How is the incoherence shown to be a result of the private language user’s knowledge at 258? — Luke

Luke, we've been through this. He has no criterion, there is no such thing as "right". Therefore it is impossible that he could identify and "know" the thing which "S" refers to.

Pretending one understands means appearing to understand without the belief one understands.
Thinking one understands means appearing not to understand with the belief one understands.
These are not the same. — Luke

I don't agree with these distinctions. Not all senses of "pretend" require intentional deception, And your explanation of "thinking one understands" doesn't make any sense to me, and is clearly not consistent with Wittgenstein's use.

What does the word “appear” have to do with the man attaching the wrong meaning to the word? — Luke

Are you serious? Because the meaning attached to the words by the person is not the right meaning, his behaviour is that of "appearing to understand" (he thinks he understands and therefore is pretending to understand) when he really does not understand.

If you think that we can talk about ‘not right’ or ‘wrong’ wrt a private language, then you don’t understand why we can’t talk about right. — Luke

Again this makes no sense to me. As I explained to you, the situation in which we cannot talk about right, is necessarily not right. How can you not understand this? When "right" is excluded as a possibility, such that we cannot even talk about the possibility of the person being right, then the person is necessarily "not right", meaning something other than right. How can you not understand this? When right is excluded, what we are left with is necessarily not right.

How we portray "not right" in this context is another matter. Wittgenstein portrays the 'not right understanding' as "subjective understanding", "thinking one understands". This is clearly not the opposite of being "right". I'd say it is categorically different from being "right". So what he has done is to place subjective understanding, which is the type of understanding associated with the private language, into a different category from "right" understanding, which is to be consistent with the common language.

f Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived. — Sam26

I believe there is a very real problem with Wittgenstein's perspective on subjective understanding. In all writing and speaking there are elements of private meaning, idiosyncrasies which are unique to the individual, and these are the elements of subjective understanding. Now, when we go to interpret a piece of oration, or writing, it is the common opinion that we ought to try to determine what was meant by the author. This means that we must delve into, and make our best attempts to understand the private elements, to reach the "true" meaning, as the one intended by the author. However, Wittgenstein dismisses this "true" meaning, as not the "right" meaning, because it strays from the rule-based social conventions. Therefore "the right meaning", which is a strictly rule based interpretation, is not necessarily in tune with "the true meaning", which is what the author meant, including all of one's idiosyncrasies, which are the private aspects of the person's speech. It is often an individual's use of particular idiosyncrasies which makes one into a great orator.

What's your argument for this? — Luke

I went through this. At 243 "private language" requires that what the words refer to is "known" to the user of the language. This is shown to be incoherent by the example at 258. So at 269, it is suggested that we could call it a "private language" when the speaker has a "subjective understanding" of the words; when one attaches meaning to the words, but not the right meaning, and therefore appears to know the meaning of the words when no one else does.

How is the private language described at 269 completely coherent? — Luke

Well, I don't see any incoherency demonstrated by Wittgenstein for what he is calling a "private language", at 269. I suppose that if you think it's incoherent you ought to be able to demonstrate that. Do you not believe that attaching meaning which is not the right meaning, and having that 'meaning'. private to oneself, is a coherent concept?

The last sentence of 269 does not refer back to the earlier sentences. There are two separate descriptions here:

(1) We might speak of a "subjective understanding" in relation to the behavioural criteria of a man 'thinking he understands' the meaning of a word, but who does not really understand because he attaches the wrong meaning to the word.

(2) Sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a "private language".

You seem to think that (1) and (2) both continuously refer to a private language. I disagree as I think that only (2) refers to a private language. — Luke

Yes, you've demonstrated to me very clearly that you enjoy removing statements from their context, to give them your own 'private meaning'. That, despite your appeals to authority, you have shown me consistently in this discussion. Why would you remove the final sentence of a paragraph, from the context of that paragraph, and place it into a different context? In some schools of formal writing we are taught to use the final sentence as a sort of summary of the paragraph.

I think it's very clear that "sounds which no else understands, which I appear to understand", is a form of what has been called "subjective understanding". What he is saying can be described in this way: these are words which no one understands (there is no 'right' here), but I pretend to understand. That's why i used the word "pretense" earlier, which you objected to. The person is "thinking he understands", and so is acting as if he understands, even to the point of exuding certitude, when he really does not understand.

When you apprehend that this sort of "subjective understanding" as a very real situation, (not necessarily in the context of 'private language', but in general) as for instance, your attitude toward Wittgenstein's use of "private language", then we can extrapolate and relate this type of 'understanding' to the possibility of a "private language". A person could have a "private language" which no one knows the meaning of the words, including the user of that language, but the person 'appears', or pretends to understand. "Pretends" is a good word here because it underscores the pretentiousness associated with that false attitude of certitude, when someone pretends to know what no one else knows.

We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2). — Luke

What kind of nonsensical argument is this? Why do you think Wittgenstein uses the word "appear" here? We say that something "appears" to be a certain way, when we want to distinguish this from the way it really is, this is fundamental in German philosophy, from Kant. The person 'appears to understand', is a distinction from 'actually understanding'. In the context, that's very clear and ought not even be a point to be discussed.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein does not use the word "wrong" here, he says "attaches some meaning to the word, but not the right one". By removing this sort of understanding from that which is said to be "right", Wittgenstein is completely consistent with 258, "here we can't talk about 'right'", making the rest of your argument irrelevant gibberish.

Of course you don't actually know what Wittgenstein means by a private language. No wonder this has been so difficult. Here are two separate explanations: — Luke

Luke, I told you the way I feel about secondary sources. They are an invalid form of appealing to authority, because the only true authority is the author.

You continue to ignore the facts of what has been written in the text. What Wittgenstein "means by a private language" is distinctly different at 243, from what it is at 269. These two are incompatible as logically inconsistent with each other.

Now, just like you said to me, there is no point in proceeding with the discussion until I fully understand what Wittgenstein says at 243, I can now say that there is no point in proceeding until you come to respect the difference between 243 and 269.

I think we can look at two possible reasons for Wittgenstein's 'change of mind' We might decide that he is intentionally being ambiguous. As I explained earlier, if this is the case there would be no such thing as "what Wittgenstein means by a private language". Another possibility, and I believe this is what the evidence indicates, is that he changed his mind as to what would constitute a "private language". The example at 258 shows that a "private language" as described at 243 is completely incoherent. So he proceeded to offer another proposal, a more realistic proposition as to what constitutes a "private language". This is actually a common practise in philosophical writing, initiated by Plato. It's called Platonic dialectics. And Wittgenstein is known to have read some Plato. You'll see in the Theaetetus for example, that the participants in the dialogue move through a number of proposed definitions of "knowledge", demonstrating each to be unacceptable, for one reason or another.

Therefore I think you ought to recognize that it would not be at all unusual for a writer of philosophy, like Wittgenstein, to propose a definition of "private language", demonstrate the definition to be unacceptable, then proceed to offer another definition. If, in the end, an acceptable definition is not found, as in the Theaetetus an acceptable definition of knowledge is not found, this does not that there is no such thing as what is meant by the words. It means that we do not properly understand the meaning of the words. It is only if the ambiguity is created intentionally that it is actually the case that there is no such thing as what the words mean.

.

The private language described at 243 is one where the word/symbol refers to what can only be known by the speaker. This is not merely “a sensation” or just any old sensation. It is a “certain sensation” or a “particular sensation”, the nature of which is private and known only to the speaker (one’s “immediate private sensations”). The word/symbol does not simply refer to any general sensation, or to the common meaning of the word “sensation”, as you suggest. And “my blood pressure rising” is not private in principle, because it can be verified by others. — Luke

Clearly, at 270, "my blood pressure is rising" is not verified by others, so it remains a private principle. And if the individual refuses, it cannot be verified.

Regarding 269, I view it as Wittgenstein’s view of the only possible thing that we might actually call a private language, which is where some individual behaves as though they actually understand sounds or words that nobody else understands. We are not told what the words or sounds of this language refer to, and I don’t see how such an individual understanding would be possible, but it is Wittgenstein’s concession regarding the possibility of a private language. — Luke

So, do you think that what is said at 270 relates to the "private language" described at 243, or to the one described at 258 and 269?

Wittgenstein asks, “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain (PI 246)?” The adding of the word know is meaningless in this situation. It’s as if you’re discovering your own awareness, “Oh, I’m in pain, gee, I didn’t know that until just this moment.” — Sam26

Actually adding the word "know" to "I'm in pain", to say instead "I know I am in pain" does a lot more than what Wittgenstein admits here. "I am in pain" states a simple opinion which the audience ought to allow as possibly true or false. "I know I am in pain" implies that I know what pain is, and what I experience has been judged to fulfill the criteria of "pain".

The issue is with the example which he has chosen. Since we take it for granted that everyone knows what "pain" means, then when someone says "I am in pain", unless we have reason to believe the person is lying, we take it as synonymous with "I know I am in pain" because everyone knows the criterion for "pain" as unpleasantness.

If we take as examples, more complex medical or psychological conditions, the difference starts to becomes evident. If someone says for example. "I have ..." a specified disorder, we might ask "have you been diagnosed?" But if the person says instead, "I know I have..." the specified disorder, we would tend to think that there's been a diagnosis.

Thread still open?

Aristotle says that Plato posits Forms for qualities, but not for artifacts.

He says that Plato at Phaedo (100d) affirms that a beautiful thing exists in virtue of its dependence on the Form of Beauty.

Aristotle’s point is that (man-made) objects like house or ring of which Plato and the Platonists hold that there are no Forms are nevertheless generated. And if objects like house and ring are generated without Forms, then other things might also be so generated. — Apollodorus

I don't think we can make this conclusion about Platonic Forms, because Forms account not only for the existence of qualities, but also of types. So the Form of Animal is the reason why anything which is an animal is an animal. We could say the same thing for Ring, and House. But I agree that there are many simple little things which Socrates would say we can't assume a Form of this, and a Form of that, until there is a different Form for every distinct individual.

This is a deficiency in Platonic metaphysics which I think Aristotle greatly improved on. Aristotle assumed that every particular thing has a Form proper to, and unique to, itself. And this becomes the principle which his law of identity is based in. He says that the fundamental question of Being, or metaphysics, is not 'why is there something rather than nothing?', but 'why is each thing the exact thing that it is, rather than something else?'.

However, Aristotle does not apply to his own comments the same logic that he applies to those he attacks. For, if no Forms are necessary for humans to build houses and make rings, it does not follow that this must apply to naturally occurring things, or to all things. — Apollodorus

But Aristotle's argument in his Metaphysics is that it is impossible that a thing is not the thing that it is. If it were not the thing that it is, then it would be something other than it is, and this is impossible, (forming the law of identity). Further, since things are generated (come into being), then in order for a thing to come into being as the thing which it is, the form of the thing must be prior to the material thing itself, as the cause of it being the thing which it is. If the form of a thing is not prior to the material existence of that thing, then the thing could come into being as anything, therefore not necessarily the thing which it is, violating the law of identity, by allowing that a thing could be anything.

So Aristotle's argument is that it is necessary to assume that each and every thing has a unique Form which is prior in existence to the material thing, as the cause of the thing which it is. So Plato is seen as not going far enough, by not allowing that every existing thing has a form unique to itself.

Aristotle knows this, but he must reject it because in his own system there is no Creator-God. — Apollodorus

There is a 'Creator-God' responsible for material existence in Aristotle, it's the Divine Mind, described I believe in Bk 12 Metaphysics. In his Metaphysics, I believe it's around Bk 6, he describes how the form of an artificial thing comes from the soul of the craftsperson, and is given to the matter in the act of creation. The matter accounts for the "accidentals", and why the thing created is not exactly the same as the form coming from the soul of the artist. He implies that natural things are created in the very same way, but from the Divine Mind.

The problem which Aristotle sees with Platonic metaphysics is that Forms are only universals, yet material things are particulars. But Plato wanted Forms to somehow be the cause of material things, by causing material things to be the type of thing that each is. However, Plato does not close the gap between universal and particular, to show how one universal Form can cause the existence of many particulars, when each particular is distinct and unique. Aristotle moves to close the gap with the concept of "matter", allowing that matter accounts for the accidentals, and the uniqueness of each individual.

This is why, as already explained, Socrates’ “Form of Bed” is a purely hypothetical Form that he uses exclusively for the sake of the Painter and Poet Analogy and should not be taken to mean that he (and even less Plato) is committed to Forms of artifacts. Had Plato believed in Forms of artifacts, he would have made this clear. But nowhere does he do so. — Apollodorus

So this is why Aristotle portrayed Plato's Forms as conceptually deficient.

In contrast, Christians like Aquinas who lived about a millennium later in the West, were cut off from the Platonic tradition. Their knowledge of Greek philosophy was largely limited to Latin translations of Aristotle and the works of Aristotelians like Averroes and Maimonides, who were anti-Platonists. — Apollodorus

I believe that this is factually incorrect. The early Christian metaphysicians, St Augustine for example were well versed in Neo-Platonism. So Christian theology was based in Neo-Platonism. The fall of the Alexandria library made the work of Aristotle less and less available to the early Christians, though they had access to Neo-Platonist teaching. The Muslims maintained access to Aristotle through other sources, and Averroes and other Muslims worked to introduce the more scientifically inclined Aristotelian metaphysics into the more mystical Neo-Platonist metaphysics which the Christians held. You can see in Aquinas' writings that he was working to establish consistency between the Neo-Platonist principles already held by the Church, and the newly introduced Aristotelian principles. This brought scholasticism to an end, and also came the end of the middle ages

The quest for the One (on different levels) is a recurrent theme in the dialogues. — Apollodorus

Metaphysically, this "quest for the One" is lagging far behind Aristotle, who found "the One", as the particular, the individual, and defined it with the law of identity. The introduction of Aristotle into Christian schools marked a revolution in thinking for the Christians.

In case you've forgotten, Wittgenstein is investigating the possibility of a private language. Moreover, he is investigating the possibility of a private language in principle. That you might choose to be uncooperative or to keep a secret are beside the point, These have nothing to do with the privacy of language, in principle. — Luke

Obviously, choice is a significant factor if we consider "private language" in any real way. The "private language" at 243 is fundamentally incoherent, so choice does not become a factor in this proposed private language. The "private language" at 269 is proposed as a real private language, existing in the context of real common language. Here, choice is relevant because the person must choose to maintain the "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than opting for "the right" understanding, which is given by integrating the private language into the common language. This is done when the speaker recognizes that "S" (private) is a "sensation" (common), rather than "S" (private) means "my blood pressure is rising" (private).

A private language has no criterion of correctness. Having no criterion of correctness implies having no criterion of incorrectness. If I think that the connection between the sign "S" and this particular sensation defines the sign correctly, this implies that I think that the connections between the sign "S" and other sensations define the sign incorrectly. By implication, whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct and whatever is going to seem incorrect to me is incorrect. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'correct' or 'incorrect'. — Luke

That's your interpretation, but it's obviously not what Wittgenstein actually wrote. He said "here we can't talk about 'correct'. He said nothing about 'incorrect'. It is very clear to me (but incomprehensible to you), that if we have a situation with no possibility of being correct, the possibility of being correct is excluded, then we can say that everything in this situation is incorrect.

Regardless, the "private language" described at 269, as "attaching some meaning to the word,
but not the right one", is very clearly consistent with both, yours and my interpretations. If there is neither correct nor incorrect in this situation, it is still consistent to say "not the right one", because 'neither correct nor incorrect' rules out the possibility of being correct. In the situation described at 258, if there is neither right nor wrong, we can say that whatever the diarist is thinking, is not right, because the possibility of being right has been excluded. And that is exactly what is said about the private language at 269, attaching a meaning but not the right one.

What makes you think that the diarist does not use "S" to refer to a sensation, or that they do not understand that they are using "S" to refer to a sensation? — Luke

If 258 is supposed to be an example of a "private language", (I deny that it's a valid example as per 243, but accept that it is a valid example as per 269), then the user of that language does not understand "S" as referring to a "sensation", because "sensation" is a word of common language. If the diarist understood "S" as referring to a sensation, this would mean that the person understands "S" in the right way (consistent with, and part of, the common language), therefore the "subjective understanding" described at 269 would be ruled out, and it could not be a private language.

Getting back to the reason this thread was started, which had to do with the idea or belief that knowing can be something coming from within, i.e., it can be generated from the mind, a kind of self generation of what it means to know. I think this confusion may arise from the use of the word know as a kind of subjective certainty. — Sam26

How many months has it taken Luke and I to work through the chaff, and get to the topic of the thread? I think that either Luke and I are very dim, or Wittgenstein is very difficult to understand. Or both.

Anybody else with a manometer could also measure his blood pressure. That's what makes it publicly verifiable whether or not his blood pressure is rising. — Luke

Read what is written! It is "I" who uses the manometer, and "I" who can then say 'my blood pressure is rising'. There is absolutely no public verification described. And, if such a verification were proposed, the person who is "I" could decline it. Therefore a "public verification" is not even implied.

He says this in relation to misidentifying the sensation, not in relation to being wrong about his blood pressure rising. We can verify whether or not his blood pressure is rising and whether he is right or wrong about that. What we cannot verify is whether he has correctly identified the sensation that he associates with his rising blood pressure. If he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, then it makes no difference whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not.

When he identifies the sensation correctly, he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, so the association between the sensation and his blood pressure holds true. But when he does not identify the sensation correctly, then he still marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is still measured as rising. In other words, he was correct about his blood pressure rising even though he misidentified the sensation. Therefore. it makes no difference to the correct use of "S" whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not. (This explains the 'mere ornament in the machine' metaphor.)

But, of course, it does make a difference to the use of "S" whether his blood pressure is measured as rising or falling, because then we have a criterion of correctness and can say whether or not his use of "S" was correct.

This might now lead you to question whether "S" actually refers to a sensation at all. Wittgenstein is well aware of this and invites the question: — Luke

None of this is at all relevant to the text. It's all your imagination, based on your assumption of a public verification, which is so obviously not what is described at 270. What is described is that the person can say 'my blood pressure is rising' "without using any apparatus". There is no comparison between the person saying "my blood pressure is rising" and the readings of the machine described. What is described is that the person says "my blood pressure is rising' without any machine.

This is inconsistent with the scenario at 270 where he discovers from experience that whenever he has a particular sensation, a manometer shows that his blood pressure is rising. How can he discover this association from experience if he can't know the particular sensation called "S"? — Luke

We've been through this already, you're not paying attention.

At 258 he says that whatever is going to seem right to the private linguist is right. This means that we public linguists cannot talk about either "right" or "wrong" here (in the public sense of these words). — Luke

That's not what is written. He said "here we can't talk about 'right'". He does not say neither right nor wrong. Then, at 269, he provides a description of a "private language" which has the person " attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one." This "private language" at 269 is completely consistent with what is described at 258. At 269, the person attaches a meaning to the words, but a meaning other than 'the right meaning', because there is no such thing as "the right" meaning here, as explained at 258.

Almost all of your post consists of you persistently insisting that Wittgenstein wrote something different than he did.

At 269 we can talk about "wrong" and "right", because Wittgenstein is using these words in the public sense. A person attaches a meaning to a word, "but not the right one". The judgment that the person attaches the wrong meaning to the word is based on their publicly observable behaviour. Wittgenstein tells us that "one might speak of a subjective understanding" in this case. And what might be called a "private language" are "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’". — Luke

Right, now do you agree that "private language" at 269 refers to something completely different from "private language" at 243.

Further, do you see that the "private language" referred to at 269 is completely consistent with the example at 258, while the "private language" referred to at 243 is not consistent with the example at 258?

That the person knows when their blood pressure is rising is not ruled out as impossible at 270. In fact, it's how the meaning of "S" was supposedly established in the first place. Once again: — Luke

The "correct" meaning of "S" is not established by the manometer, that's what Wittgenstein is explaining. That "S" means "my blood pressure is rising", is the "subjective understanding". The person thinks that they understand the meaning of "S", with reference to the manometer, but they really do not. The person has found a use, and therefore meaning, but it is not "the right meaning". It is the subjective understanding which is described at 269, as a "private language". The person appears to understand, having associated S with a meaning, but the meaning is not the right meaning.

The right meaning is that "S" is the name of "a sensation". As described at the end of 270, "S" is associated with a particular "sensation". And "sensation" is a public term, so the person must turn to the public language, justify that the thing referred to with "S" is actually "a sensation", as described (260-261), in order to understand the "right" meaning of "S"


I agree with you on that point, Wittgenstein is rejecting that subjective sense of "know", in favour of a criterion based, epistemological standard for "know". This is why the "private language" described at 243 has the speaker of the language knowing what the words refer to. And when this "private language" is shown to be incoherent at 258, because the speaker is lacking the required criterion for knowing, he proposes a different sort of "private language", at 269, one in which the speaker of the language has a "subjective understanding" of the words, rather than knowing them.

But I think of espousing more as trying to force your views on others in a way that is unreasonable. — apokrisis

Espousal does not require unreasonableness. But if the view espoused is unreasonable, that's another matter.

The only use "S" has at 270 is public. — Luke

This is such a blatant misreading, I think it must be intentional. "I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus" is very clearly a private purpose. Whether he has a public audience when he says "my blood pressure is rising", is completely irrelevant to this use. And, as he describes, if there was a public audience, they would have no way of knowing if he was getting it wrong (which would always be the case, as per269, because he doesn't "know"), and it would be as if the machine (being replaced by him now) is just for show, not even turned on. This is an example of the "subjective understanding" described at 269, he would appear like he knew when his pressure was rising, but he really didn't, because he really can't know the sensation called "S", as described at 258.

It's not my public verification; it's the manometer's. — Luke

There is no discussion of a "public verification" at 270, there is the exact opposite. After the diarist discovers, for himself (privately), with the use of a manometer, that the sensation coincides with a rise in blood pressure, he starts to say "my blood pressure is rising" instead of "S". He does this without the use of the machine. So there is no public verification. Now, his use of "my blood pressure is rising" is equivalent to his use of "S" at 258, and there is equally no such thing as "right" here. So he is just pretending to know when his blood pressure is rising, as described at 270, and this is an example of "subjective understanding" (269), what Wittgenstein describes as "...'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word but not the right one.".

If the use described at 270 were purely private, then there could be no possibility of error. As 258 tells us, a private language has no criterion of correctness and whatever seems right to the private linguist is right. — Luke

Again this is a blatant, apparently intentional, misreading, to support a completely wrong interpretation. What Wittgenstein concludes at 258 is not as you claim, "there could be no possibility of error", it is "And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'."

Your conclusion "no possibility of error" implies 'always right', which is the exact opposite of Wittgenstein's conclusion "here we can't talk about 'right'", which implies 'always wrong".

That the use of "S" is always wrong is the basis for the description of "subjective understanding" at 269, "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". It is only by this conclusion of "always wrong", that Wittgenstein can say that the user of the "private language" (as per the description at 269), associates a meaning which is "not the right one".

I must have missed it. Could you explain it? — Luke

There, I explained it above, ruminate on that for a while. You clearly do not understand 270 because you think that the manometer serves as a public verification, when it does not. it just provides a private use. or a meaning for the private language user. The meaning of "S" is now "my blood pressure is rising". But as described, it is a subjective understanding, and therefore "not the right" meaning.

How can the private linguist misidentify their sensation? What criterion of correctness is there? Whatever is going to seem right is right. — Luke

It is what is concluded at 258, "here we can't talk about right". When "right" is ruled out, we're left with necessarily wrong. And that's the basis of the second option at 269 "thinking he understands", which "might be called a 'private language'"

If the person doesn't really know what they are doing, then - contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario - are they not really able to say that their blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus? — Luke

It's not "contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario, it is the exact scenario. The person clearly does not know when their blood pressure is rising, it's all just a show, a pretense. It appears as if the person knows when his blood pressure is rising but he does not, as 269 explains. The possibility that he "make a mistake" is excluded because he's not even doing what he appears, or pretends to be doing (determining when his blood pressure is rising) to begin with. It's a completely mistaken scenario, as if the machine is not even turned on. The machine cannot make a mistake if it's not even turned on. But pretending that it is turned on when it is not creates what is necessarily wrong, as in, 'we can't talk about the machine being right here'.

And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have
recognized the sensation right or not. Let us suppose I regularly
identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews
that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. (We as it were
turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part
of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the
mechanism at all.)

Now, let's get to the real issue, of disagreement between us. Do you apprehend that "private language" at 269 refers to something completely different from "private language" at 243?

The person does not "develop a use for "S"". Wittgenstein asks us to imagine this development, but upon closer inspection, this development cannot get off the ground. — Luke

Sure it gets "off the ground", keep reading, by 270 "S" has a use.

At 258, he notes that "S" cannot be defined. However, he tries to give himself a "kind of ostensive definition" by "concentrating [his] attention on the sensation" while he writes the sign down. But this is problematic: — Luke

The meaning of "S" cannot be known by the person. There is no disagreement between us here. That's why the demonstration at 258 does not qualify as a "private language" as described at 243. However, it does qualify as a "private language" as described at 269, where it is not required that the meaning is known. It is only required that the word has a use, as developed at 270.

Where we seem to disagree is whether "S" can have a use when its meaning is not known. You do not seem to be able to grasp this fact of language, that people sometimes use words when they do not know the meaning of them.

Wittgenstein tells us at 258 that he cannot commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation because there is no criterion of correctness here. If he cannot commit the connection to memory, then no use for "S" can be developed. Therefore. "S" cannot refer to anything. — Luke

You are distorting what Wittgenstein wrote with your habitual misreading. He did not say that "S" cannot refer to anything, nor did he demonstrate that, and it is an invalid conclusion on your part. Every time he writes "S" in the book, it refers to something. That it might refer to something different every time he uses it does not negate the fact that it refers to something each time. He said "whatever is going to seem right to me is right".

We have now uncovered a second sense of ambiguity, distinct from the other sense we discussed. What we discussed was using a word once, to imply possible different meanings, like your example of "bank". Now we have using a word numerous times "S" in the example at 258, each time potentially referring to something different.

This is what has happened with Wittgenstein's use of "private language". At 243 it refers to one thing, then at 269 it refers to something different.

You are still presupposing that the symbols can refer. You are missing the fact that a use for "S" cannot be developed. — Luke

This is simply incorrect. And that's very obvious. The symbol "S" does refer, and a use is developed, despite the fact that the use is described as "whatever is going to seem right to me is right".

I quoted the SEP article regarding 269 and 270 the other day, if you'd care to read it. — Luke

Sorry, I'm not interested in secondary sources, and appeals to authority. The only authority here is Wittgenstein's writing itself.

S" is said to signify the sensation that one's blood pressure is rising. Whether one's blood pressure is actually rising (or has actually risen) is something that can be publicly verified with a manometer.
...

Either way, "S" cannot be a private sign. — Luke

Regardless of what you got from SEP, the use described at 270 is purely private. "So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus." That's a private use, he is describing, regardless of how you depict as "something that can be publicly verified". It cannot necesaarily be publicly verified because the public, just like the private language user has no criterion as to whether he has the "correct" sensation. The manometer will say whether the blood pressure rises, but the private language user could say whatever he wants, refusing to cooperate with your proposed public verification. Therefore the use described at 270 is purely private.

Do you accept that "private language" as described at 269, is completely different from "private language" as described at 243?

What might make the person "appear to understand" though? If "subjective understanding" is not understanding, then what is it? — Luke

Obviously, that's what is explained at 270. Something like the manometer would serve that purpose. "Subjective understanding" is use for a purpose. "Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. " For the person using "S" there is purpose and use, for the public it is pure show, it appears like the person knows what he is doing. Neither of these justify "the person knows what he is doing".

As a member of the Academy, Aristotle was in a position to know what the general view, including Plato’s own, was, and he clearly agrees with Plato that there are Forms of natural objects but not of artifacts: — Apollodorus

Aristotle makes a separation between "Platonists", and "Plato". I even saw at one point where he referred to. "some Platonists". Your quotes are quite questionable. Perhaps you could find the place in Phaedo which Aristotle refers to? My footnote says 100d, but I didn't find it.

Perhaps Aristotle is referring to the fact that Plato posited Forms for qualities, like Beauty and Just, not for particular things like a house or a ring. That of course was the big issue for Aristotle, particular things have substance, yet Platonists claimed Forms (as universals) were the the cause of substance. So there is a gap to bridge here.

This presupposes that the words have an established (private) use — Luke

No it doesn't presuppose any such thing, it is the example at 258, where the person is establishing a use for the sign "S". The person privately develops a use for "S" without knowing what "S" refers to.

This is no different for the purported "other" private language at 269. — Luke

Right, they are the very same thing. But "private language" as described at 243 requires that the person knows what the symbols refer to (that's one of the conditions). So the example at 258 does not qualify as a private language because the person doesn't know what the symbol "S" refers to. Yet the description at 269, which is not different from the example at 258, is called a "private language". That's because Wittgenstein offers two distinct meanings for "private language", one at 243, the other at 269.

"S" cannot have a usage because there is no criterion of correctness. — Luke

But usage is not excluded from "S". That's what Wittgenstein demonstrates(270). Even when the person does not know what the symbol "S" refers to, there may still be a use for "S". After he dismisses the requirement that the person "knows" what "S" refers to, in order for "S" to be useful, the "private language", under the new description, is a reality.

Does "subjective understanding" qualify as understanding? Because you are claiming that a person can have a private language which they do not understand. — Luke

No, "subjective understanding", as Wittgenstein uses it does not qualify as understanding, it might make the person "appear to understand" though. He describes it as "attaching some meaning to the word,
but not the right one". A good example of "subjective understanding" is your supposed "understanding" of Wittgenstein's "private language".

ed.: Just so that you don't take this as an insult, there is no "correct" understanding of Wittgenstein's "private language". Because of the two descriptions, it is ambiguous, so there is no "correct understanding".

How is it "fully coherent" that there can be a speaker of a private language who does not understand, know, or speak his own private language? — Luke

Of course the person speaks the private language, he just does not understand or "know" it. That's what's exemplified at 258. "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'". See, the person has a use for "S", and uses "S", but it cannot be the "correct" use of "S", because there is no such thing as the correct use of "S". So the diarist has a "subjective understanding" of what "S" refers to, meaning that he might appear like he understands the meaning of "S", but what he is thinking is the meaning cannot be "the right" meaning, so he really doesn't understand.

What Wittgenstein calls a language-game includes "the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven". As I said, you cannot have a language-game without a language. — Luke

That definition of :"language" at 7, is itself logically incoherent, by a fallacy of composition. It is incoherent to have the whole, and the parts which make up the whole, go by the same name (language-game).

How does this "condition" make it incoherent? — Luke

We went through this already. As demonstrated at 258, there is no criterion of correctness, no "right" here, so the condition, that what the words refer to is "known" by the speaker, is necessarily violated. It is logically impossible, by the principles employed by Wittgenstein, that the speaker knows what the words refer to. This makes the "private language", as described at 243, incoherent.

Appearances can be deceiving. What is it that he appears to understand? Wittgenstein tells us at 269 that the alleged private linguist is "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". Doesn't this imply that he does not understand the meaning of the word? To paraphrase 246, if we are using the word “understand” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then this person does not understand the meaning of the word. It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand. — Luke

Yes, all of this I agree with. Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258 that the diarist does not know or understand one's own usage of the symbol "S". That is what is intended with "I have no criterion of correctness".

Remember the example I gave, when I see someone with the same hat as me. I judge it as "the same" the moment I apprehend it, without applying any criteria. At that moment when I see it and judge it as 'the same" I cannot say that "I know" the hat is the same as mine, nor can I say that "I understand" why I judge it as the same as mine, it simply appears to me to be the same, so I judge it as the same.

It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand. — Luke

Now, what makes the private language described at 243 incoherent, is the condition that the speaker must know what the words refer to. So, if you take this sentence and remove "or to know" as a requirement, then we can also remove "not" from in front of "coherent". So we are left with "It is coherent for a person to have a private language which they do not understand.

That, "the private language which they do not understand", I tell you, is the "private language" presented at 269. This is a fully coherent "private language" (if we overlook Wittgenstein's problematic definition of "language" referred to above, which is really not relevant at this point)), in which the speaker might "appear to understand" the use of the words, through some form of "subjective understanding", which does not qualify as "knowing".

Do you consider there to be a difference between having and knowing a language? — Luke

Of course there is a difference between having and knowing a language. There is a huge difference between having a capacity, and knowing the capacity which you have. But of course there are many different definitions of "know", and one might make "knowing" synonymous with "having", in the case of language. And this would not be the sense of "knowing" which Wittgenstein employs because each time a person who has, (and "knows", if it is supposed to be synonymous with having) a language, yet incorrectly uses a word, we'd have the contradiction of the person both knowing and not knowing the same language at the same time. You might see that this also could be a feature of the incoherent definition of "language" that you insist on above, which produces a fallacy of composition.

Nah, he's talking about the same private language throughout. — Luke

How can you not see the inconsistency of "private language" between 243 and 269? At 243, what the words refer to, is "known" to the speaker of the language. At 269 the speaker of the private language has a "subjective understanding", which causes him to "appear to understand" what the words refer to. Surely you will not insist that these two are "the same".

Then that language-game would constitute the language. See PI 7. Therefore, a private language and/or private language-game cannot exist because they are incoherent concepts. — Luke

Sorry Lujke, I don't follow your logic. What makes the "private language" described at 243 incoherent is the condition that the speaker "knows" what the words refer to. If we remove that condition, as Wittgenstein does at 269, and replace it with the condition that the speaker has a "subjective understanding", or might merely "appear to understand" what the words refer to in a private language, then "private language" is no longer incoherent.

In this latter case, "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a “private language”." But that does not mean that it is a private language (or any language). — Luke

What kind of nonsense is this? Of course it is not a "private language" as described at 243, but now Wittgenstein has decided to call something else a "private language". Do you remember or discussion about ambiguity? If "private language" is intentionally used ambiguously, then its meaning is ambiguous. We cannot say that either the first or the second "private language: is "the private language" intended by Wittgenstein, the meaning is left ambiguous.

(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".

How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)? — Luke

You can take it as another condition if you want, that might be best way.

Nonsense. You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language. — Luke

Where's your proof of this? If a language consists of a multitude of language-games, then most likely there was a first language-game prior to there being a language.

It is supposed that the person knows what "S" refers to at 258 because they are associating
"S" with a certain sensation and "writ[ing] this sign in a calendar for every day on which [they] have the sensation." — Luke

It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S. You seem to be missing the gist of the example. "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation", does not mean that I actually can do that. "Want" implies a lack of. That I want to know my own sensations implies that I actually do not know them. The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example.

The language is not private because a person might appear to understand? What does "appear to understand" mean in terms of a private language? How can an outsider know how it appears to understand a private language? — Luke

Have you read 269 yet. I keep referring to it, and you refuse to acknowledge it, insisting that we must understand what "private language" at 243 means first. But you need to accept that "private language" as described at 243 is incoherent, and move along to Wittgenstein's next proposal of "private language", the one at 269, which is inconsistent with 243, as different from it. The definition at 243 has been demonstrated as incoherent because the person cannot "know" what the words refer to. So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243.

You said that a private language was an incoherent concept and that we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by it, but you are now speaking as though it is not only a perfectly coherent concept, but that a private language could actually exist. That's quite a turnaround. Next you'll tell me that square circles can exist. — Luke

Yes, the revised definition of "private language", offered at 269, is coherent, and describes something which could actually exist.

So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for? — Luke

Perhaps you ought to read Wittgenstein a little bit closer, to provide yourself with a better understanding, then the answers to these questions might be revealed to you.

There is no language-game described at 258. There is nothing more than an association of a sign with a sensation. — Luke

Why do you think that associating a sign with a sensation does not qualify to be called a "language-game"?

Well, I think I have made myself clear on what I believe Plato’s framework to be.

But here is another example in connection with the Forms:

(A). Sensibles are “in flow and motion” and always changing (Theaet. 152e).

(B). Therefore, knowledge of them is not possible.

(C). But knowledge is possible.

(D). Therefore, there must be non-sensible objects of knowledge that are changeless.

(E). These non-sensible, changeless objects of knowledge are the Forms.

Plato is clearly committed to Forms as principles of explanation for knowledge or aspects of knowledge.
— Apollodorus

I pretty much agree with all this.

He is also committed to certain Forms like the Good (or the One), Beauty, Justice, etc. — Apollodorus

Where I disagree with you is in how you present this aspect of Platonism, as being "committed to certain Forms". This would be the way that Forms are related to each other, perhaps as a hierarchy of Forms. Plato presents the good, not as a Form, but as the material thing desired by a man. So there is no equivalence between the One, which is the Form that supports mathematics (for Plato), and the good.

Therefore your proposed hierarchy which places the One as the highest Form, as derived from Neo-Platonism, is not necessarily what Plato intended. I think Beauty, for example, and even Justice, as closer to "the good", being what is desired, are higher Forms than One, .

The fact that Plato did not explicitly produce a hierarchy of Forms, is one reason why there is a division amongst "Platonists", as Aristotle described, and why "Neo-Platonists" are called by that name, not "Platonists".

Socrates’ real complaint is against poets. This is why he begins by saying that he is delighted that all dramatic representation has been banned from the Ideal City. — Apollodorus

I agree with this. The complaint which Socrates has, is against this description of reality which is twice removed from the truth, but presented as a direct representation of the truth. This is presented as "narrative" in common translations, and can be understood along the lines of a representation of a representation. Or in the cave allegory, the cave dwellers see a reflection of reality, and the narrative would be a representation of this reflection. The cave dwellers would think of it as a direct representation of reality, not grasping that what they see as "reality" is already just a reflection.

There is a very similar situation with the artists. The artist, or poet, might present us with a representation of reality, but it's really a representation of the artist's opinion, which is itself a representation. The double representation is a common theme for Plato.

We can see the importance of this in Aristotle's interpretation of "the good". Ethicists will present us with what is "good". But any particular ethicist is just presenting us with a representation of one's own opinion of "good", which is itself a representation of the "real good". So what is presented to us by ethicists is something twice removed from the real good.

Philosophers must not follow the masses. They must use their own judgement that has been honed through specific methods of inquiry, and separate what is good in poetry – and in all forms of transmitted knowledge – from what is bad. The whole dialogue has an ethical theme which is the Good and the Just and how they can be integrated into human society by means of education, philosophic inquiry, etc. — Apollodorus

Yes, I agree completely with this, and I think it is the principal message presented to us from Plato, which keeps him relevant today and into the future. In our world of mass communication and mass media, it is very important to keep in mind the multitude of layers of representation. A report in the media is a report on someone's interpretation, it is not a direct representation of reality. If we want to understand reality, we need to go beyond the layers.

As I said, I don’t see carpenters looking to a “Form of Bed” made by God as a template. They normally have a catalogue of templates most of which are copied from other carpenters. — Apollodorus

I think you are missing the point. When we take words like "just", "good", "beauty", "knowledge" and look for their meaning, we see that different people have different ideas. That is what Plato does in many dialogues, looks to the meaning of a word by analyzing the opinions of people who assume to know it. It's called platonic dialectics. The issue is that with any such word, if there is supposed to be an objective meaning, what the word actually refers to, there must be an independent Form of that thing. The independent Form is supported by the divine mind, how God would define "just", "good", etc..

So when we practise platonic dialectics, in the attempt to go beyond, the opinions of individual people, we must assume that there is a true Form, the divine Form, as the third layer. Otherwise nothing justifies the assumption of the third layer, or "Truth". We have what is reported to us in the media, and this represents the many different opinions, but we have nothing further assumed, to validate a judgement, only one's own opinion, the person judging. But one's own opinion is just another part, one of the many, in the second layer, and does not support the assumption of the third layer. That is why we need to assume a "Form", made by God, in order to validate this whole idea of "narrative", or layers of representation, which Plato presents us with.

So, whether or not the individual poet, artist, or craftsperson, looks to the divine Form, to produce one's own template, is irrelevant. In fact, the vast majority would not, having no education in philosophy one would not even know about such a thing. The person would learn one's own trade through education from others, such that one's opinion would replicate another's opinion, and this propagates what you call "the masses". There is no need to assume a divine Form here. However, the philosopher, who wants to judge the opinions of others, for truth, must assume a divine Form, or else one's own judgement is just another opinion, amongst the opinions of others. There is nothing to validate Truth.

If we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, then how does his private language have two conditions as you claim? — Luke

Just like any logically incoherent proposal can have two conditions. That's why I presented the square circle example. In this example, the one alone is not logically incoherent, it is the inconsistency between the two which produces the incoherency.

How can the concept of a private language be incoherent on the one hand, but then a private language can exist and become integrated into the common language on the other hand? How can a private language exist if the concept of a private language is incoherent? — Luke

This is why I explicitly referred to it as a "private language-game" rather than a "private language", to avoid this problem. What is presented at 258 is a language-game. A "language" consists of a multitude of language-games. The example at 258 is not an example of a "private language". We discussed this already, it is an example of a private language-game (the private use of S to name something) within the context of a common language (S is a sensation).

In what sense could a person "have" this language? They don't know or understand the language, but yet they "have" it? How? — Luke

The person can have, and use this language In the same sense that the person has and uses the private language-game described at 258. We can imagine that a person might have an entire language full of such private language-games. This person does not know or understand the use of "S", but is still using "S".

But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right' — PI 258

What produces the incoherency in Wittgenstein's "private language" definition, is the condition that the person "knows' what the words refer to. If we remove this condition we could define "private language", such that the person has a "private" language, and does not know what the words refer to, as in the example at 258. But the person might still "appear to understand" what the words refer to (269). That is why 258 is not an example of a "private language" as defined at 243. The person at 258 does not "know" what the symbol "S" refers to, as required by 243.

I believe that what Wittgenstein was trying to demonstrate is that any proposed form of a "private" language could not produce "knowledge", as knowledge is understood in epistemology, requiring justification. The proposed form of "private language", defined at 243, requires that the speaker knows what the words refer to, and so is ruled out as impossible. But other forms of "private" language, similar to the language-game described at 258, which consist of word use without knowing, might be very possible and very real.

Don't you think that Wittgenstein's private language argument is an argument against the coherency of a private language; against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand? — Luke

Let me reply to this in a way which might be more clear to you Luke. A person could have a language, which oneself does not know or understand the usage of the words, yet the person could appear to understand the usage of the words (269), and Wittgenstein does not provide the required demonstration to show that it is necessarily the case that another person would be able to understand that language. So there is no argument "against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand". That the person cannot know and understand one's own usage, in a private language-game (which is what is demonstrated), does not lead to the conclusion that another person will necessarily know or understand that language-game. So the person would have a private language-game, and it is not necessarily the case that others could understand it. Therefore "a language that another person cannot understand" is not ruled out as incoherent, but this language would not be known or understood to the person using it as well.

They don't want to be spammed. I'll wait to see your posts, try them one at a time.

Luke, the concept of "a private language" is incoherent from the outset, so there is no point in trying to determine what Wittgenstein means by "private language". There is nothing there but an incoherency, and we would go around in circles forever trying to understand a logical incoherency, when such a thing is impossible.

Suppose he had said 'Can we imagine a square circle? And what I mean by a square circle is an equilateral rectangle which has a circumference with each point equidistant from the centre.' You would see right away that we cannot imagine such a thing as the named "square circle" because it is logically incoherent, so there would be no point in discussing what does he mean by "square circle" because it's an incoherency. There would be no such thing as what he means by "square circle", because he has presented us with something incoherent.

This is exactly what he does with the proposition 'could we imagine a private language, and by "private language" I mean...'. He presents us with something logically incoherent and asks us if we can imagine such a thing. Of course the incoherency is a lot more subtle, and difficult to apprehend, and this was intentional by Wittgenstein, to create the appearance that what he proposes might actually hold the possibility of being logically coherent. But once the description given is understood as logically incoherent, then we must conclude that it is impossible to understand what Wittgenstein means by "private language".

Don't you think that Wittgenstein's private language argument is an argument against the coherency of a private language; against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand? — Luke

No, I do not think it's an argument "against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand". When the hypothesis of the conditional (the words refer to what is only known by the speaker) is demonstrated as incoherent, there is nothing we can logically say about the proposed conclusion of the conditional. So there is nothing presented to validly produce the conclusion you present me with. What is demonstrated is that a person who is privately using symbols (call this a private language-game if you want), cannot actually know or understand one's own usage, because knowing and understanding requires an independent justification.

There is no demonstration whereby we might conclude that other people cannot come to know or understand the private language-game. And so, "sounds which no one else understands but which I
'appear to understand''' (269) might become understood and known by others, as this private game is endowed with rules, becoming part of a common language.

Furthermore, I think that Wittgenstein presents this as a common occurrence and feature of natural language, that a private language-game (one in which the user of the language-game cannot be said to understand or know the language-game being played) gets integrated into the common language. And I think he presents this as a possible reason why the common languages consist of so many different language-games. .

As a result of this premise, the language cannot be understood by another person. — Luke

That is the second condition.

You see the two as one, because you think that the second necessarily follows from the first. But the second does not follow from the first, because of the incoherency of the first. If the hypothesis of a conditional is incoherent, then the proposed conclusion does not follow, and the two must be apprehended as distinct.

So your statement "As a result of this premise, the language cannot be understood by another person" is a false statement. This does not follow from the premise, "as a result", because the premise is incoherent so nothing can follow logically from it. You want to reject the incoherency of the premise as irrelevant and claim that the second thing "the language cannot be understood by another" follows logically from the premise, but we cannot proceed from an incoherent premise to claim that anything follows logically from it.

You continue to ignore the fact that Wittgenstein asks a question at 243. Can we imagine such a language? He is not telling us to imagine a language such as..., he is asking if it is possible to imagine a language such as... Do you grasp the difference?. He is not telling us that the second follows from the first, he is asking us if it does. Of course he knows that it does not, because he is about to demonstrate that the first is incoherent. So he would be a fool to stipulate that "the language cannot be understood by another person" follows necessarily from the premise, as you insist, because he is about to demonstrate that it does not.

The premise is not only that the language refers to one's private sensations. The premise is that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations". — Luke

This premise is the one shown to be incoherent, at 258. Remember, there is no "right" here, so a person using a private symbol cannot be said to "know" the thing referred to with the symbol. It is impossible that only the person speaking can know one's own sensations. This is due to the way that Wittgenstein describes understanding and knowing, as requiring justification and rule-follow, which is something requiring the judgement of another person. And this is why Wittgenstein's "private language" is logically incoherent.

Read 269, and the relationship between what he calls "subjective understanding", and the private language. The person using the private language cannot be said to "know" his immediate private sensations, he only appears to, as it is a subjective understanding, not true knowing.

The Question: How might a layman be provided with basic tools to aid in successfully navigating the world, and most importantly, be aided in being independently capable of sustaining critical thinking, to the point of possessing and learning to use an initial approach to debunking and evaluating beliefs and belief systems? — William Wallace

Isn't the best answer to this question years of institutional education?

Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus tend to dismiss this passage. Personally, I don’t think it should be dismissed, but we should take a second look at it and see if it can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with Plato’s general framework. — Apollodorus

Of course there is another possibility. This possibility is that what you call "Plato's general framework", is not consistent with what Plato has written at all. Therefore what you espouse as "Plato's general framework" is the product of a misunderstanding of Plato. I propose that it is not by mere coincidence, nor by some mistaken strokes of Plato's writing hand, that some of the most important passages in Plato's dialogues are not consistent with what you call "Plato's general framework".

What language? We need to know what sort of language it is before we can answer the question of whether we can imagine such a language. Wittgenstein tells us what sort of language it is at 243: — Luke

Yes, the question Wittgenstein asks at 243, is can we imagine a language such as the one described . Do you see this question at 243? Wittgenstein is asking us, can we imagine a language such as the one described, meaning is such a language logically possible.

The second sentence can be seen as a consequence of the first: The language refers to what can only be known to the speaker; to his private sensations. So [consequently] another person cannot understand the language. — Luke

Right, so the question. Can we imagine a language which has words that refer to a person's private sensations, and this produces the consequence that every other person cannot understand the language? Remember, with a common language a person uses words to refer to one's private sensations, but this does not produce the consequence that other people cannot understand it.

It is common in language that people use words to refer to their private sensations, and
this does not lead to the consequence that others cannot understand. But Wittgenstein is asking can we imagine a situation where this will lead to the consequence that others cannot understand.

Do you agree, that this is the question being asked at 243. Is it possible that a language which refers to one's private sensations could produce the consequence that no one else could understand? In common language a person refers to one's private sensations, but it does not produce this consequence.

He doesn’t actually say “Form/Idea of Bed”. So, the reference to “bed in itself” may simply be an illustration that need not be taken literally. — Apollodorus

Maybe you ought to reread this, starting at 596, Bk 10. "There are many beds and tables...But there are only two forms of such furniture, one of the bed and one of the table." And surely the craftsman does not make the form itself. Then who is this craftsman who makes the form? 597: The craftsman doesn't make "the being of the bed", which is equated with the form of the bed, he makes a replication, a copy, just like the painter makes a copy. Further, the being of a bed, the form, made by God, is one only.

Now, God makes one bed, "the form", and the carpenter makes "a bed", and may make many beds, and the painter imitates a bed, painting a picture of it. Being third from the natural one makes the painter an "imitator", and what is made is an imitation. And the painter does not imitate "the form", which is created by God, the painter imitates one of the many beds created by a carpenter, and the imitation imitates the way the bed appears, not the truth. Being third, it is far removed from the truth.

What I propose is that you carry the analogy further. The carpenter employs "a form", a blueprint, which is 'one' template by which he makes many beds. But the carpenter's template is a replication of the one "Form of bed", which is the perfect template, God's bed. Since there are many carpenters there are many templates, or forms of bed, each carpenter having one's own. Then the material bed produced by the carpenter is twice removed from the truth, and is third, as an imitation.

So when the carpenter makes a bed, it is not an imitation of "the Form of bed", created by God, it is an imitation of the template of the carpenter, one of many such templates, or forms (because there are many carpenters), which is each a representation of the one Form of bed, created by God. So the material bed, made by the carpenter is just an imitation of how the perfect bed, the Form of bed, from God, appears to the carpenter, manifested as the carpenter's template, or form of bed. The carpenter's from or template is one of many, as there are many carpenters, and the bed produced is an imitation of this, which is how the Form of bed appears to that particular carpenter.

Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? — Luke

Yes I agree, but "known" is being used as indicated by258, as I explained. To know the sensation called S is to to be able to identify it and correctly apply the symbol. For instance, 'I know I have a toothache' means that I can correctly identify my sensation as a "toothache". So the phrase "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" can be interpreted as meaning only the person speaking can identify the things being referred to by the words. "Know" means to be able to identify.

Wittgenstein describes what he means by a private language at 243. How is it ambiguous? — Luke

I interpret 'known' such that "to know" one's own sensations means 'to be able to correctly identify them, therefore to know what the words of the private language refer to. You seem to interpret "to know" in some other way which you have yet to explain. Unless we can agree as to what "known" means here we must concede that it is ambiguous.

And if you acknowledge both of these things, then you must acknowledge that there are not two separate conditions of Wittgenstein's private language, but that it refers to one's immediate private sensations and that another person cannot understand it (both) because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking. — Luke

How do you draw that conclusion? I think you can only draw that conclusion by omitting the fact that he is asking a question. 'Can we imagine such a language?' This question indicates that we are being asked to assess the validity of your use of "because". You say "another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language 'because' it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations". The "because" separates two distinct things which are implied to be causally related with the use of "because". When Wittgenstein asks 'could we imagine this' he is asking whether we can validate this supposed causal relation as logically necessary. That's what you are ignoring.

You appear to ignore the question, and assume that the necessary relation is dictated, or stipulated. Let's assume the following:
X=the words refer to what is known only to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations.
Y=another person cannot understand the language.
Your use of "because" indicates that you interpret this proposition as a conditional statement If X then Y, Y is the necessary conclusion from X. I agree that this proposed "private language" can be interpreted as such a conditional proposition. However, you seem to take this proposition as a premise, from which to proceed, without recognizing that Wittgenstein has asked, could we imagine such a thing. So instead of stating as a premise, 'if X then Y', he is asking us to separate the hypothesis "X", from the conclusion "Y", to examine the validity of the proposed conditional statement. That's what he means by 'could we imagine such a language?'. He is asking, is it logically coherent.

I’m talking about what is included in our concept when we use a word like magnitude. It may refer to one unit of measure, but when it does, built into its meaning is a multiplicity. If it didnt imply a relation to multiplicity , then there would be no point in saying ‘this is a magnitude’, rather than ‘this is a something’. Even saying ‘this is one unit’ implies multiplicity , because the concept of unit is incoherent without implicit reference to measure. It is one unit OF measure.

I understand the distinction you’re making between a quantity of units and magnitude as one unit , but both of those concepts fuse multiplicity and singularity ( in different ways) when we invoke either of them. The first concept involves a multiplicity OF singularities , the second a unit abstracted off from a multiplicity. But if we think ONLY the single something we are not thinking the concept of magnitude.

And of course I didn’t mention that it is not just multiplicity that belongs to the concept of magnitude whenever we think it , it is NUMERIC multiplicity. If numeric multiplicity isnt part of the concept of magnitude as we invoke it , then we are not thinking of a magnitude but a part. — Joshs

What I tried to explain, is that I really don't agree with your way of conflating singularity and multiplicty within both, the thing measured, and the measurement. There is no multiplicity implied by, or "built into" the meaning of "magnitude'. The magnitude is always one, as the thing which is measured, and the multiplicity is of the units of measure. So the thing measured might be measured by a countless number of different types of units of measurement, such that the measurement of the thing might be numerous different multiplicities, but that is strictly a property of the measurement. The magnitude itself cannot be more than one, or else the thing being measured would be distinct magnitudes, and this is contradictory.

It is clear to me that when you refer to "NUMERIC multiplicity", you are referring to the measurement of the magnitude, not the magnitude itself. Magnitude is a property of a thing, which a thing has regardless of whether or not it has been measured, while the numeric multiplicity is a property of the measurement. Since the magnitude is a property of the thing, it is one, as the thing is one., despite the fact that the magnitude might be measured in many different ways. The "many different ways" is proper to the measuring, not to the magnitude.

It is this order I’m referring to with the name totality. What I mean here is that an order is a category of meaning. Motion, for example , is a category of sense. The behavior of motion can be potentially infinite , but the concept of motion , as a category , is bounded by its definition. It is a totality , or better yet, the category is a finite entity, as are all categories of meaning. — Joshs

This looks mistaken to me as well. We can define something as unbounded, "infinite", like the natural numbers. So defining does not necessitate "bounded". Likewise, a defined thing is not necessarily "a totality", because a thing might be defined as incomplete. What this indicates is that your definition of "definition" is somewhat faulty. A definition does not necessarily create something bounded, nor does it necessarily produce a totality. This is important because it is the only way that we can have concepts of things like "infinite", and "incomplete". In order to have real concepts of these, we need to allow that the definitions actually produce something (a concept) unbounded, or incomplete. so for example, if we are to conceive of motion as "potentially infinite", we must provide something within the definition of "motion", which will allow that motion has some freedom from being bounded, and this is a feature of the definition. So as much as boundaries may be created by definitions, a lack of boundaries is also created by definitions. A deprivation in terms of boundary is often seen as an imperfection, or incompleteness in a concept. But it is sometimes intentional to a concept, depending on what is seen as useful for the intended application.

If we substitute the order of time for the order of motion, we have the same situation. Within the category of time, we can talk about an infinity, but the category of time itself is finite , it is a single concept. — Joshs

So I don't see how this could be the case. If the category of "time" is defined as an infinite category, then the category of time is not finite. Whether the category is finite or infinite depends on the definition.

This might all seem obvious as well as irrelevant to the issue we began with concerning Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, but if time for Aristotle is built on the model of either motion or magnitude , then numeric multiplicity is intrinsic to the invocation of the concept of time , just as we saw with the concept of magnitude. — Joshs

I completely disagree. I think it is wrong to think that multiplicity is intrinsic to magnitude. I think it is very clear that "one" is intrinsic to magnitude. A magnitude is necessarily one, otherwise we'd have to say that there is a multiplicity of "magnitudes". And it would be contradictory to say that both one and many are intrinsic to a magnitude. The numeric multiplicity you refer to is produced by the act of measuring, and is a property of the measurement not of the magnitude.

And this is exactly what Aristotle explains concerning our conception of time. We need to distinguish "time" as a tool of measurement, in which case it is a multiplicity of units of measure, from "time" as the thing (analogous to magnitude) which is measured, in which case it is one undivided continuum, therefore not a multiplicity.

Imagine an infinitely long freight train passing by your window. Each car is loaded with something different. From your window you can only see a single
car. So from your window of ‘now’ it appears as
though there is only ever the same car but with always changing contents. If you choose to you can count these changing items, and you can count changes in the rate of change if you like. — Joshs

This analogy doesn't work. Either you see separate cars going by, with the boundaries between them, or if the train were fast enough, you would see a blur, not seeing any cars. Never would it appear like the train is just one car. And if you could see the contents of the cars, the same thing would be the case, either separate cars with distinct content, or a blur.

To count "changing items" is no different from counting distinct cars. You need to be able to distinguish between them. And if it's a blur, you cannot do that. You'd be just throwing numbers at the train with no justification for your supposed "count".

So if I understand correctly, Aristotle has two concepts of time , time as continuity and time as discrete measurable changes. Each concept of time by itself is necessary but not sufficient. Both are needed. — Joshs

You do not seem, yet, to be distinguishing between the count, and the thing counted. This distinction is the one Aristotle based his two senses of "time" on. Each is a very distinct conception of "time" Here's an example which might clarify. Suppose that from the point in time that the sun rises, until that point again, constitutes "one day". We can employ "one day" as a unit of measurement, and compare how many days it takes for an occurring event. Notice that "time" in this sense, as a tool of measurement, must consist of points of reference (sunrise in this example), or else it cannot be employed for measurement. So whenever we use time to measure with, hours, days, seconds, or whatever, we employ points of reference, that's what a clock does, counts cycles or whatever. Now consider that the passing of time is an actual thing which we want to measure. Time seems to go by continuously without any inherent points of reference by which we might measure it. All those points of reference which we employ when using time to measure. are really derived from the motions of things, not from the passing of time itself. So "time" in the sense of something that is measured has no real points of reference, and the points which we use to measure time are referenced from recurring motions.

The word "So" indicates that another person cannot understand the language because, or as a consequence, of the preceding sentence, which states that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations." — Luke

Right, that is what he is asking, if we can imagine such a language. Is it logically possible that a language which refers to inner sensations would make it so that the language could no be understood by others. And as I said a few days ago, the answer is yes, if all the words of the language referred only to inner sensations, because justification requires something independent. However, as I said yesterday, even the person using this language could not be said to know or understand the language (269). But this conclusion is due to Wittgenstein's definition of knowing and rule-following, which is not really consistent with common usage.

1. Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? — Luke

You are continuing to separate this phrase "what can only be known to the person speaking" from its context. It makes no sense to say that a person's private sensations can only be "known" to oneself. I can't even imagine what this could mean, to know one's own sensations. And it's clearly demonstrated at 258, that such a thing is impossible. There is no criterion of identity, no justification, and no such thing as "right". From the context, at 243, it appears very clear to me, that what Wittgenstein is talking about "knowing", is what the words of the private language refer to. He is not talking about knowing the private sensations themselves, whatever that might mean.

We might say that the passage at 243 appears ambiguous, if we were reading the book in order and hadn't gotten to 258 yet. But then, at 258 it is made very clear that what he is talking about is knowing what the words refer to, the particular thing referred to with "S", "the sensation" which gets named this way. What else could "know that sensation" mean, other than to be able to identify what "S" refers to? Now it ought to be clear to you that "what can only be known to the person speaking" is how to identify the thing called "S", so as to apply the name correctly. Therefore, 'I know that sensation', means I know how to identify it and properly apply the name. So, the ambiguity is resolved, "known" in the context of "only be known to the person speaking" means being capable of identifying, and applying the name, which is the same thing as knowing what the words refer to.

2. Furthermore, do you acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? — Luke

Yes, but this is the question he is asking. Can we imagine such a thing, is it logically consistent, that if only the person creating the language can know what the words refer to, does this necessitate (your use of "because" above) that the language cannot be understood by another? The answer is yes, but there are repercussions, the person speaking the language cannot even understand one's own private language. (But that is the consequence of another premise, Wittgenstein's restricted sense of "rule following", and "knowing" being dependent on justification and therefore rule-following.

So in reality Wittgenstein demonstrates the fault to be in the very first premise, 'the words of the private language refer to what can only be known to the person speaking'. This is incoherent, because "knowing" requires justification, which is a judgement of rule-following, implying more than one person, making "knowledge" necessarily something shared.

This is probably why the first premise was expressed a little bit ambiguously, to disguise the fact that his use of "known" is already logically inconsistent with the principles of rule-following which he has already laid down, and therefore incoherent.

I haven't removed the phrase from its context. That's a non-argument. If you think that "what only the speaker can know" does not imply or is not equivalent to "what other people cannot know", then explain why not. — Luke

The incoherency is clear in your question here. "Knowledge" for Wittgenstein is necessarily something public. That's the way he defines his terms, "rule-following", "criterion" "justification", etc.. Therefore, "what only the speaker can know", is in itself incoherent. There is no such thing as something known to only one person. The speaker can believe oneself to know something privately, and even act as if something is known privately, but as my quote from 269 demonstrates, for Wittgenstein this is just the appearance of knowing, it is not really knowing, just like thinking that oneself is following a rule, is not really following a rule.

I don't think we should rush to discuss other sections until we have clarity on what Wittgenstein means by a private language. — Luke

I know that you think this way Luke, your private mode of understanding is to remove passages from their contexts, to ensure an interpretation which is consistent with your preconceived ideas. You have to look at what Wittgenstein says about rule-following and justification to understand what he means by "know".

Sure, but you are neglecting that you said you could not see the relevance of sensations in relation to Wittgenstein's private language, so let's get clear about that first. — Luke

"Out of context strawman." This phrase must mean something to you by now. What I said is that whether the words refer to inner sensations, or external things, is irrelevant to the meaning of 'only the person speaking can know what the words refer to'.

i agree, i cannot split now further is one whole thing
if you are one guy whole life, is now always the same ? you grow, go slimmer, fatter, change some personalities,.. you changed but still the same guy, is now always the same ? what do you think. — Nothing

I can't grasp the comparison because a now is like a point, while a person is a thing. There;s a categorical difference here.

Tell me how you would define or explain what a magnitude is to somebody who was unfamiliar with the concept. How does one make it comprehensible without invoking a multiplicity of a certain type , a continuous succession that differs from a randomly changing flow in a specific way. — Joshs

A magnitude is anything measurable, it is size. As such, a magnitude is one single thing to be measured. But the measurement of the thing is expressed as a quantity of units of measure, and this invokes a multiplicity. So a magnitude is one, but a measurement of that magnitude is a multiplicity. If we say that a unit of measure is itself a magnitude, this is one unit of measure, not a multiplicity.

What I am trying to get at here is that whether we are talking about a continuity or your example of a non-continuous succession in the form of something that separates the before from the after, in each case we have examples of a unified totality. — Joshs

The point I was making is that there is no "unified totality" in this portrayal. If before is separated from after, in the way described, then it is impossible that these two are unified. That which is divided is not unified. Note that the portrayal is not of the potential for division, or divisibility, it is of an actual division between before and after. So if it is a succession, it is a succession of distinct things, and nothing to make them unified except that they are understood under the precepts of "one order". The order, being potentially infinite, is not necessarily a totality.

If I move a marble from here to there and describe the path in terms of a continuous linear trajectory , notice how this flow of change is different from my me telling you to now imagine a rock, then a movie you saw, then tell you to look at your finger. There is constant change here but no continuity , no enduring identity like in the example of continuous motion. Also notice that even through the continuity is. it itself divided up , it is in the nature of this continuity that it less itself to measurement. — Joshs

The two examples are clearly distinct, but this is the incompatibility I referred to. If you represent the "continuous linear trajectory" of the marble, as being at point A at time 1, and point B at time 2, and so on, then you have the same problem of change without continuity. What happens to the marble between A and B? We say it "moves". But to have the continuity, we need to account for the movement. If we posit a point halfway between A and B, and half the time, we still don't account for the movement, because we might still ask how the marble gets from A to this point, and the answer is that it moves. So we might divide infinitely, and we still would have the movement actually occurring between the points, and the actual movement would never be accounted for, despite invoking an infinity of points to plot the trajectory.

This is the same issue as the incompatibility between the point and the line. Any line segment might be represented as an infinity of points. But an infinity of points does not produce a continuous line. The line is always what occurs between the points. So despite the assumption of an infinite number of points in a finite line segment, the line itself, which is what lies between the points, is never accounted for..

Now let’s look at before, after and the third thing that separates them. Can we talk about this structure in terms of an enduring pattern that stretches indefinitely , or infinitely long? However long we define the duration of this pattern of repeated before, during and after, notice that the pattern as a whole is a unity, a self-identical object, even though it is composed of a non-continuous sequence of events. — Joshs

Like I explained above, the only thing which allows us to say that these separate entities are unified, or are a unity, is that they are of one order. But then the unity is in the order, and if the order is allowed to be infinite, or "stretches indefinitely", there is no whole. So there is no self-identical object, just an order. If it were "an object", the order would be constrained within the defined boundaries of that object.

For Heidegger, time cannot be counted or measured because it is not an objectively present series of before after and during. And it is not a continuity akin to the behavior of a moving object. — Joshs

In other words, Heidegger describes time as absolutely unintelligible, i.e., outside the limits of intelligibility. What point is there to that?

Methfhisical undercover what you referat as "now" can be split into smaller now ? Or is one whole thing impossible of division ? — Nothing

I don't know how one might split a now into a smaller now. Can you think of a way to split a point into a smaller point?

It doesn’t have to be a continuous line. It can be a series of lines. Magnitude , as the basis of continuity, is a more complex notion than a simple plurality or multiplicity. To construe a multiplicity as a magnitude requires that we assume numeric iteration, the ‘how much’, quantity. Numeric iteration implies identical repetition, the identical ‘again and again’ of number. Magnitude also implies the earlier and later, the less and the more. — Joshs

I really don't understand what you're saying Joshs. If it's a series of lines rather than a continuous line then we are not talking about a continuity anymore. That's the point which Aristotle made. If before is distinct from after, as A is distinct from B, then there is necessarily a third thing which separates the two. That there is something else distinct from A and B which is intermediary between A and B, negates the possibility that A and B are a continuity.

The quantitative ‘same again and again’, that the continuity of magnitude assumes implies discrete units. — Joshs

But that is not a continuity. In the case of a series of lines, each segment is different and distinct. So you cannot describe it as "same" again and again, each is different. A continuity composed of discrete units is incoherent as self-contradictory.

Otherwise , we couldnt equate magnitude with quantity. — Joshs

We cannot equate magnitude with quantity, this should be obvious to you. Magnitude is what is measured, quantity is the measurement.

The after succeeds the before. This creates a continuity akin to motion and magnitude , as you point out. — Joshs

This is highly doubtful. Before and after require the application of a 'now', and the 'now' divides the time so that it is not a continuity. Therefore the assumption of before and after actually negates the possibility of continuity. This is described at 219a, 26. The before is segment A, and the after is segment B. That A is different from B implies that there is a third thing intermediate between them. That third thing necessarily breaks the continuity between A and B. The conclusion then is that time is bounded by the 'now'.

And since there appears to be no such thing as time without before and after, the whole idea that time is continuous is cast into doubt. Then 'now' appears to be ambiguous, having two meanings, one accounting for time as continuous, without before and after if there is such a thing, and the other accounting for time as divided, (therefore not continuous), in relation to before and after.

Motion and magnitude cannot be thought without presupposing an objectively present basis for motion and magnitude. motion and magnitude are changes in something that remains self-identically present through its changes. What difference does it make whether I mark off ‘now’ points on a line. It’s the supposition of the line ( the geometrical — Joshs

The thing which moves is said to be real, the motion is not 219b, 30. So Aristotle assumes a separation here between magnitude and motion, and that is why motion is a property of magnitude. So what is presupposed as "objectively present" is the magnitude, not any sense of "time" itself. But the magnitude itself is a contingent thing with generation, corruption, and changes, it cannot be represented as a continuous line.

Used for counting time, exactly. I don't see the problem. — Xtrix

The issue is that there are two senses of "time", one as a tool for counting, and the other as the thing counted. The 'now', in proper use, is a part of the former, but not a part of the latter. When we try to make the 'now' into a part of the thing which is counted, (as in 'the now is a continuous present moment'), then we have the problem of incompatibility.

Your accusation that I’m misreading is supported by a fictional quote. He does not say “refer to what can only be known to the person speaking”. Get the quote right before you accuse me of misreading, otherwise you might be accused of misreading. — Luke

Those are the exact words of the translation I am using. The complete passage is: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." The key sentence is the last one, "So another person cannot understand the language". This provides the context which indicates that he is talking about knowing what the words refer to, not knowing the things themselves (whatever that might mean).

No, he is talking about “what only the speaker can know.” An actual quote carries a lot more weight than your constant misinterpretation and made up quotes. — Luke

Right, and "what only the speaker can know" is in the context of the language proposal, and what the words of the language refer to. So he is saying that only the speaker can know what the words refer to, so "another person cannot understand the language".

That is not a valid response because Wittgenstein tells us that the language refers to “what only the speaker can know”, which implies that it refers to what other people cannot know. — Luke

You have removed the phrase from it's context, to give it your own private meaning. This I've noticed is your habitual way of arguing. It is a type of strawman procedure. Here you are strawmanning what Wittgenstein has written, by removing the phrase from the context which he provided, for the sake of supporting your misunderstanding of what he wrote.

In the context he is talking about what the words refer to, and he is saying that only the speaker can know this, such that only the speaker can understand the language. It is proposed that this (only the speaker can know what the words refer to) is the result of the words referring to inner experiences. However, it is demonstrated at 258-270, that this is not the case, others can know what the words refer to when they refer to inner experiences. So long as there is something independent to act as justification, having a word which refers to one's inner sensation does not render the word incomprehensible to another, when there is something independent to justify the use.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein suggests at 269, that the phrase you quote, "what only the speaker can know", is itself incoherent, because knowledge requires justification, and one cannot justify ones own use of words. This is only a case of the person "thinking he understands", which does not qualify as actual knowing, or understanding. "And sounds which no one else understands but which I
'appear to understand' might be called a 'private language'.

Nonetheless, the point remains that he is talking about what only the speaker can know (and, therefore, what other people cannot know); he is not talking about what the speaker does know or what other people do not know. The point is that this language is private in principle; it cannot possibly come to be understood by others and it has no possibility of translation into another language. — Luke

Sure, but you are still neglecting the context. He is asking at 243, a question, could we imagine such a language. This means that he is asking whether we can conceive of it, is it logically possible. He shows with the demonstration 258-270, that if all the words of the private language refer only to inner experiences, with no words referring to anything independent to act as justification, this language could not be understood by anyone else. However, the person using the private language could not be said to "know" or "understand" one's own private language, the person would only "appear" as if the language was understood.

But we need to acknowledge that this conclusion is due to the way that Wittgenstein restricts "know" and "understand" to rule (criteria) following activities, and claims that a person cannot privately follow a rule. Thinking that one is following a rule does not qualify as actually following a rule, therefore thinking that one knows does not qualify as actually knowing. But the fact that one can choose not to obey one's own 'private rule', and choose to act either according to one's 'private rule', or not, implies that if this cannot be called acting by a "rule" , we must still allow that it is something similar to a "rule". And since Wittgenstein offers no alternative to "rule", for describing why a person would appear to act as if one is following a rule, when the person is really doing something other than following a rule, the "private language" demonstration is really useless.

That wouldn’t work. The words of such a language would not refer to “what only the speaker can know.” Other people can know external things. Other people cannot know one’s immediate private sensations. — Luke

You're misreading again Luke. The phrase "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" ;means only the person speaking can know what the words refer to. He is talking about knowing what the words refer to, not knowing the things themselves. Whatever knowing the thing itself would mean, I don't know, but it's clearly not what is indicated by the context, talking about language. This is clarified by the sentence which follows. "So another person cannot understand the language". Knowing the thing itself (whatever that is supposed to mean) is not necessary for understanding a language, knowing what the words refer to is.

One can make up a language with words that refer to external things, so that other people do not know what the words refer to, and therefore cannot understand the language.

Obviously, we can and do talk about pain and other sensations using our public language. — Luke

So, do you apprehend the two distinct conditions now? 1) the language talks about inner experiences (which we might do with our public language), and 2) another person cannot understand the language (which also could be the case with a language that refers to things other than inner experiences).

What Wittgenstein is investigating is the logical relationship between these two, whether a language which uses words only to refer to "immediate private sensations", would necessarily be a language which no one else could understand.

But it is a continuity based on the continuity of magnitiude. — Joshs

What does magnitude have to do with "now"? The point was that Heidegger wrongly portrayed Aristotle's conception of the continuity of time as a continuity of nows. "The 'now' is no part of time...any more than points are parts of a line..." Physics 220a, 18.

"Continuity without any nows" is what, exactly? Perhaps citing Aristotle to support whatever claim you're making would be helpful. — Xtrix

Read Physics 220a, 13-23. Here's a sample: "In so far as the 'now' is a boundary it is not time, but an attribute of it..." 220a 20.

The conclusion here is that time is "a number" with respect to before and after, ('before and after' having been distinguished by the application of a 'now'). It is continuous, because it has been designated to be an attribute of motion and magnitude, which are continuous. And it is in theory, divisible by the application of a now which separates before from after.

The issue I had was with Heidegger's portrayal of a succession of nows as being proposed as an objective present. I do not think that Aristotle proposes any objective present because "present" is defined as the time "not far from now". But the objectivity of "time" is based in "before and after", not on the application of a 'now'. The 'now' is simply used for marking before and after, and in counting time.

These "two distinct things" are both described and/or entailed by: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know" (PI 243). Therefore, one "distinct thing" does not necessitate the other; instead, both "distinct things" are necessitated by "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know".

You have a lot of trouble accepting all of 243. You first ignored that the words of the private language refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. Now you are ignoring that the words of the private language refer to what only the speaker can know. — Luke

You Luke, are the one not accepting "all of 243". You don't seem to recognize that 243 is asking a question, and that the question contains two parts. 1( Can we imagine a language in which a person gives expressions to one's inner experiences, and ,2) That another person cannot understand the words of this language.

That these are two distinct parts is clear from the fact that Wittgenstein answers 1) with "Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?". Then he proceeds to the second condition "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking".

Obviously, these are two distinct conditions. And, as I explained to you already, this phrase "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", does not necessitate that the language refers to inner experiences, as you claim. One might make a language referring to external things, in which no one understands what the words refer to.

That's a different question from what Wittgenstein means by a private language, which is the question we were previously discussing. You initially thought that it did not matter what the words of the language referred to and all that mattered was "only I can understand". You have now tried to change the subject. — Luke

Since, I've always been arguing that there are two distinct conditions of the private language described at 243, this is obviously a strawman representation. I "changed the subject" to adopt a new approach, because I was not getting through to you the other way. The new approach was to show that you ignore the essence of Wittgenstein's question, 'could we imagine such a language', with your claim that you have already imagined it. Therefore you are begging the question, claiming to have the answer to Wittgenstein's question, prior to going through the logical process required to answer the question.

The point being that we need to determine whether there is logical consistency between 1) and 2), before we can answer whether such a language can be imagined. If you simply assume that 1) and 2) are united in a logically coherent way, as you do, you beg the question, claiming to have already imagined such a language.

Incidentally, it may be worth noting that, as observed by Aristotle, Plato does not suggest that there are Forms for artificial or man-made things such as table or bed. These can be explained by means of the combined Forms of Shape, Size, etc., that the human craftsman combines in his mind to form an image of the object to be crafted. — Apollodorus

I think that this is contrary to what Plato describes in The Republic. He says that when the carpenter makes a bed, as a material thing, he holds in his mind an idea of a bed, a form which he copies when producing the bed. In coming up with his idea of a bed, the one which he will make, he tries as much as possible to replicate the Divine Form, the idea of the perfect bed, or Ideal.

But Heidegger claims that for Aristotle time itself is derived from motion, a continuous change within something enduringly objectively presence. So it would seem for Aristotle the scene of being and becoming is the objectively present frame of time as motion. — Joshs

This is not really the case, because Aristotle distinguished two senses of "time", the primary sense as a tool of measurement, and a secondary sense as the thing measured. The secondary sense is often overlooked, in modern interpretations, but it is important to his physics and metaphysics. When we assume an "objectively present frame of time", this is "time" in the primary sense, a conceptual presupposition, assuming a 'point of being at the present', from which we may observe and measure. Assuming this point of unchanging being, at the present (within which no time passes) enables us to produce principles of measurement.

Notice in your quoted passage, the human act of measuring is what is referred to by Aristotle: "the now...always measures..". This describes how we apply a "now" as a point in time, then some particular motion occurs (the apparent movement of the sun for example), and we apply another "now" to mark off a measured time period (an hour or something). These are like non-dimensional points on a line, there is no line within them, but a continuous line between them.

This application of "nows" in relation with motion provides us with a number which is used as a principle of measurement. The nows are an aspect of the measuring tool, the conception of "time" as a tool of measurement, just like "points" are an aspect of the spatial conception which is a tool for spatial measurement..

If we move to the secondary sense of "time", as what is measured, we find the conception of a continuity without any nows. The nows are seen as artificial. Therefore, when Heidegger says “The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present..." in your quoted passage, this is a misunderstanding of Aristotle. It conflates the distinction between the primary sense of "time", and the secondary sense of "time", which Aristotle tried to establish.

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Husserl and Heidegger derive mathematical continuity from the idea of enduring objective presence, on which the vulgar concept of time is based. They deconstruct the idea of objective presence and determine that authentic time can’t be likened to a mathematical continuity. — Joshs

The problem which Aristotle demonstrated is the fundamental incompatibility between the two distinct ways of describing what you have named as "enduring objective presence". The one way is based in an assumption that what remains the same as time passes (being) provides the fundamental description,, and the other way assumes that things not remaining the same as time passes (becoming) provides the fundamental description. These two fundamental descriptions are incompatible ways of describing the proposed "enduring objective presence".

The issue you point to, with Hegel and Heidegger, is that "enduring objective presence", or what we commonly call "continuity", is itself a descriptive phrase which implies "remains the same as time passes". Therefore this description, "enduring objective presence", get's placed in the category of "being", and is rejected as a true representation of temporal existence, when one is in favour of the other category, becoming.

Rejecting one for the other does not resolve the incompatibility, which Aristotle exposed though. What Aristotle showed, which was derived from Plato, is that it is necessary to allow that the two fundamental, and inherently incompatible descriptive forms, are both real. So the solution is not to reject one for the other, but the arduous task of determining which parts of reality require the one descriptive form, and which parts require the other.

To make "change" intelligible requires that we assume an aspect which remains the same as time passes, and an aspect which does not stay the same as time passes. So physics for example, assumes laws which stay the same (being), and a thing which does not stay the same (becoming), as the physical world. It does not help to say that one assumption is more real or "objective" than the other.

But is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno

Time is what provides us with change, and that is what you might call the spice of life. Wouldn't life be an absolute bore if nothing changed? Time provides us with the ability to do things, change things, want things etc.. The reason why temporality is commonly given priority in philosophy is that this is the only way to make sense of spatiality. Spatial existence can then be seen for what it is, a construction, created by the sensing being to provide it an advantage in its temporal existence. What we sense is the passing of time, but we create a spatial representation which allows us to understand the passing of time. Once we see temporality as the true reality, spatial representations can be understood as just that, representations. And the vast majority of humanity takes these spatial representations to be reality, as Plato's cave dwellers, not having seen through to the temporal reality on the other side.