I won't elaborate on that any further, since what I'm trying to show right now is just that dialectical thought might still be useful, and might even remain the best way of thinking philosophically — and that it's not just an obsolete step in knowledge's forward march. — Jamal

If it's the best way of thinking philosophically, then it's true philosophy, and will never be obsolete so long as there are human beings.

I'll do what I can to keep up with the reading, but that's a lot of material. So I'm happy that you're in no rush.

Fine; but if the datapoints are entered, it is false to state that the datapoints are not entered, and it still remains a true fact in reality that Patient A cannot both have allergy B and not have allergy B at the same time. — A Christian Philosophy

This says something about the type of thing that "allergy B" refers to. It is a property, and we have categorized the aspects of reality so that things known as properties obey the fundamental rules. The issue is that there are aspects of reality which do not necessarily obey those rules.

So Aristotle propose another category, known as "potential", to classify the aspects of reality which do not obey those rules. The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present.

You can see that these aspects of reality are not accurately called properties. They are better known as concepts or ideas. The future event decided by choice, exists as an idea in someone's mind. And "matter" is a concept which Aristotle used to substantiate the reality of bodies in their temporal extension.

For a modern example of why we must allow violation of the fundamental laws of logic, you could investigate Peirce's triadic system.

If that's okay, I'll drop the efficient cause/final cause cause topic to avoid going off on a tangent. — A Christian Philosophy

Sure, but final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door, as what substantiates the efficacy of ideas and concepts, confirming their reality. This will be required to demonstrate that potential is something real. Otherwise one might simply deny the reality of the things in this category, possibility, potential, ideas, matter, etc., calling them imaginary or fictional, and insist that all reality must obey the laws of logic.

I cannot see this happening. — AmadeusD

You must pay close attention to notice Banno's equivocation, because equivocation is an interpretive error, rather than a direct error of usage. So the recognition of one's equivocation is dependent on your interpretation of one's interpretation. His latest reply to you is a clear indication that Banno is prone to misinterpretation.

Assuming the particles follow a path of some kind, how is it they manage to favour some paths over others? — tim wood

The particles do not exist in the transmission of radiant energy, so there is no path. The energy moves as waves not particles. We all know about electromagnetic waves, light waves, radio waves, etc.. Those are real waves and we can see refraction (rainbows) and a variety of interference patterns associated with these waves.

The problem is that we have not identified the medium (sometimes called ether) within which the waves exist. Therefore the waves cannot be modeled or represented as they actually exist, so they are represented as a wave function. At the base of this problem is the fact that there is no adequate understanding of the photoelectric effect, which is the quantized way that fields of radiation waves interact with what are known as material objects. That is the relationship between the medium (ether) and the supposed material objects.

I would have thought that, even though there are many sub-branches of logic, all the branches are compatible with each other so that logic as a whole is one coherent system. Much like how there are many branches of mathematics (calculus, statistics, etc.) that are compatible with each other and mathematics as a whole is one coherent system. — A Christian Philosophy

These various systems are not necessarily compatible with each other, that's why they are useful in different situations, for different purposes. One works where the other one doesn't. For a simple example, imaginary numbers have a square root of a negative and that's incompatible with the classical understand of negative numbers.

Indeed. Unless the premises are based on tautologies or pure mathematics, then they are based on induction/abduction. This makes the premises uncertain, but they are the most reasonable given the information we have. — A Christian Philosophy

Mathematics is not based in tautologies, it's based in axioms, which are a sort of definition which acts as a premise. The certainty here is based in memory and application, usefulness not truth, and that's why various systems, being useful for various purposes, have differing axioms. Some will argue that the axioms are not even based in usefulness, being purely creative expressions. But even so they get accepted and become conventional because they are useful.

Final cause, also called function, purpose, motive, or end, only applies to things that are designed by an agent with free will. In which case, the efficient cause is called a designer, agent, or thing with free will or free choice. E.g. I choose to go to work instead of staying in bed in the morning for the purpose of making money. In this example, "going to work" is the thing that exists or occurs, "making money" is the final cause, and "the chooser (me)" is the efficient cause. I made a video about this if interested. — A Christian Philosophy

The point I was making is that there is a gap in understanding between the two. If we assume that you, as the person going to work, is the efficient cause of you creating the desired end, making money, the gap in understanding is the question of how your desire to make money causes you to get out of bed and go to work. In all cases of final cause, there is this gap of understanding, of how the final cause (a desire for something), causes the physical activity which is the efficient cause designed to produce the end.

it falls short of dynamic philosophical engagement — Hanover

That's the key point. How many times did it cop out and tell you to seek professional guidance? Something it could not give you.

It was supposed to be an internal discussion paper. — Wayfarer

That's bullshit. It was formulated as a letter, not as a topic for discussion. Unless perhaps, they use AI to write up their discussion topics.

Imagine that, thy could even use AI to discuss their discussion topics, and decide which letters to send out. No wonder Musk quit the team, he saw his worst nightmare coming true, he was being replaced by AI. Next step, the AIs would be producing offspring for him.

If you're now (it seems you are) making a physics argument, I have to just say you're wrong. This is a physics concept that is widely understood as extant and helpful to physicists. If your gripe is with the use of hte word 'instantaneous' fine, but that's not how the word is used in that phrase. It is a proper name, for all intents and purposes, and so your reading is simply inapt. In any case, the term 'instant' does not mean "zero time" unless you're using a rather unsophisticated colloquial definition. "a very short period of time" is the better way to think of the word, and solves your usage issue regardless of your disagreement with the facts of the matter (i.e that instantaneous velocity is a real, measurable thing which physicists use every day). — AmadeusD

I agree about this difference in the meaning of "instantaneous". But Banno does not accept that difference of meaning, and equivocates in his complaints about my explanations. This is a common, recurring problem I have with Banno, which became evident when I demonstrated that he equivocates with the use of "same" in his interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Instead of acknowledging the tendency to equivocate, Banno doubles down and makes fun of my arguing technique.

Notice that's exactly what Banno was attempting in this thread. Instead of looking at defining "necessary" in a rational, intelligent and meaningful way, as I proposed, Banno attempted to change the subject to discuss modal logic, which excludes "necessary" to some ideal Platonic realm. This leaves "necessary" without any practical import. But then, Banno will continue to use "necessary" in the normal, practical way, while insisting on that ideal definition. That is equivocation.

So in he case of "instantaneous", there is an ideal "instant" which refers to an assumed point in time. I say it's assumed because time flows, and there is no real point in time. So that point in time, the "instant" is an ideal only. In practise, in physics with the use of calculus, a person might determine an "instantaneous velocity". Of course, that so-called "instantaneous velocity" is really the velocity over a period of time, because the instant in time is an ideal, and the accuracy of the determination is dependent on the parameters of the calculation.

For a simplified example, suppose I take a five second period of time, and determine that the velocity of an item in that time period was 5m/s. I could insist that at every "instant" of time in that five second period, the item had that 5m/s velocity. But of course that would be meaningless, and actually false. An "instant" in this sense is an ideal only, so it is meaningless when applied toa physical object, and it is false because I determined the five second period, and divided it evenly, assuming another ideal, perfectly constant motion. Of course that is a simplified example but it applies to accelerated and decelerated motions as well, which assume constancy.

Now we have the same sort of situation in this thread. Banno wants an ideal definition of "necessary", which he represented with "MUST". Of course such an ideal form of "necessary" does not enter into any practical application, just like the ideal "instant" does not enter into the practise. The important point is that just like with the mathematics, we may represent the ideal, and claim that it enters into the practise, with the mode of representation employed, but this claim is actually meaningless and false. The real form of "necessary" which enters into our practise of logic is our decisions as to what is "necessary for", or needed for, our purposes. And this varies according to the situation and principles applied, just like the meaning of "instantaneous" varies according to the application.

Logic is not only a first principle of epistemology (i.e. deduction) but also of metaphysics. — A Christian Philosophy

I would disagree with this, placing metaphysics as necessarily prior to logic. The reason for this, is that as we come to understand the nature of reality it becomes apparent that there are aspects which escape the applicability of those primary three laws. Aristotle described this class of aspect as "potential", and matter is placed in this category. His solution was to allow for a violation of the third law, excluded middle, to accommodate for what may or may not be. The problem is deep though, because the proposal of "prime matter", pure potential, violates the law of identity, because pure potential could not have any form therefore no identity. Aristotle rejected the proposal of "prime matter" in his metaphysics, but if we accept that proposal, then we also allow violation of the second law, noncontradiction, by avoiding identity. This is the case with dialectical materialism, and dialetheism.

So the issue is that we need to adapt our principles of logic to conform to our understanding of reality, and this is why metaphysics is commonly placed as prior to epistemology. The conventional approach has been to produce forms of modal logic, and these roughly follow Aristotle's lead, as exceptions to the third law, being systems to deal with possibility. Notice that I say "systems", plural, because there is a number of possible ways to approach the reality of possibility. This is why metaphysics must be understood as prior to epistemology, because we need principles to choose which system of logic is applicable to the circumstances.

E.g. a four-sided triangle is a contradiction and thus cannot exist in any possible world. — A Christian Philosophy

This exemplifies the problem of definition. The truth of this statement requires a specific definition of "triangle". Someone could propose a possible world in which "triangle" is defined as four-sided, and this possibility renders your statement as false. So that statement places the definition of "triangle" as something completely outside the system of logic, and somehow fixed, thereby creating the necessity of "thus cannot exist in any possible world".

Clearly this is a false necessity, because words can be defined as we please. So in classical logic, definitions enter into the system, being premises, and the necessity is created by acceptance of the definition. So your example really requires another premise, which would define "triangle" as three sided, and by that premise, a four-sided triangle is excluded.

With that, since both deduction and induction/abduction are first principles of epistemology, and these types of reasoning appeal to logic and the PSR respectively, then correspondingly, both logic and the PSR are first principles of metaphysics. — A Christian Philosophy

I agree with this, but the problem is to determine which principles are applicable in which circumstances. This is where metaphysics and epistemology interact. Take your example, someone sees smoke, and concludes that there is fire where the smoke is. If the person used the premise "where there is smoke there is fire", this would be a deductive conclusion. Therefore by your definition the conclusion is logical. However, we can see falsity in the premise, and in the formulation of the premises is where we find the nuances of reasoning.

If we have found fire in every situation that we have found smoke, we still cannot derived the certainty required for "necessary", as explained by Hume. So the truth of inductive premises escapes the certainty for "necessary". Further, we have to look at what "every situation" means. If the person has only seen smoke twice, and each time there is fire, this clearly is insufficient to support the premise. Furthermore, we sometimes loosen up the rules to accept probability. Perhaps seeing fire associated with smoke 99% of the time allows one to accept the premise. Also, there are nuances within the description of "smoke" which need to be considered. A person might have noticed that black smoke is always associated with fire, and white smoke often has no fire, and so the person might be using a more nuanced premise. In short, there are many factors involved in the creation of a premise, and unless the premise is a simple definition, necessity is not provided for. And even with a definition, the defining terms are not themselves defined, because this would produce an infinite regress, so necessity is not absolute even in the case of definition.

I suppose we could identify every possible cause of a given outcome and eliminate them by testing them individually. But this could still leave room for a possible non-physical cause that could not be identified in the field of physics. — A Christian Philosophy

Yes of course, this is the base of the problem, and why dualism forms the foundation for many metaphysicians. There is a fundamental difference between efficient causation which is studied by physics, and final causation which is studied in social studies, and by metaphysics. Since there is a gap between the two, meaning that we do not understand how one acts on the other, the designation of "every possible cause" is sort of meaningless or misleading. The PSR allows for both principal types of cause as "the reason". So if we determine "every possible cause" of the physical type, and are inclined toward concluding 'no reason', this still does not exclude the possibility of a cause of the non-physical type. Therefore the PSR gives us encouragement to keep on seeking the reason for an occurrence even after it has been proven that there is no physical cause for it.

Fine. — Banno

Good, we agree on something. That gives us a starting point. Care to join me on a learning experience, or is it too late to teach an old dog like yourself, new tricks?

I wonder, though, whether you’ve defined such a possibility out of existence, by stipulating that the PSR is and must be true, so that the idea of a thing without a reason is already impossible. — J

Yes, I think that is the very point of the PSR. By making a thing without a reason impossible, by definition (actually 'by law', the law being that principle), we do not consider the possibility of a thing which has no reason. Such a thing has been outlawed. Therefore, the enquiring (philosophical) mind will not be discouraged from seeking the reason for things, when the task gets tough, and something appears to be without a reason. The possibility that it really is without a reason has been outlawed so that we do not get discouraged in this way.

I guess I’m not sure whether you’re offering this connection of reasons with what can be known as a demonstration that the PSR must be true, or as an entailment of what must follow if the PSR is true. — J

The PSR "must be true", to support the philosophical mind, and the desire to know. If we allow that it may not be true, then we allow that we may become discouraged from the task of expanding knowledge to cover all of reality, and then designate particular things as occurring without reason. That is an unreasonable point of view to the philosophical mind with the desire to know.

BTW: There’s a provocative book called No Way: The Nature of the Impossible, edited by a mathematician and a physicist, that collects instances of the debate over what’s possible (including in epistemology) from a wide variety of disciplines, from medicine to music. With a question as big as this, it’s really helpful to hear from people who’ve encountered the problem in a specific situation related to their expertise. Well worth finding a copy if you can. — J

I'll keep that in mind.

Folk can Google it, Meta. Cheers. — Banno

Yes, folk can Google it. But I referred to serious philosophers, and Google does not do the studying for serious philosophers. So again, your claim is irrelevant. At least you are consistent in irrelevance.

I think the point he's driving for is that for a philosopher, the term is ridiculous. It's a totally reasonable and real physics thing though. I suggest his point is irrelevant anyhow, But this seemed to me the crossed purpose there. "instantaneous" doesn't hold it's standard meaning in that phrase. — AmadeusD

Correct, a misuse of the term. We all know that velocity is always an average and therefore no velocity is ever properly "instantaneous". Any measurement of velocity is derived from at least two instants. Banno however, seems to actually believe (or at least argues for) the literal meaning of "instantaneous", just like he seems to believe that what are termed "logical possibilities" are not actually treated as the necessities of modal logic. It appears to be a matter of Banno simply assuming that a word has a specific meaning, without taking the time to adequately understand what the word really means, within the context which it is used.

Your contribution here is pretty much on a par with your rejection of instantaneous velocity - an eccentric irrelevance. — Banno

Every serious philosopher knows that instantaneous velocity is a nonsensical idea. So you are just making a fool of yourself by bringing this up, over and over again in a philosophy forum.

I agree with your defense of the PSR. But I think we can build a stronger defense by showing that the way we infer that the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics is no different than the way we infer that logic is a first principle of metaphysics. What do you think of the following argument? — A Christian Philosophy

I look at logic as a procedure, an activity, something we do. We cannot accurately portray it as "a first principle" because it consists of a number of principles which are applied. We can describe human beings as using logic, and use that as a first principle, i.e. human beings use logic.

On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.

We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal". — A Christian Philosophy

Here is the difficulty. Deduction, induction, and abduction, can all be said to be types of logic. Or, we could restrict the meaning of "logic" to deduction, and class the other two in a broader category, as reasoning, along with deductive "logic" as a different form of reasoning. However, no matter how we define the categories of classification, we cannot avoid the fact that there are different forms of reasoning, which employ different principles.

So, if we place severe restrictions on "logic", we cannot say "everything must necessarily be logical", then we exclude the things which are understood by other forms of reasoning. This is why the PSR employs the most broad term, "reason". Then even if we restrict "logic" to a specific form of human reasoning, and we find that some things appear to be illogical, this does not imply that these things are unreasonable, and vise versa.

For example, logical conclusions are judged for validity and soundness. And, basic deductive logic often proceeds from premises which are produced from induction. This means that if we restrict "logic" to refer to the validity of the deduction, an unsound conclusion would still be "logical", yet unsound. So false premises could produce very absurd conclusions, which appear to be very illogical, but we'd still have to say that they are logical conclusions no matter how absurd they are. (Zeno's for example)

Furthermore, we still need to allow ourselves the capacity to judge the principles employed in reasoning. If we allow a more general definition of "logic" and the use of any system of reasoning is called "using logic", then we still need to be able to judge faulty applications. There are many specialized forms of modal logic, and we need to be able to judge the modes of application according to acceptability. This is how I judge Banno's reference to modal logic as unacceptable in the context of this thread.

The PSR, as a principle can be judged similarly. We cannot judge it as to whether it is logical or not, because it says something about logic, and the way that we apply logic in general. That's why I judged it as a valuable principle.

Correct. To draw a parallel with logic again, we sometimes encounter situations that seem illogical, called a paradox. We could adopt an attitude that not all outcomes are logical, or we can hold on to the belief that nothing stands outside of logic and make an effort to solve the paradox. — A Christian Philosophy

Paradoxes are generally produced from the misuse of reasoning. One might apply logic to faulty premises, or misuse the modes of modal logic as Banno does in the context of this thread.

I admit I'm confused about what "unknowable, period" or "not capable of being known by anyone or anything" might mean. Could you clarify that? Would, for instance, the decimal expansion of pi be an example of this? Or, as your post seems to suggest, do we need to understand what alien forms of life might be capable of knowing? That seems an awfully high bar to settle the question. — J

To understand what is meant, we need to consider the context. The PSR says that everything has a reason. So "unknowable" in this context means having no reason. Having no reason would make it fundamentally unknowable.

So the question is, how would we be able to determine that there is no reason for something. If we cannot find the reason, or even judge ourselves as incapable of finding the reason, that does not mean that there is no reason. Making the judgement "there is no reason for X" would only put an end to the search for that reason. Clearly, to the philosophical mind which desires to know, such a judgement would be counterproductive. Therefore the possibility of making this judgement must be excluded. We exclude this possibility with the PSR, which states that there must be a reason for everything.

You showed little understanding of modal logic. — Banno

I haven't been discussing modal logic because it's not relevant. As I explained, you use reference to modal logic as a trick of sophistry. This trick allows you to name as "possible", what the logician takes as necessary for the logical procedure. Therefore you can portray what is required by (necessary for) the logician, as a "logical possibility", instead of portraying it as it truly is in the logician's use, a necessity. Premises are required (necessary) for logical procedure, even if they are called "possibilities". Your reference to modal logic is nothing but a smoke and mirrors linguistic trick.

I can say I'm certain that my cat will never comprehend general relativity (I barely do myself), though I can't prove it. Likewise, we may discover the limits of our own comprehension -- not provably, perhaps, but beyond a reasonable doubt. We would then know that something is not knowable. — J

This is not applicable. That a cat cannot understand something, is a deficiency of the knower. You cannot conclude that the object is unknowable, based on the capacity of the knower, because a more capable knower could know it. Likewise, even if we determine the limits of the human capacity of knowing, and discover that some objects are beyond our ability to know them, this does not imply that they are unknowable.

I bolded "is" and "as" in your quote because I think what you're pointing to may be the idea that to know "something" as unknowable, is already to know something about it, hence a sort of contradiction. I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that, but there are other ways of being unknowable. — J

No, that's not really what I meant. I was asking directly, how could you determine that a specific thing, X, is unknowable. Finding out "I can't know X" doesn't mean X is not knowable. Even determining that X is beyond the capability of all human knowers doesn't imply that X is not knowable. This is because there are other types of knowers, like your cat example demonstrates. Living beings evolve, and knowledge evolves. So reference to the current condition, and knowing ability of life on earth, cannot be used as an indication as to whether X is knowable. So, I asked the question, how could you determine that X is not knowable? Wouldn't this actually require knowing X? I cannot look at a thing and say that since it is impossible for me to understand it, it is therefore unknowable. What type of information about that object can I use to draw that conclusion?

Despite you, ↪Metaphysician Undercover and ↪A Christian Philosophy best attempts there's precious little here supporting sufficient reason as a principle, intelligent design or god. — Banno

I'm not really interested in the intelligent design aspect, and I really don't understand the claimed relation.

However, sufficient reason, as a principle, supports the will to know, as I explained, and is therefore a very a valuable principle.

This statement caught my eye, looking over this thread. Isn't it too strong? If philosophy should discover that some things aren't knowable, at least by us, wouldn't that be worth knowing, part of "all things" philosophy is interested in? Maybe the word you want is "limited" rather than "misdirected." — J

How do you think it could be possible to discover that something is not knowable? I think it is impossible to know something as not knowable.

Wishful thinking on your part. — Banno

That's what the quest for knowledge is, "wishful thinking". Denying the PSR is demoralized thinking.

My argument in this comment is not an inductive argument. Rather, it says that since induction/abduction is necessary to find truth, and since it is equivalent to the PSR (inference to the most reasonable explanation), then we can trust our voice of reason when it says that everything must have an explanation. Logic can be defended the same way. — A Christian Philosophy

I don't think it's a matter of "trust" here, it's a matter of having nothing else to go on. If we want n explanation of things, we must assume that the things are explainable. To assume otherwise, even the possibility that something is unexplainable, would be an attitude of discouragement.

One could adopt the attitude "it is possible that there are things which cannot be explained", but such an attitude is not conducive toward producing knowledge. This attitude would provide a reason not to seek knowledge of things which are difficult to explain. It would give the premise required to conclude that there is no explanation for X, and that conclusion provides the required reason not to seek the explanation for X. Therefore the possibility of "no explanation for X" must be excluded if one is to have the desire to explain X.

In everything which we seek an explanation for, (and there is no reason to exclude anything here), we must maintain the premise that there is an explanation for that thing. If we allow the possibility that there is no explanation for something, then we also allow the possibility that we would stop seeking the explanation of that thing, and this is counterproductive to the quest for knowledge, and the application of the principle of "infinite", which allows no end until completion.

Simply put, denial of the PSR is unphilosophical. The philosophical mind seeks knowledge of all things, and the proposition that some things may not be knowable implies that philosophy is misdirected.

Your understanding of modal logic is on a par with your grasp of physics. — Banno

Your understanding of necessity is nonexistent. If you want to create a definition of "necessary" which is based in something other than logic, or reason, then let's see your principles. Otherwise your use of "MUST" when you say "That we look for, or expect to find, a reason simply does not imply that there MUST be a reason", is self-contradictory nonsense.

It's quite obvious to anyone with a reasoning mind, that if we are looking for something, then there is a reason for us to be looking for it. If what we are looking for is the reason why we are looking, this does not imply that there may be no reason. It only implies that the reason is unknown. You jump to the unsupported conclusion, that there may not be a reason. However, all evidence indicates that if someone is looking for something, there is a reason for that activity, so your insinuation, that there may not be a reason is nonsense.

Why is that different from saying:

"Let 'Fido' mean 'the dog whose existence is necessary,' therefore Fido exists." Have I just created Fido? Or did Fido exist before the definition? — bert1

I didn't say it is different. When you say "Let 'Fido' mean 'the dog whose existence is necessary,' therefore Fido exists.", you provide no time constraints. Therefore your question of "before" is not relevant, and not answerable from the information provided.

There is a difference between accepting a premise for the purpose of a logical proceeding, and questioning the acceptability (truth or falsity) of the premise. The premise is what is necessary for the procedure, and when accepted, what is stated is a necessity, as what is necessary for the logical procedure. If the premise is not accepted it is considered to be a possibility.

Banno appears to be proposing an interpretation of "modal logic" by which accepting the premise provides us with something that is possible, rather than something which is necessary for the logical procedure. But of course that is just a trick of sophistry. The premise states what is necessary, and even if we put the name "logical possibility" to that necessity, it doesn't change the fact that what is now called a "possibility", is the thing which is necessary for the proposed logical procedure. Therefore the "possibility" is taken as a necessity, necessary for the logical procedure, despite being assigned the name "possibility".

You fall into the atheist trap of self-contradiction, if you try to deny that God who is defined as the necessary being, is not a being.

You must play the game by the rules of the definitions, or else you equivocate.

On your logic, if someone goes looking for the Loch Ness Monster, then there must be a Loch Ness Monster. — Banno

Of course. How could one look for the Loch Ness Monster unless that is something which could be looked for?

That we look for, or expect to find, a reason simply does not imply that there MUST be a reason. — Banno

Yes it does imply "that there MUST be a reason", because the necessity of logic is based in the human need to make sense of things. Logic is a product of human minds, and logical necessity is a type of human need. Therefore, if we look for, expect to find, or in any way need a reason for X, this implies that there MUST be a reason for X. "MUST" means means nothing more than we need a reason for, and we would not look for the reason unless it was deemed as needed.

To believe that "MUST" could be based in anything other than human need is what is nonsense.

They seem to agree with Eagleman that acting on input is key. — Patterner

"Acting on input" is the wrong attitude, because we need to understand actions as prior to input. Notice the example, hitting the button is prior to the flash.

The problem I’m finding with your posts, is that you agree with a whole bunch of contradictory propositions. — Wayfarer

That's what I was pointing out, but Patterner quit talking to me.

The racket goes like this: predict a future Trump calamity, like a depression or nuclear war or fascist takeover. When it never arrives, promote oneself and one’s own failed prophesies as part of the efforts that helped stop it. Rinse, repeat. — NOS4A2

What about the inverse situation, if one makes a correct prediction? If for example, someone correctly predicts Trump's assassination, would that person be accused of aiding and abetting, or even conspiring? A correct prediction is very suspicious looking.

If this were not so, you could identify a more objective frame by the experience of time passing more quickly there. — noAxioms

Why would time seem to pass more quickly in a more objective frame?

I wonder if time isn't the thing we experience, so much as it is one of the things that must exist to facilitate experience. — flannel jesus

That's like what Kant said, time is an a priori intuition, facilitating the possibility of sense.

Can't we monitor people's physiology - brain activity, heart etc - with specialized equipment designed specifically for this purpose, in relation to various stimuli, thereby building a huge database correlating physical processes with experiences? — Pussycat

We can monitor brainwaves, to a very minimal degree, distinguishing different frequencies as corresponding with different types of activities. But our knowledge of brainwaves is very primitive and the difficulty is in determining which frequencies are associated with which matter.

https://news.mit.edu/2024/study-reveals-universal-pattern-brain-wave-frequencies-0118

I cannot think of any view that suggests that you would. I may have suggested that you experience the time during which I was listening instead of being stuck experiencing only the time that you are talking. — noAxioms

I've experienced a lot of things in my life, but I really can't say that I know what it's like to experience time.

You misunderstand. I am not asking for a determination of when that time is, only that you must inevitably be simultaneous with it at some point, unless you are skipping over swaths of time — noAxioms

We don't know how time passes. If it exists as discrete quanta, then it's quite possible that the swaths which I experience are not the same as the swaths which you experience, and so there is no such simultaneity. We can't experience the same space at the same time, so why think that we could even experience the same time? Doesn't relativity indicate that the time experienced is unique to the spatial conditions of the individual?

There is no way to know how long it takes for an actual hour to pass since one does not experience the actual flow of time, but rather one experiences proper time, same as what clocks measure. — noAxioms

I think that's an unsupported assumption about what "one experiences".

Hasn't Eternalism also given itself numerous other unsolvable problems? — substantivalism

Yes both eternalism and presentism have problems. I find neither to be acceptable.

You make it sound like you're stuck in a moment, and never experience the later time when I am 'listening'. — noAxioms

That's right, I do not experience you listening. And to determine what I am experiencing at the same time (simultaneously) as you listening requires principles of measurement. And here we run into the problems exposed by special relativity, and we are moved to accept the relativity of simultaneity. That is why presentism, which assumes the present of experience, does not necessarily lead to the assumption of an absolute present. Absolute present is a distinct principle, an assumption not supported by presentism.

It's like saying that the seller in a sale, profits more than the buyer. — Benkei

That's a good analogy. To value the cash paid for the goods as higher than the value of the goods, is to say the seller got a good deal. Likewise, to value the goods higher than the cash is to say that the buyer got a good deal. General economic principles must be based in an equivalence which represents "fair trade". To make the general statement that cash is more valuable than goods is simply faulty economics because it negates the possibility of fair trade.

You might say that's fine because a rising tide raises all boats, and so everybody gets more wealthy. But that's not actually what happened. Real wages of workers in the West haven't grow much since the seventies, it's Western elites and Asia that has benefitted from the growth predominantly. — ChatteringMonkey

This statement is meaningless without a standard of real measurement. If one group of people is living in luxury while the other is living in poverty, it makes no sense to complain that the wages of those living in poverty rose while the wages of those living in luxury stayed the same.

And there has always been capitalist "elites". When the elites already have more money than they could ever possibly spend, therefore are free to do what they want, what does "benefitting the elites" even mean?

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason. — Patterner

That's not a valid conclusion, because you allow that the particle's environment (the condition which it is in), such as hot or cold, also has causal influence over the properties which the object demonstrates. This means that some of the properties which an object displays must be caused by something other than the particles which constitute the object. Therefore "subjective experience" could come from something other than the properties of the particles which make up the object.

The time of speaking and time of hearing are different, yes, but both those times are 'the present' when they occur, for everybody. — noAxioms

How do you draw that conclusion of "the present for everybody"? That's an unsupported assumption. My present is the time of speaking. Your present is the time of hearing. Where do you derive "the present for everybody"? You speak about light cones, and a worldline, but these are the tools of relativity which deny that assumption of an absolute simultaneity of "the present for everybody", and the worldline is arbitrary.

The best part, he's now negotiating from a position of weakness because he admits needing his allies and trade partners. What an insane loser. — Benkei

That's the way to deal with your partners, inflict as much pain as possible, in hopes that the partner will give you what you want to make you stop.

Then how is it that some espouse it while being presentists and others such as William Lane Craig famously seemed to be in favor of it but with a growing block theory of time? — substantivalism

As I explained in my first post, presentism is not well suited for any physics, or universal cosmology. It's more suited to solipsism, though some may try to adapt it, like the example you provide.

That may be your opinion but its most definitely not the opinion of most dissidents, philosophers, and physicists who have spilled ink on this topic usually using Lorentz aether theory as a vehicle for their intuitive presentist viewpoints. Even such people are fearful of action at distance to a point that it's better to propose something with peculiar properties than to propose nothing at all and say it's just distant disembodied action. Course, then the distant connections would be causal in nature through this 'aether' but instantaneous and truly symmetrical, reflexive, as well as transitive. — substantivalism

Again, these are attempts to adapt presentism, twist it and transform it in an attempt to make it fit with observed reality. But as you imply, it doesn't really work, producing unsolvable problems.

Presentism requires absolutism, else simultaneity would not work. — noAxioms

Are you sure about this? Is there any presentist precept which dictates that my present must be the same as your present? I think not, and this is why presentism is sometimes described as a form of solipsism. Presentism allows that things (present) change over time, so why wouldn't things (present) change over space as well? Why would a thing here have the same present as a thing over there?

The fundamental problem of presentism is that it cannot support any type of simultaneity, because it is based in the subjective experience of the present, which is inherently unshared. If, for example, I assume to be able to speak to you, I must allow that the present in which I speak the words is distinct from the present in which you hear the words, unless we get caught up in the instantaneous action at a distance which substantivalism mentions. But then each one of us is trapped within one's own present, being unable to say that another shares the same present. Special relativity demonstrates to us that we have no measurement technique which can put us in the same present.

The US runs persistent trade deficits because global investors funnel capital into the country. — Benkei

We ought to assume that Trump is informed, and actually knows this. Therefore we can ask what is his real intention behind the use of tariffs.

So since this led us to this point, let's assume for a moment that this is the goal; getting rid of the dollar's reserve currency status. — Benkei

Trump is diabolical, but it's hard to jump to any conclusions about his intentions, other than the pure selfishness that he has consistently demonstrated throughout his life.

In the end, everywhere I look, I only see inconsistencies, which means this has not been thought through. — Benkei

That's the selfishness showing through. Selfishness is very whimsical and often displays as a sort of trial and error behaviour. I think we can look at the successes and failures which he had in applying tariffs in his last term in office for indications of his intentions. I believe the intent is as indicates, he believes it gives him leverage in the "art of the deal".

The selfish way of deal-making is to utilize one's power to inflict pain on the other, applying that force until the other gives you what you want. This selfish art of the "deal" is completely distinct from the friendly cooperation "deal", which is intended to be a "win-win" situation.

There is the implication that to truly hold to SR you have to accept a form of spacetime realism of sorts and therefore also a form of eternalism. Fine. . . but the opposing position doesn't have to resort to postulating the existence of future/past states by supposing a universal Aether frame that can be seen as an objective present or a 'physical' absolute simultaneity marker. — substantivalism

I don't think that the universal aether theory proposed by Lorentz was capable of providing for absolute simultaneity. I think that's why it was rejected in favour of special relativity. It provided the same type of principles as relativity, but not as versatile.

If they are postulating an absolute present. . . I.E. a way of giving an absolute simultaneity. . . then aren't they a presentist? — substantivalism

No, I don't think that is the case. Presentism, by most accounts is something different from claiming an absolute present. These two are distinct principles, by my understanding.

Or are they just holding to a slightly different block theory of time than SR? Does that make presentism actually inconsistent with traditional Lorentz Aether theory? — substantivalism

Yes, I think Lorentz aether theory provides for a slightly different block theory of time from that of special relativity, but both are inconsistent with presentism. That is my opinion.

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of. — Patterner

You also deny this, by asserting that the environment of those particles is just as important, being "the conditions". The environment of the particles (the conditions), is not a property of the particles, but of a larger context, within which the particles exist.

An absolute frame of reference is typically conjoined with a form of presentism or at least its implied to be so. — substantivalism

I don't think so. A frame of reference uses temporal extension to model motion. Presentism denies the possibility of temporal extension by assuming an incompatibility between the present (real) and the past and future (fictional).

The "absolute frame of reference" represents an assumed true, absolute rest frame. When the geocentric model of the universe was proven to be false, human beings realized that they have no access to any "absolute rest frame". So relativity theory removed the need for one.

Presentism is a philosophical position which really has no bearing on physical models of motion. All physics uses past observations to extend predictions into the future, thereby ignoring the present. So all forms of models made in physics are non-presentist.

Wouldn't this then make the notion of an absolute frame altogether meaningless under a thin presentism? — substantivalism

The "absolute frame" is known as "absolute time", and this is quite different from presentism.

I'd like to see that claimed contradiction. Where can I find it?

"Less heat" means the conditions have changed. The degree of heat is a condition. Initially, I described liquid water. Then I mentioned different conditions - less heat - under which the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. — Patterner

So you do argue against what you claim. What's the point of making such claims then?

What do you mean by "substantiated" if not proven? Scientific theories, much less philosophical claims, cannot be proven. Your apparent demand for absolute certainty (proof) leads if the logic is followed consistently to absolute skepticism. In that case just forget about claiming anything at all that is not analytically true or tautologous. — Janus

Scientific theories are proven through experimentation. To "substantiate" is to provide solid grounds for a claim. All science is proven (substantiated) in that way, or else it does not qualify as "science". Ideas which "seem plausible" do not qualify as science because these ideas are unsubstantiated, not proven by experimentation. The phrase "seem plausible" refers to an individual's attitudinal approach to the ideas rather than the soundness of the ideas. Therefore to accept such ideas, because they "seem plausible", is to demonstrate a lack of the philosophical skill known as critical thinking. To scoff at critical thinking, characterizing it as "absolute skepticism" demonstrates a significant attitudinal problem.

So take Q to be the statement "mental processes are physical processes". Now, the two pieces of information I listed before - the chemical effect on mental processes, and the early foray into AI that we're witnessing - I think pretty reasonably raise the probability of Q, compared to what Q would be given the opposite observations. Opposite observations being, a hypothetical world in which chemically altering the neuronal environment DOESN'T affect thinking, and in which simulating neurons in a computer DOESN'T produce a machine that can solve problems, pass the turing test, and generate internal models of the data it interacts with. — flannel jesus

This is irrelevant, and fails as an argument. Probabilities are only meaningful when there are assigned values, and there are no values assigned in this case. Take the probability of Q to be .0000001%, and the information you provided raises the probability of Q to .0000002%. Do you honestly believe that we ought to accept Q as true, now that the probability of Q being true has been doubled?

An unsubstantiated claim is a claim without any evidence. — flannel jesus

"Substantiated" implies solid evidence, well-grounded reliable evidence. "Evidence" is fundamentally subjective, as the result of judgement, and the evidence must be judged as credible. There is no such thing as "a claim without any evidence" because the claim itself is evidence. What is important is how the evidence is judged. In the preceding example, the .0000001% probability of Q must be based in some type of real evidence or else it would just be a case of arbitrarily claimed evidence. If further evidence raises the probability to .0000002%, this does not constitute credible evidence of the truth of Q. Therefore despite there being at least two bits of evidence for the claim of Q, the judgements of flannel and Janus, Q remains as unsubstantiated because these two lack in the capacity of critical thinking.