The conclusion of Lecture 6 is interesting. He returns to the idea expressed in lecture 5, philosophy's practice of distancing itself rom practice, results in what was called in Lecture 5 "bad practice", but he now changes to "false practice". This change of terminology I believe is supported by this discussion of how the concept has been separated from the object, leaving no basis for truth in the sense of correspondence. That's what I believe denying the law of identity does, removes the basis for "truth".

So he proceeds to criticize formalism, and the way that it attempts to remove content from philosophy. Heidegger is the chosen example. He explains that Heidegger does this to avoid vagueness, randomness and arbitrariness, and he advises that this is the other extreme to be avoided.

And the question or the problem facing philosophy is simply about
how it can have both content and rigour at the same time. And that
indeed can only become possible if the philosophers succeed in escaping
from the equation of universal concepts with the substantive
contents about which they have agreed to this day.

So Hegel starts with the something but drops it in favour of the concept. And this is how Hegel manages to equate being with nothing. — Jamal

This is exactly the way I see it. By doing violence to the concept of "Identity" Hegel removes being from the object itself, and makes it something we say about the object, a concept. This allows him to negate "being" with "nothing" when "being" has this form of identity, rather than the identity of "a being", because there is no longer an object which would otherwise prevent this negation. It's a sort of trick of switching the category of what "being" refers to, from the traditional understanding of substantial objects (as developed by Aristotelian studies), back to the Parmenidean proposal which equates being with knowledge. But a study of the history of ideas will demonstrate that this proposal enables Parmenidean based sophistry such as Zeno's.

When he says that "the forces of production, in other words human energies and their extension in technology, have a tendency of their own to overcome the limits that have been set by society," and that we must not think of this as a natural law, he seems to be unambiguously equating such an overcoming with revolutionary emancipation. — Jamal

I don't think this is a necessary conclusion. I think what is implied is that the forces of production overcoming the limits set by society is in some sense inevitable, but revolution is not. So overcoming the limits of society may occur in ways other than revolution. Look at the way modern technology has 'revolutionized' communications for example. The technology has globalized communication capacity to an extent far beyond the laws imposed by some societies. Changes in technology are faster than the capacity of the lawmakers to keep up, so laws are sort of posterior to the changes already brought on, they are reactive. Now, things like genetic manipulation, and AI are just beginning, and they will overcome limits of society which were not designed to reign them. This type of overcoming the limits doesn't necessitate revolution, but it indicates the need for significant, even structural, or radical societal change to keep pace with globalization.

Anyway, I'm trying to catch up so here's my opinion of Lecture 6.

Hegel goes from indeterminate to indeterminateness. — Jamal

Adorno applies substantial criticism to Hegel at this point. I believe the central issue here is the violence which Hegel does to the traditional "law of identity" derived from Aristotle. The law of identity places the identity of an individual, or particular object, directly within that object, as inhering within the object "a thing is the same as itself". This law recognizes that each object has a unique identity particular to itself. When Hegel goes from "the indeterminate" to "determinateness", he is taking identity from the object itself, which is approached by us as an indeterminate, and he is assigning it to how we apprehend the object, as "indeterminateness".

For background information on the way that Hegel deals with the law of identity, you could look at this thread in the Debates section of TPF: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9078/hegel-versus-aristotle-and-the-law-of-identity . That topic was derived from discussion in another thread, which probably has better information.

Anyway, Hegel dismisses the Aristotelian law of identity, and this discussion about the indeterminate vs indeterminateness, which Adorno describes, supports a form of "identity" which is probably more common today. This form of "identity" places identity in what we say about the object, the concept, rather than the object itself. For example, in predication there is a subject and a predicate. The subject may be representative of an object. The law of identity places true identity within the object, and respects a separation between the subject with its predicates, and the object. The other form of "identity" allows that the subject has an identity provided for by predications. The essential difference is that the law of identity allows no imaginary objects to have an identity, because they are lacking in substance, while the other form of "identity" provides no difference between a subject which has a corresponding object, and an imaginary subject. The requirement of an object is completely removed from this identity concept, and this enables things like the possible worlds of modal logic.

Martin Heidegger says that the initial interpretation of the word <ousia> was lost in its translation to the Latin. As a consequence it was also lost in its translations to modern languages. He says that <ousia> precisely means ‘being’ - not ‘substance’, that is not some ‘thing’ or some ‘being’ that “stands” (-stance) “under” (sub-).” — Wayfarer

You might prefer Heidegger's interpretation over that drawn out by centuries of study by the scholastics, but I've read some of each, and I find that the scholastic interpretation makes a lot more sense. In the end, that's the only way we can each judge something like this, by what seems to make the most sense.

If it rains, I'll get my umbrella is modal logic, and it may or may not be raining at the moment or ever again in the future. Why do these temporal issues of what is happening now or later interfere with our ability to logically assess? That is, can I not logically reason based upon the antecedent without the antecedent being true in this world? That seems what modal logic is. — Hanover

I have no problem with modal logic. It is obviously very useful and I'm not arguing against its usefulness. What I am arguing is that when it is interpreted and applied in a way which is inconsistent with the three fundamental laws of logic, we ought to respect this inconsistency, and not try to argue that it is consistent.

So for example, "if it is raining at 7 AM tomorrow I will be carrying an umbrella" signifies a future condition which could be represented as distinct possibilities, one in which I am carrying an umbrella, one in which I am not carrying an umbrella. To accept these two propositions (possible worlds) as both true, would be a violation of the law of noncontradiction, what is designated by "I" is both carrying an umbrella, and not carrying an umbrella. Under Aristotelian terms, we would represent such cases of future possibility, as neither/nor, a violation of excluded middle. This future scenario, of me carrying an umbrella at 7AM tomorrow morning, is neither true nor false, and Aristotle described it as a violation of the law of excluded middle.

However, you can see how some "possible worlds" interpretations, would say that somehow, both possible worlds must be real, due to a sort of splitting of multiverses, and I will experience one of them, but some form of "I" will also be experiencing the other. What is evident, is that if we accept the reality of "future possibility", we also must allow that the future involves a violation of the fundamental three laws of logic. That is simply the nature of "future possibility". I believe this is because the object, as thing spoken about, has no temporal extension into the future, and therefore has no identity in that direction beyond the present. To say that there is an object, with an identity, in the future, is a false proposition due to the reality of future possibility.

Now, for comparison, lets look at "If it was raining at 7 AM yesterday, I was carrying an umbrella". Again, we have two possible worlds, one in which I was carrying an umbrella, and one in which I was not. But in this case, we accept that one is true, and the other is false. So in this case, there is no violation of the fundamental laws. We allow that the possible worlds are simply a representation, and there is an independent "actual world", and only one possibility corresponds with the actual, as the truth. This interpretation is implied by terms like "counterfactual". The counterfactual is accepted as other than the truth. The point though, is that we cannot extend this independent "actual world" into the future without the assumption of determinism or fatalism, and this would deny the reality of "future possibility".

But surely ↪Metaphysician Undercover, there is a way to do counterfactual reasoning, right? So, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown." But the plant in question has to be, at least in some sense, the same plant, or else we would just be saying that if the plant was a different plant it might not have grown. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm fine with counterfactual reasoning, along with all sorts of applications of modal logic, and even statistics and probabilities, which with the aid of computers has become extremely useful. What I think though, is that we need to maintain a separation between ontology and epistemology, by embracing some fundamental ontological principles, so that we do not allow ontological problem to contaminate our epistemology. In other words, we should attempt to limit uncertainty to metaphysics and ontology, allowing epistemology to obtain a higher degree of certainty.

So to look at your example, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown", it really tells us nothing but an assumption that plants need watering to grow. This principle could be backed up and supported with evidence, but it would still not tell us whether we should water plants or not. Whether we ought to water plants is dependent on whether it is desirable to have plants grow.

Likewise, in counterfactual reasoning, we speak to the potencies that some thing possessed in the past, and then discuss what would be true if they were actualized differently. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But what use is there in talking about different ways of actualizing things, unless we have principles as to what is good and not good?

The past is, in some sense, necessary, having already become actual. But when we speak to "possible worlds" with a different past, we are simply talking about different potentialities becoming actualized. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't this self-contradicting? If the past is necessary, then talking about the possibility of a different past is inherently contradictory. We can learn from our mistakes and produce principles like 'plants need watering to grow', but we cannot realistically talk about the past being different than it was, only about what we might do differently in the future.

That's the point. You allow indexation for time, but not for possible worlds. Why? — Banno

I explained this, it is a problem with the interpretation, the "rigid designator" interpretation.. If there is one possible world in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and another in which he did not, then you have two distinct items with the same name "Caesar". They must be distinct items because they have contrary properties. In reality Caesar did one or the other. If Caesar did in fact cross the Rubicon, then the person in that possible world is correctly named "Caesar", and the other is named "counterfactual Caesar". You can see how it would be false to say that they both have the same identity. And if it is not known whether Caesar crossed the Rubicon or not, then they are both "imaginary Caesar". And by the law of identity imaginary things do not have an identity.

I hope it is clear, and as the Roman example given above exemplifies, possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future. If we accept rigid designation, the possible Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is the very same as the actual Caesar who did. That that is, "what might have happened if Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon" is a question about Caesar, and not about some other person in some other possible world who happens to have the same name. — Banno

To give both Caesars the same identity is a violation of the law of identity. I hope you understand this by now. However, as I explained above, it is necessary to violate the law of identity to speak about future objects. The reality of future possibilities makes it impossible that an object has an identity beyond the present in the direction o the future. But it is not necessary to violate the law of identity when talking about past objects. How could anyone think that it would be advantageous to violate the law of identity when speaking about past objects, just for the purpose of being able to talk about future things and past things in the same way? Since it is very clear that future things and past things are ontologically different, future things being imaginary with no identity, while past things are not real, this could only be a mistaken proposition. What beneficial purpose could it possibly serve?

In trying to throw out the bath water of fatalism, you have wholly thrown out the babe of modality. And needlessly, since accessibility allows us to make choices. — Banno

If you think I have thrown out modality, then you completely misunderstand. What I've been arguing against is specific interpretations of modality. I believe the concept of "accessibility" is completely misguided. Future possibilities have no truth value whatsoever, due to the incompatibility I described. And choices are based in what is designated as good, what is desired, not in what is determined to be "accessible". The issue here being that the strong willed person can make accessible what others designate as inaccessible so accessibility is dependent on the way that one apprehends the facts.

It handles a wider range of modalities, cleanly avoids category mistakes, and is rigorous enough for computation. — Banno

When you say that " possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future", it's very clear that you do not avoid category mistakes. As I explained, past possibilities are categorically different from future possibilities. Placing them together under the same heading "possible worlds" is a category mistake.

Odd, that it's apparently OK to index a proposition in time: "Joe was asleep at 4 am but awake at 4 PM"; but to refuse to index a proposition in reference to possible worlds: "Joe was asleep in w₀ but awake in w₁" — Banno

There is no problem with time. The law of noncontradiction is clearly qualified with "at the same time". If you interpret different times as different possible worlds, you have no principles which would even allow you to talk about the future. You could not relate one as future and another as past without invoking another principle of causation or something like that to place them in relation to each other, but what would this be based on?

This is modal collapse. There are no possible worlds. It imposes metaphysical essentialism on the system. Meta’s view amounts to a denial of genuine modality. — Banno

No, this is incorrect. As you and I discussed the "possible world" is how we relate to the future. The spoken about object has no existence in the future yet, therefore there is no such thing as "what it is" in the future. We can talk about the object's future with "possible worlds" so long as we recognize that that there truly is no such thing as "that object" in the future, and the set of fundamental laws, identity, noncontradiction, and excluded middle, are violated. It is merely a possible object therefore it has no identity, which is the defining feature of an object.

The further point I made, is that we need to be clear to distinguish between the "ontological possibility" of the future, within which those laws are violated because there is no object, and the "epistemic possibility" of the past, within which the three laws are upheld, and there was an actual object, but its properties were unknown, or we're applying counterfactuals, etc.. Obviously, these are two very different meanings of "possibility", and we ought to be sure not to equivocate. The future object violates the fundamental laws, while the past object does not.

So how are we to understand modal sentences? That "the table could have been red instead of blue" is an impossibility, since then it would not have been that table. Even taking it that "the table could have been red instead of blue" amounts to "there might have been some other table that was blue" fails, because that other table would not be this table. Any variation in property means we are talking about a different object. — Banno

Your examples are of epistemic possibility, past realities, and as I said already the fundamental laws are not necessarily violated in this application. What we were talking about earlier is future possibilities, and the need to allow that those laws are violated when talking about the future, to avoid fatalism.

Not that I agree with Meta's other thoughts on hyper-strictnesss of identity, but I don't know a consequence of it is the inability to assess hypotheticals entirely. — Hanover

What I have been complaining about is the way that modal logic is interpreted and applied. To avoid determinism, (fatalism), we must allow that any spoken about object has no existence, or true identity, in the future, and therefore the fundamental laws are inapplicable. It is a possible object, and this means that it cannot have a true identity. But in the past, the object had existence, therefore identity, and the laws are applicable. If we do not respect this difference, that modal logic can be applied consistently with the three laws toward the past, but it cannot be applied consistently with the three laws toward the future, equivocation of different senses of "possible" is implied, along with significant misunderstanding.

That brings me back to my earlier point. If we do not maintain a clear separation between means and ends, such that the means are justified relative to the end, and the end gets judged relative to a further category of good or not good, how can we have decisive (or objective) principles for judgement of good? You say Adorno judged the goal by putting it "into the context of his assessment of the situation and of history", but that seems very subjective.

I think that what Adorno is indicating in the passage I quoted, is that there is something inherently deficient about judging the goodness of a goal, for the future, by placing it into the context of history, the past. There would be a sort of implied determinism intrinsic to that perspective. But he has respect for how the forces of production will naturally overcome the [determinist] limits of society. Therefore we must recognize the potency of thought, now, at the present, to free itself from the constraints of the past, and set goals for the future, which are free from past mistakes. This is stated as relative to Marx's criticism of "abstract utopia". However, the creative aspect, something completely new for the future, is a requirement to keep the forces of production on the good instead of the bad (the bad being essentially a lack of unity, aimless anarchy).

It leads to implausible claims. Joe has the property of being awake at T1, and the property of being asleep at T2. These are certainly not trivial properties, yet does anyone claim that Joe is not the same person? — J

How does this appear to be implausible to you? Why would anyone claim that Joe is not the same person at the two different times? The individual named as Joe has the property of being awake at T1 and the property of being asleep at T2. These two properties, and all the other properties of Joe are necessary (essential) to the identity of the unique individual known as "Joe".

At the risk of being a nag, could I suggest again that you actually read one of Kripke's lectures? — J

You haven't given me any good reason to do this. You've provided no good argument against what I am saying. If you understand Kripke, and he has an argument against my points, I'm sure you could provide it. But you are not providing anything, so I'm quite sure that reading Kripke would be a waste o mine time. He would just be proceeding onward from premises which I do not believe in, without any real justification for those premises.

It’s true that Aristotle uses being (to on) in a broad sense to include many kinds of things. But in Physics and Metaphysics, he also clearly distinguishes between natural beings—which have internal principles of movement and life—and artifacts or inert things, which do not. — Wayfarer

Right, but for him, and the ancient Greeks in general, all natural things, living as well as non-living, have internal principles of movement. Many (not Aristotle) assigned soul to all things. But Aristotle assigned internal movement to non-living things without assigning "soul" to them.. Internal motion is very evident in things like water, air, fire, and it was assumed to be even in rocks, just like we assume that fundamental particles are active. This is the point of the part of Physics BK2, which Count Timothy brings up, and I'll quote below.

The distinction is not supposed to be merely natural versus artificial. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes it is meant to be natural versus artificial, and this is very evident. Here, this is the very beginning of Physics BK2, Ch 1:

Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes.
'By nature' the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)-for we say that these and the like exist 'by nature'. — 192b, 8-9

He clearly places earth, fire, air, and water in the same category as plants and animals.
Further:

All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations i.e. in so far as they are products of art-have no innate impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute. — 192b,13-23

Notice how he says that artificial things, in as much as they are composed "of stone or of earth", have the internal impulse to change. These things are then said to "have a nature". Their "nature" refers to the movements which they are inclined to make, which we now call "the laws of nature". Fire goes up for example. And he proceeds in this way. Artificial things are those created by human beings, and natural things are those such as plants, animals, earth, fire, air, water.

What to do depends on an assessment of the situation. — Jamal

Further to this, "what to do" requires putting the assessment of the situation into the context of goals, objectives, or, vise versa. Notice how producing goals within the context of the situation is distinctly different from putting an assessment of the situation, into the context of one's goals. One way shapes the goals according to the situation, and the other holds steadfast to the goals, looking for ways to shape the situation toward the goals. I think that prioritizing goals, theory, is what is alluded to in the following passage. Otherwise the forces of production which naturally outgrow the bounds of any existing society, will sort of run amok.

Moreover, it is not enough
for us to live in hope that the history of mankind will move towards
theory and practice a satisfactory state of affairs of its own accord and that all that will
be required from us is a bit of a push from time to time to ensure
that everything works out. Even though – and here too I would rather
err on the side of caution – we should bear in mind, and in this respect
Marx was undoubtedly right to maintain that the forces of production,
in other words human energies and their extension in technology,
have a tendency of their own to overcome the limits that have
been set by society. To regard this overcoming as a kind of natural
law, however, and to imagine that it has to happen in this way, and
that it has to happen immediately, that would render the entire situation
harmless, since it would undermine every kind of practice that
placed its reliance on it. And, finally, in taking the link between
theory and practice seriously, one of our most vital tasks is to realize
that thought is not a priori impotent in the face of a possible practice.
This was in fact the point of Marx’s criticism of an abstract utopia. — p48-49

Do you really call other persons and animals objects? That’s precisely my point—the term object is misleading in this context. — Wayfarer

The context is "substance", and this is applicable to both living and inanimate things.

You say I’m applying unwarranted restrictions to Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Fair enough. But I’d suggest that you may be reading Aristotle through a modern, objectively-oriented lens, one that did not obtain in his milieu, and does not do justice to the ontological depth conveyed by his original terminology. — Wayfarer

I don't believe you are correct in this assessment. I studied Plato and then Aristotle prior to studying modern philosophy, and understand Aristotle in that context. I admit that I later read Augustine and Aquinas, and then revisited Aristotle, to get a better understanding, but I do not think the your accusation of an "objectively-oriented lens" (though I don't really understand what that means) is correct.

In fact, I believe that it is you who is applying a lens of a modern world-view perspective. In his Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle did not provide a clear distinction between living beings and inanimate things, as you are proposing, so "being" could refer to both. This goes back to Parmenides, "being" refers to what is, as opposed to what is not. This is a reflection of the ancient way of seeing all "actual" things as being somehow animated with soul. The division Aristotle worked with. was between things made by art, and natural things. Natural things include both inanimate and living. Most of his examples of natural things are of living beings though, because those better serve the purpose of his teleological arguments. Ancient world views extended teleology into inanimate things where perhaps it doesn't belong.

The trend of making a division between living beings and inanimate objects came much later in Latin studies, with the field of "natural philosophy" being divided between biology and physics. Notice that along with this newer dichotomy between living and not living, the ancient dichotomy between natural and artificial gets lost. The modern scientific world view tends to think of human beings as natural, and this extends into human products as well, so that the division between natural and artificial is negated, leaving anything not natural as "supernatural". This is because if we have one principal category, existing entities, and try to dichotomize it in two ways, things get far to complicated. So what it appears like to me, is that you are taking the modern dichotomy of animate/inanimate and applying it to Aristotle's thought, when Aristotle worked with the dichotomy of natural/artificial, and this is inappropriate.

It's a bit confusing because Aristotle seems to say different things in different places, and because "ousia" might get translated as "substance," "being," or "essence" in different places. — Count Timothy von Icarus

These are the hazards of translation. It is important that the translator has a good understanding of the material, in order to make an adequately representative translation. The modern understanding of Aristotle has mostly evolved through Latin translations. Since there was much study of Aristotle, discussion and argumentation, through the Latin medium, Latin I believe, provides the best approach toward understanding him, and therefore translating.

I've seen a variety of translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and some are so different from each other, that in some sections you can't even recognize it as the same paragraph.

This is in contrast to things that "exist according to causes," like a rock, which is largely just a heap of external causes with no (strong) principle of unity (e.g. if you break a rock in half you get two rocks, if you break a dog in half you don't have a dog anymore). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a blatant misrepresentation. Natural things are given the principle of motion, activity. The things which exist according to "other causes" are artificial things, and he gives examples, a bed, a coat. He goes on to say that these artificial things are composed of aspects of the other category, stones, earth, etc., and so they still have a tendency to be active. The division he sets up is clearly a division between natural and artificial.

Here's a few remarks on lecture 5:

Adorno does not promote a concise separation between theory and practice. The two are always intermingled. Even thinking is an activity, therefore a sort of practice, and not pure theory. He also refers to Marx's criticism of some anarchists' position of "absolute action", independent of all theory. The two, theory and practice do not exist separately

There is also a pervasive concept introduced, "the forces of production". This I find to be a vague concept, and I haven't really grasped its meaning. But it's roughly stated as human energies and technologies.

And if we fail to follow up this idea that the
forces of production could satisfy human needs and enable mankind
to enter into a condition worthy of human beings – if we fail to give
voice to this thought, then we certainly will be in danger of giving
ideology a helping hand. Such an outcome is prevented only by the
relations of production and by the extension of the forces of production
into the machinery of physical and intellectual power. — p48

It appears like the forces of production might lead us toward suffering and destruction, or else toward happiness and paradise. This emphasizes the need for theory, and the idea that we cannot allow theory to be shackled by practice. And so, to give absolute precedence to practice, is "bad practice" (p50)

For to take a dogmatic view of that book of Lenin’s, or indeed all
books by Lenin or even all the books ever produced by Marxism, is
the precise equivalent of the procedures adopted by administrations
that have set themselves up in the name of Marxism, that have
absolved themselves of the need for any further thought and that have
done nothing but base their own acts of violence on these theories
without thinking them through and developing them critically. — p50

He then explains his view of how interpretation is much the same as criticism. And, without this form of interpretation "there can be no such thing as true practice" (51). From here he criticizes "Scientific socialism", emphasizing the need for philosophy.

Engels also understood very clearly: that science is not only a force
of production but that it is implicated in the social power relations
and command structures of its age. It follows from this that we
cannot simply transfer to science the authority purloined from
philosophy or the authority denied to philosophy by criticism. — p52

After all this discussion about how practice ought not overcome theory he throws a twist. Thinking, in the end, is just a form of practice anyway. So all is ultimately reduced to practice, but distinct types of practice, theorizing being one of them. And he mentions "organizer" as a type of practice.

For thinking itself is always a form of behaviour;18 it is, whether it likes it or not,
a kind of practice, even in its purest logical operations. Every
synthesis it creates brings about change. Every judgement that links two
ideas together that were separate previously is, as such, work; I would
be tempted to say it always brings about a minute change in the
world. And once thinking sets out in its purest form to bring about
change in even the smallest thing, no power on earth can separate
theory from practice in an absolute way. The separation of theory
and practice is itself an expression of reified consciousness. And it is
the task of philosophy to dismantle the rigidity, the dogmatic and
irreconcilable character of this separation. — p53

I appreciate the clarification about particularity, but I think this risks reading Aristotle through the modern, objective point of view to which we are encultured. In the Categories and Metaphysics, Aristotle’s paradigm examples of 'substance' are not objects like stones or marbles, but beings—plants, animals, and humans. They are beings that possess their own internal principles of organization, growth, and change—what Aristotle calls form and actuality. Hence again the fact that the original term was 'ouisia'. He's asking about what beings are - not what objects are. — Wayfarer

For Aristotle, every individual, every particular, (what we call an object), consists of matter and form. The composite is an instance of primary substance. You'll notice that he doesn't only talk about living beings, but also things like bronze statues. I think you are applying unwarranted restrictions to Aristotle's hylomorphism.

The concept of "rigid designator" is very simple. Banno and I were discussing the situation when "possible worlds" refers to future possibilities.

You seem to be hung up on the idea that every property of an object is essential to that object's identity. If not, then two distinct objects could have the same identity. Why is this difficult for you to accept?

This framing presents substance as nothing more than individual objects, like particular dogs - or even stones or marbles, we would be entitled to think —whic is an oversimplification that loses sight of the deeper point that 'substance' is not mere particularity, but what something is in virtue of its form and actuality. Again, it is nearer to think of it as what of being it is, than what kind of object. And there's a difference! — Wayfarer

I think the point Aristotle was making is that particularity is what substance is, in the primary sense. What an individual object actually is, is a unique peculiar form, which is proper only to itself, (the law of identity). This uniqueness, which is a feature of spatial temporal existence, is what constitutes "substance" in the primary sense. In the secondary sense, "substance" is the primary species, what kind of thing it is. Commonly, in modern philosophy Aristotle's primary substance, along with the law of identity, are overlooked as superfluous, and identity is assigned to what we say about the thing (secondary substance), rather than what the thing actually is, in itself, a unique individual with a form of its very own.

Do you conceive of possible worlds as sharing an actual, existential timeline? Such that event A in world W literally happens at the same time as event B in world Y? — J

Yes, I think it is necessary to conceive of it as the same time, because it is referred to as "the future". So, we have one present, now, and one item at the present now. The multitude of possible worlds is a description of the time after now, which is the future, and all those possible worlds must share in the same future, or else the model would be useless.

The two events, being distinct, can't share the same space, so why would we imagine they could share the same time? — J

Space hasn't been mentioned, but the space would be limited by the possibilities. They all must share the same time, because that's what is being modeled, a specified time, "the future". If we are modeling the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow, for example, it doesn't make sense to say that one of the possible worlds models yesterday as tomorrow.

Not as Kripke understands "same object" -- and I would argue that this is the common-sense understanding as well. You've read Naming and Necessity, I suppose? In his example, "Richard Nixon" is a rigid designator; thus, Nixon remains Nixon -- the "same object" -- regardless of whether he wins or loses the 1968 election. For this to violate some law of non-contradiction, you'd have to maintain that every single property, action, and attribute of a given object is essential to its being what it is. Do you really want to do that? — J

I haven't read Kripke, I'm just going on what Banno said: "In rigid designation (Kripke), names refer to the same individual in every world where that individual exists." Obviously, if it is the same individual in every possible world, the law of noncontradiction is violated every time that the individual has contradictory properties between two different possible worlds. In your example, Nixon both wins and does not win the 1968 election. Therefore the law of non-contradiction which says that a thing cannot both have a property and not have that property, at the same time, is violated.

Also, I think it's very obvious that "every single property, action, and attribute of a given object is essential to its being what it is". If any object could be different from what it actually is, then it could be two different objects at the very same time. That's nonsensical to say that one object could be two different objects at the very same time.

I think you've hit the nail on the head. — Jamal

I like to sort of apply, in thought experiments, the theory which a philosopher expresses, this helps me to understand, but sometimes misunderstand.

Now, you'll notice that Adorno will refer to objects, using concepts, while also implying that the concept doesn't quite fit, which in your terms implies that the object is imposed and means that he cannot legitimately use that concept to refer to the real, or that the purported object is entirely ideal. But he has no choice. He will say things like "objects exceed the grasp of their concepts," and applying this to one object, say the working-class, this is a way of showing that we must refer to it as an object but must also remember that its very object-hood is partly a product of thought and does not precisely capture what it's trying to capture (and what's more, no object concept can capture it). — Jamal

I think we can distinguish between objects exceeding there concepts, and concepts exceeding their objects, and this roughly corresponds with the two types of criticism. The former is found in hypothesizing, theorizing about reality. The latter is found when we apply ideals, such as my example of applying systems theory.

This plays into the theory/practice distinction of lecture 5. I find that the two always get wrapped together with internal reciprocation, and I think this is why Adorno seems to recommend blurring the boundaries. I believe the blurring of boundaries is counterproductive to analysis and criticism in general, but maybe the point is just what I am saying, that any such application of boundaries produces an artificial representation which will be deficient. Incidentally, Charles Peirce has a lot to say about this blurring, and how we must allow exceptions to the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle to avoid problems like the sorites paradox.

I believe, that at the base of this issue, is the incompatibility between "being" and "becoming" which was demonstrated by Plato. What gave me the problem in lecture 4 is the ambiguity between "system" as a way of thinking (activity, becoming), and "system" as an object (unity, whole, being). Because I accept as a fundamental, guiding principle, this incompatibility, my philosophical training has inclined me to reject the blurring of this categorical separation.

So when things are understood in terms of their activities, and these things are said to be parts of a whole, we need something further, a principle of equilibrium or something, which supports the interconnectedness required for the stability of "an object". Natural objects are understood to exist as active parts, fundamental particles, but extra "forces" are required to produce the equilibrium of the object. Likewise, if "society" is understood as a collective of active parts, we need a further principle to support the interconnectedness of those parts which is required for the equilibrium that is essential to a true "object". Systems theory inclines us to believe that we can arbitrarily impose boundaries without any such cause of equilibrium, producing "an object" without any real support for the supposed interconnectedness required for "an object".

But for Adorno the identity of being and thought is the result of the idealist prioritization of the subject. — Jamal

I haven't quite seen this yet, but I view this entire perspective, the one which blurs the boundaries and refuses to carry the critical analysis deeper, as a feature of the modern inclination toward monism. Ultimately, I believe it leads to unintelligibility, which to avoid requires the priority of the subject.

Partly for my own benefit I'd like to work out exactly what is lost, what is misleading, in this over-simple formulation. — Jamal

I think, the thing might be to recognize the two distinct directions of systematization type thought. In one case, we apply systems theory to existing reality. We produce a model, "a system" which to our purposes fits the reality, such that we can apply it and predict future activities (weather forecast). In the other direction (the case of society) we theorize with intent (perhaps latent system), to create an object according to what we view as desirable. Unless the intended object is the entirety, the whole, it must be the means to a further end. We can place the concept "working class" in that category, as an object creating for a purpose.

Now you are misrepresenting what I have said. — Banno

Well, you refused to explain yourself.

Is it the case that the same object maintains its identity as itself throughout the multitude of possible worlds (Kripke), or is it the case that the multitude of possible worlds each have similar objects (Lewis)?

The first case (Kripke) violates the law of noncontradiction. The second case (Lewis) violates the law of identity, the same object becomes a number of similar objects at the moment of the present, when looking toward future possibilities.

You can dismiss those fundamental three laws as "a group of Aristotelian syllogisms that assume individuality requires an essence", but that does not change the fact that there is inconsistency between that system of logic, and the common interpretations of modal logic.

By not admitting that each is a useful system of logic, and yet there is inconsistency between the two, it is you who is restricting yourself to one of the two.

What it comes down to is (a) I am nevertheless ready to move on and don't think this is the right time to tackle the issue (though I intend now to keep it in mind), and (b) there is a real antagonism in Adorno's thinking, which goes right down to the bottom of idealism vs realism, which I hope will become, maybe not clearer, but more explicit as the reading goes on into ND. — Jamal

I agree that this is not the right time. I am not at all familiar with Adorno, this is my first reading. So what I am expressing is a first impression, which is bound to change as I become more familiar.

Good stuff, but here is the thing: the bolded conclusion isn't justified. It begs the question. From the fact that we impose artificial boundaries on hurricanes it doesn't follow that hurricanes don't exist apart from those boundaries. — Jamal

I think you are missing the point. The argument is not that this aspect of the weather does not have real existence, the argument is that it does not exist as an "object". Nor does it truthfully exist as a "system", though it might be modeled as a system. We impose imaginary boundaries as this is what is required of "system", and this imposition produces the illusion of an "object".

If we started from the core of the storm, and worked our way outward, looking for these boundaries which make the storm into a definitive "object" as a system, we wouldn't ever find them. We start at the eye, and we wouldn't limit the system just to the eye. Nor would we limit it to the eye and the eyewall. Then we have spiral rain bands, but still the wind and clouds extend further, right into the neighbouring high pressure area, such that there is a continuous pressure gradient from the middle of the low pressure area to the middle of the high. There is no real boundary which separates the storm from everything else, it's just an imaginary boundary imposed on a world of interconnectedness.

This could be an example of Adorno's "systematization". Notice, it's a sort of subjective boundary imposed upon the whole, to create what passes for a "system", out of a selected part. Adorno is talking about, and provides an example of this systematization in theory. What I have provided is a description of how it works in practise. We apply systems theory to partition out a specific, intentionally selected aspect of reality, and model that aspect as an object, a system which is bounded.

So I extend this by analogy to the way you consider "society" to be an object. How would you separate one specific society from another, as they are all interconnected. And if the entirety of humanity is "society" in general, how would we account for all the opposing customs, etc.? This practise of systematization, which is to take something which is inherently subjective, and portray it as objective we find everywhere. For example, some will take a subjectively created group of people such as "the working class", and treat this proposed group as an objective distinction. In reality, there is just arbitrary, subjective criteria which are imposed to create the illusion of a real unified group of people.

I think he states it openly in the first lecture:

We are concerned here with a philosophical project that does not presuppose the identity of being and thought, nor does it culminate in that identity. — Jamal

I don't think that constitutes anti-idealism, it simply signifies that it is a philosophy which is other than the philosophy which establishes an identity of being and thought. So for example, Parmenides promoted an idealism with that identity of being and thought. Socrates and Plato were critical of this idealism, mostly due to the way that it seemed to exclude the possibility of becoming as something real, and intelligible. Plato ended up outlining an idealism which places mind as prior to being. So he moved away from "the identity of being and thought", but he didn't get away from idealism.

You keep repeating this absurdity. PWS logic is consistent with a=a. End of story. The rest is in your imaginings .

Further discourse is only encouraging your confabulations. Cheers. — Banno

Thank you for confirming what I already knew. When someone produces a strong argument against what you already believe, you cease communications.

Are you familiar with Taylor's work on this, and DF Wallace's response? — J

No, I'm not familiar with that. I may take a look when I get a chance but I'm really not interested in fatalism.

Could you say what you have in mind by something being in a different world "at the same time"? The same time as what? It's a different world, isn't it? — J

This was in relation to Banno's explanation: "Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS) avoids fatalism by allowing multiple possible futures, each with fixed truths...". The different possible futures, each with its fixed truth, would all refer to the same future time. So the same item would have contradictory properties, at the same time, because that same item would have existence in a multitude of different worlds, with different properties, at the same time.

When I informed Banno that this is a violation of the law of identity, because the same item would have a multitude of distinct identities, all at the same time, Banno suggested that maybe the item in different possible worlds is not the same item, but similar items. But this doesn't jive with different possible futures of one item. How could one item divide itself into a multitude of future similar items, each with its own truth, at the moment of the present? That's nonsensical.

Or, more charitably, you're a hardcore idealist who cannot accept Adorno's materialism. — Jamal

Yes, that's the issue, appropriate principles (which i haven't yet seen), are required for acceptance, justification.

But what you're saying does go to the heart of the subject-object relation, which is a central part of his thinking; and there is in fact a dialectical antagonism in his thinking between objects as non-conceptual and objects as ineluctably mediated—so I'll try responding. — Jamal

You and I disagree as to what gets placed in the "subject" category of the subject-object relation, and what gets placed in the "object" category. For example, I said "society" refers to a concept, you said it refers to an object. I haven't yet seen from Adorno any clear principles as to how to categorize. In fact, when he said that he doesn't recognize a clear distinction between criticizing judgement and criticizing phenomena, I found this to be an indication that he is intentional blurring the separation between these categories. You say the subject-object relation is a central part of his thinking, but is blurring the boundary between them a central part of what he is doing? I don't see how that could be conducive to understanding.

The thing produced being a philosophical system such as Kant's transcendental idealism or Fichte's Science of Knowledge, yes? Well, why not both? They're part of the same deal. I don't think Adorno makes an important distinction between the activity of making a system and the resulting philosophical system itself, or if he does it's along the lines of the systematization/system distinction. — Jamal

The problem is that there is a fundamental difference between activities of change, and static states. Aristotle demonstrated how the two, as "becoming", and "being", are incompatible. Becoming cannot be described with the same terms as states of being, and states of being cannot be described by the terms of active becoming. So if we allow the same word, "system" to refer to both, that would be a serious ambiguity which could lead to equivocation and misunderstanding.

It may be the case that Hegelian dialectics of logic allow for this sort of "both", by allowing that being is subsumed within the category of becoming. If this is the case, then I would argue that Hegel is mistaken. Aristotle demonstrated decisively how describing the active becoming as consisting of states of being leads to an infinite regress, and unintelligibility. So the Hegelian approach, of allowing that states of being are negated by the antithesis, in the activity of becoming, which is a synthesis of the two, is actually a recipe for unintelligibility. The contraries, being and nothing are allowed to coexist, in contradiction, within the synthesized "becoming". That is the problem with making the descriptive terms of "becoming" (or activity in general), the same as the descriptive terms of being.

Adorno, it appears shares my disdain for Hegelian dialectics. Notice the way that he rejects Hegelian "synthesis". If the opposing terms are true negations there can be nothing left for synthesis, and if they are not true opposites the premise fails. So Hegelian dialectics is a misunderstanding from the outset.

Well, which interconnectedness are we talking about? Adorno is saying there is an interconnectedness beyond thought, not only beyond philosophical systems but obscured by philosophical systems. — Jamal

If we assume an interconnectedness which is "beyond thought", then we need proper principles to distinguish this type of interconnectedness from that which is imposed by thought. Kant provides a good example. At this point, after reading lecture 4, I would say that Adorno seems intent on blurring the distinction.

Here's an example of the need for distinction. Advocates for the application of systems theory in science, will say that a weather storm, like a hurricane, can be modeled as "a system". This system is assumed to be a composition of interconnected active parts, interconnected through their activities, and operating as a whole, an object," the system". The problem is that in reality there is no such boundary between the low pressure area and the high pressure area, just a gradation, and the supposed boundary which makes all that interconnected activity into "a system" as a whole, an object, is completely "imposed by thought".

This is common in modern thought, to impose an arbitrary boundary on activity, create "a system", and treat that created system as if it is a real, independent object, "beyond thought". I would argue that this is similar to how you claim that "society" refers to an object. You impose some arbitrary boundaries on activities, and you clim that there is an object here, called "society". But your object is simply a creation of boundaries imposed by thought.

The lesson here is that thought imposes "system" on the interconnectedness which is beyond thought, because "system" is the current trend in thinking. In reality, we have very little understanding of this interconnectedness, referred to in physics by terms like "strong force", "weak force", "gravity" "electromagnetism", and in social studies, "intentions", "emotions" "morals" etc.. We can model these activities as "systems" and "societies", but the boundaries or limits of the interconnectedness, which produce "the object", imposed by thought.

We should be careful. Adorno has an interesting theory of bodily experience, and tends to use "somatic" when he is talking about sensation, because he believes the concept of "sensation" is implicated in the subjectivization characteristic of idealism, i.e., the concept of sensation takes something physical and relational and unjustifiably turns it into something mental and private. This idealist pressure of thought is demonstrated by your own way of wording things here, I think. — Jamal

I'm interested to learn more. I really do not see the anti-idealism which you refer to, yet. His criticism seems true and honest, not directed at at any specific group, but approaching idealism and materialism equally.

identity is world-bound; talk of “Socrates in another world” means “someone like Socrates.” — Banno

Then it's not identity, and the fundamental laws would not even apply to "similar things". Which is it, identity or not?

That's just a misunderstanding of what it is to be an individual. — Banno

Well, if being an individual defies the law of identity, then so be it. We still have the same conclusion, the fundamental laws are violated by this conception of "individual".

In rigid designation (Kripke), names refer to the same individual in every world where that individual exists. Identity is preserved; variation in properties does not threaten self-identity, so long as essential properties remain fixed. — Banno

OK, so identity is preserved, even though the same thing, according to that identity, may have contrary properties in different worlds at the same time. If it's the same thing, i.e. the same identity, then noncontradiction is violated. The same thing has contrary properties at the same time.

So you've just moved from the Aristotelian definition of "possible" where excluded middle is violated because "possible" means neither has nor has not the property, to a definition of "possible" where noncontradiction is violated because "possible" means that the same thing (by the law of identity) has contrary properties at the same time, according to the various possible worlds.

OMG, interpretations could go on forever. But you're right, it would be awesome because it's incredibly difficult. Maybe later.

It's just a matter of having an adequate understanding. Something the vast majority will never take the time to develop. Look at how many dialogues Plato wrote before he got to the Parmenides. It's not something that comes easy.

Nevertheless, Aristotle went on to demonstrate how forms are necessary to support the law of identity, and the idea that there is what a thing is. This was a modified theory of Forms, required after Plato obliterated the old one.

Still, 10% tariffs and the 30% tariffs on Chinese goods do have some effect... not of an embargo, but still something. — ssu

It becomes just another tax now. Maybe that was the intent in the first place, but he hyped it up, to try and get some bonus effect.

PWS avoids fatalism because it doesn't allow semantics to determine what will be ontologically true. — J

As I explained, it avoids fatalism by violating the law of identity. The "multiple possible futures" proposed by Banno are a blatant violation.

Like Adorno, I don't accept the antecedent. Things are really connected, before a system is applied to them. Indeed we could think of that as his main point, since the problem with philosophical systems is that they forget the real interconnectedness in their drive to cover everything with their own schemes. — Jamal

This is why Adorno's philosophy gets difficult for me. I find that there is ambiguity, or vagueness in the distinction between "system" as a thing, and the act which is creating the thing. Notice that in my first interpretation I took "system" to mean a whole which includes everything, the totality of reality. From this interpretation I could not get beyond the idea that he promotes system thinking. However, I noticed at the part where he talks about Heidegger that "system" thinking refers to following a single principle, and this is what unifies thought. So I went back to the beginning of the lecture and found that he actually defines "system" as a movement of thought which follows a single principle. So "system" must be properly understood as the activity of a certain type of thinking, not as the thing produced by that type of thinking

So the interconnectedness we are talking about here, is relations of thought. And we can criticize these relations with the criticism of judgement, as he says. We can also criticize phenomena, and "phenomena" refers to how the material situation appears to us through sensation. You propose a "real interconnectedness" of phenomena, but how are we supposed to derive this? Any connections we make are made within our minds, by our minds, and the same holds for divisions. So I don't see how "real interconnectedness" can be supported. Or even if we assume it, it drops from relevance like Kant's noumena.

Adorno seems to propose blurring the boundary between criticism of judgement and criticism of phenomena, but how can this help? What I think, is that we are to take phenomena as the consequences of the thinking of others, and we criticize it as a criticism of the judgements which created it. But then it all turns into a criticism of judgement, and we need principles by which to criticize.

Now, if you are looking for some kind of foundational argument justifying the claim of interconnectedness, I think you will look in vain, because negative dialectics is demonstrative and anti-foundational, rather than progressing in a linear fashion from, say, a proof that the world exists. I'm not quite clear: is that the kind of thing you're expecting he should do? — Jamal

The question is whether philosophy without system is possible. We do not have to prove that the world exists, nor even assume that the world exists, because we are dealing solely with thinking. The reality of the material world is sort of irrelevant. From this perspective, we have a creative activity of following a principle to unify thought, as "system", and we also have critical analysis, or the negative dialectics Adorno proposes which is an activity of division (blast apart). If we reject the creative activity of following a principle, and adhere strictly to the critical activity, as a type philosophy, we are confronted with the latency, which tends to indicate system. In other words when we remove ourselves from system thinking in the constructive way, there is still a latent tendency toward system thinking in the deconstructive way. There is a guidance from the philosopher's intentions in one's act of criticizing. So new a problem arises, because a philosopher must criticize according to some principle(s) which unify ones thoughts, or else it's all whimsical and incoherent. Now we're right back to the issue of "system". Isn't the best critical philosophy one which judges all according to the same principle, therefore a system?

I don't think so. Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS) avoids fatalism by allowing multiple possible futures, each with fixed truths, whereas Aristotle avoids fatalism by denying truth values to future contingents, preserving the openness of time. — Banno

Are you forgetting the law of identity? A thing is the same as itself. The idea that a thing has "multiple possible futures" is a violation of that law. You are allowing that a thing has a multitude of possible identities, in relation to the future. This is why I say that there is a choice, either violate noncontradiction, or violate excluded middle, when dealing with the future. We can say that a thing has contradictory futures, or we can say "possible futures" and interpret this as a violation of excluded middle. Aristotle insisted we maintain noncontradiction, and violate excluded middle. Therefore the concept of "possible" was developed from study of Aristotle. Some modern philosophies propose a violation of noncontradiction.

The difference lies in how each treats truth, time, and modality: Aristotle’s logic makes metaphysically assumptions of essence and potentiality, while PWS is a formal, model-theoretic system that treats possibility as quantification over worlds. Aristotle’s modal logic is limited to syllogisms, lacks a general semantics, and relies on essentialist assumptions. PWS, by contrast, provides a precise, neutral, and flexible framework for reasoning about modality. — Banno

This appears to be irrelevant. The question is whether the fundamental three laws can be maintained when dealing with future possibility, and the answer is no. Pretending that this is possible is self-deception.

Right, but it's worth pointing out that this is sometimes denied (i.e., there is no truth about "what a thing is") and people still try to do ontology with this assumption. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and I believe that this as well, is a worthwhile ontology. I was just responding to Banno's implication, that an ontology which held that there is truth and falsity to what a thing is, is not a worthwhile ontology.

IMO, this mostly comes down to the elevation of potency over actuality. When the order is inverted, then one always has limitless possibility first, and only after any (arbitrary) definiteness. Voluntarism plays a large role here. It becomes the will (of the individual, God, the collective language community, or a sort of "world will") that makes anything what it is through an initial act of naming/stipulation. But prior to that act, there is only potency without form and will. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem I have with this sort of ontology, the sort that assigns priority to potency, is that the patterns and regularities become chance occurrences. Then there is no way out of this highly improbable, chance occurrence ontology, so God becomes the only alternative. But if we do not proceed in that way, we can focus directly on the potency/actuality relation.

Presumably though, you need knowledge of an object in order to have any volitions towards that object. This is why I think knowing (even if it is just sense knowledge) must be prior to willing, and so acquisition of forms prior to "rules of language," and of course, act before potency (since potency never moves to act by itself, unless it does so for no reason at all, randomly). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with this.

Edit: I suppose another fault line here that ties into your post (which I agree with) is: "truth as a property of being" versus "truth solely as a property of sentences." In the latter, nothing is true until a language has been created, and so nothing can truly be anything until a linguistic context exists. That might still require form to explain though, because again, it seems some knowledge must lie prior to naming. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I look at "truth as the property of sentences" as naivety. All sentences must be judged for meaning, prior to being judged for truth, and it is the meaning which is judged for truth. Truth and falsity are judgements bout meaning, This implies that the judgement of truth is dependent on the interpretation. Now we have an issue of subjective vs. objective interpretation, and the possibility of objective truth tends to get lost.

As things stand, I think I have presented very good reasons not to make use of forms in any worthwhile ontology, but instead to look at how we make use of words. — Banno

If there is any truth to what a thing is, then there is a need for forms. The form of a thing is what it is. If a thing has no form then there is no such truth, as what the thing is. So we need to allow that a thing has a form, if we want to allow that there is truth or falsity about what a thing is.

I believe that an ontology which holds that there is truth to what a thing is, is a worthwhile ontology. Therefore I find that there is good reason to make use of forms in a worthwhile ontology.

You appear to lack an understanding of the different senses of "possible".

The trouble here is that modal logic subsumes propositional logic. They are not inconsistent. — Banno

I believe this depends on how modal logic is interpreted and applied. So we can say that modal logic doesn't necessarily violate excluded middle. If we assume "it is possible that X" implies that the truth or falsity of X is simply unknown, and there is necessarily a truth or falsity to X, then the law of excluded middle may be upheld, and this use of modal logic would be consistent. This is an epistemic possibility, there is an actual truth which is unknown. It requires that of all possibilities one is necessarily the actual, and true.

But if we allow for the real ontological possibility of future events, such as the sea battle example, then as Aristotle explained, the law of excluded middle must be violated in this case. A proposition about a future event will be neither true nor false because there is real possibility concerning this. To think that there is an actual truth or falsity would necessitate determinism and negate the possibility of any actual choices. To maintain the possibility of choice, excluded middle must be violated.

The problem with modal logic is that it provides no principles to distinguish one type of possibility from the other, and the common possible worlds interpretation does not necessitate that one possible world must be what is actually the case. And if we extend modal logic to deal with the probability of a future event, then the law of excluded middle is clearly violated in this application.

So the possible worlds interpretation, in conjunction with the common belief in the human being's capacity to choose, indicates that most interpretations of modal logic assume a violation of excluded middle. This is regardless of the fact that modal logic doesn't necessarily violate excluded middle, many of its common applications do.

Isn't there? Is this a Thatcherite point, i.e., there's no such thing as society? — Jamal

But this interconnectedness is by means of system. The issue is, if we reject system philosophy, what would maintain interconnectedness. If there is nothing other than system philosophy which produces interconnectedness, then it is still needed, and cannot be replaced by the inverse. The question is still, how is thought unified.

And from Adorno's point of view neither the myth nor the smorgasbord are good options, on their own. — Jamal

So are you saying that he thinks we still need system thinking, along with the inverse, a philosophy without system is actually not possible?

Do you disagree with this summary:

1. Philosophy should treat phenomena as interconnected within an organized whole
2. This is possible without system in the traditional sense
3. And this takes what is good about system rather than merely abandoning it dismissively
4. Imposing one's own scheme on the phenomena from the outside is to take what's bad about system---the phenomena should be allowed to speak for themselves — Jamal

I'll answer this now.
1. I agree that this is a sort of conclusion which Adorno makes, but I do not see that it is justified.
2. The problem is that system is what unites phenomena. Adorno turns the power of philosophy around to blast apart phenomena, but there is no reason to believe that phenomena, as a multiplicity already, has any sort of interconnectedness other than that granted by a system.
3. Really, he is taking the "power" of system, its force, or even its "latent force", and redirecting this. So we cannot say that this takes "what is good about system", because as Plato pointed out, the same power can be directed toward either good or evil. Adorno has not provided us the principles required to judge whether his proposed redirection of this power is good or bad. The critical point I believe, is his proposed duality of criticism. Criticism of judgement is generally based in principles of good and bad, correct and incorrect, or true and false. If we do not hand priority to this sort of judgement, how could we criticize phenomena? We have no principles for this.
4. I agree with this. I think the idea that we could get to the outside of phenomena is the naivety he refers to, the visibility of the world. This produces a false sense of objectivity. It is like the common assumption of "independent reality". What this does is separate the subject from the reality, leaving the subject with one's system of judgement as outside the phenomena which is to be judged. We ought to leave the phenomena to speak for themselves, as you say, but then as I say, we need principles to support any supposed interconnectedness.

So, I agree with you that what you present is pretty much consistent with what Adorno argues, but I think it may not be tenable. It may actually be the case that philosophy without system is really impossible, and the latency which he refers to is actually the essence of true "system". I've pointed out the reasons for considering this, but I'll reserve final judgement for now.

But this is ambiguous. He promotes the need for a system, in that he thinks there is something important in this need that can be redirected into "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought". But I don't think he's saying he wants to actually do a philosophical system. — Jamal

That idea, "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought", has given me much difficulty in understanding. I just couldn't get it. Here is another stab at it:

Upon further reading, I realize that the lecture gets very complex and difficult at page 38, where he addresses Heidegger directly. This induces me to reassess my interpretation of the defining aspect of "system". I had interpreted the essential feature as being one whole which includes everything, but now I'm inclined to see it as 'being guided by one principle'. So in the notes we see "System in this philosophical sense is the development of the fact from a principle, in a dynamic manner, in short, as a development, a movement that draws everything into itself...". And at page 39 when he says that the question of the possibility of philosophy without a system hasn't been given the serious thought it deserves, he says: "The question then becomes how can thought be unified if it is not guided by a principle?"

Now the difficult part of the lecture. When he addresses the influence of Heidegger on philosophy, he describes a change, a transformation of the concept of "system", a "secularization", whereby "system" becomes a "latent force". The central question is the unification of thought, how is thought unified. The issue of unification is brought up in the quote I already provided from page 39, where Adorno speaks of criticism of his own "apercu" thoughts, and says he didn't have to lay his cards on the table and reveal what unifies his thoughts. It is implied that the unifying force may remain latent. The issue is that without a guiding principle philosophy would be whimsical, or arbitrary. But the question appears to be, can the unifying principle remain latent within a philosophy?

So that is how Adorno approaches Heidegger. In my understanding, Heidegger employs the concept of "region" in "Being and Time", so that "Being" is divided into modes of Being generally corresponding with the three aspects of time, past present and future. "Being" is not a single principle, but a sort of plurality of distinct aspects derived rom the aspects of time. I would say that this plurality is unified by a single principle "time", but perhaps Adorno see things differently.

Starting from page 38, he explains how, from Heidegger the concept of system undergoes a qualitative change:

This means – and I am not
embarrassed to say that at this point I feel a certain emotion – that
the path on which system becomes secularized into a latent force
which ties disparate insights to one another (replacing any architectonic
organization) – this path in fact seems to me to be the only road
still open to philosophy. Admittedly, this path is very different from
the one that passes through the concept of Being, exploiting en route
the advantages provided by the neutrality of the concept of Being.
And it is from this standpoint that I would ask you to understand
the concept of a negative dialectic: as the consciousness, the critical
and self-critical consciousness of such a change in the idea of a philosophical
system in the sense that, as it disappears, it releases the
powers contained within itself. — p38

Then at page 39 the latent force is described as what produces the unification of thought, so that the unity of thought becomes the central issue. He distinguishes positive thinking from negative by applying an internal/external distinction. Positive thinking imposes its own authority on itself, and creates its own objects from within itself, while negative thinking is in a sense a response to the external, the situation, or environment, what "confronts" it.

We might say, then, that thought which aspires to be authoritative without
system lets itself be guided by the resistance it encounters; in other
words, its unity arises from the coercion that material reality exercises
over the thought, as contrasted with the ‘free action’ of thought itself
which, always concealed and by no means as overt as in Fichte, used
to constitute the core of the system. — p39

However, we cannot forego, or overlook the latent aspect of this unity, so he adds:

I would ask you to combine this
with an idea that I have hinted at in quite a different context, that
of the idea of the secularization of system or the transformation of
the idea of system, in other words, with the fact that philosophical
systems have ceased to be possible. — 39-40

I interpret this as meaning that philosophical systems are not possible because we now have a form of contradiction where the latent aspect, which forms the system or unity, is within, yet at the same time the philosopher must be guided by the external circumstances. So Adorno gives priority to the external, and seems to imply that confrontation of external circumstances must be given priority over the latent tendency toward system. I believe that the implication is that the internal inclination toward unifications is inverted to the external inclination of division. Hence "blasting open the phenomena".

Now we have a duality of criticism, noological, as directed inward toward judgement, and phenomenal, as directed outward toward phenomena. This duality Adorno recognizes, but refuses to separate, so he sort of rejects the duality. And in this way, the power that was formerly directed inward toward criticism of judgement, creation and production of a coherent system, is directed outward toward the criticism of individual phenomena, the "blasting open".

Thinking would be a form
of thinking that is not itself a system, but one in which system and
the systematic impulse are consumed; a form of thinking that in its
analysis of individual phenomena demonstrates the power that
formerly aspired to build systems. By this I mean the power that is
liberated by blasting open individual phenomena through the insistent
power of thought. — p40

And the conclusion:

This means that something of the system can still
be salvaged in philosophy, namely the idea that phenomena are
objectively interconnected – and not merely by virtue of a
classification imposed on them by the knowing subject. — p40

I'd say that conclusion is doubtful. What supports " the idea that phenomena are
objectively interconnected"?

The final issue is the naivety of modern philosophy in relation to visibility. This naive attitude produces a sort of provincialism. This I take as a belief that our immediate circumstances are indicative of reality as a whole. This is where the incompatibility between the positive (system) and the negative (confrontation of phenomena) is exposed in philosophy. This I believe is the "philosophical cottage". It's the belief that the conditions which I am subjected to are indicative of the conditions which others are subjected to. And this produces a false unity (system). The real issue which arises in my mind, is how can he support this claim that "phenomena are objectively interconnected" when "phenomena" is already plural, and they can be blasted open with the power of thought. How can we justify an objective interconnectedness?

Anyway, I'll give it another read, and make a report one way or another.

He is saying there is value in the need for a system, but he is not promoting the project of a philosophical system itself. He is on board with the modern rejection of systematic philosophy, and makes that quite obvious. This is where he differs from Hegel and Fichte (and Kant, although it’s more complex with Kant). — Jamal

I did not read it like that. The "need for a system" speaks for itself. I think he rejects systematic philosophy as systematization. Further, he shows how the current use of "system" actually refers to what he calls systematization. So what is known as "anti-system philosophy" is really anti-systematization. He is anti-systematization, so we could call him "anti-system", but he really promotes the need for a proper philosophical system.

The way I'd put it is, philosophy should avoid both traditional system and systematization, but it should take the energy of the former. — Jamal

That's what I thought after first reading. After second, I realized that he is actually promoting the need for a true philosophical system. To unlock this understanding required that I take the time to fully consider the distinction between system and systematization laid out at the beginning. Systematization treats one subject as a whole and so is subjective according to the choice of subject. A system "is the development of the fact from a principle, in a dynamic manner, in short, as a development, a movement that draws everything into itself, that takes hold of everything and is itself a totality; it claims objective validity such that, as Hegel would put it,7 nothing between heaven and earth can be conceived of as being outside such a system."

The difference between the two is the difference between part and whole. The systematization treats the part as a whole, and this is where I see the problem. Treating the part like a whole leaves out the aspects where one part relates to another, in the larger whole. So each subject (each form of science for example) will have its own systematization, and there could very easily be contradiction between the distinct systematizations.

The provincialism he talks about can't just be a matter of systematization, because its problem is that it still acts like it's able to do traditional systemaic philosophy: — Jamal

That's exactly the problem which he is bringing to our attention, systematization (in this context provincialism) pretends to be system, and this gives "system" a new meaning as such. This would leave a sort of void where the true "system" ought to be, and the "latent system" creeps in to fill the void.

The "latent system" is is similar to what I was talking about which brings the charge of scurrilous. This is the author's secret intention. When only systematizing a part of reality, as a single subject, there are personal reasons why the author likes to address that part, in that way, and this is why the systematization is subjective. For example, in my early criticism, I faulted Adorno for focusing on Hegel (systematizing), instead of philosophy as a whole (system). I implied that Adorno believed Hegel had authoritative power as a philosopher, and Adorno's intention was to tap into this power.

So the latent system is the secret intentions of the author in the systematization. Intention is "the good" of Plato, what Aristotle described as "that for the sake of which", final cause. The good is what sort of guides our knowledge directing it toward this or that subject. When a philosopher presents a systematization, or a multitude of systematizations, there is usually an undisclosed intention behind the author's choice of subjects and how to deal with them. This undisclosed intention is what really unifies the systematization, but that unity is relative to something external to it, a larger "objective", in the sense of a goal, and this makes a latent system.

And this very criticism, that of the aperçu-like
nature of my thinking, has frequently been levelled at me too, until
finally – simply because so many things came together and created a
context – it then lost ground in favour of other objections, without
my having had to put my cards on the table13 and without my having
had to show what joins up my various insights and turns them into
a unity. — 39

So a proper philosophical system has the true unified understanding of all reality as its goal (objective), and hides nothing in latency because there is no further concealed unifying principle. The objective, a system, is presented as a system, without any hidden intentions which would make what is presented as a system really a systematization.