There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc. — Sam26

This is what I object to, as false, or unrealistic. Our actions do not demonstrate our certainty, and the randomness of an individual's mistakes shows this. Just because a person acts, and proves to be successful in that act, does not mean that the person was certain. In its extreme form, we have the practice of trial and error, in which a person acts without any degree of certainty, and there might still be success. So it is false to conclude that our actions express, or consistently demonstrate, certainty.

This is where justification enters the picture. Justification is what is used to demonstrate one's certainty. So, prior to an act for example, one might justify one's certainty concerning the act. But such justification is generally carried out with language, and that's where the problem lies, because using language, and justification itself, is an act. Therefore, there might not be certainty behind this act of justifying with the use of language. Now the problem, justification is an act designed to demonstrate certainty, but as an act, it is not necessarily based in certainty, so this undermines the concept of "justification" in a very fundamental way.

To resolve the issue one might propose hinge propositions, or other such propositions like self-evident truths, or analytic a priori, but none of these actually resolves the problem, in a way so as to remove the possibility of uncertainty. And the problem is that justification is fundamentally fallible because it is a human act which is not necessarily supported by certainty. This does not mean that it isn't most often supported by certainty, but it isn't always supported by certainty, therefore it is fallible. Because justification is fallible, it is necessary to distinguish between justified and true.

Unfortunately, Canada’s charter of rights and freedoms has served only as a small hurdle to its tyranny. Rather than outright prohibit people from freedom of movement, it forces the airlines to enforce rigid restrictions, and travellers to undergo harsh quarantine measures at their own expense. Rather than enforce its discriminatory policies against those who refuse Pfizer vaccines, it forces the private citizen to do it. Rather than freeze and steal the contents of someone’s bank account, it forces the banks to do it. It gets around violating its own charter by forcing those who are not beholden to it to do it for them. — NOS4A2

I don't understand any of your concerns here. Laws of self-regulation exist for many industries, especially concerning safety issues. The government passes the safety rule and makes the companies enforce it within, often requiring a report to the government. So in an industry like the food industry, which has enormous safety implications, instead of having a massive army of government inspectors, the dairies, packing plants, and places like that, must hire their own inspectors. It is a far more efficient way of handling the enforcement of safety standards, to have the ones engaged in the activity enforce the regulations upon themselves. But we can still be critical of these practices, and some of the effects. For instance, it is overwhelmingly unfair to small businesses, to force them to have an inspector on the payroll. Likewise, it is unfair to a person who owns one truck and moves goods for a livelihood, to be subjected to the exact same fines for safety violations, as a multimillion dollar transport company, if the fines become similar to a tax on the industry.

But I don't see that you've expressed any valid objections to the idea of mandating airline companies, and individual travelers themselves, to self-enforce specific safety standards. And it is not in any way comparable to prohibiting people from the freedom of movement. Telling people that they can only move if they take the necessary precautions not to jeopardize the safety of others, is like telling them that if they drive their cars and trucks they must be careful not to run over pedestrians, and this is in no way comparable to outright prohibiting the freedom of movement. And the fact that this might be an added expense to the traveler is completely irrelevant. To exercise one's freedom of movement has always been something which requires expenditure. If to do so in a way which the government decrees as necessary to protect the safety of others, requires an even greater expenditure, then of course we must accept that expense if we want to engage in those forms of movement. Whether or not you agree with what the government decrees as necessary to protect the safety of others, is a different argument from the argument as to whether the government ought to make such decrees.

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I concede the floor. I am no match for your brilliance. But I beg of you one thing - please do not deny the math community access to these ideas. Believe me when I tell you that they are ground-breaking. No one has seen their like before. I implore - on bended knee - write them up and send them off to prestigious math journals. They will fight to be the first to publish your insights.

And I'll be able to say, I was there. I was the first to doubt, but be brought into the light. — Real Gone Cat

You're not the first, if you check my history on this site, I've already been engaged in fulfilling your wishes. In mathematics we are taught to take the principles for granted, and move along. There is a vast amount of material to cover, and have not the time to understand the principles of each axiom. But that's why I didn't do well in math, I wanted to clearly understand each step of the way, and the class left me behind.

In particular, mention that the line does not contain an uncountable infinite set of points, then explain the limit concept. We've been languishing under the epsilon-delta definition for far too long. — Real Gone Cat

Right, and I can tell you what the issue is. Within the mathematical community there is a field which many call "pure mathematics". Within that disciplined, it is allowed that mathematical axioma are formulated completely and absolutely, independent from reference to physical reality. They are what many call "abstract". I discussed this to some length with a member of this forum, named fishfry. He admitted that axioms of pure math are completely imaginary, and argued that mathematicians ought not be constrained by the reality of the physical world in creating their axioms.

So you can see, that unlike science, within which we hold the theories to rigid standards of empirical verification, the theories of mathematics are not held to such standards. Further, we cannot hold mathematics to any standards of empirical verification because they extend to principles which are fundamentally not empirical themselves, as the means by which we understand empirical observations. Therefore to ensure the veracity of mathematical axioms we have nothing to employ except rigorous logic. In the case of the line and the point, what I've explained is that there is a fundamental incoherency in the relation between zero and one, which inheres within your principle. You do not allow for a true zero point. The zero is allowed to always contain some part of the one.

The reason I keep pressing you to name a source for your ideas is that I intend on Tuesday (Monday's a holiday) to reveal to my students that lines do not consist of points. When I inevitably get called in by my chairperson, I would like to be able to defend myself. — Real Gone Cat

Isn't the logic clear to you? We take a line with dimension, and divide it. we end up with two lines, each with dimension. We divide those lines, and end up with more lines, each with dimension. No matter how many times we do these divisions, we will always end up with more and more, shorter and shorter lines, always with dimension.

Are you familiar with the concept of "infinitesimal"? This concept was fundamental in the development of calculus. By this concept we might say that the line is composed of infinitesimals. Then it's no longer zero dimensional points which composed the line, but infinitesimal lines. But if we define the point as infinitesimal then we cannot claim it to be zero dimensions. This produces a requirement to determine the shape and size of a point, because we've removed the point from the status of being purely abstract.

Actually, I have. But I fear that you will refuse to accept any explanation that counters the ideas you have invented for yourself. — Real Gone Cat

No you haven't explained. And that you say you fear I will refuse to accept your explanation, is admittance that you haven't explained, because you are afraid to.

Pick up any set theory textbook. Search Youtube. The explanations are not that difficult to understand. And they are certainly not open to speculation. (In fact, the "weirdness" of the infinite might appeal to you.) — Real Gone Cat

We were very explicitly talking about calculus, and your claim that it has resolved Zeno's arrow paradox. Then you jumped to infinity, and now you've jumped to set theory. Clearly it's you who is incapable of following the conversation, and needs to do a google search on "calculus".

And again you fail to bother to learn about the difference between countable and uncountable. Your initial notion of stacking points is dealing with a countable infinite set, but the points on a line are an uncountable infinite set. Both sets are infinite, but they're not the same size. — Real Gone Cat

As I told you, "infinite", whether countable or uncountable, is irrelevant. Neither is the size of a set relevant. We were not talking about infinities, nor were we talking about sets. We were talking about points, and lines. A point has no dimension, a line has dimension. There is no number of points which could be added together to make a dimensional line. Nor is there any number of times you could divide a line and be left with just points. Those are obviously incoherent ideas. Where would the dimension all of a sudden come from when adding up points? Alternatively, when dividing a line, at what point would you suddenly have no dimensionality left to the parts created through that division, just dimensionless points left? Where could the dimensionality have gone? If the whole line which was divided exists within the parts, going nowhere else, then the parts must always have dimensionality, no matter how many divisions you make. If you cannot see how obviously it is incoherent nonsense, what you propose, then provide for me a demonstration. Show me how a dimensional line can be divided, such that you would produce parts, all of which have no dimension. Show me where the dimension, which was the line, ends up after the division takes place?

I will ask again : Where do you come by your ideas? Who else believes them? — Real Gone Cat

I look at what other people say, and judge whether what has been said has logical consistency or not. If so, then I am prone to accepting it. If not, I reject it. Your claim that "a line is made up of an uncountable infinite set of points" is simply illogical. A point has zero dimension. A line has one dimension. No matter how many zeros you put together, you do not get one. Likewise, no matter how many times you divide one, you do not get zero. Therefore I reject your principle. You seem to have a very unreliable understanding of the relationship between "zero" and "one".

Lines in three dimensions make extension, which is the first attribute of matter. — Gregory

You can say that a line is extension, but a line only has one dimension. You can define space to be three dimensional, described by three lines in relation two each other, but then the three lines are the extensions of space, not of matter.

I will caution this however : If you don't understand a concept, you don't get to make up your own interpretations and expect everyone else to agree. And your ideas about infinite sets (and lines, etc.) are not consistent with any text, course at university, or discussion on this subject. — Real Gone Cat

I only state things that I believe I understand. And you haven't shown that I misunderstand. You started talking about things not relevant to what I said. I wrote about the concept of approaching a limit, and I explained how I understood this concept. You simply asserted that I have no understanding of infinity without even explaining how your concept of infinity is related to what I was talking about, approaching a limit. And you imply that you believe that this relationship between approaching a point, and infinity, somehow resolves Zeno's paradox, when clearly the application of the concept "infinity" could in no way resolve the paradox. "Infinity doesn't resolve anything because it doesn't resolve

But the notion that the points of a line form an uncountable infinite set underpins geometry, calculus, topology, and every topic more complicated than arithmetic. — Real Gone Cat

All you are attesting to, is that an incoherent, illogical concept, (that non-dimensional points could somehow form a dimensional line), underpins a vast part of modern mathematics. What does that say about the mathematics which is underpinned by this incoherent concept? The fact that it underpins all this mathematics doesn't make the concept any less incoherent, it just says that much mathematics is underpinned by an incoherent concept.

Once you wrap your mind around it, you might want to re-think your ideas of time and motion (time being represented by a line and thus an uncountable infinite set of instants). Or you can dig your heels in and keep inventing your own version of math. — Real Gone Cat

Actually, you are the one who needs to reconsider. Once you recognize that much mathematics is underpinned by an incoherent concept, you might want to rethink your ideas of time and motion, perhaps come up with something more logical like my ideas. Or, you could dig in, and keep insisting that this idea is not incoherent, without any justification.

Knowledge is a success word, it refers to a process that achieves its goal. What is that goal? The goal is simply the truth. — Sam26

These two statements are fundamentally incompatible. If "knowledge is a success word", then success is its goal, and knowledge is reduced to justification. Then there is no necessity for a specific type of success called "truth". In fact, that truth is a form of success would need to be justified. This would require a purpose for truth, then truth would simply be a means to a further end. So truth cannot be treated as a form of success, nor can it be a form of justification, therefore "truth" and "justification" (as a type of success) must be distinct things.

The result of this is that if "truth" is proposed as a goal, and "justification" is the means toward this end, then the two must be classed separately. Truth, as a goal, is an object, and must be understood in relation to other goals. Justification, is an act, therefore the means to achieving a goal. The danger of misunderstanding, which we must avoid is that justification and success are more general than the particular object, truth, therefore an act of justification can be judged as successful without producing truth, if it is judged in relation to a goal other than truth. And the notion that truth actually is a goal still needs to be justified or the whole appeal to truth falls apart.

I don't see your point. The concept of "matter" is not compatible with the concept of a "line", in any conceptual scheme that I'm aware of. Simply put, a line is not spatial because it has only one dimension, and no conception of space which I'm aware of describes space as one dimensional. Nor is a point a spatial concept.

I’m well aware that the government can invent crimes and violate its charter of rights and freedoms. I’m just saying it’s wrong and tyrannical to do so. — NOS4A2

Why do you complain about the self-evident truth, and insist that it's somehow "wrong"? What qualifies as a "crime" is what the government dictates is a crime. Isn't that self-evident to you? And that dictation must be allowed to change with an evolving society. Or do you think that the original laws, those of Draco or something like that, should persist unchanged, forever and ever, dictated to never be allowed to change?

I think you have things backward. To make a "charter" which forces the government to adhere in a fixed way, to some dictate which would cripple its capacity to "invent crimes" is what is tyrannical. In reality, the government needs to be able to "invent crimes" faster than the criminals can act them out. But as you correctly indicate, giving a government the power which it needs, to properly govern an evolving society, is fraught with disagreement, therefore very problematic. And it's a problem which obviously has not been solved.

If I utter, "Here is a broom," to someone familiar with English they would probably say, "Ya, what's your point?" So, one way of seeing a context where such a statement would be useful, is in the context of teaching the word broom to someone who doesn't know English. We are justified or grounded in calling the object a broom, because that is part of the language-game associated with the concept. In other words, it's justification or grounding lies in linguistic training, or in its grammar. — Sam26

I think you're missing an important point Sam. When you say "here is a broom", as a proposition, it is a proposal which may or may not be accepted. If someone has reason not to accept the proposal, then you asserting that there is a language-game, in which this object is called a broom, is not justification. In fact, that is exactly what the person is rejected, the language game in which the thing is called a broom. Therefore justification must consist of more than reference to a "language-game". The game itself, (calling this a broom) needs to be justified (reasons given). And that's where the problem is.

You cannot refer to the act of sweeping the floor, and say that it is necessary to call this a broom in order to be able to sweep the floor, because that is not true. Hence we have a separation between knowing-how and knowing-that. I can know how to sweep the floor without knowing that I am sweeping the floor.

The question now is whether there is a real distinction, in the means of justification, between these two types of knowledge. It appears like knowing how to sweep the floor is justified by the act. But a description of "sweeping the floor" is required for this justification, to compare the act with. So "knowing-how" can only be justified with "knowing-that". Obviously though, we cannot place "knowing-that" as more fundamental, or prior to "knowing-how", because we need to know how to use words, before we can make the required description.

Therefore we are left with the conclusion that knowing-how fundamentally cannot be justified, and this is simply a type of knowledge which exists without justification. Any attempt to demonstrate its justification will be a failure, because that justification does not exist. This is the problem we encounter with any attempt to justify knowing how to use language. Knowing how to use language cannot be justified because it is a type of knowledge which cannot be justified.

Instead of invoking an idea such as "grounding" which creates an image of some lessor form of justification, we ought to dispense with the idea of justification altogether. Instead, we might move toward the internal feelings of certitude and doubt, which influence our actions. Then we can see that these descriptive terms, which may be applicable toward "knowing-that", are inadequate for describing these feelings and motivations behind "knowing-how". For example, we commonly proceed with an activity when we still have a large degree of doubt as to whether the outcome will be a success. Furthermore, we employ strategies such as trial and error, in this case we act when we are very unsure.

So as much as certitude and doubt constitute descriptive features of knowing-how, they are not the best terms to employ, because I can still be said to know-how to sweep the floor, without being certain that there will be a successful outcome every time I try. In fact, it doesn't even make sense to ask me, when I pick up the broom, 'are you certain that you will get the floor swept?'. Likewise, it doesn't make sense to ask someone using language, 'are you certain that the other person will properly understand what you're saying when you open your mouth to speak?' That's why talking is a rapid back and forth, often consisting of many clarifications, so texting and email are not the best choice for any complicated discussion. Then we can see that this discussion of certitude and doubt, in relation to hinge propositions, is completely misguided, barking up the wrong tree, in an activity which will never get us anywhere, because it is instead irrelevant to the true nature of knowing how to use language.

I can't make sense of your post. "Matter" and "space", though related, are distinct conceptions. I don't know what you mean by matter finding space within itself. Matter is potential, for Aristotle, space is formal, therefore actual. The two are categorically distinct.

You need to talk to some mathematicians. — Real Gone Cat

I have, there is a number of them in my family. Also, I've had numerous, (some very lengthy), discussions with mathematicians in this forum, some concerning these same issues. You don't seem to understand what I wrote. You just dismissed it as inconsistent with what you believe, therefore wrong.

Same as above. Its climate-change-denial, flat-earth talk. ANY elementary text on infinite sets will explain this. — Real Gone Cat

Why do mathematicians always seem to get so emotional when their principles are subjected to skepticism, and alternative belief systems? It appears to me like they are somehow trained to believe that what they are taught is the absolute truth. Doesn't this seem like dogmatism to you?

If I go half a distance, then I have to go half that otherwise there is no space let. And half that otherwise there is no space left. This goes to infinity, so nothing is discrete in the world. This is not a trick but instead logic — Gregory

If motion is not as you think it is (i.e. continuous), then this is not true. Think about how you walk, one foot on the ground here, then the next one a yard or so away. Your feet only cover the ground in those spots where they land, all the ground in between is not covered. Yet to measure how far you walked, we'd measure the ground. That's the way motion is, it doesn't necessarily cover all the spatial points by which it is measured, that's just an assumption made by the measurer.

Bank accounts are being frozen for the crime of donating to a protest. — NOS4A2

Correction, the bank accounts are frozen for contributing to illegal activity. That's the point of the emergencies act, it allows the government to make declarations as to what is illegal, like the torture described above. Sorry NOS, but you seem to be out of sync with the reality of the situation, just like those people I saw on TV, getting arrested today. They keep insisting, we're in the right, we're not doing anything wrong, they can't arrest me. Like you, they just don't seem to understand, it's the government who decides what constitutes a crime, not the criminals.

This is simply not the modern view of motion. The modern theory of motion is sometimes call "at-at" :

Motion is : being at different places at different times. — Real Gone Cat

This is not true, that's the problem. This is not what the math represents. It's just like your claim that a line is composed of an infinite number of points. There is a disjunct between what you claim is represented, and what the mathematics actually represents. If your statement here was true, you could not claim to have resolved Zeno's arrow paradox, because that paradox is the direct result of representing motion as "being at different places at different times". Each different "place" can be represented as a point in space, and each different time is a point in time. From this, we have the Zeno problem of how the arrow gets from one point to the next. Representing motion as "being at different places at different times" does not represent the actual "motion" which is the activity that occurs between the different places and different times, how the arrow gets from one place to another.

But this is not how calculus is used to represent motion. In calculus the point is a limit, and what is represented by the function is what is between the points, hence the use of "approaching the limit" in common descriptions. Therefore the object is never represented as being at a place, it is always represented as approaching a place. And your statement above ought to read "Motion is: being at an indefinite place during an indefinite period of time". The concept of "approaching the limit" produces the illusion of definition, when clearly "approaching" is not a well defined spatial temporal position.

Again, you need to differentiate between countable infinities (stacking up points) and uncountable infinities (a line). — Real Gone Cat

Sorry, but a "countable infinity" is blatant contradiction to me, so you might try to justify this distinction you're talking about, but I think you'd rapidly discover that you'll only be wasting your time.

(Again, math. Kinda my thing.) — Real Gone Cat

Discrediting common mathematical axioms is kinda my thing, so you have fair warning now. I hope you don't have emotional attachment to your principles, as some on this forum display.

1. But I thought you said God creates the universe at each instant of time. So either God is determining all that exists in that instant, or God is being directed by us (i.e., told what to do). — Real Gone Cat

This is just a strawman. To create something, does not mean to determine all within. When an artist creates a work of art, there is much (the features of the medium for example) which is not determine by the artist. So God simply has to intentionally allow for freedom of will, in what He creates, intentionally creating indeterminacy, as we see in the nature of "the future", and there is no such problem. You seem to be assuming that when someone, or God, creates something, every aspect of the thing created must be determined by the creator, when this is simply not the true nature of creating.

2. The breaks you posit between one moment and the next means that time is not continuous, and Zeno's Arrow pops back up. You can't have continuous time consisting of discrete instants anymore than you can have a married bachelor. — Real Gone Cat

I think I addressed this already. I claim that continuity is an illusion. Continuous time is not true, just like a continuous line created from an infinity of points is not true. So, we have a number of points in time, and we might claim that the arrow has true existence at each place, and each point in time. This produces the Zeno paradox, how does the arrow get from point A to point B. Instead of going the calculus route, to say that the arrow never is at point A or point B, these are simply limits which it approaches, I say that the arrow really is at point A and point B, but these "points" have a completely different type of existence from what we understand.

This is the requirement for the second dimension of time I referred to. So within the point itself, there is time, which is completely different from the time between points. And it is completely different from the time between points, because the spatial activity within the point is completely different from "motion", which is a description of what the arrow does between points. For example, consider the concept of spatial expansion. This is an "activity" which is understood as completely distinct from "motion". The activity which happens because of spatial expansion cannot be understood by the principles of "motion", so this is said to be not motion. Now place this type of activity as within the point, as only being able to be understood through a second dimension of time.

The problem here is that you are positing a solution to a problem that doesn't seem to exist. You have to first assume that time could potentially go haywire under a lack of divine intervention (based on what I don't know), then insert God to fix it. This is what I meant by, "The problem with positing God is that you have to find something for God to do."

And why would God "pull his support"? Is God whimsical? Easily angered? Cruel? Such a God would be petty and beneath contempt. — Real Gone Cat

Obviously there is a very real problem, which God is posited as the fix of, but you just don't understand it yet. Look, you think that calculus portrays motion as being at different places at different times, when really it portrays motion as being at an indefinite place at an indefinite time. That my description is true, rather than yours, is justified by the evidence of this model's manifestation, the uncertainty principle.

I suppose I can understand your position, though, because perhaps you've never had to use a bank account, which is used to store something called "money", the prevailing means by which many of us buy food and pay bills. A little bruise is nothing in comparison. — NOS4A2

That's an expected reply, which sums the attitude very well: 'money is more important than a healthy body'. Obviously the proclaimed "freedom" is not even relevant, it's a money issue. And having money in the bank account is prioritized over having a healthy body. Thanks for the demonstration, NOS.

The protests have been so peaceful that the Ottawa had to make honking illegal in order to impose any punishment. — NOS4A2

Right, you'd categorize a bunch of 120db air horns and train sirens blowing 24/7, right outside your front door as "peaceful". I'd classify that as torture. You know, one of those horns can be heard miles away (literal truth), imagine a bunch of them right outside your door. Now torture is illegal, but those who engage in it always find new ways of doing it, and claim what they're doing does not qualify, in the attempt to avoid reciprocal punishment.

Have you ever had your bank account frozen for participating in a protest? — NOS4A2

No, but I've had a lot worse, I've been beaten and kicked all over my body. Believe it or not, that's what quite often happens when you protest the authorities.

I think the fact that freezing their bank accounts might hurt them says a lot about the type of people that are protesting there. Who are they, a bunch of spoiled rich kids, who feel so entitled as to be excluded from having to take their medicine? Oh the poor children, we ought to feel so sorry for them, now that the government has decided to put an end to their three week long rave party, up on the hill. They'll become a lot more informed about what it means to lose one's freedom, when they find themselves in a jail cell.

Yours is the classical interpretation of velocity (pre-calculus), not the modern one (post-calculus). In fact, your definition is what we now call the average velocity over the interval. To point out a problem with your definition, imagine a moving object that is accelerating over the small period of time. Clearly its velocity at the beginning of that period of time is less than its velocity at the end (no matter how short the period is). So how can we assign a single value to its velocity?

So why does the classical view of velocity exist? Zeno, Archimedes, et al., were doing the best they could with the limited math of the day. The classical view works perfectly well for objects moving with constant velocity. Which was all they could handle. Think of Newtonian physics being replaced by Einsteinian. Newtonian worked fine for the simpler problems, but not so well as the 20th Century dawned. — Real Gone Cat

You missed the point. Velocity, no matter how you interpret it, classically or in the modern way, implies motion. Motion implies that the thing moving has no definitive location. That's the real outcome of Zeno's paradox, we cannot say that a moving thing has a definite location. And since all things are moving, relatively speaking, nothing has a true location. In the modern interpretation, this creates problems like the uncertainty principle. So Zeno's paradox is not resolved, it has just taken another form.

But that's looking at it backwards. Sure, stacking up dimensionless points gets us nowhere, but when we draw a line we say it contains an infinite number of points. And nowhere on the line is a place "between" points. — Real Gone Cat

Yes that's exactly the point. Think about it. An infinite number of points cannot make a line, as you say yourself, stacking up points will not get us anywhere. Therefore your claim that a line consists of an infinite number of points with nothing between them is an invalid conclusion from the two premises, 1) a point has no dimension, and 2) a line has dimension. Your statement "when we draw a line we say it contains an infinite number of points. And nowhere on the line is a place 'between' points" is self-contradicting under the accepted definitions of points and lines. It is "what we say", but it's easy to say things that are contradictory.

Ooh, this really smacks of speculation (sorry). — Real Gone Cat

It's all good, there's nothing wrong with speculation, so long as it is presented as such, and it's somewhat reasonable. I speak metaphysics, so that it's speculation should be taken for granted.

1. If God is creating the universe at each moment in time, how is free will possible? Let's say I wish to reach out for the hot pan. By your argument, God is the one creating the moment of contact, not me. In fact, God created the moment when I decided to reach out. Through infinite regress, God creates all causes. It sounds like your arguing for determinism. — Real Gone Cat

I thought I explained my resolution to this issue in the succession of universes analogy. It is a question which many theologians have given considerable thought to. That God puts one moment of time after the last, does not necessitate that God determines everything within each moment. In fact, it is this break, between one moment and the next which allows for free will. If God wanted to determine everything, there would be no such break, just one continuous existence. It is this proposal, that the universe is recreated at each moment, which allows that we can act, and produce something which wasn't there in the last moment, so this is actually God's way of providing us with the possibility of free will.

2. Does God ever withhold temporal ordering? ("I'm gonna mess with you sinners and make every day Monday!") If the claim is that God has been creating temporal order at every instant since the beginning of time, how would we know? Is the claim testable? Is there any evidence? — Real Gone Cat

I haven't seen it, have you? This in general, is the problem of induction. So all the laws of physics are based in induction, and we assume that because things have been in such and such a way for so long, they will continue to be that way (eg, the sun will rise tomorrow). That's why Newton said his first law of motion depends on the will of God. God fearing creatures will be worried that God could pull out his support at any moment.

3. Does God actively order other continuums (the line, the set of reals, etc.)? Could 37 suddenly be less than 2? — Real Gone Cat

This is a more complex subject, because we have the issue of the human imagination intermingling with the issue of God's will. Many people like to insist that human orders, numerology are actually divine orders, or the same as, but I think it is necessary to maintain a separation, to account for the fallibility of human orders. So I propose that mathematical orders are really the product of the free willing human mind, and not determined by God. We produce these orders (sometimes with the intent of understanding the divine order), but since we are only human and fallible, so are the principles of order we produce. Sometimes they are faulty and lead us astray.

This fallibility is evident in your proposal that a line consists of an infinite number of points and nothing else, which under analysis is actually illogical. Points have no dimension, so even an infinite number of them could not produce the dimensionality required for a line. So it's examples like this which lead me to propose a distinction between true order (divine order) and orders created by the minds of human beings.

The problem with positing God is that you have to find something for God to do. — Real Gone Cat

God doesn't have to do anything. As "creator", everything is already done by the time we are present.

The act gives the federal government sweeping powers, such as to regulate and freeze an individual’s bank account... — NOS4A2

Nothing new there. Ever been audited by the revenue department?

Yet, the results of such AI calculations about metaphysics still rely on fundamental assumptions regarding the mathematical axioms that one assumes in the first place. — Photios

Begging the question.

Well Banno, I take your reply as a joke. You have put no effort into it, being afraid to look at anything which is inconsistent with what you claim. As you have not been able to indicate to me how I am wrong, I will conclude that you are just stubbornly adhering to a description of "doubt" which was created by your imagination, for a particular purpose, rather than by looking at the way the word is actually used by people in the world.

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.

That's what you do with "doubt", define it in a way which expressly restricts it to being a language game. What about all the other times we use "doubt", to refer to non-academic instances of uncertainty?

Doubt is a language game. — Banno

No, doubt is not a language game. It is an attitude of uncertainty which does not require language for its existence. Likewise, certitude is an attitude of confidence which does not require language for its existence.

So for example, when I'm hiking and come to a brook, I might have certitude, and be confident that I can, or cannot, jump across it. Or, I might have doubt as to whether I can, meaning I am uncertain. It's not language which facilitates the attitude which I have in this case, and that attitude is completely independent of any language game.

You continue to demonstrate that you really have no idea as to what doubt actually is. So you simply create a fictitious description of doubt which fits into your game analogy, instead of attempting to understand what doubt really is, and how the game analogy is incapable of capturing it. Uncertainty, doubt, negates the will to act, rendering games, which are activities, as relevant only by an extrinsic relationship. In the example above, if I am certain that I can jump across the brook, or certain that I cannot, I will act accordingly. But doubt leaves me indecisive and unwilling to act.

The limit concept has been well understood since the middle of the 19th Century (Cauchy, Weierstrass, et al.). — Real Gone Cat

I'm not saying that it's not well understood, nor am I saying that it's at all ambiguous. I'm just saying that it does not provide a real solution to the issues which cause the paradox. I might say that it provides a "work around". Consider for example, the concept of instantaneous velocity. Velocity is a concept which is time dependent, meaning that a thing could only have a velocity if it exists over a period of time. So what could velocity at an instant mean? It must mean that an instant consists of a very small period of time. That's fine, but now what about the instant that divides one period of time from another, when we perform a measurement of a period of time. If the instant contains a duration of time then the measurement is necessarily imprecise, ambiguous. The result of the "work around" is the acceptance of imprecise measurement

So it doesn't resolve Zeno's paradox, because all it does is assume that we cannot determine the precise location of a moving object, because it is moving, therefore it doesn't have a precise location, all it has is a velocity therefore it is necessarily in a multitude of places at an instant in time. If we accept this as the reality of physical existence then we accept as reality that there is no objective position of any object, (all objects being in some form of motion). Therefore we have a measurement problem and an uncertainty principle in quantum physics. The uncertainty principle is not necessarily a feature of reality, it is a product of the way that we choose to look at reality, through our mathematical principles, and what is implied by those principles; that nothing has a precise location because it is moving. The issue which creates the paradox is not resolved, it is just deferred, to create a different problem.

OK, you give me something to think about. Discrete instants would mean Zeno's Arrow is back in play. But continuity would suggest something else : if time is continuous and universe are instants of time, then universes also form a continuity. — Real Gone Cat

This is the same problem as saying that a line is composed of points. If a point has no spatial dimension, then no matter how many points you stack up, you do not get a line which has spatial dimension. We can either say that the line is what exists between points, or we can assume that there is some sort of dimension within points, so that we might put a bunch together and have a line. What I suggested for time, synthesizes both of these. The dimension of time which we know and understand is what exists between points, Within a point in time, there is no temporal extension in that sense of duration. However, within a point in time there is another dimension of time, a type of "time" which is completely different from the temporal duration which we know because it involves a different sort of activity. But we have absolutely no understanding of this dimension of time until we posit the possibility of its reality, look for the evidence of it, and establish a way of relating the dimension which we know, to the other dimension which we do not.

With respect to your last answer (about causes and God), I wonder if you could give an example. Maybe the burnt hand situation? Your idea is new to me and I'm having trouble following it. — Real Gone Cat

OK, I'll give it a try. Let's start with Newton's first law of motion, inertia. Look at that law this way, as saying that whatever has been going on in the past, will continue to go on indefinitely into the future, as time passes, unless something causes that to change. Notice the role of "cause" here. It is assumed that things will remain the same, therefore a "cause" is required to produce change. But Newton stated that his first law was dependent on the will of God. So the theological way of looking at this is that inertia, i.e. the tendency for things to stay the same, what Newton took for granted, actually is caused. And when we consider the position of free will, as I explained already, we see that it is necessary for this cause to act at every moment of passing time. So the mystical way of understanding this is that God creates the entire universe anew at each passing moment of time.

To take your example then, of the burnt hand, consider that God must recreate your hand, (as well as your entire body, even the universe), at each moment of passing time, to maintain the continuous existence of that hand. That is how we account for the inertia of that mass. If you burn your hand, something interferes with that cause of existence of your hand, its being recreated as it was in the past, at each moment of passing time. See how the role of "cause" is reversed? Instead of saying something caused your hand to be damaged, we can say that something interfered with the cause of continued existence of your hand.

In the sense that God is said to know the future, time knows the future and that includes all our choices. — Gregory

It is not necessarily true that God knows the future. This problem was investigated by Augustine at some length. If God can know the future, it appears like the possibility of free will is denied. And if the human being definitely does have free will, then God cannot know the future. The indeterminacy of the future, which is required for free will, denies the possibility that anyone, even God, could know the future. God knows all that is, but the future does not exist yet, so that is not necessarily included within "what is".

Please forgive this primitive naif. I have been enjoying our exchange, but now I see that it has been an annoyance to you. Still, I cannot help myself : I feel that I must continue to put my prattle before the public. So please deign to consider this poor bumpkin's thoughts. — Real Gone Cat

I wouldn't say it's an annoyance to me, or I wouldn't participate. I enjoy it, so don't worry about that.

If time is taken as continuous, the Arrow Paradox is resolved. Calculus helps. From the IEP : — Real Gone Cat

I am familiar with this so-called resolution, and I would call it an illusion of a resolution, rather than a true resolution. I believe it's based in a principle which rounds off the infinitely small to zero, and calls this "approaching zero", or something like that, while treating it as zero. This is the same sort of principle which treats .999... as 1. It's not a real resolution, it's just saying that we can get on with our calculations very well, without resolving the issue.

1. Is your theory of time-instants-being-distinct-universes widely held in philosophy? Can you cite sources that I might peruse? (Full disclosure : I do know of one somewhat prominent thinker who shares a similar outlook, but I'll hold off until you tell me who you read.) — Real Gone Cat

No I don't think it is a widely held solution to the problems with "time". In fact I don't even hold it myself. I just rolled with it, because it was how you characterized the point I was making. I was saying that things in the past could be characterized as not existing in the universe. You proposed that they must be in a different universe then, not wanting to allow that they were completely "outside" any universe, as this was the point of discussion, things outside the universe. So I went along with that proposal of yours, that things outside one universe would be in another universe.

Then, I tried to explain how this doesn't relieve us of the need for something which is fundamentally out side of any, and every universe. Consider, as I explained, that the human being, would necessarily staddle a multitude of universes. Since this "being" comprises a relationship between a number of universes, it has some aspect which is necessarily outside of all of them, to account for its unity independent of any particular universe. That was the point, that by proposing a multitude of universes we do not avoid the need to assume something outside of all these universes.

To summarize then, I've been insisting on the need to assume something, or things, outside the universe. You proposed that the things outside the universe would be within other universes. I then argued that we still need to assume something outside of all universes.

2. Do you think time is continuous or discrete? I.e., do instants have duration? — Real Gone Cat

Personally, I believe in a two dimensional time. I believe that the time line which we understand as duration of time, and as a continuity, is actually composed of discrete "instants", which appear to us as a continuity, like that produced from a movie of still frames. However, each still frame, or "instant" is not itself still, or a static point, but consists of a second type of temporal passage, which is very distinct from the one we understand, hence the second dimension. The second dimension of time passing, we have not even recognized so much as to posit principles toward understanding it. But it is required to assume the second dimension, in order to understand how moments of time overlap, or the relationship between the "universes" described above. The second dimension of time cannot be described as anything within this universe, or in any universe, when distinct universes are defined as moments on the continuous time line.

3. Are all, some, or no causes do to God? In the burnt hand example, what is the causal chain? Does God play a role? — Real Gone Cat

Referring to the above description of two dimensional time, causation as we know it, in the sense of efficient cause, is a simple relationship along the timeline of instances. But when each instant has a duration, and activity, proper to that distinct dimension of time, and the possibility of parallel timelines, and other timelines which are diagonal, then we have to consider different sorts of causation. For instance, consider a moment just prior to another moment on the standard timeline. If each of these moments are given breadth, then one side of the prior moment might end up being posterior to the other side of the posterior moment through a diagonal timeline. So that diagonal, or cross relationship between the two moments, would put the prior moment as posterior, in that diagonal timeline.

As for the causes which are due to God, as I said before, that is the relationship between moments. God created time (as the cause of it) in such and such a way, so as to have the relationships between moments which are the true ones.

Well, if you cannot apprehend the obviousness of the fact that any understanding of reality which you may have, is your own mind's understanding of reality, and you cannot have an understanding of reality which is not your own mind's understanding of reality, then discussion of this with you would be rather pointless.

Can anyone provide a clear explanation of the difference between a hinge proposition, and a self-evident truth? That might be a good start toward understanding what a hinge proposition is supposed to be.

Some claim that consciousness or intelligence is fundamental, but at present we have no way to settle the issue one way or the other. — Fooloso4

Actually there is a way to settle this, and that is to understand and accept the very obvious reality, and simple truth, that consciousness is fundamental. Since consciousness is the means by which we understand anything, it must be placed as the first principle, it is necessarily prior, fundamental, in any type of understanding. To suggest otherwise is simple denial of the obvious.

So, in any procedure toward understanding the nature of reality, understanding the nature of consciousness is a necessary requirement, as needed first. Any attempt to understand reality, without first accounting for the fact that any understanding of reality is merely the way that a consciousness understands reality, and is therefore not necessarily a true understanding of reality, is a mistaken adventure. The fact that any understanding of reality is a product of a consciousness is necessarily the first, and most fundamental principle to any true understanding of reality. And since we must account for the fact that any representation of reality is merely the property of a consciousness, we must, necessarily understand the consciousness's true relation to reality, before we can adequately judge the truth or falsity of any representation of reality. Therefore a true understanding of consciousness and intelligence is fundamental and necessary for any credible representation of reality.

Any claim, such as yours, that it is possible that consciousness is not fundamental in an understanding of reality, is simply ignorance of the obvious. The fact is that we cannot have a true understanding of reality without first having a true understanding of consciousness. One's understanding of consciousness forms the base, platform, or foundation, upon which all other knowledge rests. This is demonstrated by the tinted glass analogy. When we look at the world through a glass lens (consciousness or intelligence being analogous to the lens), we must have complete understanding of what the lens contributes to the image, before we can truly understand the nature of the thing being looked at through the lens.

Consciousness, or intelligence, is fundamental., and there is no other valid platform for looking at reality.

I visualize the y axis as time and the x as space. Motion is a bit of both and they all cover the same territory. The singularity is space, time, and motion as something discrete while it seems to me reality is continuous after the Big Bang — Gregory

I believe this is the mistaken simplicity which modern conceptions of space and time have fallen into. This is the result of placing pragmatic convenience as a higher principle than truth.

In reality, space and time cannot be modeled as two facets of the same thing. Space, as we understand it, is a feature of the past, it is not a feature of the future. What the reality of free will demonstrates to us is that there is no determinate spatial existence on that other side of the present (the future). The determinateness which we know as spatial position is produced only at the moment of the present. Evidence of this is manifest in quantum physics. Since one part of time, the past consists of determinate spatial existence, and the other part of time, the future, consists of indeterminate non-spatial existence, time must be modeled as the division between spatial and non-spatial, or two radically different conceptions of "space".

Given your view, how do you avoid Zeno's Paradox of the Arrow? Even if instances butt up against each other, they are still disjoint. — Real Gone Cat

As far as I know, no one has demonstrated an acceptable resolution to the arrow paradox. What it demonstrates is that a moment in time is incoherent in relation to the way that we understand the motion of an object as continuous. So we might just say that there is no such thing as a moment in time, and keep on claiming that motion is continuous. But that would render the measurement of a period of time as impossible, a measured period requiring a start and end moment. So as much as people might say there is no such thing as a moment in time, they act as if there is, by measuring time periods. What quantum mechanics seems to indicate is that the other alternative, that motion of an object is not really continuous, is the true solution. So that's how I avoid the paradox, by saying that the idea that the motion of an object is continuous, is a faulty idea.

And, also by your view, what holds an instance together? If smacking a pool ball creates a new universe what happens to the dart that has been thrown on the opposite end of the bar? — Real Gone Cat

A new universe is created at every moment as time passes, regardless of any pool balls or darts. If you take seriously the nature of free will, you'll come to see that it is necessary that the entire physical universe is created anew at each passing moment. If the will has the power to change anything, at any moment of time, then anything can be annihilated at any moment, so we cannot say that there is anything on the other side of the present (in the future). What will be, at the next moment in time, is created at that moment. This is the only way to account for the reality of free will, because the will must be free to decide at one moment, what will be at the next moment. This means that there cannot be anything there already, at the next moment. Of course then we need something like God to account for the observed continuity from one moment to the next.

We don't experience instances as separate universes, so (trying not to offend) it seems like speculation. — Real Gone Cat

We do not experience things as molecules, atoms, photons, or anything like that either, so that point is really irrelevant.

We've gotten far from my original question though. Let me try it this way : Presumably there are effects that are generated by mundane causes (the hot pan burns my hand). But the premise was that there are effects that are caused by God. How can we tell the difference? Is there something about the effect that gives it away? — Real Gone Cat

What you call "mundane causes" is just a very primitive understanding of temporality, what we might more accurately call a misunderstanding. The real scenario, is much more complicated than "the hot pan burns my hand". Sciences such as biology, chemistry, and physics show show that this is just a primitive description of what is really happening in that situation. Likewise, when you start to get a true understanding of the way that temporality must be, to account for the way that we experience things, you will begin to see that science has a very primitive understanding (misunderstanding) of temporality and causation.

Would you say claiming that past and future do not exists is related to the parts of an object not existing on their own? I say that parts and past and future exist as one — Gregory

Do you mean that if you divide the parts of an object, the object no longer exists, and if you separate past and future, time as the whole no longer exists?

Agreement on this point seems to be breaking out! I would only add that a true half is equally impossible to create (physically) - or, if created, impossible to know that it has been created. — Cuthbert

The application of division, fractions, ratios, is generally very problematic, and the way that conventional mathematics treats division in general is very inadequate. In physical reality, the way that a thing can be divided is governed by the type of thing which is to be divided. In reality, the type of thing to be divided actually determines the principles of division which can be employed in dividing the thing. But mathematicians appear to pay no respect to this fact, and produce principles which allow any object to be divided in any way. The mathematician's simplicity, every object is infinitely divisible.

The problem with this approach to division becomes very evident when things like sound waves are being divided. Of course physical reality actually prevents infinite frequencies and infinite wavelengths. But if we ignore the physical reality of waves, and adhere to mathematical principles of division instead, we end up with the Fourier uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is the direct consequence of a failure to determine the correct way to divide space and time, according to physical reality.

Doubt takes place within a language game. — Banno

That's what you might think, but quite obviously "doubt" is created when the appropriate language game cannot be determined. That's what Plato demonstrated. This is the nature of ambiguity, the word appears as if it could be employed according to multiple different games, and there is uncertainty as to which game is the correct one.

The idea of doubt "within a language game" doesn't even make sense. Think about it, there can be no doubt as to how to use the word from within the game, just like there can be no doubt about the moves of the chess piece. There can be doubt as to whether one's moves will be successful or not, but that's a completely different type of doubt, far more general, and far outside of any language use. It's the doubt as to whether my actions will be successful or not. That form of doubt is obviously not confined to within a language game.

Doubt within a language game would be like doubt as to whether one's logic is valid or not. Such a judgement is very decisive, either it is or is not valid logic, and there is no room for doubt. One could be in doubt in such a judgement, if the rules of the logic being employed were not known by the person, or if the propositions were ambiguous, but that's what constitutes being outside the game. From within the game there can be no doubt, that's what constitutes being within the game.

Now I am pretty confident that you will not grasp this. — Banno

That's right, I cannot grasp it because what you've said is completely nonsensical. It appears like you have no idea what "doubt" is. Do you recognize "doubt" as indecisiveness, uncertainty in relation to a required judgement? If one is playing chess, i.e. "within the game", there can be no doubt as to how to move the bishop. If the person was doubting how to move the bishop we could not say that the person is playing the game. So how does your example put doubt within the game?

Doubt within the game makes no sense. The person might have doubt with respect to strategy, but strategy is not "within" the game, it's what the individual brings to the game by way of experience and intuition.

Perhaps we could start a mutual understanding through a distinction between "the game", and "playing the game". Do you accept that "playing the game" is not the same as "the game", because the former refers to what an individuals is doing, or what individuals are each doing, and the latter refers to a unity of the actions of the individuals? If so, do you see that "doubt" is proper to the individual, not to the game?

What we cannot do is to measure pi exactly in the same way that we can count exactly. You can pick up exactly three apples and put back exactly two of them, leaving you with exactly one. But you can't measure out exactly pi kilos of sugar. If you happen to be holding exactly pi kilos of sugar then you can never know that is what you are holding. — Cuthbert

The issue with pi being an irrational ratio is not a measurement problem. It is a logical problem with the defined (mathematical) object, the circle. It is actually an impossible object. Simply put, a circle cannot have a centre point. But since the circle is defined as a circumference equidistance from the centre, a circle is actually impossible. This should not be a surprise to anyone, it's commonly stated that a perfect circle is impossible. What we have is approximations.

It seems like some people want to dissolve the distinction between theory and practice, and describe what is a problem with the theory as a problem of practice. There is no problem making circles in practice, there is no problem measuring them, and there is no problem employing pi to determine the area. The problem is that the circles employed in practice cannot obtain the degree of precision and accuracy which we request in theory. And the irrational nature of pi demonstrates that we will never ever get that degree of precision because it is impossible. A true circle, as defined, is an impossible object to create.

Right, there shouldn't be a need to reduce abstractions to claim they are physical. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem I see is with "intention". Intention is what gives causality to abstractions. We might assume that the abstractions are tools put to use in the world, and we could ground them in a physical attribute of the physical human being, like the brain. But the abstractions only become causal under the influence of intention, they are put to work toward a purpose. Being grounded in intention rather than the physical brain, brings us in the opposite direction of giving the abstractions physical status. Intention is related to a will toward the future, what will be, and so it cannot be assigned to any physical attribute of the human being.

This is how the mind differs from the senses. The senses are all directed toward a type of physical attribute proper to the sense organ. But the mind, being directed by intention is directed toward an "object" in the sense of a goal. And the goal has no material existence, having not yet been brought into existence. That's why the "object" which is proper to the mind is immaterial, while the senses have "objects" which are material.

If intentionality is a non-physical phenomena, it must at the least still be partly caused by physical things. But then you have the problem of how two totally different things interact, and how they can interact without leaving behind detectable evidence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think this is a proper representation of intentionality. Intentionality at its base is very general, and therefore we cannot say that it is caused in any way by particular things. Consider a base feeling like hunger, and the specific intention to eat, which we might say is "caused" by that base feeling. Notice that the intention is very general, not caused by a particular physical thing desired. Only through the direction of the mind does intention become focused on a particular thing, the intent to eat a particular food item. We cannot say that the physical object which is desired is the cause of the intention. And since intention begins as something very general, it's just a general feeling, I don't see how it could be caused by any physical thing, or even a group of physical things, which are particulars.

This is the same issue as inductive reasoning, only inverted. With inductive reasoning we produce a general principle from observing a number of particular instances. There is no way that we can say that the physical particulars, no matter how many there be, are the cause of the inductive conclusion. We do not have the premise required, to conclude that a whole bunch of physical particulars have actually caused the existence of a general principle. What really causes the actual existence of the general principle is the act of reasoning.

Next time Elon needs some calculations to land a craft, he should just call you for your results rounded to two decimal points. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Judging by the news of a whole fleet of crashed crafts a week or so ago, calling me couldn't have hurt.

To me the universe is everything that has ever existed, from the Big Bang to the Big Fade-Out. — Real Gone Cat

You should have said this right away, when I said things in the past are not in the universe. That would have saved some time, and unnecessary back and forth.

How do you differentiate between future and past then? Surely you'll agree with me that the past is radically different from the future. What has already happened cannot be undone, but when looking toward the future, we can act to cause things which we like, and also prevent things we do not like. If all future and past are together as one big universe, how do you account for this substantial difference between things of the past and things of the future?

It all comes down to our conception of time - you see time linking the multiple universes in a particular order, I see time as a component of the one universe. — Real Gone Cat

I don't see how there could be time, if all future and past are one universe. Time is that changing boundary between future and past. If all is one, then there is no such boundary and no time.

If cause-and-effect is true of the universe then it provides a mechanism for instances to follow one after another. There is no need to insert God. — Real Gone Cat

Mechanisms, machines, are artificial. They are created. There is no sense to the idea of an uncreated mechanism.

In fact, requiring God to provide temporal order seems to me to endanger free will. If God is directing the action, then what is my role? — Real Gone Cat

Well I explained this. God just orders the universes themselves, which one comes after the last, that is the necessity of time. But God does not necessitate everything which will be within any particular universe. And since your existence spans a number of universes, you can act as a cause in one universe to get what you want in a later universe. But now you reject the multiple universe scenario anyway so that was rather pointless.

You're too gone, dude. That article was specifically disagreeing with you. Data comes from sensory data of the material world. That's where the correspondence works, that's what they were saying. I'm moving on now. — Garrett Travers

Do you understand a difference between "data comes from the senses", and "data is the material world"? In the former, "data" requires sensation. In the latter "data" requires a material world. When the scientist produces a model designed to correspond with the data, which is derived from sensation, the model is not designed to correspond with the material world. It is designed to correspond with the data derived from sensation. Whether or not there even is such a thing as "the material world" is completely irrelevant to that model. Have you heard of "model-dependent realism"?

Your argument is that a hinge in one game need not be a hinge in another, and I agree; but one cannot thereby conclude, as you would, that there are no hinges. — Banno

If hinges are defined as propositions which it is unreasonable to doubt, or, are indubitable, then there are no hinges. Each person is involved in numerous different games and it is only unreasonable to doubt a supposed hinge, from within the game that it is a hinge. From another game, in which the proposition is not a hinge, it is not unreasonable to doubt that proposition. Therefore it is not unreasonable for a person to doubt a hinge.

There is no language use that is outside language games. Looking at the relationship between language games is yet another language game. Philosophers who think they can step outside language while still using language are mistaken. — Banno

A relation between two games is not itself a game. That would just imply a third game between the two, but then we'd require two more games to account for the relation between the third game and the first game and the third game and the second game. And we'd need more games to account for the relations between these games, ad infinitum. This is the type of infinite regress Aristotle demonstrated would be the result of mischaracterizing the difference (or relation) between two things, as a third thing. That infinite regress is the result here, is evidence that the description is faulty. The relation between two games is not a third game.

So it is not a matter of philosophers thinking that they can step outside of language, when using language, it is just a matter of demonstrating that language consists of more than just games. So a philosopher can place oneself outside of any particular game, and therefore potentially outside of every game, yet still be using language. Wittgenstein's intentional use of ambiguity is clear evidence of the act of a philosopher putting oneself outside of the games.

In other words, this "platonism" of yours cannot be divorced from correspondence to the material world. — Garrett Travers

The correspondence is not with a material world, it is with an immaterial world, notice the correspondence referred to is with "data", not "a material world". The model is made to correspond with the data, hence "platonism". That's why I was insistent on asking you about your assumption of "laws". Laws are immaterial. When reality is reduced to 'that which corresponds with laws and mathematics', there is no longer anything material there, in that assumed reality, only information, data. That's the point Berkeley made, we can describe all of our observations without any need to assume "matter". The world consists of forms, and what we apprehend is information, not matter.

The fact which you don't seem to be grasping is, that "matter" was assumed to account for the aspect of reality which we cannot understand, i.e. potential. That's why it's a principle of mysticism. And being the part of reality which is unintelligible to us, it is the part which is not subject to laws, because laws are what is intelligible.

There is nothing true about this statement whatsoever. You have been dispensed with, guy. Move on. — Garrett Travers

"Many physicists have uncritically adopted platonic realism as their personal interpretation of the meaning of physics."

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/

This follows from the trend of mathematicians who employ platonic realism in their axioms, to describe mathematical values as mathematical objects.

In practical calculations, Pi is never exact. It's is just computed to a given precision. In C++, the value of Pi is 3.14159265358979323846, which is sufficient for most calculations. — pfirefry

I find 3.14 is sufficient for my practical purposes. I suppose if you're a cosmologist, or someone who is multiplying pi by a googolplex or something like that, it might be worth while to take pi to a few more decimals, or your conclusion might not be very exact.

The real problem is that the person can choose not to play that game. And that is why the whole game analogy, and the described "hinge propositions", as some sort of rule system which supports the game, is fundamentally flawed, as a descriptive tool for "language" in general. Language as a whole must consist of a multitude of games, under the game analogy, and the individual user of language has freedom of choice with respect to which games to play.

So the supposed "hinge propositions" which must be, of necessity, accepted for the purpose of playing a specific game, and cannot be doubted from within the confines of that game, can always be doubted from the play of another game. The character of "hinge" is specific to, as a feature of, a particular game.

Therefore portraying such hinge propositions as somehow indubitable is fundamentally wrong. All the hinge propositions of any, and every particular game, are always the subject of doubt from the play of another game. And, a human being has the freedom of choice to play one game one day, and another game the next day, at will. Therefore it is completely reasonable for a human being to doubt any supposed "hinge proposition".

What cannot be exposed by the game analogy is the relationships between the various games, becuase these are by definition outside any particular game and are not captured by the analogy. Since this type of language use, which is outside any particular game, is a key aspect of the philosophical use of language, as the means by which we doubt linguistic activity, the game analogy completely fails as a representation of the philosophical use of language. Philosophical use of language is the use of language which is outside the game analogy.

The relationship between freedom of choice to choose a linguistic game, and dogmatic enforcement of a game, is very evident in the history of "The Inquisition". The Inquisition was formed to resist the infiltration of secular language (as heresy) into the pure language, Latin, and the perceived threat of doubt, and inevitable corruption of theological principles, from such cross-gaming. History teaches us that the enforcement of the game (The Inquisition) did not win over the freedom of the will of individuals to choose their own games. In fact, efforts at enforcement appear to have had a negative effect overall.

Abstractions generally have to be able to cause physical effects for a physicalist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've never been able to understand the basis of this claim that abstractions do not have any effect in the world. All a person has to do is open one's eyes and see all the artificial products around, to apprehend the fact that we cannot deny effect from abstractions. If we make such a denial, we end up with the proposition that chance occurrence is the cause of artificial things having the forms that they do. And of course that's just ridiculous.