal. To judge whether 2+2=4 is consistent we need a statement to determine 'consistent with what'. The "what" here forms the basis of the supposed reality which we will judge correspondence with.

So for example, in basic arithmetic we might interpret each "2" as signifying two objects, the "+" as signifying an operation of addition, the "=" as signifying equivalence, and "4" as signifying four objects. But more sophisticated mathematicians might interpret "2+2" as signifying an object, and "4" as signifying an object, and "=" as signifying "is the same as". The "reality" which "2+2=4" corresponds with (is consistent with), making it true, is determined by the principles (axioms) which the interpretation is based in.

...might in fact be the right interpretation of the proposition... — javra

This I believe is the key phrase toward understanding javra's position on this matter. We must consider "2+2=4" to be a sequence of symbols requiring interpretation, to abstract meaning. And, there is always some degree of subjectivity which enters that process of interpretation. So, when two different people produce two different descriptions, (interpretations) of the meaning which they each abstract from the phrase "2+2=4", we can judge one as a better interpretation than the other. And, if we leave the possibility open, that we can always find a better interpretation, then the question of "the right interpretation" remains unanswered.

Yes, watch me. I can be just as immature as you are. You want to immaturely run away and ignore anyone who produces evidence and logic which proves your theory to be wrong. But we can run after you and hurl insults.

Please come out of your daydream and start to consider the way things are. In the real world irrationality runs rampant. And, you'll find that the real world full of evil is a safer place to live, than a fantasy world where everyone thinks the way you want them to.

I've already said that understanding a choice isn't about one's reasons for making it so I don't think we need to go over that ground again. Quite apart from that, you're the one who is suggesting that this is all post hoc rationalization. I wasn't suggesting this. — Dan

I just cannot grasp what you mean by "understand". As I think I've shown, your use of the word does not match what you say it means. If "understanding" a choice requires knowing what that choice means (as you state), this implies "what it means to the person making it". And knowing what it means to the person making it is to position it within the context of the person's thoughts. That means the reasons for it. Therefore knowing the reasons for the choice is a requirement to "understanding" the choice, by your stated definition of "understanding a choice".

I mean, this seems pretty easy to understand to me. I was pointing out that an agent that has no desires seems imaginable and therefore possible and that such an agent could still understand the choices that belong to it/them. What part tripped you up? — Dan

I cannot imagine an agent who chooses, and also has no desires. We could imagine it making a random selection, but then we'd have to question what causes it to act on one possibility rather than another. And we'd see that the cause of the acting would be external to the so-called "agent" which is supposed to act in this way, therefore this would not be the act of an agent at all. If we are to assume an agent which actually chooses one possibility over another, (rather than being caused by an external force to make a random selection) then we must assume some sort of desire, or reason, for this agent to choose one possibility rather than the other.

Now we consider whether we should perform action 2 (praising action 1) or actino 3 (condemning action 1).
We determine that, though action 1 was wrong, praising it will lead to better consequences than condemning it (perhaps it would usually work out well, but did not in this case due to perculiar circumstances). — Dan

Dan, if action 1 is judged as wrong, due to its consequences, then how is it possible that praising action 1, because this could lead to better consequences is correct? It's already been determined that action 1 led to bad consequences, that's why it's judged as wrong. We cannot praise that action because it "could lead to better consequences", because the action already occurred, and it led to bad consequences. The only way to make a future 'similar act' lead to better consequences is to recognize the mistakes, so as to avoid them. But this is not praising the action, it is recognizing that it is not praiseworthy, and looking for ways to change it for the better.

The specifics of the act, the peculiarities of the circumstances, are part of the overall information and identity of "action 1". If you remove those specifics, to say that in other circumstances a similar act could lead to better consequences, then this similar action no longer qualifies as "action 1", the identified act which was judged as "wrong". So to say that this 'type of action', in other circumstances, might be praiseworthy is not to say that action 1 is praiseworthy. You are clearly making an error of misidentification, and not actually saying that action 1 is praiseworthy, but that a 'similar act', in other circumstances might be praiseworthy.

I really think that you have fallen into deep denial Dan. Instead of recognizing the problems with your theory, and trying to iron out those wrinkles, so that the theory might correspond with reality, you are making different sorts of fantastic imaginary scenarios, fabrications to provide evidence for your theory. But these are purely fictional scenarios, which are demonstrably impossible, so they have no correspondence with anything which could actually occur in the real world, and it just demonstrates how your theory is out of line with reality.

You have here in the preceding post, a scenario involving an agent which makes choices without any form of desires, in order to justify your claim that "understanding" a choice does not require consideration of what a person wants. This leaves you with an unintelligible definition of "understanding".

And, you also have in that same post, an imaginary scenario where an action which is judged as the wrong choice, could actually be praiseworthy because it might produce better consequences in different circumstances. But obviously this is an impossible fictitious scenario, because in different circumstances it would be a different action.

First "I felt like it" seems a perfectly sensible reason to do some things in some cases and it definitely isn't the same as saying "I don't know." — Dan

Perhaps, but the point is that "I felt like it", as the post hoc answer, indicates a lack of understanding of what the choice meant to the person at the time it was made. Therefore the person did not know what it meant to make the choice, and did not understand the choice.

Sorry Dan, I just can't follow what you're writing now. The following passage is just unintelligible to me.

I am certainly capable of imagining a free, rational agent which (at least for a length of time) has no desires. Such an agent could nevertheless understand the choices available to it, even if it doesn't care to make them one way or another. The understanding is, as I have mentioned above, a precondition to the application of one's rationality. It does not require the person to know or understand what they want, only to know and understand what the choice is and what it means to make that choice. — Dan

And the following in no way explains how a praiseworthy action could also be judged as wrong without two distinct valuation systems. I mean, you appear to be saying that the system of valuation which is used to judge the act as praiseworthy could be judged as wrong itself, but that still doesn't mean two distinct systems is not implied.

I am using one system for evaluating actions and their morality. Praising an action is, itself, an action, so it is evaluated based on its consequences (or its likely consequences). Punishing an action is the same. The initial action is evaluated for whether it is right or wrong based on its consequences and praising that action is evaluated separately based on its consequences. Punishing that action would also be evaluated based on its consequences. There's one system of evaluting the morality of actions. It's just that there is more than one action to evaluate here (the initial action, and the action of praising that action). — Dan

You're just asserting that violence is justified under most circumstances. — Clearbury

That's bullshit strawman and you know it. I just demonstrated why your claim that violence is rarely justified, and hardly ever justified is false. I never implied anything close to what you say I said, "that violence is justified under most circumstances".

I can't argue with someone like you. — Clearbury

I've noticed. Anytime anyone uses evidence and logic, to demonstrate how unsound your arguments are, you say "I can't argue with someone like you". That's obvious, you really can't, because you'll lose the battle. Run along now, Clearbury, and don't trip on the tail between your legs.

If you think you're often morally permitted to use violence against others then that's fine - I simply disagree and so, I'd wager, does virtually everyone of moral sensibility. — Clearbury

But you are not paying respect to the reality (truth) of the situation. The truth is that there is significant multitude of individuals in the world who do not have "moral sensibility", by your standards. The truth of this is evidenced by what you say about the numerous people in this thread "whose views seem to me to be indefensible", and so you chose to "ignore" them. Each one of this significant multitude of people lacking in moral sensibility, will interact with a multitude of other individuals (who may or may not have moral sensibility), on a daily basis, and each one may arbitrarily choose to use violence against these other individuals on an ongoing basis.

In these cases, where those lacking in moral sensibility, arbitrarily chose to use violence, the use of violence to protect one's rights is justified. As indicated by the statistics which may be revealed in this thread, a significant percentage of the general population are lacking in moral sensibility by your judgement. And each one of these may interact with a huge number of other people.

Therefore your claim that it is almost always wrong to use violence, and that the use of violence is only justifiable in very rare cases is completely and utterly false.

But to get to anarchy, it is sufficient that we are not allowed to decide to protect someone's rights and then bill that person and extract payment with menaces. — Clearbury

You did not answer my question, so I will ask you again. When a person provides a service to another, does that person not have a right to get paid for that service?

I am getting impatient with this constant strawman you keep setting up. If I, without asking you and without you commissioning me to do so, decide to make it my business to protect your rights, can I send you a bill for doing so and use violence against you if you decide not to pay? The answer to that question is obvious to virtually everyone: no. That's all my case requires. — Clearbury

Ha, ha, your logic (illogic) is laughable Clearbury. Again, you assume that "virtually everyone" will answer this question in the same way, "no", just like you assume "virtually everyone" with "moral sensibility" will not choose not to use violence. However, you neglect the reality and truth that there is significant multitude of individuals who do not agree with you. Are you familiar with John Locke's political philosophy, and the idea of "the social contract"?

Now, we have a large number of people who are not "morally sensible" by your standards, posing a threat of violence to you, and we have another group of people protecting your rights to be not violently treated by those with no moral sensibility. But these people are threatening to punish you if you do not pay for their service. And you believe that it is your right not to pay them because you did not personally commission them.

It looks to me, Clearbury, like you are in a situation where there is no alternative but to use violence to protect your rights. Violence is necessary. Your rights are being violated from the right and from the left, and you have no choice but to use violence to protect your own rights, because you refuse to pay those who have offered this service to you, and you need to protect your rights from their impending punishment, due to you exercising your right not to pay.

And here you are, saying things like ... it is unjust to use violence except in "rare cases", and the other, and it is "almost always wrong" to use violence. It's time for you to show your steel, demonstrate your temper, get out there and use some violence to protect your own rights, so we can all see what a hypocrite you are when you are freely choosing to use violence, while preaching that the use of violence is almost always unjustifiable.

That's a strawman version of my view. — Clearbury

I gave two quotes from you, concerning the conclusion I am talking about.. One, that it is unjust to use violence except in "rare cases", and the other, that it is "almost always wrong" to use violence. This is not a straw man, those are your words. And, I demonstrated that to be an unsound conclusion.

The SECOND claim - that in conjunction with the first gets one to anarchy - is that though a person is entitled to use violence to protect another's rights, they are not entitled to use violence to extract payment for doing so (not from the person whose rights one has decided to protect, anyway). — Clearbury

You don't think that a person has a right to get paid for their work? Is that what this claim is about? If you work for me, and I refuse to pay you, am I not violating your rights by not paying you?

It is clear to reason that it is unjust for individuals to use violence or the threat of violence against others apart from in rare cases where this is needed to protect a person's rights. And it is equally clear to reason that if a person decides to protect another person's rights, they are not entitled then to bill that person for having done so and extract payment with menaces. From those claims - claims that seem intuitively clear to the reason of most and that it would be intuitively highly costly to reject - anarchy follows. — Clearbury

As I pointed out to you, and you have still not replied, no logic allows you to move from the premise that it is only acceptable to use violence to protect rights, to the following conclusion, that it is almost always wrong to use violence, or that these are "rare cases".

This would require another premise, that it is not often that rights need to be protected. However, it is very obvious that such a premise would be false. Therefore the following conclusion of yours is not only invalid, because you have not provided the required premise, but if you did provide the required premise it would be false and the conclusion would be unsound..

It is almost always wrong to use violence or the threat of it against another person. — Clearbury

The fact is, that the world is full of irrational people, who do not respect the principle that violence is only acceptable to protect one's rights. Therefore you need to consider the possibility that using violence is commonly the correct thing to do.

And, you know that the world is full of irrational people, you've met a number of them in this thread. However, you would prefer to ignore those irrational people, and hope that they go away.

No, I am ignoring those whose views seem to me to be indefensible. — Clearbury

It's becoming glaringly obvious that you have a deeply flawed approach. Ignore all the irrational people in the world who commonly use violence irrationally, hoping that they will go away. Then keep on insisting that it is almost always wrong to use violence.

I didn't say and have applied their rationality to it. I said such that they understood it such that they could apply their rationality to it. — Dan

This is where the problem is then. This phrase "such that they could apply their rationality to it" implies that applying rationality to it is done post hoc. This means that "understood" here means absolutely nothing. There is no requirement of an act of applying rationality, or even any sort of thinking whatsoever, prior to the choice, only a requirement that the person can 'rationalize' the choice after the fact. Such rationalizing generally consists of fictional excuses, specious, and fabricated with the intent of creating the illusion that the choice was rational, and understood, when it really was not.

How can you believe that "such that they could apply their rationality to it" implies any sort of understanding? What you are describing is the potential to be understood, the possibility of applying rationality. But the potential to be understood is equally the potential to be misunderstood (as in the case of rationalizing), and so it is not any type of understanding at all.

That being said, I would also say that "I felt like it" is itself a reason, even if it is perhaps not a good one. — Dan

It is very possible to give reasons which demonstrate a lack of understanding. This is often the case with rationalizing, but rationalizing may also give reasons which are intentionally misleading. So, even though "I felt like it" may be classified as the reason for the choice, it is a reason which expresses that the person does not understand the choice. In this way it is similar to "I don't know", which is a more explicit way of saying that the choice is not understood.

The person who does not understand one's own choice, when asked why the choice was made, may answer "I don't know". If pressed further, for a better answer they might say "I felt like it". If pressed even further, one might rationalize, and fabricate fictious reasons. All of these types of "reasons for the choice" indicate that the person did not understand the choice when it was made.

As for the latter, no, understanding one's choices is not about what one wants, it is about knowing the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice. It seems entirely plausible that an entity with no desires could nevertheless understand its choices. — Dan

How can you possibly believe this? The choice of a human being concerns what one wants, therefore understanding a choice necessarily involves considering its relations within that context. This is the context of the person's intentions. Understanding a choice ("knowing the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice") is to properly position the choice within the context of the person's intentions.

Do you even think about what your words mean before writing them? I cannot believe that you could actually believe some of this stuff you are writing now. Are you the same "Dan" as whom I was talking to before you left on break? It seems like you've gone off the rails now. How do you think that something which selects (say a machine or something), without any sort of desires or intentions which guide its selections toward an end, could possibly "understand" its selections? To "understand" a choice is to place it as the means to an end. The words "meaning", and "means", which are used to describe understanding a choice, all imply reference to intention. You Dan, are using "understand" in some random ad hoc way, which varies with each time you use it, rendering the word completely void of meaning in your overall text.

I think I have understood your criticism, it was just misplaced. There aren't "two different systems". What is praiseworthy and what is right are entirely different from a consequentialist perspective because what is praiseworthy is a judgment of what should be praised to achieve good consequences, and what is right is a moral judgement. There is one system, it's just that praiseworthy is not really a moral judgment on a consequentialist account in the same way that it might be on some other account of morality. — Dan

Why do you refuse to acknowledge the fact that you have expressed two very different systems of valuation? You even name those two systems as 1)"praiseworthy" and 2) "moral judgment". The former is a system for producing a judgement as to whether a choice ought to be praised for its likelihood of producing good consequences, and the latter is a system for producing a judgement as to whether a choice is morally correct.

Can you not accept the fact that these are two distinct systems for evaluating the same type of choice? And, since the same choice may be high on one scale, and low on the other scale, the two valuation systems are incompatible. Why is this so difficult for you to acknowledge?

You have indeed been accusing me of employing two incompatible systems from the beginning, but this has been due to misunderstanding on your part. — Dan

Your use of "understanding" doesn't seem to allow for the possibility of misunderstanding. Any sort of rationalizing after the fact demonstrates "understanding", so where could "misunderstanding" enter the picture? Accusing me of misunderstanding is hypocrisy on your part.

And, your continued denial of the fact that you employ two distinct systems for evaluating a choice, when you even name the two, describe them as different, and show that the resulting judgements of the same act are contrary to each other, is just impossible to understand. This is not a misunderstanding on my part, because I profess no understanding at all of such denial. Your actions appear as completely irrational therefore not at all possible to understand, therefore misunderstanding, which is a belief of understanding that is false, is excluded.

Again, just one scale. Being "praiseworthy" isn't a seperate moral scale, it is a judgment of whether we should praise something, which relates to whether praising it would be right, rather than whether the initial action would be right (again, on a consequentialist account of morality). — Dan

You are missing the point. Of course "praiseworthy" is not a separate "moral scale", the other scale is already called "moral" judgement. This would create ambiguity right in the title, you'd have two "moral" scales which are blatantly contradictory. What I am saying is that you have two distinct scales for evaluating the same act, one is the "moral" scale, and the other is the "praiseworthy" scale. According to the principles of these two distinct scales, the same choice which is of high value (favourable) on the one scale is of low value (unfavourable) on the other scale. Do you see how that contradiction, favourable/unfavourable, is implied?

This is the same issue as your moral scale based in consequentialism, and your praiseworthy scale based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices. You use two distinct scales which produce contradictory judgements.

Would you prefer I say "what it is to make that choice"? — Dan

This is nonsense to me, and that's why I avoided it. No one knows what it is to make a choice, in general, that's why there is an ongoing debate between free willies and determinists. And we have even less of an idea of what it is to make a particular choice. So using this phrase would be completely pointless, it would simply mean that no one understands any of one's own choices, or any choices in general.

No, what I am suggesting is that a person understands their choice if they understand the nature of that choice and what it is to make that choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it. This is very much to do with what happens before the choice, not after it. — Dan

OK, so how can a person be said to understand the nature of a choice, and have applied their rationality to it, when the choice is contrary to what they desire, and made for no reason (whim or caprice), like the example of buying the shirt?

What matters is that the understand what choice they are making and what it means to make that choice so that they can respond to reasons regarding that choice. If they then decide to make their choice on a whim then that's fine. — Dan

This would be contradictory though. To make a choice on a whim explicitly means that the person cannot respond to reasons regarding that choice. That's what "whim" means. the choice cannot be accounted for. So if the person understands the choice one is making, prior to making the choice, so as to be able to respond with reasons regarding the choice, it is impossible, by reason of contradiction, that the person could then make the choice on a whim.

What matters is that they know the choice that is being made and what it means to make that choice. — Dan

It's very clear to me, that the person in the shirt example does not know "what it means to make that choice". Why is this not clear to you? The person wants to only buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, yet chooses to buy a shirt of unknown fabric. Obviously the person does not understand that buying a shirt of unknown fabric means that there is a very significant probability that it will not be the desired 100% cotton.

Again, this is analogous to my lottery example. If a person has the policy of not buying lottery tickets because they know that the odds of winning are terrible, yet they are persuaded to buy into a specific lottery because the prize is much bigger than others, clearly they do not know what that choice to buy the ticket means. A lottery with a larger prize does not indicate that the odds of winning are better. In fact the reverse is usually the case. And since 'bad odds' is the reason for abstaining from buying in the first place, the person clearly does not know what that choice, (to buy into a lottery with the worst odds) means.

First, I would say that when someone makes a choice on a "whim" they are likely responding to the reason of "I felt like it", but this is neither here nor there really. Second, and much more importantly, this is not wrong because what someone wants has nothing to do with whether their choice is understood. Understanding a choice isn't about what reasons one has for making it. — Dan

This entire paragraph is absolutely senseless. How can you say the response "I felt like it" even resembles a type of understanding of one's choice? Further, and much more importantly how can you even think that what someone wants can be divorced from any understanding of one's choice? Isn't it the case, that a choice, any choice, and every choice, is in some very significant way, related to what the person wants?

Understanding a choice is about what reasons one has for making it. In fact, that's what understanding a choice is, knowing the reasons for the choice. If the reasons are not consistent with the choice, then the choice is incoherent and it is misunderstood. That is why understanding a choice is very much "about what reasons one has for making it". And if there are no reasons (whim or caprice), there can be no understanding nor misunderstanding. I really cannot even imagine what you must think "understand" means. Your use is totally foreign to me, appearing like you just sort of make up random shit as you go.

It does make sense. It may have been the best choice in terms of expected value from the perspective of the person and the information they had at the time, but turned out to be the wrong choice due to information that they didn't have access to. — Dan

You do not appear to have understood my criticism. You can argue that "it does make sense", but this requires two distinct values systems for judging the same decisions. The first is "the perspective of the person...at the time". The second system for judging the same decision, includes "information that they didn't have access to".

The two are very clearly incompatible, in a very strong sense, contradictory. The first explicitly does not include information which the second explicitly does include. So the two systems for valuing the judgement are based in contradictory principles. This allows you to say that according to the one system of valuation it is "the best" decision, and from the other system of evaluation it is a "wrong" decision.

As I said, you've been demonstrating this problem of employing two incompatible systems for evaluating decisions, from the beginning of the thread. One system employs a consequentialist evaluation scheme, while the other values freedom of choice, and bases judgement on your stated principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". As I've told you a number of times now, these two systems of valuation are incompatible. Consequently, you distort the meaning of "one's own choices" twisting and turning it in all sorts of fantastic ways, in your attempt to establish compatibility. Of course no amount of twisting and turning will allow you to put that square peg into the round hole. You are attempting to make contradictory principles (the square thing and the round thing) compatible.

None of this has anything to do with incompatible moral values or scales — Dan

Of course it does! You clearly expressed two distinct (and contradictory) scales for judging the person's choice. By the one scale (the perspective of the person making the choice), the choice is judged as "the best". By the other scale (a perspective which takes into account information which the person does not have), the choice is judged as "wrong". Clearly the two judgements contradict each other, the best decision cannot be the wrong decision. And the obvious reason for this contradiction is that the two scales, upon which the judgements are based, employ contrary principles.

I would also say they are made for a reason, but whether or not they are made for a reason makes very little difference between understanding one's choices (as I have said many times) is not about what reasons one has for making those choices. — Dan

What could you possibly mean by "understanding one's choices" in this context? If whether or not a choice was made for a reason makes very little difference to "understanding one's choice", what does "understanding" mean. It cannot mean "what it means to make the choice", as you say, because "the reasons for the choice" is implied by "what it means to make the choice". "Meaning" implies what is meant, and this implies intention. How could one know the intention behind the choice without knowing the reasons for the choice?

I mean, we are devolving into nuh-uh territory here. I disagree. That isn't what I am talking about when I mention someone "understanding their own choices". — Dan

I know that isn't what your talking about when you mention "understanding their own choices". In your usage "understanding" appears to have no meaning at all. As I explained, when you say "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", "understand" is completely redundant. We could pull it out, and simply proceed with "the ability to make one's own choices" instead, without changing your intended meaning.

However, you do seem inclined to give "understand" some meaning in a retrospective sense. If a person can look back in time, and say "I made that choice", then the person "understands". the choice. This appears to be your usage of "understanding". If a person looks at the choice after the fact, in retrospect, and recognizes oneself to have made the choice, then would say that the person understands the choice. The problem is that this is unrelated to the ability to make a choice. The ability of a person to make a choice is to look to the future and choose accordingly, and the ability of a person to "understand" (by your usage) a choice is to look to the past and recognize that a choice was made.

Is this what you are proposing, two distinct aspects of decision making? One, the ability to make a choice, looking to the future and choosing, and the other the ability to understand a choice, looking to the past and recognizing that a choice was made?

Responding to reasons to make such a choice is very much something that happens before making the choice. Responding to as in being responsive to, being able to make a decision based on reasons. — Dan

I think you really need to clarify this, because it is not consistent with what you've been saying. Making a choice on a whim, or impulse, clearly does not include responding to reasons to make that choice, before making it. Making a choice on whim or impulse is exactly the opposite of this, choosing without considering reasons before making the choice. Yet you say so long as the person can give reasons in retrospect, then the person "understands" the choice. This is why I propose the separation above, between looking forward in time, and looking backward in time, so that there is no ambiguity in our use of "understands".

Further, it making a choice that is contrary to what you want, or especially contrary to what you wanted in the past, does not mean the person didn't understand the choice. — Dan

Clearly this is wrong. If the person wants X, and on a whim chooses not-X, then it is impossible that this choice could be "understood", in any sense of the word, because "whim" implies that the choice was made without reasons. Looking forward in time, prior to the choice, "whim" is given as what inclines the choice, and whim distinctly means without a reason. So the person chooses what is expressly not wanted, without reason. That cannot be understood. And, looking backward in time, after the fact of the choice, any reasons given for choosing what was not wanted would be fictional, made up as rationalizations, because acting on a whim clearly denies that there are reasons for this behaviour. Therefore, from both perspectives of "understand", it is impossible that the person could understand that choice.

Whether a person understands their choice is all about what is going on in their mind. The disagreement here is that you think acting in a way that is counter to one's desire is proof-positive that one did not understand the choice in question. I don't agree. I think people can act counter to what they want while still understanding what they are doing. — Dan

What is at issue here is not "acting in a way which is counter to one's desire". We do that all the time, for good reason, in an understandable way. This on its own, in no way implies that the person did not understand one's choice. Often this is simply a case of changing one's mind. And changing one's mind occurs with reason.

What is at issue is acting in a way which is counter to one's desire, without a reason for that act. This is what is known as acting on a whim, impulse, caprice, emotional urges, being overcome by passion, etc.. There are subconscious forces which incline one to act without considering reasons. We can understand the reality of this type of act through the reality of habits and addictions. We cannot ignore the reality of these causes of action, because they are very commonplace. When these inclinations to act lead to actions which are contrary to what an individual has expressed as one's desire, then it is clear that the actions cannot be understood by the person who chose them. The choice is made without considering reasons, and it is contrary to what has been expressed as what is desired. How do you think that such a choice could be understood?

It would be entirely reasonable to praise someone for making the best decision they could while acknowledging that it turned out to be wrong due to factors they couldn't have known about. — Dan

This makes no sense. If the person made the best choice that they could, you cannot say that the person made the wrong choice, unless you are judging "best" on a different scale from your judgement of "wrong". If "best" and "wrong" are consistent in principle, then it is impossible that the person's best choice is the wrong choice.

That is a problem you've consistently demonstrated since the beginning of the thread. You employ two distinct scales of moral value, and this statement is perfect evidence of that fact. One scale allows you to say the person made "the best decision they could", while the other scale allows you to say this same decision which was "the best" decision in that set of circumstances, was also the wrong decision.

This problem is indicative of the general problem with your approach. You are attempting to reconcile two incompatible moral scales, one which values the freedom of choice of the individual (providing the basis for the judgement of the person's "best choice"), and the other which values the moral principles of consequentialism (providing the basis for the judgement of the "wrong" choice).

As soon as you recognize that these two value scales are incommensurable, and fundamentally incompatible, then you will give up on your attempt to establish compatibility between them. However, as you've indicated, you've already wasted a good part of ten years on this problem, and you also seem completely unwilling to admit that this was wasted time, so you forge onward. Therefore I conclude that you will most likely continue in your futile effort, refusing to admit to yourself, that your time has been wasted, and so you dig yourself deeper and deeper into an endless pit, by wasting more and more time.

No I didn't. I said the actions of agents with free will were not wholly caused by preceding factors but rather by the agent themself and were in principle not predictable. It's absolutely fine for actions to be caused by the person performing those actions making a choice. I would say that is exactly what I think causes them. It's not that I don't think actions have causes, it's that I think the agent is generating new casual chains rather than is just a link in a casual chain that stretches back to the origins of the universe. — Dan

OK, we can work with this premise if you like, that choices cause actions, but then you need to respect the separation between choice and action, as the separation between cause and effect. In the case of cause and effect, the cause necessitates the effect, but occurrence of the effect does not necessarily mean that the associated cause occurred. This is because different things can have the same effect (raising the temperature causes water to boil, as does lowering the pressure, for example).

This implies that the occurrence of human actions does not necessarily mean that a choice was made. Would you rather deal with the type of actions mentioned by me above, acting on a whim, caprice, impulse, emotional urges, being overcome by passion, and even habit, which are contrary to one's expressed desire, as actions which occur without a choice? This way, instead of classing such actions as ones which are not understood, we'd call them actions which are caused by something other than a choice.

Look, if you think the Jews had no moral rights under the Nazis then it follows that the Nazis did nothing wrong in exterminating them. I can't argue with someone who thinks that way. — Clearbury

Clearbury, you are jumping to conclusion without the required premises, therefore your argument is illogical. That's why I've bee telling you that you need to justify your principles. In the argument stated here, you have only one premise, "the Jews had no moral rights under the Nazis". Then from this one premise you jump to the conclusion: therefore "the Nazis did nothing wrong in exterminating them". You need a premise which provides the link between "moral rights" and "wrong" behaviour.

To assume that "wrong" is opposed to "rights" is to confuse different meanings of "right", and this is known as the fallacy of equivocation. So you need to clear up the obvious equivocation implied when you say that if a person thinks that the Jews had no moral rights under the Nazis, then the person thinks that the Nazis did nothing wrong in exterminating them. In reality, the one is just evidence of the other. The exterminations are evidence that a lack of rights is the truth.

Please allow me to guide you in rephrasing your argument so as to escape the obvious fallacy you have committed. You need a second premise. The premise needs to state that the code of rules called "moral rights" dictates exclusively, what is morally right and what is morally wrong, in human actions. Then you might conclude that if a person does not have the moral right to live it is not wrong to kill that person.

Do you understand this requirement? If not, I think you would be just demonstrating yourself to be an irrational fool. So please reformulate your argument, with the premises required to avoid the obvious equivocation which is implied by it, in its current state.

The "intuitions" in question are relevant to survival. If there is a world external to ourself, it would be necessary to have a functionally accurate view of that world. If there is not such an external world, what would explain this false intuition? — Relativist

Whatever it is that kills people would be the explanation here. It doesn't have to be "the world". We call whatever it is, that seems to be not a part of oneself, "the independent world", and we have a conception of what "the world" means, including the intuitions of space and time. If the conception of "the world" is wrong, then it is not the world which kills us but something else. That "a world external to ourselves" kills us would be false. The intuitions are false.

No, it's not. Our sensory perceptions aren't oracles that magically know truths beyond what we could possibly perceive. Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time. — Relativist

What does "more precise truths" mean? Either a proposition is true or it is false, the idea that one truth is more true than another doesn't make any sense.

Bergson’s critique aligns with Kant in suggesting that time is not merely a succession of isolated moments that can be objectively measured, but a continuous and subjective flow that we actively synthesize through consciousness. This synthesis is what lets us experience time as duration, not just as sequential units. It is our awareness of the duration between points in time that is itself time. There is no time outside that awareness. — Wayfarer

This is the issue with Zeno's arrow paradox, which supposedly demonstrates that motion is impossible. The problem was analyzed extensively by Aristotle, as sophistry which needed to be disproven. The analysis, along with other examples, resulted in the conclusion that "becoming" is distinctly incompatible with "being", and this in part leads to the requirement of substance dualism. The other required premise is that they both are real.

Any measurement of time requires a beginning point and an end point. Determination of these points requires the assumption that there is a describable "state-of-being" at such points. The "state-of-being" is describable as how things are, at that point in time, so it is necessarily assumed that no time is passing at that point when there is a state-of-being. Therefore the "point in time" has no temporal existence or reality, it is removed from temporal existence which is existence while time is passing. If we allow that time is actually passing within a point in time, then the "state-of-being" is lost, because change will be occurring within the point in time. Consequently, precision in measurements of time will be forfeited accordingly. But in order that we have any capacity to measure time at all, it is necessary that the "state-of-being" is to some extent real.

This is what Einstein's special relativity does, it allows variance, or vagueness within the point in time, by assuming that simultaneity is relative, consequently any "state-of being" is relative. By accepting this principle we accept that it is impossible to make precise temporal measurements, because there is necessarily variance in the state-of-being at any point in time due to the relativity of simultaneity, making any proposed state-of-being perspective dependent. This means that there is no real, independent state-of-being, consequently no independent "world". The "state-of-being" is still a valid principle, making temporal measurement possible, but it is perspective (frame) dependent. When the different perspective-dependent states-of-being are compared they are reconciled by the assumption that the only real existence is activity (becoming), one motion relative to another with no absolute rest. The activity (becoming) which is occurring gets a different description dependent on the perspective.

There are ways around this problem, but they are all very complex, and conventions tend to follow Ockham's principle. As Aristotle and Plato both demonstrated, reality consists of both becoming and being, This produces the premises required to make substance dualism the logical conclusion. But understanding the nature of time, and why it imposes on us the requirement of dualism, takes more than a casual effort.

I have justified my belief. Perhaps you missed it. Here it is again: if governments determine what rights people have then the Jews had no rights under the Nazis (and thus in exterminating millions of Jews, the Nazis violated no one's rights, certianly not the Jews they exterminated).
The Nazis violated the rights of the millions of Jews they exterminated
Therefore, governments do not determine what rights people have.

That is a case. It is an argument and its conclusion follows from its premises and its premises are obviously true. — Clearbury

I don't follow your argument. Those people had no rights under Nazi rule, that's why they were exterminated. If they had rights they would not have been abused. This seems pretty clear, just like the slaves in the US had no rights. The second premise, that their rights were violated, is from the perspective of a different community, one other than the Nazi community who denied them of rights. This community has a different conception of what rights Jewish people have. Therefore, your argument seems to actually prove the opposite of what you claim. The rights that people have is something determined by the community.

Note, I am talking about moral rights here, not legal ones. — Clearbury

Morality deals with good and bad, "rights" is not the subject of moral philosophy. Rights consist of rules, and although they are usually consistent with ethical rules, they are more properly understood as legal rules. This misconception of "moral rights" could be the root of your confusion.

The issue is much simpler than people think. It is almost always wrong to use violence or the threat of it against another person. No one - no one worth arguing with, anyway - seriously disputes that. Yes, it can be justified under some circumstances - when one is in immediate danger or someone else is - but not otherwise. (There's of course room for a bit of debate over when one can legitimately use violence against another, but not much....every reaonable person is going to agree that the boundaries are pretty tight, even if there's no consensus on precisely where they lie). — Clearbury

I think this is a very faulty principle Clearbury. It is based in what "every reasonable person is going to agree" to. The problem is that there are very many unreasonable people in the world. And, those unreasonable people will not agree "It is almost always wrong to use violence". Being unreasonable, they perceive many instances when violence is called for. Because of this use of violence by unreasonable people, the reasonable people have reason to return that violence with defensive violence. Therefore your claim that "it is almost always wrong to use violence" is proven to be false by the fact that many people are unreasonable. Violence is a fact of life which needs to be reckoned with.

Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions). — Relativist

Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles.

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false? — Relativist

There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false.

Special relativity demonstrates that our perceptions of space and time aren't universally true, but it also explains how it is true within the context in which our sensory perceptions apply. — Relativist

Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that. — Relativist

How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth?

But so entertaining goes far deeper, I believe, than claiming physical reality to be on par to something one hallucinates or else can imagine at will or so forth. As individual first-person points of view we are all bound to the physicality that surrounds, and our very lives are dependent on there being a sufficient degree of conformity to it. — javra

What one hallucinates, and what one imagines at will, are very different concepts, and ought not be classed together in this context. This is because we need to maintain some kind of division between things created by the mind which are not created consciously by will, and things willfully created. This is necessary to allow for the reality of the mind's subconscious activity in creating things like sense perceptions, images etc.. And when we allow that sense perceptions are creations of the mind, this enables us to properly understand things like dreams and hallucinations. But it also exposes the fact that what we know as "physical reality" is just a creation of the mind.

The fact that our lives are jeopardized by this force (I'll call the medium "a force" in this context) which we know as physical reality does not imply that our lives are dependent on it. Those are two different concepts. Our lives are dependent on that which gives us life, whatever it is which throws us into this situation of jeopardy, but the force which jeopardizes us is not necessarily the same as that which we are dependent on.

Because of this, it is incorrect to say "we are all bound to the physicality that surrounds". The reality of free-will indicates that this boundness is not real. It is an illusion which we have created. The illusion has been created (part of it subconsciously through evolution and instinct, and part of it consciously through education and science), because it assists us in understanding and dealing with "the force" in our actions. The important point to understand here is that this force is power, and as much as power is a force which can appear as if it restricts and binds us, it can also be harnessed and used to enhance one's freedom. But in order to use the force in this way, we need to understand it, and to understand it we represent it in the determinist model which produces the illusion that we are bound by it.

Still, a drop is typically understood as that amount of liquid which might remain intact and maybe fall as such from a stick which had been placed into the liquid. — javra

This is incorrect. You are simply defining "drop" as a quantity, for the purpose of your analogy, when "drop" is really not commonly understood as a quantity. My OED has as the first definition "a small round or pear-shaped portion of liquid that hangs or falls or adheres to a surface". Notice that the shape and activity of the thing, as an individual object called "a drop", are the principal features. The quantity is secondary, and is simply stated in the relative term of "small". "Small" does not indicate any specific quantity.

But importantly, if no solipsism then, necessarily, the world can only be brought about by a multitude of minds - and not by a sole mind. — javra

You are not getting the important point. The judgement of "no solipsism" may be only the creation of a mind. So we cannot produce the necessity required for your conclusion. "The world" might still just be the creation of a lonely mind, which likes to have other minds to keep it company. Once we accept that the subconscious part of the mind is engaged in creating (as evidenced in dreams and hallucinations), we cannot claim that just because the other minds are not willfully created by my conscious mind, they are not created by the mind in an absolute sense. The other minds might still be created by the subconscious part. The conclusion of "no solipsism" might be just a tactic (evolutionarily produced or something) which is allowing the mind to better deal with the force.

To be clear, are you then saying that if the so-called "medium" of physicality in total - to include my physical body and its brain - is not something that is an aspect of my own mind it would then need to be something the occurs as an aspect of some other individual mind? — javra

I mentioned that as a possibility. The issue here is that we do not know, and we cannot exclude anything as impossible until we do know, because that could mislead us.

As to the initial question, (I take it that) there is an actuality, or set of actualities, which affects all observers equally irrespective of what the observes believe, perceive, imagine, want, interpret, etc. — javra

This cannot be true, we can almost exclude it as impossible. We know each person to have a distinct perspective, and this necessitates the conclusion that the so-called "set of actualities") does not effect observers equally. The "distinct perspective" necessitates the conclusion of unequal effects. The equality you refer to is a creation of the mind. We create equality to understand each other.

Do you deny there being actualities which occur irrespective of what any one individual sentient being intends, believes, and so forth? — javra

What you call "actualities" is I believe, what I called "force". The problem with your question is that the force is understood as relative to the agent, so it does not make sense to ask about its existence independent of the agent. It is only a force relative to the thing which wants to move. We can only understand it in its relation to us, because that's the only existence which it has to us. It appears to us as "a force" because of our living tendency to act, but without that tendency to act, it may be nothing at all. So what appears as "the force", the independent reality, may actually be nothing, in the purest sense of the word. That's why I say questions about an independent reality are really incoherent.

God, pull up your pants please. We don't need to see that.

I am not sure I can argue with someone who thinks a person has a right if and only if the government of any community of which they are a member says they do. That view is so plainly false to me that I am at a loss to know how to argue with someone who is willing to embrace its implications. — Clearbury

Try demonstrating, or showing with logic, that what you believe is actually true. It's called justifying your belief. If you strongly belief that "a right" is more than just something which a community of human beings bestows upon you, then you ought to be able to provide support for this belief. Otherwise your belief is nothing other than a desire, you believe it because you want it to be true. And if that's the case you need to consider what RogueAI is saying, perhaps you want something which is impossible.

Fair enough. I'll try. First, we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is false. Therefore, ours is not the only mind that currently occurs in the world. Given this fact, we then entertain the metaphysical reality/actuality that there can be no world in the absence of minds (in the plural). — javra

What we can conclude from the assumption that solipsism is false, is that there must be something which separates one mind from another, some sort of medium. But we cannot exclude the possibility that the medium is an illusion, or mind-created, as a sort of deficiency in minds' ability for direct communication with one another.

Via one convenient though imperfect analogy: We all know that an ocean is not one single drop of water. Given this fact, we then hold the conviction that there can be no ocean in the absence of individual drops of water from which the ocean is constituted. — javra

This one doesn't make sense to me. What is a "drop of water"? Why can't we say that the ocean is a single drop of water? And to me, "a drop" is an isolated quantity of water, so it makes no sense to talk about a body of water as if it is made of drops. If a number of drops put together makes an amount of water which is more than a drop, so that it cannot be called a drop, the entire amount exists without any drops within it, as a drop of water is an isolated thing. If a number of creeks coming together creates a river, it doesn't make sense to conclude that a river consists of a bunch of creeks.

In a roundabout way, the same can then be upheld for any non-solipsistic idealism: the physical world is mind-independent when it comes to any one individual mind (or any relatively large quantity of minds) - this even thought it is mind-dependent in the sense that no physical world can exist in the complete absence of minds. — javra

Sorry javra, I just cannot understand what you are saying here. This is what I get from it. If there is a complete absence of minds, then there is also the complete absence of a physical world. In that sense there is no mind-independent word. However, if there is so much as one mind (or a multitude of minds), then there must also be a mind-independent.

So how does the existence of a mind (or multitude of minds) necessitate the existence of a mind-independent world? If it is the existence of a mind, (or minds), which necessitates that world, how can it be a mind-independent world?

As one possible summation of this, within any non-solipsistic idealism, there will necessarily be an external world that occurs independently of me and my own mind. — javra

I don't deny that there would be something outside my own mind, what I called the "medium" above. But why conceive of this as "a world", or "a universe", or even "reality", as all these refer to mind dependent things, if you want to think of the medium as mind-independent? But, since I believe in the reality of numerous minds, there is nothing to persuade me that the "medium" is not something inside another mind, therefore not mind-independent at all.

We obviously perceive space and time... — Relativist

I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".

Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? — Relativist

Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible.

If what is addressed by the term “reality” (I presume physical reality which, in a nutshell, is that actuality (or set of actualities) which affects all minds in equal manners irrespective of what individual minds might believe or else interpret, etc.) will itself be contingent on the occurrence of all minds which simultaneously exist—and, maybe needless to add, if the position of solipsism is … utterly false—then the following will necessarily hold: reality can only be independent of any one individual mind. As it is will be independent of any particular cohort of minds—just as long as this cohort is not taken to be that of “all minds that occur in the cosmos”. — javra

I really can't understand what you are saying here javra. Perhaps you could rephrase it?

Do you really doubt there exists a mind-independent reality? — Relativist

I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent.