. Numerical values originate with counting, 'how many'. Qualitative values originate with judgement. ' — Wayfarer

Counting, "how many", is a judgement. How could you think it is not?

Not all the blame falls on the mirror then, huh? Suppose a line's on the line of symmetry (flush with the mirror's surface), this line, as per you, doesn't undergo lateral inversion then. However, such a line (remember only 2D objects can achieve 0 distance between itself and the mirror's surface/line of reflection) and the line of reflection/the mirror surface would be indistinguishable i.e. we're no longer talking about an object at all but the mirror itself. — Agent Smith

I don't get your point. But a mirror's surface is not a true 2D plane. Look at it under a microscope, and you'll see this. So I don't see how you can propose to reduce a mirror's surface to a plane in this way. There is no such thing as a "2D object", things don't exist as planes, and such 2D things are imaginary fictions.

I don't see it that way. Numbers are sets that arise out of iteration and partition.
Start with /
Iterate //
Reiterate ///
etc /////////////////////////////...
Partition each step into {/} {//} {///} {////} {/////}...These are sets. Numbers are sets.
In familiar symbols these are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,...
This is how set theory defines numbers. There are no values ascribed here. — EnPassant

What you are demonstrating is that the set {///} has the value signified by 3. Do you not accept the fact that mathematics works with values? If "{///}" means the same as "3", and "3" means the same as "{///}" then you have a vicious circle of definition. But clearly this is not the case in set theory. Sets have all sorts of different values like cardinality, extensionality, etc.. To say "there are no values ascribed here" is rather ridiculous.

I really don't believe that is the point. I think the point is that the expression '=' or 'is', strictly speaking is only completely accurate in the case of A=A. In other arithmetical expressions, the "=" sign denotes an exactness which is never the case for empirical objects. Mathematical statements have an exactitude which is never truly characteristic of the sense-able realm. Statements about the empirical world are always approximations, because the objects of empirical analysis always consist of an admixture of being and becoming. The reason that 'the law of identity' is being dismissed as a trivial tautology is because this is not seen. It goes back to Parmenides' discussion of the 'nature of what is'. — Wayfarer

This is a good point. When A=A is meant to express the law of identity, i.e. "a thing is the same as itself", then the "=" sign represents a very special sort of exactness, the relationship which a thing has with itself. And this goes beyond the capacity of a human being to judge. Human beings do not really know, nor are they capable of judging the relationship which a thing has with itself. It is simply asserted, as the law of identity, that such a special, and exact relationship exists, and is something real.

But when the "=" sign is used to express equality, as is the case with mathematical equations, then the relationship between the two things related by the sign is a matter of a value judgement, and this does not obtain that degree of exactness which is expressed by the law of identity. It is less exact because it is always a judgement of some value, therefore some specified property. So two groups of two things for example, are "equal" in the sense that they both have the quantitative value of two, and so they are the same in that respect. But they might be different in every other respect, yet still equal, being each a group of two.

Not buying, sorry. I think this obliterates a distinction of the first order. — Wayfarer

What's this "distinction of the first order" you are talking about? I've never seen "first order" used in this way.

Clearly they are both "values", under the same general definition of "value", meaning "a thing's estimated worth". When we see a group of objects and assign the value "10", this is the group's "estimated worth", within the quantitative value system we use when we apply a number to the group. Likewise, when we judge the morality of a human act, we are assigning an "estimated worth" to that action. Why deny this basic fact concerning human judgements? All such "value judgements" are related to each other in this way.

But you're equivocating the meaning of 'value'. In maths,'value' is a number signifying the result of a calculation or function. In ethics and philosophy, values are basic and fundamental beliefs that guide or motivate attitudes or actions. So the meaning of 'value' is different according to the context. — Wayfarer

No equivocation. A value is the estimated worth of a thing, whether the principle of estimation is numerical (providing the basis for quantity), or the principle is moral (providing the basis for ethics). Yes, a numerical value is a distinct type of value from a moral value, like a dog is a distinct type of animal from a human being, here I am talking about the more general "value". And just like dogs and human beings are both examples of the more general "animal", numerical values and moral values are examples of the more general "values".

As I explained, it is the claim that there is a fundamental separation between these types of value, which gives scientism its traction. This proposed separation provides for the appearance that somehow mathematical values are more "objective" than other types of values. This produces the illusion that science creates a higher form of certainty than ethics. In reality though both of these forms of certainty are supported merely by the extent of agreement, or convention, afforded by each. So the idea that science through the means of its mathematical applications, gives us a higher form of certainty than ethics, is just an expression of "mob rules". More people agree therefore it more objective.

Assuredly. That A=A is not dependent on your or my mind, or on your or my assent. But it can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why I favour the form of objective idealism which says there are real ideas that are not dependent on our minds, but which can only be grasped by a mind. — Wayfarer

Your expression "A=A" is just a rule, which states that each time the symbol "A" is employed, it must represent the same thing as the last. The reality of equivocation demonstrates that the rule is often not followed. Now, your statement "A=A" is nothing more than an ethical principle, 'what we ought to do' if we do not want to deceive others, and desire to give them a clear understanding of what we're thinking.

So if we want an "objective idealism" we need to start with an objective ethics, because logical proceedings are dependent on people doing what they ought to do in their activities of thinking. When there is no clearly defined rules as to what people ought to do in their logical proceedings, they'll rationalize all sorts of illogical things and try to pass them off as acceptable logic. If there is such a thing as "real ideas that are not dependent on our minds", these ideas must exist as the result of following the appropriate rules of action ("action" includes thinking); as ideas, is how such activity is present to our minds.

Can you give an example of how mathematics is a value judgement. I suppose they are very few. — EnPassant

The symbols used in mathematics represent values, as I described, "2" represents a value. Each time that mathematics is employed in application, there is a judgement as to where to assign which values, just like ethical judgements are judgements as to where to assign moral values. So all applied mathematics involves such value judgements, just like applied ethics involves moral judgements. In the case of theoretical mathematics, what some call pure mathematics, rules are introduced which define the values and describe how to apply them, as moral philosophy does the same with moral values. So all forms of mathematics involve value judgements, always.

It appears as if some people here have kind of (conveniently) forgotten that mathematics deals with values. Influenced by this ignorance, mathematics is distanced from "value", and given the appearance of objectivity.

n short, if there's an object, we have two lines perpendicular to each other passing through this object with their point of intersection somewhere inside that object. This framework then provides us with chirality/handedness.

When I look in the mirror, I see myself looking back at me (the reflection). Based on the above system of lines, my left becomes my image's right and my right becomes the image's left (lateral inversion). — Agent Smith

These two are very different. The imaginary plane and lines you describe are imaginary and may be positioned arbitrarily. The mirror is a real (though artificial) object with a spatial separation between it an the object whose image is reflected by the mirror. So there is a reason for the so-called lateral inversion which the mirror produces, it's due to the spatial separation between the object and the reflecting plane.. In the case of the arbitrary plane, or arbitrary point, within a supposed object there is no medium between the thing and its reflection (one side of the plane and the other), so the lateral inversion of this object is completely fictitious and not an adequate representation of a mirror reflection. It is lacking a key element, which is the medium between the object and the reflecting plane.

I can't see how that can be true. Mathematics is purely quantitative, surely? 2 x 2 = 4 whether I like it or not, whether I think it's appealing or not. — Wayfarer

The symbols "2" and "4" signify numbers, and numbers are quantitative values. In its simplest form, a number is the value assigned to a group of things. Mathematicians work with values. And the reason why 2x2=4 is that the values associated with the symbols, is fixed by convention.

A more interesting way of stating your question might be to ask whether there are values which are independent of human minds, i.e. objective values, which either correspond, or do not correspond with the conventional assignment of values. For example, is there an independent, objective value which corresponds with what is symbolized by 2?

The problem with your perspective being that we have no clear dividing line between conventional mathematics (where we all agree), and non-conventional mathematics (where there is some disagreement). The degree of agreement varies depending on the axioms employed.

There's a difference though but I trust mathematicians - there must've been a very good reason lateral inversion has been swept under the rug. Can you figure out why? — Agent Smith

Simplicity, I suppose. The object and the image are on opposites sides of the plane. And the reality of the turning required such that they face each other (what it really consists of), is ignored for simplicity sake.

he general point to make is to begin to distinguish the roles of quantitative analysis and qualitative judgement (a.k.a. 'value judgement') in human affairs. Science is grounded in quantitative analysis, even if judgement always plays a role in e.g. what to measure, what experiment to pursue, what is worth investigating, and so on.
...
From this it is hoped to arrive at the most general idea possible, an hypothesis, which unites disparate observations into a coherent theory. But it can only ever proceed in terms of what is measurable or quantifiable. So I don't agree that it is the most rational way to evaluate 'the world'. — Wayfarer

What is often missed, is that mathematics itself is a value structure, and is therefore dependent on, and based in "value judgement". What has occurred through the history of humanity is that we have achieved significant levels of agreement, convention, concerning these value judgements of mathematics, and this has produced great confidence in the notion that "objective knowledge" is produced by mathematics. In reality this knowledge is better classed as 'inter-subjective'.

Inter-subjective knowledge is dependent on agreement between individuals, concerning the applicable value principles. The trend in modern scientism based metaphysics, is to claim a separation between the value judgements which we have great agreement on (like mathematics, asserted as objective), and the value judgements which we do not have great agreement on (like personal pleasures, asserted as subjective), producing an unwarranted division between mathematical values and personal values. In reality though, there is no such separation, just a matter of the degree of agreement, and the type of things which we can more readily agree on.

I don't quite understand what you're asking. Care to explain a bit better?

A reflection, or mirror image, is not identical to the thing reflected. Notice that when you look into the mirror, the features on the right side of your face are reflected as the features of the left side of your face.

AgentTangarine is a bot. Not a real member posting. Can we put a restraining feature on this bot? — Caldwell

How do you know this?


Thanks for the detailed and informative post. Regardless of whether you are a bot or not, I find your posting to be both interesting and coherent. Perhaps, in relation to subjects like this, it's better to be a bot, because human beings tend to be emotional

There's a couple questions I have. The first, concerns the nature of the described A field. You said:

The A-field in QED is caused by the electrons themselves and they induce local gauge transformations on the electron field, precisely in such a way that the Lagrangian of the conserved. The gauge changes introduced cause similar shifts in interference patterns as in the BA effect. This causes electron fields to get shifted like the interference pattern is shifted in the effect above-mentioned. The difference is that the shift is not the same everywhere (global) but rather varies from place to place. The induced local gauge transformations show themselves as interference effects (which is the only way to observe rotations of internal vectors in the complex plane). — AgentTangarine

If I understand correctly, the classical "electromagnetic field" which is a property of electrons, can be represented as two distinct fields, electric field and magnetic field. I understand the electric field (E) to be spatial, representing a spatial relation to the position of the electron. The magnetic field (B) I understand as temporal, representing the changing position of the electron. If I understand you correctly, you are saying that the relationship between the E field and the B field, which ought to represent "electromagnetism", is not strictly invariant, so there is a need to introduce an A field to compensate. I would conclude that the relationship between space and time is not invariant. It is made to appear as invariant through the use of the A field. If you can explain where this interpretation is misunderstanding, or deficient, I'd be grateful.

On the other hand, here's another question. It has to do with the use of "planes". I understand the E field to be represented as a different plane from the B field. I don't understand why this principle is employed in the first place. But there is evidently a problem, because there is a fundamental difficulty in relating two planes, known as the irrational nature of the square root of two. Further, when the relationships is presented as curved lines, circles or arcs, there is the irrational nature of pi to deal with. So distinct planes is a problematic concept to me. Can you tell me what is meant by "the complex plane"?

This is almost similar to what I'm saying above. Symmetry becomes the object itself, and the main event becomes the background -- a supporting role to symmetry. Is this close to what you're thinking here? — Caldwell

Yes, I think this is close. The problem being that the symmetry cannot actually be the object, so this is where the notion of falsity, or in the case of your example of artwork, maybe even a form of deception, is involved. "Symmetry" is a descriptive term referring to the relationship between things, thereby implying a multitude of things. If the symmetry is the object, we'd say that the multitude of things are parts of a whole, and the whole is "the symmetry". The issue is that a whole never really is a symmetry, so that is a misrepresentation. So when we see "the main event" as a symmetry, we are not seeing the whole, we are seeing the parts involved in an event which is seen as symmetrical. And the whole is something completely different from a symmetry, so if we see the whole work of art, we are not seeing a symmetry, and it would be wrong to describe it this way.

In other words, to describe a whole as a symmetry is to lose track of the essence of what a whole really is.

On the contrary, the second notion of symmetry(17th c) from the quote you provided, ignores the location or context. The left and right are simply equal, or they mimic each other. While the first notion, which is the ancient definition of symmetry, refers to balance. This symmetry, I think, is what's dependent on location. You'll find this a lot in art composition -- paintings for example, around the 15th century. — Caldwell

Yes I agree, the older notion of symmetry does not involve removing the symmetrical thing from its context. In fact it might be argued that the reason why symmetry is considered to be beautiful is the way that the symmetry is observed to be a fit, within the context. In other words, the beauty of any particular symmetry is given by the context. And one could even take this principle further to argue that symmetry is actually a feature of the context, reducing the internal thing which is supposed to be the symmetry itself, to a simple central point within a balanced environment.

So the point I tried to make in the op is that the modern use of "symmetry" as it is used in pop metaphysics, in the sense of symmetry-breaking and similar concepts, derived from the application of mathematics in physics, is what we might call a perverted sense of "symmetry". It places "symmetry" as a feature of an object rather than as an arrangement of objects. We could say that it abstracts "a symmetry" as an object, from "symmetry" which is necessarily an arrangement, therefore a plurality of things. In essence, a true symmetry requires an arrangement of parts, whereas a modern symmetry is considered to be an invariant whole, thereby denying the possibility of parts.

Good topic, but out of sync, I'm afraid. — Caldwell

I don't get you. Out of sync with what? Out of sync with the modern sense?

You touch upon a deep issue here, as a matter of fact! It is claimed that symmetries lay at the basis of forces.The SU(2)l×SU(1)ySU(2)l×SU(1)y symmetry for the so-called unified force (splitting in the EM force and weak force after a break of symmetry, namely that of the Higgs potential) the SU(3)SU(3) symmetry for the color force, and a coordinate symmetry for general relativity. You can perform symmetry operations without truly change a system. This is simply done mentally, and by demanding symmetry, forces arise, while in fact it's the other way round. It are forces which give rise to symmetry principles. You can literally force symmetry transformations upon nature, like you do with the squares, and retrospectivelyclaim that forces are the result, but that's indeed putting the horse behind the wagon. You can rotate all points of a square locally and say that because of this forces will appear in the square to let it keep its shape (making it symmetrical wrt to local rotations or gauges), but as you say, you have to pull and push it first for these forces to appear. — AgentTangarine

Thanks for your contribution Agent Tangerine. I must admit that I don't quite grasp what you're talking about here. I'm having a difficult time understanding the concept of gauge symmetry, and especially the role of what is called "internal space", and its relation to space-time. Maybe because it's supposed to be "internal", is the reason for the role reversal which you describe.

Your reading of my position, MU, seem uncharitable and tendentious to say the least. Anyway, forget me; read some P. Foot, O. Flanagan, D. Parfit, M. Nussbaum, A. Sen, P. Singer, K. Popper ... — 180 Proof

You might call my reading "uncharitable", but I simply do not understand how you can propose an ethics which proposes to give priority to all natural species. Clearly that is not a possibility. And regardless of how many names you can list off, of people who have supported this unrealistic idea, it flies in the face of the natural process which we call "evolution". So until you can provide some explanation as to how you can produce consistency between "what's good for each species for thriving", and the natural process called "evolution", I'll assume that your proposed type of ethics is a very unnatural attempt to constrain this natural process, therefore not a naturalistic ethics at all. It is an ethics of artificial interference.

It's no wonder you can't discuss philosophy with me, you refuse to accept the points that Wittgenstein makes, which I point out to you, insisting that I misunderstand. If you wouldn't be so encapsulated by your own interpretation you'd see that there is much more to his writing than could possibly be grasped by any particular individual, and you'd approach interpretations which are radically different from your own interpretation with more of an open mind.

So the fact remains, that you are denying, or ignoring the importance of the phrase "what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him?". If you would accept this, you would see that it is not necessary that there is anything in the box, "...for the box might even be empty". Then the word "beetle" cannot be the name of a thing. The possibility that the use for the word "beetle" is to name a thing , has been ruled out by the fact that the box might be completely empty.

Instead, you state "the object could literally be anything". But this is a misrepresentation. What Wittgenstein has actually said is that there might not be an object. This misrepresentation appears to cause you to be stumped in your understanding because you end your passage with:

,

Does it then follow from this that we cannot talk about our internal experiences of pain, hope, joy, sadness, etc? Obviously we can talk about these things, we do it all the time. This then brings us back to the notion of how meaning does get a foothold. — Sam26

But if you would simply recognize the difference between naming, and describing, which I explained to you, and the fact that a description does not require a thing which is described, as it might be totally fictional, then you would have no problem with understanding how "the thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all". This "game" being referred to is a game of description, where descriptive terms like "pain" are being employed not to describe "things", but to describe inner feelings, which are decidedly not things. The proposed "thing in the box" is actually not a thing at all, and we ought not assume that one could assign a name to it as if it were thing.

Now there is no issue, or problem, of how meaning gets a foot hold, because it is demonstrated by Wittgenstein as a matter of describing inner feelings, which is distinctly not a matter of naming things. A problem only arises when we assume the inner feelings to be things. Then we have the incompatibility demonstrated by Wittgenstein, between what it means to be a thing which can bear a name, and what it means to be an inner feeling which can only be described.

We've got Agent Smith, and now Agent Tangerine. Where's Agent Bruce?

The strange thing with squares is that they do stay the same after rotation. It's relation with surrounding squares may become different, but the square by itself stays the same. — AgentTangarine

That's the problem though, how can a thing be rotated like that (a force being required to rotate the thing) without changing the thing? The force must have an effect, and the effect is to rotate the thing. But nothing else changes so there must be a change to the thing rotated to account for the expenditure of force required to rotate it.

If you play soccer with a ball protected by a coat then the ball beneath the coat will be the same ball before and after the game. Demanding that the ball stays the same under kicks and stops will introduce forces in the ball. Demanding that it stays the same in free flight will render it force free (this is the essence of Noether's theorem,). — AgentTangarine

Clearly the ball is changed, even after employing the "coat" as a sort of forcefield to protect the ball. The forcefield is not absolute, perfect, ideal, or else the ball inside would have eternal existence exactly as it is, inside that forcefield, never being capable of being changed in there.

The only misunderstanding, is if someone wants to talk about the thing in the box in this way (again it's not me or W.). It would be the interlocutor responding to Wittgenstein's beetle example, i.e., they would be trying to describe the thing in the box as a kind of picture. So, the only confusion here, is you not understanding the point of W.'s remarks. — Sam26

Clearly it is indicated by Wittgenstein that it is not necessary that there is something which the description refers to. So you seem to ignore this part: "then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him?", to support your claim that I misunderstand.

What you are missing (misunderstanding), is, as Wittgenstein says, that it is not necessary that there is anything in the box. So it is you who demonstrates misunderstanding when you talk about "the thing in the box". If it is not necessary that there is something in the box, then you display misunderstanding by referring to "the thing in the box".

And as I explained, that's why naming is completely different from describing. Naming ("beetle", for example) requires that there is an object which is named, otherwise it is not an act of "naming". "Describing" does not require that there is an object which fulfills the stated description.

And that is why we can describe our inner feelings, but we cannot name them, because there is no "thing" there to be named. To say "I have a pain", is not to name something that I have (like naming it 'beetle" for instance), it is to describe a feeling.

I don't know what to tell you MU, you do this all the time, and no matter how many times people try to explain it to you, you seem stuck in a place that no one can free you from. And, this is why I generally don't respond to your posts. Luke spent a long time with you trying to explain your misunderstandings, but to no avail. All I can tell you is that your interpretations of W. are so far from the norm, that I wonder if we're both speaking English. — Sam26

Oh, so here we go with the ad hominem fallacy. You thought that I misunderstood something in the past, therefore everything I say ought to be dismissed as misunderstanding.

Whatever you say Bruce.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9SqQNgDrgg

Let us continue with Wittgenstein’s thinking: “If you say he sees a private picture before him, which he is describing, you have still made an assumption about what he has before him. And that means that you can describe it or do describe it more closely. If you admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him—then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”

Even if you say that the inner thing is a kind of picture, you are still making an assumption with no content. There is no way to describe it, you cannot see inside the other person’s box, so it is an empty assumption. And, of course, if you admit, Wittgenstein says, that you have no notion of the thing in the box, then how is it that you want to say there is something there? Maybe you could respond, “Because I have these kinds of inner things.” Yes, there are these internal experiences going on, but none of us can observe these internal happenings, it is like the beetle in the box example. Does it then follow from this that we cannot talk about our internal experiences of pain, hope, joy, sadness, etc? Obviously we can talk about these things, we do it all the time. This then brings us back to the notion of how meaning does get a foothold. — Sam26

Notice how you've moved from "object and designation" here, toward "description". These two are fundamentally different types of language use which cannot be conflated without the creation of misunderstanding and confusion.

An object can be named without the requirement of any description, there is simply some form of pointing it out. On the other hand, a description can be made without the requirement of a thing being described. In the case of an "inner experience" there is no possibility of pointing out the particular object, just some general sort of "feeling", therefore there is no possibility of object designation. So we produce a description without a thing being described.

Therefore we must bear in mind that descriptions do not require any object designation. In fact, they are based in general feelings where there is no object being described. And, the inclination to request the object being described (point it out for me), is a mistaken adventure. There is no "thing in the box", and descriptive terms are derived from something other than 'the properties of a thing'. They are derived from general feelings.

In logical language use we employ both types of language use together. We point to a thing, giving it a name, and we utilize descriptive terms for that thing. What we need to respect is that the descriptive terms are not justified by the features of any particular things, they are justified by consistency in general feelings.

Are you averring that there is such a thing as a square? I myself would say that squareness is a quality, and that quality retained by that thing that possessed it notwithstanding rotation. — tim wood

The point is not whether a thing would maintain one, or even some, of its qualities, when being moved, that is not the sense of "symmetry" I am talking about. The question is whether a thing could maintain all of its qualities when being moved. In pop metaphysics, "symmetry" is taken to refer to a thing, which has transformational invariance. There is assumed to be real symmetries existing in the world, things which are defined by this feature, (which is not a real feature, but an abstract tool). Consider that moving something requires the application of a force. How would it be possible to apply a force to a thing without in some way changing the thing?

Or using your criteria of movement as change and change meaning no-longer-the-same, then it would follow that nothing is ever even the same as itself (not least because we know that everything is in constant motion), and thus nothing could ever be sensibly said of anything. (Because the thing spoken of, by the time spoken, would no longer be that thing.) And any abstraction would necessarily apply to no thing - and absurdly, not even to itself. — tim wood

This is not relevant. The law of identity allows that a thing changes, as time passes, yet the thing maintains its identity as the same thing. A thing's "identity" is not based in properties or attributes, its based in the thing's temporal continuity of existence. This principle provides for us, the means to understand the reality that a thing may be constantly changing, thereby having contrary properties, yet remain being the same thing.

While their may be an iota of wisdom in this, it is at the same time non-sense. — tim wood

I don't see the basis for your accusation of "nonsense". Is that your general approach to things you do not understand? Instead of trying to understand you just designate it as nonsense.

Perhaps the bedrock here is that there is no bedrock. Truly all is seeming - qualities - and not being. But we take it for being; it works as being and for being, and that's an end of it! Or where would you go with your ideas? — tim wood

This is self-defeating, as self-contradicting. You are saying we assume being (take it for being), when it's really not being. Yet you say "truly all is seeming". Well, it seems to be being, so your claim of "not being" is completely unsupported.

Reread the post of mine you've quoted. There's no mention of a "particular species". I wrote "natural species" with "our" in parenthesis to include h. sapiens. Maybe not clear enough ... well, "natural" connotes any other species as well as ours; so 'what's good for each species for thriving' is specific to each species and therefore differ, by degrees (not kind), from one another, suggesting that moral concern is, on a naturalistic basis, inherently pluralistic (i.e. inclusive). — 180 Proof

Sorry for the misunderstanding. But now the sentence appears incoherent to me. Obviously what is good for some species is not good for other species. There is a natural competitiveness in the world which leaves most organisms in a state less than "thriving". The thriving of all species is completely counter to the natural process of evolution. Are you suggesting that morality should be based in an effort to put an end to evolution? This would not be naturalistic at all.

Anything other than that particular species.

'Natural goodness', as Philippa Foot, says is the immanent "source of the ethics" for natural beings – pursuing what is good for ((our) natural species') thriving and avoiding / reducing what is not good for ((our) natural species') thriving. A modern formulation of fundamental insight shared by Laozi, Kǒngzǐ, Buddha, Hillel the Elder, Epicurus-Lucretius, Diogenes the Kynic, Seneca-Epictetus, ... Spinoza, et al. — 180 Proof

There is a problem with basing ethics in what is good for one particular species. Much will be sacrificed for the good of that particular species.

Are you saying that if I turn a square 360 degrees it is no longer a square? — tim wood

No, I am saying that the square is no longer the same as it was before you turned it. The fact that you turned it means that you changed it and it is no longer the same. So if you represent a square as being able to be turned without being made different than it was before you turned it, you make a false representation.

That reality is intelligible is the presupposition of all scientific endeavours: that the intelligibility science proposes is always subject to empirical verification means that science never actually explains existence itself but must submit itself to a reality check against the empirical data. This existential gap between scientific hypotheses and empirical verified judgment points to, in philosophical terms, the contingency of existence. There is no automatic leap from hypothesis to reality that can bypass a "reality check." — Neil Ormerod, The Metaphysical Muddle of Lawrence Krauss

This is an important point. Some modern metaphysics will remove this necessity, that reality is intelligible, to posit a fundamentally unintelligible "chaos" as the first principle. This is the consequence of materialism. Under Aristotelian principles, form is intelligible, matter is not. Giving priority to matter renders reality as fundamentally unintelligible.

The importance is not the question of which perspective is true. It could very well be true that reality is fundamentally unintelligible. However, since we are in a position so as not to know which is true, we must posit that reality is fundamentally intelligible, in order to support the scientific endeavours required to determine which is true. If we take the materialist perspective, and posit that reality is fundamentally unintelligible, there will be no motivation toward determining the true nature of reality, this being designated as impossible. So this perspective, that reality is fundamentally unintelligible, is demonstrably the wrong position to take, regardless of whether or not it is true.

I don't think that you are properly representing the concept of "equality" Qmeri, and this is what is giving you the problem. This concept allows us to overlook differences to assign "the same value" to two distinct things. Notice that it is "value" we are dealing with, therefore the overlooking of differences is supported within a conceptual structure. So it must be done within a logical framework, defining what sort of value supports the type of "equality". In the case of "all human beings are equal" this is a legal framework which supports human rights.

This sense of "right", is very closely related to "right" in the sense of correct. We consider it to be the correct thing to do, to assign equality to human beings, and this "correctness" supports the value judgement which is presented as human rights.

Since this form of equality is based in a judgement of correctness, it is fundamentally incorrect to argue against it. This is why your thread has gone astray. You are presenting yourself as saying that it is somehow acceptable to argue against what is by definition correct. This would be like arguing that it is acceptable to break the law.

The argument you want to make actually can be made, in a somewhat rational way, but you need to take yourself outside this conceptual structure which assigns correctness to equality. By using the term "inequality" as you do, ("...if you argue for inequality..."), you do not free yourself from that conceptual structure. "Inequality" is simply what is opposed to equality. So all you do is present yourself as opposed to equality, therefore opposed to what is correct, and necessarily incorrect.

Not for all P. P must have certain qualities to be either true or false: call it truth-capable or false-capable. Lacking those, the LEM, then, simply does not apply. — tim wood

Yes that's what I was saying, we have an exception to the rule, the rule does not apply. Sorry if I didn't express myself clearly.

One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. — tim wood

As argued by scholars who have followed Aristotle, it is somewhat unclear what is meant by 'one must be true and the other false' in this context.

In this case it would have been clearer if he had said 'either one or the other must be true". It is important to understand the difference between these two ways of expressing this, because in the latter, truth or falsity is assigned to the relation between the propositions, which is expressed as "one or the other". So truth is a property of that proposition, "one or the other", and not the property of any one of the two propositions. We can say "one will happen", because this does not specify which one will happen, while implying that the other is excluded by the happening of the one. But we cannot unambiguously say "one must be true", because at that time neither is true. If you read the entire section this ought become clearer to you. And the ambiguity is evident in the years of debate which followed.

The best description in On Interpretation is found at 19a 7-23:

Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that both deliberation, and action are causative with regard to the future, and that, to speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there is a potentiality in either direction. Such things may either be or not be; events also therefore may either take place or not take place. There are many obvious instances of this.
...
It is therefore plain that it is not of necessity that everything is or takes place; but in some instances there are real alternatives, in which case the affirmation is no more true and no more false than the denial; while some exhibit a predisposition and general tendency in one direction or the other, and yet can issue in the opposite direction by exception.

Of course Aristotle's best treatise on potentiality (that which may either be or not be) is found in his Metaphysics, a a large section of that text is devoted to this, and a thorough reading is required to understand what he is saying. Here he expounds on the principle established in his Physics, that the concept of "matter" serves to represent the real existence of potentiality in the field of physics.

And here we are at absolute presuppositions. They're both absolutely presupposed in their respective systems. Not,, then, a question of right, but of efficacy. You mention the "force" of gravity. Absolutely, and it works: F = G(m1)(m2) / r^2. F of course for force. The only trouble being that these days and for some time, gravity has been understood not as a force, but as a curvature of spacetime, objects merely following shortest distance paths, geodesics, through spacetime. Gravity as force is a sometimes convenient fiction, and the math works well-enough, but not how it works according to best understanding.

So we're back to models. And your point remains obscure and obscured. — tim wood

That's exactly the point, the nature of the presuppositions affects the efficacy of the model. These models are all effective in some situations and less so in others. That the model becomes ineffective when pushing its boundaries, or parameters, is evidence that it is deficient. Notice that the ineffectiveness is within the boundaries, when the model approaches its boundaries, not outside its boundaries (in which case it wouldn't even be applied), therefore the deficiency is within the model itself, attributable to faulty presuppositions.

My point remains, and is not at all obscure. The presuppositions employed by the models of modern physics fail to account for the difference between past and future, the future holding real possibility. These models are inertia based models based in the assumption (presupposition) that what has been in the past, will necessarily continue to be in the future, unless 'forced' to change.

This presupposition is directly contrary to what Aristotle demonstrated as the nature of "matter", holding the capacity to either be or not be, allowing for the reality of free will. What is clearly described by Aristotle is that there is no such necessity with regard to future events, as distinct from past events. So the necessity attributed to inertia is a false necessity, not a true property of "matter" as defined. It is posited for the sake of producing effective models, making it a pragmatic presupposition which is necessarily untrue because it contradicts the definition. Matter has no properties, properties are formal. So the models break down and fail near their limits, due to the reality that the necessity assumed (as inertia) is a false (contradictory) necessity.

Can you clarify this? Let P be the proposition that tomorrow I will have turned to the left. P is today neither true nor false. What is the exception to the LEM? What reality? — tim wood

The LEM dictates that P must be either true or false. You have said, P is neither true nor false, hence an exception to the law.

But what would be here the difference between the logical and the ontological possibility, the possibility having been arrived at as a possibility? — tim wood

In the case of yesterday there is a truth or falsity to "I turned left". Either it actually occurred or it did not. In the case of tomorrow there is neither truth nor falsity to "I will turn left" because I could do either. Look up Aristotle's famous example, "there will be a sea battle tomorrow". It must be the case that we believe it to be neither true nor false, or else we would not deliberate in decision making.

I think this is misleading. To be sure, this true of all models. But this just a conscious setting aside of the irrelevant - not a deficiency for a model. It leaves open the question as to whether it is a good or a bad model. — tim wood

If you understood the difference, you would see that it is not irrelevant. Newton's law of inertia for instance states that a force is required to change the motion of a thing. But imagine the difference, if it was required to apply a force at every moment of passing time, to maintain any constant motion. These are two very distinct ways of looking at inertia with completely different implications. But which one is correct? Since motion appears to us to be constant, we take constant motion for granted. Then we say a force is required to alter it. But what validates the notion that there is not a force (such as gravity) being applied to every massive object at every moment of passing time, which maintains its constant motion? If this is the case, then we need to understand what sustains this force, to be able to understand motion.

You might like this — Wayfarer

What is actually needed, is a definitive separation between the two principal senses of "potential", being logically possible, and ontologically possible.

In relation to future events, there is ontological possibility, in the sense that I might stand up and walk to the right, or I might go straight ahead, to the left, or remain seated. As Aristotle pointed out, even though one of these will come true as time passes, it is incorrect to say that there is a truth or falsity to any of them, at the present time. That we say there is no truth or falsity with respect to such future events necessitates that we allow exception to the law of excluded middle to account for this as reality. If we would say that such statements were both true and false, this would necessitate that we allow exceptions to the law of non-contradiction.

In the other principal sense of "potential", logically possible, we can look at past events which we are unsure of and establish logical possibilities for what actually occurred. In this case there is a truth or falsity to what occurred, but we are unable to determine with certainty what is the case, so the possibilities are not ontological they are logical.

Now, the situation gets confusing when we realize that we can apply logical possibility toward future events in the act of predicting. When we do this there is no need to separate logical from ontological possibilities to produce an accurate prediction. All that is required is a universal law, like Newton's first law of motion, which extends the actuality of the past, into the future, through that designation of necessity provided by the law. So, for convenience, all future possibilities are treated as logical possibilities as provided for by the law.

Science is derived from observation which provides us with the true or false representation of what has occurred (the past). Through universal laws derived from induction, and the principles of causal determinism, we create models which extend the past through the present, into the future, with complete disregard for ontological possibilities which do not fit into these models. The models are deficient because they do not recognize the true nature of the present, as a divisor between what is ontologically possible, and what is ontologically actual, conflating those two senses of "potential".

You know all about Mickleson-Morley - it's generally accepted there is no aether. — tim wood

The problem here is that what you state as "generally accepted", is not a valid conclusion from Michelson-Morley experiments. These experiments demonstrated that the relationship between the aether and a massive object was not as proposed. The conclusion that there is no aether is simply invalid logic.

Which opens up the question of the independent reality of descriptors. Two pears and two pears are four pears. The pears are real, but the two, four, addition, equaling, all of that, ideas, nothing in the reality that holds the pears. Similarly with odds. — tim wood

Ok, now do you see that by your analogy, the Fourier transform is numbers applied to waves. The waves are real, just like the pears you say are real. The numbers you claim are not.

Bottom line for me, if you insist the waves are real, then what is the nature of their reality? — tim wood

I already answered this for you. Until we know the nature of the medium, within which the waves exist (commonly known as the aether), we will not know the nature of their reality.

Wave functions produce probabilities, they do not describe probabilities. The mathematics employed is a description of waves, and what is produced through the application of the math is probabilities.

Consider that one can record statistics endlessly, and the statistics are useless for prediction unless they are employed. If a person desires to make a prediction, one must employ some principles which describe an activity enabling a prediction. We cannot jump from statistics to prediction without such a principle. Imagine you that you assign a successive number each time the sun comes up, 1,2,3... until you get to 6348. You want to predict the next one, 6349. But that number is useless and doesn't qualify as a prediction without a description, "the sun will come up". In the case of a wave function, the principles employed describe a wave activity, and the application of these principles produces probabilities, enabling prediction.

I don’t think so. I think there are strong objections to the single home theory, but they don’t touch the idea of a word being at home in a language-game, having a role or a function. It’s easier to see in the negative: if you’re working on a bit of carpentry and you have the wood, hammer, nails, screws, drill, ruler, sandpaper, and so on, then the soldering iron doesn’t belong here. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you are changing the subject by switching to the negative. The issue is the affirmation that a word has a home (or possibly more than one home). By proceeding in the negative, as you suggest, all you can do is keep saying 'this is not the word's home', and 'that is not the word's home', so on and so forth. You would always be left with a multitude of possibilities such that if meaning is directly related to the home, as Sam26 suggested, we could never have certainty of meaning.

I know that we are not necessarily looking for certainty, as you say, we are simply looking to accomplish a purpose. However, the context of Sam's post indicates that the issue we are dealing with is the question of distinguishing one "sense" from another, and in the case of logic, certainty is the purpose. So the problem is well exemplified with the way that people use the word "know". There is an epistemological sense of "know" which implies justified. Justification requires logical proof, and this requires that a word's use be limited by a definition. Ambiguity and the possibility of equivocation nullifies any attempt at justification.

So you might really be talking about something completely different from me. You are saying, so long as we can exclude misuse of the tool, we can proceed with the tool in a vast multitude of correct uses. Excluding misuse will exclude the possibility of mistake, and the tool will always serve the intended purpose. But you do not appear to be considering the fact that word usage has at least two sides, the person who hears is distinct from the person who speaks. And, the person speaking cannot exclude the possibility of mistake by the person hearing, in the way you propose, because where the word "doesn't belong" varies from one person to another.

Look at Sam's interpretation of Banno's chosen word, "congenital", a few posts back, in relation to my interpretation. I think that this word does not belong in that context, there is no language game which supports that use, and Banno is wrong to use that what in that way. But Sam, in my opinion fabricates a game which supports that use, and claims that Banno is simply within the rules of that game. As demonstrated by this example, and multitudes of other similar examples which abound in this world, your proposal, that we might just decide that a word "doesn't belong here", is completely inaccurate, because someone else will come along and use it there. And this incompatibility between one person saying it doesn't belong, and another saying it does, will result in the word not serving the intended purpose, and misunderstanding.

The homonym business — eh, it’s almost semantics. The one argument against it would be that in introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in, you’re relying to some degree on people’s understanding of how the word is used elsewhere — either for the metaphor, or by making a case that there’s a strong analogy between the known use and the new one. It would be hard to pitch a known word as an empty vessel you can add a new meaning to at will. (A somewhat outlandish metaphor can do the trick. Timothy Williamson got mainstream philosophers to talk about “luminosity”.) — Srap Tasmaner

I don't agree with this at all, and I believe that this is why this issue is so "tricky". I think we have to distinguish between two very different "ways" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in". If you are relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, then you are not actually introducing the word to a new game, you are forming an extension on an old game. This is the sort of overlap which Banno referred to with "family resemblances". But this is where the game analogy breaks down and fails, though people like Banno will refuse to accept this fact. What Wittgenstein represents as a game, is one specific way of using the word. If we allow now, that "a game" consists of two distinct ways, even if one is related to the other by a family resemblance, we contradict the premise of "a game". Therefore distinct uses must be distinct games despite the reality of "overlap" This is the age old issue in Plato's Parmenides, of the incompatibility between One and Many.

That is the one "way" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in", allowing that the two games have a relationship (family) with each other. And the problem is that this really negates the effectiveness of the game analogy. Meaning is attributable to this relationship between games, not to any game. We now have to assume something within language, which is very significant and important to meaning, which is outside any particular game, as the relating of one game to another. This is equivalent to "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts". We have to allow that there is something which makes a whole a whole, which is not a part of the whole. It's a sort of dilemma, and the solution is to reject the analogy. Language-games are proposed as the parts, but the whole which is "a language" is not a congregate of such parts. Therefore the proposal is unacceptable.

That "way" we might call the natural way. The other "way," we might call the logical way. The logical way is to strictly define the word, making the usage specific to one particular game, thereby excluding all relations with other games. Excluding relations with other games is very important, to avoid the tendency to equivocate. This way is exactly opposed to relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, because that way of understanding consists of a multitude of relations between games (which "game" fails to capture because the understanding lies in the relations, not in the games) and this sort of understanding is extremely conducive to equivocation.

With respect to the two "ways", the logical way is consistent with the "language-game" analogy, but the natural way is not. So the language-game description really fails to capture the true nature of natural language, being based in the logical way which is opposed to the natural way.

One point from the other direction doesn’t seem to be brought up much: must a word have a single use in a language-game? Why couldn’t a word have multiple uses in the same language-game? — Srap Tasmaner

In essence, this is exactly why the game analogy fails in accounting for natural language. "A game" as demonstrated by Wittgenstein is a single type of usage. To avoid violating, or contradicting that premise, a double usage cannot be one game. So a usage is a game, and this principle allows for the reality of logical proceedings, free from equivocation. However, natural language is directly opposed to this, deriving meaning from a multitude of very distinct usages. One might portray these distinct usages as distinct games, but that's really a step in the wrong direction. The real production of distinct games is the artificial process of creating distinct logical premises, and distinct logical proceedings. The natural process of deriving meaning is a comparison of individual, particular, instances of use, which cannot be portrayed as games. They cannot be portrayed as games because the game representation assumes that each instance of usage proceeds with the intent of establishing a rule for general usage. Natural language use does not often proceed with the intent of establishing a rule, it just proceeds with the intent of accomplishing the purpose in that particular instance. So when a person compares distinct instances of usage to derive meaning, this is not a matter of comparing distinct games, because that intent, of demonstrating a game is not necessarily there in these distinct instances.

More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction. — Sam26

Which one of my interpretations? I offered two completely different. You are the one who brought up a word's "home". How do you interpret this concept? Does a word have only one "home" in one language game, or does it have a "home" in every language game which it is used in? If the former, how would we know which game is the home game? If the latter why would we call this the same word, if it has many different homes? And what sense is there to saying that something has numerous homes?

I’m sympathetic to your thinking in this post, but this is backwards. That is, you’re talking here about reflecting on the meaning of a word, analysing it, theorizing it, rather than using it. When it comes to use, either a word will do for your purpose or it won’t — or it can be made to work the way you want or it can’t. Think first of cases of trying to use a word for some purpose rather than of scrutinizing the word; the point of a tool is to use it when it will get the job done, not to contemplate it. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so when deciding on what words to use, making the judgement as to whether the word will serve the purpose or not, Sam26 said we need to "think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home". So, if the word is a tool, to make that judgement as to whether it will get the job done or not, we need to find the language game which is the word's home. Whether or not this is "scrutinizing the word" is irrelevant, but this is what is suggested that we need to do. One cannot just pick up any tool, and expect that it will get the job done, so we look at a word's 'home game' to determine whether it will get the job done. How do we determine the word's 'home game'?

But doesn’t the ‘words are homeless’ line of argument contradict the ‘homonym’ argument? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that is the point. They are two very distinct, perhaps even contradictory perspectives. That's why I started off with the suggestion that there's a sort of paradox here. The homonym argument says that since each different game in which a word is used is a distinct "home", then really these ought to be considered as distinct words. But then we might annihilate the relations between one game and another, which Banno pointed out is an important part of meaning, in the article on family resemblances. Now, in this homonym scenario each game is a distinct game, as a distinct home for the words within it, and every word in a different game, even though they might sound and be spelled the same, are different words. You can see that this is an unrealistic scenario because it denies the importance of the relations between one game and another.

However, if we go to the other option, that the same word is used in many games and one of the games is the word's home game, which validates the word's meaning, we have an equally unrealistic scenario. We have no way of knowing which game is the home game, and then the word becomes "homeless" completely free from constraints, like a tool we might be able to pick up and use for any purpose.

I think we do better to take in more rather than less of what’s going on, so that we can see the hammer being a part of — being ‘at home’ in — each ensemble of tools and practices where it is useful (cabinetmaking, house framing, tractor maintenance, surveying, etc.), but not part of others where it is not. I’d lean toward multiple homes, with both hammers and words. Someone used to using a hammer in only one way for one sort of job might be surprised to find other people think of it quite differently, and the same thing happens with words sometimes. (Someone might use a chisel as a doorstop for years without the slightest idea what it’s ‘really’ for.) — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so the other two ways I mentioned are both completely unrealistic, being like two extremes, neither of which properly describes the reality of the situation. Now you propose a word has "multiple homes". I would say now, that the word "home" does not serve any purpose any more. The same word, like the hammer, has a different job, in many different games. We can't say that any particular game is the home, so it's rather meaningless to say that every game in which it appears is a "home" for it.

Now we're right back to square one, having resolved nothing. Suppose one wants to decide whether a word will serve a particular purpose or not, how could one proceed? I have a job to do and I want to know whether the hammer will serve the purpose. Each job, or purpose is unique, distinct from every other one so it doesn't make sense to start looking through all the different language games that the word has appeared in, or all the different things I've ever done with a hammer. How do you think the judgement is made? If I do not look at one game as the home game, and I do not consider all the different games, what do I do, take a few games and make an average or something?

All right! The wave function describes waves. What sort of waves do they describe? — tim wood

What sort of waves are described is the problem, isn't it? Until the aether is identified that question cannot be answered. Right? We know that waves are described, because that's what the Fourier transform (which is central to a wave function) does, describes waves. Therefore the name "wave" function. We just don't know the medium of those waves. But we know that the waves are real because the transmit energy.

You brought up this issue of "the language game that is its [a word's] home". But if you'd prefer not to discuss it then just say so.

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

Since a word has a place in numerous different language-games, would we be correct in saying that the word has a number of different "homes"? You seem to imply that for Wittgenstein, only one of the language-games is the word's true "home". If this is the case, then what is the word's position in another language-game? How is it possible that we look to a word's home language-game to understand its meaning in a completely different language-game? Obviously, the situation I described, that the word is a distinct and different word in each different language-game, with its own home in that game, is not the case, if a word has a one "home" game that determines its meaning.

So, what is the case? If any particular instance of a word's meaning is not dependent on its use in that specific game in which it is being used at that time, and it is actually required that we determine the word's "home" game to know its meaning in that other game, how do we determine its "home" game? I assume that if we do not know with certainty, the word's "home" game, we cannot know with certainty the word's true meaning. Do you agree with this?

Or, is this idea of a "home" game just a ruse? One might search forever, trying to confirm the word's "home" never really being sure which game is the word's "home", therefore never really being sure of the word's meaning. Perhaps the idea that there is one "home" game is just wrong, and the word has a home in each different game which it is used. Then shouldn't we say that these are distinct words, like homonyms, each with its own home in its own game? On what principle then do we say that it is "the same word" used in different games? Oughtn't we say that a word is homeless, and is free to go and find a place wherever one wants it to be?

Wiki, wave function: "A wave function in quantum physics is a mathematical description...". I am going to assume you were being facetious. — tim wood

Well of course, a wave function is a mathematical description. And what the mathematics describes, is waves. That's what I said "'wave function' describes waves". I didn't think anyone reading this would be so uninformed as to require the qualification "using mathematics". That the description is made with mathematics is self-evident. I'm not being facetious, you are just being unbelievably ignorant.

Are you familiar with the Fourier transform which is central to the mathematics of a wave function? It describes wave frequencies.

History
Main articles: Fourier analysis § History, and Fourier series § History
In 1822, Joseph Fourier showed that some functions could be written as an infinite sum of harmonics.[10]

Introduction
See also: Fourier analysis

One motivation for the Fourier transform comes from the study of Fourier series. In the study of Fourier series, complicated but periodic functions are written as the sum of simple waves mathematically represented by sines and cosines. The Fourier transform is an extension of the Fourier series that results when the period of the represented function is lengthened and allowed to approach infinity. — Wikipedia: Fourier Transform

The infamous "uncertainty principle" is a feature of the principle referred to here as "allowed to approach infinity". We really know that neither the actual time value nor the actual frequency of a real wave could be "infinite", so this assumption introduces a degree of uncertainty (falsity) into the mathematical description.

Coming from you that convinces me otherwise. — 180 Proof

You ought not say things like that 180. It just demonstrates that you are convinced by ad hominem. And that's known as a fallacy. Relying on ad hominem to make judgements of metaphysics is just not good. Why do you base your metaphysical judgements in fallacious logic?

...even though you've taken a leap of whatever off of the raggedy edge of my post. — 180 Proof

That's hard to avoid. The entire post is a ragged mess, best to abandon.

actually this question and tim woods response makes me question whether the study of the evolution of the universe is actually 'history'. The web definition of history is 'the study of past events, particularly in human affairs e.g. "medieval European history". — Wayfarer

I think the word "history" is used to create the illusion of science, by the authors. By calling it "history", the metaphysics which consists of speculations about the early universe. is presented as if it might be science.

I'm not smart enough to dumb down my 'philosophical via negativa' any further especially for someone who won't bother to read it.
How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?
— The Sign of the Four, chap. 6
Last attempt (paraphrasing Arthur Conan Doyle):

'If we eliminate (negate) the ways the actual world necessarily could not have been or cannot be described, then what remains is every way the actual world – phase space – possibly could have been or can be described.' — 180 Proof

Eliminating the impossible does not give us the truth. Such a method always leaves us with possibility because the logic operates within that category. And truth is what actually is. So we still have a categorical separation between what we get from eliminating impossibility (i.e., possibility), and truth (what actually is).

And, the proposition that all reality consists of mere possibility, without anything actual, is inconsistent with sense observation. In other words, to class the actual as impossible because it is other than possible is contrary to empirical evidence (it is a sophistic trick). So we are still left with a gap between what the logical process of eliminating impossibility gives us (possibility), and what sensation gives us (actuality). This gap needs to be closed if are to claim a proper understanding of reality. To deny the gap, by claiming that the actual is impossible because it is something other than possible, is a sophistic move of ignorance.