The process of photons traveling in spacetime is not visible by itself (you can't enlighten them to make them visible), and in a sense all photons are virtual (so not only the ones between electrically charged particles, being the means for interaction). — Raymond

It has been very well demonstrated that light energy transmits through space, from one place to another, as a wave motion. The idea that there are photonic particles which move through space from one place to another, is a theory which is completely unsupported by empirical evidence.

I'd say blunt as in direct, not blunt as in something you smoke.

The question of how to understand the passive and active intellect is very interesting, and one I believe has never been satisfactorily answered. Aquinas wanted to hold the immateriality of the intellect, but there was a problem with the passive aspect of intellect, passivity being associated with matter. I believe he ended up proposing a passivity which is not material, to maintain the immateriality of the intellect, thus allowing for the disembodied intellect which Apollodorus clings to. Augustine has as good a representation of the human intellect as anyone, with his tripartite intellect (in comparison with the Holy Trinity). It consists of memory, reason or understanding, and will. I don't think he avoids the problem of passivity though because memory appears to be a passive aspect.

Your comments seem to imply that you are denying some basic and generally acknowledged facts. A person’s power of optic perception or sight, for example, may operate differently in different surroundings. In a prison cell, one might see some light through a small window, but outside the cell one will see the direct sun light and even its source (the sun) itself, together with all the objects it illuminates: the sky, the earth, the sea, and everything else under the sun. — Apollodorus

You, Appolodorus have opted for the belief that the intellect , or "mind" is an immaterial power. Therefore the comparison with sight, which is a power dependent on the material body, will not work for you. If you accept the belief that the human intellect is a power dependent on the material body, as I've explained, then we can make the comparison with sight. However, by doing this we forfeit the idea that a human intellect, or "mind" can continue to exist after the death of the material body.

Since you make mind distinct from sight in this way, you cannot even claim to have an understanding of Plato's cave analogy, as you leave mind as being incomparable with sight. The comparison can only be made if you understand mind as a power of the soul, just like sight, but then mind becomes dependent on the material body, just like sight. That's why the intelligible objects, as intelligible, are dependent on "the good", and not absolutely independent.

Obviously, if the soul or nous has knowledge prior to embodied existence, it must also have consciousness of that knowledge, otherwise it could have no recollection of it. — Apollodorus

You are making the mistake of equating "soul" and "mind". Making the separation between these two concepts is exactly what Aristotle spends a significant portion of De Anima doing.

To infer that is for the purpose of rejecting "the whole idea of an eternal "mind" as fundamentally incoherent" runs into the fundamental problem that Aristotle keeps referring to precisely that idea throughout his writings. — Paine

It is not a "fundamental problem", nor is it in any way strange or unusual, to refer over and over again to the idea which you are refuting or discrediting. Any idea to be rejected or refuted, must be fully exposed, and all of its weaknesses laid bare, well explained and left unprotected, in order that the idea may be properly understood, so that it may be rejected.

This we find in Plato's treatment of Pythagorean idealism. Plato draws out this form of idealism, explains the theory of participation which supports it, and in the meantime he exposes the weakness of participation. The untrained philosopher, who does not thoroughly read a significant portion of Plato's work, and perhaps along with a study of the work of Aristotle, who was a student of Plato, might think that Plato was doing what he could to support Pythagorean idealism. But this would be a mistake, not seeing that Plato, with the method of Socratic skepticism, was actually working to expose its weaknesses.

We see this in Aristotle's references to 'prime matter'. Many modern philosophers will insist that Aristotle supported the idea of 'prime matter'. But it's very clear from Bk9 of his metaphysics, in what is called the cosmological argument, that he rejects "prime matter'. And all those before him whom he has discussed as employing this idea, are dismissed as misdirected in this idea.

Now, It is clear from the passage I quoted from De Anima, that Aristotle rejects this idea of the mind moving itself through eternal circular motion. He attributes this idea of the mind moving itself to Plato's Timaeus, and he rejects it, for the reasons given in the quoted passage. The description is spatial, and that which is immaterial cannot be described in spatial terms.

But then, in Bk10-12 of Metaphysics, the same idea, circular motion of the mind, seems to be accepted. When I took a course on Aristotle's Metaphysics in university, the professor told us that it was debatable as to whether Aristotle actually wrote this part. He attributed the writing to some other (unknown) Neo-Platonist, and so we did not study it with the rest of the text.

I am not proposing a reversal of a property but observing the role of the statement in Aristotle's argument. The passage I quoted at 408b starts with "The case of the mind is different." What it is different from is the argument that started at 408a30 which distinguishes the soul from the vehicle it is in. The vehicle can move in space but that is not the soul that is moving. Regarding the experience of man, the lack of motion of the soul is put thusly: — Paine

You are neglecting the part which I quoted, which is at 407, prior to 408. Here, it is explained why "the case of the mind is different". The case of the mind is different because the mind is said to move itself, in an eternal circular motion. As such, it has no need for the soul, or psyche, as the active principle. The mind in this conception is properly independent, as self-moving. But this is the idea which Aristotle is rejecting. He wants to place the soul first, and not have the mind as independent sort of soul. If the mind is a self-moving sort of soul, then it has no need for the "soul" as Aristotle is defining, as the source of activity. That would separate "soul" in the sense of mind from "soul" in the sense of first actuality of a living body.

And it's very evident from the last line of the passage you quoted "That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said, and if it cannot be moved at all, manifestly it cannot be moved by itself." This is clear reference to the previously explained conception of "mind" as a self-moving eternal circular motion. And it excludes thus sense of "mind" from being a soul, rendering the concept useless.

The sharp contrast between saying the nous is self-moving while the psyche is not, places the problem squarely in the wheelhouse of first philosophy while also not trespassing the causal formula Aristotle demands for 'combined' beings. — Paine

But this expresses a misunderstanding. The Platonic notion of a self-moving nous is dismissed at 407a, in the passage I quoted, and it's discredited further through 407b. So the point at 408b is that the soul does not move the body in the way proposed by the Platonists, as a self-moving mind. This leaves the question of how the soul actually moves the body as completely unanswered. And we leave Bk1 in that condition.

On the level of the cosmic order as a whole, the way that neither nous nor psyche can be made entirely the part of the other is recognized as a problem in the narrative of the Timaeus but not resolved there. Aristotle does not explain it away somewhere. — Paine

As we proceed through Bk2 and 3, an explanation is provided. This is the actual/potential division. The way that the soul moves the body is by means of the powers, which are potentials. The potentials are not naturally active, they need to be actualized. So I do not think it is the case that we consider one to be a part of the other, but they exist in this relationship which is the active/potential relationship of hylomorphism, matter/form.

With the above distinctions applied to what 'universal principles' might mean, I don't understand your last paragraph. It seems to me that you are blowing past boundaries Aristotle went to great effort to put in place. He is trying to make the question harder for us, not easier. — Paine

I don't understand this. What boundaries are you referring to? And why do think that Aristotle would want to make things more difficult for us? Do you recognize the two distinct senses of "form" in Aristotle, as I described?

Maybe I was too blunt, and I apologize for that. But I'm well informed on Aristotelian hylomorphism and it's not like what you were presenting. The problem with what you presented, concerning "sense knowledge", is that we do not ever get the form of the particular through the senses. (That's what Kant pointed to with the phenomenon/noumenon distinction.) We always get an abstracted form, and the form of the particular, complete with accidents, stays united with the material object. This is why our knowledge of particulars is always incomplete, as Kant pointed out.

hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, namely, substantial form. — https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism

Well, you seem to have some kind of fixation with Aquinas. The reality, of course, is that Aquinas is a Christian who is trying hard to put his own spin on Classical authors. Plato and Aristotle are not Christians. There may be similarities, but their systems are NOT the same as Christianity. IMO it is delusional and dishonest to claim otherwise. — Apollodorus

Aquinas offers what I believe to be by far the most comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle, and possibly Plato as well, with comparison to numerous other ancient philosophers. He makes Gerson appear to be speaking from an introductory level of education. I'm sorry for being blunt, but it's rather obvious, and your comment implies that you do not notice this.

And no, there is no inconsistency in saying that the powers of disembodied nous are the same as those of embodied nous. — Apollodorus

You might assert this as many times as you like, but until you address the arguments, your assertions have no significance, impose no influence, and bear no fruit.

It is absurd to claim that embodied nous does not have these powers and only acquires them on becoming disembodied. If this were the case, (1) man wouldn't be human and not even alive, and (2) the analogy of the entombed or imprisoned soul would be nonsense and no one would speak of "release" and "liberation" as there would be nothing to release or liberate .... :smile: — Apollodorus

What you have stated there, are the features of the embodied intellect, "consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action". What is absurd is to say that an immaterial existence, eternal and immutable, has these same features.

Correlating phrases helps to spot things like contradictions, omissions, fallacies, babbling, etc. Obviously, people didn’t need reconstructions to spot these already, but it can be argued they were sort of doing reconstruction before it was called reconstructionism. At a small scale (short political discourses for example), reconstruction of discourses is basically the same as traditional analysis. — thaumasnot

I see a problem with this sort of thing, because the same word in different contexts has different meanings. So when you remove phrases from their contexts and say look, here's a contradiction, when it's really not a contradiction at all, because of the difference in context, that's being disrespectful to the author.

Great question. Logic is focused on the errors or false statements. It’s a pinpointing thing. Reconstruction makes you focus on the whole reasoning that led to the error/false statement or was built on the error/false statement. The “help” here is not in establishing that the reasoning was wrong. Logic can do that. It’s to make you appreciate how the reasoning was “constructed”. You’ll surely remark that in doing so, reconstruction uses logic, and that’s true. In that case, the “content” considered by the reconstructionist is the combination of that logic with the pseudo-scientific text. In reconstructionism, the process of defining the content is a formal step that I call “conventional medium delimitation”. It’s just a convention, not a profound statement of truth. — thaumasnot

Most reasoning is outside the formal constraints of logic, so I can see how reconstruction would be useful if it could help someone to recognize different styles of thought process. There is for example abductive reasoning, and different people have different ways for dealing with probabilities.

What I have the most difficulty with is your idea of medium delimitation. I think that the difference between what you call the medium and what I call the medium is significant, and this shows in what I say above. I would say that the medium on its own, must be considered to be completely passive, and cannot be assigned any meaning toward the piece of work. All the meaning is what has been given to it by the author. So any time that you remove a part of a narrative from its context, you cannot assign any meaning to that piece, because all its meaning is derived from its position in the narrative.

For example, there is a trend in modern TV, for a series to develop a character's personality over many episodes, even over numerous seasons. I actually find it rather boring, and unreal because I find that they'll spend an unreasonable amount of time demonstrating a person's character as being a certain way, then all of a sudden the person will start to do things right outside of one's character, seeming to undergo a significant change in character. From my perspective, I would say the person would never do something like that, the act is out of character for that person, so I see it as unrealistic, and I'm pissed off that they tricked me into thinking that the person was otherwise.

And with good editing they can even do this with "reality" shows. They show numerous, very particular types of actions, by the person, to make you think you understand the person's character. But they've actually created a false representation with crafty editing. Then all of a sudden they'll show the person doing something completely inconsistent with that, completely outside the realm of what you think that person is capable of doing, based on what they've already shown you. And this is supposed to be a filming of real life, "reality" TV.

So editing film footage for a "reality" show is like a reconstructive interpretation. And you can see how taking parts from the narrative (parts from the true narrative offered by the author, or by the complete set of footage taken in filming the "reality" show), you can very easily create a "sub-narrative" which doesn't have to be at all consistent with the true narrative. And you can very easily create a false narrative simply by removing bits and pieces from their proper context, and producing a new context with these bits and pieces.

It could be argued that it’s more interesting to see how errors are made than how a perfect scientific text is constructed. The empirical argument is that there are millions of ways of making errors, and only one way to be correct. And learning how we make errors is quite interesting, not only theoretically, but also as a lesson. So reconstruction is not primarily about finding errors, but rather about discovering reasoning patterns, and that’s a fun endeavour (hedonism). — thaumasnot

I propose that you turn this perspective around, consider that there is a vast multitude of ways to be correct, and only one way to be incorrect. There are many ways to be correct because correctness is determined in relation to the end, if the end is achieved. Notice that there is a vast variance in ends themselves, and even if we define a particular end, there can be a number of different ways to achieve it. Each of these produces a "correct" way. However, any time there is determined a "correct" way, what is inconsistent with this is often called "incorrect". But when that supposed "incorrect" way is seen to be consistent with a slightly variant end, then it is actually a correct way according to that different end. This leaves only one way to be "incorrect", and that is to be consistent with no end whatsoever. What is consistent with no end is a mistake. Therefore there is only one way to be incorrect, and that is to make a mistake.

So when we look at all the different ways that people do things, we cannot say such and such is incorrect, (eg., point to the the phrases which have been removed from context, and say there is contradiction), we look at the different ways as being different. And being different means that they were done for a different purpose, from the one which I apprehend, and this makes it appears as incorrect, to me. But if I can determine the purpose, then what seemed incorrect to me, becomes correct because I've found the proper context. And only if I can demonstrate that it is inconsistent with any possible purpose, can I say that it is an accident, a mistake, and therefore incorrect.

The stated powers the nous has in the embodied state are the same powers it has in the disembodied state. The difference consists in the wider range those same powers can find application in the disembodied state, resulting in more accurate or "true" knowledge.

This is precisely why the body-mind compound is referred to as a "prison" or "tomb", as it prevents the nous from utilizing its powers to their full potential. For the same reason, separation from body-mind is referred to as "release" or "liberation" - which obviously implies release and liberation of the power to know and other powers already belonging to the released or liberated nous: — Apollodorus

The realistic interpretation is the one offered to us by Aquinas. A separate, independent, immaterial intellect, (a divine intellect), has a superior knowledge which is completely different from the knowledge of the human intellect, which is tainted by the human intellect's dependence on the material body.

There is no "inconsistency" in this at all. — Apollodorus

There is inconsistency in saying that the intellectual power which is united with a material body, is "the same power" as the intellectual power which is immaterial, independent, separate, and not united with a material body. That's like saying that the "form" which a material object has, which is united to that material object, making it what it is, as the unique and particular material object which it is, is the same "form" which is separate from the material object, existing in the mind of the knower. Notice that these two senses of "form" are distinguished from one another by the accidentals of material existence. The material object has a "form" as a particular, and within the human mind is a "form" as a universal. A particular is not the same as a universal, therefore we cannot say that they are "the same".

In that regard, the concluding remark is not a qualification of the statements just made but the reverse. — Paine

Yes, that is the way that the overall passage, and the concluding remark seem to fit into context of BK1 in general. But the remark is made at the end of that description of the relationship between mind and soul, and this description is oddly inserted into a discussion about how the soul can be the actual cause of movement, but it cannot itself be moved. Prior to your quoted passage, in Ch3, you'll see a discussion of Plato's Timaeus, and the idea of the soul being, or causing, a circular motion.

What is at question is how does the soul move the body. Aristotle gives Plato's account from the Timaeus, of harmonic numbers, and a bending of the straight line into circles. What I quote here is the end of the paragraph where Aristotle gives Plato's account, and the beginning of the next, where he proceeds to dismiss it. Pay particular attention to how he drives a wedge between "soul" as referring to the whole, and "mind".

All this [Plato's account] implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movement of the heavens.

Now, in the first place, it is a mistake to say that the soul is a spatial magnitude. It is evident that Plato means the soul of the whole to be like the sort of soul which is called mind --- not like the sensitive or desiderative soul, for the movements of neither of these are circular. Now mind is one and continuous in the sense that the process of thinking is so, and thinking is identical with the thoughts which are its parts; these have a serial unity like that of number, not a unity like that of a spatial magnitude. Hence mind cannot have that kind of unity either; mind is either without parts or is continuous in some other way than that which characterizes a spatial magnitude. How indeed, if it were a spatial magnitude, could it possibly think? Will it think with any one indifferently of its parts? In this case, the 'part' must be understood either in the sense of a spatial magnitude or in the sense of a point (if a point can be called a part of a spatial magnitude). If we accept the latter alternative, the points being infinite in number, obviously the mind can never traverse them; if the former the mind must think the same thing over and over again, indeed an infinite number of times (whereas it is manifestly possible to think a thing once only). — On the Soul. 407a

Notice here that Aristotle has rejected Plato's description of the soul, as being like a "mind". Furthermore, he has rejected the whole idea of an eternal "mind" as fundamentally incoherent. To support the continuity required by the concept of "mind", the mind must either traverse an infinity of points, or think the same thing an infinite number of times. Both, as stated here, are impossible, therefore the concept of "mind" as such a continuity is incoherent. But he proceeds to discuss the possibility of mind thinking the same thing forever, as a type of circular movement, and demonstrates how this is not consistent with a description of actual thinking.

Therefore, I think that we can conclude that the closing sentence of the paragraph you quoted, is referring us back to the prior page, and this prior discussion of "mind". And, we can see that Aristotle is working to produce a concept of "soul" which is distinct from that earlier Greek concept of "mind", that he has found to be incoherent. The problem is exposed as describing the "mind", or the "soul" using spatial terms. Notice in the quoted passage that "serial unity" implies a temporal order, as the suggested replacement for "spatial magnitude".

The limits of what is possible for composite beings informs the way universal principles work on the level of causes within the cosmos. — Paine

So I believe that the reversal you propose here is quite mistaken. The difference between the knowledge which a material human being has, and the knowledge which a divine independent, separate soul is said to have, is the difference between universal forms, and particular forms. The human intellect, being deficient as united to a material body, understands through the means of universal forms. But the reality of the universe is that it exists as particulars. This marks the deficiency of the human intellect, the failure to grasp the accidentals which are proper to the uniqueness of the particulars of the universe. Aquinas proposed separate intellects, God and the angels, which being immaterial, and independent of matter, may apprehend the Forms of the particulars, complete with accidentals. He even proposed a temporal concept, "aeviternal", which serves as an intermediary between eternal and temporal, allowing for an actuality which moves the material world without itself being moved by the material world.

Therefore it is not as you suggest, "universal principles", which act as causes within the cosmos. "Universal principles" is the means by which the human intellect, a deficient intellect, being united to a material body, understands the cosmos. The true immaterial causes within the cosmos are, each and every one of them, unique and particular, and this is why each and every thing is unique and particular. And the human intellect understanding through universal forms lies trapped within this deficiency in its capacity to understand.

That's the passage Appolodorus brought up earlier. The idea of the mind as an independent substance implanted in the soul is very doubtful. And, at this point, Aristotle is discussing in what way the soul moves, and in what way it might be moved. The last line, "that the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said", seems to dismiss the idea of the mind being an independent substance implanted in the soul, which moves it.

What about the two hydrogen atoms in water. Aren't they symmetric somehow? — Raymond

I think the bonding of those atoms is actually quite complicated.

Isn't symmetry about two different things being the same? Left and right are symmetric. If you let things move to the left it's the same as making them move to the right. — Raymond

Two different things being the same is contradiction. Left and right, as principles are symmetrical, but the issue is not symmetry in theory. In practice, making something move to the left is not the same as moving it to the right.

Then the perpendicular direction is "the front", in relation to the mirror, because the mirror switches the direction front to back. You might call it right and left, but the result is the same, the right becomes the left when the mirror switches the image. And the side toward the 1 is different from the side toward the 3.

That should read as the beginning of the conflict between them. Paul's Letter to the Hebrews was an eviction notice. — Paine

It's not the beginning of the conflict because Saul was already engaged in the persecution of the followers of Jesus, stoning them to death. The conflict began before Jesus was crucified, and his crucifixion was a part of that conflict. Paul acted to end that conflict by declaring to the Jews, of whom he was one, that Jesus is in fact the Son of God.

Certainly, for Plato true knowledge is possible only in a disembodied state. — Apollodorus

There is another way to interpret this. The way I've been suggesting throughout this thread. And that is that human knowledge is necessarily deficient. The human being, as a soul united to a body, has a deficient form of knowledge, as the result of being united to a body. That is the interpretation which Aquinas gives us.

Knowledge and action, the very powers of the embodied self that determine its fate, are the same powers that define it once death has separated it from the physical body. — Apollodorus

This is inconsistent. If only a disembodied soul can obtain "true" knowledge, then the knowledge which a human being, with a material body, has, is distinctly different from the knowledge of a disembodied soul. So it's inconsistent to say that the embodied powers are " the same powers that define it once death has separated it".

But what if it has length only? Front and back are symmetric then, like the 2 facing 1 or 3. — Raymond

Where does the mirror fit then?

How do you involve complex numbers here? I'm not sure I understand. — Raymond

It was the agent's suggestion, that -2 is the mirror image of +2, which got complex numbers involved

Plotinus' mysticism was said to be impersonal, the invidual literally surrendering or loosing his/her identity in merging with the Absolute, whereas in Christianity it is supposed that personal identity is retained. — Wayfarer

I believe it was Paul who really pushed onto Christianity the idea of personal resurrection. It's in his letters or something like that, I can't remember now. But Paul (Saul) was Jewish, and was appealing to the ancient Jewish traditions for acceptance, so the more modern Greek science based principles might have been neglected by him.

Paul also strongly promoted the idea that Jesus was Son of God, rather than Son of Man as Jesus professed. It was only through this twist that the crucifixion of Jesus, by the Jews could be justified. This was the way which was revealed to Saul, as to how to produce consistency, unification between Christians and Jews, ending the continued conflict between them. He could propose both, that Jesus claimed to be Son of God, thereby justifying the crucifixion, and also that Jesus actually was Son of God, thereby supporting the Christian sect. Paul obviously had a great influence on the course of Christianity by conceiving of this unity between the Jewish and the Christians.

But we must remember that Paul was preaching to Jewish people, and so was influenced to say what they needed to hear, to produce acceptance of Christianity. This made Christianity the 'higher' religion, because it had the Son of God as its leader. But Christianity itself suffered by being overwhelmed with the ancient Jewish traditions, some of which it was trying to distance itself from. The result of the merger was that the Jewish religion seized power through application of its existing structure, taking the name from the Christians, while the 'true' Christians lost the capacity to dispel unacceptable ideology So a large portion of the more "true" Christians ('true' at that time, prior to The Church defining 'true Christian') retreated into the mysticism provided for by Greek philosophy. You can see how Augustine comes from the mystical side, rather than the structured religious (Jewish) side.

nterestingly, the "intention" or idea seems to be to destroy the symmetry. — Agent Smith

It's not to "destroy the symmetry", but simply to see it for what it has become, a tool which has limited capacity, rather than a reflection of reality. Traditionally we'd see the appearance of symmetry in nature as something beautiful. But we'd always know that any deeper analysis of the beauty would reveal discrepancies, and the appearance of perfect symmetry is just an illusion. But this in an odd way, only adds to the beauty of the natural world, and all those little discrepancies would contribute to wonder, which is the philosophical attitude.

Now the tool, symmetry in principle, has become so powerful in its mathematical applications, that we dismiss all those discrepancies as insignificant, assume that the thing which appears to be symmetrical really is symmetrical, and this kills the philosophical attitude.

t depends on how you mirror the 2. You can mirror it with a mirror perpendicular to the 2. Then the mirror image of 2 and the 2 are symmetric wrt each other. — Raymond

A mirror only creates a reflection of something, if the thing has width, so this wouldn't work.

Flat spacers claim global space is flat and thus infinite. — Raymond

Is this meant to imply that flat spacers are like flat earthers? Is space curved if there is no mass? If not, then how do you know that the curvature is not just a property of the mass and its influence on surrounding objects, like the earth and its gravity.

"Dimp stands for DIMensionless Point.
This is a new idea with a funny name that challenges all physics.
We know that photons are outside of time and distance.
My suggestion is that Dimp contains all photons.
That means Dimp contains all electromagnetic energy in a single dimensionless point.
Dimp is eternal and outside time, space, distance.
Dimp was here before the Big Bang and will be here after the Big Bang, and long after this space-time universe has ended. — universeness

If we remove time from its "fourth dimension" relationship with space, and allow that time can pass without any physical change, time becomes prior to physical existence. Then time becomes the zeroth dimension, and we have the basis for the reality of dimensionless points. There is allowed for, activity within the dimensionless point, as time does not require physical activity, and time is conceived as prior to space. When time is prior to space, we need principles to allow for the coming into being of space, as space is then something which is generated in time. This means that we must allow that space itself is not static, but changing, as the concept of spatial expansion indicates.

he lateral inversion in (vanity) mirrors accounts for the change in valence/sign: good reflected becomes bad, positive becomes negative, left becomes right, top becomes bottom ( :chin: ). — Agent Smith

No. the rotation (or change in valence) is the 180 degree turn, to be facing the other way. That the left becomes the right when the turn around occurs indicates that the representation is limperfect.

Think of it this way. The 2 has two parts because that's what "2" symbolizes. If the 2 were to turn from facing the 3, to become facing the 1, it's right part would remain its right part, and its left part remain its left part. But the mirror image is not such a turn, it is a reflection. And so the left and right do not get properly represented in the reflection because it's not a true turn, but a representation which is deficient.

When -2 is compared with +2, for symmetrical value, the deficiency is even greater, more complex, than the deficiency of the mirror image. This is evidenced by imaginary numbers. A whole system of imaginary numbers must be employed to create the illusion of symmetry. In the case of the mirror, the deficiency can be traced to the activity occurring at the medium, the mirror. In the case of the numbers, a faulty conception of zero is indicated.

Aristotle also says that the universe is created by an Intellect in conjunction with Nature: — Apollodorus

Aristotle's conception, a divine mind thinking on thinking, as the source of eternal circular motion, and the cause of heaven and earth, is demonstrably incorrect. This ought to cast doubt on his entire conception of divinity, the proposed highest good, the way that order is imposed, etc..

Plato did not make this same mistake, saying only that "the good" is the highest, and that a divinity caused the order in the universe. But you can see that Plato has a gap between "the good" as something passive, and the act itself which moves to bring into reality, the good, which is order. So Plato only avoids the problem because he didn't go far enough to properly attempt a solution. Aristotle excelled in demonstrating that the actual is necessarily prior to the passive potential, in the absolute sense.

And this is where Plotinus failed, he assigned to "the One" the nature of absolute, pure, potential, in the Platonic tradition. But he also said that the One is responsible as cause, of the manifestation of everything else. And this directly contradicts Aristotle's demonstration, showing that a pure potential cannot actualize anything. We can conclude that both Aristotle and Plotinus failed in resolving the problem raised by Plato, though Aristotle gives us better direction. But I don't think it is the direction which you have chosen to take from Aristotle.

Can't the metric of space have a symmetry? — Raymond

What I believe is that such a symmetry is imaginary, and not a true representation of space. We make up the symmetry principles, and apply them because they are very useful. But then we have to deal with what is left over, the aspects of reality which don't fit into the artificial symmetry. So if we represent space as a thing, we should consider the same principle. If we represent it as symmetrical, we ought to accept that there are aspects of it which vary from that symmetry, that we still need to describe. This is the difficult part of description, accounting for the aspects of the described thing, which do not quite fit into the parameters of the descriptive terms. So in cosmology they propose names like dark energy and dark matter to describe the features which do not fit in to their descriptive models.

What's a mirror image (to you)? — Agent Smith

We discussed this earlier in the thread. A mirror image is not a symmetry because the mirror shows the features of the left side of my body as being on the right side of my body. So when the mirror does what it does, to turn the image of my body from frontward facing to backward facing (from my perspective), it does something which makes the backward facing image of me, not perfectly symmetrical with the frontward facing image of me.

Multiplication (the operation you used) is a scale transformation and, in my humble opinion, has nothing to do with reflection symmetry unless you want to use a do/undo transformation combo. — Agent Smith

The square root of +2 differs from the square root of -2. The reality of imaginary numbers demonstrates that one is not a mirror image of the other.

A black hole has a perfect cylindrical symmetry. It exists in the real world. — Raymond

I think that is a good example of a mistaken conclusion derived from this misunderstanding of symmetry which I am talking about.

Not really, because +2X+2=4, and also -2x-2=4. So there is something asymmetrical there. But this is all irrelevant, because as I said, symmetry is just a principle we apply. So even if we stipulate that +2 and -2 are perfectly balanced, it doesn't give us the reality of the principle. Show me where -2 represents something real in the world, for example.

Identification with the highest element in man is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy. — Apollodorus

The issue seems to be what it means to be "the highest". If we go by logical priority, the soul is the highest, as first cause of the living body, and what is required (necessary) for the activities of all the various potentials of living beings. However, we are generally inclined to place the soul, being first cause, at the base, the foundation, and we perceive the base as lower. On the other hand, you place the intellectual capacity, being the soul's ability to know itself, as the highest.

In Plato there is definitely a conflation of the soul and the intellect. Mind, as the power of reason, and soul, are often interchangeable. This is primarily because Plato had not thoroughly worked out the passive/active division. Aristotle worked out the passive (potential)/actual division, and gave "soul" a proper definition as the active cause of the living body. From this it follows that the capacities of living beings are the soul's potentials. We might ask the further question, as Aquinas does, how does an actuality (the soul) have potentials as properties.

So it really doesn't make sense for you to say that "identification with the highest element is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy". It would be better said that a chief point in both of their philosophies was an attempt to identify the highest element, thus recognizing that the highest element had not been properly identified.

It's a principle of perfect balance, an ideal, which nothing in reality actually achieves.

Your body is not symmetrical, and negative/positive numbers are not symmetrical, as the need for imaginary numbers shows.

The point is that there is no symmetry there. A mirror does not provide a true symmetry, as discussed earlier. Symmetry is just an imaginary principle, like zero, which helps us to understand things, but there is no real things in the world which it models. "Zero" and "symmetry" are very closely related, as the left side of an equation has zero difference from the right side.

That’s quite confusing. “When I'm reading, I don't see the things I am reading as words” followed by “I'm reading I see each particular word as the word it is”. — thaumasnot

I know it's confusing, but I thought I explained it well enough to dispel the confusion. When I'm reading I don't see them as words. But when I reflect on what is written, or talk about it in any way, not reading it, I see them as words. I only see them as words when I'm not reading it. When I'm reading it, I'm not thinking 'that's a word, that's a word, that's a word' etc., because I am too busy reading. And reading does not consist of seeing things as words, it's a matter of deriving meaning, not a matter of judging things as words. I cannot do both at the same time, read the material, and also count the words.

It’s not something that matters to reconstruction (as a hedonistic endeavour). If you care about this, you can even use your definition. The medium could come from an artist, a UFO, or be generated randomly by a computer. You can also try to reconstruct anything you experience in real life (quite useful when interpreting political discourses or pseudo-scientific debates for example). — thaumasnot

If this is the case then how can you say that the purpose of it is to help others? Unless there is some attempt to try and understand what the artist is doing, how can you call this a type of "help"? Take a politician's speech for example, you'd say, look at the cool patterns in the way this guy uses "make America great again", in relation to some other phrases used by that politician, but how is that supposed to be helpful?

Reconstructing how pseudo-scientific conclusions can be reached is quite amusing and enlightening. — thaumasnot

Isn't this something completely different though, something called logic? With logic, there are strict standards, formal rules, which the patterns of word usage must follow. If we analyze the pattern and find that it strays from the rules. we can say that the conclusion is invalid. But that's something different from simply reconstructing the patterns, it's also judging the patterns according to some standards. I can see how this would be helpful, if your judgements are according to some accepted standards, like logic provides us with. When you do reconstruction, and you judge the work which you are reconstructing, where do you derive your standards of judgement from?

I think the reason for this is that the main concern in both Plato and Aristotle is to prepare the philosopher for life after death and this seems to imply the conscious self-identification with that in man that is said to survive death. — Apollodorus

This is a stretch of your imagination. Aristotle has volumes of material concerning knowledge of the physical world, criteria for correct judgement, etc.. The question of life after death has only a few passing mentions. Even his ethics is based in "happiness" which is a description of the human being's earthly condition. It is not based in a higher existence after death, heaven, hell, or anything like that. Plato is quite similar, and although the issue of life after death takes a more prominent position than in Aristotle, it is incorrect to say that it is "the main concern".

I use medium roughly in the sense “perceived physical manifestation”. Even if we don’t agree with that definition, the only thing that matters is that I mean by “medium-specific narrative” a narrative whose elements are things you perceive in the content. So they’re visual, audible, readable, etc. things. It’s important because it contrasts traditional interpretation, which goes beyond these things. — thaumasnot

The problem though, is that perception has interpretation built in, inherent within. Let's go back to your example of the word "PHYSICS".

In most cases, the viewer will see PHYSICS as a word, and I think that’s enough for most purposes. — thaumasnot

When I'm reading, I don't see the things I am reading as words. So I do not see "physics" as a word, when I come across that word in a piece of writing. I talk about it now as a word, but when I'm reading I see each particular word as the word it is, and read it as that particular word, giving it meaning according to context, but I do not see any of the words as words, that's just how we refer to them when we talk about them.

So when you go to a "perceived physical manifestation", like motif M for instance, and single it out as a motif, and say that this, as a motif, is a perceived physical manifestation, it's not really true. Just like I don't perceive the word "physics" as a word, when I'm reading, I don't perceive motif M as a motif when I hear the music. It's all part of a complex piece. So when you analyze, and say that this part is motif M, which I perceive, that's not really true, because I do not perceive it as a motif.

This is the difference between your conception of "medium" and mine. The motif, you see as part of the medium, a physical manifestation, I see it as something created by the artist.

The point was that I think symmetry might make a good principle to compare with our observations of the universe, to see how the universe is not symmetrical, but that means that symmetry does not make a good model.

So medium is music, the same for both Metallica and Vivaldi. I say "medium-specific" because for another medium, painting for example, obviously it won't be about melodic motifs, but visual patterns. — thaumasnot

We have a difference in our understanding of "medium". I would say that "music" is a classification of art form, a type of artistic expression. The medium used by the musician is sound, and there is distinct aspects of that medium, rhythm and pitch for example. Notice that aural narrative, referring to the act of telling a story with words, uses the same fundamental medium, sound, but it doesn't have refined (or defined) rhythm and pitch. Because different forms of artistic expression might use the same fundamental medium, and also one form of artistic expression might be presented through a number of different media, I think it's best to maintain a distinction between "medium" and "art form".

Well, it's still part of the story. In the case of medium-specific narratives; obviously, motif M can be used in unexpected ways. How this is achieved exactly is the interesting part, and this is the whole medium-specific narrative. — thaumasnot

I must admit I haven't been able to grasp your example of "motif". A motif is a particular form which may be repeated, and it may even be copied to another piece. It is a particular way of using the medium, which is repeated. But motifs are not medium specific. There are visual motifs as much as there are sound motifs. And, a particular motif is specific to a particular piece, until it is copied to another. We can talk about what types of motifs are specific to certain types of media, but I do not think that this is your intent. It appears like you want to talk about particular motifs as if they a part of the medium. But they are not, they are a part of the form created by the artist. Only if an artist stole a motif from somewhere else, would it not be created by that artist. And this is why we need to maintain the distinction between "medium" and "art form". If a motif were part of the medium, an artist could plagiarize motifs freely, claiming to just be using the medium available.

So, about this active thing. What I mean by active consumption in the context of reconstruction is the activity of correlating things (the basis of any narrative). As you can see from the "copy" aspect of reconstruction, reconstruction is a little replica of the experience. In fact, the property of "pure referentiality" almost means it is the experience itself, except in a guided way. Ultimately, the reader of a reconstruction can ditch the reconstruction, and live the experience the way the reconstruction suggested. — thaumasnot

But don't you think that being "guided" takes away from the experience? If the artist is using the element of surprise, then the guide could rob the artist of that technique. It's one thing for the artist to provide some form of guidance, as a footnote to an art piece, or something like that, but for someone else to be doing the guiding just seems wrong. Suppose you are going to watch a movie, and someone else comes and describes to you, their experience from the movie, then says "go and have your own experience". Well it's already too late, the person has stolen your capacity to have your own experience, by giving you their own.

If a modern can understand the assumptions underpinning the idea of nous that were made by the Ancient Greeks then one can understand the concept as it was understood by the Greeks. If moderns cannot find out what those assumptions are, then sure, moderns could not understand them, and consequently could not understand what nous meant for the Greeks. — Janus

We understand the world in terms of objects and forces, an impersonal conglomeration of basic physical forces. — Wayfarer

What is required when looking back like this, is to develop the mindset of a lesser developed intellect. This is what I've been trying to explain, the way to a higher understanding is through understanding the lower, and this reveals the types of changes which occur in the passage from lower to higher. As we see here, the passage from lower to higher was a turning outward of the mind, from self-consciousness to consciousness of one's environment. And this is contrary to what Appolodorus is proposing here, that the way to higher intelligence is to turn the mind inward.

The turning outward of the mind is fraught with problems of inversion. Inside we apprehend the soul as inhering deep within, and activity flows outward. Outside we see activity in all different directions. We've tried to posit a Soul as the source of this activity, but we do not see the inward-outward flow of activity in external bodies, so the Soul seems out of place. But of course we cannot see (sense perception) through the material bodies to apprehend this activity within, and this leaves the Soul of other material bodies as inapprehensible. Therefore the Soul is dismissed because the motion it causes is not perceived by the senses. And when we turn back inward we are inclined to dismiss the inner soul as well, because its activities have not be objectified (i.e. determinism). And so we are lost, incapable of the first degree of understanding, which is derived from self-reflection.

Back from the digression. We cannot start with the assumption of a higher intellect, describe it, and proceed to direct our minds toward obtaining this position, because that higher intellect is outside the realm of possibility of our own intellects. Therefore we cannot describe it, and we know not where to go. But we can look backward at the lower levels of intellectual capacity, understand what was already understood, come to apprehend the changes which have occurred to produce the higher level, and derive some direction in this way. This method of looking backward to obtain direction for the future, is very well demonstrated by Plato.

Consciousness is always aware of itself and this self-reflexive awareness is an activity of consciousness that is already there as the background of other activities of consciousness. — Apollodorus

Then it seems you agree with me on this point. If consciousness is always self consciousness, then self-consciousness is the lowest, most base form of consciousness, being a part of every form of consciousness. And consciousness as an awareness of external things is a higher form of consciousness, consisting of that lower form with something else added.

At the highest level of perception (knowledge) consciousness is cognitively identical with the perception. Therefore, the highest form of knowledge is self-knowledge which is knowledge of oneself as consciousness or nous. — Apollodorus

Now where do you draw this conclusion from? In no form of knowledge is the knowledge identical with the thing known. This is where the error lies. If the thing known was the very same as (identical to) the knowledge, the knowledge would be absolutely perfect. But there is no such thing as perfect knowledge, hence the need for skepticism.

This is why the method you describe is faulty. You assume that perfection in knowledge can be obtained through a direct unity between knower (soul), and thing known (intellect or consciousness). The problem is that you neglect the reality of the medium which exists between these two (the material body), which makes such a direct unity, and perfect knowledge, impossible.

If, on the other hand, we insist on claiming that consciousness does not exist, or that the way to truth is through the study of physical matter, or through the consciousness of lower forms of life, then it's a different story. — Apollodorus

So you deny the need to understand physical matter, and lower life forms, because you think perfect knowledge will be obtain by the direct unity between soul and intellect. But if you would understand the true metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, you would see how the material body affects the way that the soul uses the intellect to know itself, rendering such perfect knowledge as impossible. And, you would see the need to understand physical matter and the lower life forms, in order to grasp how these affections taint our knowledge.

From what you have said, it appears clear that the hypothesis of "ideal time" has been falsified by the evidence. To appeal to "before the big bang", and say that it was true then, is nonsensical, because there is no evidence from before the big bang, and one could propose absolutely anything as true.

The periodic motion of the clock can be divided in arbitrarily small parts, though some say its motion is quantized, that time is discrete, which entails a difficulty of determining when the next unit of time comes into play, for a short while, everything is static. The numbers on the clock are placed on the time axis with the result that there are even points in time. But can a continuum really broken into parts? — Raymond

This idea of quantized time becomes a more interesting question, if we remove the ideal clock. The ideal clock described is independent from physical evidence and measures a continuous time. So if we propose a standard quantum of time as the smallest possible length by physical evidence, and say two distinct features of the universe require one quantum of time, they could each start and end at a different time, by the ideal clock. So the ideal clock would require units of time smaller than the smallest possible unit of time, by the physical evidence, to account for the beginning and ending of the features of the physical universe, at different times.

But if the ideal clock is removed, then all these features must start and stop at precisely the same time, to account for the truth of the proposition that physical motion is quantized, unless time is driven by some non-physical property of the universe.

Of course self-consciousness is a type of consciousness. But self-reflexive consciousness or consciousness being aware of itself is on a higher level than objective consciousness or consciousness being aware of things other than itself. Aristotle himself distinguishes between "active" and "passive" consciousness and clearly classifies the former as higher than the latter. — Apollodorus

The difference between the active and passive aspects are described as the difference between acting, and being acted on. This does not correlate to the difference between being conscious of other objects, and conscious of oneself. So if the active part of consciousness is higher than the passive, this does not mean that self-consciousness is higher than consciousness. Since the consciousness in self-consciousness is acted on, because it is thinking on itself, it cannot be purely active, i.e., it is the (passive) object of thought just as much as it is the act of thinking.

I agree though, that both Plato and Aristotle posited self-consciousness as a higher level of consciousness. What I've been arguing is that this was a mistake. It is not consistent with the bulk of Aristotle's principles. There is really no principle given which justifies the idea that being conscious of oneself is higher than being conscious of others. And, since all the basic principles of morality are derived from respect for others, rather than from a selfish self-consciousness, we ought to be extremely wary of this proposal, that self-consciousness is higher than consciousness.

Furthermore, we find that empirical evidence, from the sensations of external objects, provides the strongest support for any knowledge. That's why "science" is so successful. Since we have both moral philosophy, and science, as proof that consciousness of external objects is "higher" than self-consciousness, if we are inclined to class levels of consciousness in this way, we need to dismiss the way proposed by Plato and Aristotle, as mistaken. The idea that self-consciousness is higher than being conscious of other things, is simply inconsistent with all of our knowledge.

The intellect’s capacity to “think itself” identifies it as a form of consciousness and highlights the similarity between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception of intellect or nous. It is this close similarity that enables those familiar with Plato to correctly understand Aristotle. — Apollodorus

What you say here, "to correctly understand Aristotle" is not really true, because you latch on to a small point here, the immortality of the intellect, which is inconsistent with all the parts that I pointed at, and you claim that this is the correct understanding.

The basic idea behind all of this is that of hylomorphic dualism - that the psyche (soul) has two aspects, sensory and intellectual. Intellect is what sees the forms/essence/ideas and it does that by in some sense becoming one with it. Obviously there is no such union on the level of sensory interaction but there is on the level of the intellect. — Wayfarer

Aristotelian hylomorphism is the idea that all material objects consist of a duality of form and matter, the form is the cause of the matter being what it is instead of something else. In the case of a living body the form is the soul.

Relations would require space since they occur among/between? separate objects. — Daniel

There are all sorts of different relations, and some are not between objects, like the relation between hot and cold.

Why not just agree that divorce and marriage are relationships so that you don't contradict yourself in saying that a divorce is a type of unity. What you mean is that it is a type of relationship. — Harry Hindu

No that's not what I meant. I meant what I said. The word refers to the state, or condition of a certain type of unity. The type of unity being marriage, and the condition, that it has been ended. And if you cannot understand this without seeing it as a contradiction, I don't think it's worthwhile to say anything more.

I'm trying to gasp exactly what you mean by "medium-specific narrative". It would seem to be a type of narrative which is specific to a certain medium. But I think in your use, narrative is more particular, so you talk about particular narratives. Or, is it the case that you look for similar narratives in different pieces. For example, you made a sort of comparison between Vivaldi and Metallica. Is comparing narratives acceptable and useful in reconstructionism? I would say that Metallica uses a different medium from Vivaldi, but then "medium" can refer to something very specific or something more general.

If you are looking for narratives which are medium-specific, I would assume that you have a way of classifying media. And the way that media is classified would dictate whether a type of narrative is specific to one medium or not. Then we might see how a type of narrative can cross from one medium to another. If I stretch this to make an example, we might say that distinct genres of music use distinct media, because the medium is manufactured, produced by engineers specifically for the genre. then we might see that narrative types can pass freely from one medium to another. Likewise with a painting and a photograph, distinct media, but possibly similar narratives. And if you allow yourself to become very general in defining your narrative type, you might find that a narrative type found in one medium is actually derived from a very different medium.

3. Doubts regarding traditional analysis/reviewing: the way we talk about music, and how analysis/reviews talk about it, are not how we experience music. What is this gap? The natural extension of this line of questioning is the development of our awareness for medium-specific narratives. — thaumasnot

I really do not think that this gap can be closed in this way. I think it is a gap fundamental to the way that the human mind works, and we ought not even try to close it. Experiencing music, or any art work, begins as a passive reception of the piece. Sometimes we are inclined, or encouraged by the artist, toward active participation, sing along, clap, or dance, for example. The active participation is a direct response, as an "affect", derived from the emotions of the observer. It's an emotion driven activity.

When we describe the art, "talk about" it, this is a reflective activity. So it's a matter of the conscious mind looking back at what has already been experienced, which is very different from allowing the affections of a direct experience. We might say that the affections are filtered by the mind when we look back. If one looks at a reconstruction, and approaches a piece with the reconstruction in hand, then an attempt is made to filter the experience prior to it occurring. That significantly effects the experience, more often than not I believe, in a negative way. This is what happens for instance when you read reviews prior to watching a movie. It focuses the anticipatory aspect of affection, and experience in general, in an unnatural way.

We do not ever close the gap between passive experience and active participation in this way, because it's based in a false sense of "knowing what will happen". This is why a live music performance of a song you've heard a hundred times on the same recording, has so much more affect. It allows for the unknown. Being in reception of the unknown is fundamental to the experience. But when we turn around and reflect, it is all coming from within so there is no element of surprise, no unknown. So the gap between passive and active is only really closed in the experience itself, where the presence of the unknown causes a real need for an active sort of affection. Otherwise, the affection is artificially passive, caused by that sense of knowing what will happen. Of course there is always a certain interplay of the two, but attempting to remove the unknown will not produce an affection consistent with true experience.

5. The promise of a different type of sensations/payoff. Very roughly, it will lead you to something like big Eureka moments. In metal, you can superficially spot where these moments tend to occur. Traditionally, it’s in the form of “riff breakdowns” that are announced “theatrically”: the vocalist sometimes emit a distinctive exclamative roar, there’s a big break in the drumming, or there’s a striking aesthetic transition (for example, Metallica’s Master of Puppets when it switches to clean-sounding guitars). In the context of “great” medium-specific narratives, these kind of moments gain a whole dimension of significance. In other genres like classical music, these moments are not so much theatricalized. For example, in Vivaldi (who is my go-to when it comes to medium-specific narratives) the moment can aesthetically look like any other moment, and someone with no awareness of the narrative will just not hear anything different. — thaumasnot

I don't see these features you describe as features of the narrative, but more like points where the narrative breaks down, to be replaced by a lack of narrative, something distinctly new, as if 'out of place'. This shows the importance of the unknown. The artist lulls you into a feeling of comfort, telling you a bedtime story, then all of a sudden the story is gone, and the artist is somewhere else completely. That's the power of the dichotomy in anticipation. When you're drawn into a story, you have a strong sense of knowing what will happen because it's confined within that story. Even though the story could twist and turn, and you know not what's coming up, it's actually extremely confined, as within that particular story. Therefore the anticipatory feature of your experience is highly subdued. But the artist has the capacity to jump right out of the story, at any moment, and since your anticipatory capacity has been dulled by the story, you get caught completely by surprise. The artist did something completely contrary to intuition, something seemingly impossible, suddenly transcending the story.

That's like when the pop music artist gets paid to mention a product in a song. I think it's actually an old technique.

Is the notion of freedom an objective feature of the painting? — Raymond

I'm pretty sure I would not see that painting as an expression of freedom. It's far too violent, and from the description the violence appears to be in the foreground. Try a dove maybe?

It seems the problem is that a small camera disturbs the equipment, because maybe a wire emitting IR radiation can produce false images. — Raymond

Wouldn't you be disturbed with a small camera on you all the time?

Any artist will tell you that the design of a painting explicitly directs the viewer’s
attention as a temporal unfolding. So the view may not recognize the story as explicit, but the creator of the art does. — Joshs

I agree, that this is the case once in a while. But often the artist wants the viewers to use their minds to create one's own narrative. In this case, the creator does not know the story, because the intention is to allow for whatever story the viewer wants to come up with. One viewer produces one narrative, another produces another, and the artist would say they are both acceptable, because the art was produced without a specific story in mind.

That's why I said reconstruction is a helper. A reconstruction of metal music would totally change how you listen to music (whether it's for the better remains to be seen), even though it just "copies". Your analysis of rock music is very typical (in fact, it isn't far from what in the Manifesto is described as "description for the blind/deaf"), and reconstructionism is historically a separation from the trend it represents. — thaumasnot

I guess I just don't understand why I need help to enjoy something I already enjoy. Perhaps if I didn't enjoy it, but wanted to enjoy it, that might help. But what would be the motivation to make me want to enjoy something which I do not. It's as if you treat me like a child and I don't want to eat my peas. You say, follow this technique and I'll help you to make peas taste good. Well, if peas are supposed to be good for me, I might want to develop a taste for peas, therefore follow the technique. But how is something like metal music good for me, so why would I want to develop the taste if I didn't already have it? And if I already had the taste for it, that taste would be based in something personal, so how would the reconstruction do anything but subtract from my enjoyment of it, through distraction?

A painting tells a story that unfolds temporally as one’s gaze moves from one object to another within the frame, and then circles back after having formed bits of narrative to be embellished or reconfigured by further looking. — Joshs

The point was that this "story" is not explicit, therefore whatever story you imagine, it's not at all objective.

The more we stare at a painting, the more it seems
to be doing and changing. — Joshs

Oh sorry, I didn't realize this was a school of art appreciation for acid trippers.