That does not seem very correct, or at least it seems only a way to imagine something. such as numbers. 2 and 2 is 4 independent of there being 2 things and 2 other things. — Tobias

Sure, but "2+2=4" is rather useless accept when applied to actual things, just like "if P, then Q" is rather useless without any things that P and Q refer to. Arne was saying the opposite, that numerals are especially useful when there is no spatial thing which they refer to.

The way I read Aristotle, he believes that the soul depends on the body, belongs to the body, and therefore it perishes with the death of the body (De Anima 414a20ff.) — Apollodorus

The problem with this interpretation is that you are not accounting for the order of dependence of "the parts" which Aristotle clearly explains.

From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are (if it has parts) --- for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. — Aristotle On the Soul 413a,3-6

The higher powers, sensitive and intellectual, are very clearly not separable from the material body, being dependent on it. But when we get down to the very basic powers, self-nutrition, and self-movement, these may be separable. And the soul itself is clearly separable, in the way I described. As cause of the material body it is prior to the material body, therefore it existed independently from the material body at that time.

The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. — 415b, 7-12

It appears to me like you are not respecting the temporal order, and priority explained by Aristotle. So you say, that a soul cannot exist after the death of a living body, therefore a soul has no existence independent from the body. However, Aristotle clearly explains how the soul has existence independent from the body prior in time to the body. Therefore we cannot conclude that "the soul depends on the body". The "parts" of the living being which are prior are not dependent on the parts which are posterior. The soul itself, is the first in temporal priority, and as the cause of the material body, its existence is temporally prior to the material body, so it is separate and immaterial. However, the parts which are posterior are dependent on the parts which are prior, so no posterior part can have independent existence.

If we are saying that the intellect depends on the soul, then there can be no intellect after the death of the body-soul compound. — Apollodorus

Correct, and this is why I disagreed with you in the other thread, when you discussed independent intelligence. I believe that independent immaterial existences, such as God and the angels in Aquinas, which account for the necessity of assuming immaterial and separate Forms, ought not be called "intellects" or "intelligences". These immaterial existences are prior to material existence whereas the human intellect is posterior to material existence. That is why there is a huge separation (the medium of matter) between human intelligible objects (concepts and ideas) and independent Forms. So I conclude that referring to these independent Forms as intelligences is very misleading because the immaterial Forms are temporally prior to matter while intelligible objects are posterior to, and dependent on matter.

If Aquinas accepts everything Aristotle says, he may find himself in conflict with his own Christian views. — Apollodorus

That's what I said already:

So Aquinas had a fine line to walk here, between two completely incompatible doctrines, personal immortality, as a traditional tenet of the Church, and the immateriality of the soul according to Aristotelian principles (science?). Aristotelian immateriality is based in the concept of "prior to matter", and assigns particular, individual, and personal identity to an object's material presence, posteriority. This directly conflicts with the classic Christian teaching of personal resurrection. What is prior, the immaterial soul, cannot be postulated as posterior, to support personal resurrection.

If you look closely into Aquinas' metaphysics and theology, you'll see that ultimately he chooses the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. Take a look at the first line from your quoted passage. "I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." This is consistent with Aristotle. The soul, as the source of activity, actuality, is the first principle of intellectual operation. This is the very same for all the powers of the soul. The soul is the first principle, as the source of activity, for self-nutrition, sensation, and self-movement, each and every power of a living being. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point being that the Aristotelian view was more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. So Aquinas lead his church in that direction, with his metaphysics, saying just enough concerning personal resurrection and immortality, to appease those with the ancient religious views, and maintain good standing relative to the authorities of the Church. His work of thoroughly analyzing the metaphysical perspective of Aristotle did very much to lead western society out of the dark ages of ancient tenets, into the scientific era.

I think it would be more consistent to see reality as a hierarchy of intelligences and both soul and body as created by a higher intelligence, as in Platonism and similar systems. — Apollodorus

The problem though is that this is not scientific, i.e. not consistent with the evidence. Which do you think is better for metaphysics, to try and twist around the meaning of words like "intelligence" and "soul", to produce consistency with advancements in science, or to change fundamental principles of metaphysics to maintain consistency with new collections of evidence?

Plato laid out, exposed and explained all sorts of ancient (ancient to him) metaphysical principles concerning soul and mind and their relations with matter and human intentions. Many of these were inconsistent with the science of the time. So there was a great project to determine the fallacies of the ancient metaphysics, as well as the fallacies of the contemporary science. When there is such incompatibility, it is not a matter of choosing one side or the other. So we need to take the evidence from the scientific side and the theories from the metaphysical side, which make a match.

The evidence shows that intelligence is a product of the living body, dependent on it, therefore posterior to the body, while the theory shows that the immaterial soul is prior to the living body. So we have that temporal separation between soul and intellect. It makes no sense to bring the posterior (intellect) around to the prior (soul), and start talking about prior immaterial existences as if they are intellects, just for the sake of appeasing some ancient ideas. This only creates an inability for proper education of the subject matter, and consequently confusion. Therefore we must establish new, distinct terms for the immaterial existences, Forms, which are prior to matter, rather than calling them intelligences.

Here, I am afraid, I shall require once more the assistance of the giraffe...How did he come by his long neck? Lamarck would have said, by wanting to get at the tender leaves high up on the tree, and trying until he succeeded in wishing the necessary length of neck into existence... Darwin pointed out—and this and no more was Darwin's famous discovery—that [another] explanation, involving neither will nor purpose nor design either in the animal or anyone else, was on the cards. If your neck is too short to reach your food, you die. That may be the simple explanation of the fact that all the surviving animals that feed on foliage have necks or trunks long enough to reach it...Consider the effect on the giraffes of the natural multiplication of their numbers, as insisted on by Malthus. Suppose the average height of the foliage-eating animals is four feet, and that they increase in numbers until a time comes when all the trees are eaten away to within four feet of the ground. Then the animals who happen to be an inch or two short of the average will die of starvation. All the animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average will be better fed and stronger than the others. They will secure the strongest and tallest mates; and their progeny will survive whilst the average ones and the sub-average ones will die out. This process, by which the species gains, say, an inch in reach, will repeat itself until the giraffe's neck is so long that he can always find food enough within his reach, at which point, of course, the selective process stops and the length of the giraffe's neck stops with it. Otherwise, he would grow until he could browse off the trees in the moon. And this, mark you, without the intervention of any stockbreeder, human or divine...

Darwin's so-called "explanation" is incomplete. It is explained here how the animals which survive are the ones which happen to have longer necks, but it does not explain why they happen to have longer necks. Therefore it does not account for the "cause" of giraffes having longer necks. Lamarck's theory on the other hand addresses the issue of "causation". He says that a being's inclination to repeatedly act in a specific way affects its material body in a way which may be passed on to its offspring. Here, we can see that Lamarck accounts for the cause of existence of "animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average". Darwin simply takes this condition for granted, and produces an evolutionary theory based on the evidence of this reality.

So there is no fundamental and significant incompatibility between Lamarck's theory, and Darwin's theory, until we get to the idea of "chance", "accidental", or "spontaneous variations". Lamarck attributed such variations to the desires of the individual beings (notice that "desire" also includes sexual orientation).

But I think we ought to consider that Darwin has posited the cause of variation as unknown, not as "chance", or "random". This idea of chance or random variation might be an interpretive fallacy. The problem with Lamarck's view, which Darwin exposed, is that variations appear to be as likely to have a negative affect as they are to have a positive effect.

Under domestication we see much variability, caused, or at least excited, by changed conditions of life; but often in so obscure a manner, that we are tempted to consider the variations as spontaneous.
...Variability is not actually caused by man; he only unintentionally exposes organic beings to new conditions of life, and then nature acts on the organisation and causes it to vary.
... As geology plainly proclaims that each land has undergone great physical changes, we might have expected to find that organic beings have varied under nature, in the same way as they have varied under domestication. And if there has been any variability under nature, it would be an unaccountable fact if natural selection had not come into play. It has often been asserted, but the assertion is incapable of proof, that the amount of variation under nature is a strictly limited quantity. Man, though acting on external characters alone and often capriciously, can produce within a short period a great result by adding up mere individual differences in his domestic productions; and every one admits that species present individual differences.
...Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life and from use and disuse: a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. — Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Chapter XV: Recapitulation and Conclusion

https://infidels.org/library/historical/charles-darwin-origin-of-species-chapter15/

I'm not saying anything new here. — Agent Smith

If you say that color is a property, then when something changes from being green to being red, it still has the same property, color. So you assert change is a property, because for you a property is something which changes. But if green and red are distinct properties, then when something changes from green to red, the change is not a part of either of these properties, and change is not a property.

You are saying that "it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul". But some souls apparently do have an intellect. In their case, the intellect is part of the soul. The intellect cannot be at once part of the soul and separate from the soul.

This means that the parts of the soul have no separate existence from each other . The "separation" is only hypothetical. — Apollodorus

Sure, but if we go in this way, then as Aristotle shows, the separation of the soul from the body is only hypothetical.

However, the hypothetical separation is shown to be consistent with the evidence of temporal priority. The sensitive power is prior to the intellectual power, in time, therefore it exists independently of the intellectual power, at that time, so the hypothetical separation is scientifically proven by evidence. Likewise, the hypothetical separation between the nutritive and the sensitive power are proven by evidence.

There is no evidence though, to support the reverse separation. At no time does the intellectual power exist separately from the sensitive. And at no time does the sensitive power exist separately from the nutritive.

Therefore the hypothetical separation is very real, proven and true, when taken in one direction, but it is disproven in the other direction. The separation is evidently time dependent, and only the base powers exist separately from the higher powers, not vise versa.

It doesn't exclude the possibility, though. Who decides that "humans cannot obtain pure unaffected intelligence" and on what basis? — Apollodorus

This is the exact point of the discussion I was having with Wayfarer. This is what Aquinas explains, through reference to Aristotle's principles. The fact that the human intellect is dependent on the material body (by the principles described above) renders the human intellect as deficient. Human beings will never obtain pure unaffected intelligence because their intellectual power is dependent on the material body.

The theory of evolution states that intelligence evolved from physical matter. Yet you are saying that "the soul constructs the physical body". How does the soul do that? — Apollodorus

No one knows how the soul produces the living body. But the same principle which is derived from the hierarchy of powers, along with the principle of the cosmological argument, demonstrate that the soul is necessarily prior to the material body (being an organized body), as cause of it.

The powers are demonstrated by Aristotle, to be potentials, because they are not always active and potential is the feature of matter. Since there must be an actuality which gives actual existence to any potential which is actualized(the cosmological argument), there must be an actuality which is prior to the material living body, giving it existence as an actual organized body with powers. This actuality is the soul. So the cause of the material body having actual organized existence with powers, is the soul. Since it is prior to the material body as cause of it, (therefore separable by the principles above), it is immaterial.

Asfar as I'm concerned change happens to properties (colors, shapes, temperature, weight, etc.) — Agent Smith

"Color" does not refer to a property, nor does "shape", "temperature", or "weight". Otherwise red and green would be the same property, round and square would be the same property, hot and cold would be the same property, and 5 kg and 100 kg would also be the same property. Surely you've got something confused AS.

Numerals are symbols and as such they are especially useful when that for which they stand has no spatial existence. — Arne

Call me daft if you want Arne, but you'll have to explain this to me. In my usage 2 stands for two distinct things with spatial separation between them, and 3 stands for three spatially separated things, etc.. Therefore, contrary to what you say, numerals seem especially useful when they refer to things with spatial existence. And I really don't see how they would be at all useful (except for the purpose of deception) to refer to things without spatial existence, i.e. fictitious things.

If you would have spent a tad more time reading the last full paragraph of the comment you clearly spent a significant amount of time criticizing, you would see that I already addressed the possibility that even if we accept for sake of discussion that there are non-spatial entities, wouldn't they necessarily have to refer to an entity that is or was a spatial entity. — Arne

As I said, I see no point in accepting for the sake of discussion that "there are non-spatial entities", until someone can explain in a reasonable way exactly what a "non-spatial entity" could be. It's one thing to accept the possibility of non-spatial entities, and then move to discuss what a non-spatial entity might be, but it's a completely different thing to accept that there are non-spatial entities, when no one has made it clear how an "entity" could be non-spatial.

To be quite honest, the idea of the higher depending on the lower sounds a bit strange to me. Either the soul has powers or it has not. If it has, then it has them by virtue of being a soul, i.e., a living intelligent being endowed with powers. — Apollodorus

I don't see why this is difficult for you, it is simply a statement by Aristotle of what has been observed. We cannot think without some kind of images which are derived from sensation. And without nutrition we lose the capacity to sense. Therefore the intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power which is dependent on the nutritive. It's very consistent with the evidence of evolutionary development, so unless you reject evolution I don't see why it sounds strange to you.

n that case, humans can never attain higher states of consciousness either through Philosophy or by any other means.

Moreover, if the “intellect” continues to be affected even after being separated from the soul, what is the difference between an “intellect” with and an “intellect” without soul?

What is the purpose of Philosophy or spiritual practice? — Apollodorus

The fact that people can obtain different levels of consciousness does not imply that a person can obtain "pure unaffected intelligence". It's like you are arguing that if a person cannot obtain the status of 'the biggest thing possible', people cannot differ in size. That there is a limit to the human intellect which makes it impossible for a human being to obtain pure unaffected intelligence, does not imply that there is not different levels of intelligence within human beings.

The point is that it is impossible for an intellect to exist without a soul, but not impossible for a soul to exist without an intellect. So the intellect is dependent on the soul but the soul is not dependent on the intellect. The mode of dependency is what is described above; intellectual capacity is dependent on sense capacity which is dependent on the nutritive capacity which is dependent on soul. Therefore there is a medium of separation between the intellect and the soul, i.e. the intellect is not directly dependent on the soul, it is dependent on what lies between it and the soul, and this in turn is dependent on the soul.

.

Change is what happens to properties. Yes, that's what I wanted to say from the very beginning. As far as I can see, change isn't a property. — Agent Smith

That's not really true AS. Change is what happens to the thing. The thing either has or does not have the property, and in the time between it is changing. The property cannot change, or it would not be that property. It is, by definition, the stated property and there is no possibility of a changing property. Change is what happens to the thing in between having, and not having, the stated property.

It appears like your project is to remove all human feeling and emotion from the review of an artistic piece, and analyze it as an AI would. You would look for patterns in the content, specific to the piece itself, limiting the meaning of "content" in that way, by disallowing that the content be related to anything external to the piece itself, in the production of interpretive "meaning". Is this a fair summary of what you are promoting?

Someone other than I postulated a mortgage as an example of an entity that is not in space. — Arne

The mortgage example is not good, it's just a ruse. Numerals have spatial presence, along with the other stated conditions of a mortgage. If we couldn't refer to the numerals and the conditions somewhere, no one would ever know how much anyone owed, and we wouldn't have to pay our mortgages. So that's just wishful thinking, but not reality.

And it occurred to me that if we accept for the sake of discussion that mortgages are not in space, we can differentiate them by the order in which they are created, i.e., we could differentiate them by time. — Arne

If there is not any spatial difference between them, they would all appear to be exactly the same. So how would you be able to say when one or another got created? If there was one in existence, it would just seem like there was still one in existence, because you'd never be able to observe any change, no matter how many, and how often new ones were supposedly created.

Simply put, if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, then time is one method by which we can differentiate them. — Arne

I don't think we should accept such a proposal without some sort of demonstration as to how such proposed entities could exist. Banno is prone to making assertions, then refusing to justify them, so you ought to take this suggestion with a grain of salt.

But this raises an additional and perhaps more fundamental issue, i.e., even if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, do they not necessarily refer to an entity that is or once was in space? — Arne

I don't think it's very useful to "accept for the sake of discussion" a phrase which no one has any real understand of what it means. "Entities not in space" is such a phrase. Banno's examples refer to things whose spatial presence is difficult to describe, being very complex, not things which do not occupy some space. It is the approach of a lazy, unphilosophical mind, to simply assume that these things have no spatial presence, just because their spatial existence is difficult to understand.

The difficulty arises when we separate the intellect or intelligent spirit (nous) from the soul (psyche). — Apollodorus

Clearly, this separation is possible, warranted and not a difficulty, because plants have a soul, but no intellect. Therefore intellect is not an essential part of the soul, and it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul. So we must allow a separation between the intellect and the soul. This is explained by the hierarchy of powers. The intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power, which is dependent on the nutritive power. The nutritive power is not dependent on anything but the soul itself. Therefore those other lower powers can be seen as a medium between the intellect and the soul.

We can see a similar description in Kant. Knowledge is dependent on the a priori intuitions of space and time. Those intuitions are a medium between the soul, as knower, and knowledge, as property of the mind. The soul knows through the medium of those intuitions, it does not have direct access to the thing known.

If, pure, unaffected intelligence (nous) is separable from the soul (psyche) on the death of the physical body, then there is no possibility of divine judgement. — Apollodorus

The point being, that there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings. Human beings do not make divine judgements. The evidence is clear, intelligence is "affected". So setting up a model in which human intelligence is not separable from the soul, for the purpose of supporting the concept of "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings, is a mistaken intention, therefore a mistaken representation.

by time. — Arne

Why would this not be the same individual, extended in time?

As with any company, the balance sheet is what is important. That only sick people use pharmaceuticals is a long outdated idea. But it may be the case that a lot of fancy names are given to the conditions of non-sick people, to help ease them into the pharmaceutical market, in case that old idea might still persist. In many cases though, pharmaceuticals are used just to make one feel better, and so they are often not intended to cure.

Geez MU, who in the world ever said there was a norm of use with regard to a private language? — Sam26

You criticized me for interpretations of Wittgenstein which are "far from the norm". Aren't we discussing private language? As you say here, in regard to a private language, there is no norm. So, how is 'far from the norm" something to be critical of, rather than what is intended by Wittgenstein in his discussion of "private language"? And if it is what was intended by Wittgenstein, I would say that it is "the true" interpretation which is far better than any 'normal' interpretation.

We are only able to talk about the false assumption of having a private language, in light of the social nature of meaning, namely, it's a necessary feature of a concept that its meaning happens socially within forms of life, both linguistically and non-linguistically. — Sam26

It really doesn't matter if private language is a true or false assumption. Mathematics is full of axioms which are neither true nor false, yet we must adhere to the principles if applying the mathematics. Now we are discussing "private language". So we must adhere to the principles of that premise. Therefore there can be no such thing as "the norm" for interpreting Wittgenstein's conception of "private language". If there was a norm, then it would not be "private language".

So, the proposition is a language which is not based in norms. We cannot just dismiss the proposition as impossible, or false, because that would just circumvent the intent behind Wittgenstein's discussion of "private language", leaving Wittgenstein's whole discussion as pointless. Therefore we must accept the proposition, a language which is not based in norms, rather than rejecting it as false, in order to engage with his discussion.

If we separate the intellect from the soul, for example, we run the risk of falling into a similar trap to when we say that the soul has "separate" parts. — Apollodorus

The soul does have separate parts, that is well explained by Aristotle. That is why one soul has many different powers, what we might call different faculties. One soul cannot have distinct powers if it doesn't have distinct parts. So a living body is a composite of parts and I think it would be impossible for one soul to be the principle of actuality for many different material parts, if it did not have corresponding immaterial parts itself.

Equally problematic are the hypotheses that the soul constructs the body, that the body is a medium between soul and intellect, etc.

We would need to explain how the soul “constructs” the body, etc. — Apollodorus

This is exactly the problem which the science of biology has yet to resolve. Yes, "we need to explain" it, but we do not have the capacity, just like we do not have the capacity to explain how the universe was "constructed". Of course the biological problem ought to be easier to resolve than the cosmological problem, being nearer to us in space and time, but we can't even figure that one out yet.

That's a very good passage, and the sick man's tongue being affected by a bitter humour, is very similar to the tinted glass analogy which I think you and I discussed at some other time.

The fact that Aquinas holds "the soul" to be separate and immaterial is not at all debatable. That's what I've been saying all along, and it's consistent with how I interpret both Aristotle and Aquinas. The soul is necessarily prior (in time) to the living body, therefore it is not dependent on matter, it is separable in theory, and is therefore an immaterial principle.

The issue at hand is in what way the intellect is related to the soul. The passage you have provided states "...the human soul which is called the intellect...", so it equates the "human soul" with "the intellect".

I don't know where that passage is from, but a thorough reading of the section of the Summa Theologica, which I referenced, will demonstrate to you that we cannot equate "the soul" with "the intellect", as is demonstrated by Aristotle and accepted by Aquinas. Now, "soul" here in your passage is qualified with "human", which is a descriptive term of a living being with a material body. Therefore if there was a type of "soul" like the one referred to as "human soul" it would be dependent on a material body, the human body, and this dependence would negate the principle by which we say that the soul is immaterial, i.e. that it is prior to, and therefore not dependent on a material body.

In other words, saying "the human soul", implies that the soul referred to is dependent on the human body. And, if it is dependent on the human body, then the "soul" defined in this way as "human soul" cannot be immaterial by the principles employed to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul.

That is the problem which Christian theologians have with the type of immortality promised by Jesus and his disciples. I believe it's Paul, who offers a lecture on 'personal' immortality following human resurrection. This idea of personal resurrection, and personal immortality, is basic to early Christianity. It is however fundamentally inconsistent with Aristotelian principles which assign the uniqueness of the individual person to material accidentals, therefore one's personality is attributed to one's material existence. So when we release the soul from its material confines, which provide for the material descriptive terms, "plant", "animal", "human", "Wayfarer", etc., to allow for the true immateriality of the soul, we also lose personal identity (under Aristotelian principles). The soul cannot be immaterial, and also personal.

So Aquinas had a fine line to walk here, between two completely incompatible doctrines, personal immortality, as a traditional tenet of the Church, and the immateriality of the soul according to Aristotelian principles (science?). Aristotelian immateriality is based in the concept of "prior to matter", and assigns particular, individual, and personal identity to an object's material presence, posteriority. This directly conflicts with the classic Christian teaching of personal resurrection. What is prior, the immaterial soul, cannot be postulated as posterior, to support personal resurrection.

If you look closely into Aquinas' metaphysics and theology, you'll see that ultimately he chooses the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. Take a look at the first line from your quoted passage. "I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." This is consistent with Aristotle. The soul, as the source of activity, actuality, is the first principle of intellectual operation. This is the very same for all the powers of the soul. The soul is the first principle, as the source of activity, for self-nutrition, sensation, and self-movement, each and every power of a living being.

So we have no substantial difference between "the soul" as the principle of intellectual activity, and "the soul" as the principle of sensitive activity, and "the soul" as the principle of self-movement, and "the soul" as the principle of nutritive activity. This is very consistent with Aristotle, and vitalism in general, where the soul is the first principle of actuality of a living body. Where the difficulty for Aquinas, and the Scholastics in general, arises, is that this actuality, or first activity, which is responsible for, as cause of the activities of the living body, requires something passive, something receptive, to receive that immaterial activity which is proper to "the soul", and be 'actualized' into motion by the soul.

In the case of the power which is called intellection, this calls for "the passive intellect". And here begins the debate. We have two distinct approaches to the passive intellect, analogous to top-down, and bottom-up, each of which provides an understanding in an 'opposite way' to the other. The Aristotelian approach is most properly described as a bottom-up approach, because "the soul" is understood to be at the base, prior to the material body, and the material body is constructed by the soul in a bottom-up manner. The power of intellection is therefore something produced by the soul through the means of the material body. The top-down approach starts with intellection as a direct activity, derived directly from the soul. There is no medium of passivity between the soul and the intellect, and the intellect is an active part of the active immaterial soul.

You can see that the top-down approach has the intellect directly united to the soul, immediately active, with nothing passive between the soul and the intellect. Then the intellect itself is directly active, and the passive element is the forms, ideas, phantasms, etc., which are derived from the senses. The bottom- up approach has the biological, material body, as a medium between the soul and the intellect. The material body therefore serves as the passive element, which receives the activity of the soul. Under this view, the intellect itself is essentially passive, a potency or power, which is actualized by the soul. And you can see how there is a medium of separation (matter) between the activity of the soul, and the activity of the intellect. In this way the intellect can passively receive the actual forms, phantasms and images received through the senses, and also be receptive to the actuality of the soul. This makes the intellect itself the divisor between the two distinct types of actuality (substance dualism) described by Aristotle, the immaterial actuality of the soul, and the actuality of material objects.

A thorough analysis will reveal that the bottom-up way of understanding is more consistent with the evidence and the scientific understanding which we have. We can learn this lesson from Plato's description of vision in the Theaetetus. Here, sight is described as an activity, a motion which is emitted from the eye, and meets with the object, similar to a bat's sonic sensing. This is analogous to the top-down understanding of the intellect within which the intellect is directly united with the activity of the soul, acting on things. In reality though, we need to understand the intellect as a passive receiver, just like the eye is a passive receiver, and it is acted upon from both sides, the forms which it receives, and its primary actualization from the soul.

If you proceed onward in your study of Aquinas, toward understanding the appetites, you will see more clearly why it is necessary to posit this separation between the soul and the intellect, to account for the reality of the will. The will must be placed as higher than the intellect, in an absolute way, to account for the reality of the free will. That the rational human being can move and think in a way which is irrational, is very clear evidence of the medium between the soul and the intellect. And to postulate that the intellect always controls the will is simply an unreal representation.

Of course it is! That is the whole point! You said: — Wayfarer

Of course the rational power is specific to human beings. It is that way by definition. We have no disagreement with this. What I said is that the rational power is not separable from the lower powers, because it is dependent on them. Therefore we cannot separate a "rational soul" from a "sensitive soul", nor can we separate a "sensitive soul" from a "vegetative soul", though we can make the inverse separations. The higher power is dependent on the lower. That is the point which Aristotle makes at your reference. This has nothing to do with how we define the rational power as being specific to human beings.

The key point is the levels of dependency of the powers, what you call being "nested". The lowest power, self-nutrition is first, so it is dependent on nothing but the soul itself. Therefore we can say that this power is separable from the others, and not dependent on any of the others. But as we move to the higher powers, sensation and local motion, we see that they are not separable from the lower power, but dependent on it. And the even higher power, intellection, is not separable from the lower ones, but is dependent on them. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is in direct contradiction to the understanding of rationality that is in both Aristotle and Aquinas. Reason, rationality, the power of abstract thought, is unique to humans. It is through that power that humans grasp the essence or forms of things, though in a limited way (except, as noted, for 'the blessed' who see in a way that the rest of us don't.) — Wayfarer

You've already demonstrated to me that you are not very well-read in either Aristotle or Aquinas, so the fact that you think what I say directly contradicts them both doesn't hold much weight for me.

Consider, that reasoning and abstract thinking are the way that we apprehend the immaterial, but this does not mean that reasoning and abstract thinking are themselves immaterial. Actually, they are clearly dependent on the material, as Aristotle demonstrates, and so they cannot be truthfully said to be immaterial. For both, Aristotle and Aquinas, the immaterial aspect of a living being is the soul, and this is the same whether the living being is a plant or an animal.

That the human being can grasp the reality of an immaterial soul which is proper to all living beings, as necessarily prior in time to the material body of a living being, does not imply that the tool used to apprehend that reality, the rational intellect, is itself immaterial. This leads us into the need for a duality, the passive intellect, and the active intellect. As Aristotle explains at 432a, no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, as the activity of the mind depends on images which provide sense content.

Aristotle says the rational soul is a power unique to the human which enables her to speak and think. — Wayfarer

Sorry to be blunt Wayfarer, but I don't think you've read the material. If so you wouldn't be saying "the rational soul is a power", you'd be saying that the soul has a power which is rationality. There's a big difference between these two. At Bk4 Ch.3 he turns to the rational "part of the soul". "Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks...". And what he means by "part of the soul" has already been explained in BK3, as a power of the soul.

We cannot describe "the soul" as rational because "the soul" is the fundamental actuality of all plants and animals, but only human beings have rationality. And we cannot say that the soul of the human being is rational because the soul of the human being, as "soul" is no different from the soul of a plant.

But for Aristotle a soul is necessarily united with a material body, just like the union of matter and form in material things. So when we say that a human being is rational, we do not say this of the human being's soul, that it is rational, we say that of the union of body and soul, the human being is rational.

In relation to the soul itself, rationality is a potential, and this allows that the human being may act rationally and may not act rationally. We say the human being is a rational animal, but since rationality is related to the soul as a power, or potential, this means that the specified animal has the potential to be rational, but is not necessarily rational all the time. So we cannot describe the soul (the first principle of actuality) of the human being as "rational", because it is not rational all the time, it only has the power to be rational. If we defined it as necessarily rational that would be a false premise leading to unsound logical conclusions.

There is no mention of "the rational soul". That would be a completely different concept from "the rational part of the soul", which is what he is talking about.

OK - 'powers of the soul'. The rational power is unique to humans. That is the point at issue, which you've spilled thousands of words obfuscating. — Wayfarer

That the rational power is unique to humans is not the point of disagreement. I said that when we first engaged, it is unique, but as explained by Aristotle it is dependent on the lower powers. What is at issue is the relationship between the soul (which is actual) and the power (which is potential).

That's a nice image. I once read that the ancient Greek saw the human body as loosely connected parts, instead of the harmonious whole it seems to be nowadays. Seems a whole lot closer to reality. In fact, it looks that my hands have some kind of life of their own, typing and holding! — Raymond

I think the view was that the soul is what causes the body to hold together as a harmonious whole.

:up:
And Sam26 says my interpretations of Wittgenstein are "so far from the norm". What Sam refuses to accept, is that when we are talking "private language", there is not such thing as the norm. How can one even discuss the possibility of private language if one insists that language use must be normative?

The capacity to perceive other beings reaches the highest level when a being is actually what they are in one's presence. — Paine

I don't understand what you're saying here. Could you explain?

The soul, according to Aristotle, is the animating principle of all living things (hence the name of the text 'De Anima'). The soul is the principle that enables a body to engage in the necessary activities of life. The more parts of the soul a being possesses, the more evolved and developed s/he is. The three types of soul are the nutritive, the sensible, and the rational. — Wayfarer

These are not called "three types of soul" by Aristotle. This is clearly a misreading, and he is quite explicit. These are stated as "powers" of the soul, potencies, or capacities. Also, it is questioned whether the soul is one and indivisible, as is commonly said of the "soul", or in what sense can these be said to be "parts" of the soul.

He explains why they are described as "potentials" (powers) when he discusses sensation. Rather than something actual, as the soul is, he explains how the powers are not always in activity. A being is not always eating, one is not always sensing (we sleep), so these powers are potencies which need to be actualized. The soul is the principle of activity, the actuality which actualizes the distinct powers. So there is necessarily a logical separation between the soul itself, and its powers, the former being actual, the latter being potential.

Now, "potential" according to the principles of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics, is the defining principle of "matter". Therefore we can conclude that the "powers" of the soul are proper to the material body.

Aquinas tackles this issue extensively. He questions where does the "habit" reside. A habit being a property which a living being has, which is the propensity to act in a specific way. He concludes that habits, including intellectual habits like reasoning, must be seated in the material aspect of the being. The free-will is a completely different issue though, which complicates the subject. The actions of the free will cannot be classed as habits. Free will is a capacity to act independently, even from the conclusions of reason, which is an habitual action.

This was one of the biggest problems Plato, Augustine, and the early Christian theologists faced. How is it that we can act in a way which is contrary to what we know is good, right, and reasonable? That principle provides the strength by which Plato attacked the sophists who proposed "virtue is knowledge", and claimed to be able to teach virtue. Augustine developed the concept of "free will" as the solution to this problem.

Are you familiar with Lamarckian evolutionary theory? Jean-Baptiste Lamarck proposed an evolutionary theory prior to Darwin. His theory delved deeply into the relationship between habits and the material body of a living being. He proposed that a living being developed a habit, and that the material body of the being evolved in such a way as to support the habit. You can see how this is somewhat contrary to Aquinas who concluded that a habit is only supported by the appropriate material body. And western science scoffed at Lamarck when Darwin produced an evidence based theory.

The problem of course is that scientific evidence is material, and material arrangements (organization), are apprehended as the cause of specific activities. So unless we include final cause (intent, desire, and want) as an immaterial cause of action, we cannot ever conceive of how the propensity to act in a specific way could produce a material body suited toward that activity. This is the problem which Lamarckian evolution faces.

So if we position "free will" (being the capacity to act in any way, free from the influence of material or efficient cause), at the base of the powers of the soul, then we have the principle required for such an evolutionary theory. We can say that the soul itself is a first actuality, which has the capacity to act freely from causal influence. However, then we still must account for intent, desire, and want. So we need to place final cause (intention) as inherent within the soul. This places what we call "free will" as fundamental to all living things, at the base of life itself, allowing that things such as desire and want may be responsible for the souls activities, and such activities may cause the existence of a material body to support habituation, and Lamarckian evolution.

Aristotle is very clear in Bk2, Ch4, to state that the soul is the cause of the material body. Where you and I seem to disagree is whether it is a distinct type of soul which causes a distinct type of body. I think that this would render "the soul" as unintelligible, being particular to a material object, and this is exactly what Aristotle was trying to avoid.

The nutritive soul is the first and common to all living things. — Wayfarer

"The nutritive soul" is a misrepresentation. Look at Bk2, ch2, 413a, 31-34, for example: "The power of self-nutrition... This is the originative power...".

A "power" is a potential, a capacity, as Aristotle explains. The soul is an actuality. So "nutritive soul", "sensible soul", and "rational soul" are all misconceptions. The powers which are described as nutritive, sensible, and rational, are all potentials, so they cannot be said to be souls, as the soul is something actual.

The sensible soul is the part of the soul by which the environment is perceived. — Wayfarer

And this is incoherent. You are saying the sensible "soul" is a part of the soul. If it's a soul, how can it be a part of the soul. That's why Aristotle calls it a "power". It is an attribute, something which the soul has as a property. But all these parts, being powers, capacities, or potentials, are all housed in the material body, which consists of parts.

I highly recommend that you read Aristotle's work yourself, to avoid the sloppy terminology you present here. That is the problem with most modern, popular representations of classical philosophy. The modern attitude has already dismissed the classics as irrelevant, so they are presented in a careless way which demonstrates this dismissal. Aristotle was very logical, and he was very clear to represent self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection, as powers of the soul, not as distinct souls.

I've read "On the Soul" a number of times. Book two starts with a definition of "soul".
"That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized." 412a28

There is nothing to indicate that "soul" means something different for every different living thing. In fact Aristotle is very clear to say that he is asking "what is soul?", in general. And his answer indicates that he will use It always to mean the very same thing, the first grade of actuality of a living body, no matter what type of living body it is.

Indeed! The argument went like this: tell the alien (who speaks English and physics) to rotate an ἤλεκτρον (a Greek electron, supposing they are not made of anti matter...). Or better, a bunch of them. Tell them to take a circular electrical wire put a voltage on it, and the electrons start to rotate. The electron rotation and the direction of the ensuing magnetic force have a fixed relation. Coordinate the rotation direction and the direction of the magnetic field (like you can coordinate your up direction and front direction with positive numbers).Then place a bunch of Cobalt atoms at the origin of this coordinate frame. Cobalt sends positrons in one direction only. Coordinate this direction with plus. But then... It depends on the way you place this new axis orthogonal to the other two in two ways. To put it differently, you can connect you plane with the two plus directions in two ways with the direction in which the positrons come flying off the Cobalt. So surely he was joking, mr. Feynman. — Raymond

I think that the reliability of this sort of method is doubtful. There may be a larger context which determines a left or right rotation which we are unaware of. Take the Coriolis effect for example. The flow around low pressure is counter-clockwise in the northern hemisphere, and clockwise in the southern hemisphere. If a person lived only in the northern hemisphere, and did not know about the forces of this larger context which changes the direction of spin, one might use this cyclonic spin as an example of right and left. The person would be unaware that in a different context (the southern hemisphere) the spin would be reversed.

You're not seeing the big picture Wayfarer. "Human being" is a classification of animal defined as "rational animal". Therefore all human beings are animals, and it is illogical to separate "human being" from "animal". That would contradict the definition. Have you read Aristotle's "Prior Analytics"? The defining idea is said to be "within" the idea defined. So "animal" is a defining idea of "man", therefore the idea of "animal" is within the idea of "man". Human beings cannot be separated from animals in the way that you propose, because "animal" inheres within "human being".

In a similar way, both "plant" and "animal" are described as living, aka things with a soul. Just like it is illogical to separate "rational animal" from "animal", because "animal" is inherent within "rational animal", it is also illogical to separate "the soul" of the rational animal from "the soul" of the plant. This would be like saying that it means something different for a rational animal to be living (have a soul) from what it means for a plant to be living (have a soul). That would make "soul" mean something different for every different type of living being, defeating any logical attempt to understand the reality of the immaterial (soul) with the consequent equivocation. If we follow this route, ultimately "soul" would mean something different for every particular, distinct living being, and the real immaterial existence which is represented as "soul" would be rendered as unintelligible, meaning something different in every particular instance where it appears.

Instead, we ought to allow as Aristotle describes, that "soul" means the same for all living beings, thereby making "soul" something intelligible. So it is defined as the first cause of actual being of a living body. Therefore to say that "the soul" of a rational animal is something different from "the soul" of a plant is to contradict this definition.

Go for it baker, it sounds like Baden has challenged you. Express your hatred, maybe you'll get banned, and maybe not. It seems kinda like Russian roulette, a lot to lose in comparison with what you might win.

Look closely at what Aristotle is saying here. These are called "powers" of the soul. They are not distinct souls, or degrees of soul, but capacities of "the soul". You'll understand this better if you read what he says about "habits" (I'm sorry I can't remember the references). The word "habit" is very closely related to "to have", in the sense of a property or attribute. So the capacities of the soul manifest in a way like habits. So these "powers" are not different "degrees of soul" as if one power makes an individual more of a soul than another, they are properties of the soul, as in what the soul has, as a habit. Habits, including intellectual habits are discussed at length by Aquinas.

The key point is the levels of dependency of the powers, what you call being "nested". The lowest power, self-nutrition is first, so it is dependent on nothing but the soul itself. Therefore we can say that this power is separable from the others, and not dependent on any of the others. But as we move to the higher powers, sensation and local motion, we see that they are not separable from the lower power, but dependent on it. And the even higher power, intellection, is not separable from the lower ones, but is dependent on them.

So, when we look at the rational being, with the power of intellection, we must conclude, by these principles, that the rational soul is not a separate soul from the nutritive soul, the rational part being dependent on the nutritive part, therefore inseparable from it, while the nutritive part is not dependent on the rational part, and is separable from it. Notice that this dependency is within the parts, the attributes of the soul, not the soul itself.

You'll see that at 413b25 he says the power to think "seems to be a widely different kind of soul...", but he proceeds to describe how this is contrary to the evidence already stated. Therefore I think we need to conclude that the rational soul cannot be a distinct, or separate kind of soul.

I never heard that one from Dr. Feynman. He was a good joker though. There might be some truth to this. If the right and left of the observer transposed exactly to the right and left of the weak force, then one who knows the weak force ought to be able to determine one's own right and left from this principle, in the reverse fashion. The principles of the weak force would be the larger context.

Suppose the principles of the weak force are like the directions NSEW. If we can communicate to an alien which directions are NSEW, then the alien can determine right and left from this. The problem though, is that if N and S are the opposing aspects of a true symmetry, then there is no way to tell one from the other without reference to something further. So we'd have to refer to a larger context in order to differentiate N from S. And, in the case of the weak force, as you say, the larger context would end up being right and left.

//ps// one more thing - how do you interpret this definition from an online dictionary:

Definition of rational soul: the soul that in the scholastic tradition has independent existence apart from the body and that is the characteristic animating principle of human life as distinguished from animal or vegetable life
— compare ANIMAL SOUL, VEGETABLE SOUL — Wayfarer

It's not a definition of "soul" which I would accept. I really try to steer away from online dictionaries, especially for philosophical purposes they're often pop oriented. Even SEP I find is heavily slanted in a direction heading toward popularism, in relation to IEP for example, which itself is quite deficient.

I completely accept the Aristotelian tradition, in which "soul" is defined as the animating principle, the first form of a living body, as the actual cause of existence of that material body. This is similar to vitalism. So, as "soul", there is no difference between the soul of a plant and the soul of an animal, or even the soul of a human being. And the soul is the immaterial base, being prior to the material body. Any other attribute of a living being is posterior to the material body, therefore not properly Immaterial in the sense of being independent from matter.

It is evident that what differs between the living beings is their material bodies. And, the difference between these material bodies is what enables the distinct and particular activities of the immaterial soul; rational thinking being one of those activities.

The level of immaterial existence, from which the soul comes, is unknown to us because we barely even recognize the reality of immaterial existence, let alone have a real understanding of the different levels of immaterial existence. Suffice it to say, that I believe all earthbound living beings are of the same level of immaterial existence, being like one big family. But unless we accept the reality of immaterial existence, and bring this idea back into mainstream culture so that proper study of it is appropriately encouraged, and we can achieve adequate education in this field, any suggestion of different levels to immaterial existence by you, I, or anyone else, are just statements of opinion.

How can you define left and right without to referring to spatial arrangements in the first place? — Raymond

You can't, that's the point, "right and left" requires context.

We have the context built in to our bodies.
We have a built in forward: this is where our eyes look. We have a built in up: this points out of the top of our heads. These two directions together create a plane. Our bodies are symmetric about this plane. We call one side of the plane right, the other left. No reference to a larger context here. — hypericin

Ok. let's take this one step at a time Hyper. There is a built in front and back, and a built in up an down. Do you agree, that the reason why we can say that these are "built in", is because there is a distinct difference between up and down, and also between front and back? If there was not that built in difference we would not be able to make those direct distinctions simply by referring directly to the body.

Now, lets take the plane created here, up and down along with front and back, and lets suppose each side of the plane is perfectly symmetrical with the other side. There is no differences which would distinguish one side of the plane from the other. By what principle would you say that one side of the plane is right and the other side left, without referring to some further context like NSEW?

But I don't think that any of those sources presume the radical division between the human and the divine that you are suggesting. — Wayfarer

I think you misunderstand classical philosophy if you do not apprehend this as a radical division. It is the division represented by Kant as the distinction between phenomena and noumena. It starts with Plato, who produced a vague outline in the cave allegory. Notice the difference between the fire in the cave, and the sun itself. Suppose the fire represents what people think is "good", then the sun represents the true or divine "good". This division, or separation between what people think, and what is the true, or divine Idea, is paramount in the method of Platonic dialectics.

Aristotle expounded on this separation, and firmly refuted the Pythagorean cosmology which held that the universe was composed of mathematical objects. This is the problem which occurs if we do not uphold the radical division. The principles of mathematics which are being applied at any particular point in history, being observed as extremely successful in their application, are assumed to actually be the constituent parts of the universe. This negates the possibility of truth as correspondence, because the principles are supposed to be the very thing which correspondence theory would say that they must correspond with.

It is precisely because of the ability of reason to discern the Ideas that differentiates humans from animals. — Wayfarer

It is this differentiation by species of animal, that I am arguing is wrong. It fails in it's ability to account for the reality of evolution by falling into the trap of the incompatibility between being and becoming, which Plato and Aristotle exposed. This incompatibility is exploited in sophistry to produce all sorts of absurd conclusions.

Here's another example of this incompatibility. In the science of the psyche, the concept of a "state of mind" is often employed. But the mind is always active, and such a concept is a generalization which is very useful in many ways, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of an active mind. This is the same problem we have in representing life forms as "species". It is a very useful for many purposes to represent life forms as static "species" which exist at any moment in time, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of actively evolving beings because it doesn't properly represent the temporal extension.

It seems odd that, on the one hand, you deny the radical difference between humans and animals, which traditional philosophy ascribes to reason, and claims is a fundamental distinction, but on the other hand, you wish to ascribe a radical difference between the human and the divine, when according to Christianity man is created 'imago dei'. — Wayfarer

The divisions I propose are well justified. The divine Forms are temporally prior to, as cause of, matter, and all material existence. Living beings on earth are temporally posterior to matter, and material existence. That is a radical difference. There is no such radical difference between the individual species of living beings, as genetics and evolution demonstrate to us.

Where we need to impose divisions is with respect to types of matter, or substance. We have divine Forms, which as I explained are prior to, as cause of, matter and substance. But there are levels of priority, some types of substance or matter, are temporally prior to others. So Aquinas for example, posits angels to account for the different levels of priority. Then we have the soul, which is prior to, and cause of all the organic matter, or substance on earth, but not prior to other types of matter.

So in as much as I divide the divine from the living soul, by placing matter as the medium between them, I allow for different types of matter, some temporally prior to others. This is the complexity of material existence. Immateriality can be defined as temporally prior to matter, but since there is a temporal order to the types of matter, the living soul might be immaterial in relation to one type of matter, as temporally prior to it, but still posterior to other types of matter, placing the soul at a lower degree of immateriality than the angels and God. An immaterial being is required as cause of each and every material existence.

Here, it is said 'the blessed who see God know all things in the eternal types'. The blessed are able to see something which the run of the mill do not. So again the separation from the human and the divine is by no means absolute. — Wayfarer

To "see God", and to know that God knows, in no way implies that the person who sees God knows what God knows. And this is where the division between types of intelligible objects lies. If there was no way of knowing that there is anything at all on the other side of the division, it would not be a division, just a boundary, and we'd all be atheist. But since there is a medium between the immateriality of the living soul, and the divine immateriality, and the medium we know as matter, we understand matter as a divisor rather than a boundary.

Thanks for your efforts to explain these things to me.

Your right side and left side of your body is identifiable independently of your location. The notion is unconnected to your current environment. — hypericin

Think about it, if you have no location, you cannot have any right or left side. To have a right and left side implies that you have parts existing in a relation to each other, which is defined by reference to a larger context, north, south, east, west. To have such direction means that you occupy some place on the earth. This means that you have a location, which fits that context.

You cannot have parts existing in spatial relationships with each other unless they have that relation at some place, that's what "spatial" means. You can have an abstract square, and define the relations of its parts, but these relations are not spatial, they are geometrical, so there is no right or left side of the square. To make them "spatial" is to apply the geometry to "space". The concept of "right" and "left" are already "spatial", being defined by north, south, east, west. So right and left only have meaning in a larger context. If you removed that defining feature, the larger context, how would you know which side of your body is right and which is left?

It is the nous, the 'rational soul of man' that corresponds with the incorporeal element, is it not? (Regardless, I will try and slog through more of the Summae.) — Wayfarer

I believe it is the soul itself which is the incorporeal element. And this is the same for all living things. This is the Aristotelian structure. Then it is the various powers, capacities, or potencies, of the soul which define the type of living being. Plants have the power of self-nourishment, other things have self-movement, and some have sensation, while human beings are rational. Each of these powers, being a potency, is in that way incorporeal. But the specific nature of any particular potency is determined by the material body which it depends on. So the rational power of the human being differs from the power of thought which other animals have, because the human being's material body differs.

My approach is not as detailed as that laid out by Metaphysician Undiscovered. It's simply defending the assertion that 'there are real ideas'. This means that there are ideas that are not dependent on some particular mind entertaining them or that are casually dependent on individual minds. It doesn't mean that these ideas exist in a separate domain, other than in the sense understood by expressions such as 'the domain of real numbers'. In that usage, I'm inclined to say that 'domain' should not be understood to exist temporally or spatially as an actual place, but is nevertheless real - hence, transcendent, or 'real in all possible worlds'. — Wayfarer

What comes from the work of Plato and Aristotle, and culminates in Aquinas, is the reality of a completely separate domain of Forms. This is the realm of the divinity, God. These separate, or independent Forms are responsible for, as cause of, the material universe, just like human ideas are the cause of artificial things.

It is very important to acknowledge the separation between the independent Forms, and human ideas, because this is recognition of the fallibility of human knowledge. You can think of it as the idea that the laws of physics are meant to represent something which has causal influence in the material world, but how well these laws actually represent the independent Forms, is questionable. So as much as we desire to be God-like, it is fundamental to theology, that having the power of God is not possible for any human beings.

This lesson is told by Aquinas with reference to the fallen angels. Lucifer, or Satan, desires not only to be like God, but to be equal to God, or to actually be God. This required that Lucifer relinquish the belief that God is higher. But to position oneself as equal to God is the greatest sin.

This is why we need to maintain the separation between the independent Forms of divinity, and the ideas of the human mind. The former being properly immaterial, the latter being dependent on material existence.

Other than scholarly interest, how does this model of reality play out in your daily life? What value is there in accepting this version of idealism? — Tom Storm

It helps me to obtain mental peace.

How does Aristotle demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers and actualizes these ideas? — Tom Storm

Aristotle explains this by describing what he calls "geometrical constructs". We must assign some causality to the act of the mind which "discovers" the geometrical figure. But the principle discovered must in some way exist prior to being discovered. So he assigns actualizing to the process of discovery, and potential to the existence which the principle has, prior to being discovered. He proposes this as a way to avoid the difficulties which arise from Plato's demonstration of the theory of recollection.

Show me where Thomas Aquinas says that the human intellect produces its own ideas and forms. — Wayfarer

We've been through this already Wayfarer, and I've provided the reference. Also, I explained to you how I understood this issue in a way very similar to the way that you do, in my earlier days of studying philosophy. I studied both Plato and Aristotle quite a lot, before moving on to Neo-Platonists and Augustine. I was completely under the impression that "universals" were understood to have separate, independent existence, as modern day Platonism holds.

But then I began to study Aquinas, and found that he explicitly rejects this theory, and he refers to Aristotle for the principles of his rejection. I was taken aback, and had to reread a lot of Aristotle's material to find where I misunderstood. The point of revelation for me was what is referred to as the cosmological argument. This is where he lays down the difference between potential and actual in a temporal framework. What he shows, Metaphysics Bk.9, is that actuality must be prior to potentiality in an absolute way. This is because any potential needs something to actualize it (efficient cause), So if potentiality was prior to actuality, in an absolute way, that potential could not ever be actualized. Therefore, he concludes that anything eternal must be actual. (This is a fundamental difference between Christian theology which holds the eternal God to be actual, and Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, which holds the first principle, the One, to be an unlimited potency.)

Then Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers them, that actualizes these ideas. The ideas only have actual existence after being discovered, and prior to being discovered they exist only potentially. But according to the cosmological argument, these "potential" ideas cannot be eternal. So this effectively refutes Pythagorean idealism, and what Aristotle referred to as "some Platonists" who posited these ideas as eternal.

That revelation inspired me to revisit Plato, and there I saw the seed for the division between human Ideas, which are passive potential, as tools in the minds of human beings, and the divine Forms which are separate, and active in the causal creation of the world. The material world, I now see as a medium of separation between the human minds seeking to understand reality, and the divine Forms which are separate, independent, and active in the creation of the material world.

If you look at Aquinas' Summa Theologica you'll see a section called "Treatise On Man", Questions 75-102. It is a long section, but I recommend a thorough reading to understand Aquinas' portrayal of the relationship between the soul, the human body, and the intellect, and how the human body is a sort of medium between the soul and the intellect, even though it is proper to attribute the intellect as a property of the soul. Understanding this relationship is very important and significant in understanding the distinction between the active intellect and the passive intellect.

I will direct you expressly to Q.84, "How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It". Art.4 "Whether the Intelligible Species are Derived by the Soul from Certain Separate Forms". You'll see a discussion questioning why (the sufficient reason) the soul is united to a body. If the human intellect derives its intelligible objects directly from separate Forms, there would be no reason for the soul to be united with a body. However, the soul is united to a body, and uses the senses to "receive" intelligible forms. At Art.6 I believe you'll find what you asked me for, a description of how "the active intellect...causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction."

However, I will add that there is still the matter of the "passive intellect". So this explanation does not account for the totality of intellectual knowledge, it accounts only for the material cause, as Aquinas says. The "passive intellect" is the controversial aspect of Aquinas' portrayal. Something passive is required to act as the receptor, when we say that the intellect receives forms. But if we see this "receiving" as a misrepresentation, and portray the intellect as creating the forms entirely, rather than receiving some aspect of the form through sensation, then the issue is resolved.

It is the supposed separation between the senses and the intellect, coming from antiquity, which causes this problem. Due to this separation, the intellect must receive something from the senses, which in turn receive something from the objects, and at each step of the way there must be a passive and an active aspect. If we dissolve the separation between senses and intellect, and allow that the two are one thing with two parts, then the senses become the passive part, and the intellect becomes the active part, thereby removing the need for the controversial "passive intellect".

This distinction between receiving and creating forms, is the same as the distinction between discovering and producing ideas. In order to account for the reality of the fallibility of the human intellect we must allow that the intellect creates the intelligible forms which it utilizes, rather than representing the intellect as receiving the forms which it uses.

Sorry for the late reply. I got a bit entangled in this field last days. I traveled from the big bang (the ones in front of us and the ones starting behind us), mass gaps, pseudo-Euclidean metrics, closed, presymplectic differential- and two-forms, Poincaré transformations, the Wightman axioms, tangent-, cotangent, fibre, spin bundles, distributions, superspace, gauge fields (resulting from differential 2-form bundles), correlations (Green's functions), Lie groups and Grassman variables, operator valued distributions, point particles and their limits, to the nature of spin and spacetime, spacetime symmetries, lattice calculations as a non-perturbative approach, the non-applicability of QFT to bound systems, a mirror universe, composite quarks and leptons (no more breaking of an artificial symmetric Higgs potential!), viruses falling in air, and of course symmetries. I just want to know! — AgentTangarine

It occurs to me, that only a bot could do that in just a few days.

The B-vector is a pseudo-vector. It has weird relection properties. If the vector is reflected in a mirror parallel to it, it changes direction. When reflected in a mirror perpendicular to it, it stays the same. Contrary to the E-field. — AgentTangarine

What does this mean, to produce a reflection of a vector? You refer to a "mirror", but surely no one holds a mirror to a vector field. What kind of material might be used to create such a reflection? I ask because it's possible that the weird reflection properties you refer to, are a product of the method employed to create the reflection.

Moving on to QFT. The A-field is a field that is not a part of the electron field. It is introduced to compensate for changes in the electron field (a Dirac spinor field, like that of quarks and leptons, and probably two massless sub-particles). If you gauge the electron field [this field assigns to all spacetime points an operator valued distribution (which creates the difference with classical mechanics which uses a real valued function), the operator creating particle states in a Fock space], you mentally rotate the particle state vectors in the complex plane. All the states can be seen as vectors in a complex plane (the plane of complex numbers). You have to rotate space twice to rotate such a vector once, hence these are spin 1/2 spinor fields. The local gauge rotates them differently at different spacetime points. This has an effect on the Lagrangian describing the motion, i.e.the integral over time being stationary, the difference with the classical case being that all varied paths are in facts taken, with a variety of weights. — AgentTangarine

I must admit, I do not understand "complex numbers". Wikipedia tells me that complex numbers are a combination of real numbers with imaginary numbers. But I apprehend imaginary numbers as logically incompatible with real numbers, each having a different meaning for zero, so any such proposed union would result in some degree of unintelligibility.

Now, for the Lagrangian (which is the difference between kinetic and potential energy, like the Hamiltonian is the sum) to stay the same, a compensation has to be introduced. That's the A-field, which is a potential energy inserted in the Lagrangian since we started from a free field. Why should the Lagrangian stay the same? That's an axiom. But a reasonable one. — AgentTangarine

This is the part which really throws me. How does a physicist dealing with fields distinguish between potential and kinetic energy? From my minimal degree of education in this field, I would think that all energy of a field would be potential energy, energy available to cause motion of a particle. If a field is supposed to have kinetic energy, I would assume that this field would be proposed as moving relative to another field. But how would that motion be modeled other than as the motion of the physical object which creates the field, relative to the other object which creates the other field? If this is the case, then the field of the moving object is simply a representation of potential energy, and transformation principles would be required to represent this field as actually moving relative to another field. In other words, I don't see how a field can be represented as actually moving, rather than simply being represented as a field existing relative to an object, and this field might be changing (not moving) relative to other objects, while the objects are represented as moving relative to each other. And if a field cannot be represented as moving, how can it have kinetic energy?

So it appears to me like what you are saying is that physicists start with some basic assumptions of symmetry, like 'there must be a conservation of energy', but when this is not consistent with observations, they just find ways to fudge the numbers, to be consistent with the fundamental assumptions. For example, if the observed potential energy of an electromagnetic field is not consistent with that same energy's representation as kinetic energy, a compensatory field must be created to account for the difference.

It's a factual observation. Radical means 'at the root', and h. sapiens are radically different to other species, even to their simian relatives. Not in biological terms, as our kinship with the biological order is obvious and manifold, but on the grounds of attributes. — Wayfarer

Well, this is where we disagree then. I do not see an "at the root" difference between human beings and other mammals. I think the fact that they are all mammals indicates that they are the same at the root.

'Species' are real, the term has a perfectly intelligible definition in biology, 'a group of living organisms consisting of similar individuals capable of exchanging genes or interbreeding. The species is the principal natural taxonomic unit, ranking below a genus and denoted by a Latin binomial, e.g. Homo sapiens.' — Wayfarer

That it has a definition does not make it something real. That goes to the very heart of the weakness of mathematics and logic. Because it is an axiom, and is accepted by the community of mathematicians, or logicians, does not mean that it is true. And, the fact that untruths can be accepted as fundamental premises in any field of science, turns this weakness into a real problem.

The problem with the definition of "species" which you provide, is that it does not allow for the reality of the creatures "in between" species which constitute an essential part evolution. This is the incompatibility between being and becoming, demonstrated by Aristotle. If for example, there is a process whereby members of species A evolve, breed, and become species B, then we need to account for what type of species the "in between" are. We cannot posit a different species between A and B, to account for these individuals, for obvious reasons. And, as they begin to differ from A, these individuals are still capable of breeding with A, but for a number of possible reasons do not. By your provided definition, they would not constitute the separate species B, until they cannot breed with A. So this definition does not grasp the true reality of this "section" of A, which is becoming B, by classing it as a part of A, when it has already separated itself from A by not breeding with A, and therefore ought not be classed as part of A. This "section" is both species A and species B by your proposed definition.

Problems like this, which demonstrate that a vast number of individual living beings exist as "in between" beings, demonstrate that this way of classifying beings as "species", is inherently faulty. It is a convenient form of classification for many purposes, but for the purpose of understanding the reality of evolution, it fails miserably. And since we adhere to this archaic system of classification, despite the fact that we recognize the reality of evolution, indicates that we live in a society which has very little, if any real understanding of evolution.

You often refer to the classical texts, Aristotle, Aquinas et al, but what you say here is in direct contradiction to what they believed. — Wayfarer

Actually, as I explained already, this is very consistent with Aquinas. He explains quite clearly how the human intellect is deficient because it is dependent on the material body. And, the ideas and forms which are grasped by the human intellect are distinct from the independent Forms which are proper to the Divinity. The ideas and forms of the human intellect are not properly independent and immaterial, as the divine Forms of God and the angels are. This is because the human ideas are dependent on the material body, so understanding these ideas and forms does not properly bring the human intellect into the realm of the immaterial Forms which have a relation to material existence which is an inversion of the relation that human ideas have to material existence. Material existence is dependent on these Forms, whereas the ideas of the human mind are dependent on material existence.

The issue is understanding reason as 'the product of' or 'constituted by'. Certainly h. sapiens evolved and one of the abilities that evolved was abstract thought and the ability to reason. But the theory of evolution is a theory of the origin of species, not a philosophical theory of the nature of the mind, and what can be known through the faculty of reason is not necessarily explicable from the point of view of biology. When such a rationale is introduced, then it invariably turns into consideration of 'what is advantageous from the point of view of survival and reproduction'. Such considerations can't help but be reductionist. — Wayfarer

We can accept the observed facts of evolution without accepting the hypothetical postulate as to what constitutes "advantageous". I'm sure you can see that "advantageous" is a value judgement. The obvious problem with the currently accepted evolutionary theory is that it takes the desire for survival, which is proper to an individual, and assigns this to a species. But there is nothing to ground the idea that there is anything advantageous to the continued survival of any species. In fact, we see that in living beings there is a vast variety of differences. And, having a huge multiplicity of variety is probably far more advantageous to "life" as a whole, in its capacity for existence, than is the advantage provided by the continued existence of any specific species.

So the issue here is that if we take the desire for continued existence, survival, which is proper to the particular, the individual, and assign it to something more general, then we need to move to the most general, life itself, instead of stopping at any particular species. The reality of "a species" as a particular object isn't really justified. So the commonly accepted theory of evolution, which assigns advantage to one species or another, does not grasp the whole picture in its conception of advantage. We need to look toward what is advantageous to life as a whole. And when we do this we see that simple survival is not what life is about.

Humans are uniquely able to transcend their biological roots. As you're well aware, in the Western philosophical tradition, the soul is associated with the faculty of reason, which is thought to be uniquely associated with humans as 'the rational animal'. But as modern culture has on the whole abandoned the traditional understanding, then humans are understood through solely biological and even mechanistic metaphors. It's a popular belief that life itself is kind of a fluke event, an 'accident of nature', and that the mind is 'the product of' this accident. Even though modern people pride themselves in being 'rational', this is actually an irrationalist attitude. — Wayfarer

I agree that looking at the existence of life as an accident is a huge mistake. But I also think that calling for a radical difference between human beings and other animals is also a big mistake. This is the mistake of Darwinism in general, described above, which assigns special status to what we call "a species", as if a species was a thing, thereby separating the human species from other species. If we dissolve these artificial divisions within the unity of living beings, we can understand that it is by means of "the soul", that we and all other living beings participate in the realm of the immaterial. Then the differences between us are attributable to our material bodies, and it is not the case that a human being, through the use of reason, has any more participatory capacity in the realm of the immaterial, then any other creature. What is the case is that we have developed a way toward understanding the immaterial realm. But this is a way of understanding which is firmly grounded in our material existence, so it does not actually admit us into the immaterial realm where the soul itself has its roots. In other words, we have found a way to use the material body to turn inward on itself, in an attempt to understand the immaterial source of its existence, but the material body still has no direct access to the immaterial itself, except through that source, the soul.

Reason becomes a product of an evolved brain, with no inherent reality beyond adaptive utility. — Wayfarer

I don't see why you are so averse to the idea that reason is the product of an evolved brain. This idea is consistent with most classical religions, and it does not conflict with the understanding of the immateriality of the soul. Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary to adopt a principle like this to account for the deficiencies in human reason, in its capacity to fully understand the material world.

The model adopted by Christianity, as described by St Thomas, is strongly based in Aristotle's De Anima. The various powers of the soul, self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, as well as intellection, are all explained by, and therefore seated in, the material body of the living being. As potencies, powers, these features of living beings are dependent on the material body of the beings for their specific reality; the concept of "matter" accounts for the reality of potential. The various different potentials (capacities) of the various living beings, must rely on the material body of the particular being. And this is also why each living being is truly unique in its material presence, and in its capacity to act.

In most religious traditions, there is an original union between the soul and a material body. This is often portrayed as a handicapping of the soul, a punishment for original sin, or something like that. We must remember though, that this is to place the soul in relation to other immaterial beings, divine beings like God and the angels. The proposed divine beings have a different temporal relation to matter, they are prior to matter, being the cause of material objects. The living beings on earth are dependent on their material bodies, for their powers, and only the soul itself, as the first principle of activity, the first form of the living body, bridges that medium, called "matter", into the immaterial realm of the divine.

This is why St. Thomas is very clear to stress the reality that the human intellect, while it is united to the material body, cannot obtain an understanding of the divine realm of immaterial existence. Due to the fact that the human intellect is dependent on its material body, it has that handicap in relation to supposed beings of the divine realm. To deny the reality of that physical constraint imposed upon us by the material conditions of our existence is a mistake and a misunderstanding of the reality of our existence.

But when we accept this reality, and we turn this handicap around, as Aristotle did, and see that the physical constraints which have been imposed upon us, are actually potencies, our powers, capacities, the tools by which we conduct ourselves through this world, and flourish within it, then we have a completely different perspective on our material being. No longer do we see being united to a material body as a punishment, we see it as a blessing, something done as necessary to enable us with the capacity to understand material existence. However, it is crucial that we understand the limitations of that capacity to understand, because that is exactly what constitutes understanding material existence.

What then about proofs that are independent of the subject? Proofs in Number Theory that are demonstrably true? For example ϕ(n),τ(n),d(n)etcϕ(n),τ(n),d(n)etc are indisputable values. They are what they are beyond any subject's opinion of them. — EnPassant

Such proofs are dependent on the axioms. And the axioms are not independent of the subjects.

Their claim is that rather than a dualism between being and becoming, becoming is prior to being. — Joshs

This is the position put forward by Hegel's dialectics. Being and its negation, not-being, are subsumed within becoming as the process known as becoming. It is a position which allows for violation of the law of non-contradiction by dialectical materialists, because this means that a thing both has and has not, the specified property, when it is becoming. But it is distinct from Aristotle's position which held being and becoming as distinctly incompatible, allowing becoming to violate the law of excluded middle, because the thing neither has nor has not the property, when it is becoming.

I would think that a quality or attribute which is impossible for a thing to have, is a false principle.

It's all good then, no? One side of my body is actually a reflection of my other side and the mirror proves the point by lateral inversion (flipping my left and right sides) as no one (usually) reports anything amiss in our reflections. — Agent Smith

The point though, is that it's not really true that the right side of your body is a duplication of the left. A look at a representation of a brain will show this to you. However, it may be the case, that to produce a balanced, stable body within a turbulent environment, something similar to symmetry facilitates this. But "similar to symmetry" is not symmetry, and the capacity to act is a fundamental feature of the human body. So I propose that it is the non-symmetrical features which enable this capacity to act, and this is likely more essential to the existence of a living being than the symmetrical features. And once we see the non-symmetrical as more essential than the symmetrical within living beings, we can move to inanimate objects, and see that the non-symmetrical is more essential to such objects as well. From here we can understand that representing objects as symmetries is a mistaken adventure.

It is not a value judgement. — Wayfarer

It only seems that way to those who ignore the fact that numerals signify values. You think that numerals signify some type of Platonic object, called a number, so you have complete disrespect for the fact that numbers are really quantitative values, which are assigned by human beings in practice, rather than some type of eternal object. Such disrespect for reality is rampant in modern philosophy of mathematics.

One thinks not because "counting" is a practice; "judgment", however, consists in participating or not participating in a practice. — 180 Proof

That's nonsense. A "practice" consists of a conglomeration of many activities, and judgements are required at many points along the way throughout any practice. To practice something is to exercise your capacity to make such judgements, it does not remove the need to make the judgements. Suppose you have a pile of apples, and you want to count how many are ripe, leaving the underripe. Each apple must be judged as to whether it qualifies or not. And if you are simply counting, not counting any specific objects, just expressing an order of numerals, you need to make the judgement at each step, as to which numeral comes next.

Perhaps, when one gets really good at some practice, counting from one to ten for example, they simply ignore the fact that they are making these judgements, as the decision making process becomes very rapid and habitual. Then the person might insist that the practice doesn't involve any sort of judgement. This type of ignorance seems to be the prevalent attitude toward mathematics. But ignorance makes poor philosophy. And it is clearly indicated by legal principles that habit does not absolve one from the responsibility of habitual judgements. So your implication that practice is somehow independent from judgement is just ridiculous.

This is exactly the problem with the "mechanistic" reduction refers to. It is a fundamental, basic denial of the reality of the very significant and important role of "free will" in the process of conceptualization. To remove the element of free will from the essence of the concept, portraying the concept as an eternal Platonic object, is a self-deceptive denial of the reality of the "human condition".

But you are talking about subjective value: something that can be open to disagreement. How can there be disagreement about the cardinality of a finite set? — EnPassant

What I am saying is that all opinion is subjective (of the subject). Agreement produces a sort of "intersubjectivity", whereby we say one's opinion is the same as another's. But intersubjectivity is still dependent on subjects, so it cannot support a definition of "objective" (of the object) which extends beyond the existence of subjects.

And if there was disagreement about the cardinality of infinite sets it would not be because of subjective opinion it would be highly technical and concerned with Godel's undecidable cardinals - such as in the continuum hypothesis. — EnPassant

This is an example of a difference in opinion. These issues are related to a difference in opinion concerning the definition of "infinite" which existed when set theory was younger. As time passed, and new hypotheses were proposed, mathematicians obtained a higher degree of consensus. That something is "undecidable" is an opinion.