What's philosophical is the idea of a dimensionless point producing an offspring. — jgill

That's so incoherent it's actually funny.

Yes, but we don't know if that was an intentional play or if they just had bad intel by bad intel operators. — Christoffer

Bad intel doesn't explain seeing what isn't there. Blurry vision, seeing vague and undistinguishable things, does not account for making those things into something identified and intelligible. This is why we have to include the role of intention, even if it's some sort of subconsciously affected intention, causing paranoia, or some irrational fear. A bump in the night is heard as a ghost. I know the ghost is here, I have proof, I heard it.

Those are not the same. Putin wants to redraw borders, Ukraine should be "his". — Christoffer

I generally ignore people who claim to know the intentions of others, especially when the other is a proven strategist, and strategy is a skill based on keeping one's intentions secret.

It's really a sort of unique but trivial way of progressing from F=r to defining a new fixed point, b. Bifurcation is usually meant to "split" one fixed point into two fixed points. A kind of "Adam's Rib" sort of thing. — jgill

Being familiar with some of my posts, you probably already have a good idea of what I would say about this proposal. The idea of one point becoming two points, without a clearly defined division (division of a point appearing to be impossible), is simple contradiction, in the first place.

Once upon a time, disease/illness were thought of as having supernatural causes (evil spirits, demonic possession, sorcery, and witch's spells).

Physicalism settled the matter definitively: diseases are caused by microbial invasion of the body. Evidence poured in from all the research labs in the world via microscopes. — Agent Smith

Tiny organisms, too small to be seen, which grew to a visible size were said to originate in "spontaneous generation". That was an accepted theory. This is very similar to the modern conception of abiogenesis. It seems like the physicalist's reliance on "supernatural causes" hasn't waned.

US invasion of Iraq was a farce. It was either a strategy to "fool" the world that an invasion was needed, or just the worst intel operators ever. — Christoffer

This is a good demonstration of the role of intention in interpretation. You see what you want to see. They wanted to invade Iraq, they saw weapons of mass destruction there.

The key differences are that US didn't invade to make Iraq into a new state of the US. If anything, they just wanted the oil. — Christoffer

I don't think this distinction is valid. They wanted to exercise control over what they perceived as an unruly state, through disposal of its leader. Seems like a very similar situation to me. The tactics differ widely.

The blame game is not really applicable to international politics, nor is it good to apply it. We can blame individual human beings, but we cannot blame an entity like NATO. So there is no comparison to be made between blaming NATO and blaming Putin. Nor is it likely that we can blame a democratic government, blame being properly directed toward the actions of individuals.

One of the intents behind a democratic organization is to minimize the relevance of any particular human being's actions, thus minimizing the consequences of an individual's personal weakness. On the other hand this leaves the democratic organization impossible to read in terms of strategy. In fact, since strategy is a personal trait, inherently practiced by an individual in secrecy, it is doubtful that we could even say that a democratic organization has a strategy.

Thanks, jgill. As you may know, I am not into interpretations of mathematical symbols and formulations, having rejected such dogmatism in high school (smoked too much weed). I've had enough difficulty interpreting English as it is.

From my simple mind, I would say that in the one interpretation, you treat "b" as an undefined symbol, an unknown, and you resolve to determine the unknown, so it gives you "information about b". In the other interpretation you treat "b" as a known, a defined operation (or some such thing) called a bifurcation, and so you apply that rule, the bifurcation, resulting in "F=r". The issue then is whether the meaning of "b" is truly defined in the applied algebra, or does the algebra just use a method to dissolve the issue.

Have you any examples of when NATO threatened Russia and Putin? Because his feelings of being threatened can be valid for explaining his actions, but that doesn't mean there's valid guilt on NATO's part in any of Putin's actions. — Christoffer

Human feelings are extremely complex and difficult to decipher, from observation of a person's actions. That's why psychology is borderline science. And, in psychology the patient is supposed to try and make one's feeling known to the psychologist. When an individual intentionally hides one's feelings, the acts are twisted around multiple motives, so psychological problems are often referred to as a "complex". Jealousy for example manifests itself in very strange ways.

Russia's "feelings" do not matter in this. — Christoffer

"Feelings" are attributable to individual human beings, very unique and particular to the individual, as they are tied up within the highly structured and organized chemical system within the human being. It makes absolutely no sense to say that an entity like "Russia" has feelings.

Russia told NATO to fuck right off, and NATO did the exact opposite of that... — StreetlightX

This is a piss poor argument. If I stand up to the bully, (or the extortionist for that matter) and do the opposite of what he requests, and he goes off to torture my friends and family, obviously, you can say that I might have handled the situation better (incapacitate the bully?) but you cannot blame me for the ensuing actions of the bully. The bully is fundamentally unpredictable, making his actions irrational.

The reformers and their Western advisers simply decided – and then insisted – that market reforms should precede constitutional reforms.

Double benefit here, the west gets freedom to exploit the resources, and whatever money is paid for the resources is pocketed by a few individuals, instead of a properly organized governance. Win, win, until you consider everyone else affected.

I hope people stop seeing this conflict as good vs bad. If anything, both sides are at fault for not reaching a compromise through dialogue/diplomacy — Eskander

So it's bad vs bad, they'll kill each other, therefore the conflict is good? The problem of course, is that the bad supports itself trough abuse of the good. So the conflict may be eternal, as the good suffer while the bad are forever in conflict. Whether the bad can kill each other without first annihilating the good, or if the good must resist the bad, is beyond comprehension, because we do not know how to distinguish "the good" from the bad. Maybe we're all bad.

If one expects two pieces of information simultaneously, yes. But with a slight passage of time one perceives cube#1, then a moment later cube#2. Two different objects arising from one symbol. — jgill

I know that the same person can perceive one, then the other, but this will only incline the perceiver to wonder which is the correct interpretation. And, a number of perceivers might interpret ambiguity differently, and be inclined to discuss which is correct. So in an attempt to find out which is correct, we try to determine what was meant by the author. However, as implied by "intentional ambiguity", the author meant to be ambiguous, therefore ambiguity is what was meant, and this implies no correct interpretation.

The issue is to absolve the author from the charge of deception. That is what I've been describing. We can say that the author intended contradictory interpretations, but that constitutes deception. I also believe that if the author intended the symbol to mean one thing at one moment, and another thing at another moment, this would also constitute deception because the author provides no indication as to when we're supposed to interpret which. So I do not believe the author can be absolved from blame in this way. The only way which I've been able to find, to justify the intentional use of ambiguity, is to recognize that the author's intention is something completely different from cube#1 or cube #2. Therefore, what is symbolized by the drawing (the meaning of it) cannot be interpreted as cube#1 nor cube#2, nor can we say that it is both, as the author is showing to us, something completely different from cube#1 and cube #2. What the author is showing to us is ambiguity, hence the intent is to be ambiguous, and what is meant, or the meaning itself, is ambiguous. And "ambiguous" implies something completely different from cube#1, or cube#2, or both, it is none of the above.

The subject is not insignificant, because intentional ambiguity is much more common than many people would expect, and to identify it takes experience. We find an abundance of it in Wittgenstein for example, and the trend is for interpreters to argue 'my interpretation is the correct interpretation'. And the problem is that we can argue endlessly 'the correct interpretation', and diligently apply principles in an attempt to determine 'the correct interpretation', without recognizing that this is a fruitless process because there is no correct interpretation. And to say that there is a multitude of correct interpretations does not solve the problem, it just creates another problem, because they contradict each other, and it's impossible for the author to intend contradictory things.

Furthermore, 'a multitude of correct interpretations' doesn't accurately describe what the author is doing with intentional ambiguity, and that's why 'no correct interpretation" is a much better description. Understanding intentional interpretation as 'no correct interpretation' gives us a far better approach to the true nature of meaning, by revealing the open ended aspect of "meaning". What I mean by "open ended aspect", is the way that the perceiver creates meaning for an encountered symbol which was not intended by the author. From this perspective we see that experience, training, education, and convention, act to put boundaries to this creative aspect of the mind. So when a person encounters a bunch of symbols, one's mind will create a meaning, an interpretation of the pattern of symbols, which is conditioned by one's experience. Your past experience has created boundaries as to where your mind can go with your interpretation. When there is words which you are not too familiar with, your boundaries may be too narrow, or too broad, and the result is misunderstanding what was meant. From this perspective meaning is inherently imprecise.

For example, how many old scientists does it take to replace a light bulb? — magritte

I give up. How many? I will note though, that changing the incandescent for the LED has provided us with a much more efficient source of light. And the LED still has significant energy loss as heat.

It's not like there is a lot of unexplored territory in energy-physics where one might expect radical new technologies just around the corner. — ChatteringMonkey

That's a defeatist attitude. Quantum mechanics presents us with a huge mystery. Mass is, for the most part, a mystery.

Complementary, not contradictory. — jgill

Your example was the Necker cube. As I quoted from Wikipedia the two possible interpretations exclude each other by way of contradiction. They do not complement each other. This is generally the case with intentional ambiguity. If one interpretation is correct, it would exclude the possibility that another is correct. I don't know how an author could attach two distinct meanings to the exact same symbol without contradiction. I'll listen if you'll explain how you think it is possible.

Why do you keep bringing up the word correct? The only thing correct is one gets two pieces of information from one image, like my mathematical example (a bit too complicated to relate here) - one expression yields two pieces of math information depending on how it is interpreted (seen). — jgill

"Correct" was your word.

And I recently posted a short note concerning a math expression that implies two distinct conclusions depending on how one interprets it. Both interpretations are correct simultaneously. — jgill

So I tried to explain to you that the proper interpretation of intentional ambiguity would be that neither interpretation is correct, rather than your claim that contradictory interpretations could be simultaneously correct, in violation of the law of non-contradiction.

It’s not part of your experience that your dog is greater than your kitchen counter? — Joe Mello

Without qualification as to greater in what sense, that question doesn't even make sense to me. Are you talking magnanimous? If so, I can't even begin to class a dog, let alone a kitchen counter. I have no idea what you are talking about. Sorry Joe, but your continued gibberish, and refusal to explain yourself, makes discussion rather pointless.

I do not think Putin is stupid enough to start a nuclear war... — FreeEmotion

If Russia's policy is to use nukes to defend the homeland, and Putin claims Ukraine as Russian, then any military assistance provided to the Ukrainian resistance by a NATO country, will justify a nuclear response. Of course that would constitute a declaration of war against NATO, under the claim that NATO attacked Russia.

My point is that tanking the economy is probably never a push towards other solutions, — ChatteringMonkey

This is doubtful. As they say, necessity is the mother of invention (not talking Zappa here, who was extremely creative himself). Take The Manhattan Project for example. When you get hundreds, or even thousands of scientists working together, in a network, there is a lot more efficiency than a handful of scientists here, and a handful there, with intellectual property guarded by secrecy. Fusion, or other new ideas, might not be as far away as you think.

Isn't this simply putting things in their order of significance - a rock is less than a mouse; a mouse is less than a human? — Tom Storm

Perhaps it's an order of "significance", but Joe would not even identify it as such. If Joe said it was an order of significance, then I would say that is completely subjective. To him, one is more significant than the other. Joe seems to have a strong feeling about that, and thinks it ought to be obvious to me. But of course in philosophy we don't make our judgements based on strong feelings, we proceed with rational arguments and logic. That's why I asked Joe to justify his claims, because are not in any way obvious to me.

It’s common sense and your own experiences. — Joe Mello

Clearly it's not any part of my experience. It's some principle you dreamed up, so it's part of your experience. And it makes no sense to me, for a person to be using "greater" in the way that you do, to refer to a quality which cannot be measured in terms of quantity. Obviously, "great" in any normal usage is a quantitative term. That's why I requested you switch to a principle like "better and worse", which is more consistent with my experience of a quality which is not measurable as a quantity. You refuse to switch, because if we remove the ambiguity brought by the word "greater", your principle makes no sense at all, and therefore completely loses its emotional appeal.

A qualitatively greater thing than physical matter would be living tissue, life, a living being.

A qualitatively greater thing than life would be a thought, an emotion, a human personality. — Joe Mello

This is a good example of why I do not understand you. First you say that a living being is greater than a dead thing. Then you say that a thought is greater than a living being. How can a thought be greater than a living being, when a living being is the cause of a thought? I do not understand how an effect can be greater than its cause. What is "greater" supposed to mean in your usage?

The principle is logically stating that only something (qualitatively) greater than life and thought and emotion and us, and everything else that has evolved in our physical universe, had to be present for evolution to have taken place. — Joe Mello

So this doesn't make any sense at all. Your examples show the posterior thing to be greater than the prior thing; physical matter is first, than the greater thing, living tissue, then an even greater thing, a living being, then an even greater thing, a thought. So your examples display that for you, greater things come from lesser things. The lesser things are prior to the greater things. Then you claim that there must be something even greater, which is prior to all these things. But that's completely inconsistent. You ought to conclude that there is something lesser which is prior to all these things. The thing which had to be present in the first place would be the least thing, not the greatest thing.

I’m only taking about one principle, and you keep talking about your definition of what is “greater”, and I am correcting your definition because I provided the principle not you.

I’m repeating myself because you’re repeatedly holding up quantity for me to look at as a greater thing when quantity is not part of the principle, other than calling the extra element of superior quality an added element. — Joe Mello

You haven't yet told me what quality you are talking about. That's what I keep asking of you. Greater in what quality? "Greater" itself does not refer to a quality.

What you should be doing is looking to science to see if it supports the principle, not trying to make it your own. — Joe Mello

I thought that is what you were asking, for me to understand your principle, accept it, and make it my own. How can I look to see if science supports it when I can't even understand it, because you haven't made clear what you mean by "greater"? All you've done is stated examples which are useless because you do not identify the quality which one of the things in the example is greater in. You could say a chair is greater than a table, or a table is greater than a chair. And when I ask you why you class one thing as greater than another thing, you simply say it's obvious.

You and most of the posters here have a failure of imagination. — Joe Mello

So use your imagination then Joe. When you say that it's obvious that one thing is greater than another, use your imagination, and dream up some criteria to justify your claim. Otherwise all you are saying is that X is greater than Y because I say so. And what kind of principle is that?

There are a couple of posters here who readily appreciated the principle and welcomed it into their thinking like they were waiting for it. — Joe Mello

I sincerely want to welcome your principle into my thinking, as you even said above, I'm trying to make it my own. Why else would I spend my time asking you to clarify it for me to understand. But if you do not clarify, then I will not understand, and I cannot welcome it into my thinking.

In my case the true meaning is a dual observation: giving one piece of information when viewing from one perspective, and another when viewing from the other perspective. Take a Necker cube for example. It can be seen two ways, each a valid cube. What is "the meaning intended by the author"? — jgill

According to Wikipedia, the Necker cube is an ambiguous drawing, "it can be interpreted to have either the lower-left or the upper-right square as its front side". My argument is that neither of the two possible interpretations is the correct one. and that is what is intended by the artist.

The reason why I say that they cannot both be correct, is because the two interpretations contradict each other. If we say that both are correct, then we say that the drawing depicts an object which has both, the lower left, and also the upper right, as the front side. Clearly this is contradictory. And, the fact that this is wrong, is evident from the way we see it. At any time, we must see the drawing as one or the other, and we cannot see it as both, at the same time. This is also evident in the case of drawings like Wittgenstein's proposed duck-rabbit.

To avoid this contradiction, which results from the claim that both are the correct interpretation, we have to say that neither is the correct interpretation. And, this interpretation, that neither is correct, is consistent with the intent of the artist. when such ambiguity is the intent. The artist intends that both interpretations are equally possible, therefore the intention is that neither one is the correct one. Clearly, since the the artist intends that each of the two is an acceptable interpretation, then the artist intends that neither is the correct one. If we were to say that the artist actually intends that we interpret both as correct, at the same time, then the artist intends contradiction, and that would be necessarily an act of deception by the artist. So to avoid the conclusion that the artist is engaged in deception, we can say that the artist intends that neither is the correct one.

I already posted that a greater thing has an extra element, a qualitatively extra element. — Joe Mello

I explained this already. A whole is greater than the sum of its parts, because there is something "extra" which is the cause of the unity of the parts. Are you in agreement with this common philosophical principle? What makes a whole greater than the sum of the parts, is this "extra" thing which is the reason why the parts exist in unity as a whole, or a single thing.

You posted an example of more of the same element, which is simply quantitative. — Joe Mello

The reason why I moved to a quantitative example, is that the unity of a bigger thing appears to be greater than the unity of a smaller thing. Do you agree, that the cause of unity (the extra thing) of a bigger thing, ought to be considered as greater than the cause of unity of a smaller thing? Or do you propose some other principle whereby we could judge one instance of greatness (cause of unity) as greater than another instance of greatness?

So your example failed to see the importance of quality, and replaced quality with quantity, making quantity equal to or better than quality. — Joe Mello

Judging by this statement, you would propose that one unity could be judged as greater than another through reference to a quality. Let me remind you, that bigger is a quality. Most qualities we are capable of representing as a quantity, that is how we measure the various qualities. So I do not think you are offering a productive approach by driving a wedge between quality and quantity. You yourself said that we, human beings are the ones who speak for reality. So if reality appears to us as qualities, and we measure these qualities in quantitative terms, then that is simply our way of speaking about reality. Therefore we ought not look for principles to separate these two, but look to understand how they are unified, if we want to understand reality.

Look at your example and mine for what I’m saying, not a word I chose to use. — Joe Mello

As I said, I am asking you to explain your principle. Merely asserting this is better than that, repeating yourself over and over, and deriding the other person because they cannot understand why you assert that this is better than that, does not help me to understand your principle. Look at what I said for example. I explained the something "extra", which makes a whole greater than the sum of its parts, then I explained why I think that a bigger whole is greater than a smaller whole. It appears to me like you are thinking of a principle whereby you would say that one unity is "better" than another unity, a principle which is other than size, and perhaps could not even be measured as a quantity. If so, could you explain this?

Your conclusion does not logically follow. I have a mathematical expression that can be interpreted two distinct ways, each of which is valid and "correct". However, it is a novel idea and something I haven't seen in math before. Maybe I'm wrong? Who knows . . — jgill

Being valid does not necessarily imply "correct", because the conclusion must also be sound. In the case of meaning, the true meaning is the one intended by the author, that is what is meant. In the case of intentional ambiguity, not one nor the other interpretation, though they are each "valid" interpretations, is intended to be the correct one. Therefore we can conclude that the true meaning is that neither is the correct one.

You have held up quantitative as equal to or better than qualitative. I don't think it can be. — Joe Mello

That's not true Joe, we were talking about "greater", not "better". I've held "greater" to be something which can be measured quantitatively. I suggested that bigger is greater. Don't switch from "greater" to "better" at this point in the discussion, just because it suits you better now. I asked you earlier in the thread if you wouldn't prefer a more qualitative term like "better", but apparently this doesn't work for your principle. Your principle doesn't make any sense if you switch "better" for "greater".

So, by what principle do you say that "greater" in the qualitative sense is greater than "greater" in the quantitative sense?

First, one must have in his or her mind an integral understanding of what makes up a thing -- its elements. And I don't mean its atomic number.

A living thing and a material object both have matter and take up space. But a living thing has an extra element, and not simply a quantitatively extra element but a qualitatively extra element. A living thing is alive. So, when we place a living thing and a material object before us, and as the only spokespersons for reality, we can proclaim with absolute certitude that a living thing is greater than a material object. — Joe Mello

Can I say that a thing's elements are its parts? If so, then we have to consider that there is more to a thing than just its element, there is whatever it is that produces the unity of parts. In my mind, this is what makes a thing greater than the sum of its parts. Whatever it is which unifies the thing's parts is something other than the thing itself, as a cause of the thing, and is also something other than all its parts.

So when we come to the distinction between a living thing, and an inanimate thing, they are, each one of them, a composition of parts. Therefore both have this facet which is the cause of their unity, and so they each have something "greater" than each one's individual and separate parts.

Your claim is that a living thing is greater than an inanimate thing, but I don't see your principle. To me, the earth looks greater than any living thing, the sun looks greater than the earth, a galaxy looks greater than the sun, and a black hole might be even greater than a galaxy.

You seem to think that it is obvious that a living thing is greater than an inanimate thing, but I don't see why you think this. Living things have an extremely short life span, after which they decay and the parts are no longer unified. But some inanimate things exist in unity for millions or even billions of years. Doesn't a longer period of existence, therefore unity of its parts, constitute a greater being to you?

Let me try another way of explanation Wayfarer. See if you can ignore all the riff raff around you, the entire physical world, and place yourself squarely within the reality of the non-physical. I think you'll find that there is a separation between your non-physical reality, and that of others, you and I are not connected through the non-physical. I can assume, from my experience, that you do have a non-physical aspect, just like I do, but my non-physical aspect does not connect directly to yours. In mathematical terms, the non-physical is a non-dimensional point, which is distinct from another non-dimensional point, related to each other by a dimensional (physical) line. If the points were directly connected there would be no need for the line.

This separation is a real problem in metaphysics because it implies that the non-physical is a multiplicity rather than the commonly assumed "One", as Neo-Platonism proposes. Plato's "The Sophist" explores this problem of the relationship between "One" and "multiplicity". Unless we can somehow overcome this separation, the bridge through or across the medium, which I proposed above, then the proposed non-physical "One" is unreal.

MU, I explained the principle step by step showing that I understand it very well. You ignored these steps, Now you’re accusing me of just repeating it from someone else. — Joe Mello

You did not explain yourself. You just kept insisting that this is "greater" than that, without stating your criteria for greatness, and when I asked for it, to justify your statement, you acted as if it is somehow self-evident that this is greater than that, implying that I'm an imbecile for asking.

And, no, the last thing I expect is you to readily understand such an elegant principle. You have given me no reason to, no matter how many questions you ask and consider on point when they’re not. — Joe Mello

Elegance is an aesthetic principle, beauty, appealing to the senses rather than to the intellect. That your principle is elegant does not make it intelligible. This is a philosophy forum, and in philosophy we try to judge principles by their intelligibility. You have presented what you believe to be an elegant piece of art. However, you want to pass it off as a Metaphysical Principle. To move from the former category to latter requires justification. Beauty does not require justification, principles do.

Your questions haven’t been about the principle but about your ideas.

Be honest. You didn’t ponder it at all, but simply rushed into the first thoughts off the top of your head. — Joe Mello

Joe! Where is your head at? I looked at your "elegant principle", and realized instantaneously that I have no idea what you mean by "greater". One could spend an eternity pondering 'what does Joe mean by greater', approaching an infinity of possibilities. I chose a more appropriate action, ask Joe what he means by "greater". Your replies indicate Joe does not know what he means by "greater", and he reacts to my questioning in a defensive way, trying to make me feel like the uneducated one.

I provided you a metaphysical principle and claimed it is extremely important in understanding the evolution we know took place on our planet. — Joe Mello

You did not provide a metaphysical principle Joe. By your own admittance you have given us something elegant, something you believe to be a beautiful piece of art. A metaphysical principle requires justification, something you appear to be unable to give us. Therefore you have not provided a metaphysical principle.

And I ended with that I was looking forward to further discussions. — Joe Mello

The "further discussions" you requested, could have been your justification of your principle. However, you seem to think that the statement is self-justifying without any indication as to what "greater" means.

If it makes you happy Joe, as you seem to be truly miserable and I would be delighted to cheer you up, I'll provide an analysis of your "principle" for you:

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

Look, it's obvious that a combination of lesser things does produce a greater thing, always without fail. That's how "lesser" and "greater" are commonly defined, such that a complexity is greater than a simplicity. The more lesser things you add, the greater the complexity becomes. The idea that a "greater thing" needs to be added to the lesser things is unwarranted because the act of "adding" itself, is what creates the greater thing from the lesser things. And you cannot say that the act of "adding" is the greater thing because it is already categorically separated from "greater and lesser".

But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously (although I have an ominous feeling..... :scream: — Wayfarer

Yes I agree, but the point is that agreement does not imply "the same". That I agree with you indicates a specific type of relationship between us, it does not mean that the non-physical aspect of me is the same as the non-physical aspect of you. I would say that there is a relationship between the non-physical aspect within me, and the non-physical aspect within you, which constitutes agreement . But it appears to me, like you want to say that the non-physical within you is the same as the non-physical within me, that somehow each one of us grasps within our minds, the very same non-physical conception.

Despite our agreement on that simple point, the difference between you and I, in our understanding of this matter, is a difference of temporal relation, causation. I would say that human minds, in their relations with other minds (communication) are the cause of existence of conceptions. So I locate the conception itself within the physical world, a shared thing, along with other artifacts, which exist as representations (Plato's reflections) of the non-physical reality within the human minds that create them. I think you would say that each human mind apprehends the same non-physical reality. The issue I have with this, is that from your perspective we have to understand how the immaterial realm acts on the human mind, allowing itself to be understood by the human mind, in a way similar to the way that the sense world acts on the senses. So we'd have to assume intelligible objects acting on the human mind, in a way analogous to the way that sense objects act on the senses. But experience demonstrates to us that intelligible objects are acquired through the means of sensation instead of being directly produced by the mind from the non-physical realm.

From my perspective we have no need to say that the non-physical realm is acting on the non-physical aspect of the human being, because the non-physical aspect of the human being (the soul) is what is active in the creative act. The physical aspects of the human being, sense organs etc., are acted upon, and this contributes to to the soul's understanding, influencing it, but the soul as the non-physical part, is what acts to create.

I believe it is important to proceed in this way, to recognize the reality that we do not have any approach to the non-physical except through our internal self. And, when we approach the non-physical through introspection, self-reflection, or whatever internal means, we approach a fundamental division between oneself and others. This is the separation which unless we bridge it through the medium (communication), we are lead toward solipsism. And I believe, that when we grasp this internal isolation of the non-physical aspect within us, we must come to realize that there are no universal non-physical intelligible objects which are acting equally on us all, internally, from the non-physical realm, causing us to understand them. Our only means for unifying the non-physical, which underlies the existence of each one of us, is relationships made through the medium, what Christians call love. Assuming an underlying relationship between us, through the non-physical realm, is the fatal mistake of taking love for granted. Instead, our relationships must be cultivated through the medium, or else they dissolve.

Intentional ambiguity is the use of language or images to suggest more than one meaning at the same time
(Cambridge English Dictionary) — jgill

I have no problem with this. But as I explained, "to suggest more than one meaning at the same time", implies that none of the suggested meanings is the correct one not that they are both correct. That there is a number of correct meanings is an illusion (a suggestion, or proposition) created by the author, you could consider it a type of deception. Meaning is what is meant or intended by the author. So you and I might discuss endlessly the intended meaning of a piece which is ambiguous, each of us claiming to have "the correct interpretation". However, since the ambiguity is intentional, then the author intended neither one nor the other of the interpreted meanings. We cannot say that the author intended both because that would be contradictory, saying that the author performed two incompatible acts of intention at the same time. Therefore we must conclude that in the case of intentional ambiguity neither is the correct interpretation. The correct interpretation is to recognize that the meaning is intentionally ambiguous.

A true skeptic is skeptical of himself, too. — Joe Mello

I am skeptical of myself, very much so. But that doesn't answer the questions I have for you, concerning your "Metaphysical Principle". You seem to have no doubt that your Principle can be readily understood by anyone without any need to explain yourself. Or maybe you do not understand your own Principle, and you are just repeating what someone else told you. Perhaps you are simply lacking in will. Whatever. So much for the discussion you were looking forward to.

The fact they may explain it using slightly different words does not imply they interpret a theorem differently. — jgill

I don't see how you could argue this point. An interpretation is how one explains the meaning of something. To use different words to explain something is to provide a different explanation. Therefore using different words implies a different interpretation.

This discussion concerns the obvious: yes, we may interpret differently. — jgill

It's not that we may interpret differently, it's that no two people will produce the same interpretation of the same set of symbols, so we necessarily interpret differently. This is the difference between a particular and a universal. Each interpretation is particular, unique to the individual, just like each material object is particular. You might say that they are close enough, to say that they are "the same", just like all rocks are "the same", being rocks, but this is a misuse of "the same". The point being that the different members of a universal cannot truthfully be said to be the same. Likewise, when there is a universal understanding of your theorem, we cannot say that each member who understands in that way, has the same understanding, because "the way" is universal, and each member who participates in that universal is a particular, with a particular understanding. So as Aristotle explained, we ignore the accidentals of the particulars, when understanding the essence, which is the universal. In other words, we can ignore the accidentals of a particular interpretation, to say that it meets the criteria of the universal, and is therefore correct.

But it leads to a more challenging notion: intentional ambiguities, like neckers cube. And I recently posted a short note concerning a math expression that implies two distinct conclusions depending on how one interprets it. Both interpretations are correct simultaneously. — jgill

I would argue that intentional ambiguity results in neither one being correct. This is because the intention is to allow the appearance that either one could be correct. Therefore the intention must be to ensure that neither one is the correct one, to allow the apparent possibility that either one is correct. And if the intention is that neither one is correct, then the proper reading is that neither one is correct. This is consistent with Aristotle's fundamental principles of logic. Possibility violates the law of excluded middle, but not the law of non contradiction. So in some cases, to say that both are correct would be a violation of the law of non contradiction, and to say that neither is correct would violate the law of excluded middle. Intentional ambiguity produces the latter, neither is correct, because the correct interpretation is to apprehend the intentional ambiguity.

But it’s also off track because all I’m trying to get at is that the principle logically answers and points us to the necessity of an omnipotent power (the something greater than the greater thing) being added to lesser things when these lesser things evolved into greater things. — Joe Mello

It's not off track, because your designation of "greater" might be purely subjective, and in itself off track. You might say stone is greater than water, and all you are really doing is referring to a difference between the two. But to be able to truthfully say that a thing which is different from another thing is "greater" than that other thing, you need a principle to validate your judgement. That's why I referred you to the concept of "order" in my first post.

Otherwise, all you are saying, when you say "thought is greater than life" for example, is that thought is different from life, because you have provided nothing to support your judgement of "greater". And when this is all that you mean, then obviously every different thing is different from every other thing, but it doesn't make sense to say that thing E is more different than thing D which is more different than thing C, and so on. To make a hierarchy you need a principle to build it on. And an undefined "greater" doesn't provide that principle because "greater" only make sense when it is qualified as to greater in what sense.

MU, you are wandering into purpose.

The metaphysical principle I provided you is a journey into existence.

God's omnipotent existence would be the power behind the existence of evolution within the physical universe.

God's divine mind would be the "why", not the "how"? — Joe Mello

I am having 'great' difficulty understanding what you tried to tell me Joe. Isn't it true that "why?" is an inquiry as to purpose? So why do you dismiss my point as "wandering into purpose", and then say God's mind is the "why"? When wandering into purpose, "why?", is exactly what I am asking.

And every skeptic I have ever met refuses to understand the simple fact that, for example, a living being is "greater" than a rock.

When I tell a skeptic that a mother holding her dying child is a greater reality than the death of a star, that skeptic cannot for the life of him agree. It's truly dumbfounding. — Joe Mello

So this is where my difficulty lies, in your use of "greater". To judge something as greater than another requires principles or criteria, a scale of some sort. Often such scales are reducible to quantitative measurements, like larger, hotter, wider, taller, etc.. But you are obviously talking about a qualitative scale.

In terms of quality, I could give you a colour word, like "green" as an example, and we might judge one thing as greener than another. Then we'd need a criterion as to what constitutes "green", to validate our judgement. Your word is "great", so I want to know the principle whereby you would judge one thing as greater than another. Giving examples like "Life is greater than the elements, and thought is greater than life, and love is greater than thought" does not help, because you haven't explained how you make such a judgement, in order that we might extrapolate and judge something like God as greater than something else.

Another qualitative term often employed is "good". But "good" turns us toward purpose, as the goodness of something is always judged in relation to a specified purpose. You claim "existence" as your term, but I do not understand how you judge existence as a quality, to assume that one thing is a higher existence than another. Can you explain how you judge things to have a higher or a lower existence and are therefore greater or lesser?

Probably the real reason why Saddam Hussein had to be ousted was the flow of sanction busting black market oil.

I don't see how you can believe that what goes on in the minds of two different people, when they read the very same thing, is the same. Pass two people the same proposition or axiom and have them each explain it. They will not explain it with the exact same expressions. Therefore they do not have the same interpretation. It's a very simple and obvious fact which you seem to be in denial of.

Yes, I may interpret them the wrong way, just as you have on countless occasions misinterpreted the simplest of mathematical symbolism. If I were to insist it was my right to reinterpret results I would be ridiculed for my stance - as I should be. — jgill

That you believe there's a boundary, by which you can classify some interpretations as "the wrong way", and some as the right way, is clear evidence that you really recognize that each interpretation is particular to the individual, and you have some means for judging the differences between them. Obviously, if such variance exists, so that you can reject some interpretations as unconventional, or inconsistent with some norm, or standard, therefore "wrong", then you recognize the reality of particular differences, and you are simply in denial of what you actually apprehend as the reality.

Suppose there is such a boundary, which constitutes a division between the right way and the wrong way to interpret a symbol, or set of symbols, or a pattern of symbols. Your claim is that there is only one right way, and everything other than that is the wrong way. What do you suppose is the standard, the criterion which you could refer to in each case of each different theorem, to make the judgement that the person's interpretation corresponds exactly with the criterion, therefore exactly as every other person's, who correctly interprets the theorem, so it is the right interpretation. Unless you can produce this criterion, and demonstrate your mode of judgement, then your claim is no better than a claim that a rock here, and a rock on the other side of the earth are the exact same rock. But to judge two distinct things as the same is very clearly a mistake if truth is what you're looking for. So it appears like it's just an assumption you make, for a metaphysical convenience, some sort of pragmatist principle, but your convenience leads you away from the true reality of the situation.

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Not so. This "theory" is composed of a number of specific theorems not open to individual interpretation. But the "meaning" of this theory certainly is an individual's prerogative. — jgill

As I said, I believe a theorem is literally the terms that state it. Therefore any and all theories or theorems are open to individual interpretation. Each of us understands them according to one's own experience of learning and practicing. You can state that one must understand the words in a specific way (provide definitions), but then the words of the definitions need definitions, etc., ad infinitum. And we do not avoid the reality of individual interpretation.

But nevertheless, it is real independently of your or my mind or anyone's mind. As Augustine says:

Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. — Wayfarer

I do not accept this argument, because what is common to all who think is that they have ideas, but we all have different ideas. So I think it is wrong to say that we all grasp the same thing, we clearly have different ideas. My discussions on this forum with a number of mathematicians has indicated very clearly to me that we do not even understand basic concepts of arithmetic like "+" and "=" in the very same way as each other. And since there is a multiplicity of number systems we do not even understand symbols like "2" in the very same way.

So I've come to what I believe is a more realistic view, that each mind constructs its own understanding which is unique and particular to the person, dependent on each individual's learning process. This is why standardized education is so important in our societies, to create the degree of sameness in our thinking patterns, which is required for us to properly understand each other, and have standard "concepts". I, for instance, cannot understand 180proof's use of the English language, because the thinking patterns which are supposed to be represented by the words are unintelligible to me.

Which is similar to the kind of Platonism that Frege advocated. The problem for empiricists and materialists is that such 'objects' are non-physical but real, so they can't accept that. In actual fact the fundamental elements of reason itself - ideas, in the true sense - are themselves intellectual in nature, not physical. Our experience and judgement always contains elements of both the sensory and the intellectual, but empiricism will only admit the reality of the sensory and will insist that the intelligible must be dependent on or produced from that (which is then explained with reference to evolutionary theory). But this is a backwards way of looking at it (as explained by Maritain.) — Wayfarer

I definitely agree that the fundamental elements of reasoning are non-physical. But I disagree on the character of these non-physical features, and their position in reality. I believe that the fundamental feature, which is at its base non-physical, is the act of thinking. I also believe in a fundamental difference, a categorical separation between an act, and an object. An act is a change over a temporal duration, while an object is what stays the same over temporal duration.

And this is why the non-physical, which has active existence within the human being, ought not be represented as an object. The active, non-physical element (soul, if you like) uses physical objects as signs or symbols for recognition, but is itself not physical yet still active. Think of this as an activity without an object engaged in the activity, because it is a completely non-physical activity. It does have a physical effect though, it creates the signs and symbols.

Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. — Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy - The World of Universals

I believe this is exactly what is the case. No two men think the very same thing, nor does one man ever think the very same thing twice. Aristotle made this point in the part of "On The Soul" which we were discussing in the other thread. So Russell's conclusion here is the opposite of what it should be. What leads him to assert an "object" of thought, instead of simply an activity called "thought", is the idea that two different men think the very same thing when thinking whiteness. We do not though, my images of whiteness which I employ when thinking whiteness, are different from yours.

In reality, the "object" of thought is the word, "white". That's what stays the same, as an object, the symbol. And when I hold that object, or a mental representation of it, within my mind, asking what is the meaning of "white", i.e. what is whiteness, I produce images or descriptions, which are not the same as the ones you would produce when asking yourself what is whiteness.

So, for example, no two people can really disagree about fundamental physical laws, like the laws of motion; it's not a matter of opinion how they will determine the outcome of motion. In fact, that is the very meaning of 'objectivity'. But in many areas of science, for example atomic physics and evolutionary theory, there is enormous scope for disagreement about what the theories mean. — Wayfarer

I conclude you have not encountered me discussing fundamental laws of motion on this forum, clear evidence that two people can disagree on such laws. Take Newton's first law of motion for example. People claim it's a brute fact which cannot be otherwise. But I argue that Newton actually stated that the truth of his first law requires the will of God. This is because it is a statement about what has been, in the past, and it assumes the premise that what has been in the past, will continue to be so, into the future, necessarily, if not caused to change. In reality though, the nature of free will demonstrates that we cannot take the continuity of physical existence, from past to future, for granted. When reality is understood in this way, we see Newton's first law in a completely different way. A cause, "God's will" is required for the continuity of existence which we call "inertia". And many theologians and mystics assume that God must recreate the material world anew, at each passing moment of time, so Newton's first law of motion requires the will of God to be true.

After reading the article it seems more like the dishbrain was programmed to do do something which was a simulation of playing the game pong.

My reply is similar to Wayfarer's, but if we go deeper you'll see that I differ significantly in opinion, from Wayfarer. As I defined "exist" as spatial-temporal, you'll see that I attribute "existence" to the physical manifestation, which is the symbolization, in its physical form. This leaves "grasping the theory", or understanding it, as something which the rational mind does somewhat separately, from the theory itself, which is exterior to the mind, existing in its physical form.

The problem I find, is that if we say that the theory itself, is what exists within the human mind, as that which is understood, or the understanding which the mind has, then we have to account for particular differences in understanding between individual people. The fact that such differences in the way that different people understand "the same" theory are very real, is evident from this forum. So if "the theory" exists within the rational mind, manifested as the activity which is "understanding", then we cannot accurately call it "the theory" any more, because each person has one's own unique interpretation of what is called "the theory", so we would have a multitude of different instances of the same theory. Therefore I prefer to refer to the physical manifestation as "the theory", so that we are justified in having one united theory, instead of a multitude of different related theories in different minds.

However, you'll see that my way of understanding, and expressing what constitutes "the theory", does not completely resolve the problem of differences. We might have different expressions, different written formulas, or even different instances of physical occurrence, of what we would call "the same theory", just like we say "2" is "the same" symbol each time we see this physical appearance, despite it being different instances. We really ought to say each time we see a 2 that it is the same type of symbol as the other time, and not actually the same symbol.

What I think though, is that this way of looking at it gives us a more realistic approach to the fundamental difference between expressing a theory, and interpreting a theory. These two are necessarily very different from each other, because interpreting (understanding) is necessarily prior in time to expressing what is understood. So the expression, which is "the theory" is the result, or effect, of the act of understanding.

I believe this gives us a better approach toward understanding the reality of what I would call the creation of a theory, and what Wayfarer would probably call the discovery of a theory. I would say that the theory is created when the symbols are given their appropriate relations to each other, in the physical medium. This means that the theory is actually a representation of the non-physical which remains within the mind. But the non-physical here is the process by which the physical representation (the theory itself) is created. Wayfarer would probably say that the theory itself is within the mind, as a non-physical thing, intelligible object, discovered by the mind. The substantial difference, is that I posit a non-physical activity, which is the cause of a physical thing (the theory in its physical manifestation), while Wayfarer posits a non-physical static immaterial object called the theory. (Correct me if I'm wrong please )

Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not? — Luke

Neither is relevant to the attendant, who will get the coat either way. That's the point, the attendant doesn't even consider whether or not the thing is a token, only looking at the number. So it could just as easily be counterfeit.

It is not the only certainty underlying the attendant’s actions, but one example. There are also the underlying certainties (e.g) that coat checking is a custom, that people own coats, that people have jobs, that there are other people, etc, etc. It’s unthinkable that any of these could be false or doubted. Of course it is imaginable, but not within the confines of our actual lives and what we know of life and society as it is today. — Luke

These are not necessarily certainties for the attendant. The attendant is not necessarily certain that coat checking is a custom, or that people own coats, or have jobs. It is wrong to describe such things as certainties to the person performing the act. A monkey might be trained to do the coat check.

In an analysis we might say that such things are implied by the person's actions. Then we might be inclined to say the person must take them for granted when acting, so they must be certainties within the mind of the person taking the action. But this is false, because the person doesn't even think about such things when taking action. So the analysis is proceeding in the wrong direction, using false assumptions. And when we look at the true reality of human actions we see no need for anything like hinge propositions. The concept of hinge proposition is a product of the faulty analysis.

I’m happy to discuss further if you think that my reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, but not if you think that Wittgenstein himself is incorrect. — Luke

Obviously I think Wittgenstein is incorrect, I've been saying that in all my participation in this thread. So if you're not ready to consider that possibility, then I don't think we should go any further with this.

Contrary to what he aimed to demonstrate, Newton's physics work without the hand of God. — Fooloso4

Actually, Newton said his first law of motion requires the will of God. The fact that something existed in a specific way in the past, doesn't necessitate that it will continue to exist that way in the future. This is very similar to the problem with induction, in general.

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

Why don't you just say that any form of organized existence, or order in general, must be created by a mind or something mind-like? I think clearer terms like "order" are easier to discuss than the more ambiguous terms like "greater".

That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty

This is where Wittgenstein goes wrong with the idea of hinges. The proposition that this is a token is completely irrelevant, and not even taken into consideration when the person retrieves the coat. The person reads the number and gets the coat without considering whether it is a token or not. You could steal someone else's coat by making something which looks like a token, but is a false token, and the attendant would not even notice. So Wittgenstein's representation of what appears like things we take for granted, as hinges of our activities, is inaccurate. We may make our actions without having any idea of any underlying assumptions, therefore no sense of certainty involved with such.

At some point, in retrospect, one might analyze the action and say something like the idea that this is a token must underlie the attendant's action. But this is just a proposition produced from analysis, and does not necessarily represent the attendant's action. It simply represents the mode of analysis, which is to proceed from the particular toward the more general. That this is a faulty method is evident from the appearance of infinite regress, or getting to the most general, which is extremely vague. So Wittgenstein proposes hinges instead. In reality though, the action is grounded in a multitude of judgements concerning the circumstances of the particular situation, so the appeal to such general propositions is to proceed in the wrong direction. The coat check attendant reads the number, notices the person's gender, perhaps remembers the person, etc., and the action cannot be reduced by analysis to being based in any hinges of any game, because its supported by a synthesis of all sorts of different ideas and associations which for some reason seem relevant to the person in the situation.

"Universals" do subsist, but until we grasp them, they do not exist – stand out – for us. Is it your position, Wayf, that they are "real but do not exist" (à la Meinong)? If so, sketch what "real" means to you in this instance as distinct from "exist".
— 180 Proof

Generally, "exist" is a spatial-temporal concept. To exist is to be describable in spatial-temporal terms. The concept of "real" allows for truth in referring to things which cannot be described as having spatial temporal positioning. So for example, fictitious characters are real, but we cannot say that these characters exist. This allows that we can make truthful statements about things which have no spatial-temporal existence.

This, or any similar mode of classification allows for the reality of things which transcend spatial-temporal existence. It is necessary to allow for this because we do not know whether our concepts of space and time encompass all the possibilities of reality. And as Wayfarer points out, "possibility" itself is not something which can be included within spatial-temporal existence. So we have problems like quantum entanglement, which demonstrate very clearly to us, that reality transcends what we know as spatial-temporal existence. So we allow that the concept of "reality" extends to cover things outside the realm of "physical", because "physical", as an attribute is necessarily limited in its application. Therefore "reality" encompasses the non-physical.

My position is that "universals" are not real (i.e. they are not 'ineluctable, subject/language-invariant, non-tautologies') yet they do subsist (e.g. fictions) :point: — 180 Proof

There is no point to excluding universals from reality, as you propose. Then you still have to assign something to universals in order to bring them into the realm of intelligibility, i.e. being intelligible. To say that they "subsist", but are not real, is not a good use of the word "subsist", and usage like this is why I have so much difficulty understanding you. "Subsist" is normally used to refer to the temporal extension of existence, to continue to be alive or exist, through time. This necessitates that the thing which subsists also exists. But you are saying that the thing which subsists is not real, so you imply a not real thing which exists. Why make "existence" the more general concept, such that it extends to include things which are not real?