You claim to have a scientific perspective, but I think the trend by modern scientists, especially physicists, is toward idealism. What's commonly accepted is a form of Platonism, the position that all of reality is composed of mathematics and laws, and matter itself is just an illusion. This is much more consistent with the physics of today, as matter has become an outdated idea.

I'm waiting for you to address the issues I raised. Show me where I might find one of these laws of reality that you insist I must obey. Where is the substance of these laws? Where's the space they occupy, and the mass they possess? And quit trying to negate the reality that there isn't such a thing as "a law" in your material world. It's just a brain without an intellect which is saying these things.

I might add this though. Of course the universe appears ordered to us. Because we are in this universe, we believe it to have order. Humans see order because our evolution occurred in this universe. We evolved to survive and understand this universe. If we came from somewhere else, then this universe might not appear ordered. — Real Gone Cat

You've lost track of the premise. There is a succession of universes, one every moment, stacked like pancakes. The "order" is the relation between these universes, not within "the universe". Each one of us human beings has a being which spans a number of universes. It is necessary that there is order between the universes or else none of us could have a being. The "order" is not simply an appearance of order, it is necessarily the case, because without that order we could not exist.

If you really believe that an order could come into existence without being created, I'd like to hear your explanation. You'd have to start with a description of what a pure, absolute, lack of order would be like, then explain how an order could spontaneously occur.

The suggestion that God must be outside because God is the creator implies that God is outside all universes - the universe of the cause and the universe of the effect. That's the nut you must crack. — Real Gone Cat

Yes, I don't see why you think that this is a problem. God is necessarily outside all the universes, as that which puts them in order. Where's the problem? Each cause is in a universe outside the universe of its effect, being at a different moment in time. But something must validate the relationship between cause and effect, i.e. the relation between one universe and another. That's God, like the hand that deals the cards, puts one universe after the other. How is this a problem?

The people of Hiroshima don't share your opinion, neither does science, and neither does that definition. In general does not imply conceptual, you just made that up. In general, all substances; that's matter. And (in physics), that'd be science, all things that occupy space and possess mass. That's not conceptual, you have misinterpreted the definition entirely. As if this has to be covered for you. — Garrett Travers

If you do not understand that "occupy space", and "possess mass" are both conceptual, then please read some philosophy before posting on a philosophy forum in the pretense of knowing something philosophical.

Laws are not created by humans, they are noticed and provided a symbolic representation for by humans. — Garrett Travers

OK, explain to me where I can find one of these laws, so I might observe it, and be able to make a symbolic representation of it.

You realize that the onus is on you to demonstrate that reality isn't material, right? — Garrett Travers

No, you claimed "the brain is made out of matter". The onus is on you to support this claim. All you've done is made some vague allusion to substance, occupying space, and possessing mass. And in the mean time, demonstrated a pathetic lack of understanding.

Unless you hold with Heidegger and Wittgenstein that any such separation between subjective attitude and objectivity is incoherent. It is the hinge that makes the world objectively intelligible in the first place. — Joshs

Let me state the problem using other words then. If you proceed in this direction, you have no "truth" as correspondence, because you've denied that there's a separation between the thing, and what corresponds with the thing by denying the separation between subjective (of the subject), and objective (of the object). Then we have no "knowledge" in the traditional sense because there is no separation between truth and justification. We'd have to say that if it is justified then it is true, because any other form of truth (correspondence with the object) has been excluded. But this is contrary to experience. We know from experience that what is justified sometime still turns out to be false. That's why we uphold a difference between justified and true.

“One’s hinge certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this proposition. This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence.” — Joshs

This is exactly why the so-called hinges are the most dubious of all propositions. We simply pick them up, acquire them through some sort of animalistic habituation without any type of ratiocination. Therefore they are the least reliable, and ought to be the first to be doubted. And, in philosophy, through methods like Platonic dialectics we learn the process for doubting them. That's why Wittgenstein is simply wrong when he suggests that it is for some (unexplainable) reason, unreasonable to doubt the hinges.

Because the hinges may be archaic remnants, left over from some ancient traditions, which are maintained in common language for simplicity sake only, they are the propositions most in need of the skeptic's doubt. Consider phrases like "the sun rises in the morning, and sets in the evening". We know that it's not true that the sun literally rises, it stays put, relatively, while the earth spins. This demonstrates how simple statements which we acquire, and use ("swallow them down"), may be very misleading. They can appear to correspond precisely with our observed world, they are also simple and very useful, yet sometimes they are actually false. That's why they are actually in need of the skeptic's.

“On the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational basis for their truth. In
particular, our continued certainty in them would be manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems to involve a rational response to changed circumstances.” — Joshs

I don't agree with this, and that's why I think Wittgenstein is wrong. Plato, throughout his dialogues demonstrated how Socrates doubted such commitments. And it wasn't just moral commitments which were doubted, but he doubted commitments throughout the entire sphere of knowledge, including technical practice, science, mathematics, law, and even the meaning of "knowledge" itself. To doubt the meaning of a word, like "love", "virtue", "just", or "knowledge", is to doubt how one's society uses that word, and therefore the hinge commitments which support that usage.

Shouldn't be an issue, here's google: physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy. — Garrett Travers

Anything defined with "in general" is conceptual, so "physical substance in general" is purely conceptual. And so is "occupies space", as well as "rest mass".

Matter is a human concept that maps to reality, that's called correspondence. — Garrett Travers

So far you've only mapped matter to the above concepts, "physical substance", "occupies space", and "rest mass". You haven't shown how any of these concepts map to reality. So you've provided no indication of how your concept of "matter" partakes in "correspondence".

Laws of reality don't ask your opinion. Humans map those laws through conceptual framework, nothing else to it. — Garrett Travers

Laws are created by human beings. I'm still waiting for you to explain how you conceive of a law which is not created by human minds. Who would create such a law?

Since you seem really stuck on this idea that there are "inviolable" laws which you must obey, perhaps you could point me toward where I could find them, so that I might be able to read, understand, and therefore obey them. Since they are said to be inviolable, I think I'd better take extra time in understanding them, because the punishment must be very severe if I do not obey them. So please, lead me to these laws, show them to me. And don't show me human conceptions, and claim correspondence, I want to see the laws themselves, so I can judge whether or not the human laws correspond with the natural ones. Where in your materialist world do these laws hide, and how do we know how to obey them?

The brain is made of matter, not pixie dust. — Garrett Travers

Matter is just a concept. Unless you can clearly define your concept of "matter" you might just as well be saying that the brain is made of pixie dust. Try it, exchange "pixie dust" for "matter" in some of your statements and you'll see that the meaning of your statement doesn't change a bit.

"The brain is made of [pixie dust, not matter]. Highly functional, highly systemmatized, genetically coded, [pixie dust] of unrivaled sophistication."

See, "matter" is just a stand in term, for something you haven't got a clue as to what it is, just like "pixie dust", so the two serve the exact same purpose in your statements. The real issue here is the question of how some instances of the assumed "matter" can be highly functional, and highly systematized, while other instances of matter are not. What gives your pixie dust ("matter") such magical powers, that it can come in all these different forms?

As Berkeley demonstrated there is no need even to assume that there is any matter there. Each existing thing is a just a form, each thing having its own unique type of of sophistication, as a particular, and there is no need to say that there is any "matter" underlying that form.

You are anthropomorphizing the universe. Whenever you realize that such givings are a miscalculation between your nature and the universe, you will understand completely. — Garrett Travers

You are making the exact mistake you are accusing Wayfarer of, except we might say that you are materializing the universe, rather than anthropomorphizing it. You are invoking a magical substance, naming it "matter" instead of "pixie dust", and claiming that this magical dust is responsible for all existence. This given, which you take for granted as "matter", is actually your miscalculation. "Matter" is just a human concept, therefore it cannot make up the independent universe.

Besides, the only way for us to master reality and learn its secrets, is to first obey its inviolable laws. — Garrett Travers

Now you're being hypocritical. You tell Wayfarer that laws such as "f=ma" are simply human conceptions. Then in the very same paragraph you proceed to say that we must obey the laws of reality. Please be consistent Garrett. If "laws" are human conceptions, then there are no independent laws of reality which we must obey. And if you assume that there is some sort of "laws" which are independent from human existence, then please explain who is writing and enforcing those laws. That's why Berkeley had to assume God. If every unique, individual, particular thing is reducible to a unique formula, its very own specific law which determines its exact existence, then someone must be creating these laws.

It's weird to see so many people on here, just like you on the mystic bandwagon, who never can give an argument about their beliefs in extra mundane phenomena that doesn't included insult, obfuscation, conflation, appeal to ignorance, or some other negation technique that, I guess normally works on the untrained minds with whom you regularly make contact with and present this trash to. — Garrett Travers

If you knew anything about the history of the concept of "matter", you would see that it is a central concept of western mysticism. So it is actually the materialist who is on the mystical bandwagon, summoning up a magical substance with mystical powers, named "matter", and insisting that this synonym to "pixie dust" is the cause of all reality.

I must admit I find it needlessly complicated. — Real Gone Cat

That's the way I find reality, complicated. If you think my description of reality is needlessly complicated then you probably do not share my opinion that reality is complicated.

And God as temporal organizer seems like an explanation that has gone looking for a problem. Why do you assume that God, and only God, provides an objective relationship between moments in time? Does something suggest to you that a world absent of God would suddenly go haywire? Water flowing uphill? Cats living with dogs? I think you need to show that God is necessary for temporal order. — Real Gone Cat

Not that a world without God would suddenly go haywire, but that it wouldn't have any order in the first place. The existence of order implies something which has caused that order, because order means that things have been put into the right place. That's what order is, things being in their correct place, and things do not just get up and go to the right place on their own. So we might conclude that there is a cause of temporal order, no?

And finally, when I asked how do you know that certain effects have an outside cause, I meant, what is it about them that reveals this? (Of course, other than your speculation that God is needed to provide temporal order.) What can you point to about them that will convince skeptics? — Real Gone Cat

I guess I don't understand your question. A cause is distinct from its effect, the two are not the same thing. The cause is temporally prior to the effect. So wouldn't you agree that a cause is "outside" its effect, as distinct from it? If we say that the cause is inside the effect, then it is a part of the effect, as internal to it, an internal part of it, and we no longer have a separation between cause and effect.

Even though you are correct, technically speaking, the hinge proposition is actually accepted by the individual as having true premises. Or, humans couldn't use those propositions to inform action. — Garrett Travers

I think that action is generally based in probability rather than in truth. We usually act when we believe that there is a probability for success, not when we believe that it is true that we will have success. So it is not true premises (what is) which inform action, it is understanding the relations between means and ends (this action ought to produce the desired result) which informs action.

Hinge describes implicit presupposition. If one can call this is a use, it is a different use than rational belief.Duncan Pritchard suggests that hinge commitment is a more appropriate way to understand what Wittgenstein is getting at than hinge proposition. — Joshs

If you go in this direction, then the hinge says something about the attitude of the subject rather than saying something about the world (something objective). Therefore it could not be a basic presupposition or proposition forming a foundation for knowledge about the world, objective knowledge. It would be a type of psychological principle only. So take Sime's example:

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood". — sime

The 'hinge proposition', as an objective fact about the world, would be "human beings have blood". The "hinge commitment" would be 'I have faith that my belief that human beings have blood is true'. The latter is not what Wittgenstein is saying, because attitudes, even strong ones like faith can be doubted, whereas Wittgenstein is talking about something we cannot doubt. Therefore it is the former, something we believe to be an objective fact about the world, not a subjective attitude toward a proposition, like a commitment.

Alright, let me see if I understand your position (correct me if I’m wrong) : there are many (an infinite number of) universes, each containing all that exists at one moment in time. So Dead Grandma exists in the universes in which she was alive, just not in the current universe, where she is dead. Universes are stacked up like pancakes.

I can kind of get on board with this, it’s a version of the multi-verse idea. A few questions, though : — Real Gone Cat

OK, I'll go with that description. The first thing to come to grips with, is that there is no such thing as "the universe", "our universe", or "my universe". As you'll see from the description, each living being, living at the present, does not occupy a line of division between a past universe and a future universe. A person has one foot in the past and one foot in the future (so to speak), and therefore exists as a bridge between a multitude of universes. This is important, the present, which we know as our lived experience, is not itself a single universe, but it is a conglomeration of universes. In other words, by the terms of your description, my lived experience of the present, is not a single moment in time, but a number of moments, united together as my presence.

How do we access the past? I mean, you claim I have a relationship with Dead Grandma. How? Through memory? Not only is memory faulty, but the memory of a thing is not the thing being remembered. Is it? — Real Gone Cat

I agree, memory is faulty. This is one reason why we apply logic, to confirm our memories, and help to determine which are faulty. Consider memory as the part of you which is in a past universe. We only have true access to past universes which are very close at hand. But at the same time, anticipation and prediction represent a part of us which is in a future universe (or universes), like memories represent a part of us in a past universe (or universes).

Now, you'll see how a person's being at the present occupies a time period in which future universes (anticipations) are becoming past universes (memories), so there is a process which is occurring, which constitutes the lived experience. This process is the manifestation of the relationship between universes. By understanding this relationship between universes, which is actually occurring in our lived present, we can extrapolate and apply this to the distant past, as in memory, and to the distant future, as in prediction, thus extending the range of our understanding into universes within which we are not actually present. Fundamental to this idea is that there are a number of universes (or moments in time) which are present at any given time. This extrapolation process is not without its problems hence our memories and predictions are not infallible.

And where is God in all this? Even if I can access past universes through memory, that would not seem to be possible with God. — Real Gone Cat

I would say that God is needed to substantiate the relationship between universes, providing for an actual truth. We could say that God is the cause of temporal order. Suppose it appears to you like there is an infinite number of moments in time. However, we still want to say that there is a real, determined order: a moment yesterday must be prior to a moment today. Therefore, as time passes in our lived experience we cannot change the order of universes, though through freedom of will we might alter what comes to be, or is and is not, within particular universes (through our presence spanning multiple universes). So the order of universes itself is the fundamentally determined thing which limits our freedom of will. But any order must be based on a principle, higher or lower, prior or posterior, or something like that. So the decision as to what kind of order that order is, is attributed to the will of God.

A somewhat unrelated question : How do you know that an effect is due to an outside cause? That’s a unique skill. — Real Gone Cat

Isn't this just a version of Cartesian skepticism? We have sensations which appear to be caused by an external world, but how do we know that it's really an external world? The knowledge that it really is an external world is not a unique skill, but a fundamental assumption based on an apprehended necessity. It is necessary that we assume an external world so that we avoid deception. That is why I said above, "God is needed to substantiate the relationship between universes". If there is no objective relationship between moments in time, an objective order, then we might put a moment of time from far in the future beside one from far in the past, or establish any random order to moments in time, making absolutely anything possible. But this idea would be self-deception.

Yeah, I mean I might as well posit the idea of door frame propositions, because even hinge propositions have to have a stable set of facts to work with, so as to remain stationary in use. In which case, I'll then have to have wall propositions, as door frames have to be constructed from... so on and so on...... — Garrett Travers

Yes, I see your point, but facts are not propositions, and this is what gives so many people the problem in understanding what supports the hinge propositions. Is it facts (objective reality), or attitude (subjective disposition) which supports hinges? People seem to be hesitant to consider that both are required, because it leads into dualism and a conception of reality which is far to complex for a simple mind to understand.

I had written an essay on Wittgenstein the other day where I characterized his view on hinges entirely inaccurately. — Garrett Travers

I wouldn't worry about that. There are as many different interpretations of Wittgenstein as there are people who read him. It's very clear that he is intentionally ambiguous. Banno distorts what Wittgenstein has actually written, by cherry picking items, to make it appear as if "hinge proposition" is a conception which is coherent and reasonable. Likewise, Banno might argue that the author of your article, Siegel, cherry picks in a way to create the opposite impression. Of course this is a reflection of the ambiguity which is inherent in Wittgenstein's writing. Ambiguity is a very common feature of word use which makes itself particularly evident in philosophy.

Wittgenstein was very much aware of the role of ambiguity in language. Hence Banno's claim that one and the same hinge proposition can change over time, like a river bed. But despite Banno's cherry picking to make Wittgenstein appear to be intelligible, Banno doesn't even seem to understand what it means to have a changing proposition.

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. — Banno

How could a proposition which changes over time (therefore necessarily ambiguous) have a truth value? What it means for a proposition to not have a truth value, is that the proposition is ambiguous. And that is also what it means for the same proposition to change over time; the proposition is mutable, and may be adapted by the different human minds who put it to use, to different purposes.

The outcome of all this is that Wittgenstein is completely wrong. It is not such ambiguous propositions, which can be molded and shaped at the will of human beings to maintain relevance in an evolving body of knowledge, which forms the foundation of that knowledge. To the contrary, it is actually clear and precise propositions, which in philosophy are called self-evident truths, because they appear to be impossible to be wrong, which forms the base for knowledge. But as you and Siegel indicate, a self-evident truth might still be wrong. It is only when we try to justify the claim that it is impossible for them to be wrong, that we get led down the path of deception, into believing that ambiguity (in the form of ambiguous propositions which change their meaning to maintain relevance in an evolving world)), are at the base of knowledge.

So stick with what Siegel tells you Garrett, as a fair enough representation, and don't get drawn into the ambiguity of Wittgenstein. Allowing ambiguity (which is the only way to support the idea of a proposition without a truth value) to be a first principle of knowledge, is simply wrong, for obvious reasons.

I'd say that such would be correct, if we were to accept Wittgenstein's assertion that hinges are not open to rational confirmation, or falsifiability. From that perspective, there is no such thing as a hinge proposition. And such is logically valid because there aren't any propositions that are not up for either. All are subject to both. Or else, logic simply has no point at all. — Garrett Travers

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them.

Every single proposition, not matter how coherent, is sibject to valid argumentation and scrutiny. The paper I sent you is excellent on this subject. — Garrett Travers

Yes, in the paper you referred, the author argues, as I do, that there is no reality to "hinge propositions" as described by Wittgenstein. A real "hinge proposition" would have to be something completely different from what Wittgenstein describes.

Sure, what no longer exists (causes, dead grandmas) is no longer in the universe. But does that mean it then moves to an existence outside the universe? A junkyard for spent causes? Or does it cease to exist anywhere? (And no, I do not have relationships - or interaction - with dead relatives. I have never seen a ghost. I did have relationships with them while they were IN the universe.) — Real Gone Cat

We cannot deny these things, which were in the past but no longer are now, and which might be, in the future, from reality. Clearly they are in some sense real.

These once-in-the-universe-but-now-no-longer-existing things are very different from things that somehow exist on the outside. — Real Gone Cat

I don't see this difference. To me that's what outside the universe is, external to the confines of our temporal understanding, which produces our conception of what is real. I think you are asking for an unwarranted separation, for the purpose of placing God in a separate category. In reality, things in the past are just as "unreal" as the cause of the universe is, because we don't understand what being in the past is, nor do we understand what being the cause of the universe is.

How can you tell when causes from the outside have generated effects on the inside? Its like trying to use quale to discern things-in-themselves. — Real Gone Cat

Why not? Isn't this exactly what we do? We use our sensations, which occur inside of us, to find out about the things which are outside of us, the things we sense. We figure things out about the outside things by applying logic to our observations. That's how we got to know about molecules, and atoms, and stuff like that, which are not actually a part of our sensations. If we had the attitude that we couldn't know about these things because they are outside of our sensations, science wouldn't have gotten anywhere.

In simpler times, unexplained events were called miracles and attributed to gods, because people didn't know any better. — Real Gone Cat

It's when things are not well understood that people start to appeal to things like magic and miracles. Obviously the cause of the universe is not well understood. But we do have a name for it, God.

Sure, “if”. You would have to show the previous existence of god or a creator. Not so with dear grandma, whose previous existence is not in question.
Since you havent shown god to have previous existence then its fallacious to use this grandma analogy to make your point/case. — DingoJones

I was going on Real Gone's interpretation of what you said, that God is outside the universe. Under that proposal there is no question as to whether God is real or not, it is stated that God is outside the universe. The existence of God is taken for granted, but Real Gone could not understand how a person could have a relationship with something outside the universe. So I explained how a cause is outside the universe by the time the effect occurs.

But I've met my grandmother, so it's hard to ignore the fact of her existence. Agent Smith makes the claim that God is not in this universe. So his God is not real. His God is speculation, nothing more. And if you agree with him (a position you dance around and don't seem to commit to), then I guess God can be anything you want. — Real Gone Cat

The point of the example is that the premise "X is not in this universe" does not lead to the conclusion "X is not real". You've met your grandmother, so you know she's real, yet she's outside this universe, being no longer in existence. Agent Smith's assumption that since God is not in this universe, God is therefore pure speculation, is unjustified. Therefore I clearly do not agree with Agent Smith.

How is a made-up God essential to understanding reality? Even if you need God to be your Prime Mover, a god-that-is-not-present adds nothing to the understanding of reality. Only things in the universe can give us information about the universe. — Real Gone Cat

So this question, and the conclusion are completely wrong. That God is not in the universe does not necessitate the conclusion that God is "made-up". And, we can learn stuff from things which are outside the universe, as I explained. A cause, being prior to its effect, is always outside the universe by the time the effect occurs, and the effect is always outside the universe when the cause occurs. So knowing the relationship between things within the universe, and things outside the universe is a very important part of understanding the universe.

The relationship with you grandmother already existed. The same cannot be said about god. The relationship with god doesnt have a previous existence upon which to base it like dear old grandma does. Thats the key, that you cannot have a relationship with something that never existed in the first place. — DingoJones

I don't see the basis for your claim. If God is the creator, then God had real existence, prior to your existence, just like your grandmother had real existence prior to your existence.

If God is not a part of our universe, then God does not exist for us. So why can't we just ignore God? — Real Gone Cat

You could ignore God if you want, just like you can ignore the fact that you had a grandmother. But if you want to understand the reality of your existence, then if God is real, understanding that there is a God is essential to understanding that reality, regardless of whether God is here now. Just like your grandmother who is no longer existing, you can ignore the reality that you had a grandmother, but this is not conducive toward understanding the reality of your existence.

The picture can be expressed in propositional form: — Fooloso4

The problem with expressing the picture in the propositional form, is the gap between the particular and the universal. A picture is always a particular, and the propositional form always employs universals. So for instance, "this is a hand" employs the universal "hand" to describe the particular image, which is the picture.

So the issue is, how does that gap between the particular (picture), and the universal (proposition) get bridged. What validates the use of this universal "hand", to refer to this particular image? This is the difficult problem in philosophy of mind, and epistemology, we cannot simply assume 'we call it a hand therefore it is a hand', because "hand" must involve criteria to make it epistemically useful.

If the senses receive particular images, and the mind employs universals in understanding the particular images, and there is a gap, a categorical difference between a particular and a universal, then how do we know whether the mind is mistaken in its application of universals? And, because the philosophical mind is naturally led into this skepticism concerning the application of universals, requesting criteria, the use of the universal ("hand") must be justified. This is what we know as 'proving a theory' (that it is correct to call the thing in the image, a hand, must be demonstrated).

As for "hinge propositions", the idea that there are propositions which may be excluded from that request for criteria and justification, is itself unjustifiable. And, as we see from Joshs' example of Kuhn's paradigm shifts, the so called hinge propositions actually do get subjected to the skeptic's doubt, sometimes with substantial effect.

How can we have a relationship with an entity that essentially doesn’t exist (not in our universe anyway)? — Real Gone Cat

How can you have a relationship with your dead grandmother? The fact that the named entity does not presently exist in your universe does not deny your relationship with that thing. It only means that you have to expand you concept of what "relationship" means, to include other things. This is the nature of the cause/effect relationship. By the time that the effect exists in the universe, the cause no longer exists in the universe.

Is there an objective reality or truth to what falls within the purview of a hinge proposition? Is there an objective reality or truth to the facts that are defined with a Kuhnian paradigm, a feature of the thing being looked at? — Joshs

I'd answer both those questions with no. And I agree with your relating Kuhn to Wittgenstein, I think Kuhn most likely built on Wittgenstein's idea. And what Kuhn demonstrates is that this notion, that a hinge proposition is somehow excluded from doubt, is a false idea. Doubt of the so-called hinge proposition is a requirement for the paradigm shift.

But if the so-called hinge proposition is not excluded from doubt by its nature, it must be excluded from doubt for some other reason, such as its usefulness. Then it would only hold the status of "hinge proposition" to those who find it useful. Those who doubt it would just consider it to be a proposition which may or not be true, like any other proposition. So the supposed "hinge proposition" really has no special place, unlike the self-evident truth which is supposed to have a special place. The so-called hinge proposition is just an ordinary proposition which has proven itself to be extraordinarily useful. Most likely it has been found to serve a multitude of purposes.

Why do you dismiss the idea of God having been "designed"?

If we do not dismiss this idea, then we are confronted with the possibility of an infinite regress of Y designed Z, and X designed Y, W designed X. etc.. This potential infinite regress indicates that we haven\t properly determine what it means to have been "designed". Misunderstanding, or failure to provide an adequate definition of "design" is what causes this potential for an infinite regress.

Instead of properly addressing this issue, what it means to have been "designed", you dismiss the possibility of the designer having been designed. But if you look at the evidence, of designed things, artefacts, you'll see that the idea that the designers themselves, human beings, have not been designed, has not been adequately justified, or you wouldn't be asking the question which you are asking in the first place.

I think it needs to be kept in mind that Wittgenstein is talking about empirical propositions, which are traditionally considered to be contingently true (or false). Hinge propositions, however, have the special status of being empirical statements that are quasi-necessarily true. W likens them to mathematical statements (e.g. see §340). Hinge propositions are beyond doubt, beyond truth (see §94 above), beyond justification, and non-epistemic.

I say "quasi-necessarily true", because they are treated as necessarily true and beyond true (beyond doubt) only when they form part of the background assumptions that we do not usually consider consciously and that we use (consciously or not) as a rule of testing (§98). When these same empirical propositions are instead consciously considered and used as "something to test by experience" (§98), then they revert to being normal, contingent, empirical statements that lie within the scope of epistemology, knowledge, doubt, truth and justification. — Luke

We actually agree on something here Luke. But how we both interpret this is bound to differ. I see what you describe here as clear evidence that there is no reality to what is called "hinge propositions".

From what you say, it is evident that the same thing can be described both as a hinge proposition, and not a hinge proposition, depending on how you look at it. This indicates that "hinge proposition" is a feature of how we look at things, the observer's attitude. It is not a feature of the thing being looked at, and called a "hinge proposition", it is a feature of the attitude which looks at the thing. Therefore there is no objective reality, or truth, to any statement of "X is a hinge proposition". Such a judgement is always, necessarily, a subjective judgement because what makes something a hinge proposition or not, is the attitude of the subject who makes that judgement.

Being confined to an artificial structure in an extremely hostile outside environment is definitely not my idea of utopia. Many of the political issues on earth would not be applicable out there, where people would have to live together to survive. But there would be other problems derived from being cooped up with others, for a long duration, mental health problems like anxiety and depression, or one person annoys another, and the annoyance becomes intolerable. I don't see overpopulation as a problem.

What you have demonstrated is that your idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. When he says:

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
(OC 166)

it does not follow that hinge propositions are mistaken, but that:

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
(OC 152) — Fooloso4

That's the problem, the axis itself (the proposed hinge proposition) is not fixed, so it revolves around something else, another "hinge", and so on. If we say that any belief, statement, or attitude, which has others hinged on it, is a hinge proposition, then everything becomes a hinge. And if we say that only things that are somehow fixed because they are beyond doubt, are hinge propositions, then nothing is a hinge.

So in reality the idea is just nonsense, there's simply varying degrees of fixedity, doubt, significance, etc., in relation to all beliefs, statements, and so on, and it makes no sense to think that some have a special significance as a "hinge proposition". We might say that some have more significance than others, for various reasons, but each and every one has its own special significance particular to itself, and this negates the generalized special significance of "hinge proposition".

I think what Wittgenstein demonstrates, is that the idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. Hinge propositions are simply something we want to assume the reality of, to prove to ourselves that our knowledge is adequately grounded, and quell the skepticism which constitutes the philosophical yearning of the human mind.

But when we investigate, as Wittgenstein did, we find that we must conclude that this assumption of hinge propositions is just not consistent with reality. The evidence for this conclusion is that when we try to describe the paradigm, or hold up anything as an example, of a hinge proposition, we find that it can never fulfil the criteria of what we want, as a hinge proposition. And the idea of hinge propositions remains fundamentally flawed.

Wait until a planet is habitable. — L'éléphant

I think that the other planets are known to be fundamentally uninhabitable, any colonization would be within an artificial structure, just like the space station. You appear to be dreaming about something which will never happen.

You think so, but no. — L'éléphant

Why not? Hasn't the International Space Station already turned into a sort of melting pot, with people of all different nationalities going there? Wikipedia: "As of 30 December 2021, 251 people from 19 countries had visited the space station, many of them multiple times."

But isn't this an observation about following a rule? and not about obeying a rule? We need not have "followed" a rule to be said to have obeyed it. "Why did you drive under the speed limit?" "I followed the rule." or "What speed limit? I'm just driving here." But is it our lack of rationality that causes the fear here? or that there remains a lack of certainty, even if "rules" are involved? — Antony Nickles

I really can't see the distinction you are trying to make here. What would it mean to obey a rule without following it? Notice "follow" implies a temporal posteriority, as does "obey". I really don't see how one could obey a rule without following it.

In fact, in reading your post, I do not understand your use of "rule" at all. You appear to remove the necessity of temporal priority of "rule" in relation to "obeying a rule" by denying causality from "rule", but then you say that our judgements are "based on the criteria for doing such a thing". If a rule is not the criteria for making such a judgement, therefore causal in making such a judgement, then what is a rule?

In other words, what meaning could "obeyed a rule" possibly have, if the thing referred to with "rule" is not causal in judgement? Either the person acting must be caused by the rule to act in a way consistent with the rule, or the person observing must be caused by the rule to judge the one acting, as obeying the rule. If we are going to assume that there is such a thing as a rule, so that "obeying a rule" says something meaningful, I see no way to remove the causality of the rule from such a judgement.

It makes no difference to the issue of the causality of the rule in judgement, if the person acting judges oneself to be obeying a rule, or the person observing judges the actor to be obeying a rule. In each case, a person must interpret the rule, and interpret the act, and make the judgement as to whether the act "obeys" the rule. The fact that the person acting makes the judgement prior to the act being made, while the person observing makes the judgement posterior to the act, has little or no significance in relation to the rule being causal in the judgement.

But what if we could actually create human habitat on Mars? — L'éléphant

The new melting pot: Mars.

Antarctica. — T Clark

I thought Antarctica is already owned by Nazi Germany.

Let's start a new life from now!" — Alkis Piskas

I assume this means let's make a baby.

The problem is that that particular brand of metaphysics cannot make sense of the particular experience of freedom of choice. — Tobias

Yes, that is the problem, isn't it? What are you going to believe, your own experience of thinking, acting, and living, which demonstrates the reality of free will, or some half baked notion that the world is "naturalistically determined"?

But that's a question for another thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12257/free-will-and-other-popular-delusions-or-not

And we certainly can't say either that "it started at time sero", since this is a circular statement: time started at time zero! — Alkis Piskas

Consider the possibility of "time zero". This would mean that there is a future without any past. Why would there suddenly be a past? "Time zero" itself makes sense, but it requires a cause from outside of time, something which causes there to suddenly be a past. It's the "cause from outside of time" which is difficult to make sense of.

I just can't leave the ghost of Free Will in peace. Since this is one of the most polarized topics on the forum, I find it one of the most interesting as a philosophical exercise. — Gnomon

I believe that we all live and act as if we have free will. So to deny free will is a self-deceptive attempt at hypocrisy, to force oneself to belief something which is contrary to what is demonstrated by one's actions.

But the interesting thing is that once we let go of this attempt at hypocrisy, and accept the reality of the freedom of the will, it forces a metaphysical separation from the commonly accepted worldview which supports modern scientism. There is an implicit incompatibility between the concept of free will, and the idea that the entirety of reality is determined by fundamental laws, the laws of nature.

When we give metaphysical priority to our lived experience, that we think, act, and live as if we have free will, and recognize that this is clear evidence of the reality of something which transcends the laws of nature, we develop a completely different perspective of the laws of nature, and the reality of time itself. This is a perspective which displays the basic incompatibility between itself and what is commonly accepted as 'the reality of time' in the discipline of physics, casting doubt on the conception of "space-time". So we can now understand that the laws of nature are not necessary. This is the perspective developed by physicist Lee Smolin in his book "Time Reborn".

Appeal to authority, another failure.

So you say, but you failed in justifying this claim.

And we haven't even gotten to the issue you intentionally avoided, the relation between the brain and the senses.

Now you seem to be catching on. Each depends on the other, so we cannot say that one controls the other. If the brain existed first, and created the heart to serve its purposes, then we might be able to say that the brain controls the heart. But that's not the case. So we cannot truthfully say that.

No, that's not what it means. Here's the definition: the continuation of something by itself without external agency or intervention. Now stop being stupid. — Garrett Travers

The brain is not "self-perpetuating" by any definition. The heart pumping blood is external agency. Who is being stupid here?

t only stops when it is dead, never before. Yes, it is self-perpetuating. Read what I am saying to you. — Garrett Travers

Self-perpetuating is to continue in existence indefinitely. If it dies it is not self-perpetuating.

The brain, through natural processes, only allows in what it allows in. I recommend you do some research on this. Alcohol is passed through the blood stream, which is what the brain allows to pass. You placing alcohol in that system, by using the system as it's designed, changes nothing about the nature of the system itself. Again, what chemical process happens in the brain are you referring to? qualify your original assertion you made. And keep your goddamn insults to yourself. If you can't generate an argument without them, you've no place presenting one. — Garrett Travers

Obviously it's not a closed system.

The brain is not a closed system neither is it self-perpetuating. Your argument fails, and the position you claim is nonsense.

Do you know how to do long division? Or, the calculator just does it for you?

Since life is self-perpetuating in accordance with its genetic code, by extension the brain, provided through evolution by natural selection, that would be wise of you if you had preconceived notions that included the brain not be self-perpetuating, because that would contradict reality. It only stops when it is dead. — Garrett Travers

Garrett, my brain is not your brain. And both of our brains have come into existence and will pass out of existence. "The brain" is not self-perpetuating.

Where does this chemical change come from if not the brain; which is a closed system of chemcials, bound by a semi-permeable membrane that only allows passage of said exclusive, highly specific chemicals? — Garrett Travers

Where did you learn biology? There is a constant flow of blood into and out of the brain. By no stretch of the imagination is it a "closed system of chemicals". Have you ever had an alcoholic beverage? I mean no offence to the children amongst us, but your argumentation appears like you have not yet obtained to the drinking age.

Got it. You cannot recall any specific instances in the text that supports your claim of Plato's intention.

Seeing as how my challenge is pointless, I will not darken your door again. May the road rise up gently to meet you. — Paine

I believe it's pointless because I know that each reference I produce can be met with a counter reference implying something contrary, just like in our exchange on the other thread. Then, in the end it will come down to a question of the intent of the author. So, I think we ought to be able to discuss what we each believe to be the intent of the author, without quoting conflicting references, which turns into an endless process going nowhere.

Do you agree that it was Plato's intention to investigate into the truth of this matter, in his efforts to understand the practice of the sophists who claimed to teach virtue? And do you agree that the truth of the matter is that we can know and understand what is good, yet still proceed to behave in a contrary way, I.e. to do what is bad when we know what is good? If you agree with both of these, then why do you not agree that Plato's intent was to demonstrate the truth of the latter in his effort to show that the sophists were wrong when they claimed that virtue could be taught, as a type of knowledge?