Let me try another way of explanation Wayfarer. See if you can ignore all the riff raff around you, the entire physical world, and place yourself squarely within the reality of the non-physical. I think you'll find that there is a separation between your non-physical reality, and that of others, you and I are not connected through the non-physical. I can assume, from my experience, that you do have a non-physical aspect, just like I do, but my non-physical aspect does not connect directly to yours. In mathematical terms, the non-physical is a non-dimensional point, which is distinct from another non-dimensional point, related to each other by a dimensional (physical) line. If the points were directly connected there would be no need for the line.

This separation is a real problem in metaphysics because it implies that the non-physical is a multiplicity rather than the commonly assumed "One", as Neo-Platonism proposes. Plato's "The Sophist" explores this problem of the relationship between "One" and "multiplicity". Unless we can somehow overcome this separation, the bridge through or across the medium, which I proposed above, then the proposed non-physical "One" is unreal.

MU, I explained the principle step by step showing that I understand it very well. You ignored these steps, Now you’re accusing me of just repeating it from someone else. — Joe Mello

You did not explain yourself. You just kept insisting that this is "greater" than that, without stating your criteria for greatness, and when I asked for it, to justify your statement, you acted as if it is somehow self-evident that this is greater than that, implying that I'm an imbecile for asking.

And, no, the last thing I expect is you to readily understand such an elegant principle. You have given me no reason to, no matter how many questions you ask and consider on point when they’re not. — Joe Mello

Elegance is an aesthetic principle, beauty, appealing to the senses rather than to the intellect. That your principle is elegant does not make it intelligible. This is a philosophy forum, and in philosophy we try to judge principles by their intelligibility. You have presented what you believe to be an elegant piece of art. However, you want to pass it off as a Metaphysical Principle. To move from the former category to latter requires justification. Beauty does not require justification, principles do.

Your questions haven’t been about the principle but about your ideas.

Be honest. You didn’t ponder it at all, but simply rushed into the first thoughts off the top of your head. — Joe Mello

Joe! Where is your head at? I looked at your "elegant principle", and realized instantaneously that I have no idea what you mean by "greater". One could spend an eternity pondering 'what does Joe mean by greater', approaching an infinity of possibilities. I chose a more appropriate action, ask Joe what he means by "greater". Your replies indicate Joe does not know what he means by "greater", and he reacts to my questioning in a defensive way, trying to make me feel like the uneducated one.

I provided you a metaphysical principle and claimed it is extremely important in understanding the evolution we know took place on our planet. — Joe Mello

You did not provide a metaphysical principle Joe. By your own admittance you have given us something elegant, something you believe to be a beautiful piece of art. A metaphysical principle requires justification, something you appear to be unable to give us. Therefore you have not provided a metaphysical principle.

And I ended with that I was looking forward to further discussions. — Joe Mello

The "further discussions" you requested, could have been your justification of your principle. However, you seem to think that the statement is self-justifying without any indication as to what "greater" means.

If it makes you happy Joe, as you seem to be truly miserable and I would be delighted to cheer you up, I'll provide an analysis of your "principle" for you:

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

Look, it's obvious that a combination of lesser things does produce a greater thing, always without fail. That's how "lesser" and "greater" are commonly defined, such that a complexity is greater than a simplicity. The more lesser things you add, the greater the complexity becomes. The idea that a "greater thing" needs to be added to the lesser things is unwarranted because the act of "adding" itself, is what creates the greater thing from the lesser things. And you cannot say that the act of "adding" is the greater thing because it is already categorically separated from "greater and lesser".

But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously (although I have an ominous feeling..... :scream: — Wayfarer

Yes I agree, but the point is that agreement does not imply "the same". That I agree with you indicates a specific type of relationship between us, it does not mean that the non-physical aspect of me is the same as the non-physical aspect of you. I would say that there is a relationship between the non-physical aspect within me, and the non-physical aspect within you, which constitutes agreement . But it appears to me, like you want to say that the non-physical within you is the same as the non-physical within me, that somehow each one of us grasps within our minds, the very same non-physical conception.

Despite our agreement on that simple point, the difference between you and I, in our understanding of this matter, is a difference of temporal relation, causation. I would say that human minds, in their relations with other minds (communication) are the cause of existence of conceptions. So I locate the conception itself within the physical world, a shared thing, along with other artifacts, which exist as representations (Plato's reflections) of the non-physical reality within the human minds that create them. I think you would say that each human mind apprehends the same non-physical reality. The issue I have with this, is that from your perspective we have to understand how the immaterial realm acts on the human mind, allowing itself to be understood by the human mind, in a way similar to the way that the sense world acts on the senses. So we'd have to assume intelligible objects acting on the human mind, in a way analogous to the way that sense objects act on the senses. But experience demonstrates to us that intelligible objects are acquired through the means of sensation instead of being directly produced by the mind from the non-physical realm.

From my perspective we have no need to say that the non-physical realm is acting on the non-physical aspect of the human being, because the non-physical aspect of the human being (the soul) is what is active in the creative act. The physical aspects of the human being, sense organs etc., are acted upon, and this contributes to to the soul's understanding, influencing it, but the soul as the non-physical part, is what acts to create.

I believe it is important to proceed in this way, to recognize the reality that we do not have any approach to the non-physical except through our internal self. And, when we approach the non-physical through introspection, self-reflection, or whatever internal means, we approach a fundamental division between oneself and others. This is the separation which unless we bridge it through the medium (communication), we are lead toward solipsism. And I believe, that when we grasp this internal isolation of the non-physical aspect within us, we must come to realize that there are no universal non-physical intelligible objects which are acting equally on us all, internally, from the non-physical realm, causing us to understand them. Our only means for unifying the non-physical, which underlies the existence of each one of us, is relationships made through the medium, what Christians call love. Assuming an underlying relationship between us, through the non-physical realm, is the fatal mistake of taking love for granted. Instead, our relationships must be cultivated through the medium, or else they dissolve.

Intentional ambiguity is the use of language or images to suggest more than one meaning at the same time
(Cambridge English Dictionary) — jgill

I have no problem with this. But as I explained, "to suggest more than one meaning at the same time", implies that none of the suggested meanings is the correct one not that they are both correct. That there is a number of correct meanings is an illusion (a suggestion, or proposition) created by the author, you could consider it a type of deception. Meaning is what is meant or intended by the author. So you and I might discuss endlessly the intended meaning of a piece which is ambiguous, each of us claiming to have "the correct interpretation". However, since the ambiguity is intentional, then the author intended neither one nor the other of the interpreted meanings. We cannot say that the author intended both because that would be contradictory, saying that the author performed two incompatible acts of intention at the same time. Therefore we must conclude that in the case of intentional ambiguity neither is the correct interpretation. The correct interpretation is to recognize that the meaning is intentionally ambiguous.

A true skeptic is skeptical of himself, too. — Joe Mello

I am skeptical of myself, very much so. But that doesn't answer the questions I have for you, concerning your "Metaphysical Principle". You seem to have no doubt that your Principle can be readily understood by anyone without any need to explain yourself. Or maybe you do not understand your own Principle, and you are just repeating what someone else told you. Perhaps you are simply lacking in will. Whatever. So much for the discussion you were looking forward to.

The fact they may explain it using slightly different words does not imply they interpret a theorem differently. — jgill

I don't see how you could argue this point. An interpretation is how one explains the meaning of something. To use different words to explain something is to provide a different explanation. Therefore using different words implies a different interpretation.

This discussion concerns the obvious: yes, we may interpret differently. — jgill

It's not that we may interpret differently, it's that no two people will produce the same interpretation of the same set of symbols, so we necessarily interpret differently. This is the difference between a particular and a universal. Each interpretation is particular, unique to the individual, just like each material object is particular. You might say that they are close enough, to say that they are "the same", just like all rocks are "the same", being rocks, but this is a misuse of "the same". The point being that the different members of a universal cannot truthfully be said to be the same. Likewise, when there is a universal understanding of your theorem, we cannot say that each member who understands in that way, has the same understanding, because "the way" is universal, and each member who participates in that universal is a particular, with a particular understanding. So as Aristotle explained, we ignore the accidentals of the particulars, when understanding the essence, which is the universal. In other words, we can ignore the accidentals of a particular interpretation, to say that it meets the criteria of the universal, and is therefore correct.

But it leads to a more challenging notion: intentional ambiguities, like neckers cube. And I recently posted a short note concerning a math expression that implies two distinct conclusions depending on how one interprets it. Both interpretations are correct simultaneously. — jgill

I would argue that intentional ambiguity results in neither one being correct. This is because the intention is to allow the appearance that either one could be correct. Therefore the intention must be to ensure that neither one is the correct one, to allow the apparent possibility that either one is correct. And if the intention is that neither one is correct, then the proper reading is that neither one is correct. This is consistent with Aristotle's fundamental principles of logic. Possibility violates the law of excluded middle, but not the law of non contradiction. So in some cases, to say that both are correct would be a violation of the law of non contradiction, and to say that neither is correct would violate the law of excluded middle. Intentional ambiguity produces the latter, neither is correct, because the correct interpretation is to apprehend the intentional ambiguity.

But it’s also off track because all I’m trying to get at is that the principle logically answers and points us to the necessity of an omnipotent power (the something greater than the greater thing) being added to lesser things when these lesser things evolved into greater things. — Joe Mello

It's not off track, because your designation of "greater" might be purely subjective, and in itself off track. You might say stone is greater than water, and all you are really doing is referring to a difference between the two. But to be able to truthfully say that a thing which is different from another thing is "greater" than that other thing, you need a principle to validate your judgement. That's why I referred you to the concept of "order" in my first post.

Otherwise, all you are saying, when you say "thought is greater than life" for example, is that thought is different from life, because you have provided nothing to support your judgement of "greater". And when this is all that you mean, then obviously every different thing is different from every other thing, but it doesn't make sense to say that thing E is more different than thing D which is more different than thing C, and so on. To make a hierarchy you need a principle to build it on. And an undefined "greater" doesn't provide that principle because "greater" only make sense when it is qualified as to greater in what sense.

MU, you are wandering into purpose.

The metaphysical principle I provided you is a journey into existence.

God's omnipotent existence would be the power behind the existence of evolution within the physical universe.

God's divine mind would be the "why", not the "how"? — Joe Mello

I am having 'great' difficulty understanding what you tried to tell me Joe. Isn't it true that "why?" is an inquiry as to purpose? So why do you dismiss my point as "wandering into purpose", and then say God's mind is the "why"? When wandering into purpose, "why?", is exactly what I am asking.

And every skeptic I have ever met refuses to understand the simple fact that, for example, a living being is "greater" than a rock.

When I tell a skeptic that a mother holding her dying child is a greater reality than the death of a star, that skeptic cannot for the life of him agree. It's truly dumbfounding. — Joe Mello

So this is where my difficulty lies, in your use of "greater". To judge something as greater than another requires principles or criteria, a scale of some sort. Often such scales are reducible to quantitative measurements, like larger, hotter, wider, taller, etc.. But you are obviously talking about a qualitative scale.

In terms of quality, I could give you a colour word, like "green" as an example, and we might judge one thing as greener than another. Then we'd need a criterion as to what constitutes "green", to validate our judgement. Your word is "great", so I want to know the principle whereby you would judge one thing as greater than another. Giving examples like "Life is greater than the elements, and thought is greater than life, and love is greater than thought" does not help, because you haven't explained how you make such a judgement, in order that we might extrapolate and judge something like God as greater than something else.

Another qualitative term often employed is "good". But "good" turns us toward purpose, as the goodness of something is always judged in relation to a specified purpose. You claim "existence" as your term, but I do not understand how you judge existence as a quality, to assume that one thing is a higher existence than another. Can you explain how you judge things to have a higher or a lower existence and are therefore greater or lesser?

Probably the real reason why Saddam Hussein had to be ousted was the flow of sanction busting black market oil.

I don't see how you can believe that what goes on in the minds of two different people, when they read the very same thing, is the same. Pass two people the same proposition or axiom and have them each explain it. They will not explain it with the exact same expressions. Therefore they do not have the same interpretation. It's a very simple and obvious fact which you seem to be in denial of.

Yes, I may interpret them the wrong way, just as you have on countless occasions misinterpreted the simplest of mathematical symbolism. If I were to insist it was my right to reinterpret results I would be ridiculed for my stance - as I should be. — jgill

That you believe there's a boundary, by which you can classify some interpretations as "the wrong way", and some as the right way, is clear evidence that you really recognize that each interpretation is particular to the individual, and you have some means for judging the differences between them. Obviously, if such variance exists, so that you can reject some interpretations as unconventional, or inconsistent with some norm, or standard, therefore "wrong", then you recognize the reality of particular differences, and you are simply in denial of what you actually apprehend as the reality.

Suppose there is such a boundary, which constitutes a division between the right way and the wrong way to interpret a symbol, or set of symbols, or a pattern of symbols. Your claim is that there is only one right way, and everything other than that is the wrong way. What do you suppose is the standard, the criterion which you could refer to in each case of each different theorem, to make the judgement that the person's interpretation corresponds exactly with the criterion, therefore exactly as every other person's, who correctly interprets the theorem, so it is the right interpretation. Unless you can produce this criterion, and demonstrate your mode of judgement, then your claim is no better than a claim that a rock here, and a rock on the other side of the earth are the exact same rock. But to judge two distinct things as the same is very clearly a mistake if truth is what you're looking for. So it appears like it's just an assumption you make, for a metaphysical convenience, some sort of pragmatist principle, but your convenience leads you away from the true reality of the situation.

[

Not so. This "theory" is composed of a number of specific theorems not open to individual interpretation. But the "meaning" of this theory certainly is an individual's prerogative. — jgill

As I said, I believe a theorem is literally the terms that state it. Therefore any and all theories or theorems are open to individual interpretation. Each of us understands them according to one's own experience of learning and practicing. You can state that one must understand the words in a specific way (provide definitions), but then the words of the definitions need definitions, etc., ad infinitum. And we do not avoid the reality of individual interpretation.

But nevertheless, it is real independently of your or my mind or anyone's mind. As Augustine says:

Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. — Wayfarer

I do not accept this argument, because what is common to all who think is that they have ideas, but we all have different ideas. So I think it is wrong to say that we all grasp the same thing, we clearly have different ideas. My discussions on this forum with a number of mathematicians has indicated very clearly to me that we do not even understand basic concepts of arithmetic like "+" and "=" in the very same way as each other. And since there is a multiplicity of number systems we do not even understand symbols like "2" in the very same way.

So I've come to what I believe is a more realistic view, that each mind constructs its own understanding which is unique and particular to the person, dependent on each individual's learning process. This is why standardized education is so important in our societies, to create the degree of sameness in our thinking patterns, which is required for us to properly understand each other, and have standard "concepts". I, for instance, cannot understand 180proof's use of the English language, because the thinking patterns which are supposed to be represented by the words are unintelligible to me.

Which is similar to the kind of Platonism that Frege advocated. The problem for empiricists and materialists is that such 'objects' are non-physical but real, so they can't accept that. In actual fact the fundamental elements of reason itself - ideas, in the true sense - are themselves intellectual in nature, not physical. Our experience and judgement always contains elements of both the sensory and the intellectual, but empiricism will only admit the reality of the sensory and will insist that the intelligible must be dependent on or produced from that (which is then explained with reference to evolutionary theory). But this is a backwards way of looking at it (as explained by Maritain.) — Wayfarer

I definitely agree that the fundamental elements of reasoning are non-physical. But I disagree on the character of these non-physical features, and their position in reality. I believe that the fundamental feature, which is at its base non-physical, is the act of thinking. I also believe in a fundamental difference, a categorical separation between an act, and an object. An act is a change over a temporal duration, while an object is what stays the same over temporal duration.

And this is why the non-physical, which has active existence within the human being, ought not be represented as an object. The active, non-physical element (soul, if you like) uses physical objects as signs or symbols for recognition, but is itself not physical yet still active. Think of this as an activity without an object engaged in the activity, because it is a completely non-physical activity. It does have a physical effect though, it creates the signs and symbols.

Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. — Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy - The World of Universals

I believe this is exactly what is the case. No two men think the very same thing, nor does one man ever think the very same thing twice. Aristotle made this point in the part of "On The Soul" which we were discussing in the other thread. So Russell's conclusion here is the opposite of what it should be. What leads him to assert an "object" of thought, instead of simply an activity called "thought", is the idea that two different men think the very same thing when thinking whiteness. We do not though, my images of whiteness which I employ when thinking whiteness, are different from yours.

In reality, the "object" of thought is the word, "white". That's what stays the same, as an object, the symbol. And when I hold that object, or a mental representation of it, within my mind, asking what is the meaning of "white", i.e. what is whiteness, I produce images or descriptions, which are not the same as the ones you would produce when asking yourself what is whiteness.

So, for example, no two people can really disagree about fundamental physical laws, like the laws of motion; it's not a matter of opinion how they will determine the outcome of motion. In fact, that is the very meaning of 'objectivity'. But in many areas of science, for example atomic physics and evolutionary theory, there is enormous scope for disagreement about what the theories mean. — Wayfarer

I conclude you have not encountered me discussing fundamental laws of motion on this forum, clear evidence that two people can disagree on such laws. Take Newton's first law of motion for example. People claim it's a brute fact which cannot be otherwise. But I argue that Newton actually stated that the truth of his first law requires the will of God. This is because it is a statement about what has been, in the past, and it assumes the premise that what has been in the past, will continue to be so, into the future, necessarily, if not caused to change. In reality though, the nature of free will demonstrates that we cannot take the continuity of physical existence, from past to future, for granted. When reality is understood in this way, we see Newton's first law in a completely different way. A cause, "God's will" is required for the continuity of existence which we call "inertia". And many theologians and mystics assume that God must recreate the material world anew, at each passing moment of time, so Newton's first law of motion requires the will of God to be true.

After reading the article it seems more like the dishbrain was programmed to do do something which was a simulation of playing the game pong.

My reply is similar to Wayfarer's, but if we go deeper you'll see that I differ significantly in opinion, from Wayfarer. As I defined "exist" as spatial-temporal, you'll see that I attribute "existence" to the physical manifestation, which is the symbolization, in its physical form. This leaves "grasping the theory", or understanding it, as something which the rational mind does somewhat separately, from the theory itself, which is exterior to the mind, existing in its physical form.

The problem I find, is that if we say that the theory itself, is what exists within the human mind, as that which is understood, or the understanding which the mind has, then we have to account for particular differences in understanding between individual people. The fact that such differences in the way that different people understand "the same" theory are very real, is evident from this forum. So if "the theory" exists within the rational mind, manifested as the activity which is "understanding", then we cannot accurately call it "the theory" any more, because each person has one's own unique interpretation of what is called "the theory", so we would have a multitude of different instances of the same theory. Therefore I prefer to refer to the physical manifestation as "the theory", so that we are justified in having one united theory, instead of a multitude of different related theories in different minds.

However, you'll see that my way of understanding, and expressing what constitutes "the theory", does not completely resolve the problem of differences. We might have different expressions, different written formulas, or even different instances of physical occurrence, of what we would call "the same theory", just like we say "2" is "the same" symbol each time we see this physical appearance, despite it being different instances. We really ought to say each time we see a 2 that it is the same type of symbol as the other time, and not actually the same symbol.

What I think though, is that this way of looking at it gives us a more realistic approach to the fundamental difference between expressing a theory, and interpreting a theory. These two are necessarily very different from each other, because interpreting (understanding) is necessarily prior in time to expressing what is understood. So the expression, which is "the theory" is the result, or effect, of the act of understanding.

I believe this gives us a better approach toward understanding the reality of what I would call the creation of a theory, and what Wayfarer would probably call the discovery of a theory. I would say that the theory is created when the symbols are given their appropriate relations to each other, in the physical medium. This means that the theory is actually a representation of the non-physical which remains within the mind. But the non-physical here is the process by which the physical representation (the theory itself) is created. Wayfarer would probably say that the theory itself is within the mind, as a non-physical thing, intelligible object, discovered by the mind. The substantial difference, is that I posit a non-physical activity, which is the cause of a physical thing (the theory in its physical manifestation), while Wayfarer posits a non-physical static immaterial object called the theory. (Correct me if I'm wrong please )

Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not? — Luke

Neither is relevant to the attendant, who will get the coat either way. That's the point, the attendant doesn't even consider whether or not the thing is a token, only looking at the number. So it could just as easily be counterfeit.

It is not the only certainty underlying the attendant’s actions, but one example. There are also the underlying certainties (e.g) that coat checking is a custom, that people own coats, that people have jobs, that there are other people, etc, etc. It’s unthinkable that any of these could be false or doubted. Of course it is imaginable, but not within the confines of our actual lives and what we know of life and society as it is today. — Luke

These are not necessarily certainties for the attendant. The attendant is not necessarily certain that coat checking is a custom, or that people own coats, or have jobs. It is wrong to describe such things as certainties to the person performing the act. A monkey might be trained to do the coat check.

In an analysis we might say that such things are implied by the person's actions. Then we might be inclined to say the person must take them for granted when acting, so they must be certainties within the mind of the person taking the action. But this is false, because the person doesn't even think about such things when taking action. So the analysis is proceeding in the wrong direction, using false assumptions. And when we look at the true reality of human actions we see no need for anything like hinge propositions. The concept of hinge proposition is a product of the faulty analysis.

I’m happy to discuss further if you think that my reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, but not if you think that Wittgenstein himself is incorrect. — Luke

Obviously I think Wittgenstein is incorrect, I've been saying that in all my participation in this thread. So if you're not ready to consider that possibility, then I don't think we should go any further with this.

Contrary to what he aimed to demonstrate, Newton's physics work without the hand of God. — Fooloso4

Actually, Newton said his first law of motion requires the will of God. The fact that something existed in a specific way in the past, doesn't necessitate that it will continue to exist that way in the future. This is very similar to the problem with induction, in general.

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

Why don't you just say that any form of organized existence, or order in general, must be created by a mind or something mind-like? I think clearer terms like "order" are easier to discuss than the more ambiguous terms like "greater".

That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty

This is where Wittgenstein goes wrong with the idea of hinges. The proposition that this is a token is completely irrelevant, and not even taken into consideration when the person retrieves the coat. The person reads the number and gets the coat without considering whether it is a token or not. You could steal someone else's coat by making something which looks like a token, but is a false token, and the attendant would not even notice. So Wittgenstein's representation of what appears like things we take for granted, as hinges of our activities, is inaccurate. We may make our actions without having any idea of any underlying assumptions, therefore no sense of certainty involved with such.

At some point, in retrospect, one might analyze the action and say something like the idea that this is a token must underlie the attendant's action. But this is just a proposition produced from analysis, and does not necessarily represent the attendant's action. It simply represents the mode of analysis, which is to proceed from the particular toward the more general. That this is a faulty method is evident from the appearance of infinite regress, or getting to the most general, which is extremely vague. So Wittgenstein proposes hinges instead. In reality though, the action is grounded in a multitude of judgements concerning the circumstances of the particular situation, so the appeal to such general propositions is to proceed in the wrong direction. The coat check attendant reads the number, notices the person's gender, perhaps remembers the person, etc., and the action cannot be reduced by analysis to being based in any hinges of any game, because its supported by a synthesis of all sorts of different ideas and associations which for some reason seem relevant to the person in the situation.

"Universals" do subsist, but until we grasp them, they do not exist – stand out – for us. Is it your position, Wayf, that they are "real but do not exist" (à la Meinong)? If so, sketch what "real" means to you in this instance as distinct from "exist".
— 180 Proof

Generally, "exist" is a spatial-temporal concept. To exist is to be describable in spatial-temporal terms. The concept of "real" allows for truth in referring to things which cannot be described as having spatial temporal positioning. So for example, fictitious characters are real, but we cannot say that these characters exist. This allows that we can make truthful statements about things which have no spatial-temporal existence.

This, or any similar mode of classification allows for the reality of things which transcend spatial-temporal existence. It is necessary to allow for this because we do not know whether our concepts of space and time encompass all the possibilities of reality. And as Wayfarer points out, "possibility" itself is not something which can be included within spatial-temporal existence. So we have problems like quantum entanglement, which demonstrate very clearly to us, that reality transcends what we know as spatial-temporal existence. So we allow that the concept of "reality" extends to cover things outside the realm of "physical", because "physical", as an attribute is necessarily limited in its application. Therefore "reality" encompasses the non-physical.

My position is that "universals" are not real (i.e. they are not 'ineluctable, subject/language-invariant, non-tautologies') yet they do subsist (e.g. fictions) :point: — 180 Proof

There is no point to excluding universals from reality, as you propose. Then you still have to assign something to universals in order to bring them into the realm of intelligibility, i.e. being intelligible. To say that they "subsist", but are not real, is not a good use of the word "subsist", and usage like this is why I have so much difficulty understanding you. "Subsist" is normally used to refer to the temporal extension of existence, to continue to be alive or exist, through time. This necessitates that the thing which subsists also exists. But you are saying that the thing which subsists is not real, so you imply a not real thing which exists. Why make "existence" the more general concept, such that it extends to include things which are not real?

There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc. — Sam26

This is what I object to, as false, or unrealistic. Our actions do not demonstrate our certainty, and the randomness of an individual's mistakes shows this. Just because a person acts, and proves to be successful in that act, does not mean that the person was certain. In its extreme form, we have the practice of trial and error, in which a person acts without any degree of certainty, and there might still be success. So it is false to conclude that our actions express, or consistently demonstrate, certainty.

This is where justification enters the picture. Justification is what is used to demonstrate one's certainty. So, prior to an act for example, one might justify one's certainty concerning the act. But such justification is generally carried out with language, and that's where the problem lies, because using language, and justification itself, is an act. Therefore, there might not be certainty behind this act of justifying with the use of language. Now the problem, justification is an act designed to demonstrate certainty, but as an act, it is not necessarily based in certainty, so this undermines the concept of "justification" in a very fundamental way.

To resolve the issue one might propose hinge propositions, or other such propositions like self-evident truths, or analytic a priori, but none of these actually resolves the problem, in a way so as to remove the possibility of uncertainty. And the problem is that justification is fundamentally fallible because it is a human act which is not necessarily supported by certainty. This does not mean that it isn't most often supported by certainty, but it isn't always supported by certainty, therefore it is fallible. Because justification is fallible, it is necessary to distinguish between justified and true.

Unfortunately, Canada’s charter of rights and freedoms has served only as a small hurdle to its tyranny. Rather than outright prohibit people from freedom of movement, it forces the airlines to enforce rigid restrictions, and travellers to undergo harsh quarantine measures at their own expense. Rather than enforce its discriminatory policies against those who refuse Pfizer vaccines, it forces the private citizen to do it. Rather than freeze and steal the contents of someone’s bank account, it forces the banks to do it. It gets around violating its own charter by forcing those who are not beholden to it to do it for them. — NOS4A2

I don't understand any of your concerns here. Laws of self-regulation exist for many industries, especially concerning safety issues. The government passes the safety rule and makes the companies enforce it within, often requiring a report to the government. So in an industry like the food industry, which has enormous safety implications, instead of having a massive army of government inspectors, the dairies, packing plants, and places like that, must hire their own inspectors. It is a far more efficient way of handling the enforcement of safety standards, to have the ones engaged in the activity enforce the regulations upon themselves. But we can still be critical of these practices, and some of the effects. For instance, it is overwhelmingly unfair to small businesses, to force them to have an inspector on the payroll. Likewise, it is unfair to a person who owns one truck and moves goods for a livelihood, to be subjected to the exact same fines for safety violations, as a multimillion dollar transport company, if the fines become similar to a tax on the industry.

But I don't see that you've expressed any valid objections to the idea of mandating airline companies, and individual travelers themselves, to self-enforce specific safety standards. And it is not in any way comparable to prohibiting people from the freedom of movement. Telling people that they can only move if they take the necessary precautions not to jeopardize the safety of others, is like telling them that if they drive their cars and trucks they must be careful not to run over pedestrians, and this is in no way comparable to outright prohibiting the freedom of movement. And the fact that this might be an added expense to the traveler is completely irrelevant. To exercise one's freedom of movement has always been something which requires expenditure. If to do so in a way which the government decrees as necessary to protect the safety of others, requires an even greater expenditure, then of course we must accept that expense if we want to engage in those forms of movement. Whether or not you agree with what the government decrees as necessary to protect the safety of others, is a different argument from the argument as to whether the government ought to make such decrees.

.

I concede the floor. I am no match for your brilliance. But I beg of you one thing - please do not deny the math community access to these ideas. Believe me when I tell you that they are ground-breaking. No one has seen their like before. I implore - on bended knee - write them up and send them off to prestigious math journals. They will fight to be the first to publish your insights.

And I'll be able to say, I was there. I was the first to doubt, but be brought into the light. — Real Gone Cat

You're not the first, if you check my history on this site, I've already been engaged in fulfilling your wishes. In mathematics we are taught to take the principles for granted, and move along. There is a vast amount of material to cover, and have not the time to understand the principles of each axiom. But that's why I didn't do well in math, I wanted to clearly understand each step of the way, and the class left me behind.

In particular, mention that the line does not contain an uncountable infinite set of points, then explain the limit concept. We've been languishing under the epsilon-delta definition for far too long. — Real Gone Cat

Right, and I can tell you what the issue is. Within the mathematical community there is a field which many call "pure mathematics". Within that disciplined, it is allowed that mathematical axioma are formulated completely and absolutely, independent from reference to physical reality. They are what many call "abstract". I discussed this to some length with a member of this forum, named fishfry. He admitted that axioms of pure math are completely imaginary, and argued that mathematicians ought not be constrained by the reality of the physical world in creating their axioms.

So you can see, that unlike science, within which we hold the theories to rigid standards of empirical verification, the theories of mathematics are not held to such standards. Further, we cannot hold mathematics to any standards of empirical verification because they extend to principles which are fundamentally not empirical themselves, as the means by which we understand empirical observations. Therefore to ensure the veracity of mathematical axioms we have nothing to employ except rigorous logic. In the case of the line and the point, what I've explained is that there is a fundamental incoherency in the relation between zero and one, which inheres within your principle. You do not allow for a true zero point. The zero is allowed to always contain some part of the one.

The reason I keep pressing you to name a source for your ideas is that I intend on Tuesday (Monday's a holiday) to reveal to my students that lines do not consist of points. When I inevitably get called in by my chairperson, I would like to be able to defend myself. — Real Gone Cat

Isn't the logic clear to you? We take a line with dimension, and divide it. we end up with two lines, each with dimension. We divide those lines, and end up with more lines, each with dimension. No matter how many times we do these divisions, we will always end up with more and more, shorter and shorter lines, always with dimension.

Are you familiar with the concept of "infinitesimal"? This concept was fundamental in the development of calculus. By this concept we might say that the line is composed of infinitesimals. Then it's no longer zero dimensional points which composed the line, but infinitesimal lines. But if we define the point as infinitesimal then we cannot claim it to be zero dimensions. This produces a requirement to determine the shape and size of a point, because we've removed the point from the status of being purely abstract.

Actually, I have. But I fear that you will refuse to accept any explanation that counters the ideas you have invented for yourself. — Real Gone Cat

No you haven't explained. And that you say you fear I will refuse to accept your explanation, is admittance that you haven't explained, because you are afraid to.

Pick up any set theory textbook. Search Youtube. The explanations are not that difficult to understand. And they are certainly not open to speculation. (In fact, the "weirdness" of the infinite might appeal to you.) — Real Gone Cat

We were very explicitly talking about calculus, and your claim that it has resolved Zeno's arrow paradox. Then you jumped to infinity, and now you've jumped to set theory. Clearly it's you who is incapable of following the conversation, and needs to do a google search on "calculus".

And again you fail to bother to learn about the difference between countable and uncountable. Your initial notion of stacking points is dealing with a countable infinite set, but the points on a line are an uncountable infinite set. Both sets are infinite, but they're not the same size. — Real Gone Cat

As I told you, "infinite", whether countable or uncountable, is irrelevant. Neither is the size of a set relevant. We were not talking about infinities, nor were we talking about sets. We were talking about points, and lines. A point has no dimension, a line has dimension. There is no number of points which could be added together to make a dimensional line. Nor is there any number of times you could divide a line and be left with just points. Those are obviously incoherent ideas. Where would the dimension all of a sudden come from when adding up points? Alternatively, when dividing a line, at what point would you suddenly have no dimensionality left to the parts created through that division, just dimensionless points left? Where could the dimensionality have gone? If the whole line which was divided exists within the parts, going nowhere else, then the parts must always have dimensionality, no matter how many divisions you make. If you cannot see how obviously it is incoherent nonsense, what you propose, then provide for me a demonstration. Show me how a dimensional line can be divided, such that you would produce parts, all of which have no dimension. Show me where the dimension, which was the line, ends up after the division takes place?

I will ask again : Where do you come by your ideas? Who else believes them? — Real Gone Cat

I look at what other people say, and judge whether what has been said has logical consistency or not. If so, then I am prone to accepting it. If not, I reject it. Your claim that "a line is made up of an uncountable infinite set of points" is simply illogical. A point has zero dimension. A line has one dimension. No matter how many zeros you put together, you do not get one. Likewise, no matter how many times you divide one, you do not get zero. Therefore I reject your principle. You seem to have a very unreliable understanding of the relationship between "zero" and "one".

Lines in three dimensions make extension, which is the first attribute of matter. — Gregory

You can say that a line is extension, but a line only has one dimension. You can define space to be three dimensional, described by three lines in relation two each other, but then the three lines are the extensions of space, not of matter.

I will caution this however : If you don't understand a concept, you don't get to make up your own interpretations and expect everyone else to agree. And your ideas about infinite sets (and lines, etc.) are not consistent with any text, course at university, or discussion on this subject. — Real Gone Cat

I only state things that I believe I understand. And you haven't shown that I misunderstand. You started talking about things not relevant to what I said. I wrote about the concept of approaching a limit, and I explained how I understood this concept. You simply asserted that I have no understanding of infinity without even explaining how your concept of infinity is related to what I was talking about, approaching a limit. And you imply that you believe that this relationship between approaching a point, and infinity, somehow resolves Zeno's paradox, when clearly the application of the concept "infinity" could in no way resolve the paradox. "Infinity doesn't resolve anything because it doesn't resolve

But the notion that the points of a line form an uncountable infinite set underpins geometry, calculus, topology, and every topic more complicated than arithmetic. — Real Gone Cat

All you are attesting to, is that an incoherent, illogical concept, (that non-dimensional points could somehow form a dimensional line), underpins a vast part of modern mathematics. What does that say about the mathematics which is underpinned by this incoherent concept? The fact that it underpins all this mathematics doesn't make the concept any less incoherent, it just says that much mathematics is underpinned by an incoherent concept.

Once you wrap your mind around it, you might want to re-think your ideas of time and motion (time being represented by a line and thus an uncountable infinite set of instants). Or you can dig your heels in and keep inventing your own version of math. — Real Gone Cat

Actually, you are the one who needs to reconsider. Once you recognize that much mathematics is underpinned by an incoherent concept, you might want to rethink your ideas of time and motion, perhaps come up with something more logical like my ideas. Or, you could dig in, and keep insisting that this idea is not incoherent, without any justification.

Knowledge is a success word, it refers to a process that achieves its goal. What is that goal? The goal is simply the truth. — Sam26

These two statements are fundamentally incompatible. If "knowledge is a success word", then success is its goal, and knowledge is reduced to justification. Then there is no necessity for a specific type of success called "truth". In fact, that truth is a form of success would need to be justified. This would require a purpose for truth, then truth would simply be a means to a further end. So truth cannot be treated as a form of success, nor can it be a form of justification, therefore "truth" and "justification" (as a type of success) must be distinct things.

The result of this is that if "truth" is proposed as a goal, and "justification" is the means toward this end, then the two must be classed separately. Truth, as a goal, is an object, and must be understood in relation to other goals. Justification, is an act, therefore the means to achieving a goal. The danger of misunderstanding, which we must avoid is that justification and success are more general than the particular object, truth, therefore an act of justification can be judged as successful without producing truth, if it is judged in relation to a goal other than truth. And the notion that truth actually is a goal still needs to be justified or the whole appeal to truth falls apart.

I don't see your point. The concept of "matter" is not compatible with the concept of a "line", in any conceptual scheme that I'm aware of. Simply put, a line is not spatial because it has only one dimension, and no conception of space which I'm aware of describes space as one dimensional. Nor is a point a spatial concept.

I’m well aware that the government can invent crimes and violate its charter of rights and freedoms. I’m just saying it’s wrong and tyrannical to do so. — NOS4A2

Why do you complain about the self-evident truth, and insist that it's somehow "wrong"? What qualifies as a "crime" is what the government dictates is a crime. Isn't that self-evident to you? And that dictation must be allowed to change with an evolving society. Or do you think that the original laws, those of Draco or something like that, should persist unchanged, forever and ever, dictated to never be allowed to change?

I think you have things backward. To make a "charter" which forces the government to adhere in a fixed way, to some dictate which would cripple its capacity to "invent crimes" is what is tyrannical. In reality, the government needs to be able to "invent crimes" faster than the criminals can act them out. But as you correctly indicate, giving a government the power which it needs, to properly govern an evolving society, is fraught with disagreement, therefore very problematic. And it's a problem which obviously has not been solved.

If I utter, "Here is a broom," to someone familiar with English they would probably say, "Ya, what's your point?" So, one way of seeing a context where such a statement would be useful, is in the context of teaching the word broom to someone who doesn't know English. We are justified or grounded in calling the object a broom, because that is part of the language-game associated with the concept. In other words, it's justification or grounding lies in linguistic training, or in its grammar. — Sam26

I think you're missing an important point Sam. When you say "here is a broom", as a proposition, it is a proposal which may or may not be accepted. If someone has reason not to accept the proposal, then you asserting that there is a language-game, in which this object is called a broom, is not justification. In fact, that is exactly what the person is rejected, the language game in which the thing is called a broom. Therefore justification must consist of more than reference to a "language-game". The game itself, (calling this a broom) needs to be justified (reasons given). And that's where the problem is.

You cannot refer to the act of sweeping the floor, and say that it is necessary to call this a broom in order to be able to sweep the floor, because that is not true. Hence we have a separation between knowing-how and knowing-that. I can know how to sweep the floor without knowing that I am sweeping the floor.

The question now is whether there is a real distinction, in the means of justification, between these two types of knowledge. It appears like knowing how to sweep the floor is justified by the act. But a description of "sweeping the floor" is required for this justification, to compare the act with. So "knowing-how" can only be justified with "knowing-that". Obviously though, we cannot place "knowing-that" as more fundamental, or prior to "knowing-how", because we need to know how to use words, before we can make the required description.

Therefore we are left with the conclusion that knowing-how fundamentally cannot be justified, and this is simply a type of knowledge which exists without justification. Any attempt to demonstrate its justification will be a failure, because that justification does not exist. This is the problem we encounter with any attempt to justify knowing how to use language. Knowing how to use language cannot be justified because it is a type of knowledge which cannot be justified.

Instead of invoking an idea such as "grounding" which creates an image of some lessor form of justification, we ought to dispense with the idea of justification altogether. Instead, we might move toward the internal feelings of certitude and doubt, which influence our actions. Then we can see that these descriptive terms, which may be applicable toward "knowing-that", are inadequate for describing these feelings and motivations behind "knowing-how". For example, we commonly proceed with an activity when we still have a large degree of doubt as to whether the outcome will be a success. Furthermore, we employ strategies such as trial and error, in this case we act when we are very unsure.

So as much as certitude and doubt constitute descriptive features of knowing-how, they are not the best terms to employ, because I can still be said to know-how to sweep the floor, without being certain that there will be a successful outcome every time I try. In fact, it doesn't even make sense to ask me, when I pick up the broom, 'are you certain that you will get the floor swept?'. Likewise, it doesn't make sense to ask someone using language, 'are you certain that the other person will properly understand what you're saying when you open your mouth to speak?' That's why talking is a rapid back and forth, often consisting of many clarifications, so texting and email are not the best choice for any complicated discussion. Then we can see that this discussion of certitude and doubt, in relation to hinge propositions, is completely misguided, barking up the wrong tree, in an activity which will never get us anywhere, because it is instead irrelevant to the true nature of knowing how to use language.

I can't make sense of your post. "Matter" and "space", though related, are distinct conceptions. I don't know what you mean by matter finding space within itself. Matter is potential, for Aristotle, space is formal, therefore actual. The two are categorically distinct.

You need to talk to some mathematicians. — Real Gone Cat

I have, there is a number of them in my family. Also, I've had numerous, (some very lengthy), discussions with mathematicians in this forum, some concerning these same issues. You don't seem to understand what I wrote. You just dismissed it as inconsistent with what you believe, therefore wrong.

Same as above. Its climate-change-denial, flat-earth talk. ANY elementary text on infinite sets will explain this. — Real Gone Cat

Why do mathematicians always seem to get so emotional when their principles are subjected to skepticism, and alternative belief systems? It appears to me like they are somehow trained to believe that what they are taught is the absolute truth. Doesn't this seem like dogmatism to you?

If I go half a distance, then I have to go half that otherwise there is no space let. And half that otherwise there is no space left. This goes to infinity, so nothing is discrete in the world. This is not a trick but instead logic — Gregory

If motion is not as you think it is (i.e. continuous), then this is not true. Think about how you walk, one foot on the ground here, then the next one a yard or so away. Your feet only cover the ground in those spots where they land, all the ground in between is not covered. Yet to measure how far you walked, we'd measure the ground. That's the way motion is, it doesn't necessarily cover all the spatial points by which it is measured, that's just an assumption made by the measurer.

Bank accounts are being frozen for the crime of donating to a protest. — NOS4A2

Correction, the bank accounts are frozen for contributing to illegal activity. That's the point of the emergencies act, it allows the government to make declarations as to what is illegal, like the torture described above. Sorry NOS, but you seem to be out of sync with the reality of the situation, just like those people I saw on TV, getting arrested today. They keep insisting, we're in the right, we're not doing anything wrong, they can't arrest me. Like you, they just don't seem to understand, it's the government who decides what constitutes a crime, not the criminals.

This is simply not the modern view of motion. The modern theory of motion is sometimes call "at-at" :

Motion is : being at different places at different times. — Real Gone Cat

This is not true, that's the problem. This is not what the math represents. It's just like your claim that a line is composed of an infinite number of points. There is a disjunct between what you claim is represented, and what the mathematics actually represents. If your statement here was true, you could not claim to have resolved Zeno's arrow paradox, because that paradox is the direct result of representing motion as "being at different places at different times". Each different "place" can be represented as a point in space, and each different time is a point in time. From this, we have the Zeno problem of how the arrow gets from one point to the next. Representing motion as "being at different places at different times" does not represent the actual "motion" which is the activity that occurs between the different places and different times, how the arrow gets from one place to another.

But this is not how calculus is used to represent motion. In calculus the point is a limit, and what is represented by the function is what is between the points, hence the use of "approaching the limit" in common descriptions. Therefore the object is never represented as being at a place, it is always represented as approaching a place. And your statement above ought to read "Motion is: being at an indefinite place during an indefinite period of time". The concept of "approaching the limit" produces the illusion of definition, when clearly "approaching" is not a well defined spatial temporal position.

Again, you need to differentiate between countable infinities (stacking up points) and uncountable infinities (a line). — Real Gone Cat

Sorry, but a "countable infinity" is blatant contradiction to me, so you might try to justify this distinction you're talking about, but I think you'd rapidly discover that you'll only be wasting your time.

(Again, math. Kinda my thing.) — Real Gone Cat

Discrediting common mathematical axioms is kinda my thing, so you have fair warning now. I hope you don't have emotional attachment to your principles, as some on this forum display.

1. But I thought you said God creates the universe at each instant of time. So either God is determining all that exists in that instant, or God is being directed by us (i.e., told what to do). — Real Gone Cat

This is just a strawman. To create something, does not mean to determine all within. When an artist creates a work of art, there is much (the features of the medium for example) which is not determine by the artist. So God simply has to intentionally allow for freedom of will, in what He creates, intentionally creating indeterminacy, as we see in the nature of "the future", and there is no such problem. You seem to be assuming that when someone, or God, creates something, every aspect of the thing created must be determined by the creator, when this is simply not the true nature of creating.

2. The breaks you posit between one moment and the next means that time is not continuous, and Zeno's Arrow pops back up. You can't have continuous time consisting of discrete instants anymore than you can have a married bachelor. — Real Gone Cat

I think I addressed this already. I claim that continuity is an illusion. Continuous time is not true, just like a continuous line created from an infinity of points is not true. So, we have a number of points in time, and we might claim that the arrow has true existence at each place, and each point in time. This produces the Zeno paradox, how does the arrow get from point A to point B. Instead of going the calculus route, to say that the arrow never is at point A or point B, these are simply limits which it approaches, I say that the arrow really is at point A and point B, but these "points" have a completely different type of existence from what we understand.

This is the requirement for the second dimension of time I referred to. So within the point itself, there is time, which is completely different from the time between points. And it is completely different from the time between points, because the spatial activity within the point is completely different from "motion", which is a description of what the arrow does between points. For example, consider the concept of spatial expansion. This is an "activity" which is understood as completely distinct from "motion". The activity which happens because of spatial expansion cannot be understood by the principles of "motion", so this is said to be not motion. Now place this type of activity as within the point, as only being able to be understood through a second dimension of time.

The problem here is that you are positing a solution to a problem that doesn't seem to exist. You have to first assume that time could potentially go haywire under a lack of divine intervention (based on what I don't know), then insert God to fix it. This is what I meant by, "The problem with positing God is that you have to find something for God to do."

And why would God "pull his support"? Is God whimsical? Easily angered? Cruel? Such a God would be petty and beneath contempt. — Real Gone Cat

Obviously there is a very real problem, which God is posited as the fix of, but you just don't understand it yet. Look, you think that calculus portrays motion as being at different places at different times, when really it portrays motion as being at an indefinite place at an indefinite time. That my description is true, rather than yours, is justified by the evidence of this model's manifestation, the uncertainty principle.

I suppose I can understand your position, though, because perhaps you've never had to use a bank account, which is used to store something called "money", the prevailing means by which many of us buy food and pay bills. A little bruise is nothing in comparison. — NOS4A2

That's an expected reply, which sums the attitude very well: 'money is more important than a healthy body'. Obviously the proclaimed "freedom" is not even relevant, it's a money issue. And having money in the bank account is prioritized over having a healthy body. Thanks for the demonstration, NOS.

The protests have been so peaceful that the Ottawa had to make honking illegal in order to impose any punishment. — NOS4A2

Right, you'd categorize a bunch of 120db air horns and train sirens blowing 24/7, right outside your front door as "peaceful". I'd classify that as torture. You know, one of those horns can be heard miles away (literal truth), imagine a bunch of them right outside your door. Now torture is illegal, but those who engage in it always find new ways of doing it, and claim what they're doing does not qualify, in the attempt to avoid reciprocal punishment.

Have you ever had your bank account frozen for participating in a protest? — NOS4A2

No, but I've had a lot worse, I've been beaten and kicked all over my body. Believe it or not, that's what quite often happens when you protest the authorities.

I think the fact that freezing their bank accounts might hurt them says a lot about the type of people that are protesting there. Who are they, a bunch of spoiled rich kids, who feel so entitled as to be excluded from having to take their medicine? Oh the poor children, we ought to feel so sorry for them, now that the government has decided to put an end to their three week long rave party, up on the hill. They'll become a lot more informed about what it means to lose one's freedom, when they find themselves in a jail cell.

Yours is the classical interpretation of velocity (pre-calculus), not the modern one (post-calculus). In fact, your definition is what we now call the average velocity over the interval. To point out a problem with your definition, imagine a moving object that is accelerating over the small period of time. Clearly its velocity at the beginning of that period of time is less than its velocity at the end (no matter how short the period is). So how can we assign a single value to its velocity?

So why does the classical view of velocity exist? Zeno, Archimedes, et al., were doing the best they could with the limited math of the day. The classical view works perfectly well for objects moving with constant velocity. Which was all they could handle. Think of Newtonian physics being replaced by Einsteinian. Newtonian worked fine for the simpler problems, but not so well as the 20th Century dawned. — Real Gone Cat

You missed the point. Velocity, no matter how you interpret it, classically or in the modern way, implies motion. Motion implies that the thing moving has no definitive location. That's the real outcome of Zeno's paradox, we cannot say that a moving thing has a definite location. And since all things are moving, relatively speaking, nothing has a true location. In the modern interpretation, this creates problems like the uncertainty principle. So Zeno's paradox is not resolved, it has just taken another form.

But that's looking at it backwards. Sure, stacking up dimensionless points gets us nowhere, but when we draw a line we say it contains an infinite number of points. And nowhere on the line is a place "between" points. — Real Gone Cat

Yes that's exactly the point. Think about it. An infinite number of points cannot make a line, as you say yourself, stacking up points will not get us anywhere. Therefore your claim that a line consists of an infinite number of points with nothing between them is an invalid conclusion from the two premises, 1) a point has no dimension, and 2) a line has dimension. Your statement "when we draw a line we say it contains an infinite number of points. And nowhere on the line is a place 'between' points" is self-contradicting under the accepted definitions of points and lines. It is "what we say", but it's easy to say things that are contradictory.

Ooh, this really smacks of speculation (sorry). — Real Gone Cat

It's all good, there's nothing wrong with speculation, so long as it is presented as such, and it's somewhat reasonable. I speak metaphysics, so that it's speculation should be taken for granted.

1. If God is creating the universe at each moment in time, how is free will possible? Let's say I wish to reach out for the hot pan. By your argument, God is the one creating the moment of contact, not me. In fact, God created the moment when I decided to reach out. Through infinite regress, God creates all causes. It sounds like your arguing for determinism. — Real Gone Cat

I thought I explained my resolution to this issue in the succession of universes analogy. It is a question which many theologians have given considerable thought to. That God puts one moment of time after the last, does not necessitate that God determines everything within each moment. In fact, it is this break, between one moment and the next which allows for free will. If God wanted to determine everything, there would be no such break, just one continuous existence. It is this proposal, that the universe is recreated at each moment, which allows that we can act, and produce something which wasn't there in the last moment, so this is actually God's way of providing us with the possibility of free will.

2. Does God ever withhold temporal ordering? ("I'm gonna mess with you sinners and make every day Monday!") If the claim is that God has been creating temporal order at every instant since the beginning of time, how would we know? Is the claim testable? Is there any evidence? — Real Gone Cat

I haven't seen it, have you? This in general, is the problem of induction. So all the laws of physics are based in induction, and we assume that because things have been in such and such a way for so long, they will continue to be that way (eg, the sun will rise tomorrow). That's why Newton said his first law of motion depends on the will of God. God fearing creatures will be worried that God could pull out his support at any moment.

3. Does God actively order other continuums (the line, the set of reals, etc.)? Could 37 suddenly be less than 2? — Real Gone Cat

This is a more complex subject, because we have the issue of the human imagination intermingling with the issue of God's will. Many people like to insist that human orders, numerology are actually divine orders, or the same as, but I think it is necessary to maintain a separation, to account for the fallibility of human orders. So I propose that mathematical orders are really the product of the free willing human mind, and not determined by God. We produce these orders (sometimes with the intent of understanding the divine order), but since we are only human and fallible, so are the principles of order we produce. Sometimes they are faulty and lead us astray.

This fallibility is evident in your proposal that a line consists of an infinite number of points and nothing else, which under analysis is actually illogical. Points have no dimension, so even an infinite number of them could not produce the dimensionality required for a line. So it's examples like this which lead me to propose a distinction between true order (divine order) and orders created by the minds of human beings.

The problem with positing God is that you have to find something for God to do. — Real Gone Cat

God doesn't have to do anything. As "creator", everything is already done by the time we are present.

The act gives the federal government sweeping powers, such as to regulate and freeze an individual’s bank account... — NOS4A2

Nothing new there. Ever been audited by the revenue department?

Yet, the results of such AI calculations about metaphysics still rely on fundamental assumptions regarding the mathematical axioms that one assumes in the first place. — Photios

Begging the question.

Well Banno, I take your reply as a joke. You have put no effort into it, being afraid to look at anything which is inconsistent with what you claim. As you have not been able to indicate to me how I am wrong, I will conclude that you are just stubbornly adhering to a description of "doubt" which was created by your imagination, for a particular purpose, rather than by looking at the way the word is actually used by people in the world.

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.

That's what you do with "doubt", define it in a way which expressly restricts it to being a language game. What about all the other times we use "doubt", to refer to non-academic instances of uncertainty?

Doubt is a language game. — Banno

No, doubt is not a language game. It is an attitude of uncertainty which does not require language for its existence. Likewise, certitude is an attitude of confidence which does not require language for its existence.

So for example, when I'm hiking and come to a brook, I might have certitude, and be confident that I can, or cannot, jump across it. Or, I might have doubt as to whether I can, meaning I am uncertain. It's not language which facilitates the attitude which I have in this case, and that attitude is completely independent of any language game.

You continue to demonstrate that you really have no idea as to what doubt actually is. So you simply create a fictitious description of doubt which fits into your game analogy, instead of attempting to understand what doubt really is, and how the game analogy is incapable of capturing it. Uncertainty, doubt, negates the will to act, rendering games, which are activities, as relevant only by an extrinsic relationship. In the example above, if I am certain that I can jump across the brook, or certain that I cannot, I will act accordingly. But doubt leaves me indecisive and unwilling to act.

The limit concept has been well understood since the middle of the 19th Century (Cauchy, Weierstrass, et al.). — Real Gone Cat

I'm not saying that it's not well understood, nor am I saying that it's at all ambiguous. I'm just saying that it does not provide a real solution to the issues which cause the paradox. I might say that it provides a "work around". Consider for example, the concept of instantaneous velocity. Velocity is a concept which is time dependent, meaning that a thing could only have a velocity if it exists over a period of time. So what could velocity at an instant mean? It must mean that an instant consists of a very small period of time. That's fine, but now what about the instant that divides one period of time from another, when we perform a measurement of a period of time. If the instant contains a duration of time then the measurement is necessarily imprecise, ambiguous. The result of the "work around" is the acceptance of imprecise measurement

So it doesn't resolve Zeno's paradox, because all it does is assume that we cannot determine the precise location of a moving object, because it is moving, therefore it doesn't have a precise location, all it has is a velocity therefore it is necessarily in a multitude of places at an instant in time. If we accept this as the reality of physical existence then we accept as reality that there is no objective position of any object, (all objects being in some form of motion). Therefore we have a measurement problem and an uncertainty principle in quantum physics. The uncertainty principle is not necessarily a feature of reality, it is a product of the way that we choose to look at reality, through our mathematical principles, and what is implied by those principles; that nothing has a precise location because it is moving. The issue which creates the paradox is not resolved, it is just deferred, to create a different problem.

OK, you give me something to think about. Discrete instants would mean Zeno's Arrow is back in play. But continuity would suggest something else : if time is continuous and universe are instants of time, then universes also form a continuity. — Real Gone Cat

This is the same problem as saying that a line is composed of points. If a point has no spatial dimension, then no matter how many points you stack up, you do not get a line which has spatial dimension. We can either say that the line is what exists between points, or we can assume that there is some sort of dimension within points, so that we might put a bunch together and have a line. What I suggested for time, synthesizes both of these. The dimension of time which we know and understand is what exists between points, Within a point in time, there is no temporal extension in that sense of duration. However, within a point in time there is another dimension of time, a type of "time" which is completely different from the temporal duration which we know because it involves a different sort of activity. But we have absolutely no understanding of this dimension of time until we posit the possibility of its reality, look for the evidence of it, and establish a way of relating the dimension which we know, to the other dimension which we do not.

With respect to your last answer (about causes and God), I wonder if you could give an example. Maybe the burnt hand situation? Your idea is new to me and I'm having trouble following it. — Real Gone Cat

OK, I'll give it a try. Let's start with Newton's first law of motion, inertia. Look at that law this way, as saying that whatever has been going on in the past, will continue to go on indefinitely into the future, as time passes, unless something causes that to change. Notice the role of "cause" here. It is assumed that things will remain the same, therefore a "cause" is required to produce change. But Newton stated that his first law was dependent on the will of God. So the theological way of looking at this is that inertia, i.e. the tendency for things to stay the same, what Newton took for granted, actually is caused. And when we consider the position of free will, as I explained already, we see that it is necessary for this cause to act at every moment of passing time. So the mystical way of understanding this is that God creates the entire universe anew at each passing moment of time.

To take your example then, of the burnt hand, consider that God must recreate your hand, (as well as your entire body, even the universe), at each moment of passing time, to maintain the continuous existence of that hand. That is how we account for the inertia of that mass. If you burn your hand, something interferes with that cause of existence of your hand, its being recreated as it was in the past, at each moment of passing time. See how the role of "cause" is reversed? Instead of saying something caused your hand to be damaged, we can say that something interfered with the cause of continued existence of your hand.

In the sense that God is said to know the future, time knows the future and that includes all our choices. — Gregory

It is not necessarily true that God knows the future. This problem was investigated by Augustine at some length. If God can know the future, it appears like the possibility of free will is denied. And if the human being definitely does have free will, then God cannot know the future. The indeterminacy of the future, which is required for free will, denies the possibility that anyone, even God, could know the future. God knows all that is, but the future does not exist yet, so that is not necessarily included within "what is".

Please forgive this primitive naif. I have been enjoying our exchange, but now I see that it has been an annoyance to you. Still, I cannot help myself : I feel that I must continue to put my prattle before the public. So please deign to consider this poor bumpkin's thoughts. — Real Gone Cat

I wouldn't say it's an annoyance to me, or I wouldn't participate. I enjoy it, so don't worry about that.

If time is taken as continuous, the Arrow Paradox is resolved. Calculus helps. From the IEP : — Real Gone Cat

I am familiar with this so-called resolution, and I would call it an illusion of a resolution, rather than a true resolution. I believe it's based in a principle which rounds off the infinitely small to zero, and calls this "approaching zero", or something like that, while treating it as zero. This is the same sort of principle which treats .999... as 1. It's not a real resolution, it's just saying that we can get on with our calculations very well, without resolving the issue.

1. Is your theory of time-instants-being-distinct-universes widely held in philosophy? Can you cite sources that I might peruse? (Full disclosure : I do know of one somewhat prominent thinker who shares a similar outlook, but I'll hold off until you tell me who you read.) — Real Gone Cat

No I don't think it is a widely held solution to the problems with "time". In fact I don't even hold it myself. I just rolled with it, because it was how you characterized the point I was making. I was saying that things in the past could be characterized as not existing in the universe. You proposed that they must be in a different universe then, not wanting to allow that they were completely "outside" any universe, as this was the point of discussion, things outside the universe. So I went along with that proposal of yours, that things outside one universe would be in another universe.

Then, I tried to explain how this doesn't relieve us of the need for something which is fundamentally out side of any, and every universe. Consider, as I explained, that the human being, would necessarily staddle a multitude of universes. Since this "being" comprises a relationship between a number of universes, it has some aspect which is necessarily outside of all of them, to account for its unity independent of any particular universe. That was the point, that by proposing a multitude of universes we do not avoid the need to assume something outside of all these universes.

To summarize then, I've been insisting on the need to assume something, or things, outside the universe. You proposed that the things outside the universe would be within other universes. I then argued that we still need to assume something outside of all universes.

2. Do you think time is continuous or discrete? I.e., do instants have duration? — Real Gone Cat

Personally, I believe in a two dimensional time. I believe that the time line which we understand as duration of time, and as a continuity, is actually composed of discrete "instants", which appear to us as a continuity, like that produced from a movie of still frames. However, each still frame, or "instant" is not itself still, or a static point, but consists of a second type of temporal passage, which is very distinct from the one we understand, hence the second dimension. The second dimension of time passing, we have not even recognized so much as to posit principles toward understanding it. But it is required to assume the second dimension, in order to understand how moments of time overlap, or the relationship between the "universes" described above. The second dimension of time cannot be described as anything within this universe, or in any universe, when distinct universes are defined as moments on the continuous time line.

3. Are all, some, or no causes do to God? In the burnt hand example, what is the causal chain? Does God play a role? — Real Gone Cat

Referring to the above description of two dimensional time, causation as we know it, in the sense of efficient cause, is a simple relationship along the timeline of instances. But when each instant has a duration, and activity, proper to that distinct dimension of time, and the possibility of parallel timelines, and other timelines which are diagonal, then we have to consider different sorts of causation. For instance, consider a moment just prior to another moment on the standard timeline. If each of these moments are given breadth, then one side of the prior moment might end up being posterior to the other side of the posterior moment through a diagonal timeline. So that diagonal, or cross relationship between the two moments, would put the prior moment as posterior, in that diagonal timeline.

As for the causes which are due to God, as I said before, that is the relationship between moments. God created time (as the cause of it) in such and such a way, so as to have the relationships between moments which are the true ones.

Well, if you cannot apprehend the obviousness of the fact that any understanding of reality which you may have, is your own mind's understanding of reality, and you cannot have an understanding of reality which is not your own mind's understanding of reality, then discussion of this with you would be rather pointless.