Now that’s what I call garbled. It’s garbled but I can still recognize the traditional notion of time dating back to Aristotle in it. This is what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time and Husserl calls constituted or objective time.

Heidegger, in a move similar to Husserl, traces the origin of the mathematical and of empirical science to the concept of enduring objective presence undergirding constituted time (what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time). — Joshs

I believe the separation between what you call "the vulgar conception of time", and the modern conception of time, is initiated by Hegel. He's the one who firmly rejected Aristotelian principles, offering an alternative starting point.

Aristotle maintained a categorical separation between being and becoming, commonly presented to modern philosophers as the ontologies of Parmenides and Heraclitus. He demonstrated a fundamental incompatibility between the two, which was elucidated by Plato. This was represented as the incompatibility between 'points' of being, and a 'continuous' line of becoming. The incompatibility was manifested as Zen's paradoxes.

Hegel dissolves the separation by allowing that 'being', along with 'not-being', might be subsumed within the category of becoming. And modern mathematics allows an infinity of points within a continuity. This also provides the foundation for Heidegger and phenomenologists to portray 'being', and consequently 'beings', as forms of becoming. For Aristotle, becoming is neither being nor not- being (apparent violation of the law of excluded middle). For Hegel, becoming is both being and not-being (apparent violation of the law of non-contradiction)

In one sense, Banno represents this correctly

Asking "what is being?" is asking "How do we use the word 'being'?" — Banno

To know what "being" is is to know what is referred to with "being". But when the uses of "being" are distinctly divergent, then no amount of endless analysis of use will determine what "being" is. The word refers to distinct things (or conceptions). Then we must turn to something other than use (which only leads us into confusion), to determine what being is. And in this sense Banno is clearly incorrect

I am suggesting that an examination of the language of being looks more productive than musings about time. — Banno

The problem with Banno's perspective is that it has become evident that any attempt to understand the nature of becoming, will lead one into the realm of the unknown, and the unintelligible, as what violates the fundamentals of logic, and consequently the principles of what can be said. However, this does not lead to the conclusion, as some believe, that these things cannot be talked about, it leads to the conclusion that the principles of what can be said are wrong, and need to be altered.

Since the human understanding of time is infantile, the principles we hold as to what can be said, in relation to time, are very crude and immature.

You haven't been addressing anything I say, only tediously repeating that nonsense, so it appears there's no discussion here.

We were discussing 243, not 256. Remember? You said: — Luke

Luke you're being ridiculous, the quote from 256 is a reference to what was meant at 243. Do you think that 256 is referencing a different type of private language from the one mentioned at 243? If so then we have intentional ambiguity. Clearly 256 indicates that referring to one's private sensations, and "only I can understand" are two distinct things. The issue is to determine whether there is a relationship of logical necessity between these two, as proposed at 243. Does "referring to private sensations" necessitate "only I can understand".

Wittgenstein does not talk about "describing one's private sensations in words which another person can understand" at 243. If another person could understand the language, then the language could not "refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations." — Luke

Of course not, that's already given, It's a known fact that we can talk about private sensations in words that people can understand. That's the reason for the second condition of the private language. 1. It refers to private sensations. 2. it uses words which no one else can understand. The second condition is necessary to distinguish the private language from a common or public language which refers to private sensations. This would be using words like "pain".

To repeat: Another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. — Luke

You are begging the question Luke. The question at 243 is "can we imagine" such a language. Is such a proposal a logical possibility. Would having a language which refers only to one's private sensations cause that language to be only understandable to that person. At 265 you'll see that the answer implied is "yes". Justification requires reference to something independent, so if the language referred only to one's private sensations, it would be incomprehensible to others.

You need to respect exactly what he is asking at 243, "can we imagine" such a language. He is not asking you to imagine such a language. The answer he reveals is that though we can imagine such a language ( justification requires something independent, 265), as it is fully logical, such a language is not a real description of language. In reality, having the words refer to one's private sensations does not necessitate, or cause, the words to be incomprehensible to others because we have independent sources of justification. Therefore we can imagine such a language one which reference only private sensations making it impossible that another person cannot understand the words, but this is not a real language, in the sense of how languages actually exist.

You seem to have jumped the gun, and actually proceeded toward attempting to imagine such a language, prior to determining whether it is logically possible to imagine such a language. So you beg the question, assuming that such a language is logically possible. If you didn't already assume that this language was logically possible, you would not proceed toward imagining it.

Wittgenstein does not mention internal/external or what "a person can talk about". He mentions "what only the speaker can know". — Luke

You're just being tedious Luke. He does mention "inner".

"256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?"

Notice that he says my inner experiences "and" which only I can understand. There are two described features here, " describes my inner experiences", and, "only I myself can understand".

Why do you refuse to recognize that a person might describe one's private sensations in words that another can understand? And so, "describing one's private sensations", and "describing one's private sensations in words which another person cannot understand", are two distinct things.

Beauty and Good are not identical in every respect but they are closely interconnected, especially on higher levels of experience, with consciousness and experience becoming increasingly unified. In the Philebus, the Good is described as a mixture of three Forms, Beauty, Proportion, and Truth, and Beauty and Good appear together in other dialogues.

The combination and (partial) identification of Beauty with Good is particularly obvious in the Symposium.

To begin with, the dialogue takes place at the house of the “Good and Beautiful” Agathon. Beauty and Good are combined in Agathon himself, the party host, who is said to be “beautiful” and whose name means “good”. This could not have escaped Plato readers even under Roman rule when all educated citizens, including Christians, spoke Greek. Moreover, Socrates himself calls Agathon “very beautiful and of good nature and breeding” in the Protagoras (315d-e).

So, there can be no doubt that we are in the realm of the Good and Beautiful from the start. Socrates himself is dressed in beautiful clothes for the occasion. — Apollodorus

I suggest that you consider the passage in The Symposium in the following way. There is a separation described by Diotima between the good and the beautiful. Hence the necessity for good "and" beauty. The good is not necessarily beautiful, and the beautiful is not necessarily good. This is why Socrates could not say why a person would desire the beautiful, but could easily say why a person would desire the good. The good is desired for the sake of something, happiness/. But beauty, if it's desired, is desired for the sake of itself.

This is why Diotima places the good in the human realm, what is desired by people, while beauty is placed in the realm of what is godly. Now, human beings do not necessarily desire what is godly, so the good, what a human being desires, is not necessarily something godly or beautiful. It might still be something ugly. "The good" being what a human being determines as desirable, might not be godly or beautiful.

So when we look at the phrase "beautiful and good", what is described here is a consistency between what is desired by a human being, "the good", and what is godly, "Beauty". At this point, the beautiful (what is godly) is the good (what is desired by a human being. Though the good and the beautiful are not necessarily the same, they may be the same, and when they are, we might call this Truth.

You'll see that Aristotle described this principle in a slightly different way, and his description was adopted into Christianity, especially from Aquinas and later. He distinguished the real good from the apparent good. In Christianity the apparent good is what a human being desires, and the real good is what God determines. The goal of moral philosophy is to shape the apparent good so that it conforms to be the same as the real good.

He thereby prepares the ground for Socrates’ own speech, in which Socrates takes the theme to the highest level where the philosopher who has set out on the quest for Beauty has found the Good and the Good and the Beautiful combine together with Truth to form one reality. — Apollodorus

I think this is the point here. Truth is elusive to the intellect, difficult to understand. The good is always present, so it is apprehended first. To move onward from the good to Truth, we must give to beauty what we find in the good, thus uniting Beauty and Good.

Explaining it again does not change the fact that you described the same condition twice.

You claimed that a private language had two conditions but you repeated the same condition of privacy twice. What's the other condition? — Luke

I can't believe how you stubbornly resist understanding something so simple. Words can refer to internal things or external things. That the proposed private language uses words to refer to internal things is one condition. Also, a word might be understood by someone else, or it might not. That the words of the private language cannot be understood by another, is a second condition.

That these two conditions are not the same condition, as you seem to think, for some strange reason, is evident from the following. A person can talk about internal things in words which others can understand. And, a person can talk about external things with words that someone else cannot understand. Therefore the two conditions are not the same condition, nor are they equivalent.

It's very clear that the necessary relationship between the one and the other, required to say that they are the same, is simply not there. It is simply not the case that "referring to internal feelings" is equivalent with "not understandable by others". What makes a word understandable to someone else, rather than not understandable, is not that it refers to something external rather than internal. Understandability depends on the mode of learning which the person has undergone, not whether the thing referred to is internal or external.

For example, physicists give names to external things which I cannot understand. Obviously, it is not because these things are supposed to be internal and private, that I do not understand these names, it is because I do not understand the conceptual structure which provides the context where the names have their positions. That is what makes a name understandable or not, to another person, whether the person understands the context. And the case is exactly the same with names of internal things. That the name "S" refers to something internal does not make it fundamentally impossible to another person to understand. You argued this incessantly already, that we can understand "S" through the understanding of "sensation". However, Wittgenstein makes it appear like we cannot understand what "S" refers to, through the use of ambiguity.

That the use of ambiguity makes it impossible to understand what a word refers to, while internal/external is completely irrelevant, is irrefutable evidence that the two conditions are separate conditions.

I haven't neglected anything. I stated that the two separate conditions - privacy and the reference to sensations (assuming this was your second condition) - are actually inseparable. In contrast, you said that sensations are irrelevant. — Luke

The separate condition I'm referring to is "another person cannot understand the language". That's why I said you are completely neglecting this phrase. And, in insisting that the second condition is "privacy", rather than "another person cannot understand the language", you continue to neglect that condition. What's with that? You quoted my statement as "another person cannot understand the language", and you referred to it as "privacy"

That a person owns something as "private" does not necessitate that others cannot have access to it. The person can allow another access to one's private property, or another might take it with the use of force. So, stating the second condition as "privacy" is a straw man misrepresentation. "Private" is not the same as "another person cannot use it".

A person may intentionally allow, what is held as private (the use of S in this example), to be shared by others. That the person shares it does not negate the fact that the thing shared remains that person's private property. And, of course this is why the example is not an example of a "private language", as defined by "another person cannot understand the language". It is allowed that the person with the private naming ("S"), shares the use of the name, through the means of the common understanding of "sensation". Therefore the condition "another person cannot understand the language" is violated, despite the fact that the naming itself is something private.

Do you understand this? The naming is something "private", it is a private language-game. But it is described as occurring within the context of a public language. This private language-game, expressed at 258, is not "a language", and therefore not "a private language". The private language-game is not "a language", because a language consists of many different language-games, and the private language-game is just one language-game. This is an example of the difference between one and many, explored by Plato in "The Parmenides"

What private word is being integrated into a common language at 258? — Luke

Luke, the private word is "S". The word of the common language is "sensation". The private word "S" is made public (integrated into common language) through the proposition "S is the sign of a sensation". However, this proposition ought to be justified, and that's where we find a problem. How do we confirm that the thing referred to with "S" conforms to the grammar of "sensation"?

Hint: 258 has nothing at all to do with integrating a private word into a common language. You are lost. — Luke

Your proposed "hint" is obviously misunderstanding misrepresenting itself as guidance. That's a very good example of what fuels my attitude of condescension, and why it is "not misplaced when directed towards you", despite your implication that you know what I know.

You still refuse to acknowledge the last line of 257 despite the fact that I've quoted it a number of times now. I'm going to keep repeating it, over and over, until you accept that it is relevant to the example expressed at 258:

And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. — PI 257

You have not described two conditions. You have described the same condition of privacy twice. — Luke

If the words of a language which talks about inner feelings could not be known to another, we could not coherently talk about our inner feelings. Therefore, what makes the private language incomprehensible to others must be something other than that it refers to inner feelings.

These two conditions are inseparable in Wittgenstein's description, and they are therefore not two separate conditions. — Luke

You are neglecting the statement "So another person cannot understand the language."

Obviously we understand another person's language when they talk about their private sensations. Talking about our private sensations, and understanding each other is a common part of natural language. Therefore, "so another person cannot understand the language", is a condition other than referring to one's immediate private sensations. The language has to refer to private feelings in a particular way so that others cannot understand.

How many times do you need to be told that he attempts to give the private language advocate what he wants but fails, because he is showing us the incoherency of the concept of a private language? THAT'S THE POINT. And yet you still complain that it isn't really a private language. Well, no shit. — Luke

There is no attempt to give the private language advocate what he wants, that's nonsense. What is provided as an example at 258 is not even close to an example of a private language, as indicated from my quote of 257. It is an example of something completely different.

That the concept of a private language is incoherent is self-evident. This requires no demonstration, it's obvious. Private language is an oxymoron. The demonstration is not meant to show that a private language is incoherent, it is meant to show that something very similar to private language, the integration of a private word into a common language, is a very real aspect of language, even though "private language" itself is incoherent.

Here's a proposal. Let's look at the word "only" at 243. Let's assume that all the words of the proposed "private language" can only refer to private sensations, nothing else. Every word in this language can only refer to a private sensation, just like "S", and this might be the reason why the language cannot be understood by others. We can see why Wittgenstein would say that such a language would not be understandable to others, at 265, because he says justification requires reference to something independent. But the demonstration at 258 shows one private word, "S", in the context of common words, "recurrence" and "sensation", so it is clearly not an attempt to portray a private language.

There are not two conditions.

When he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", the word "this" is indicative of the language he mentioned earlier, namely: "a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use". — Luke

Luke, think about what "only the speaker can know" means. If I talk about my pains, can you know what I'm talking about? Of course you can. Then I am not using a private language, despite talking about my inner feelings. Therefore, the conditions for being a "private language" must be more than just a language about one's inner feelings. The second condition is that only the speaker can know what the words refer to. Obviously this second condition is not fulfilled when "S" is described as a "sensation". This is because "the existence of the grammar of the word...[sensation]... shews the post where the new word...(S).. is stationed." (257).

Describing S as a "sensation", "a word of our common language" (261), so that we can all know what "S" refers to, negates the possibility that the demonstration is intended as an example of a private language, as defined.

All you have is misplaced condescension. — Luke

My condescension is aimed only at those who assume to have a thorough understanding of what Wittgenstein has demonstrated when they obviously do not. I don't think that's misplaced when directed toward you.

You cannot ignore these parts of 243: — Luke

I don't see your argument. A private language is a language in which a person speaks about one's inner sensations, and no one else can understand the words (243). At 258 is given an example of the naming of an inner sensation in which we have the ability to understand the name, as the name of a sensation. You seem to conclude that since they both concern inner sensations, the latter is a private language.

It's ironic how we've changed positions. I spent days arguing that we cannot know exactly what "S" refers to because of ambiguity (we can't understand the meaning of S), while you argued that we can understand what S signifies, a sensation. Now you're saying that this is an example of a private language. If this is the case, then you must concur that we cannot understand the meaning of S, as indicated by the description, or definition of "private language".

The difference between us, is that I attribute the inability to understand "S" to intentional ambiguity by the author, and you seem to think that this is because it is supposed to be a private language. We could discuss whether intentional ambiguity constituted a private language, to see if there is consistency between us, but we wouldn't get far. With intentional ambiguity the words cannot be understood by others, as required for a private language, but they do not refer to private sensations. As I explained earlier, with intentional ambiguity the word has no proper referent, its meaning is ambiguous.

To have a private language, as defined, both conditions, must be fulfilled, reference to inner sensations, and impossible for others to understand..

You are ignoring everything here except "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". How can you possibly think this gives you a better understanding of the text? — Luke

I'm not ignoring it, I'm just pointing out the insufficiency to you. It's basic logic. If a definition stipulates two requirements, then fulfilling one of the requirements is insufficient for designating that the thing meets the conditions of the definition.

I agree. As I said, he tries and fails to provide an example of a private language according to the description he gives at 243 which includes the word "sensations". — Luke

You continue to refuse to consider the immediate context of the example. As I've explained already, 257 makes it very clear that he is not trying to provide an example of a private language with the first person perspective laid out at 258. The existence of the grammar of the word "sensation" is presupposed, and it acts as a post where the new word "S" is stationed. That's made very clear at the end of 257. Obviously this is not intended to be an example of a "private language" as defined. And, from 260 onward, when he looks at the example from the third person perspective, he discusses justifying the use of "sensation" for the positioning of the new word "S".

You might see the mention of "private language" inserted at 259, and think that this means 258 is supposed to be an example of a private language, but this is only evidence of intentional ambiguity. Clearly Wittgenstein indicates at the end of 257, that the proposed new word "S", is given it's position relative to the grammar of "sensation". To suggest that the new word is given position according to some sort of private system of rules, directly contradicts this.

Now, do you see what Wittgenstein intends, for us to do, in understanding, to avoid the apparent contradiction creating the appearance ambiguity at 259? We must reject the notion of private rules, as explained earlier in the text, and reject that there is even impressions of rules (259) involved here. "The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression of a balance". Therefore we are left to conclude that the new word "S" finds its place according to the grammar of "sensation", as described at 257. And so there is no intent that 258 is an example of a private language, because this would require that the position of S would be done through some private sort of balance. That is not the way that the example is expressed.

Why is it only the word "sensation" that requires justification at 258? Why not all the other words too? What makes this word so special? — Luke

The use of the word "sensation" requires justification because it is the word used to describe the thing which S is directly related to, as the name of. That is the layering of reference. The diarist names something S, then tells the public that the thing named S is of the type "sensation". The diarist cannot point to the thing named by S, to show that it is an example of a sensation, demonstrating that the use of "sensation" is called for (the thing is correctly classified), so "sensation" must be justified in some other way, i.e. we turn to something independent.

Does the "sensation" at 243 also require justification? And what is this process of justification? How are these words justified? Please answer these questions to help support your argument. — Luke

Justification of such words is done through reference to something independent, as explained by Wittgenstein. This is actually quite similar to scientists making revelations about things which cannot be directly observed. These things are in a sense "private", as not directly revealed to to the senses of any human being. They are as the religious would say, private to God Himself. Through hypothesis, the scientist will name such unrevealed things. giving the newly named things contextual position by means of the grammar of the words of the hypothesis. The name of the thing is positioned within a conceptual structure of other known names. Then the hypothesis, that the newly named thing deserves that contextual position which it is given, must be justified through independent experimentation.

Nice cherry picking. Are you blind? How many times do I need to quote the passage from 243 before you comprehend that it contains the word "sensation"? Look: — Luke

I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant. The words of this proposed "private language" cannot be understood by another person. "Sensation" is not such a word. But "S" at 258 is said to be the name of a sensation. Therefore 258 is not an example of a private language.

No shit, Sherlock. But "sensation" is given as part of the description of a private language at 243 that you agreed to. Did you agree to that definition by mistake? — Luke

The description, or definition, of "private language", is not itself a private language. So "sensation" might be used in the definition of a private language, but since it is a publicly understood word, it cannot be part of a private language. This is very simple. Do you understand this?

That's why he tries to provide an example of a private language and fails. — Luke

As I demonstrated with the quote from the end of 257, he is not at all trying to provide an example of a private language. Please read 257 again. He is showing how a new word, produced from a private experience might fit into, or receive a place. in an existing public language, as indicated by the last sentence in 257.

Once you understand this, you might then move on toward understanding why he says at 261, that the use of "sensation" as the word for what S is, must be justified. "S" is the new word with the private referent, and "sensation" is the public word. That the thing, if there even is a thing, which is named by "S", is consistent with the criteria of "sensation", must be justified. This is how "S" might receive a place in the public language.

There is an explicit connection between desire and the beautiful and the good from the start. — Apollodorus

Of course there is a connection, or relationship, the point though is that Beauty and the good are not the same.

It follows that it is wrong to claim that intelligence is the product of knowledge just as it is wrong to claim that imagination is the product of the imagined image. Intelligence and imagination are the faculties, knowledge and imagined image are the products of, and therefore posterior to, their respective faculties. — Apollodorus

I see what you mean, "intelligence" is ambiguous. You are using "intelligence" as synonymous with "intellect", and I thought you meant "intelligence" in the sense of the property of an intellect

Compare 243 with 258. He is clearly talking about the same thing here: — Luke

Why would you say this, right after insisting that he is talking about a "sensation" at 258? When he talks about the private language at 243 he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". Obviously "sensation" doesn't refer to something only he can know, and S is described as a sensation.

Ask yourself why a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. — Luke

The reason why a definition cannot be formulated is because what is proposed is a direct relation between a word and a thing (a sensation in this case). So the situation is a naming, like what a proper noun does. There is no definition in this type of usage, just a direct relationship between the name and the thing named, such that the thing named defines the name. That's why he proceeds to say that he can give himself a sort of ostensive definition by pointing to the thing inwardly.

However, the thing is described as "a sensation", or an "inner experience", and these are words of a public language, Therefore there is no real attempt at exemplifying a private language here. There is a private naming, within the context of a public language. The parameters as to what type of thing is being named are laid out by the public language. This he describes at the end of 257, just before launching into the example.

"And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed." ---257

As explained, "sensation" shows the post where the new word "S" is stationed. This is not a private language.

Luke, your post is so confused, and your replies so brief and unexplained, that I cannot even begin to understand what you are trying to express, in the majority of your replies.

We have two principal disagreements. First, how Wittgenstein uses "S", and "the sensation" at 258, and second, whether 258 is meant to be an example of "a private language".

Let's start with the first. Do you agree that "S" is supposed to signify, or be "the name of" whatever it is which is described as recurring? This is not only consistent with, but very clearly what he is talking about in the context, i.e. 256, 257. He is talking about establishing a direct relationship between a name and a sensation, and that's what's meant, and described at 258, establishing a direct relationship between a sensation, and its name "S", by giving that sensation a name, "S".

So, from the first person perspective which Wittgenstein provides us at 258, we have a recurring 'thing' (whether type or token is irrelevant here), we have "S" as the sign, or name of this thing, and we have the person referring to this thing as "the sensation", in telling us about the thing he has named "S".

Do we have agreement on this, or not?

I think that if we cannot come to some agreement on this fundamental understanding as to what Wittgenstein is giving us as his example, there is no point in going further. We'd have such completely different ideas about what is going on in that example, that any discussion of the example would be completely pointless. Accordingly, discussion of our second principal disagreement, whether this is meant to be an example of "a private language" or not, is pointless until we have agreement as to what has been given to us in the example.

If you don't agree with what I propose above, there is still another possibility for agreement. We could simply agree that the example is ambiguous. If we agree on that, then we can conclude that discussion of the second disagreement will be fruitless, and therefore unnecessary, because there is no correct understanding due to the ambiguity.

What do you say?

This is not how Wittgenstein dictates the example. He associates "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S" and writes the sign "S" in a calendar for every day on which he has the sensation. — Luke

You are not grasping this correctly. He does not associate "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S". "The recurrence of a certain sensation" is a phrase of language. This is not what he marks with an "S", but he uses this phrase to describe to us what he marks with an "S". He has something (private) which he signifies with "S". He is telling us (publicly) about this activity of marking in the diary, with that phrase, and is calling it (the thing signified by S) "the sensation". Therefore this phrase, "the recurrence of a certain sensation" refers to the thing he is signifying by marking with an "S", as does "the sensation", not vise versa.

What definition of a private language are you using? Earlier you said you agreed to Wittgenstein's description of a private language that he gives at 243: — Luke

Yes that's the one, 243: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be
known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language".

The example at 258 is not such a "private language" because he explicitly states: "Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." He is talking about "a diary", and "a certain sensation", He is not using words which another person cannot understand. Nor is he even attempting to do such. He is arguing that the concept of a private language doesn't even make sense, words are already public, by the nature of what words are, they exist in the context of other words which provide grammar (257), so it doesn't even make sense to speak of words which another person can't understand.

It's not at all accurate to say that the demonstration at 258 is an example of a private language, nor is it an attempt at exemplifying a private language.

We don't know what "S" refers to, so how is it not private? — Luke

It's not private because we have a public word which refers to the thing named "S", it is "sensation". But you can't seem to get the referencing right. The issue though, which Wittgenstein brings up, is are we justified in using this word.

If he applies it to whatever he wants, then he is not applying it only to his immediate private sensations, as per the description of a private language at 243. — Luke

I know, it's not an example of a private language. How many times do I have to demonstrate this to you? See, "private sensations" is a public concept, and it is the confines of that public concept which restricts the way that he may use the name. So even the idea of "private language", as described, is self-refuting, as nonsensical. Why would the person with the supposed private language be restricted only to naming private sensations with that language? If "private language" made any sort of sense we couldn't say that this language would be restricted by any conceptions imposed by the confines of our public language. It couldn't be restricted at all. But then how could it be a language?

So you're saying that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something — and that is all that can be said? — Luke

Sorry, I just can't help you. I don't know what you're asking.

It is "S" which supposedly refers to the sensation, not the sensation which refers to "S". — Luke

That is how Wittgenstein dictates the example. There is "a certain sensation" which is signified with "S". Then Wittgenstein refers to this sensation as "the sensation". So, in the demonstration "the sensation" refers to a particular sensation which has been named with "S". You can't change the way the demonstration has been written just because you don't like it, or it's "not how English works" in your opinion.

He tries his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario based on the assumptions of the private language advocate without it turning into a public language. He does not succeed, but that's the point. — Luke

He does not "try his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario". He already knows that as impossible, so he is depicting something different. He is depicting a private game (though he doesn't call it a game) within the context of a public language. He starts with the premise of "a certain sensation", a public name, and he assumes that thing which is described by the public word "sensation" is something private.

That is why there is two layers of representation, "the sensation" refers to "a certain sensation signified with S", and this refers to what we know not, something private. But to understand the context, and therefore the meaning of the demonstration, you need to order the layers correctly, because each layer opens up a wider context. So, naming something with S is the immediate, direct description of what the person is doing. Referring to that named thing with "the sensation": is the way that the person is describing that activity to us. So this, describing the thing as a sensation, is less immediate and therefore a wider context. The fact that he in no way points to, or otherwise signifies the thing which "the sensation" refers to (as this is meant to be private), leaves "the sensation" as ambiguous.

What would be an example of a private language? — Luke

One cannot give an example of a private language, because "give an example" is something already public. You are just giving a person an impossible (self-contradicting) task by asking for this. It is the same issue as to why the type/token distinction is not applicable to Wittgenstein's demonstration. A "token", under the confines of the type/token distinction is necessarily an example of a type. And "a type" is something public, being limited by rules, or criteria.

If Wittgenstein wanted to portray a private language, he would have to remove the naming of a thing from the confines of these public rules, to make it something private. He'd have to name a thing without naming it as a member (token) of a type, because that would put it within a public language.

He doesn't do this. The premise states: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." So the thing is clearly named in the context of a type (public language). Therefore the idea of a private naming has already been defeated by the premise. However, he proceeds to show that since the thing named is hidden from the public (kept private), it cannot be a token or example of a type. The ambiguity as to why the thing is not a token of a public language throws you off. It is not as you seem to think, that the naming is an act of a private language, which makes it that the thing cannot be a token of "sensation", it is the case that the thing named is kept private, and cannot serve as an example, which makes it so that it cannot be a token.

You did not seem to grasp this the last time I brought it up. A token is an example of a type. A type is public, and an example of a type must be public as well, only being "a token" in relation to the conception of the type. The thing named with "S", though it is stipulated by the person naming it, as a member of a type, is held private by that person, and therefore cannot serve as an example (token) of that type. The thing cannot be considered as a token of a public language, because the thing itself is held private. This is not an example of a private language because that would require that the naming of the thing would be held private. It is impossible to exemplify such a thing.

A true "private language" would require that the naming of the thing be private. Wittgenstein does not keep the naming of thing private, he only keeps the thing private. The result is the problem of justification. But this is not at all an example of a private language, it is an example of naming a private thing through the use of public language, and this is meant to portray what commonly occurs in language use. It is not meant to portray a private language, which is something which does not occur.

You already said this was denied at 258. Your position at 261 is that we are looking to justify that "sensation" fits what the person has. — Luke

Yes, this is the switch in perspective which I described to you. At 258, from the first person perspective, the use of "S" cannot be justified "there is no right here"; "I" can apply S to whatever I want. But at 261, from the perspective of the observers, "we", that the thing named with "S" has been called a "sensation" and this needs to be justified.

These are the two layers of representation described above. The first layer is naming something with "S". The second layer is the person claiming that the thing named as S is a sensation, thereby referring to the thing as "the sensation". The first is portrayed as a private act, but it is not an activity of a private language, because according to the parameters of the example, the person already apprehends the thing as a "sensation", which is the word of a public language. The second layer, the use of the public word "sensation" to refer to the thing, requires justification.

How is what you said different to what I said? I said that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use. You just repeated it back after saying it's not true. — Luke

Consider that the person could be using "S" completely privately without knowing that "S" refers to something which we would call a "sensation". The use of "S" could be completely private, yet from our perspective, "S" refers to a sensation. That is the difference.

You have reversed the layers of representation so that "the sensation" is between "S" and the object named. This makes it so that "S" cannot have a private use without excluding "the sensation". But this is an improper representation of the layers. When properly represented, "S" refers directly to the object, and "a sensation" is a description of that object. Then we can portray the private application of "S' to an object, and allow that this object may or may not be a sensation. That is why our use of "sensation" to describe this object needs to be justified.

Once again, "sensation" is not ambiguous given the context, as it clearly refers to an "inner experience" such as pain. It doesn't seem sensible for it to have any other meaning. Only "S" or the type of sensation denoted by "S" might be considered ambiguous or vague. — Luke

Good, we finally have agreement, "the sensation", referring to the particular sensation named "S" is ambiguous.

Now we can ask whether this ambiguity is intentional or not. In any attempt to understand the meaning of an ambiguous passage of writing, it is necessary to determine whether the ambiguity is intentional or not. It seems obvious to me that in this case it is intentional, as it is meant to be this way for the purpose of the demonstration. Do you agree?

What definition of a private language are you using? — Luke

The definition you stated, referring to 243. The demonstration of 258 is not an example of a "private language" according to the description of 243, for the reasons I explained.

258 is a kind of reductio ad absurdum, where Wittgenstein attempts to play along with the private language advocate only to show that their assumptions lead to an impossible conclusion. It is not Wittgenstein contradicting himself, but the idea of a private language contradicting itself. — Luke

There is no contradiction, 258 is simply not an example of a private language. It is only if you think it is supposed to be an example of a private language that the appearance of contradiction arises. But that's only because the example is not consistent with the description of "private language".

He notes at 261 that "sensation" cannot be a word of a private language because it is "a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me." — Luke

Right, so it is very clear, that at 258, where Wittgenstein proceeds to name "a certain sensation" with "S", this is not an example of a private language. What is being named with "S" is "a sensation", and "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore this is not an example of a private language

So the example at 258 is already set up within the bounds of common language, to talk about something which is being referred to through the use of common language as a certain sensation. Therefore it is impossible that this is an example of a private language.

When he goes on to say: "And it would not help either to say it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something," he is talking about "Something" as being a lesser claim than a "sensation". The private linguist may accept that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, as Wittgenstein notes, however he may try to respond that "S" could still refer to "something" (not nothing), even if it is does not refer to a sensation. Wittgenstein is saying that it would not help to make the lesser claim that "S" refers to "something" instead of a "sensation", either. This is because ""has" and "something" also belong to our common language". Just like "sensation", "something" is also "a word of our common language which is not a language intelligible only to me." — Luke

This is totally confused, and going in the wrong direction. Wittgenstein never says "'S' cannot refer to a sensation", nor is this implied. That explicitly contradicts the premise of the demonstration, that the diarist is using "S" to name a certain sensation, as I've already told you.

I think you need to pay closer attention to the subtleties of the demonstration. Notice that at 258, the author, Wittgenstein, is providing the first person perspective: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." Then by 261 he switches to the third person perspective "when he writes "S", he has something". This switch is not accidental.

It is demonstrated at 258, that from the first person perspective, the use of "S" need not be justified.: "whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." There is no such thing as the diarist justifying his use of "S" in naming something, because he can use "S" however he wants, to name whatever he wants. That's the way Wittgenstein set up the example.

Now proceed to 261. The author of the demonstration, Wittgenstein, has switched places. He is no longer the diarist, but is now an observer, one of us, or "we", and he refers to the diarist as "he". From this perspective, that the thing named with "S" is "a sensation" needs to be justified. This is because "sensation" is a word of the public language, and therefore has meaning within such a language game. We are no longer concerned with how the judgement is made whereby something is judged as fitting the name "S", we are concerned with whether the thing which has been given the name "S" qualifies as a "sensation".

So the diarist has said at 258, 'I am naming something "S"', and naming this thing this way is his own little private language game. No justification is required for this simple private game of naming something with "S". However, since the diarist has said that the thing named is a "sensation", and "sensation" is a word from a public game, then from the perspective of the people in that game, 'us', or 'we', the diarist needs to justify the assertion that the thing called "S" is a sensation.

You appear to be considering it a matter of course that the person is making a note of something, despite what Wittgenstein says here. — Luke

It is not a matter of course, but it is stipulated by the parameters of the demonstration. From the first person perspective, 258, it is stipulated that the diarist is making a note of something. That is a premise of the example, so it cannot be otherwise, and we cannot ignore this.

However, when Wittgenstein switches to the third person perspective, he has to allow that from the perspective of the observers, within the example, it is possible that the diarist is completely lying, and there is absolutely nothing which "S" refers to, he is using the symbol in a completely random way. This is why justification is required. The diarist has claimed 'I have a sensation which i am calling S". That the diarist has something, and that the something is a sensation needs to be justified.

At 258 Wittgenstein asks us to imagine that he keeps a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation that he associates with the sign "S". He can only be talking about the diarist's use of "S" at 261. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation"… in the imagined scenario at 258? — Luke

You are not abiding by the switch in perspective. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation". Notice "we"? He is no longer talking about the diarists use of "S", he is talking about our use of "S", as indicated by "we". "Sensation" is our word, in our language game, and if we want to allow "S" into our game, as the name of a sensation, that the thing called S is a sensation must be justified.

If it is "well established at 258" that the use of "S" cannot be justified, then why would we need to justify the use of "S" at 261? — Luke

The use of "S" in the private game (258) cannot be justified. But when 'we' (the public) refer to 'his' use of "S", saying that "S" is the sign of a sensation (261), where "sensation" is a word of our language, then justification is required.

The key to understanding the demonstration, which you are not getting, is that when we switch to the perspective of the observers, 'we', it is not a question of whether his use of S is justified, it is a question of whether our use of "sensation", to refer to the thing which he has named S is justified. That is why the first question is whether there is even "something" which the name refers to.

Wittgenstein poo poos the idea that the private linguist could have something (if not a sensation). But, assuming you are correct, what do you view as Wittgenstein's supposed reason for stating that "something" cannot be justified as a sensation? — Luke

If I claim that I am using "S" to refer to a certain sensation, and you ask me to justify this claim, that the thing I am calling S is a sensation, how is proving that there is something which S refers to, justification for the claim that the thing is a sensation?

Surely the private linguist has their own rule for the use of "S". Otherwise, how do they recognise the same thing as "S" again each time? How do they use "S" in the same manner each time? Surely the use of "S" is at least intelligible to the user of "S". If "S" denotes a different type of thing each time, what purpose could that possibly serve? — Luke

No, the possibility of a private rule is denied by Wittgenstein. To think of oneself as following a rule, does not mean that the person is actually following a rule. So whatever means the diarist uses to judge the occurrence of a sensation as qualifying for the name "S", it cannot be a rule. That is why we cannot talk about "right" here. According to Wittgenstein there can be no rule being followed here, therefore no such thing as the "right" judgement.

So all these points you raise, are from Wittgenstein's perspective, unanswerable, and therefore ought not be asked in that way. These questions get approached from the third person perspective outlined at 261. We look for justification that S actually names a sensation.

Perhaps "disallow" is not the right word, but Wittgenstein shows at 261 that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use. — Luke

This is not true. What is shown is that the diarist's claim 'S refers to a sensation' remains unjustified (i.e. no such thing as correct or incorrect use) so long as the use of "S" remains private. The problem though is that the diarist already steps outside the bounds of a "private language", by using "sensation" to say what "S" refers to, because "sensation" is a word of public language. So the diarist has already gone beyond private use with this claim. "Private use" and "private language" are two distinct things.

The Good manifests itself as Beauty. Man craves Beauty. But when he comes to see Beauty itself, he really sees the Good, which is within himself. This is why he becomes able to give birth to things that are beautiful, good, and true. You can’t give birth to things from outside yourself, giving birth, producing, or creating is always from within. — Apollodorus

This is not consistent with what is written at 206. What people crave is the good, and there is no mention of "Beauty" at this particular section of the discussion.

"In a word then, love is wanting to possess the good forever" Symp. 206a.

Then Diotima proceeds to describe Beauty as something godly:

Now no one can possibly give birth in anything ugly; only in something beautiful. That's because when a man and a woman come together in order to give birth. this is a godly affair. Pregnancy, reproduction---this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do, and it cannot occur in anything that is out of harmony, but ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly. Beauty, however, is in harmony with the Divine. Therefore the goddess who presides at childbirth---she's called Moira or Eilithuia---is really Beauty. — The Symposium 206 c-d

It is very evident that there is a separation made here by Plato, between the mortal animal's (man's) wanting to possess the good, and Beauty, which is godly. Hence the conclusion:

"'You see, Socrates', she said, 'What Love wants is not Beauty as you think it is."

What you don't seem to grasp Apollodorus, is the proper relationship between these two, love, as the desire to possess the good forever (immortality), and Beauty, which is the actualized immortality, made real by reproduction. What Plato goes on to explain, is that the actual immortality, which is reproduction, and the real presence of Beauty, manifests itself in the animals as a sort of disease, called Love. This drives them to do all sorts of "sick" things for intercourse, and to nurture and protect their young.

So you have the relationship backward. The Good does not manifest itself as Beauty, Beauty, as the Divine, manifests itself as a desire for the good. What is important to understand here, why this inversion is the reality, is the role of Necessity. There is no necessary relationship which would make the desire for the good necessarily cause the existence of something beautiful. The desire for intercourse, for example, does not necessarily bring about birth. So we cannot say that childbirth (which is beautiful), is the necessary result of the mortal desire for intercourse. Therefore we cannot say that Beauty is the manifestation of the good. We are lacking the required necessity. On the other hand, if we posit Beauty as the cause of love, and the mortal desire for intercourse, we have a necessary relationship, and therefore the mortal desire for the good can be apprehended as the manifestation of Beauty.

I think this point is important if one is to understand the supposed causal role of the Forms. The Form is prior to the material manifestation. The material manifestation is what we know and accept scientifically as "reality", the behaviour of animals and stuff like that; but the Forms are prior to this, as the true cause of that behaviour. That's why the cave dwellers just see the material manifestation as reality, when that material "reality" is really just a reflection, or representation, being what has been caused by the true reality of the Forms.

Accordingly, the point Plato is making is that many beauties lead to one Beauty and Beauty leads to its source which is the Good. — Apollodorus

So this is really the opposite of what Plato indicates in "The Symposium". The true source is Beauty, as the Divine. Then the good is the means by which the mortal animals relate to the Divine. "The good" for Plato is fixed to desire, as the object which is needed, wanted, the end, represented here as immortality. And this reality, that human animals have desires, needs and wants, is a manifestation of the Divine, Beauty, which is the cause of it. The desire for the good is a manifestation of, i.e. caused by, the Divine Form, Beauty.

So what you describe here is the process of learning, the logical process, which is established on the basis of logical priority, but it is actually a reversal of the temporal priority of causation. We see many beauties, and this leads logically to a necessity to assume one Beauty, and the one Beauty appears as if it must be temporally, or causally prior to the many beauties. But it occurs as an unintelligible dilemma, as to how the one Form, Beauty, could be the cause of the many beauties. This dilemma is only resolved by placing "the good" (love and the desire for the good, described as immortality), as the medium between the many beauties and the one Beauty. Then the one Beauty may be apprehended as the cause of many beauties, through the intermediary, which is the desire for the good. This is why "the good" is the fundamental principle, because it allows us to apprehend the Forms as causally active.

Eventually, we realize the beauty of the knowledge-holder, the soul itself, and we understand that the source of all knowledge is intelligence which is the essence of life in general, and of our soul in particular. — Apollodorus

Again, this displays your backward approach. You completely misrepresent "intelligence". The source of all knowledge is not intelligence, intelligence is the product of knowledge. The source of knowledge is the desire for the good, the desire for immortality, which is a manifestation of the Divine Form, Beauty. As the Form Beauty is the cause of that desire for the good.

Personally, I think the “problem” is artificial and stems from reading Plato through an Aristotelian or Christian Platonist lens. I am taking the traditional Platonic view here. — Apollodorus

The problem here, is that your "traditional Platonic" view is an off-shoot, a perspective which is not consistent with Aristotle and the majority of western readers of Plato (Christian Platonists). So we have a relatively small group of so-called traditional Platonists, who adhered to the Pythagorean principles which Plato actually rejected, and directed Aristotle away from, such as yourself, and you claim to have the true Platonic metaphysics. However, as evidenced above, this off-shoot is just a misunderstanding of Plato.

Why do you need this question to be answered in the context of 258? — Luke

The question does not need to be answered. The point is that with no way of knowing what "the sensation" refers to, we can conclude that it is used ambiguously. And if the ambiguity is judged as intentional (and I believe it can be), then we need to determine what he is doing with this ambiguity, in order to understand what he is demonstrating with the example.

In other words, if we judge the ambiguity as intentional, then we conclude that the question of what the thing is which "the sensation called S" refers to, cannot be answered, as I explained to you already. Then to understand the meaning of the passage we need to determine what Wittgenstein intended to do with that ambiguity.

oes "C" have only a private use? No one else but the diarist is supposed to know what "S" refers to.

However, I know what "chair" refers to, because you have defined it as "a seat for one person". And I know what "sensation" refers to in Wittgenstein's scenario because he talks about it in the context of "inner experiences" and "pain". — Luke

"C" in my example has the same use as "S" has in Wittgenstein's example. The fact that you claim to know what "S" refers to in Wittgenstein's example, as "a sensation", indicates that Wittgenstein is not giving us an example of a "private language". Remember, as I explained to you, 258 is not an example of a "private language" as you define it. A true "private language" in that sense, could not be described like that, using words of common language, like "sensation". It is impossible for Wittgenstein to give an example of a "private language" as you define it, because that would be unintelligible to us, so he gives us an example of something different; "S" is the sign for a certain sensation, but no one knows what that sensation is.

So the scenario he sets up at 258 is not a "private language". It is a supposed situation where a person has named something (a sensation in this case) with a symbol, and according to what is described at 257, Wittgenstein wants to examine how the person would establish a relationship between a particular thing (the sensation), and the symbol. It is concluded that this is unintelligible, as "private".

The type of sensation that "S" refers to is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point. "S" has a private use so you can imagine any type of sensation you like. It makes no difference. Moreover, Wittgenstein proceeds to establish that the diarist cannot rely on the public word "sensation", so "S" cannot name a sensation anyway. — Luke

You seem to be missing the fact that Wittgenstein is making a demonstration, he is giving us an example for the purpose of demonstrating something. Therefore we need to consider the big picture, what he is trying to demonstrate. That's what we learn from experience of studying much philosophy, how to determine what the person is trying to demonstrate.

We definitely cannot say, as you do, "the type of sensation that 'S' refers to is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point", because Wittgenstein has clearly taken steps to set up this scenario intentionally. And since expressions like "a certain sensation", and "the sensation" are very deliberately employed at 258, we must respect the reality of this situation, that this is very significant to Wittgenstein's point.

What you propose, "so 'S' cannot name a sensation anyway", directly contradicts what Wittgenstein says in the example, that "S" is the sign for a sensation, therefore we must reject your proposal. The problem appears to be that you believe Wittgenstein is giving an example of a "private language", when he is not, because this is impossible, so you can only support your belief by contradicting what Wittgenstein actually wrote. Therefore your belief is incorrect.

He doesn't say "all we can say is that he has something." He says: "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something."

That is, according to Wittgenstein at 261, we cannot say that the diarist has Something. — Luke

I believe you are misreading this. He is talking about justifying the use of the word "sensation" here. He is saying "it would not help", (in relation to the attempt to justify this use), to point out that when he writes "S" he has "something" which "S" refers to. This is simply due to the obvious, saying that it is "something" doesn't justify calling it a "sensation".

That is, according to Wittgenstein at 261, we cannot say that the diarist has Something. — Luke

He does not say that we "cannot" say this. He says that it would not help, either, in the attempt to justify the use of "sensation", to say that he "has something". Therefore he says that saying this does not help (in relation to the attempt to justify the use of "sensation").

We cannot say that he has something. Wittgenstein shows us that the diarist fails to establish a use of "S" by inwardly associating it with a particular sensation. — Luke

You are stuck in your faulty representation of 261 which I pointed out to you earlier. What needs to be justified, according to Wittgenstein, is the use of "sensation" here. He has already shown at 258 that the use of "S' by the diarist cannot be justified, there is no "right" here.

The diarist has a use of "S", that cannot be denied, because it is stipulated by Wittgenstein's example. Therefore your claim that the diarist "fails to establish a use of 'S'" is false. What Wittgenstein claims, is that whatever criteria, or principles which the person applies in making the judgement of "S", they cannot be understood or described by words. This is the "private" part. It is simply the person's memory, and the application of "private" judgement which cannot be described in words, because we describe things in terms of rules, and this is not a matter of following rules. This "private" aspect of language we cannot describe, so even metaphorical, or analogous description, such as 'it's sort of like rules' or "impressions of rules", are not really useful according to Wittgenstein:

259. Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?—
The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression
of a balance.

Therefore you need to respect the fact that he is asking a question at 260, when he asks did the man make a note of "nothing". He is not stating that "S" signifies nothing. The parameters of the example stipulate that "S" signifies something, so this would be contradictory. However, he has set up the example with so much ambiguity as to what "S" signifies, that it might appear like "S" could signify nothing. That is why, in our attempt to answer the guessing game, what "S" signifies, we must first rule out the possibility that "S" signifies nothing.

Remember how I treated your example of "bank". You set up the example of "bank", with intentional ambiguity so as to make an example of ambiguity. Because this ambiguity was intentional, I could say that "bank" in your example referred to neither the financial establishment, nor the side of the river. Because you intended "bank" to be ambiguous, it actually referred to neither. However, this does not mean that "bank" has no meaning in your example. The meaning is ambiguous. But you refused to accept "ambiguous" as meaning.

What is (further) explained at 265 is that the private use of "S" is not justified, since "justification consists in appealing to an independent authority." — Luke

According to my translation, this is incorrect. What I have is "—But justification consists in appealing to something independent."

Furthermore, we are not talking about justifying the use of "S" here. That is the misunderstanding which I dealt with already. It is well established at 258, that the use of "S" cannot be justified. So we must drop this notion at that time. Now, proceeding onward he is talking about justifying 'our' use of "sensation" to refer to what the diarist signifies with "S", not the diarist's use of "S".

The example stipulates that the diarist, Wittgenstein himself, has classed the thing which "S" refers to as "a sensation". Since "sensation" is a word of public language (261), we need to justify that the thing which "S" refers to is a token (to use your word) of the type, sensation. It is asserted by the diarist that it is, but this does not justify it.

Wittgenstein disallows the private use of "S" to name a sensation because "sensation" is "a word of our common language". But Wittgenstein also disallows "that when he writes "S" he has Something" for the same reason - because "has" and "something" are also words of our common (public) language. — Luke

Again, this is a bad interpretation. We cannot say that Wittgenstein "disallows" such. He is saying that use of these public words needs to be justified, he is not disallowing them. Obviously the claim that he has "something" does not justify the claim that "the something" is a sensation.

This is the guessing game I described to you. The person has named a thing, "S", and this naming is private to the person. Whatever method the person employs when attaching the name to the thing is completely private, as not being a matter of following a rule, and so it is unintelligible to us. So the person cannot justify the use of "S", that has been ruled out. Therefore, we are given the task of 'guessing' what "S" refers to. The first possibility to rule out, is that "S" refers to nothing (260).

However, we can rule out this possibility based on what is stipulated in the example. The demonstration stipulates that the person is using "S" to signify "a certain sensation". Therefore the proposal that he has "nothing", can be ruled out as contrary to the premises. Next, Wittgenstein wants us to justify "sensation", that what he has is a sensation. That we've ruled out nothing, and assume that the person has something, does not necessitate the conclusion that what the person has is a sensation.

Once again, we can turn to the parameters of the example, it is stipulated that what the person has is a "sensation". But this is where it gets complicated. The word "sensation" implies that there is an object sensed, as I explained. If there is nothing sensed, no source of the sensation, then it is not a real sensation, and we're back to nothing. But this is not what is stipulated, it is stipulated that there is a sensation. Therefore we can conclude that there is an object sensed, a source or cause of the sensation. That there is a sensation implies that there is something sensed, and like the example of the chair, the something sensed is the "something independent", which serves to justify the use of "sensation". If there is nothing sensed we cannot call it a sensation, the use of "S" would be a fiction.

You have misread if you think Wittgenstein allows the use of "S" to name Something, and you are wrong that what "S" refers to "must be something". The entire point is that a private language is not possible. — Luke

Obviously, it is you who has misread. The demonstration is set up very clearly so that "S" is the sign of a sensation. This is very deliberate and explicitly stipulated. You want to turn back on the premises of the demonstration, and deny the principle premise, saying that Wittgenstein disallows such a use. But this would be blatant contradiction. Instead, we must accept what is shown at 258, as Wittgenstein's word on this matter. He shows that the person can use "S", in the way described, but there is no such thing as "right" here. The person uses "S" according to some judgement which is private (not by a public rule), so the person's use of "S" cannot be judged as to whether the rule is followed or not.

What you are claiming, that Wittgenstein disallows such a use of "S", certainly contradicts the premises of Wittgenstein's demonstration.

The "separation" is only apparent. What Plato means is that Beauty is an expression of the Good. It cannot be otherwise as the Form of the Good contains all the Forms that participate in it. By pursuing Beauty, the philosopher arrives at the Good. This is the true meaning of Diotima's instruction. — Apollodorus

I've told you a number of times now, "the good" as Plato uses this, is not a Form. This idea seems to really skew the way that you read Plato, resulting in your misunderstanding of Symposium 206. The passage is very explicit. It is said that Love wants the good. Then it is said: "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'." Clearly what is described is a separation between Beauty and the good.

Similarly, individual intelligences are made of the same stuff as the Creative Intelligence. It doesn't mean that they are identical with it in all respects. — Apollodorus

But this is wrong, and a problem which philosophers have grappled with for millennia. It is well described by Aquinas. The human intellect is deficient because of its dependency on the material body. The supposed Creative Intelligence has no dependence on material existence, being prior to it. Therefore individual intelligences cannot be made of the same stuff as the Creator Intelligence.

If you think you have to guess what "sensation" means then you have missed the surrounding context.

If you think it's necessary to guess what type of sensation he means, then you don't understand the purpose of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language.
— Luke

We've been through this so many times now that I can't count them. The issue is not what "sensation" means. The question is what does "the sensation" refers to in the context of 258.

Saying that he identifies it as an internal experience shows that you know how he is using the word. — Luke

Knowing that a sensation is an internal experience, as defined by Wittgenstein, does not tell me what he is referring to with "the sensation". Yes, "the sensation" is supposed to refer to a sensation, which is an internal experience, as defined, but knowing this does not indicate to me, the particular which "the sensation" refers to.

Suppose I define "chair" as a seat for one person. Then I tell you that I have named a certain chair "C". And then I proceed to talk about "the chair" named C, without telling you any of its identifying features, only that it is a chair. How can you not see that there is ambiguity with respect to what "the chair named C" refers to. Suppose I asked you to bring me the chair named C, so I could sit on it, because it's my favourite chair. How would you know which chair is named C?

This is why I call it a guessing game. Wittgenstein is saying, that there are many different things, which go by the name "internal experience", further, many of these are called "sensations". Now, out of these many things called sensations, I have taken one and named it "S". Then he leaves it completely ambiguous (a guessing game if you will), as to which sensation is the one which he has named S.

At 261 he questions calling "S" the sign for a sensation. There is no such “answer” given. — Luke

The answer is at 270, that's why I said the answer is given "eventually".

And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here?
Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,—
And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time?
Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

Regardless, you haven't explained what this has to do with the private language argument. — Luke

Yes I have, but you haven't been paying attention. At 258, Wittgenstein leaves it ambiguous as to whether "the sensation" as an internal experience, refers to the sensation itself, or the source of the sensation (what I called the thing sensed), as both are internal in sensations like pain. In the case of the chair, the thing sensed is external, so the separation between the sensation and the thing sensed is obvious. At 261 he makes it clear, when he says all we can say is that he has something, that "something" here must refer to the source, rather than the sensation itself. This is because if there was no source (or cause) of the sensation, we could not say that he had anything, the sensation would be completely fictitious. We could not say that he has any sensation

What makes it not fictitious is that there is an object, a thing being sensed. Otherwise we could not say that he has something, because he might have nothing, and be naming nothing with "S", i.e. using S randomly.

So, as I explained in the other post, he makes a switch at 261, so that "S" refers to the object, the thing sensed, rather than the sensation itself, from this point onward. That's why it's very important to understand the ambiguity, in order to understand the so-called private language argument, and why the "switch" is made. From 261 onward "S" does not refer to the sensation itself anymore (if it ever did, because that was ambiguous in the first place), it refers to the object being sensed, the source, or cause of the sensation. This "switch", is what allows his use of "S" to be justified, as explained at 265. That there is an object sensed, or that there is a source, or cause of the sensation is what justifies the use So at 270 "S" might simply refer to his blood pressure.

Actually, he says "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something." — Luke

Right, this exemplifies the ambiguity he has employed. The use of "sensation" needs to be justified because nothing has indicated to us, that "S" actually refers to something we would call "a sensation". It has not been justified, that whatever it is which is being called by "S" is a token of sensation, that has simply been asserted, S is a certain sensation. So, it does not help, as a means of justification, to say that he must have "something". This is because we still do not know what it is which is referred to as "S", that was left ambiguous, and remains ambiguous. That it must be something does not justify that it is a sensation. And if it's nothing it's totally fictitious, and still not a sensation.

The particular something is identified, as "a certain sensation". — Luke

Uh-huh, just like I can identify a particular colour, as "a certain colour". It might be good for a guessing game, but not too good for philosophy

Is that the real ambiguity? You keep saying that the type-token distinction is irrelevant here, except where it suits you to say that the type-token distinction is the main problem here. — Luke

There is no type/token distinction here, only a distinction between a type and a particular object. The reason why a type/token distinction is insufficient in Wittgenstein's example is that "a token" is necessarily a representative of a type, and Wittgenstein wants to avoid this necessity. That's why he asks at 261, what reason do we have for calling this a sensation. And the answer, eventually, is that it's a sensation because that's what it's called. At this point it becomes a token of a type, when "sensation" is justified. but prior to this, Wittgenstein intends that we just recognize it as a particular. But he has to give it some identity as an internal experience, to be able to even lay out his example, so he just calls it a sensation. The hidden thing must be referred to, in order to set up the guessing game.

The diarist is supposedly naming a type of "certain sensation" with the use of "S". This means that "S" is the type and its tokens are also called "S", being instances of the type. The "objects" of inner experiences can only be tokens or instances of the type "S". The type "S" cannot be an object, token or instance itself because it is only a conceptual category. — Luke

This doesn't make any sense to me. As I said "certain sensation" and "the sensation" can only refer to a particular to me. Yet you insist it can only refer to a type. Therefore any reasonable person would conclude ambiguity. I don't know why you're being so unreasonable, insisting that it is not ambiguous.

It seems that, in the case of pain, pain is both the thing sensed and the sensation. — Luke

This is ambiguous though. The "thing sensed" is the wound, injury, or whatever it is which is the source of the pain. If you say "pain" refers to both, the sensation which we call "pain", and the injury which is the source of the pain, you may be charged with equivocating.

If you deny that there is a thing sensed, as the source of the pain, then you deny the reality and objectivity of the sensation which is called "pain". The sensation of "pain" would be completely imaginary. This is what I tried to explain to you earlier, but you refused to attempt to understand the metaphysics.

You still refuse to attempt to understand this. But I've made clear the distinction for you, so if you continue to insist that "pain" refers to both the sensation, and the injury, or source of the pain, I will continue to insist that you equivocate.

"Something" doesn't refer to the source of the pain; it doesn't really refer to anything. — Luke

Come on Luke, you must see how ridiculous this looks. Wittgenstein explicitly says, "He has something", and this is what he means, that there is something which is being referred to. We can either say that "the sensation" has a real source, or it is imaginary. If it's imaginary we can't say that he has something, because he made it up, therefore he would not really be sensing anything and there would be no sensation being referred to. Therefore "something" must refer to the fact that there is a source of the sensation.

It makes no sense for you to try and say that it isn't anything. That's explicitly contrary to what Wittgenstein said. What he has explicitly done, is create the highest degree of ambiguity possible, a guessing game where the intent is to remove the thing referred to from any category of type whatsoever. Ever play "twenty questions"? That's the type of guessing game we're into here. The thing referred to must be something in particular, something definite, so the person cannot just make it up as the game proceeds.

I would concur that at 258 he is talking about "a certain sensation", and, yes, the sensation itself. However, I would not agree that this sensation is "pain". Wittgenstein does not specify what type of sensation it is. — Luke

Right, that's why it's ambiguous, and just like a guessing game. I have a sensation named "S". I cannot show it to you, therefore it cannot be a token (example) of a type. Can you guess what type it is? See, he is attempting to create the highest degree of ambiguity possible.

In his dialogues, Plato uses the imagery of reflection multiple times to point either to the individual self or to the Universal Self/Ultimate Truth.

For example, in the Phaedo, he compares looking for truth in theories and arguments about things, to studying the image of the Sun reflected in water “or something of the kind” (Phaedo 99e). The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account.

The metaphor refers to one seer or cognizing subject. Hence the illustration of the mirror. What Plato is saying is that the philosopher must look at himself, i.e., at his own intelligent soul, using his own intelligence as a mirror. This is the path to self-knowledge as well as the path to knowing the Ultimate. — Apollodorus

I look at the reflection metaphor as something more specific, something more scientific. We see in the mirror image, an inversion, right is shifted to the left. So looking at a reflection does not give us a true representation, but it is so close to being true that it fools us. So while you say "The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account", I look at Plato as saying the reflection itself is not a true representation. So much of Plato's work involves informing us of ways to distinguish reflections from reality, so that we can be aware of the inversion which occurs in reflection, and not accept it as a true representation. That a reflection contains an inversion, and is therefore not a true representation is a key point.

That which “sees itself in the other” and "is the source of all knowledge", is Ultimate Reality which reflects itself in itself. The “Other” and resulting “Many” here is conceptual. When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself. — Apollodorus

Based on what I said above, I think that this is incorrect, especially the last sentence. "When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself. " There is no such thing as "reflects itself in itself". A reflection is always external to the thing reflected, so there is already an Other implied by "reflection", the thing which reflects. Otherwise there is no reflection. And, I believe this is critical to understanding Plato, because this Other is the cause of the deficiency and misunderstanding in knowledge. If we ignore the Other, then we think we have pure, true knowledge, ignoring the role of the Other, and the inversion of the reflection, thereby deceiving ourselves.

So your statement is really self-deception, which can be apprehended as self-deception when analyzed and seen as self-contradicting. The Intelligence which sees itself in the reflection must see the reflection as Other, to see the true reality, because the true reality is that the reflection is Other than itself, as it is an inversion. It's contradictory to say that the reflection of a self is itself. And if we fall for that self-deception, to think that the reflection of oneself is oneself, and not recognize that it is Other than oneself, this is self-deception.

Even when we look inward, what we call "introspection", or reflecting on one's own existence, it is imperative that we recognize a division between the outer self, and the inner self. This is why we have a dualism. To deny this division, and make the thing reflecting the very same thing as the thing reflected on, is to wrongly dissolve dualism, and fall for the illusion that the reflection is the true reality.

In the world of Being, the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, for example, is cognitively identical with the Forms and is aware of this identity. The sense of real difference only arises in the world of Becoming, where things are not perceived as different manifestations of one cognizing intelligence but as separate and independent of one another and of the cognizing subject. — Apollodorus

This is simply an unsupported speculative proposition concerning the nature of the "Creative Intelligence". As I I explained already, and exemplified with your finger/hand analogy, we have no reason to believe the Creator is an "Intelligence", just like we have no reason to believe that the unity of five fingers is a "Finger": A hand is something completely different from a finger, therefore we ought to also believe that the Creator is something completely different from an intelligence.

So you simply ignore the separation I described above, which is an essential part of "intelligence", (dividing the reflecting self, in the case of introspection, from the thing being reflected on), to say that the Creative Intelligence is identical with the Forms. But if the Creator was truly an intelligence, we'd have to respect this separation which is an essential feature of "intelligence". It is respect for this separation which creates the need for Plato's tripartite soul, and the Trinity of Christianity. The separation between the two aspects of a dualism requires a third thing which maintains the division. I believe this situation is touched on in the Parmenides.

The reality of Becoming impresses itself onto any intelligence in a way which cannot be ignored. This results in a division between the "beings" which we know, and are intelligible to us, always being contingent as the result of a becoming, and the "Being" which is assumed as prior to contingent being. This division cannot be ignored in any introspection (self reflection) as it separates the introspecting self as the activity of a contingent being, from the Being of the so-called "Creative Intelligence" (which I argue is not properly called an intelligence).

If we follow the pattern established by Plato and developed by later Platonists, we can avoid most of the misunderstandings or misinterpretations that have arisen especially in more recent times.

The relation between the Good and the Beautiful is a case in point, showing how two apparently distinct things can be ultimately one. — Apollodorus

This idea, that the Good and the Beautiful are one, is itself a misunderstanding.

It follows that, as Diotima says, love of Beauty is really love of Good (Symp. 206a): We love Beauty because it is in some sense Good. Love of Beauty is the desire not only to behold Beauty, but to hold it for ever and to manifest it in everything we do in every way we can. The Gods do not judge man by what he sees but by his actions.

Plato clearly equates Beauty with Good and with Truth — Apollodorus

This is a misrepresentation of what is presented by Plato at Symposium 206. Notice, at 206a, that the object of Love is the good. This is what Diotima gets Socrates to agree with. People love the good, and they want the good to be theirs forever. There is no mention of Beauty here. Then Diotima proceeds to discuss Beauty. Beauty is described as being consistent with the gods, harmony with all that is godlike.

So we have Aristotle's distinction here between apparent good (the good which a person loves and wants to keep forever), and what is called by A as the real good, harmony with all that is godlike, what Diotima calls "Beauty". What Plato has set up therefore, is the division between "the good", what people desireor love, and "the beautiful", what is godlike.

Now we proceed to the end of 206, where Diotima states "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'."

So the point made by Plato at 206 is actually the opposite as to what you propose. Diotima is actually establishing a separation between the good, and Beauty, and proposing that the good is what is desired and wanted by people, "loved", and this may be very inconsistent with what is beautiful, i.e. what is godlike, Beauty.

How definite do you need him to be? — Luke

Well, if he's talking about a particular item, or a particular type, referring to it as "the...", then this particular "something" ought to be identified. I mean, this is philosophy, not a guessing game. "I have a type of fruit in my bag, can you guess what type it is?"

Of course the real ambiguity is as to whether he's talking about a particular object, or what you call a type, because this is the question of Platonic realism, what sort of existence the so-called "objects" of inner experiences have. But you refuse to acknowledge this.

And it is quite possible that Wittgenstein is talking about a particular (or a particular type), and hiding the thing he is talking about from us, for the purpose of making a philosophical point, but then we must conclude that the ambiguity is intentional.

Is pain not a sensation? Or can we not sense pain? Or both? You said: — Luke

If you refuse to acknowledge a difference between the thing sensed, and the sensation, then we simply cannot go any further in this philosophical discussion. Do you apprehend a difference between the chair, as the thing sensed, and the sensation of the chair. If so, then why not recognize a difference between the thing sensed, and the sensation, in the case of pain?

Suppose we assign "pain" to the sensation itself. We still need a thing sensed, let's say the thing sensed is a wound, or an injury, what I'll call the source of the pain. Can we discuss Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument while maintaining this distinction, without conflating the two in ambiguity? Would you agree, that at 261, when he says "he has something", what the word "something" refers to here, is not the sensation, but the thing sensed, the source of the pain? Would you concur, that at 258 he is talking about the sensation itself, which we call "pain", but at 261 he switches and proceeds from this point onward to refer to the thing sensed (the source of the pain). If a person is not careful in one's reading, one might think that the "something" here is the sensation itself, rather than the source of the sensation.

In terms of the type-token distinction, the type is “a certain sensation”.

How definite do you need him to be? What more information do you need and why do you need it?

Let’s assume that instead of “a certain sensation” Wittgenstein had said that the diarist has “a certain fruit”. Then you would complain that Wittgenstein was using the word “fruit” ambiguously because he does not tell us what type of fruit it is. And if he said it was an apple you would then complain that he doesn’t tell us what type of apple it is, etc. How far does Wittgenstein need to go before you are satisfied that he is no longer being ambiguous, vague, unclear or indefinite? . — Luke

Luke, if he says "a certain type of fruit", then the type of fruit is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he says "a certain type of apple", then the type of apple is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he is saying "a certain type of sensation" then the type of sensation is left unidentified and this is ambiguous.

There is nothing unclear in the first place about what he means by “fruit” or what he means by “sensation”. If there is, then you need to be more exact about what you mean by “definite” and tell us: At what level of detail does it stop being “indefinite” and become “definite”? Otherwise you face the same charge of “ambiguity” in your use of the word “definite”. — Luke

I don't believe you can be so persistent in your ignorance of Wittgenstein's use of "the".

You’ll need to remind me why you think this is nonsense. — Luke

No, I will not do that, because you totally ignored me the last time, saying you refuse to follow any metaphysics. Until you change your attitude I will not waste my time.

Okay, we sense sensations. What’s your point? — Luke

No, this is not an acceptable relation between sense and sensation. Sensations are the result of sensing, and they are apprehended by the conscious mind. Sensations are not what is sensed. So you have things backward. Sorry Luke, but I see no attempt by you to demonstrate what I asked for.

The particular type has been identified - as "a certain sensation". What's your definition of "definite"? — Luke

Definite: clear and distinct, not vague..

If you don't see "a certain sensation" as indefinite and ambiguous, I don't think I can help you to understand ambiguity. You need some elementary level training. Which sensation is he talking about? He's talking about a certain sensation. How does that identify the particular type of sensation referred to, making clear and distinct that type of sensation?

So we can only ever talk about something if "the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features" of that something? — Luke

I've clearly indicated that we can talk about an unidentified thing, Such talk is most likely ambiguous though.

The purpose of all discussion about something is always to better define it? Go back to PI 71 - sometimes a blurry (or more general) picture is just what we need. — Luke

When the ambiguity is unintentional, we often get beyond it through the use of contextual references, and circumstantial aids like gesturing.

That Wittgenstein says "sometimes a blurry (or more general) picture is just what we need." is further evidence to my accusation that he employs intentional ambiguity. You ought to take notice of such hints, if you want to really understand what he was doing.

You're jumping to Wittgenstein's conclusion about the scenario at PI 261 here. I am (and we previously were) discussing the scenario at PI 258 itself. — Luke

When ambiguity is evident, we need to make contextual references, to make a determination of the intended meaning (what was meant by the author). The contextual references which we've looked at in this case, all indicate that the ambiguity is intentional. If it is intentional we can conclude that there is no correct interpretation of what "the sensation" named "S" refers to at 258. as I explained are the consequences of intentional ambiguity.

If I've "insisted" anything, it's that you cannot experience the same token of a sensation (e.g. a pain) twice. — Luke

And, as I've already explained to you it's nonsense to claim that there is such a thing as a token of a sensation. But there is no point to revisiting that, you have no inclination toward understanding any metaphysical principles.

What do you think "occurrence" means? It need not have anything to do with "experience". Your experience of a chair is not the chair's occurrence. The chair's occurrence is its existence. The chair has one existence or instance, and thus there is one token of the chair. You can experience the chair's existence many times. Or zero times. There is still one token of the chair. — Luke

You've already made it very clear that you are completely uninterested in trying to understand any complex metaphysics. So I'm not going to waste my time on any complicated explanation when you have not the will to follow. If you truly have the intent to enter into such an endeavour, and have an honest desire to understand, then demonstrate to me that you understand the following, simple principle.

Any sensation requires an object of sensation, the thing sensed, and the object sensed is distinct from the act of sensing it. In the case of a sensation of a chair, the object is the chair itself, and in the case of a sensation of pain, the object is the pain itself. The object of the sensation is distinct from the act of sensing, such that the thing we call "the pain" is separate and distinct from the act of sensing it, just like the thing we call "the chair" is separate and distinct from the act of sensing it.

My request from you, is to demonstrate that you understand the logical necessity for this principle. If there was no object of the sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary, totally within the individual's mind, without any objectivity. Consider the sensation of the chair, if there was no object, called "the chair" which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. The same principle is applicable to the sensation of pain. If there is no object called "the pain", which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. Do you recognize this need, to assume an object which is being sensed, in any form of "sensation", as a requirement for producing a real representation of what a sensation is?

The definite article can be used for both the type and a token. For example:
"The blue whale is the largest mammal."
"The giraffe has a very long neck."
"The sensation is a tingling in the toes resulting from a lack of oxygen." — Luke

I've told you already, type or token is not the question, it's only how you represent the issue.

Let's suppose that Wittgenstein's use of "the sensation" is meant to single out a particular type, like in your examples, then unlike your examples he hasn't given anything to identify this particular type. So he is using "the sensation" to single out a particular type of sensation, which supposedly has been identified, and made definite as his use of the definite article "the" indicates, yet the particular type has not been identified and made definite. Hence the ambiguity.

Imagine that I have an imaginary type of thing in my mind which I refer to as "the thing" and I name it with "T". I can talk about this type, "T", and you can talk about it. So we can talk about this type all we want, as "T", asking me is T in your mind now, was it in your mind yesterday, etc.. But talking about it, unless the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features, does not remove the ambiguity (obscurity) as to what T is the name of.

And in Wittgenstein's case, he doesn't even go so far as to say that "S" represents a type of thing. that is simply your assumption. At 261, he explicitly says we cannot make such a judgement. It is only you who is claiming that "S" names a type, as an attempt to remove the inherent ambiguity, and make the passage intelligible to you.

You said in the quote at the top of this post that "S" refers to a single token of the sensation. You have also argued previously that "a certain sensation" refers to a single token of the sensation. You are now arguing that neither the symbol "S" nor the word "sensation" can refer to the sensation. So which is it? Do "S" and/or "sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation or can they not refer to the sensation? — Luke

I've been telling you over and over, it's ambiguous, that means "which is it" cannot be determined. That's why I can coherently argue both sides. There is no answer to "which is it", that's the nature of ambiguity. You just don't seem to grasp the nature of ambiguity. We can apprehend ambiguity as either this or that, or neither. If the ambiguity is unintentional, the meaning is either this or that, with potentially a correct answer, but a lack of capacity to determine the correct answer. If the ambiguity is intentional it is neither this nor that, because there is no correct answer. We can't say "both" because we'd be allowing contradiction. If we do not know whether the ambiguity is intentional or not, there is the three basic options, this or that, or neither. Both is nonsensical. We do not know whether Wittgenstein's ambiguity is intentional, so we cannot rule out "neither".

This is all you could possibly mean by saying that "S" and/or "the sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation. If there are two tokens, then you face the same contradiction that "one particular sensation is being referred to two different times". — Luke

This is not contradiction, and that's what Wittgenstein shows with the chair example. You keep insisting that we cannot experience the same token twice, but this is blatantly false. I see the same token of chair here today, which I saw here yesterday, therefore I experience one token two different times, and refer to it as "the chair". If I didn't believe it was the same token, I would just say that there is a chair here today, and there was a chair here yesterday. But since I believe both instances of "chair" to be instances of the very same token, I refer to them both with "the chair".

To associate a "certain sensation" with a name/symbol is (supposedly in this scenario) to establish a type, not merely to name a single token. This has been my point. In the most basic terms, it is not logically possible to have the recurrence of a single token, which has only one instance, so Wittgenstein could only be referring to a type of sensation. — Luke

This is completely wrong. "Recurrence" signifies another occurrence of the very same thing, a sort of repeating. The mistake you are making is that you produce the assumption "it is not logically possible to have the recurrence of a single token", and you apply this to what Wittgenstein has said, and this causes you to misread. You refuse to accept what he has said, because you believe strongly in your assumption that it is not logically possible to have a recurrence of the same token. But the chair example proves otherwise, that sensation commonly provides a repeated or recurring experience of the very same token.

Why do you refuse to consider the example of the chair? Every day I see the same chair in front of me. Is it not true that my sensation of that chair is a recurrence of a sensation of a single token?

When you come around to accepting the reality that what you claim to be "not logically possible", regularly happens on a daily basis, then you'll reject this assumption that such "is not logically possible", and allow yourself to understand what Wittgenstein is exemplifying.

Should the diarist now [after one year] mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation? — Luke

"S" clearly refers to only one token, as is indicated by the definite article, "the" sensation. That's what "the" means, a particular member of the type signified by "sensation" is being talked about.

We can't say whether or not the diarist should mark "S" because of the ambiguity as to what "the sensation", or "S" is supposed to refer to. We have no criterion of identity. Whether It is, or is not what is called "the sensation", named "S", cannot be answered. There is no such thing as "what should be done" in this context.

How does the person know to write “S” every day for 10 years? Same problem. — Luke

You're quite right, it's the same problem. We went through this already weeks ago,. It's very clear in Wittgenstein's example, that the person doesn't "know" when to write S. No one knows this. The person decides when to write "S", but this in no way implies that the person "knows" when to write "S".

So if you have a pain and it goes away for one year and then returns, it is still the same instance of the pain? You were just unaware of it for a whole year? Garbage. — Luke

I would never refer to them both as "the sensation" in the same context of speaking. However, Wittgenstein is talking about "the sensation" when referring to both occurrences, the use of "the" indicating that one particular sensation is being referred to two different times.
'

So the ambiguity is with respect to how that person, or anyone else for that matter, knows that this sensation which occurs at a later time is "the sensation".

Here's where the ambiguity lies:

And when "the sensation" (same token in your words) appears a year later, the diarist ought to mark another S. Both occurrences must be "a single token" (as in Wittgenstein's example of the chair), because that's what the definite article "the" signifies, that an identified particular is being referred to, i.e. a single token. — Metaphysician Undercover

My mistake, but that's not where the ambiguity lies.

I think we all know that it's ambiguous. Only a few, including yourself, refuse to admit it, despite knowing that it is..

et’s say that the diarist has a single token of the sensation which lasts for 10 years. The diarist recognises it as the same sensation every day and so they write “S” in their diary every day. After 10 years the diarist does not have any further experience of the sensation until exactly one year later when the diarist recognises the sensation again. Should the diarist now mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation? — Luke

I don't know, because as I say, what you call "Wittgenstein's instructions", are ambiguous. Why would the person mark a new "S" every day for ten years, if that time period is only one occurrence of "the sensation"? The person is not keeping track of the temporal duration of "the sensation", only how often "the sensation" occurs. Wouldn't that entire time period just qualify for one S, one occurrence of "the sensation?

And when "the sensation" (same token in your words) appears a year later, the diarist ought to mark another S. Both occurrences must be "a single token" (as in Wittgenstein's example of the chair), because that's what the definite article "the" signifies, that an identified particular is being referred to, i.e. a single token.

You recently made the issue about the meaning of the word “sensation”, with your claim that its meaning was not only ambiguous but that it could also mean “ambiguous” (as well as “token” and “type”). I’ll take the quote above as your retraction of this foolish claim. — Luke

Luke, my issue has always been with Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation", in particular, his reference to "the sensation" at 258. Our disagreement as to what "the sensation" refers to in this context indicates very clearly that his use is ambiguous.

I just provided you with a detailed response and reading of 258 here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/617672.

You declined to respond. — Luke

You provided nothing that we hadn't already discussed, therefore nothing to resolve the disagreement, and nothing which would alter the judgement of "ambiguous".

You incessantly refuse to acknowledge Wittgenstein's use of the definite article "the". The issue is not strictly concerning the word "sensation". The issue is with the particular referent identified as "the sensation", at 258. This is the thing which the diarist names with "S".

And, as you admit we spent two months discussing what was meant by "the sensation" with no agreement. Therefore I can conclude that there is ambiguity here. The only question which remains is whether the ambiguity is intentional or not.

It is my opinion that ambiguity is a prevalent and significant feature of philosophy, which is often simply the result of the nature of language. But I also believe that intentional ambiguity is a feature of bad philosophy.

Yes, but it is not just the dyad particular and universal. — Fooloso4

Particular and universal are not opposite to each other, they are categorically distinct. For example, hot and cold are opposite, and these opposites are within the category of temperature. But temperature is not the opposite of size, they are categorically distinct. Likewise, particular is not opposite to universal, it is a different category.

Neither is many opposed to one, as I explained to Apollodorus above. Many consists of a multitude of one's, so "one" is included in "many" as part of many, therefore not opposed to many but a part of many.

When people propose different dyads and dichotomies, we must be cautious, and analyze them carefully to determine whether or not they are reasonable proposals. Otherwise the person might proceed with a logical argument, using the unreasonable proposition as a premise, and the result might be an absurd conclusion.

OED: ambiguous 1. "having an obscure or double meaning".

Maybe you have something else in mind for "ambiguous", or maybe you don't think that Wittgenstein's writing at this part of PI is obscure. But if the latter is the case, I think it's time for you to justify this claim. I already justified my assertion, that the writing is ambiguous, with the evidence that you and I discussed this section for two months without being able to come to any agreement as to the meaning.

You brought it up again. — Luke

I brought it up, because our disagreement on interpretation, and the fact that we could not resolve that disagreement with two months of discourse, is very clear evidence that what Wittgenstein said is ambiguous.

And, I believe that we will never resolve that disagreement because what Wittgenstein wrote actually is ambiguous, as the evidence indicates. So I think that after two months, any further discussion on the particulars of that disagreement is pointless because we will both be reiterating the same points.

Therefore I think we should both agree to disagree on the interpretation of that passage, and accept the fact that it is ambiguous. It appears like you need more time to maturate. But I will not be your sitter. So I'll leave you to do that on your own time

Since ex nihilo nihi fit, Parmenides rejected becoming; after all becoming implies an initial stage of nonbeing which in Parmenides universe is either nothing or too close it for comfort. — TheMadFool

This is not how Plato represents Parmenides in "The Parmenides", as indicated by the passage I've referred to above, at 135.

It is not that Parmenides rejected becoming, clearly Plato represented him as accepting the reality of "becoming". He just presented the extreme difficulty of understanding "becoming" logically. This is the same situation we find with Zeno's paradoxes. Zeno does not reject the reality of motion, he just demonstrates that the principles employed to understand motion, at that time, were insufficient to provide a real understanding.

Sorry Luke, I will not go back to where we were two months ago, and pretend that we didn't already discuss this.

And you do not seem to have any grasp of the reality of ambiguity, or the desire to discuss it. So, I don't see any point in proceeding.

How is it ambiguous to define green as a colour? — Luke

Red is a colour. Pink is a colour, so are brown and blue, and many more. The definition is very ambiguous because there are many colours and it provides nothing to distinguish the colour green from the others.

What is in question is whether the phrase "a certain sensation" refers to a one-off particular instance of a sensation or to a recurrent particular type of sensation. I have given you all the quotes about "recurrent" and "every time" to support that he means the latter. — Luke

After discussing this issue for a month or two, with no consensus between us, I came to the conclusion that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. Further, I gave some reasons why I believe that Wittgenstein practiced a technique of creative writing which employs the intentional use of ambiguity.

I thought we were making some progress. But obviously you just want to go back and argue the same thing, all over again, so that we can establish once again, that "sensation" is ambiguous.

You might have an argument for your interpretation of "type", if Wittgenstein hadn't used the definite article "the", four times at 258, when referring to "the sensation". Do you understand the grammar of this definite article?

It appears to me, that we have established beyond any reasonable doubt, that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. The question which remains is whether that ambiguity is intentional or not. If it's not intentional, then one or the other interpretation might be the correct one. But if it is intentional, then neither interpretation is the correct one.