Can anyone provide a clear explanation of the difference between a hinge proposition, and a self-evident truth? That might be a good start toward understanding what a hinge proposition is supposed to be.

Some claim that consciousness or intelligence is fundamental, but at present we have no way to settle the issue one way or the other. — Fooloso4

Actually there is a way to settle this, and that is to understand and accept the very obvious reality, and simple truth, that consciousness is fundamental. Since consciousness is the means by which we understand anything, it must be placed as the first principle, it is necessarily prior, fundamental, in any type of understanding. To suggest otherwise is simple denial of the obvious.

So, in any procedure toward understanding the nature of reality, understanding the nature of consciousness is a necessary requirement, as needed first. Any attempt to understand reality, without first accounting for the fact that any understanding of reality is merely the way that a consciousness understands reality, and is therefore not necessarily a true understanding of reality, is a mistaken adventure. The fact that any understanding of reality is a product of a consciousness is necessarily the first, and most fundamental principle to any true understanding of reality. And since we must account for the fact that any representation of reality is merely the property of a consciousness, we must, necessarily understand the consciousness's true relation to reality, before we can adequately judge the truth or falsity of any representation of reality. Therefore a true understanding of consciousness and intelligence is fundamental and necessary for any credible representation of reality.

Any claim, such as yours, that it is possible that consciousness is not fundamental in an understanding of reality, is simply ignorance of the obvious. The fact is that we cannot have a true understanding of reality without first having a true understanding of consciousness. One's understanding of consciousness forms the base, platform, or foundation, upon which all other knowledge rests. This is demonstrated by the tinted glass analogy. When we look at the world through a glass lens (consciousness or intelligence being analogous to the lens), we must have complete understanding of what the lens contributes to the image, before we can truly understand the nature of the thing being looked at through the lens.

Consciousness, or intelligence, is fundamental., and there is no other valid platform for looking at reality.

I visualize the y axis as time and the x as space. Motion is a bit of both and they all cover the same territory. The singularity is space, time, and motion as something discrete while it seems to me reality is continuous after the Big Bang — Gregory

I believe this is the mistaken simplicity which modern conceptions of space and time have fallen into. This is the result of placing pragmatic convenience as a higher principle than truth.

In reality, space and time cannot be modeled as two facets of the same thing. Space, as we understand it, is a feature of the past, it is not a feature of the future. What the reality of free will demonstrates to us is that there is no determinate spatial existence on that other side of the present (the future). The determinateness which we know as spatial position is produced only at the moment of the present. Evidence of this is manifest in quantum physics. Since one part of time, the past consists of determinate spatial existence, and the other part of time, the future, consists of indeterminate non-spatial existence, time must be modeled as the division between spatial and non-spatial, or two radically different conceptions of "space".

Given your view, how do you avoid Zeno's Paradox of the Arrow? Even if instances butt up against each other, they are still disjoint. — Real Gone Cat

As far as I know, no one has demonstrated an acceptable resolution to the arrow paradox. What it demonstrates is that a moment in time is incoherent in relation to the way that we understand the motion of an object as continuous. So we might just say that there is no such thing as a moment in time, and keep on claiming that motion is continuous. But that would render the measurement of a period of time as impossible, a measured period requiring a start and end moment. So as much as people might say there is no such thing as a moment in time, they act as if there is, by measuring time periods. What quantum mechanics seems to indicate is that the other alternative, that motion of an object is not really continuous, is the true solution. So that's how I avoid the paradox, by saying that the idea that the motion of an object is continuous, is a faulty idea.

And, also by your view, what holds an instance together? If smacking a pool ball creates a new universe what happens to the dart that has been thrown on the opposite end of the bar? — Real Gone Cat

A new universe is created at every moment as time passes, regardless of any pool balls or darts. If you take seriously the nature of free will, you'll come to see that it is necessary that the entire physical universe is created anew at each passing moment. If the will has the power to change anything, at any moment of time, then anything can be annihilated at any moment, so we cannot say that there is anything on the other side of the present (in the future). What will be, at the next moment in time, is created at that moment. This is the only way to account for the reality of free will, because the will must be free to decide at one moment, what will be at the next moment. This means that there cannot be anything there already, at the next moment. Of course then we need something like God to account for the observed continuity from one moment to the next.

We don't experience instances as separate universes, so (trying not to offend) it seems like speculation. — Real Gone Cat

We do not experience things as molecules, atoms, photons, or anything like that either, so that point is really irrelevant.

We've gotten far from my original question though. Let me try it this way : Presumably there are effects that are generated by mundane causes (the hot pan burns my hand). But the premise was that there are effects that are caused by God. How can we tell the difference? Is there something about the effect that gives it away? — Real Gone Cat

What you call "mundane causes" is just a very primitive understanding of temporality, what we might more accurately call a misunderstanding. The real scenario, is much more complicated than "the hot pan burns my hand". Sciences such as biology, chemistry, and physics show show that this is just a primitive description of what is really happening in that situation. Likewise, when you start to get a true understanding of the way that temporality must be, to account for the way that we experience things, you will begin to see that science has a very primitive understanding (misunderstanding) of temporality and causation.

Would you say claiming that past and future do not exists is related to the parts of an object not existing on their own? I say that parts and past and future exist as one — Gregory

Do you mean that if you divide the parts of an object, the object no longer exists, and if you separate past and future, time as the whole no longer exists?

Agreement on this point seems to be breaking out! I would only add that a true half is equally impossible to create (physically) - or, if created, impossible to know that it has been created. — Cuthbert

The application of division, fractions, ratios, is generally very problematic, and the way that conventional mathematics treats division in general is very inadequate. In physical reality, the way that a thing can be divided is governed by the type of thing which is to be divided. In reality, the type of thing to be divided actually determines the principles of division which can be employed in dividing the thing. But mathematicians appear to pay no respect to this fact, and produce principles which allow any object to be divided in any way. The mathematician's simplicity, every object is infinitely divisible.

The problem with this approach to division becomes very evident when things like sound waves are being divided. Of course physical reality actually prevents infinite frequencies and infinite wavelengths. But if we ignore the physical reality of waves, and adhere to mathematical principles of division instead, we end up with the Fourier uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is the direct consequence of a failure to determine the correct way to divide space and time, according to physical reality.

Doubt takes place within a language game. — Banno

That's what you might think, but quite obviously "doubt" is created when the appropriate language game cannot be determined. That's what Plato demonstrated. This is the nature of ambiguity, the word appears as if it could be employed according to multiple different games, and there is uncertainty as to which game is the correct one.

The idea of doubt "within a language game" doesn't even make sense. Think about it, there can be no doubt as to how to use the word from within the game, just like there can be no doubt about the moves of the chess piece. There can be doubt as to whether one's moves will be successful or not, but that's a completely different type of doubt, far more general, and far outside of any language use. It's the doubt as to whether my actions will be successful or not. That form of doubt is obviously not confined to within a language game.

Doubt within a language game would be like doubt as to whether one's logic is valid or not. Such a judgement is very decisive, either it is or is not valid logic, and there is no room for doubt. One could be in doubt in such a judgement, if the rules of the logic being employed were not known by the person, or if the propositions were ambiguous, but that's what constitutes being outside the game. From within the game there can be no doubt, that's what constitutes being within the game.

Now I am pretty confident that you will not grasp this. — Banno

That's right, I cannot grasp it because what you've said is completely nonsensical. It appears like you have no idea what "doubt" is. Do you recognize "doubt" as indecisiveness, uncertainty in relation to a required judgement? If one is playing chess, i.e. "within the game", there can be no doubt as to how to move the bishop. If the person was doubting how to move the bishop we could not say that the person is playing the game. So how does your example put doubt within the game?

Doubt within the game makes no sense. The person might have doubt with respect to strategy, but strategy is not "within" the game, it's what the individual brings to the game by way of experience and intuition.

Perhaps we could start a mutual understanding through a distinction between "the game", and "playing the game". Do you accept that "playing the game" is not the same as "the game", because the former refers to what an individuals is doing, or what individuals are each doing, and the latter refers to a unity of the actions of the individuals? If so, do you see that "doubt" is proper to the individual, not to the game?

What we cannot do is to measure pi exactly in the same way that we can count exactly. You can pick up exactly three apples and put back exactly two of them, leaving you with exactly one. But you can't measure out exactly pi kilos of sugar. If you happen to be holding exactly pi kilos of sugar then you can never know that is what you are holding. — Cuthbert

The issue with pi being an irrational ratio is not a measurement problem. It is a logical problem with the defined (mathematical) object, the circle. It is actually an impossible object. Simply put, a circle cannot have a centre point. But since the circle is defined as a circumference equidistance from the centre, a circle is actually impossible. This should not be a surprise to anyone, it's commonly stated that a perfect circle is impossible. What we have is approximations.

It seems like some people want to dissolve the distinction between theory and practice, and describe what is a problem with the theory as a problem of practice. There is no problem making circles in practice, there is no problem measuring them, and there is no problem employing pi to determine the area. The problem is that the circles employed in practice cannot obtain the degree of precision and accuracy which we request in theory. And the irrational nature of pi demonstrates that we will never ever get that degree of precision because it is impossible. A true circle, as defined, is an impossible object to create.

Right, there shouldn't be a need to reduce abstractions to claim they are physical. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem I see is with "intention". Intention is what gives causality to abstractions. We might assume that the abstractions are tools put to use in the world, and we could ground them in a physical attribute of the physical human being, like the brain. But the abstractions only become causal under the influence of intention, they are put to work toward a purpose. Being grounded in intention rather than the physical brain, brings us in the opposite direction of giving the abstractions physical status. Intention is related to a will toward the future, what will be, and so it cannot be assigned to any physical attribute of the human being.

This is how the mind differs from the senses. The senses are all directed toward a type of physical attribute proper to the sense organ. But the mind, being directed by intention is directed toward an "object" in the sense of a goal. And the goal has no material existence, having not yet been brought into existence. That's why the "object" which is proper to the mind is immaterial, while the senses have "objects" which are material.

If intentionality is a non-physical phenomena, it must at the least still be partly caused by physical things. But then you have the problem of how two totally different things interact, and how they can interact without leaving behind detectable evidence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think this is a proper representation of intentionality. Intentionality at its base is very general, and therefore we cannot say that it is caused in any way by particular things. Consider a base feeling like hunger, and the specific intention to eat, which we might say is "caused" by that base feeling. Notice that the intention is very general, not caused by a particular physical thing desired. Only through the direction of the mind does intention become focused on a particular thing, the intent to eat a particular food item. We cannot say that the physical object which is desired is the cause of the intention. And since intention begins as something very general, it's just a general feeling, I don't see how it could be caused by any physical thing, or even a group of physical things, which are particulars.

This is the same issue as inductive reasoning, only inverted. With inductive reasoning we produce a general principle from observing a number of particular instances. There is no way that we can say that the physical particulars, no matter how many there be, are the cause of the inductive conclusion. We do not have the premise required, to conclude that a whole bunch of physical particulars have actually caused the existence of a general principle. What really causes the actual existence of the general principle is the act of reasoning.

Next time Elon needs some calculations to land a craft, he should just call you for your results rounded to two decimal points. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Judging by the news of a whole fleet of crashed crafts a week or so ago, calling me couldn't have hurt.

To me the universe is everything that has ever existed, from the Big Bang to the Big Fade-Out. — Real Gone Cat

You should have said this right away, when I said things in the past are not in the universe. That would have saved some time, and unnecessary back and forth.

How do you differentiate between future and past then? Surely you'll agree with me that the past is radically different from the future. What has already happened cannot be undone, but when looking toward the future, we can act to cause things which we like, and also prevent things we do not like. If all future and past are together as one big universe, how do you account for this substantial difference between things of the past and things of the future?

It all comes down to our conception of time - you see time linking the multiple universes in a particular order, I see time as a component of the one universe. — Real Gone Cat

I don't see how there could be time, if all future and past are one universe. Time is that changing boundary between future and past. If all is one, then there is no such boundary and no time.

If cause-and-effect is true of the universe then it provides a mechanism for instances to follow one after another. There is no need to insert God. — Real Gone Cat

Mechanisms, machines, are artificial. They are created. There is no sense to the idea of an uncreated mechanism.

In fact, requiring God to provide temporal order seems to me to endanger free will. If God is directing the action, then what is my role? — Real Gone Cat

Well I explained this. God just orders the universes themselves, which one comes after the last, that is the necessity of time. But God does not necessitate everything which will be within any particular universe. And since your existence spans a number of universes, you can act as a cause in one universe to get what you want in a later universe. But now you reject the multiple universe scenario anyway so that was rather pointless.

You're too gone, dude. That article was specifically disagreeing with you. Data comes from sensory data of the material world. That's where the correspondence works, that's what they were saying. I'm moving on now. — Garrett Travers

Do you understand a difference between "data comes from the senses", and "data is the material world"? In the former, "data" requires sensation. In the latter "data" requires a material world. When the scientist produces a model designed to correspond with the data, which is derived from sensation, the model is not designed to correspond with the material world. It is designed to correspond with the data derived from sensation. Whether or not there even is such a thing as "the material world" is completely irrelevant to that model. Have you heard of "model-dependent realism"?

Your argument is that a hinge in one game need not be a hinge in another, and I agree; but one cannot thereby conclude, as you would, that there are no hinges. — Banno

If hinges are defined as propositions which it is unreasonable to doubt, or, are indubitable, then there are no hinges. Each person is involved in numerous different games and it is only unreasonable to doubt a supposed hinge, from within the game that it is a hinge. From another game, in which the proposition is not a hinge, it is not unreasonable to doubt that proposition. Therefore it is not unreasonable for a person to doubt a hinge.

There is no language use that is outside language games. Looking at the relationship between language games is yet another language game. Philosophers who think they can step outside language while still using language are mistaken. — Banno

A relation between two games is not itself a game. That would just imply a third game between the two, but then we'd require two more games to account for the relation between the third game and the first game and the third game and the second game. And we'd need more games to account for the relations between these games, ad infinitum. This is the type of infinite regress Aristotle demonstrated would be the result of mischaracterizing the difference (or relation) between two things, as a third thing. That infinite regress is the result here, is evidence that the description is faulty. The relation between two games is not a third game.

So it is not a matter of philosophers thinking that they can step outside of language, when using language, it is just a matter of demonstrating that language consists of more than just games. So a philosopher can place oneself outside of any particular game, and therefore potentially outside of every game, yet still be using language. Wittgenstein's intentional use of ambiguity is clear evidence of the act of a philosopher putting oneself outside of the games.

In other words, this "platonism" of yours cannot be divorced from correspondence to the material world. — Garrett Travers

The correspondence is not with a material world, it is with an immaterial world, notice the correspondence referred to is with "data", not "a material world". The model is made to correspond with the data, hence "platonism". That's why I was insistent on asking you about your assumption of "laws". Laws are immaterial. When reality is reduced to 'that which corresponds with laws and mathematics', there is no longer anything material there, in that assumed reality, only information, data. That's the point Berkeley made, we can describe all of our observations without any need to assume "matter". The world consists of forms, and what we apprehend is information, not matter.

The fact which you don't seem to be grasping is, that "matter" was assumed to account for the aspect of reality which we cannot understand, i.e. potential. That's why it's a principle of mysticism. And being the part of reality which is unintelligible to us, it is the part which is not subject to laws, because laws are what is intelligible.

There is nothing true about this statement whatsoever. You have been dispensed with, guy. Move on. — Garrett Travers

"Many physicists have uncritically adopted platonic realism as their personal interpretation of the meaning of physics."

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/

This follows from the trend of mathematicians who employ platonic realism in their axioms, to describe mathematical values as mathematical objects.

In practical calculations, Pi is never exact. It's is just computed to a given precision. In C++, the value of Pi is 3.14159265358979323846, which is sufficient for most calculations. — pfirefry

I find 3.14 is sufficient for my practical purposes. I suppose if you're a cosmologist, or someone who is multiplying pi by a googolplex or something like that, it might be worth while to take pi to a few more decimals, or your conclusion might not be very exact.

The real problem is that the person can choose not to play that game. And that is why the whole game analogy, and the described "hinge propositions", as some sort of rule system which supports the game, is fundamentally flawed, as a descriptive tool for "language" in general. Language as a whole must consist of a multitude of games, under the game analogy, and the individual user of language has freedom of choice with respect to which games to play.

So the supposed "hinge propositions" which must be, of necessity, accepted for the purpose of playing a specific game, and cannot be doubted from within the confines of that game, can always be doubted from the play of another game. The character of "hinge" is specific to, as a feature of, a particular game.

Therefore portraying such hinge propositions as somehow indubitable is fundamentally wrong. All the hinge propositions of any, and every particular game, are always the subject of doubt from the play of another game. And, a human being has the freedom of choice to play one game one day, and another game the next day, at will. Therefore it is completely reasonable for a human being to doubt any supposed "hinge proposition".

What cannot be exposed by the game analogy is the relationships between the various games, becuase these are by definition outside any particular game and are not captured by the analogy. Since this type of language use, which is outside any particular game, is a key aspect of the philosophical use of language, as the means by which we doubt linguistic activity, the game analogy completely fails as a representation of the philosophical use of language. Philosophical use of language is the use of language which is outside the game analogy.

The relationship between freedom of choice to choose a linguistic game, and dogmatic enforcement of a game, is very evident in the history of "The Inquisition". The Inquisition was formed to resist the infiltration of secular language (as heresy) into the pure language, Latin, and the perceived threat of doubt, and inevitable corruption of theological principles, from such cross-gaming. History teaches us that the enforcement of the game (The Inquisition) did not win over the freedom of the will of individuals to choose their own games. In fact, efforts at enforcement appear to have had a negative effect overall.

Abstractions generally have to be able to cause physical effects for a physicalist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've never been able to understand the basis of this claim that abstractions do not have any effect in the world. All a person has to do is open one's eyes and see all the artificial products around, to apprehend the fact that we cannot deny effect from abstractions. If we make such a denial, we end up with the proposition that chance occurrence is the cause of artificial things having the forms that they do. And of course that's just ridiculous.

You claim to have a scientific perspective, but I think the trend by modern scientists, especially physicists, is toward idealism. What's commonly accepted is a form of Platonism, the position that all of reality is composed of mathematics and laws, and matter itself is just an illusion. This is much more consistent with the physics of today, as matter has become an outdated idea.

I'm waiting for you to address the issues I raised. Show me where I might find one of these laws of reality that you insist I must obey. Where is the substance of these laws? Where's the space they occupy, and the mass they possess? And quit trying to negate the reality that there isn't such a thing as "a law" in your material world. It's just a brain without an intellect which is saying these things.

I might add this though. Of course the universe appears ordered to us. Because we are in this universe, we believe it to have order. Humans see order because our evolution occurred in this universe. We evolved to survive and understand this universe. If we came from somewhere else, then this universe might not appear ordered. — Real Gone Cat

You've lost track of the premise. There is a succession of universes, one every moment, stacked like pancakes. The "order" is the relation between these universes, not within "the universe". Each one of us human beings has a being which spans a number of universes. It is necessary that there is order between the universes or else none of us could have a being. The "order" is not simply an appearance of order, it is necessarily the case, because without that order we could not exist.

If you really believe that an order could come into existence without being created, I'd like to hear your explanation. You'd have to start with a description of what a pure, absolute, lack of order would be like, then explain how an order could spontaneously occur.

The suggestion that God must be outside because God is the creator implies that God is outside all universes - the universe of the cause and the universe of the effect. That's the nut you must crack. — Real Gone Cat

Yes, I don't see why you think that this is a problem. God is necessarily outside all the universes, as that which puts them in order. Where's the problem? Each cause is in a universe outside the universe of its effect, being at a different moment in time. But something must validate the relationship between cause and effect, i.e. the relation between one universe and another. That's God, like the hand that deals the cards, puts one universe after the other. How is this a problem?

The people of Hiroshima don't share your opinion, neither does science, and neither does that definition. In general does not imply conceptual, you just made that up. In general, all substances; that's matter. And (in physics), that'd be science, all things that occupy space and possess mass. That's not conceptual, you have misinterpreted the definition entirely. As if this has to be covered for you. — Garrett Travers

If you do not understand that "occupy space", and "possess mass" are both conceptual, then please read some philosophy before posting on a philosophy forum in the pretense of knowing something philosophical.

Laws are not created by humans, they are noticed and provided a symbolic representation for by humans. — Garrett Travers

OK, explain to me where I can find one of these laws, so I might observe it, and be able to make a symbolic representation of it.

You realize that the onus is on you to demonstrate that reality isn't material, right? — Garrett Travers

No, you claimed "the brain is made out of matter". The onus is on you to support this claim. All you've done is made some vague allusion to substance, occupying space, and possessing mass. And in the mean time, demonstrated a pathetic lack of understanding.

Unless you hold with Heidegger and Wittgenstein that any such separation between subjective attitude and objectivity is incoherent. It is the hinge that makes the world objectively intelligible in the first place. — Joshs

Let me state the problem using other words then. If you proceed in this direction, you have no "truth" as correspondence, because you've denied that there's a separation between the thing, and what corresponds with the thing by denying the separation between subjective (of the subject), and objective (of the object). Then we have no "knowledge" in the traditional sense because there is no separation between truth and justification. We'd have to say that if it is justified then it is true, because any other form of truth (correspondence with the object) has been excluded. But this is contrary to experience. We know from experience that what is justified sometime still turns out to be false. That's why we uphold a difference between justified and true.

“One’s hinge certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this proposition. This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence.” — Joshs

This is exactly why the so-called hinges are the most dubious of all propositions. We simply pick them up, acquire them through some sort of animalistic habituation without any type of ratiocination. Therefore they are the least reliable, and ought to be the first to be doubted. And, in philosophy, through methods like Platonic dialectics we learn the process for doubting them. That's why Wittgenstein is simply wrong when he suggests that it is for some (unexplainable) reason, unreasonable to doubt the hinges.

Because the hinges may be archaic remnants, left over from some ancient traditions, which are maintained in common language for simplicity sake only, they are the propositions most in need of the skeptic's doubt. Consider phrases like "the sun rises in the morning, and sets in the evening". We know that it's not true that the sun literally rises, it stays put, relatively, while the earth spins. This demonstrates how simple statements which we acquire, and use ("swallow them down"), may be very misleading. They can appear to correspond precisely with our observed world, they are also simple and very useful, yet sometimes they are actually false. That's why they are actually in need of the skeptic's.

“On the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational basis for their truth. In
particular, our continued certainty in them would be manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems to involve a rational response to changed circumstances.” — Joshs

I don't agree with this, and that's why I think Wittgenstein is wrong. Plato, throughout his dialogues demonstrated how Socrates doubted such commitments. And it wasn't just moral commitments which were doubted, but he doubted commitments throughout the entire sphere of knowledge, including technical practice, science, mathematics, law, and even the meaning of "knowledge" itself. To doubt the meaning of a word, like "love", "virtue", "just", or "knowledge", is to doubt how one's society uses that word, and therefore the hinge commitments which support that usage.

Shouldn't be an issue, here's google: physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy. — Garrett Travers

Anything defined with "in general" is conceptual, so "physical substance in general" is purely conceptual. And so is "occupies space", as well as "rest mass".

Matter is a human concept that maps to reality, that's called correspondence. — Garrett Travers

So far you've only mapped matter to the above concepts, "physical substance", "occupies space", and "rest mass". You haven't shown how any of these concepts map to reality. So you've provided no indication of how your concept of "matter" partakes in "correspondence".

Laws of reality don't ask your opinion. Humans map those laws through conceptual framework, nothing else to it. — Garrett Travers

Laws are created by human beings. I'm still waiting for you to explain how you conceive of a law which is not created by human minds. Who would create such a law?

Since you seem really stuck on this idea that there are "inviolable" laws which you must obey, perhaps you could point me toward where I could find them, so that I might be able to read, understand, and therefore obey them. Since they are said to be inviolable, I think I'd better take extra time in understanding them, because the punishment must be very severe if I do not obey them. So please, lead me to these laws, show them to me. And don't show me human conceptions, and claim correspondence, I want to see the laws themselves, so I can judge whether or not the human laws correspond with the natural ones. Where in your materialist world do these laws hide, and how do we know how to obey them?

The brain is made of matter, not pixie dust. — Garrett Travers

Matter is just a concept. Unless you can clearly define your concept of "matter" you might just as well be saying that the brain is made of pixie dust. Try it, exchange "pixie dust" for "matter" in some of your statements and you'll see that the meaning of your statement doesn't change a bit.

"The brain is made of [pixie dust, not matter]. Highly functional, highly systemmatized, genetically coded, [pixie dust] of unrivaled sophistication."

See, "matter" is just a stand in term, for something you haven't got a clue as to what it is, just like "pixie dust", so the two serve the exact same purpose in your statements. The real issue here is the question of how some instances of the assumed "matter" can be highly functional, and highly systematized, while other instances of matter are not. What gives your pixie dust ("matter") such magical powers, that it can come in all these different forms?

As Berkeley demonstrated there is no need even to assume that there is any matter there. Each existing thing is a just a form, each thing having its own unique type of of sophistication, as a particular, and there is no need to say that there is any "matter" underlying that form.

You are anthropomorphizing the universe. Whenever you realize that such givings are a miscalculation between your nature and the universe, you will understand completely. — Garrett Travers

You are making the exact mistake you are accusing Wayfarer of, except we might say that you are materializing the universe, rather than anthropomorphizing it. You are invoking a magical substance, naming it "matter" instead of "pixie dust", and claiming that this magical dust is responsible for all existence. This given, which you take for granted as "matter", is actually your miscalculation. "Matter" is just a human concept, therefore it cannot make up the independent universe.

Besides, the only way for us to master reality and learn its secrets, is to first obey its inviolable laws. — Garrett Travers

Now you're being hypocritical. You tell Wayfarer that laws such as "f=ma" are simply human conceptions. Then in the very same paragraph you proceed to say that we must obey the laws of reality. Please be consistent Garrett. If "laws" are human conceptions, then there are no independent laws of reality which we must obey. And if you assume that there is some sort of "laws" which are independent from human existence, then please explain who is writing and enforcing those laws. That's why Berkeley had to assume God. If every unique, individual, particular thing is reducible to a unique formula, its very own specific law which determines its exact existence, then someone must be creating these laws.

It's weird to see so many people on here, just like you on the mystic bandwagon, who never can give an argument about their beliefs in extra mundane phenomena that doesn't included insult, obfuscation, conflation, appeal to ignorance, or some other negation technique that, I guess normally works on the untrained minds with whom you regularly make contact with and present this trash to. — Garrett Travers

If you knew anything about the history of the concept of "matter", you would see that it is a central concept of western mysticism. So it is actually the materialist who is on the mystical bandwagon, summoning up a magical substance with mystical powers, named "matter", and insisting that this synonym to "pixie dust" is the cause of all reality.

I must admit I find it needlessly complicated. — Real Gone Cat

That's the way I find reality, complicated. If you think my description of reality is needlessly complicated then you probably do not share my opinion that reality is complicated.

And God as temporal organizer seems like an explanation that has gone looking for a problem. Why do you assume that God, and only God, provides an objective relationship between moments in time? Does something suggest to you that a world absent of God would suddenly go haywire? Water flowing uphill? Cats living with dogs? I think you need to show that God is necessary for temporal order. — Real Gone Cat

Not that a world without God would suddenly go haywire, but that it wouldn't have any order in the first place. The existence of order implies something which has caused that order, because order means that things have been put into the right place. That's what order is, things being in their correct place, and things do not just get up and go to the right place on their own. So we might conclude that there is a cause of temporal order, no?

And finally, when I asked how do you know that certain effects have an outside cause, I meant, what is it about them that reveals this? (Of course, other than your speculation that God is needed to provide temporal order.) What can you point to about them that will convince skeptics? — Real Gone Cat

I guess I don't understand your question. A cause is distinct from its effect, the two are not the same thing. The cause is temporally prior to the effect. So wouldn't you agree that a cause is "outside" its effect, as distinct from it? If we say that the cause is inside the effect, then it is a part of the effect, as internal to it, an internal part of it, and we no longer have a separation between cause and effect.

Even though you are correct, technically speaking, the hinge proposition is actually accepted by the individual as having true premises. Or, humans couldn't use those propositions to inform action. — Garrett Travers

I think that action is generally based in probability rather than in truth. We usually act when we believe that there is a probability for success, not when we believe that it is true that we will have success. So it is not true premises (what is) which inform action, it is understanding the relations between means and ends (this action ought to produce the desired result) which informs action.

Hinge describes implicit presupposition. If one can call this is a use, it is a different use than rational belief.Duncan Pritchard suggests that hinge commitment is a more appropriate way to understand what Wittgenstein is getting at than hinge proposition. — Joshs

If you go in this direction, then the hinge says something about the attitude of the subject rather than saying something about the world (something objective). Therefore it could not be a basic presupposition or proposition forming a foundation for knowledge about the world, objective knowledge. It would be a type of psychological principle only. So take Sime's example:

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood". — sime

The 'hinge proposition', as an objective fact about the world, would be "human beings have blood". The "hinge commitment" would be 'I have faith that my belief that human beings have blood is true'. The latter is not what Wittgenstein is saying, because attitudes, even strong ones like faith can be doubted, whereas Wittgenstein is talking about something we cannot doubt. Therefore it is the former, something we believe to be an objective fact about the world, not a subjective attitude toward a proposition, like a commitment.

Alright, let me see if I understand your position (correct me if I’m wrong) : there are many (an infinite number of) universes, each containing all that exists at one moment in time. So Dead Grandma exists in the universes in which she was alive, just not in the current universe, where she is dead. Universes are stacked up like pancakes.

I can kind of get on board with this, it’s a version of the multi-verse idea. A few questions, though : — Real Gone Cat

OK, I'll go with that description. The first thing to come to grips with, is that there is no such thing as "the universe", "our universe", or "my universe". As you'll see from the description, each living being, living at the present, does not occupy a line of division between a past universe and a future universe. A person has one foot in the past and one foot in the future (so to speak), and therefore exists as a bridge between a multitude of universes. This is important, the present, which we know as our lived experience, is not itself a single universe, but it is a conglomeration of universes. In other words, by the terms of your description, my lived experience of the present, is not a single moment in time, but a number of moments, united together as my presence.

How do we access the past? I mean, you claim I have a relationship with Dead Grandma. How? Through memory? Not only is memory faulty, but the memory of a thing is not the thing being remembered. Is it? — Real Gone Cat

I agree, memory is faulty. This is one reason why we apply logic, to confirm our memories, and help to determine which are faulty. Consider memory as the part of you which is in a past universe. We only have true access to past universes which are very close at hand. But at the same time, anticipation and prediction represent a part of us which is in a future universe (or universes), like memories represent a part of us in a past universe (or universes).

Now, you'll see how a person's being at the present occupies a time period in which future universes (anticipations) are becoming past universes (memories), so there is a process which is occurring, which constitutes the lived experience. This process is the manifestation of the relationship between universes. By understanding this relationship between universes, which is actually occurring in our lived present, we can extrapolate and apply this to the distant past, as in memory, and to the distant future, as in prediction, thus extending the range of our understanding into universes within which we are not actually present. Fundamental to this idea is that there are a number of universes (or moments in time) which are present at any given time. This extrapolation process is not without its problems hence our memories and predictions are not infallible.

And where is God in all this? Even if I can access past universes through memory, that would not seem to be possible with God. — Real Gone Cat

I would say that God is needed to substantiate the relationship between universes, providing for an actual truth. We could say that God is the cause of temporal order. Suppose it appears to you like there is an infinite number of moments in time. However, we still want to say that there is a real, determined order: a moment yesterday must be prior to a moment today. Therefore, as time passes in our lived experience we cannot change the order of universes, though through freedom of will we might alter what comes to be, or is and is not, within particular universes (through our presence spanning multiple universes). So the order of universes itself is the fundamentally determined thing which limits our freedom of will. But any order must be based on a principle, higher or lower, prior or posterior, or something like that. So the decision as to what kind of order that order is, is attributed to the will of God.

A somewhat unrelated question : How do you know that an effect is due to an outside cause? That’s a unique skill. — Real Gone Cat

Isn't this just a version of Cartesian skepticism? We have sensations which appear to be caused by an external world, but how do we know that it's really an external world? The knowledge that it really is an external world is not a unique skill, but a fundamental assumption based on an apprehended necessity. It is necessary that we assume an external world so that we avoid deception. That is why I said above, "God is needed to substantiate the relationship between universes". If there is no objective relationship between moments in time, an objective order, then we might put a moment of time from far in the future beside one from far in the past, or establish any random order to moments in time, making absolutely anything possible. But this idea would be self-deception.

Yeah, I mean I might as well posit the idea of door frame propositions, because even hinge propositions have to have a stable set of facts to work with, so as to remain stationary in use. In which case, I'll then have to have wall propositions, as door frames have to be constructed from... so on and so on...... — Garrett Travers

Yes, I see your point, but facts are not propositions, and this is what gives so many people the problem in understanding what supports the hinge propositions. Is it facts (objective reality), or attitude (subjective disposition) which supports hinges? People seem to be hesitant to consider that both are required, because it leads into dualism and a conception of reality which is far to complex for a simple mind to understand.

I had written an essay on Wittgenstein the other day where I characterized his view on hinges entirely inaccurately. — Garrett Travers

I wouldn't worry about that. There are as many different interpretations of Wittgenstein as there are people who read him. It's very clear that he is intentionally ambiguous. Banno distorts what Wittgenstein has actually written, by cherry picking items, to make it appear as if "hinge proposition" is a conception which is coherent and reasonable. Likewise, Banno might argue that the author of your article, Siegel, cherry picks in a way to create the opposite impression. Of course this is a reflection of the ambiguity which is inherent in Wittgenstein's writing. Ambiguity is a very common feature of word use which makes itself particularly evident in philosophy.

Wittgenstein was very much aware of the role of ambiguity in language. Hence Banno's claim that one and the same hinge proposition can change over time, like a river bed. But despite Banno's cherry picking to make Wittgenstein appear to be intelligible, Banno doesn't even seem to understand what it means to have a changing proposition.

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. — Banno

How could a proposition which changes over time (therefore necessarily ambiguous) have a truth value? What it means for a proposition to not have a truth value, is that the proposition is ambiguous. And that is also what it means for the same proposition to change over time; the proposition is mutable, and may be adapted by the different human minds who put it to use, to different purposes.

The outcome of all this is that Wittgenstein is completely wrong. It is not such ambiguous propositions, which can be molded and shaped at the will of human beings to maintain relevance in an evolving body of knowledge, which forms the foundation of that knowledge. To the contrary, it is actually clear and precise propositions, which in philosophy are called self-evident truths, because they appear to be impossible to be wrong, which forms the base for knowledge. But as you and Siegel indicate, a self-evident truth might still be wrong. It is only when we try to justify the claim that it is impossible for them to be wrong, that we get led down the path of deception, into believing that ambiguity (in the form of ambiguous propositions which change their meaning to maintain relevance in an evolving world)), are at the base of knowledge.

So stick with what Siegel tells you Garrett, as a fair enough representation, and don't get drawn into the ambiguity of Wittgenstein. Allowing ambiguity (which is the only way to support the idea of a proposition without a truth value) to be a first principle of knowledge, is simply wrong, for obvious reasons.

I'd say that such would be correct, if we were to accept Wittgenstein's assertion that hinges are not open to rational confirmation, or falsifiability. From that perspective, there is no such thing as a hinge proposition. And such is logically valid because there aren't any propositions that are not up for either. All are subject to both. Or else, logic simply has no point at all. — Garrett Travers

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them.

Every single proposition, not matter how coherent, is sibject to valid argumentation and scrutiny. The paper I sent you is excellent on this subject. — Garrett Travers

Yes, in the paper you referred, the author argues, as I do, that there is no reality to "hinge propositions" as described by Wittgenstein. A real "hinge proposition" would have to be something completely different from what Wittgenstein describes.

Sure, what no longer exists (causes, dead grandmas) is no longer in the universe. But does that mean it then moves to an existence outside the universe? A junkyard for spent causes? Or does it cease to exist anywhere? (And no, I do not have relationships - or interaction - with dead relatives. I have never seen a ghost. I did have relationships with them while they were IN the universe.) — Real Gone Cat

We cannot deny these things, which were in the past but no longer are now, and which might be, in the future, from reality. Clearly they are in some sense real.

These once-in-the-universe-but-now-no-longer-existing things are very different from things that somehow exist on the outside. — Real Gone Cat

I don't see this difference. To me that's what outside the universe is, external to the confines of our temporal understanding, which produces our conception of what is real. I think you are asking for an unwarranted separation, for the purpose of placing God in a separate category. In reality, things in the past are just as "unreal" as the cause of the universe is, because we don't understand what being in the past is, nor do we understand what being the cause of the universe is.

How can you tell when causes from the outside have generated effects on the inside? Its like trying to use quale to discern things-in-themselves. — Real Gone Cat

Why not? Isn't this exactly what we do? We use our sensations, which occur inside of us, to find out about the things which are outside of us, the things we sense. We figure things out about the outside things by applying logic to our observations. That's how we got to know about molecules, and atoms, and stuff like that, which are not actually a part of our sensations. If we had the attitude that we couldn't know about these things because they are outside of our sensations, science wouldn't have gotten anywhere.

In simpler times, unexplained events were called miracles and attributed to gods, because people didn't know any better. — Real Gone Cat

It's when things are not well understood that people start to appeal to things like magic and miracles. Obviously the cause of the universe is not well understood. But we do have a name for it, God.

Sure, “if”. You would have to show the previous existence of god or a creator. Not so with dear grandma, whose previous existence is not in question.
Since you havent shown god to have previous existence then its fallacious to use this grandma analogy to make your point/case. — DingoJones

I was going on Real Gone's interpretation of what you said, that God is outside the universe. Under that proposal there is no question as to whether God is real or not, it is stated that God is outside the universe. The existence of God is taken for granted, but Real Gone could not understand how a person could have a relationship with something outside the universe. So I explained how a cause is outside the universe by the time the effect occurs.

But I've met my grandmother, so it's hard to ignore the fact of her existence. Agent Smith makes the claim that God is not in this universe. So his God is not real. His God is speculation, nothing more. And if you agree with him (a position you dance around and don't seem to commit to), then I guess God can be anything you want. — Real Gone Cat

The point of the example is that the premise "X is not in this universe" does not lead to the conclusion "X is not real". You've met your grandmother, so you know she's real, yet she's outside this universe, being no longer in existence. Agent Smith's assumption that since God is not in this universe, God is therefore pure speculation, is unjustified. Therefore I clearly do not agree with Agent Smith.

How is a made-up God essential to understanding reality? Even if you need God to be your Prime Mover, a god-that-is-not-present adds nothing to the understanding of reality. Only things in the universe can give us information about the universe. — Real Gone Cat

So this question, and the conclusion are completely wrong. That God is not in the universe does not necessitate the conclusion that God is "made-up". And, we can learn stuff from things which are outside the universe, as I explained. A cause, being prior to its effect, is always outside the universe by the time the effect occurs, and the effect is always outside the universe when the cause occurs. So knowing the relationship between things within the universe, and things outside the universe is a very important part of understanding the universe.

The relationship with you grandmother already existed. The same cannot be said about god. The relationship with god doesnt have a previous existence upon which to base it like dear old grandma does. Thats the key, that you cannot have a relationship with something that never existed in the first place. — DingoJones

I don't see the basis for your claim. If God is the creator, then God had real existence, prior to your existence, just like your grandmother had real existence prior to your existence.

If God is not a part of our universe, then God does not exist for us. So why can't we just ignore God? — Real Gone Cat

You could ignore God if you want, just like you can ignore the fact that you had a grandmother. But if you want to understand the reality of your existence, then if God is real, understanding that there is a God is essential to understanding that reality, regardless of whether God is here now. Just like your grandmother who is no longer existing, you can ignore the reality that you had a grandmother, but this is not conducive toward understanding the reality of your existence.

The picture can be expressed in propositional form: — Fooloso4

The problem with expressing the picture in the propositional form, is the gap between the particular and the universal. A picture is always a particular, and the propositional form always employs universals. So for instance, "this is a hand" employs the universal "hand" to describe the particular image, which is the picture.

So the issue is, how does that gap between the particular (picture), and the universal (proposition) get bridged. What validates the use of this universal "hand", to refer to this particular image? This is the difficult problem in philosophy of mind, and epistemology, we cannot simply assume 'we call it a hand therefore it is a hand', because "hand" must involve criteria to make it epistemically useful.

If the senses receive particular images, and the mind employs universals in understanding the particular images, and there is a gap, a categorical difference between a particular and a universal, then how do we know whether the mind is mistaken in its application of universals? And, because the philosophical mind is naturally led into this skepticism concerning the application of universals, requesting criteria, the use of the universal ("hand") must be justified. This is what we know as 'proving a theory' (that it is correct to call the thing in the image, a hand, must be demonstrated).

As for "hinge propositions", the idea that there are propositions which may be excluded from that request for criteria and justification, is itself unjustifiable. And, as we see from Joshs' example of Kuhn's paradigm shifts, the so called hinge propositions actually do get subjected to the skeptic's doubt, sometimes with substantial effect.

How can we have a relationship with an entity that essentially doesn’t exist (not in our universe anyway)? — Real Gone Cat

How can you have a relationship with your dead grandmother? The fact that the named entity does not presently exist in your universe does not deny your relationship with that thing. It only means that you have to expand you concept of what "relationship" means, to include other things. This is the nature of the cause/effect relationship. By the time that the effect exists in the universe, the cause no longer exists in the universe.

Is there an objective reality or truth to what falls within the purview of a hinge proposition? Is there an objective reality or truth to the facts that are defined with a Kuhnian paradigm, a feature of the thing being looked at? — Joshs

I'd answer both those questions with no. And I agree with your relating Kuhn to Wittgenstein, I think Kuhn most likely built on Wittgenstein's idea. And what Kuhn demonstrates is that this notion, that a hinge proposition is somehow excluded from doubt, is a false idea. Doubt of the so-called hinge proposition is a requirement for the paradigm shift.

But if the so-called hinge proposition is not excluded from doubt by its nature, it must be excluded from doubt for some other reason, such as its usefulness. Then it would only hold the status of "hinge proposition" to those who find it useful. Those who doubt it would just consider it to be a proposition which may or not be true, like any other proposition. So the supposed "hinge proposition" really has no special place, unlike the self-evident truth which is supposed to have a special place. The so-called hinge proposition is just an ordinary proposition which has proven itself to be extraordinarily useful. Most likely it has been found to serve a multitude of purposes.

Why do you dismiss the idea of God having been "designed"?

If we do not dismiss this idea, then we are confronted with the possibility of an infinite regress of Y designed Z, and X designed Y, W designed X. etc.. This potential infinite regress indicates that we haven\t properly determine what it means to have been "designed". Misunderstanding, or failure to provide an adequate definition of "design" is what causes this potential for an infinite regress.

Instead of properly addressing this issue, what it means to have been "designed", you dismiss the possibility of the designer having been designed. But if you look at the evidence, of designed things, artefacts, you'll see that the idea that the designers themselves, human beings, have not been designed, has not been adequately justified, or you wouldn't be asking the question which you are asking in the first place.

I think it needs to be kept in mind that Wittgenstein is talking about empirical propositions, which are traditionally considered to be contingently true (or false). Hinge propositions, however, have the special status of being empirical statements that are quasi-necessarily true. W likens them to mathematical statements (e.g. see §340). Hinge propositions are beyond doubt, beyond truth (see §94 above), beyond justification, and non-epistemic.

I say "quasi-necessarily true", because they are treated as necessarily true and beyond true (beyond doubt) only when they form part of the background assumptions that we do not usually consider consciously and that we use (consciously or not) as a rule of testing (§98). When these same empirical propositions are instead consciously considered and used as "something to test by experience" (§98), then they revert to being normal, contingent, empirical statements that lie within the scope of epistemology, knowledge, doubt, truth and justification. — Luke

We actually agree on something here Luke. But how we both interpret this is bound to differ. I see what you describe here as clear evidence that there is no reality to what is called "hinge propositions".

From what you say, it is evident that the same thing can be described both as a hinge proposition, and not a hinge proposition, depending on how you look at it. This indicates that "hinge proposition" is a feature of how we look at things, the observer's attitude. It is not a feature of the thing being looked at, and called a "hinge proposition", it is a feature of the attitude which looks at the thing. Therefore there is no objective reality, or truth, to any statement of "X is a hinge proposition". Such a judgement is always, necessarily, a subjective judgement because what makes something a hinge proposition or not, is the attitude of the subject who makes that judgement.

Being confined to an artificial structure in an extremely hostile outside environment is definitely not my idea of utopia. Many of the political issues on earth would not be applicable out there, where people would have to live together to survive. But there would be other problems derived from being cooped up with others, for a long duration, mental health problems like anxiety and depression, or one person annoys another, and the annoyance becomes intolerable. I don't see overpopulation as a problem.

What you have demonstrated is that your idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. When he says:

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
(OC 166)

it does not follow that hinge propositions are mistaken, but that:

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
(OC 152) — Fooloso4

That's the problem, the axis itself (the proposed hinge proposition) is not fixed, so it revolves around something else, another "hinge", and so on. If we say that any belief, statement, or attitude, which has others hinged on it, is a hinge proposition, then everything becomes a hinge. And if we say that only things that are somehow fixed because they are beyond doubt, are hinge propositions, then nothing is a hinge.

So in reality the idea is just nonsense, there's simply varying degrees of fixedity, doubt, significance, etc., in relation to all beliefs, statements, and so on, and it makes no sense to think that some have a special significance as a "hinge proposition". We might say that some have more significance than others, for various reasons, but each and every one has its own special significance particular to itself, and this negates the generalized special significance of "hinge proposition".