III. Evolutionary Foundations

From the first single-celled organisms, life has evolved mechanisms to process information about its surroundings. Bacteria move toward nutrients (chemotaxis) and away from toxins; while simple, these are proto-cognitive behaviors—rudimentary information processing loops.
As organisms developed nervous systems, the ability to distinguish pain from pleasure, safety from danger, and kin from stranger conferred adaptive advantages.
Human consciousness, therefore, is not a cosmic anomaly but the peak of an ancient biological trajectory—the culmination of matter learning to model and predict itself. — Copernicus

If the first single-celled organism required something immaterial (the soul) then physicalism is excluded. So this basic description does not provide any evidence to support physicalism.

IV. Emergence: When Physics Becomes Experience

Though each neuron obeys physical law, the collective pattern of billions of neurons yields subjective experience. This phenomenon, known as emergence, marks the transition from matter behaving mechanically to matter behaving meaningfully.
A single water molecule is not “wet,” yet collective behavior gives rise to wetness. Likewise, a single neuron does not “think,” but structured neural networks do.

Hence, consciousness does not violate physical law—it is physical law in a higher-order configuration. — Copernicus

If each neuron disobeys physical law, which seems to be the case as quantum physics describes activities which disobey physical law, obeying laws of probability instead, then this is evidence against physicalism.

However, I don't think we'll agree on those details. I enjoyed the idea that Aristotle's accidents are equivalent to Adorno's non-identical, but in the end of course, they are very different. I'm not sure I understand the rest. If your central point is that for Adorno, concepts = bad and intuitions = good, that's not right at all. — Jamal

To be clear, I am not saying that Aristotle's accidents are equivalent to Adornos non-identical. Equivalence itself is taken as an identity type of relation which would be misleading in this context. I am using Aristotle's approach to the object, defining it as primary substance, as an analogy to help understand Adorno's approach. So I am pointing at a similarity between the two.

We appear to agree that Adorno is saying that the philosopher ought to give special status to oneself, in self-reflection, as an individuated object. Where we disagree is in how Adorno recommends that we develop the relationship between the object and the universal, or in this case, the particular person and the more general, state. I think you jump the gun, and jump to a conclusion when you say that the individual grounds oneself in the universal. Adorno has not yet revealed how the individual is to be related to the universal, as a "subject", and the traditional spiritual way is for the individual to ground one's own existence in the divine. Then the self-reflecting individual sees oneself as a sort of medium between divinity and state, while the non-self-reflecting individual might see the state as a medium between the divine and the individual.

So I am definitely not saying concepts=bad, and intuitions=good. Adorno has not made any reference to such a hierarchy of values. That would be the sort of grounding which I am looking for, and I have been critical of him from the beginning, for not providing it. But I am patient to see what comes.

I think that's a very good assessment Jamal. I completely agree with the substance of what you wrote, especially the last few paragraphs. There's one small point I would like to address though, because I think that this specific point facilitates a better understanding of what Adorno is saying. The point is the reversal he has made, from the "identity", "positive" way of thinking, which portrays the concept as extending beyond the object, to the position he now describes, in which the object extends beyond the concept. What you state as "the universal dwells within that which is individual".

Here it is in the Solidified section:

What in the object goes beyond the determinations laid upon it by
thinking, returns firstly to the subject as something immediate; where
the subject feels itself to be quite certain of itself, in the primary
experience, it is once again least of all a subject.

Here now in Quality and the Individuated:

Hegel’s aversion towards this denies the very state of
affairs [Sachverhalt] which he underlined, where it suited him: how
much the universal dwells within that which is individual.

That which is general in the subject is
simply not to be grasped any other way than in the movement of
particular human consciousness.

The isolated individual [Individuum] however,
unencumbered by the ukase, may at times perceive the objectivity more
clearly than a collective, which in any case is only the ideology of its
committees.

Having the concept extend beyond the object is the mathematical way. The category, as the universal, allows for every possible instance, that means that it extends beyond every one. The set for example allows for possible objects, and this provides the basis for the empty set. That the concept extends beyond the object is the principle which provides for the object to be measured. Numbers are infinite, so they will always extend beyond what is to be counted, therefore we will be able to count anything and everything.

But Aristotle showed how in reality the object always extends beyond the concepts. This he formalized with the difference between the essence and the accidents. The essence is what the concept captures of the particular individual, whereas the accidents are the aspects of the particular which extend beyond this. He validated this with the law of identity which makes identity a relation between the object and itself, rather than a relation between the object and concept, allowing that every object is unique, with properties which extend beyond what can be captured with abstract concepts, universals.

So Aristotelian logic proceeds with principles which are reversed in relation to how we commonly speak. The more general is said to be "within" the more specific. Commonly, we would say that "human being" is in the category of "animal" as a member of that group. But for Aristotle "animal" is within "human being", as a defining feature. This is what enables deductive logic. If human being, then animal, because animal is within human being, as logically prior. In "Categories", primary substance is defined as "that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse".

So it's through participation in language and thought (the "discursive medium") that the individual finds its grounding in the universal. At the same time, the individual becomes subject. These two moments are two sides of the same coin: (1) a reciprocal conditioning where the universal provides concepts and the necessary logical form for self-objectification—including the identification of oneself as a member of a class of objects; (2) the act of self-objectification—becoming a self-aware "I"—is how the universal is actualized in a thinking being. — Jamal

According to what I've written above, I am critical of this passage. The individual cannot find grounding in the universal, because that would position the individual as "within" the universal. And that is the identity thinking which Adorno is avoiding, "the identification of oneself as a member of a class of objects".

What I think, is that the self-objectification is when the individual grounds oneself as an object, instead of grounding oneself as the subject of some state (the universal). This is when the individual allows one's own feelings, emotions, intuitions, and most importantly goals and values, to extend beyond the conventional, the formal, and the person comes into contact with one's own accidentals, the nonconceptual within oneself.

These two moments are two sides of the same coin: (1) a reciprocal conditioning where the universal provides concepts and the necessary logical form for self-objectification—including the identification of oneself as a member of a class of objects; (2) the act of self-objectification—becoming a self-aware "I"—is how the universal is actualized in a thinking being. — Jamal

So I would say that the true self-objectification is not a logical form. We had some discussion earlier about different logical forms, like abduction, but I would say that the self-objectification goes beyond even abduction in its lack of form. The issue I see is the matter of intention, goals, and the hierarchies of value such as moral values. First principles cannot be validated by logic, that's why we've had things like God and Spirit in this place.

But the grounding in the universal only comes to be actualized in the subject, so the former is both the condition and the result of the latter. — Jamal

See, by not grounding the individual within oneself, by objectifying oneself as an individuated object, but saying that the individual is grounded "in the universal", you set up a vicious circle, where the individual and the universal are grounded in each other. Take note of Aristotle's definition of primary substance above, "nor present in a subject". To be a true object, an individuated object, i.e. primary substance, the object cannot be within a universal.

He is standing up for individualism: an expansive critical reason just isn't possible without autonomous subjectivity. "The people," though above and beyond the subject, is not thereby in a better to position to determine the objective. On the contrary, it is the autonomous subject, unshackled in its thoughts by the ukase (official decree), which can better perceive the truth. — Jamal

Yes, I think this is exactly the point, and I'm glad you see this. But are you willing to go all the way on this principle, as I believe Adorno is leading us? Consider the way that the object extends beyond the concept. "The Party" holds the concept, as ideology, but only the individual has the capacity to see beyond the party line, and determine what is truly objective. In other words, The Party is actually guided by the efforts of various individuals who see beyond, and shape the concept, they are not guided by the conceptual ideology (that's just an appearance).

I'm always open to adjust my view point as I read the text further, and often forces me to reread. So I don't know if we can get past the impasse at this point. How my understanding stands right now, I agree with the first part of your quoted secondary reference, all subjects are objects. However, when the subject views oneself as an object, "subjectivity" becomes an ambiguous term, because it doesn't distinguish between the person as an object and the person as a subject. Then, the part of the person, which the person understands through reflection on oneself as an object, e.g. feelings and qualitative value judgements, are said to be "subjective", while things that the person as a subject understands, mathematical judgements etc., are said to be objective. So this is reverse of what the person sees in oneself as an object.

My interpretation of what I've read so far of ND indicates to me that Adorno is assigning priority to the objective (nonconceptual) aspect of the human person )feelings sensations), as immediate to the person, and the conceptual as mediated through societal justification of the concepts, e.g. ideology and education. I provided the quotes to support that interpretation, and it is further supported by his claims that the qualitative (nonconceptual sensations) are prior to, and underlying, the quantitative (mathematics). We do not need to agree on this.

But notice that Adorno singles out the philosopher, just like Plato's cave allegory, as an individual who sees beyond the conventional, or traditional ideology, which the sheep (Adorno), or cave dwellers (Plato) accept. In both cases, for some reason it is incumbent on the philosopher to open the eyes of the others.

In the Privilege of Experience:

To those who have had the undeserved good fortune to not be
completely adjusted in their inner intellectual composition to the
prevailing norms – a stroke of luck, which they often enough have to
pay for in terms of their relationship to the immediate environment –
it is incumbent to make the moralistic and, as it were, representative
effort to express what the majority, for whom they say it, are not
capable of seeing or, to do justice to reality, will not allow themselves
to see.

In Quality and the Individuated:

The Party is supposed to
have a cognitive power a priori superior to that of every individual
solely due to the number of its members, even if it is terrorized or
blinded.
The isolated individual [Individuum] however,
unencumbered by the ukase, may at times perceive the objectivity more
clearly than a collective, which in any case is only the ideology of its
committees.

I'm not willing to engage with it any more. — Jamal

That's good. We'll just continue, I'll speak my words, you speak yours. When we clash we clash, so be it.

Before anyone cuts me off with heavy criticism, I'll go a bit further to explain the need for the turn around. Plato exposed this need with "the good". The guiding principle is always intention, and this produces another sense of "object" or "objective", the goal. If we base the state in the abstract Idea, absolute Spirit, then the guiding intention is equivalent to the will of God. But we have no access to God's intention, so we haven't a clue as to what the true objective (goal) is. When we flip things around, then we have the intent of individual human beings to deal with, as what guides us. Since we have no access to God's intent it cannot be what guides us, but I have access to my own intent, so this must be what guides me, rather than God's intent.

Think of the "object" as the grounding, what objectifies or substantiates the philosophy. Hegel has the false ground of idealism, absolute spirit, which when analyzed produces the infinite regress of bottomlessness. So we need to follow Marx's lead, and flip things over, putting the ground in the individual, making the individual an object with relations to other objects. This provides a true ground, for true objectivity.

Although I obviously don’t think this relation itself is “within the individual person,” it’s true that Adorno is interested, in the introduction, in intellectual experience, so the precise way that the philosophical subject relates to the object is the main focus at this stage. So I think we probably agree on at least this: that he wants to see subjective qualitative judgement make a comeback. — Jamal

We are essentially in agreement, other than some fine details about word usage which creates the appearance of inconsistency to me. The principal dispute I have is concerning your desire to portray the state, or society in general, as "objective". This I believe derives from Hegel's representing the state as the evolution of the Idea, which he bases in absolute Spirit. So that form of "objectivity" which is based in absolute Spirit, and consisting of concepts and ideology, is really in truth, subjective because these are evolving aspects of the subject rather than having an eternal base of absolute Spirit.

So Adorno is showing that we should really base "the object" in the opposite pole, the experience of the individual, and this pays respect to the spirit of the individual, as objective, instead of the absolute Spirit which is a theologically based falsity, for him. But now with your usage, we have a duality of "objective", which is confusing and may produce ambiguity, equivocation, and mislead us, even though your usage is the conventional, as derived from Hegelian ideology.

Another dialectical twist. Does it mean that only in our alienated modern society in which everyone must be an exclusive specialist of some sort could there be people, like Adorno and his peers, capable of focusing intently and deeply on the qualities of things? If so, this is a natural follow-on from the "Privilege" section. — Jamal

I will offer my opinion here, but our modes of interpretation have diverged significantly, so much so that unless you adopt the principles which you recently disputed, what I say will look far off track.

As discussed in the prior sections, our object is now the subject. He says we yield to this principle. "To yield to the object is so much as to do justice to its qualitative moments." Kantian principles have demonstrated that we have no immediate access to any supposed independent objects, therefore if we want a true immediate understanding of the object, we need to look internally, and look at oneself as an object. This means that I am primarily an object, and I need to yield to this fact and understand myself as an object. This perspective will provide a basis for understanding that this object is also a subject, the objective being prior to the subjective though. Primarily, the person, myself, must be removed from the social context, within which the word "subject" applies, and understood as an "individuated object".

Form this perspective the qualitative, based in non-conceptual sensations and feelings, is prior to the quantitative which is conceptual and therefore mediated by the social context. In Plato, "the good" (qualitative) replaces the Pythagorean "One" (quantitative) as the first principle.

There is no quantifiable insight which does not first receive its
meaning, its terminus ad quem [Latin: end-point], in the retranslation
into the qualitative.

Now the sentence at question:

The qualitative subject awaits the potential of its qualities in the thing, not its transcendental
residue, although the subject is strengthened solely thereto by means of restrictions based on the division of labor.

The subject awaits the qualities within itself, the thing, as sensations and feelings. The "transcendental residue" is what is left from that qualitative moment and communicated to the social context, thereby transcending the individual. The division of labour has produced certain restrictions which enhance this capacity of the subject to experience its own qualitative aspect, it's being an object amongst other objects.

Notice the next sentence:

The more meanwhile its own reactions are denounced as presumably merely subjective, the more the qualitative determinations in things escape cognition.

The qualitative moment is dismissed within the social context, as "subjective", and therefore is neglected and escapes cognition. This relates back to what he said about truth in "Privilege of experience".

The "capability of distinction" is a relation between the nonconceptual object, and the conceptual subject, within the individual person. It is a judgement the person carries out.

After this Adorno describes how Hegel misrepresented the individual consciousness as requiring the concept for its continuity. This he did from the intent of disempowering the individual spirit. And he proceeds to explain how the individual, being in its primary sense, an object, becomes a subject.

I don't know whether a complete catalogue of possible mistakes is possible. Perhaps it is. — Ludwig V

I think it is definitely not possible, that's why we categorize by types, to extend our comprehension of what is possible as much as we think is possible. So we start with the most general "mistake is possible", and we assume this catalogues every possible mistake. Then we divide into different types of mistakes, but we realize that some may complete escape our categories. But if that is the case, then it means that we don't completely understand what "mistake" means. And if we look back at the initial category "mistake" and the proposition "mistake is possible", we can see that there may be some mistakes which escape our judgement of "mistake". There may be some mistakes which we never would know as mistakes. Then we have to admit that "mistake is possible" doesn't capture all the possible mistakes. And that's just the nature of what a mistake is, something which eludes judgement.

I stake it or claim that, yes, if a being cannot ever experience suffering, it cannot ever experience pleasure, if it cannot experience emotion, it is not conscious per largely established and widely-agreed upon definition. So one cannot simply act like the legs that form a chair do not exist, or otherwise have no meaning, and still talk about the thing as if were a chair. — Outlander

Sorry Outlander, I really cannot follow your argument. You talk about experiencing emotion, and I have no problem with that premise. It is a broadly accepted definition. But then you start talking about the legs of a chair, and i don't see how you relate these two very distinct ideas.

Yes, every emotion is an internal condition of the material subject. Why would you think that this implies that consciousness is not real? In Marxist materialism consciousness is very real. Contrary to idealism though, consciousness has a material base. Is that difficult to grasp?

Ah, why didn't you say so! The answer is no. This notion of philosophy is exactly what Adorno is against. Never forget that for Adorno, the need to let suffering speak is the condition of all truth. The suffering of the victims of genocide is an utterly external, material reality. To claim that philosophy should only be interested in our concepts of that suffering, and not in the way the reality of that suffering shatters our concepts, is to make philosophy ethically monstrous. This is Adorno's deep motivation. — Jamal

In case you weren't aware, suffering is an internal condition of the subject.

He's arguing that a philosophy which only looks inward at its own concepts... — Jamal

Clearly he acknowledges the reality of the internal nonconceptual. That is essential to Marxism, of which he is familiar.

So if we want to compromise, maybe here is where we can do it: Adorno's philosophy is about the relation between concepts and things, where concepts are subjective and things are "external to the subject". If we can agree on that then we've made progress. — Jamal

This is not at all correct. How can you argue that suffering is external when it exists for others, yet concepts are always internal, even when they are the concepts of others? Your principles make no sense. It is clear that for Adorno the division between concepts and nonconceptual is not equivalent to the division between internal and external to the subject.

Anyway this bickering is not productive, and I'm participating here to read and discuss the text, not to have you lecture me on "exactly what Adorno is against". I had enough of that kind of thing in school.

But where? I don't see the evidence in those quotations. — Jamal

If you can't follow that, it becomes more explicit later. Here's the second paragraph in "Thing, Language, History". It starts with the assertion that matter is the mediation of the non-conceptual. Then pay special attention to the final sentence of the paragraph. What for idealism is the immediacy of the concept, is the measure of untruth for materialism.

For the mediation in the midst of what is non-conceptual is no
remainder of a complete subtraction, nor is it something which would
refer to the bad infinity of such procedures. On the contrary, the
mediation is the hyle [Greek: primary matter] of its implicit history.
Philosophy creates, wherever it is still legitimate, out of something
negative: that in its attitude of things-are-so-and-not-otherwise, the
indissolubility before which it capitulates, and from which idealism
veers away, is merely a fetish; that of the irrevocability of the existent.
This dissolves before the insight that things are not simply so and not
otherwise, but came to be under conditions. This becoming disappears
and dwells in the thing, and is no more to be brought to a halt in its
concept than to be split off from its result and forgotten. Temporal
experience resembles it. In the reading of the existent as a text of its
becoming, idealistic and materialistic dialectics touch. However, while
idealism justifies the inner history of immediacy as a stage of the
concept, it becomes materialistically the measure not only of the
untruth of concepts, but also that of the existing immediacy. — ND p66-67

And here he says that they, the given facts (by which he means the immediate, since he is contrasting it with "universal mediation"), "are not the truth". Therefore the non-conceptual is not the immediate. — Jamal

From the perspective of idealism, the given facts are the immediate. From the perspective of materialism, this is false. The given facts are not truth, nor are they immediate. According to the final statement in the paragraph I quoted here, "immediacy as a stage of the concept" is not only a measure of the untruth of that concept, but also a measure of the untruth of that proposed immediacy. In other words the concept is never immediate from the materialist perspective.

Here's a proposal for a compromise. Adorno is very crafty, open minded, and doesn't appear to take sides. For compromise, let's say that he is elucidating both sides, the idealist (your interpretation, i.e. the immediacy of the concept) and the materialist (my interpretation, i.e. the untruth of that immediacy), and he does not side with or the other.

Generally speaking, the idea that the very thing Adorno is interested in is something internal to the subject is the opposite of Adorno's meaning, to put it very mildly. — Jamal

I don't think we could call it "philosophy" if the interest is something external to the subject. Wouldn't this bring us into the field of empirical sciences.

For Adorno, this is very much not the case. Can you remember which passages made you so convinced of this? — Jamal

It's what the section on the solidified is all about. Here's some cherry picking. Notice that he is inverting, turning around, what Hegelian logic teaches. What is actually the case, the truth, is the exact opposite of the principles which Hegelian logic is based in. That is the Marxist technique. Karl Marx took the whole idealistic Hegelian structure, completely intact, and flipped it over. This hands priority to the indeterminate "matter", content; rather than to the determined "Idea", the formal concept. But this ends up putting certainty, necessity, at the very fringes, instead of at the base, which is a huge difference.

The turn around is completed at paragraph 5. Instead of the concept extending beyond the object, he now speaks of the object extending beyond the concept. And this, that which extends beyond the concept, the nonconceptual, indeterminate, is shown to be what is immediate to the subject.

Paragraph 1

Unfettered dialectics does not dispense with anything solid any more
than Hegel. Rather it no longer accords it primacy.

They [Hegel's logical categories] are brought into harmony with the dynamic through
the doctrine of an immediacy which reproduces itself anew at every
dialectical level.

It [negative dialectics] takes the unmediated
immediacy, the formations, which society and its development present
to thought, tel quel [French: as such], in order to reveal their
mediations through analysis, according to the measure of the
immanent difference of the phenomena to what they claim, for their
own part, to be.

Paragraph 2

That which holds itself together as solid, the “positive” of the
young Hegel, is the negative of such analyses, just like his.

Paragraph 3

The Science of Logic is for its
part abstract in the simplest sense; the reduction of general concepts
already uproots in advance the counter-force [Widerspiel] to such, that
which is concrete, which idealistic dialectics boasts of harboring in
itself and developing.

Paragraph 4

Since Hegelian logic always had to do with the medium of the
concept and only generally reflected on the relationship of the concept
to its content, the non-conceptual, it is already assured in advance of
the absoluteness of the concept, which it was bent on proving. The more
the autonomy of subjectivity is seen through critically, the more it
becomes aware of itself as something mediated for its part, the more
conclusive the obligation of thought to take up what solidity has
brought to it, which it does not have in itself.

Paragraph 5

What in the object goes beyond the determinations laid upon it by
thinking, returns firstly to the subject as something immediate; where
the subject feels itself to be quite certain of itself, in the primary
experience, it is once again least of all a subject. That which is most
subjective of all, the immediately given, eludes its grasp. Yet such
immediate consciousness is neither continuously held fast nor positive
pure and simple.

Paragraph 6

The confidence that the whole seamlessly emerges out of that
which is immediate, solid and simply primary, is idealistic appearance
[Schein]. To dialectics immediacy does not remain what it immediately
expresses.

Explicitly
idealistic philosophy is by no means always ideology. It hides in the
substruction of something primary, almost indifferent as to which
content, in the implicit identity of concept and thing, which the world
then justifies, even when the dependence of consciousness on being is
summarily taught.

My Interpretation:

Paragraph 1 states that the Hegelian representation, the immediacy of conceptual formations, is false, and negative dialectics will reveal their mediations.

Paragraph 3 The concrete solidity which idealism boasts is just an assumption.

Paragraph 4 That assumption proves the absoluteness of the conceptual, but it's a matter of begging the question. However, the autonomy of the subject, which this enables, allows the subject to become aware of the true mediation, because the concept claims to have the solidity, which the subject does not experience. In other words, the autonomy of the subject, which this ideology allows for, widens the gap, the medium, between subject and concept, forcing an obligation on the subject, to doubt the solidity.

Paragraph 5 The doubt produces the turn around referred to above,

Paragraph 6 The whole structure, the whole system, is revealed as an idealistic illusion, because of the false priority which it has assumed.

I always thought it was the user who mastered the circumstances by using the tool. — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but I think it is the tool, as the means to the end, which actually overcomes the circumstances. It is more proper to say that the means is what brings success rather than the will. If it was just the will, you could will yourself to success. Instead, success is highly dependent on the tool employed.

But isn't there a case for describing the tool as adjusted to or fitting in with the relevant circumstances. A carpenter's saw is good for cutting wood. For metal, you need a hacksaw. Hammers for nails (appropriate in some circumstances). Screwdrivers or spanners in others. Certainly, the enterprise is to adjust circumstances in certain ways; but one needs to recognize what can be changed and what can't. — Ludwig V

Of course. I recognized this type of mistake when I said in the earlier post, "Mistakes in producing or choosing the symbol to be used as a representation". That would be a mistake of trying to use the wrong tool. We were talking about the different types of mistakes which are possible, and whether each type could be recognized.

In other words, try to remember that "dialectics" is in the title. That is the framework for all that follows. — frank

I broached this already with Jamal. If "dialectics" refers to Hegelian dialectics, then Adorno is not practising dialectics, and this is not "the framework for all that follows". He is clearly very critical of Hegelian dialectics, and I would say that he firmly rejects it. That was evident when he rejected Hegelian synthesis, and it becomes even more evident in "Dialectics and the Solidified" where he exposes "the deception of prima philosophia", the idealistic illusion that "that the whole seamlessly emerges out of that
which is immediate, solid and simply primary".

The problem with Hegelian dialectics which Adorno is revealing, is that this method cannot adequately portray the nature of becoming, evolution, emergence. What he said about synthesis is that it could just as easily be a step backward as a step forward. Now he has revealed that because Hegel does not provide for a principle of change which inheres within the concept itself, change to the concept is impossible, if we were to adhere strictly to Hegelian dialectics. This is essentially the same issue I took up with my professor. Since the thesis (being), and the antithesis (nothing), are both purely conceptual, admitting of no degree of matter (the potential for change) the becoming which is supposed to result from the synthesis cannot possibly be a true representation of becoming. We must allow something else, a medium, between being and nothing, such as the potential of matter, or else we have no true becoming. In other words, becoming cannot be the synthesis of those two, it must be a medium between them.

For these reasons we cannot assume that "dialectics", in the sense of Hegelian dialectics, is the framework from which Adorno is working. It would be a more accurate conclusion to say that "negative dialectics" is a project which refutes Hegelian dialectics, negating it in that sense. And, we cannot say that it "negates" dialectics in the sense of Hegelian dialectics, because that would be hypocritical, anmd self-defeating, to use the process which one is demonstrating to be defective, in your refutation of that process.

So if we allow that Adorno is using a dialectical method, we must accept that it is not Hegelian dialectics. Near the beginning of the thread, I remarked that Adorno's form of "dialectics" seems much closer to Platonic dialectics then Hegelian to me. Plato allowed for a true becoming in his dialectics with his proposal of "the good".

Agreed! It seemed to me that rather than trying to understand, you were just automatically gainsaying anything I said, scoring points by fisking. Years of TPF will normalize that kind of behaviour, but it's not the best way. However, if that's your style I can deal with it — Jamal

For me it's not a matter of scoring points, it's a matter of getting at the truth. But it's natural for a person who believes oneself to understand something, to defend against contrary claims.

I agree that the way you and I each understand Adorno is not very different. However, there are nagging little things which I believe derive from a difference in each of our preconceived ideas. The preconceived ideas form the principles by which we interpret. That's why I throw some names to elucidate the preconceptions.

The problem though is that a small difference can have a substantial effect. This is because dialectics (and I mean in a general sense which incudes Platonic as well as Hegelian) deals with relations between concepts. And, since logic often works with relations of priority, a small difference can invert the logical priority misleading any logic which follows.

So for example, if we take being and nothing as two opposing concepts and we produce becoming as a synthesis, it is implied that the concepts of being and nothing are logically prior to the concept of becoming. In this way it appears like becoming emerges. But this presents an empirical problem because emergence is a type of becoming, and now we say that becoming comes to be from a process of becoming (it comes from itself} This problem is easily avoided in a naive way by saying that the concept of becoming emerges from those other concepts, but "real material becoming" is something prior to even those concepts. However, that simple avoidance is to admit nonidentity, that the conceptual scheme is false. The concept of becoming is not true.

Now to have a true conceptualization we need to place becoming as prior to both concepts, being and nothing. This allows that the concepts emerge through a process of becoming. Then "becoming" refers to the nonconceptual, as something which is logically prior to the concept. Therefore we are forced by this logical necessity to place "becoming" into a completely different category, as nonconceptual. "Becoming" cannot be the logical synthesis of being and nothing, because it is something which is necessarily prior to concepts in general, therefore it must be characterized as other than conceptual.

Aristotle demonstrated something similar. If we characterize becoming as a process of is-not/is (does not have the property then has the property), we will have an infinite chain of such, which will never provide a true representation of what the activity of becoming really is. So all this does is produce a false conception of becoming.

The main difference of interpretation between you and I is how we relate some key concepts to each other. But little differences sometimes have a big impact. So I'm going to fisk out the rest of your post and show a couple points where I think you are inconsistent with Adorno.

The difficulty he has been at pains to describe, especially in the lectures, is that negative dialectics seeks to understand the nonconceptual by means of the concept, which is to say, to circumvent the falsifying nature of the concepts, by means of concepts themselves. He is aware that this looks impossible on the surface. — Jamal

I think he is actually showing the opposite of this. The nonconceptual has been shown to be the immediate. The concept is mediated. This implies that we come to understand the concept through the means of the nonconceptual. The alternative is disputed as the false representation. Consider for evidence, that a child born into this world understands no concepts. But the child comes to understand concepts. This implies that at the fundamental level the nonconceptual is always prior to the concept. And throughout our lives, the nonconceptual experience is always the means by which we learn concepts.

Now, the difference is this. You can say that we work towards extending our understanding by applying the conceptual (knowledge) to the nonconceptual (unknown), but is this really the case? When we work with the conceptual we are always applying concept to concept. The nonconceptual enters the work through some type of intuition, or abductive reasoning, but it needs to be rendered into the conceptual form before it can actually enter the work. This, I believe is the point of the "Privilege" section. The type of person who is suited to this intuitive work is the type who does not think in the normal way of concept to concept relations. That person allows the nonconceptual to rule over the conceptual, as one of those "who have had the undeserved good fortune to not be completely adjusted in their inner intellectual composition to the prevailing norms".

According to what I've said so far, this here is a faulty argument. The implied premise, which you state elsewhere, is that if there is no such thing as a 100% successful identity relation, identity-thinking must be rejected. But this is not Adorno's view. So the focus on the relationship between the concept and the conconceptual is not an alternative to identity-thinking, but a way of pushing it through to breaking point, whereupon the nonconceptual might be revealed. But there is a kind of alternative, a supplement to coercive identity-thinking, which is mimesis, the kind of understanding embodied in art. — Jamal

Again, you talk about how "the nonconceptual might be revealed". But this is backward, the nonconceptual is always already directly revealed, as the immediate. This means that what is at issue, is how the concept is revealed through the medium which is the nonconceptual.

The example of mimesis and art show that we are close to the same understanding, but I think you have things turned around. These are ways in which concept (understanding) come from the nonconceptual (lack of understanding).

ncidentally, my impression is that despite appearances I don't think we're too far apart in our interpretations. But you just seem too eager to come down on one side or the other, and to reify and hypostasize and systematize all over the place with the result that the elements of Adorno's thought become frozen and static. — Jamal

The issue is to understand the truth. And if the truth is that Adorno prioritizes one over the other, then we need to understand him that way. To systematize is what Adorno described as necessary for understanding, but this is distinctly different from creating a system.

But I disagree with "unacceptable". What he finds unacceptable is not identity-thinking per se, but its dominance and coerciveness in modern thought. — Jamal

I have not found any reason yet to think that Adorno thinks of identity thinking as good. He's described as based in false premises and misleading. To me that merits "unacceptable", but maybe you know where he describes it as acceptable.

Of course, it is a concept, but he wants it to remain just a pointer, a bit like the thing in itself, which is a signpost without much positive content. — Jamal

I really think that it is this tendency of yours, to categorize the nonconceptual as some form of external object, or the thing in itself, which misleads you. We have no need or warrant to look at external things, because they are completely ineffective in the realm of concepts. That is because the intuitions lie between, as the medium. And the intuitions are nonconceptual. So we have our conceptual and nonconceptual right here, without looking toward the thing in itself.

Anyway, concept/thing, subject/object, and mediation seem to be covered extensively later, so maybe we should hold off getting too deep into it now. — Jamal

I agree. If you're ok to hold off on this particular topic, we ought. However, it appears to be a pivotal point which underlies a lot, so it might just fester for a while.

That's quite a tall order. But still, if they can all be determined as mistakes, it follows that there must be a truth of the matter, beyond appearances. — Ludwig V

I don't think so. First, i didn't say anything about how mistake would be determined, only that we ought to believe it is possible. Then, when we look at the primary feature of determining mistakes, mistake is commonly a matter of not producing the desired result. This doesn't imply truth or lack of truth.

So now I need to know what kind of relationship you think there is between the representation and what it is a representation of. — Ludwig V

I think there is a relationship of mastery, like a tool masters the circumstances it is applied to, to produce the desired end. The representation (symbol) is a tool, the living being uses it, and this tool assists the being in survival, as well as making use of its environment toward its ends, and perhaps some other things, dependent on intention.

What will you be throwing at me next? — Jamal

I've got a heavy arsenal and I'll choose the weapon according to intent and circumstances. Just kidding, we're not doing battle, nor even debating, just trying to assist each other to understand why we each, respectively, interpret the way that we do. You are guided by your principles, and I follow mine, and I think we both claim a better interpretation than the other. I'm willing to adapt if you show me how your principles are better suited for the purpose.

Our primary disagreement seems to be concerning what type of existence things like society, economic systems, and ideology, have. You claim these to be objects, i claim them to be concepts. I've shown willingness to compromise. I'm ready to allow that they are material objects, under the principles of Marxist materialism, whereby concepts are material objects. This way, these things can be concepts as I claim, and also material objects, as you want them to be interpreted.

The ontological status of concepts is a red herring. It doesn't follow from the fact that concepts are part of the material world that there is no legitimate distinction to be made between concepts and the world. ND is full of the distinction and utterly relies on it. This doesn't imply a mind vs. matter ontology. One can maintain a materialist ontology, where both concepts and objects are part of a single, material world, and still insist on a functional or critical distinction between the act of identifying (the concept) and that which is to be identified (the object). — Jamal

Adorno is arguing in ND, that what you are insisting on here, is a false premise.

One can ... still insist on a functional or critical distinction between the act of identifying (the concept) and that which is to be identified (the object).

A principal point is that Identity thinking, identifying concept and object is a false principle. We need to dismiss it as faulty thinking. This means that we cannot refer to this principle in an attempt to understand the principles which Adorno is putting forward, because he has explicitly said that we need to reject this. This implies that we need to look at other principles for understanding the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual. To fall back onto this identity principle is a mistake.

If we could not make this distinction, Adorno's whole cricial project would be dead in the water, because he could no longer say that the conventional concept of capitalism fails to capture the reality of the economic system. — Jamal

That the concept of capitalism does not capture the reality of capitalism is evidence that identifying concept and object is a mistaken project. Such identity thinking misleads us. Now that we understand that there is no such thing as an identity relation between concept and object, we can pursue the true nature of the concept. As an alternative, Adorno has proposed a relationship between concept and nonconceptual.

So we need to understand the nonconceptual. I propose that the nonconceptual is referred to as "content". And the dialectical method allows that the negation inheres within the concept, so we can understand that the nonconceptual inheres within the concept, as the content, which may manifest as the irrational aspect of the concept.

The concept is a kind of material object that attempts to subjugate others. The non-conceptual and non-identical are what resists or escapes such domination. — Jamal

This is exactly what I am talking about, except instead of "attempts" I'd say that it has succeeded. The concept subjugates, and this is why the nonconceptual inheres within it, as the content. It does make sense to speak about resistance, but I do not think that "escapes" makes any sense because of the nature of the relationship between the two. Resistance may cause change and evolution of the concept, and this is why the concept is not immutable and eternal, but I don't think escape is possible.

It should now be clear that I'm not promoting any form of idealism. But I've certainly simplified Adorno to make my points. The 16th-century economic system did not have a "capitalism" nametag. Our historical concept of capitalism came later, and was used to organize, understand, and indeed, partly constitute that past as a specific object of analysis. This mediation is where identity thinking happens, e.g., the modern concept can easily impose itself retrospectively, smoothing over the non-conceptual particularity and internal contradictions of that historical reality. — Jamal

You agree with me here too, that identity thinking is a mistaken way.

But this mediation, or "partial constitution," does not erase the fundamental distinction. — Jamal

it does not erase the distinction, because many will still utilize it. however it demonstrates the distinction to be unsound, therefore one which we ought to reject. Philosophers like to instil categories, and these may become dogma or ideology, but Adorno is showing that this specific way of categorizing is unacceptable. To have a better understanding we need to reject it and accept a better way.

On the contrary. The goal of negative dialectics is to use the concept to push against its own mediating function, to expose the gap between our conceptual "capitalism" and the heterogeneous, non-identical reality of the 16th-century economic life it tries to capture. To say the object is conceptually mediated is not to say it's conceptually created. Conflating the two is what allows the concept to dominate the object apparently without remainder. — Jamal

OK, so let's say that Adorno does this, he demonstrates the gap between concept and reality. And you are referring to the reality as "the object". So what he has shown is that our understanding of "the object" is wrong because objects don't relate to our concepts in the way we believe. Now he proposes a different object, the subject, and is proceeding to investigate whether we can produce a true understanding of this object. That would be a true concept/object relation. From the perspective of the subject, the concept is mediated, and the nonconceptual is immediate, but this requires that the subject is the object.

So I'm not promoting a simplistic dualist interpretation. I'm basing things on Adorno's underlying dialectical maintenance of subject vs. object, a "separation" (but not an ontological one) which is both true and false: — Jamal

Maybe at some other times he speaks of a separation between subject and object, but at this point in the book he is almost explicit to say that the subject is the object.

What in the object goes beyond the determinations laid upon it by
thinking, returns firstly to the subject as something immediate; where
the subject feels itself to be quite certain of itself, in the primary
experience, it is once again least of all a subject.

When skepticism concerning the object, hits the subject as immediate reality, the subject turns to its own experience, and is certain of itself, such as "I think therefore I am", then the subject becomes the object.

This is the point of the "Privilege of Experience"

[/quote]In sharp contrast to the usual scientific ideal, the objectivity of dialectical cognition needs more subject, not less.
...
The individualism of the nineteenth century no doubt weakened the objectifying power of the Spirit – that of the insight into objectivity and into its construction – but also endowed it with a sophistication, which strengthens the experience of the object.[/quote]

Notice "the experience of the object". The subject is the object.

We've been here before. Remember that what we're doing is trying to understand what Adorno means. It's clear that he does not think that when we talk about economic systems, we are talking about concepts; he thinks we are talking about a material reality to which concepts are applied (the response of "material reality itself is just a concept!" is equally inappropriate, an intrusion of idealist dogma). — Jamal

The problem with this description is that under the principles derived from Karl Marx, there is no proper separation between the internal mind, and the external material reality. That idealist separation is dissolved, and the entire thing is "material reality.

In your description of "economic systems" you rely on a distinction between concepts and the material reality to which concepts apply, but that distinction is not valid, having already been denied by the ontological principles of Marxist materialism. By that ontology, concepts are already a part of the material reality. Therefore your argument is not valid because "the material reality to which concepts are applied" includes concepts themselves, so that if he is talking about material reality, we cannot automatically conclude that he is not talking about concepts.

This is why I referred you to the Marxist distinction between form and content. Content is the means by which the material aspect is represented within ideas. So, my interpretation is that economic systems are as you say, a part of material reality, just like ideology is a part of material reality, but they are a fundamentally conceptual part. Look at the quote provided by frank from p154. Material reality enters into the concept.

The idea of something immutable, identical to itself, would also thereby collapse. It is derived from the domination of the concept, which wished to be constant towards its content, precisely its “matter”, and for that reason is blind to such. — frank

Concepts like "economic system" are not just abstract categories; they're crystallizations of real social relations, and the nonconceptual is the lived experience of those relations, including, say, exploitation and homelessness. Or are exploitation and homelessness just concepts too? — Jamal

Yes, I agree that we are talking about "real social relations", but the way of analyzing society, categorizing the parts, is not the same as traditional western philosophy. We do not start with a mind/body, material/immaterial, idea/material reality, separation. Instead, we take a position which is supposed to be more real, which is more like the division between the individual subject, and the society. Then we can see that the essence of the societal is the form, while the essence of the individual is the content. However, both form and content coexist within each, though their positioning as essence and accident is reversed relative to each other. Content is the essence of the subject, and form is accidental, while form is the essence of society and content is accidental. In this way all aspects partake of both sides of the ontological category division, and the category division is no longer between internal mind and external material reality, as both of these partake of both sides of the new division, form and content.

Generally you are being pedantic, failing to take my analogy in the spirit it was intended, and stubbornly upholding an idealist viewpoint while trying to understand an anti-idealist philosopher. — Jamal

Wow, that's exactly the criticism I've leveled at you above. You are describing Marxist philosophy from fundamental idealist categories, the separation between mind and material reality. So I think it is actually you who is stubbornly upholding the idealist ontological perspective, while trying to understand Marxist materialism.

Adorno also refers to the non-conceptual within the concept. This more obscure aspect of it might be what frank and @NotAristotle are thinking of. I think it's a way of describing (b) while emphasizing that the inadequacy of the attempted conceptual capture is intrinsic to the concept. — Jamal

In this context, I think of ideas as being composed of form and content. The formal aspect is the conceptual, and the content is nonconceptual. The content would be what the individual's subjective experience adds to the conscious processing of ideas, in relation to the formal conceptual aspect which is added through education and ideology. This is consistent with sense (b), as the aspect of the person's thinking experience which is not apprehended conceptually.

But I see your description of sense (a) as somewhat confused. Yes, it is what is heterogenous to thought, and what is of interest to ND, but economics systems are not an example, as these are conceptual. The question of "physical objects" is even more difficult, and I'll address this below.

But I see that as a consequence of the basic concept<->(non-conceptual) object relationship. A good way to think about that is to see the non-conceptual as the thing in itself, if you can imagine this to be immanent to experience, decoupled from Kant's formal apparatus, and potentially determinate. In my opinion, Adorno is as Kantian as he is Hegelian, and often more so. You see it especially here. — Jamal

If Adorno is Kantian, then the nonconceptual cannot be the thing in itself, because the thing in itself is only a concept. So anything we say about the thing in itself is purely conceptual, being conditioned by that concept. To talk about the nonconceptual, and have it make any sense within this context, it must be something within the experience itself, like you say, "immanent to experience", but this I think would exclude the supposed thing in itself.

This is why it gets a little tricky describing the nonconceptual as physical objects. Strictly speaking "physical objects" is conceptual, as defined within an ontological, or metaphysical system. And if we look at the naive and mundane way of speaking, "physical objects" refers to to some particular aspects of the circumstances, which Kant says that it only make sense to speak about as phenomena. So we might say that the phenomena we experience as sense objects, is one type of the nonconceptual, being a part of the nonconceptual aspect of thought, as the content provided through sensation, and the intuition of space. But there is also internal passions and feelings, and things like that which Kant attributes to the intuition of time. These must make up another, somewhat different part of the nonconceptual.

It's hard to disagree with that. But if we accept that possibility, should we not, by the same token, accept the possibility that there is no mistake. We could then ask which of those possibilities is actually the case. Or even question the framing of the question. — Ludwig V

I think the issue is the nature of "representation", and the different types of mistakes which are possible.

Suppose that we consider words as an example of a representation. Mistake could consist of two principal types, mistake in producing (choosing} the representation, and mistake of interpretation. Each assumes a form of consistency whereby inconsistency would constitute mistake.

Mistakes of interpretation are maybe easier to determine, but some, such as those caused by ambiguity, are not so easy because they require an understanding of the intent behind the act of producing or choosing the representation. Other mistakes of inconsistency in interpretation are easier to determine.

Mistakes in producing or choosing the symbol to be used as a representation are more difficult to determine because that requires an analysis of the context, and the intent, to determine whether principles of consistency are being followed.

But the issue is the meaning of "nonconceptual". If "the nonconceptual is the negation of the concept", this just makes the nonconceptual something conceptual, because negation is a feature of conception.

Deciding what is a mistake in Kant is more difficult. We don't have the object of representation in hand to compare with another supposed object in the unexperienced bush. — Paine

That's why I was talking about the possibility of mistake. Instead of insisting that there must be real independent objects, because we perceive objects, as Amadeus seemed to be doing, we ought to accept the possibility of mistake.

I think you are just stating the Hegelian perspective which Adorno disagrees with.

Are there not particular concepts? Concept of capitalism. Concept of a car. Etc. — NotAristotle

Each of these concepts is tied up with a whole lot of other concepts. Concepts are defined by others.

I really think the only way to make sense of the nonconceptual is as the negation of the concept. — NotAristotle

I think Adorno is describing the nonconceptual in another way, as prior to concepts, the nonconceptual is the immediate. This means that it can't be understood as the negation of the conceptual, because it is something other than concepts, from which concepts emerge. This is part of denying the eternality of concepts, providing the alternative explanation as to how concepts come into being.

Rather, perhaps the "non-conceptual" is instead to be understood as the negation of [a particular] concept. In that way, it is not failing to be a concept, but is the unrendering of a specific concept. — NotAristotle

There is a certain self-contradictory aspect of your terminology. A concept is a universal. So it is somewhat contradictory to refer to "a particular concept", if we maintain a category separation between the particular and the universal. Therefore this is a form of language which might best be negated. But language itself is counterproductive in apprehending the non-conceptual (demonstrated by Wittgenstein with "private language")

I think this idea gets developed in the next section on the import of experience. In this field of dialectics, the peculiarity and uniqueness of the individual subject is a description of the object. So to be objective requires that we study this, the individual, rather than the universal, which is the generalized whole of conception. But the generalized whole of conception is what is commonly referred to as "objective" knowledge.

Hegel’s doctrine, that the object
would reflect itself in itself, survives its idealistic version, because in a
changed dialectics the subject, disrobed of its sovereignty, virtually
becomes thereby the reflection-form of objectivity.

Truth is objective, but it is the objectivity of the subject, therefore it is the most subjective. As I argued in another thread, somewhere, sometime, real truth is an attitude of the subject, honesty, to be true to oneself, and others, which is to tell the truth, your honest belief. But communication, through the assumption of "independent object", twists the meaning of truth, attempting to force it into a form of "justified". This annihilates real truth by leaving it without any location of being.

Anything perceived as an object, a book, a desk, a chair, might really be activity. Doesn't physics tell you that these supposed objects are just a bunch of activities?

Perhaps. But is it likely that someone who thinks they are perceiving an object is actually viewing an activity? — Patterner

Yes, that is the subject of process philosophy. And, I think it's exactly what modern physics has determined to be the case. So I believe it is likely.

That error comes up a lot in Aristotle. Perhaps you could point out where that happens with Kant. — Paine

I don't quite understand what you are asking Paine.

Can you give an example of something a person is actually perceiving that fits not have temporal extension? — Patterner

Any activity I suppose. At each moment it is new and different, therefore there is no temporal extension of any specific thing.

Seems to me that he explicitly defines the content as the non-conceptual. — NotAristotle

Yes, that's right, he does. But the question we are looking at is the approach to the non-conceptual. Is the non-conceptual which is spoken of, an external material object, or is it the irrational, or material aspect of the conscious thinking mind. I believe Adorno is talking about the latter. This is because he designates it unmediated.

To summarize, we have 3 putative theories of "content." 1. Philosophical content. 2. Material kernel of consciousness. 3. The non-conceptual. — NotAristotle

The problem is that the non-conceptual, by its name, is fundamentally unintelligible. So trying to understand it, or conceptualize it, is sort of self-defeating. The three putative theories here are each just as correct as the others, but in a deeper sense, they are all equally incorrect.

5. If consciousness were not naive -- taking the immediately perceived as the real-deal rather than a phenomena -- then thought would not think of itself. There would be no negative. Thought would get on with the task of perceiving reality and never think of itself. Thought here would be a "dim copy" of the perceived. — Moliere

I generally agree with your summary Moliere, but I think you might have gotten something turned around here. The immediately perceived, as content is the real deal, hence the naivety of idealism in believing that the conceptual is the real deal.

6. The immediate reflection on the object which reflects upon the non-conceptual beyond the intuitions laid about the object is the least subject-like experience of all, and yet even here we must acknowledge that our experience is not the object as per paragraph 5. — Moliere

So in this paragraph, he is saying that the aspect of the object which extends beyond conceptual grasp and comes to the subject as something immediate, is the most subjective.

That which is most subjective of all, the immediately given, eludes its grasp."
Our experience is the object, but thinking only grasps a part of it, i.e the conceptual.

7. That confidence in the immediate is an idealistic appearance. — Moliere

So here, the confidence in the immediate is the idealistic approach, but it is a false confidence due to a false immediate. It is a false confidence because "the immediate" is wrongly characterized as the conceptual, the abstract. In a sense, the idealist approach is to take the conceptual for granted as immediate, instead of portraying it as mediated through ideology, education etc..

These may be minor points, sort of nitpicking, but it does make a bit of a difference to the overall interpretation.

Perhaps I'm not grasping this, but if someone is perceiving "something" then that is "objects" broadly (and in the way i suggest it be used here - I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses). These could simply be that which is required as an assumption for hte perception to obtain. I content roughly that — AmadeusD

"Required as an assumption" implies that the assumption is a necessary aspect. That is why the sensation is commonly called a representation. It is assumed to represent something.

Consider what Paine says:

The "physical objects" we experience in our sensations and judgements are representations made possible through combinations of our intuitions of space and time. — Paine

If these representations are false, it may be the case that the person is not actually perceiving objects, despite believing oneself to be perceiving objects.

What are the criteria? — Patterner

I would say that the single most important criterion for "object" is temporal extension.

Surely the non-immediacy, i.e., the mediatedness, of content is the whole point of this section: the appearance is the bad positive and behind it lies some internally contradictory thing, which I take to be the content. Despite this terminological difference I suspect we agree more than disagree.

What do we even mean by "content"? The content is surely what Adorno is referring to with "the thing" here: — Jamal

The meaning of "content" is the difficult part. I suggest you pay attention to Marx who was explicit in separating form and content. The distinction Adorno makes is between concept, and content. After a number of readings i believe it is quite clear that he believes the concept is mediated, and content is immediate. This is the reverse of Hegel, but he thinks Hegel is mistaken, and it is Hegel's supposed immediacy of the concept which provides for its absoluteness.

Since Hegelian logic always had to do with the medium of the
concept and only generally reflected on the relationship of the concept
to its content, the non-conceptual, it is already assured in advance of
the absoluteness of the concept, which it was bent on proving.

"Content" is difficult to understand, but I believe it is that part of the subject which is material, therefore non-conceptual, the true object as it inheres within, being an intrinsic part of the consciousness. I believe this is the point which Marx makes, and how he differs fundamentally from Hegel. Hegel makes the idea pure, absolute, but Marx adheres to Aristotelian hylomorphism which necessitates a duality of matter and form, which manifests as content and form within the idea itself. The notion that there must be a "kernel" of content (which from the pure idealist perspective would be a contamination) within any idea, being 'matter' within the idea, I believe is the ontology which supports Marxist materialism.

So in this context, content is that part of the consciousness which escapes intelligibility, being material in nature. But I believe that Adorno argues it is what is immediate to the conscious subject. Consider that the content comes from within the subject, one's own feelings and passions, while the concept comes from an exterior source, as that which is taught, ideology, formalisms.

Adorno, being interested in the the non-identity of concept and thing, reveals through the analysis of mediation a different thing (different from the appearance). So the content here is not something like sense-data or the given, i.e., the content of experience in AP terms, but the content of philosophy (philosophy as it should be, i.e., negative dialectics). — Jamal

The non-identity of concept and thing (thing being the object which is a subject) is the difference between the subject's own idiomatic thinking, and the concepts of ideology. As Adorno implied in other parts, the individualist ideology has propagated a widening of this gap allowing for 'free thinking'.

I believe it is only from this perspective that the closing paragraph makes sense. By making the content something material which inheres within consciousness itself, the content, the kernel (seed of potential) within the idea, then we have the required principle to account for evolving and changing ideas. Otherwise we are left with the idealist absolute forms, which are invariant and eternal, but this is demonstrably false.

Yes. They are perceiving something. Things are objects. That fact we can't know what/which (and similar questions) doesn't change that part of the position. (and, as above, Kant knows this too). — AmadeusD

The thing perceived is not necessarily objects. The person may judge oneself to be perceiving objects, but if "objects" doesn't fulfill the criteria for what the person is actually perceiving, then that judgement is wrong. the person is mistaken, and is perceiving without perceiving objects.

I found this section difficult, and what I've said here avoids getting caught up in the details, which I didn't really untangle—so I'd be interested in what others think. — Jamal

I'm afraid I probably can't help to untangle this mess. However, I'll give it a try. I believe there is a number of conceptual relations being discussed, and it is intended that they all relate to each other in some way. There is "solid", "whole", "emergent", "invariant", "immediate", and "mediated", to name some important ones.

The central issue seems to be a criticism against Hegel's categories needing to be both emergent and logically invariant. Adorno see these two descriptions as incompatible. So the section tries to untangle becoming, changing, evolving, from the invariant, immutable, eternal concepts of idealism.

He makes the distinction between concept and content. It appears to me, that the concept is always mediated, and content is immediate, also the medium. This puts solidity, being "that which holds together", and the ensuing whole, the concrete, as something mediated, conceptualized, or provided by conception. Content on the other hand is nebulous, and this leaves subjective experience, along with that which is immediate, content, in the strange situation of being unable to understand itself. "That which is most subjective of all, the immediately given, eludes its grasp."

In the final paragraph then, he attempts at an explanation of how the whole, as the concept, and mediated, emerges out of the immediate, the content. The two extremes, the immediate content, and the invariant concept, are described as "moments" rather than as "grounds". The supposed invariance however, is revealed as an artificial, or even false invariance, being "produced", created. We can see that the "immutability is the deception of prima philosophia", and the concepts gain the appearance of invariance when "they pass over into ideology", where they are solidified as part of the whole.

Here's what I think is the pivotal passage, in the middle of the section:

Since Hegelian logic always had to do with the medium of the
concept and only generally reflected on the relationship of the concept
to its content, the non-conceptual, it is already assured in advance of
the absoluteness of the concept, which it was bent on proving. The more
the autonomy of subjectivity is seen through critically, the more it
becomes aware of itself as something mediated for its part, the more
conclusive the obligation of thought to take up what solidity has
brought to it, which it does not have in itself. Otherwise there could not
even be that dynamic, by which dialectics moved the burden of that
which is solid.

Notice the solidity is only an appearance, because if it were true, dialectics could have no effect. So referring back to the beginning of the section, this is why solidity, and even the whole itself, are the bad positive.

It occurs to me that rather than induction or deduction, there are two alternative ways of characterizing his reasoning: abductive reasoning (inference to the best explanation) and transcendental argument. In fact, looking at the SEP entry for transcendental arguments, I notice the suggestion has been made that transcendental arguments are abductive rather than deductive as they are commonly taken to be. This means that abductive reasoning and transcendental argumentation might be two ways of describing the same process of reasoning. — Jamal

i understand "abductive reasoning" as a broad category encompassing a number of different types of informal reasoning processes. Some people want to restrict "logic" to formal deduction, and class inductive as distinct, "reasoning". Therefore it's best to class them both as forms of reasoning. The difference is in the format of the rules. Deduction has formal rules, induction does not. If we proceed further, into the category of reasoning with formal rules, we meet the highly formalized modal logic. If we proceed further into the category of reasoning without formal rules, we meet abduction where judgement is according to some vague principles.

It is necessary to allow the validity of abductive reasoning, which I agree transcendental reasoning is a type of, because we need to allow for a process whereby the rules of formal logic come into being. In other words, this type of reasoning, which produces the conditions for formal logic, must be afforded some form of validity. The basic example is that informal inductive reasoning often produces the premises required for the formal deductive argument. But we must be able to judge and assign some type of validity to the premises. This is commonly known as soundness which is distinct from deductive validity. So when we proceed into forms of reasoning which are even less formal, abductive reasoning, we need to devise principles for judgement, and those principles come from even less formal reasoning. The appearance is a sort of groundlessness, and the apparent infinite regress of justification which Wittgenstein looked at in On Certainty.

1. The entrepreneur

Adorno begins with the fact of objectively necessary false consciousness: a capitalist must believe in a fair exchange between himself and the worker, even though this belief is objectively false. The transcendetal question is "What must be the case for this illusion to be—not just possible, but necessary?" Or "What must be the case for the maintenance of this paradox to be possible?" And here is where the abductive reasoning comes in to hypothesize the social whole as the best explanation, completing the transcendental argument by identifying the conditions. (Obviously this is just an outline) — Jamal

i suppose one could come to that conclusion, but I see the opposite conclusion, that the social whole is impossible. That's the thing with abductive reasoning, we don't always come to the same conclusions. And this supports relativism, so it would be very difficult to disprove relativism through abduction.

2. Free time — Jamal

I really enjoy Adorno's outlook on freedom in general. He sees it as very paradoxical. We get so enamoured by this idea of freedom, without even having a clear understanding of what freedom is, that we rapidly become enslaved by an illusory "freedom". So we really restrict ourselves with our own understanding of 'freedom".

it is this intertwining of contraries which allows me to make the opposite conclusion to you, in the case of the social whole, above, and in abductive reasoning in general. Notice that Adorno says, that we can see through all this, and find that philosophers speak as if they are opposing each other, when they are really saying the same thing. Maybe what they are saying is "I don't know". So they waffle back and forth and some interpret one thing, while others the opposite thing.

This inference has no implication at all as to the characteristics of this (so called) God. All we know is that this "God" is some thing that kicked off the sequence of universe states. — Relativist

Sure, how does that mean that what I said makes no sense? It seems to make complete sense to me. There is something which caused the reality of the universe which we know and understand, but we do not know anything else about this cause.

Non-sequitur. Even if the universe was created by Yahweh, it entails an initial state of Yahweh (and nothing else). So it's self-defeating to rule out an initial state. — Relativist

This supposed conclusion is contrary to the argument. The argument demonstrates that the "thing" you refer to as prior to all the physical states, is explicitly not a state. That is why God is understood as immaterial. To characterize it as a state is to demonstrate that you are either failing to understand it, or refusing to accept it. Judging by the rest of our discussion, I think you are refusing. I think you actually grasp the force with which the argument disproves the physicalism of your faithful devotion, and so you practise denial because you are not prepared for apostasy.

But my argument is that time is generated from rotation. — apokrisis

But rotation is an activity which requires time. This puts time as prior to rotation. Rotation cannot get started without the passing of time. Therefore it is impossible that rotation is the cause of time, or that time is generated from rotation.

The logic I use above is the same type of logic by which Aristotle demonstrates that eternal circular motion is physically impossible in De Caelo. He starts by showing how eternal circular motion is logically possible. All the mathematical principles, the Ideals, are consistent and sufficient to support the reality of eternal circular motion. However, he then goes on to explain how any circular motion would involve a body which is moving in that motion. And, the body would consist of matter. The material body, would have been generated in the past, and would corrupt in the future, therefore the eternal circular motion is physically impossible.

The same logic can be applied to your claim that time is generated from rotation. Rotation is an activity which requires something which rotates. The thing which is rotating is a physical thing, a temporal object, existing in time. Therefore time is prior to rotation, rotation occurs within time, and it is impossible that time is generated from rotation.

This is of course the quick and dirty account. But it’s based on the maths of the symmetries underpinning quantum field theory. How SO(3) breaks down into its double cover of SU(2). You can get the fluctuation that is a vector gauge boson. A particle that exists as it has the dimensional structure that is an action in a direction. A translational degree of freedom which carries with it a transverse plane of rotation - a spin that cashes out an intrinsic energy. The constant field strength of a quantum oscillator. — apokrisis

All this happens in time. it is not an account of how time is generated.

So even if you can’t follow these details, you can see how time is an emergent description of what the universe is doing as a material system. — apokrisis

No, i don't see how it is possible that time is emergent from something material. And, you should be able to understand this as well. All material things are temporal, having their beginnings and endings in time. As demonstrated by Aristotle's argument in Bk 9 of metaphysics, which I referred to, anything eternal must be actual.

Some people develop areas of expertise, e.g. auto mechanics and MDs — wonderer1

But these are specifics, this type of thing, or that type, according to the area of expertise. What we were talking about is why things (in general) behave the way that they do.

Do you really think that is an accurate claim about yourself? Or do you recognize that an MD is apt to know more than most people, about why your body behaves the way it does? — wonderer1

Yes, I really think it is an accurate claim. And, I do not think that an MD knows more about why I behave the way that I do, then I do.

That's an unjustified conclusion. The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series. — Relativist

This is not true. Evidence indicates that becoming, or change, is a process of transition. Therefore the series ends, but it does not end abruptly at a point, it transitions to something else. This is neither an infinite series nor a unique point which initiates the series, it is a process of change.

Because an initial state (a unique thing) with potential to produce a subsequent state is also consistent with the evidence. So you need a rational reason to rule this out. — Relativist

I explained the rationale behind ruling out the "initial state". An "initial state" is an ideal which is arbitrarily assigned in the application of systems theory. As an "ideal" it has nothing which directly corresponds with it in the physical world. Take the eternal circular motion referred to above, in my reply to apokrisis, as an example. It is a logical possibility, and an ideal, but it is actually physically impossible. It is common that ideals are actually physically impossible, because the physical world lacks the perfection of the ideal. But that does not make the ideals useless. Many are extremely useful, for all sorts of purposes. However, when it comes to cosmology, and we assign the ideal as a fundamental property of the universe, when the ideal is actually physically impossible, this is a mistake which is very misleading. It is sometimes called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Both you and apokrisis make this same mistake, of designating an ideal which is actually physically impossible, as a fundamental property of the universe. I believe this type of mistake is common to all forms of physicalism.

The presence of the social whole in his thought ties things together. Without it, things in all their contradictory nature just don't make sense. Thus, the social whole is a valid inference. I admit, of course, that he nowhere deduces it. — Jamal

Ok, suppose "the social whole" is assumed as a means to tie things together. That could be a bit of a mistaken interpretation, uncharitable you might say, because it would represent it as something posited, or taken for granted. That would portray Adorno as having a system approach, guided by that intention of creating a whole, casting Adorno in the hypocritical light.

Notice however, if we pay close attention to the qualification in "preestablished whole", we can produce a slightly different interpretation. Instead of creating "the whole" with the intent of holding things together, we can say that "the whole" has been produced from observation and inductive reasoning. It is preestablished as an observed fact. But this implies that we ought to be able to analyze and judge the inductive reasoning involved in concluding the "preestablished whole".

I don't understand this interpretation. I mean, I can accept that Adorno inherited the very idea of a totality from Hegel, but he explicitly distinguishes it from Spirit. — Jamal

The problem is, that he can assert over and over, that his "preestablished whole" is distinct from "Spirit", which is the whole as established by Hegel, but if they are both taken for granted, and posited as a means to tie things together, to produce a philosophical system, then they are actually the very same thing. Then he falls into the category of hypocrite which the relativists get exposed as.

Notice also, that the subjective, intentional, act of assuming X for the sake of Y, where X represents the relationships between human beings, and Y represents the intent of the subject, is the essence of relativism by Adorno's description. Therefore the act of positing "Spirit" as absolute, is itself a hypocritical act, being relativistic. Then this act, by its nature, turns out to support the relativist position through what it demonstrates.

This is why I think it would be very important to determine how Adorno induces the "preestablished whole". Without appropriate inductive reasoning, "the whole" falls into that category of intent for the purpose of system, undermining Adorno's negative dialectics.

Or, does criticality towards capitalism not imply Marxism? — NotAristotle

Critical of capitalism is the larger category in relation to Marxism. Therefore the latter may imply the former, if the former is judged as an essential property of the latter, but the former does not imply the latter. .

In other words, Adorno is saying that relativism is, not logically self-refuting, but hypocritical. It makes use of thoughts inherited from the social world to produce the thought that thoughts are entirely the product of the individual. — Jamal

I agree, he basically says that the actual consequences of relativism are what refutes it. The problem i find is that the social "whole" which he refers to is not well validated.

In truth divergent perspectives have their law in the structure of
the social process, as one of a preestablished whole.

We can talk about preestablished social conditions, but the relativist will claim that they are relativistic conditions. Adorno needs the "whole" to support his objective law. This objective whole is really nothing other than Spirit in principle, as that which unites.

I'm finding it hard to work out how he makes this leap from the thesis of relativism to the contempt for Spirit. I understand the distinction he means, which is that between (1) useful productive work and the financial, class, in general materialist (in the popular sense, as Adorno says, "vulgar") concerns that go along with it; and (2) art and ideas, love and beauty, and God if you're so inclined. But how does relativism produce the exclusive focus on (1) and dismissal of (2)? — Jamal

Relativism dissolves the whole, and that means breaking down the social relations which are commonly understood under the conception of Spirit. Therefore it shows a contempt for Spirit. Referring back to earlier sections, I would say that Adorno would like to validate the whole under relations of production, or forces of production, which would unite people under principles of cooperation for production rather than Spirit.