There's no getting away from the concept-object confrontation; the question is how much of the object is lost in the confrontation, or how much the nonidentical is otherwise part of the experience in which the concept-object confrontation is central (which is so far unexplained). — Jamal

I don't like this concept-object confrontation, and I do not see the need for it. It appears like it will reduce the activity of mind to mere representation, and this would be an ignorance of what I believe to be the primary activity of mind, creativity. I believe that a proper understanding of concepts reveals that there is no necessity of a corresponding object, and this lack of object is not a fault of the concept, but a feature of its utility, versatility, and infinite applicability. This is what we see in mathematics for example, conceptions produced without corresponding objects.

The issue though is that since there is no object which corresponds with these concepts, a loss of objectivity becomes apparent. There is nothing to ground "truth". Then the pure mathematicians who dream up these concepts with their imaginations tend toward Platonism to fill this gap, producing a vacuous form of "objectivity". The concept and object are one and the same.

I think they're so ridiculous that they must be motivated by strong prejudice, and I guess I won't be able to argue you out of that. — Jamal

There is prejudice here, no doubt. I don't believe it is strong though. Since the matter is the intentions which authors conceal from us in the secrecy of their own minds, it is something which can only be speculated about, therefore confidence cannot be obtained. If one allowed oneself confidence (strong prejudice), in this sort of matter, that person would be subsumed by paranoia. But also the highly speculative nature makes it very difficult to argue one out of it, as well.

Anyway, I'll try to hold off the criticism until the designated time slot, and enjoy the reading. I find the material well written and very interesting. And I don't mean this in the sense of "dead wrong", I'll withhold judgement on that.

I don't get your point. Of course "P" and "not P" say different things, they are opposed in meaning. And, LEM says one or the other must be true.

Yes, "possibly P" has the same meaning as "possibly not P". And, this meaning is that neither P nor not P is true, which is a violation of the LEM.

Consider, what is known by us as "possibility" could be understood in another way. It appears as an aspect of reality which violates those three fundamental laws. It could be understood as a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Then when someone says "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" we would understand it as both "there will be a sea battle tomorrow", and "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" are true. But this is not the way that we are taught to understand it. We are taught to understand it as neither one is true. If we understand them both as true the result is unintelligibility. If we understand neither as true, the result is a new form of logic, modal logic, which deals with those aspects of reality which violate the LEM. This indicates that when something appears like it might be unintelligible, we might just need to look at it in another way.

He contrasts abstract negativity, or negativity in itself, with what he is really getting at with his negative dialectics, which is something to do with determinate negation: — Jamal

When he talks about "confronting concepts with their objects and, conversely, objects with their concepts", isn't this exactly the type of identity philosophy which he claims to be rejecting?

And, the meaning of "determinate negation" seems very unclear. It appears strangely like a reification. When "negativity of this kind is made concrete", doesn't this imply making it a fixed object? He may attempt to explain this when he talks about the "fixed element" as an aspect rather than an absolute, but it's very unclear what he is trying to do here.

Maybe it will become clearer when he addresses the question of whether a negative dialectics is even possible. Maybe it will end up being self-defeating, and we'll just be negating the negative dialectic.

See I'm practising my negative (critical) thinking, to see how it goes.

Because the matter of rhetoric and logic/dialectic are usually different, rhetoric provides its own appropriate logic. We can call it rhetorical logic if you like... — tim wood

As you can see, I don't like.

Rhetoric employs a number of different means, some logic, some not, depending on the circumstances. We cannot class appealing to another's emotions "logic".

There is no reason for him to mention "The enormous power of Hegel", and speak as if he's awed by this mysterious force of ideology. How is that consistent with his project of negative dialectics? And he did this right after claiming we need to critique the hypostasis of mind. Instead, he's sucking up to it when he says that all his ideas are contained in Hegel.

Anyway, you can call me scurrilous, and I'll say that you turn a blind eye, willfully ignore and deny, a significant aspect of German philosophy. Now we can happily continue on, with these negative opinions about each other.

Then you do not understand what rhetoric is or what it's for or how it differs from logic. — tim wood

You are the one who said "the right logic for this is Rhetoric", implying that rhetoric is a form of logic. It's clearly not.

And, as I said, logic can be used as rhetoric, because "rhetoric" is a use of language intended to persuade. What do you believe rhetoric to be?

And the right logic for this is Rhetoric, in which we consider both alternatives, sea battle or no sea battle. — tim wood

The problem though is that "Rhetoric" is not necessarily logic, it is language intended to persuade. If we class the language which deals with what is possible, and this includes what is named "modal logic", as simple rhetoric, @Banno will not be happy. However, "rhetoric" is the larger category, and logic can be used as rhetoric. But this leaves your statement as meaningless.

This is a minor quibble. He says that all of his ideas are contained in Hegel's philosophy, or are contained at least in tendency. That is, interpreted a certain way, everything he's saying can be spun out of Hegel. I don't think that's the same as saying he adheres firmly to Hegelian principles. — Jamal

Ok, what I said was completely an exaggeration, not an interpretation which remains true to Adorno's intention. It seems I have an odd subconscious habit of seizing on quirky lines and directing attention to them by interpreting them in a strange way. So what exactly is Adorno's intention in mentioning this?
The quirky lines often betray secrets which the author has no intention of revealing.

This what he actually said:

The enormous power of Hegel – that is the power which
impresses us so hugely today and, God knows,
it is a power that impresses me today to the point where I
am fully aware that, of the ideas that I am presenting to you, there
is not a single one that is not contained, in tendency at least, in
Hegel’s philosophy.

So, to pay respect for the difference you point out, what I see is a trick of rhetoric. He apprehends Hegel as hugely powerful in influencing the minds of men, and he has a desire to tap into that power, perhaps having political objectives. To support this end, he has mentioned some work of the younger Hegel, which is somewhat inconsistent with the older Hegel, and with reference to this, he claims everything he says is "contained" (in a qualified sense) in Hegel.

The trickery is this. He implies that he and the thoughts he presents, originate from, or have been greatly influenced by ("contained") by Hegel, suggesting that he is Hegelian. In reality, he is not, but he knows that Hegel is understood as a powerful authority, and he desires to gain support for his project by appearing to be consistent with Hegel.

I don't see it. Wikipedia tells me reification is a form of alienation. So that would be the opposite of this negation of the negation, which leads to the positive synthesis. Are you saying that Adorno's negative dialectics, which disputes this interpretation, is itself a reification?

Yes, but that "it's not a static thing" does not imply that it's not an object. Objects are not necessarily static things, so how is reification implicated?.

OK, but objects are not static things either. So how do you draw the conclusion of reification?

And so... Where's the reification?

But rhetoric certainly existed, with its own logic in which even as a matter of necessity both sides of a contradiction are "entertained." There will be a sea battle; there won't. The ultimate reduction being either-or, to which A. added also neither-nor. And Achilleus, "in the division of his heart," weighting competing courses of action. — tim wood

We are not talking about the situation after a future reduction though, we are talking about the current situation now. At the present time, neither "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" nor "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" is true. "It is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is true, but obviously this violates the law of excluded middle. However, under the principles of determinism, one or the other is considered to be true, even at the current time. But this leaves "it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" as false. (Note to Banno: this use of "possible" is not consistent with modal logic, but there is a number of different ways "possible" is commonly used). Also, determinism leaves deliberation as superfluous, so only a fool would accept that perspective.

What is it a reification of, "society"?

So, he goes through a bunch of meanings for "positive" and distinguishes two principal uses, "positive" in the sense of good, and positive in the sense of what is posited, or postulated as actual fact. The latter is the sense associated with positivism, and he warns about a sort of equivocation whereby the word "positive" in positivism has connotations from the other meaning, good, approvable, and ideal.

I will add that there is another sense of "positive" which sort of bridges between those two principle senses, it is the sense of a sort of certitude about what is the actual fact. "I am positive that I put the file in the folder, therefore unless someone removed it, it must be there." This appears to signify the positive attitude which Adorno's negative dialectics is opposed to, as a sort of Socratic skepticism. In analogy, the positivists are to Adorno, like the sophists were to Plato.

‘

For this reason,
therefore, we might say, putting it in dialectical terms, that what
appears as the positive is essentially the negative, i.e. the thing that
the negation of negation is to be criticized.
And that is the motive, the essential motive, for
the conception and nomenclature of a negative dialectic. — p18-19

So he describes his negative dialectics as a form of critical theory which goes beyond conventional critical theory, by affecting not only the way that we think, but also the way that we act. By affecting the way that we act, it has an affect on reality itself. This proposition we can reflect back on Hegel's distinction between "being-in-itself" as passive critical thought, and "being-for-itself" as active negative dialectics.

In this context, I remember very well a junior seminar
I gave with Paul Tillich shortly before the outbreak of the Third
Reich. A participant spoke out very sharply on one occasion against
the idea of the meaning of existence. She said life did not seem very
meaningful to her and she didn’t know whether it had a meaning.
The very voluble Nazi contingent became very excited by this and
scraped the floor noisily with their feet. Now, I do not wish to maintain
that this Nazi foot-shuffling proves or refutes anything in particular,
but I do find it highly significant. I would say it is a touchstone
for the relation of thinking to freedom. It raises the question whether
thought can bear the idea that a given reality is meaningless and that
mind is unable to orientate itself; or whether the intellect has become
so enfeebled that it finds itself paralysed by the idea that all is not
well with the world. It is for this reason in my view that the theoretical
notion of a positivity that represents the sum of all negativities is
no longer possible – unless philosophy wishes to live up to its reputation
of worldly innocence, something it always deserves most when
it attempts to become overly familiar with the world and to ascribe
a positive meaning to it. — 19-20

He then proceeds to dismiss the positivist interpretations of Hegel, which I interpret as addressing them as a sort of misinterpretation. They are misinterpretations because they focus on a part, but not the whole of Hegel's work. This thinking, which accepts a part as the whole leads to that positivist notion which he rejects, that the sum of all negatives produces something positive. Further, he explains how dialectics must address the primary question of the hypostasis of mind, which is very appealing to the philosophical mind which apprehends it.

We shall see that the thesis of the identity of concept
and thing is in general the vital nerve of idealist thought, and indeed
traditional thought in general. Furthermore, this assertion of the
identity of concept and thing is inextricably intertwined with the
structure of reality itself. And negative dialectics as critique means
above all criticism of precisely this claim to identity – a claim that
cannot of course be tested on every single object in a kind of bad
infinity, but which certainly can be applied to the essential structures
the negation of negation confronting philosophy either directly
or as mediated through the themes of philosophy.
Furthermore, dialectics as critique implies the
criticism of any hypostasization of the mind as the primary thing, the
thing that underpins everything else. — 20-21

The lecture is concluded by assertions that he adheres firmly to Hegelian principles.

It's good to see that we agree, once in a while.

I don't doubt the consistency of S5. Did I say that one system of logic, or another is not consistent? No, I pointed out two systems of logic which are not consistent with each other.

I'm sorry, Meta, but your post is again risible. You say no one is restricting themselves to Aristotle and then go and do exactly that. — Banno

You seem to have a limited capacity for understanding.

What I said was:

What I am recommending is that we acknowledge the inconsistency between modal logic and the fundamental three laws, and not attempt to argue that there is consistency between them.

I then proceeded to explain the reason why the two are inconsistent.

If that produces for you, the conclusion that I am restricting myself to one or the other, then you have a significant problem in your ability to interpret a simple piece of writing.

Not quite. Running the statement through the law of excluded middle gives: "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will not possibly be a sea battle tomorrow (i.e. a sea battle tomorrow is impossible)". If, in reality, a sea battle is possible, then the first statement is true and the second one is false. — A Christian Philosophy

The issue, is that you are making "possibly be" into a predicate. By doing this you violate the law of excluded middle, because the meaning of "possible" (what may or may not) is a violation.

The law of excluded middle is a law concerning predication. Now, we introduce a very special predicate named "possible", which we accept as being excluded from the applicability of this law. My argument is that we must respect the fact that this is an exclusion, and not attempt to represent "possible worlds", or "modal" logic as consistent with the fundamental three laws.

As shown in the links above, the logic of possibility and necessity - modal logic - has a strong standing in modern logic. Those who restrict themselves to Aristotle still have difficulties. — Banno

No one here is suggesting that anyone ought to restrict themselves to Aristotelian logic. What I am recommending is that we acknowledge the inconsistency between modal logic and the fundamental three laws, and not attempt to argue that there is consistency between them. Arguing for consistency signifies misunderstanding.

In ancient Greece the three laws were applied religiously, modal logic did not exist. Aristotle demonstrated how sophists (like Zeno who proved that motion cannot be real), could prove absurdities when those fundamental laws were strictly adhered to. He proceeded to expose the root of the problem as being the reality of potential, possibility, as the basis of change and becoming, and showed that we need to allow violation of either non-contradiction or excluded middle to understand this reality.

Aristotle's best examples were future possible events, which needed to be decided upon by human choice, like the sea battle. He determined that the way we understand human choice implies that the law of excluded middle must be violated to enable that understanding. However, he insisted that the law of non-contradiction must be adhered to avoid absolute unintelligibility. This violation of excluded middle, proposed by Aristotle, is the foundation of modern modal logic which is the manifestation of that violation.

Hegel's logical dialectics, on the other hand, allows that being and not being are subsumed within becoming. This is a violation of non-contradiction, which provides the foundation for dialectical materialism. Notice, that Aristotle's violation of excluded middles is based in the potential associated with human choice, while Hegel's violation of non-contradiction is based in the potential of matter.

yeah - there it is — AmadeusD

Yeah, there it is. A relatively new type of logic which is not based in the fundamental three laws, and openly averts these laws. It's really not a big deal, but to deny that modal logic intentionally avoids those laws, because of a perceived need to violate those laws, is to demonstrate a basic misunderstanding of logic.

Yes. Funnily enough, i actually picked up Tractatus for hte bus this morning, so read these exact passages before responding.
The point of Many Worlds is that you can think, logically, of a world which does not exist, but is coherent and possible.

Nothing illogical about that. My comment about Witty leading to the type of thoughts Meta is putting forward was about not contextualizing Wittgenstein as coming out of Russell per On Denoting. Not a great way to move from language use, to what 'can be'. — AmadeusD

I am not saying it's illogical. No principles dictate that all forms of logic must obey those three basic laws, to be classed as "logic". Those three laws are ancient, and concern what we can say about a thing, starting with the law of identity, a thing is the same as itself. If, for some purposes, we find that we need a logic which applies to possibilities (possible worlds), then we would need a different set of laws, because possibilities are categorically different from actual things. However, the fact that one set of logical laws is not compatible with another, because the two apply to completely different aspects of reality, does not imply that one or the other is illogical. It simply demonstrates that there is a significant difference between the different aspects of reality.

Good interpretations, and worded better than mine :up: — Jamal

Thank you. I'm going to take a look at the senses of "negative" referred to. I'm intrigued by the way that "negative" is associated with bad, and "positive" is associated with good, almost to the point of a necessary relation in common usage, yet "no" is not necessarily associated with bad, nor is "yes" necessarily associated with good.

A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. — AmadeusD

The basic laws of logic apply to the the way the world is. They are rules concerning what we can say about things. Adding to this, "or could have been". is a violation.

Your replies are very predictable. When you do not understand the concept, walk away instead of learning.

In other words, the progressive thinker as subject stands against their social context, criticizing the institutions of the status quo, and in such a negative stance represents the emancipation of the spirit (think of Enlightenment thinkers criticizing monarchy). But this negation of institutions, this so-called abstract freedom or abstract subjectivity, is one-sided and unbalanced: it forgets that the ability to critique institutions is itself a product of institutions (like universities). Therefore another negation is required, the negation of the original critical stance, leading to a reconciliation in which the subject's freedom is no longer abstract but is mediated by institutions (parliament limits the power of the monarchy). This last stage is the positive outcome of the process. — Jamal

I interpret this negation of the negation in the following way. The rebellious subject sees the institutions of society as restrictive and infringements on freedom, and therefore acts to negate the validity of them. An example of this is when I argued that "society" is not a proper object, but a concept. That would be a step toward negating the validity of those institutions. But Hegel implies that this gets the subject nowhere, because the subject is actually dependent on these institutions, so it ends up rebounding back upon the subject requiring a negation of one's own negation. Therefore the subject is forced to negate that negation for one's own support.

Now, Adorno says that this is a feature consistent throughout most of Hegel, but also points out that there was a time when Hegel did not accept this principle.

Now it is quite remarkable, a historical fact, and one that is perhaps
of key importance for what I wish to explain to you today, that this
negation of the negation that is then postulated as a positive is a
notion that the young Hegel sharply criticizes in essays which Nohl
published with the title of Early Theological Writings.6 In their central
thrust these youthful essays amount to an attack on positivity, in
particular on positive religion, positive theology, in which the subject
is not ‘at home’ [bei sich] and in which this theology confronts him
as being something alien and reified. And since it is reified and external
and particular, it cannot be the absolute that religious categories
claim it to be. Moreover, this is an idea that Hegel does not repudiate
or abandon later on; he merely reinterprets it. In general, he
abandoned or rejected very few of his ideas. What he mainly did was to
change their emphasis, albeit sometimes in a way that turned them
into their opposites. — p15

Further, there is another possible conclusion, to this issue with the institutions of society. This is the approach described by Plato in The Symposium. In this dialogue the student is being educated on the principles of "love". The student learns to see that institutions are beautiful. This requires no denial or affirmation of any specific institution, only a recognition that each, in its own way, has beauty. And there is no possible reason for them all to be beautiful other than the fact that they participate in the Idea of Beauty.

I believe that in the Platonic approach the double negation is averted, by averting the first negation. Through the teachings of love, the primary desire to negate the institutions is averted by demonstrating the natural beauty of an institution as artificial, a form of art. And when the subject proceeds to inquire how is it possible that an institution, which is fundamentally an infringement on one's freedom, could be beautiful, the person is lead to the reality of the Idea, which transcends all such things. Hegel posits the Idea as prior to, and transcending the state and its institutions, but gets there in a faulty way, so this position is unsupported.

Another topic which comes up in the second lecture is Hegel's distinction between "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself" (p14). To me, the former represents a passive being, while the latter represents an intentionally active being. I believe that this distinction will help us to understand the sense of "negative" which Adorno is attempting to circumscribe. In a way "No" is at the heart of morality, as the capacity to resist acting on temptations. And this type of negativity, known as will power, is not quite the same as a simple opposition to yes. It's more like the means by which deliberation is capacitated.

This resisting action, which is like the skeptic's "suspending judgement", which allows clear thinking, is the reason I believe he associates negative dialectics with critical thinking:

I would suggest that
the two terms – critical theory and negative dialectics17 – have the
same meaning. Perhaps, to be more precise, with the sole difference
that critical theory really signifies only the subjective side of thought,
that is to say, theory, while negative dialectics signifies not only that
aspect of thought but also the reality that is affected by it. — p20

There are two possible worlds that are accessible from today. — Banno

The concept of "possible worlds" itself violates the fundamental laws of logic. To predicate of "a world" that this world is possible violates the fundamental laws of logic. "Possible" implies that the world neither is nor is not and that is a violation.

Or, as argued earlier, determinism is false. — Banno

That's the best conclusion. But, if in fact determinism is false, then either the law of non-contradiction, or the law of excluded middle, both, or even identity, do not apply toward things of the future. This produces an important ontological question of what does the future consist of.

.To question the creator at all, we are assuming they exist to begin with right? So I see why the claim you make regarding Inherent existence is relevant here. Otherwise, bringing up the infinite regress aspect of design vs designer arguments as an acceptable position is assuming the existence exists in the first place..or is questioning how the existence was created apart of it's inherent nature? — Kizzy

An infinite regress signifies a logical impasse, a point where logic fails us. Assuming a final cause, as first cause, breaks the infinite regress of efficient cause, thereby pointing the mind in a different direction, allowing the logic to go to work from a different perspective, and possibly avoiding that failure.

So when I mention "the will to know" it involves the will to get beyond the logical impasse presented by things like infinite regress, (which appear to indicate that the object is impossible to know), and derive a new approach toward knowing it.

But there is a shwack load of situations with real possibilities. This would make the application of the law of excluded middle to be so infrequent that it would be no law at all. Which sounds absurd. — A Christian Philosophy

When you think about it, the law of excluded middle has very limited applicability. It's incompatible with probabilities. That's why modal forms of logic were invented.

Here is my alternative solution: There is ambiguity in the terms "there will be".
The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" either means "there will necessarily be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow". Both statements are either true or false. — A Christian Philosophy

Ambiguity just brings the violation of to a different level. Which of the two statements is true, and which is false? If we say "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" is true, then the being or not being of that event, the referred sea battle, violates the law. This is exactly the tactic of Banno, by making "sea battle" a logical subject instead of an objective occurrence being referred to, it's existence becomes irrelevant, and the world of the sea battle is simply a possible world. Then whatever is said about it must follow the rules of that form of logic, rather than the rules we are discussing.

That's fine, within that logical structure which respects the fact that the subject, the sea battle tomorrow, is not a real object, but an idea created by a mind. The three laws, identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, make statements concerning what we can say about real objects. They do not apply to imaginary (or possible) objects, because we can say anything we want about these. The imagination is inherently unlimited. And since these imaginary subjects are beyond the applicability of those laws, we can just make up other laws, axioms, definitions, etc., which these imaginary things must obey.

Your notion of concepts and objects seems incommensurable with mine, such that we're talking past each other. — Jamal

Yes I noticed this. We employ different principles for categorization.

In other words, both in thought (the concept) and in society (the object), contradiction stems from or reveals the drive to master nature, which becomes also the drive to master people. — Jamal

I interpret that passage like this. In the case of "reality", nature is constrained by the laws of nature. In the case of thought, mind is constrained by the principle of identity.

With reference to what I said earlier, about the problem with conflating "process and result", "method and content", we have no principles here to help us judge whether this process called "mastery", is good or not.

Further, we ought to be skeptical of Adorno's representation when he says that these constraints "force it into its intrinsic contradictions". It may actually be the case that these constraints act to exclude contradictions which are already immanent. If "contradiction" becomes the basis for a judgement of bad, then this becomes a very important question, concerning the described mastery.

Lol! It seems to me that "exactly similar" is an oxymoron or close to it. — tim wood

I think that's exactly the point made by the op. "Symmetry" is a sort of self-refuting idea, which we allow to have existence in our minds, but it is denied from reality. Like many ideals (perfections) we conceive them, but they do not have real independent existence.

Plato's "Symposium" is a very good source as a tutorial for understanding "Forms" through the theory of participation.

Like I thought, two different meanings. I think the op uses the word in the following way:
"the quality of being made up of exactly similar parts facing each other or around an axis."

In the real world, is the distance between my front door and my mailbox the same as the distance between my mailbox and front door? — jgill

If this is a symmetry, then "symmetry" has distinct meanings. I think of symmetry as involving two distinct parts. which are identical. Here we have one thing looked at from different perspectives.

But consider: it is the case that I live in an organized group of people, and that the way this group is organized has effects on me, providing opportunities for and imposing limits on my actions. Since it is so important, it is one of the things I think about, one of the things I reason about with concepts. — Jamal

The issue which brought us to this disagreement is the epistemological implications of one's ontological judgement, as to what qualifies as "an object". If I allow that an organized group of people is an object, simply because that group is important to me, though it may well be the case that some members of that group believe X is good or true, while others believe X is bad or false, then we allow that contradiction inheres within that object. At this point, we forfeit the identity principle, i.e. the law of identity, which states that an object has an identity, and along with that forfeiture we lose the applicability of the law of non-contradiction.

The point being that by doing this, we no longer have as a tool, the principle by which we distinguish which type of existents the fundamental laws of logic are applicable to, and which type are not, therefore we lose the rule by which those laws are applied, inviting arbitrary exceptions. We allow that contradiction inheres within objects, therefore objects do not necessarily have an identity.

Consider a dual meaning of "object", one being a unified body of material substance, and the other being a goal, or end. I think you'll agree that these two are very different meanings, and to mix them up would be equivocation. Now think about the "organized group of people", and how this is "important" to you. The use of "important" indicates that this is a goal based meaning of "object", rather than a material substance based meaning of "object". Further, we can see that all value (in this word's most general sense) based "objects", extending through ethics, money, mathematics, etc., are grounded in the goal, or end, meaning of "object", rather than the material substance meaning.

So we find that contradiction readily inheres within goals, intentions, and ends, "objects" in this sense. An individual attempts to rectify such contradictions in deliberating on actions. Now the question is, do we want to annihilate the distinction between the two types of objects, allow that contradiction may inhere in all objects, and forfeit the applicability of the fundamental laws of logic. That might involve a complete denial of epistemological principles. Or, can we maintain some sort of rules as to where these laws are applicable, and not, as Peirce attempted. I'm interested to see how Adorno might proceed with his negative dialectics.

In my opinion, which I believe I share with Adorno, when we talk about society we are not talking about a concept, therefore “society” doesn’t refer to a concept. Sure, it’s not a bundle of moderately sized dry goods (paraphrasing Austin), but it’s something real with an objective structure all the same. What matters to Adorno is the subject-object polarity, with the philosopher or whoever as the subject and, most relevantly, society or a part or aspect of society as the object. — Jamal

That you, Adorno, and others believe that "society" refers to an object, rather than to a concept, because it is something real with "an objective structure", does not really prove that this is the truth. Platonists believe that numbers and other mathematical concepts are objects. But the fact that these concepts have what can be called "an objective structure" does not justify the claim that these concepts are objects. This is because there is much ambiguity in the meaning of "objective", and we would need a clear definition of "object", and base "objective" on that definition, to make that judgement without a likelihood of equivocation.

This is where the law of identity plays a role. We can define "object" as something that has an identity which inheres within itself, rather than the identity which we assign to it, and this excludes artificially created axiomatic concepts from being objects. If however, we deny the applicability of the law of identity, as Hegel did, and take up a position of "non-identity", then what will serve as the means for distinguishing objects from concepts? And if contradiction is seen to inhere within concepts, then it will also be seen to inhere within objects, if we do not apply the principle that an object is a type of thing which has an identity and obeys the law of non-contradiction.

Anyway, I'm more than happy to drop this digression and continue with the reading. I'm interested to see where he is leading us.

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules. — A Christian Philosophy

In this example, the law of excluded middle is violated. The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is neither true nor false. We do not say that it is both true and false, so non-contradiction is upheld. You express this as "it is possible", and this is an expression which violates the law of excluded middle. The law of excluded middle implies that it is necessary that one or the other is true, therefore real possibility is excluded.

I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does? — A Christian Philosophy

Well, it's beyond the scope of this thread, but if I remember correctly, firstness is the realm of real possibility, potential, where the law of excluded middle is not applicable, as demonstrated in your example of "possible" above. Secondness is the realm of actual occurrence where the law of identity and the other laws of logic are all applicable. Thirdness is the realm of generality, universals, which unites the first and second, but this is only done through violation of the law of non-contradiction.

Well, he does immediately give the prime example he has in mind of what "the object" is: antagonistic society. And despite our worries about formal logic and predication vs identity (and your concern about identity vs equality), it doesn't seem far-fetched to say that society is contradictory at least in some sense (and he gives examples). — Jamal

I have a short, and hopefully concise, reply to make to this, and then we can leave the subject until it resurfaces. In my opinion, "society" refers to a concept rather than an object. I believe Aristotle imposed the law of identity as a means for distinguishing objects from concepts. An object has an identity, a concept does not. This allowed him to create a separation between material things, as primary substance, and the "mathematical objects" of Platonism which are not substantial. A material thing constitutes "primary substance", and there are no material things which words like "society" and "freedom" refer to. They are lacking in substance and are purely conceptual.

Notice, that the law of identity, as I present it, provides the basis for the Identity logic which Adorno rejects. If it is an object it has an identity, and vise versa, and this constitutes the secondary sense of "identity" as the logical identity, of what it means to be an object, to have this predication, "identity". After Hegel denied the usefulness of the law of identity, we have many logicians who blur the category distinction between object and concept. But this creates difficulty in determining when and where the law of identity is applicable. Along with this, the applicability of the other two laws, contradiction and excluded middle are questionable, as demonstrated by Peirce. Further, without grounding truth in primary substance (material object) the applicability of different types of logic, like modal logic and fuzzy logic for example, is not well disciplined. That I believe, is the principal issue involved with blurring the category separation between object and concept, unclear rules for the applicability of different logic types.

In other words, Adorno is wrong to claim that logic and language themselves are responsible for the coerciveness of identity thinking. He is right that thinking in modernity leads to the extinguishing of valuable particularity, but he is wrong about the ultimate cause; the cause is not an inherent tendency in logic and language, but is something to do with social and economic pressures. — Jamal

I agree with this, and the "social and economic pressures" could be generalized as a rapidly changing world with evolving knowledge and social conditions. However, I believe that we must take "the coerciveness of identity thinking" from the very top, or very bottom depending on how you look at it to understand it properly. At the very bottom is the law of identity and the strict category distinction between object and concept. The coerciveness is analogous to an ethical principle. In a rapidly changing world, new situations and circumstances arise which extend far beyond the applicability of the old rules, and we need to adapt quickly. Efficiency generally guides us, but what principles distinguish good ends from bad ends, or truth from falsity? This is the inevitable result of refusing the division between method and result, or process and content. Emphasis is placed on getting the job done without due consideration as to what is being done. We are left with a hole where "truth" or "good" used to be.

I believe that these considerations will suffice for the moment to show you how we are compelled from the vantage point of objective reality to apply the concept of contradiction, not simply as the contradiction between two unrelated objects, but as an immanent contradiction, a contradiction in the object itself. — p.9

This I believe could constitute a challenge to the law of identity itself. If contradiction inheres within the object itself, this would seem to imply that the object could have no identity. But he does not clarify what he means in this statement, and the ancients allowed contradictory predications so long as they are not at the same time. This is how change was understood, a negation of the property, a property come form its contrary. That requires temporal extension.

How do we interpret Adorno’s insistence that predicative judgments imply identities, i.e., that bringing two things under the same concept amounts to equating them? So far I’ve had to settle with the view that there is such a tendency — but Adorno’s claim is stronger. — Jamal

Yes, I have difficulty with this as well. In simple predication, "A is B" signifies a subject and a predicate. In no way is the subject identical to the predicate. However, the predication may be taken as an identity statement in the sense that it could function to help identify which objects correspond with the named subject, A. In another sense we might identify a named object A, as being of the type or classification of B. We'd say "A is a B". This is a stronger sense of identity.

What I think, is that when Adorno mentions "predicative judgements", he is referring to predicate logic, or "first order logic". If I understand correctly, predicate logic allows objects to be classed together according to predicates, as a set, and this establishes an equality between the individual objects. So for example, if we name something A only if the thing has property B, then all As have B. This allows us to say "if A then B", and there is an equality established amongst all the things named A by that relation to B. For that specific purpose then, all things named A are the same, identical, in the sense that B is implied.

The deeper issue, which I believe Adorno will address, is that equating things is this way is not truly giving the things an identity because the equality is based on the predicate, and proper identity is assigned to the object itself. So when a logician asserts that this type of equality is identity, that is a pretense. And if it is necessary to accept this form of equality as identity, in order to make the logical procedure, that is what he called logical coercion.

I think of identity in two ways:

(a) Subject-object identity: identity between the concept and the thing, the prioritization of the subject and the loss of aspects of reality in the act of conceptualization. This is what Adorno is referring to as the identity of being and thought, but there's another side to it...

(b) Object-object identity: identity between the objects brought under the concept, the flattening out of difference, the loss of thisness. — Jamal

I think we need to differentiate between "identity" as it is used in first order logic or predicate logic, and "identity" as it occurs in Aristotle's law of identity.

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. This places identity within the thing itself, as a form of object-object identity, recognizing the uniqueness of the particular thing, as the thing's identity. This is a relationship which a thing has only with itself, it is the same as itself. In logic, a thing's "identity" is something we assign to the thing.

There is actually a huge difference between these two, because first order logic then takes "identity" to mean "equal to". So in logic there may be two distinct things which share the "same" identity by being equal to each other, while the law of identity restricts "same" to a relation which one thing has only to itself. It may be argued that sameness by the law of identity is a special type of equality, an equality relation which a thing has only with itself, but it's really meaningless to say that a thing is equal to itself, when what is meant is "same". The difference between "equal" and "same" appears to be paramount in the proposed dialectics.

In common practise, this difference is the difference between "same type", and "same" in an absolute sense. So you and I can be said to have the same car (similar make, model, colour), but we do not actually drive the same car in an absolute sense. One sense of "same" bases identity, or sameness in the type, the other bases sameness in the thing itself. The sense of "same" used by modern logicians is qualified or restricted for the purpose of the logical procedure, so that it really means same in a specific way which is designed for, and relevant to that procedure, the differences being dismissed as differences which do not make a difference. This is really a meaning of similar.

Adorno's "non-identity" appears to be a rejection of the form of identity employed by logicians, the one which is really equality, being a specified similarity. We see that a multitude of objects subsumed under the same concept are deemed as the same by virtue of that concept, and Adorno denies this sameness with the term "non-identity". However, he has not, at this point, denied that distinct things have a true identity within themselves, as dictated by the law of identity. So "non-identity" does not negate the law of identity in its traditional form, it negates identity in the logical form, as equality.

The meaning of "non-identity", and the importance of "contradiction" is presented on page 8. Simply put, "A=B" seems to imply that A is identical with B, as an identity statement. However, evidence indicates that B is not A. This demonstrates that identity in this form is actually a "coercion" of logic, where we are coerced to accept A=B as identity. If we do not accept this coercion, then A=B as identity, is viewed as self-contradictory itself. Such resistance to this coercion is also characterized as contradiction, allowing the law of non-contradiction to be applied in support of the coercion. Therefore, we accept one or the other, and deny the one not accepted, as contradictory. But either way, contradiction is the base of our thinking. One concept of "contradiction" contradicts the other so that the two oppose each other. The view of "non-identity", I conclude, is the view that sees the identity claim of "A=B" as self-contradicting.

Now you may well say, this discrepancy is not necessarily a
contradiction. But I believe that it offers us a first insight into the necessity
of dialectical thinking. Any such predicative judgement that A is B,
that A = B, contains a highly emphatic claim. It is implied, firstly,
that A and B are truly identical. Their non-identity not only does not
become manifest; if it does manifest itself, then according to the
traditional rules of logic, predicative logic, that identity is disputed. Or
else we say: the proposition A = B is self-contradictory because our
experience and our perception tell us that B is not A. Thus because
the forms of our logic practise this coercion on identity, whatever
resists this coercion necessarily assumes the character of a contradiction.
If, therefore, as I observed at the outset, the concept of contradiction
plays such a central role in a negative dialectics, the explanation
for it is to be found in the structure of logical thought itself, which
is defined by many logicians (though not in the way it operates in the
various current trends in mathematical logic) by the validity of the
law of contradiction. And what this means then is that everything
that contradicts itself is to be excluded from logic – and, in fact,
everything that does not fit in with this positing of identity does
contradict itself. Thus the fact that our entire logic and hence our
entire thinking is built upon this concept of contradiction or its denial
is what justifies us in treating the concept of contradiction as a central
concept in a dialectics, and in subjecting it to further analysis.

He ends the lecture with a question about his use of "negative" as a defining term of his dialectics:

Given that the concept of dialectics contains the element
of negativity precisely because of the presence of contradiction, does
this not mean that every dialectics is a negative dialectics and that
my introduction of the word ‘negative’ is a kind of tautology?

He outlines the issues derived from Hegel, how thought itself acts to negate, seeming to imply that the subject needs to negate itself, but the question is left to be fully answered at a later time.

So maybe we can say, not that Adorno was a Platonic post-Hegelian, but that he was a Socratic one. — Jamal

I'm fine with that, but I generally look at what you call "the Socratic method" as the Platonic method. This is how Socrates is portrayed in Plato's dialogues, so this method is really indicative of Plato's thought process.

It's very good to separate the Platonic method (Platonic dialectics) from Platonism, because the latter has developed a meaning in modern usage which is actually in contradiction with what Plato expressed. "Platonism" is commonly understood as the conception of eternal unchanging ideas. But this is exactly the concept which Plato subjected to skepticism, with what you call the Socratic method. Following Plato, you'll see that Aristotle continued with a full refutation of Pythagorean idealism (my name for what is now called "Platonism"), by applying the concept of potential, and he also started on a reconstruction, a sort of synthesis where potential, as "matter", plays a very important role. Classical Neo-Platonists on the other hand attempted to cling to the vestigials of Pythagoreanism, forcing "matter" into the world of mysticism.

Also, I think for context, it would very useful to understand the ancient notion of contradiction. This is a logical principle expressed by Parmenides as the difference between being and not being. Being and not being are understood not in an absolute sense, as we are prone to think of these, but in a qualitative sense as "B is A", and "B is not A". This is the way that the ancients understood change, as a thing moving from being what it is, to not being what it was. So change was understood as active contradiction, supported by a temporal separation between the contrary states.

It wasn't until Aristotle's work, that the principles of predication were firmly established. Aristotle defined the separation between subject and predicate. This allowed that the subject could maintain its identity as "B", and contradiction was relegated to its predicates, "is A", "is not A". In this way, a thing, with its identity as itself, could never evolve into not being itself, because what changes, or moves between contradictories, is the thing's properties. Hegel subjected this idea "identity" to skepticism, doubting the need to assume an underlying subject which maintains its identity as itself. This forces us back to reconsider the pre-Socratic notion, that the entirety of a thing's being is negated at each moment of change.

As for the lectures, copies of LND are widely available, but let me know if you have trouble locating one. — Jamal

I've been searching, but haven't found anything free online yet, and it's an expensive book.

Why must everything be a matter of contradictions? — Jamal

From what I've read in a free sampling of LND, his idea of "contradiction" is not really conventional. It seems more like difference, or contradicting in the sense that not-same negates sameness.

It is that the concept of contradiction will play a central role here, more
particularly, the contradiction in things themselves, contradiction in
the concept, not contradiction between concepts. At the same time –
and I am sure that you will not fail to see that this is in a certain
sense the transposition or development of a Hegelian motif – the
concept of contradiction has a twofold meaning. On the one hand,
as I have already intimated, we shall be concerned with the contradictory
nature of the concept. What this means is that the concept enters
into contradiction with the thing to which it refers.

So he goes on to explain this difference between concept, as a sort of whole (perhaps a type), and the individuals or particulars which are named by the concept. There is a specified sameness which each particular has, which forms the concept, by abstraction, and since the concept does not include every aspect of each individual, it is in that sense less than the individual. However, at the same time, the concept mysteriously has something more than that abstracted value, which extends beyond that entire set of individuals, and this is what provides it with the potential to be applied indefinitely. I believe that his is the basis of that "contradictory nature of the concept". It is at the same time less than each individual thing, but also more than all the individual things.

When a B is defined as an A, it is always also different from and more than the A, the
concept under which it is subsumed by way of a predicative judge
ment. On the other hand, however, in a sense every concept is at the
same time more than the characteristics that are subsumed under it.

Here is another important aspect of his outlook:

I shall not pretend to make a virtue of necessity, but I do believe that this view
does not properly fit our understanding of the nature of philosophy;
that philosophy is thought in a perpetual state of motion; and
that, as Hegel, the great founder of dialectics, has pointed out, in
philosophy the process is as important as the result; that, as he asserts
in the famous passage in the Phenomenology, process and result are
actually one and the same thing.

...

...I do not recognize the usual distinction between method and content...

I believe that it is important to note this position, because it denies the assumed separation between the means and the end. In one sense, the appearance that teleology is avoided can be created this way, by saying all is process, and there is no desire for conclusion. However, it's just an appearance, as the end is now the means, so priority is placed on perfecting the method. In this way, it may be possible to come as close as possible to avoiding prejudice, by having no preconceived goal to influence the direction of the process.

It's interesting that he positions Hegel as the founder of dialectics rather than Plato. It appears to me, like what Adorno is offering is a dialectics more closely related to Plato's than Hegel's. He dismisses "synthesis" completely, and focuses on a deconstruction of the concept. It may be characterized as deconstructionist. This is very similar to the Platonic dialectical method. Plato took varying definitions of the same term to break down the assumed concept, and expose contradiction within the supposed "concept", demonstrating its weaknesses. it is a skeptical method.