Doesn't the evidence of the cosmological background radiation put the earth at the center of the universe?

The more accurate statement then would be that the law does not necessarily correlate to morality, but sometimes it does, and sometimes it intentionally does. — Hanover

I find this to be an interesting statement. How could a law intentionally correlate to morality? Let's say that different lawmakers make laws for different reasons, morality might be one. Suppose a lawmaker proposes a law which is apprehended by that lawmaker as correlating to morality. Doesn't that law have to be passed by all the other lawmakers involved, before it becomes a law? Each of those lawmakers has one's own intentions. So, by the time the law is passed, the one who proposed the law had the intent of morality, but all the others had some other intentions, and unless those other intentions were morality, then we shouldn't say that the law intentionally correlates with morality.

If your local government legalized rape, wouldn't your objection to the law have something to do with the immorality of it, and don't you think your local politicians would be motivated to change the law based upon an appeal to their sense of right and wrong? If they do illegalize rape out of respect for its immorality, wouldn't that be an instance of a law having something to do with morality? — Hanover

Oh, this is a nice one. You appeal to your "local government". What happens when the local government is not consistent with the regional government? Who has the real authority?

If by an "assumed standard" you mean something that is adopted by a state or sovereign to regulate conduct, is codified, is enforceable by the state or others through an established system of processing and adjudicating violations or claims and making judgments, then I suppose an "assumed standard" may include laws. But I doubt that is what Austin intended by it. — Ciceronianus the White

Well if not that, which seems the obvious meaning of "assumed standard", what else could Austin possibly mean by "assumed standard"? Is Austin talking about some sort of "assumed standard" which has not actually been assumed? Wouldn't that be contradictory?

Oh no! The muon is a fiction and now the whole Standard Model is fucked. Oh well, I'm sure the physicists can apply the appropriate mathematical smoke and mirrors to make it all work out just fine.

I say: There is no Law but the Law! — Ciceronianus the White

What does "the Law" here refer to, other than an assumed standard?

They're not as interesting as your goats, and they're very destructive and mean. — Hanover

Being very destructive and mean makes them quite interesting. The wild boars are so destructive that many states have open season on them, no laws whatsoever governing the killing of them. This makes them a prime target for people who want to test out their own home made weapons of mass destruction. The YouTube footage seems to get a lot of views so some people must be interested. And you think the backyard slaughter of a few goats is disturbing.

Metaphysician Undercover commits a similar act, desiring uncertainty of the language he uses to formulate that very uncertainty. The difference is that Meta does not see that he is writing nonsense. — Banno

The fact that I express my uncertainty with language, just like I might express other emotions with language, doesn't mean that the emotion is a feature of the language.

This is just what is impossible, unless we want to consider screaming madness. — T H E

I explained very clearly why doubting the entire belief system is the only reasonable form of skepticism. Beliefs within a system are necessarily logically consistent and interrelated. That's what makes it a "system". To doubt one belief within a system requires doubting the beliefs it is dependent upon, and it is implied that the beliefs dependent upon the doubted belief are doubted as well. So it's unreasonable to doubt one belief without doubting the entire system within which it is integrated,

This is why the idea that there are hinge propositions which are somehow indubitable is unacceptable epistemology. If the entire system is intrinsically consistent, and valid, which it must be to be a "system", then no part of the system can be doubted without doubting the whole. And this would require doubting the supposed hinge propositions as well.

The preceding result, is the logical conclusion of assuming that beliefs exist as part of a "system". If we remove that premise, and allow that beliefs have individuality, free from the influence of an overall system, then it is reasonable to doubt individual beliefs. But then the whole game analogy, and the idea of hinge propositions is completely inapplicable. .

Yes, it appears quite possible to me too that a person could be uncertain. However, you do not appear to be uncertain, but quite dogmatically certain. you are playing the uncertainty card in order to dispute something that you do not in fact dispute. and that is the game I am playing back at you, that you are now disputing in turn. This is by way of a demonstration of something, rather than a proof of anything. You want to tell me "you probably already know what I mean," but you will not have it the other way about. — unenlightened

I am arguing that a certain type of doubt is reasonable to assume, not that I have that type doubt. Anyway, the fact that it appears to you that my personal form of doubt is actually dogmatic certainty, is irrelevant because you may be misunderstanding me. When you see a dog standing its ground, barking at you, and forbidding you to come closer, would you think that these actions of the dog are based in a dogmatic certainty?

I propose we revisit the premise, "doubt can occur only within a system of believe", and maybe we can find an acceptable compromise.

Let's first distinguish true doubt from fake doubt. Fake doubt is what you accused me of, playing the doubt card when I am actually dogmatically certain. True doubt is when a person is truly uncertain. So for example, an atheist might play the doubt card of fake doubt, in a discussion with a theist, pretending to doubt the reality of God, when that person really has certitude about the opposite. Only an agnostic would have true doubt in this situation.

Now let's position the "system of believe" relative to the true doubt. The doubting person cannot be "within" the system of believe because that would mean that the system is already accepted by that person. The doubt must be aimed at the system as a whole, because as "a system" we must assume that there is consistency between the parts (individual beliefs) of the system, and one cannot reasonably doubt one part of a consistent system. So true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole.

Would you agree with that? If we say doubt can only occur from within a system of belief, that system of belief must be other than the system being doubted. The two systems may not even be remotely related. So the assumption "doubt can occur only within a system of believe", is really an irrelevant point, because that system of belief must be other than the one which contains the belief being doubted.. And if we take the game analogy, true doubt can only come from the person who refuses to play the game, because to play the game is to consent to the rules, and to consent to the rules is to forfeit your right to doubt them.

Part V
Claiming to know only makes sense when doubt is possible.

This depends on the notion that our beliefs are to be found only within language games, each of which is formed by taking some beliefs as non-negotiable.

And is threatened by truth and knowledge being dependent on the language game in which the claims of truth or knowledge occur.

This is the claim. I can't at the moment see the argument. — Banno

Here's how what I stated above is relevant to this thread. If we assume that any specific language-game is a representation of a system of beliefs (consistency being a necessary requirement of "system"), then true doubt can only be directed at any specific language game from outside that particular game. I.e. the person who refuses to play. I'll call that person the skeptic, is the only one who may cast true doubt. If we assert that the skeptic must pose one's doubt from a position of being within a language-game, within a system of beliefs, then that system providing the skeptic's approach, must be other than the one doubted, and there cannot be consistency between these distinct language-games, or else true doubt would be impossible. This implies that language in general, as a whole, cannot be represented as a single language-game, because of the inconsistency between distinct language-games which makes true doubt a real thing.

The other course we could take, is to allow inconsistency within any specific language-game, and system of belief, thereby allowing for doubt within the system. If there is inconsistency within the game, or system, then doubt from within would be true justified doubt. But that ought to be seen as epistemologically unsound, to allow inconsistency to inhere within a system. It produces a faulty definition of "game" or "system", one in which the rules of the "game" contradict each other, or the "system" has parts which oppose each other, or are not conducive to its function.

So the logical course is to maintain that a language-game, or a system of beliefs, is necessarily consistent, and true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole, from outside that system. This is also the most practical solution, because if inconsistency appears to inhere within a system of beliefs, it is extremely difficult to isolate the defective parts, with the goal of doubting just those parts. So the entire system must be doubted as a whole. This implies that refusal to play the game is required, and we're at the point of doubting the entire system anyway.

If Moore held up his hand as said: "This is a hand" we could look and confirm that it is indeed a hand. — Fooloso4

What if he raised his arm and said "this is an arm"? How would that act of holding up his arm be different from the act of holding up his his hand? How do you propose that we could confirm whether he's actually holding up a hand, or an arm?

No it isn't. What is this 'doubt' of which you speak? — unenlightened

I could try to explain it to you, but if you are already doubtful of what I am saying without understanding what I am saying, then you probably already know what I mean, through your own doubt which requires no understanding, so there is no need.

From what perspective can a perspective be said to be deficient? — unenlightened

The perspective I speak of is the perspective of being uncertain. From the perspective of uncertainty, the claim that uncertainty requires certainty is seen as deficient. It appears as a misunderstanding of uncertainty. If you are uncertain about this "doubt" of which I speak, as you imply with your question, do you really believe that it is necessary that you are certain of something in order to support this uncertainty as real uncertainty? Do you not think that it is possible for a person (Socrates for example) to have a general, overall attitude of uncertainty, and therefore truly be uncertain about everything? Many people demonstrate an attitude of certainty, and others demonstrate an attitude of uncertainty. Why conflate these two opposing attitudes by insisting that the attitude of uncertainty is really a form of certainty?

It appears completely logical to me, that a person could actually have such an attitude of uncertainty, such a lack of confidence. So I really don't know why the idea is quickly rejected by so many people, as if uncertainty is just a form of certainty in disguise. Doesn't certainty require faith? Are there not people living without faith? Rearrange Grayling's argument. Certainty only occurs when there is faith. Sometimes faith is lacking. Therefore sometimes certainty is lacking. Where certainty is lacking there is doubt. Grayling's premise "doubt can only occur within a system of belief" is false. Those outside a system of belief are there because they lack faith in that system, therefore they are uncertain and doubtful of it, and this doubt is not from within the system, it is external to it.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false? — Luke

I think what Wittgenstein intends, is that it doesn't make sense to ask this question, because to ask whether they are true or false is to doubt them. The truth of them is accepted without having to say they are true, or ask of them, is this true.

I of course do not agree with this, as I see that there is no such thing as a proposition, or any sort of belief, or idea which is indubitable. That supposition seems so obviously false. Hinge propositions are a fiction and that's why it's so difficult for these people who believe in them to agree on the criteria of being such.

Or you're clearly not trying if it makes no sense to me. Someone speaking a different language to me clearly does not understand that I don't understand that language. Speaking and writing requires an understanding of your audiences understanding of the words you are using. It requires two or more following the same protocols to communicate. How you might communicate with a child or a person just learning English will be different than how you communicate with an adult that speaks English fluently. — Harry Hindu

The question you asked me was how can I apprehend that there is something which I cannot conceptualize. The example was, when someone speaks a foreign language to me, I can apprehend that the person is speaking to me but I cannot conceptualize what the person is saying. Therefore it is an example of what I said, there are aspects of what I am hearing, which I cannot conceptualize.

So you're saying that your dualism isn't one of mind vs. body, rather one of understanding vs mis-understanding? I still don't get it. — Harry Hindu

Don't fret, it's not a big deal if you do not understand dualism. But if you want to, I suggest studying some classical philosophy to get a grasp of the concepts.

And humans and their actions are outcomes of natural processes. The only reason you'd want to distinguish between what humans do and what everything else does is because you believe in the antiquated idea that humans are specially created or created separate from nature. — Harry Hindu

No, my reason for separating intentionally constructed things (artificial) from natural things, is to help me understand reality. Clearly we haven't yet obtained a firm grasp on reality, so I don't know why you would think that this is an antiquated approach.

Tree rings symbolize the age of the tree because of how the tree grows throughout the year, not anything to do with the intent of some human. — Harry Hindu

Obviously, the intent to determine the age of the tree is implied in this description. Otherwise you simply have a growing tree with the form that it grows into, nothing symbolized by that tree without the intent to determine something about it. Therefore you have not separated this relationship from intent, as you claim.

Humans come along and observe the tree rings and their intent is to understand what the tree rings are. The human attempts to grasp what is already there and the processes that produced the tree rings. This is how the human comes to understand what the tree rings are, which is what they mean. This is what humans do, we attempt to understand what exists by explaining the causal processes involved in producing what we observe. — Harry Hindu

Right, you seem to understand here. The relationship between the tree rings and the age of the tree is something determined by human beings through their intent to understand. It is a form of measurement. Do you agree? And do you see that measurement is an act of comparison carried out by human beings, relating one thing to another, rings to a time scale in this case? This comparison, act of relating one to the other, does not occur without those human beings.

The case Grayling has in mind seems to be that doubt can occur only within a system of believe; but doubts occur; hence there must be a system of belief in which to doubt. — Banno

The deficiency in this perspective is the idea that doubt must be justified. Once this idea is dismissed, doubt is merely uncertainty, and uncertainty need not be based in any form of certainty. So the proposition "doubt can occur only within a system of believe" is false. This assumes that "doubt" must be defined relative to something which is doubted, and does not respect the true nature of "doubt" which is lack of definition.

And you cannot get beyond this brute fact in the way unenlightened suggests: "If you want to play chess, you have to accept the rules as 'given'.", because the nature of free will, and the phrase "if you want..." does not produce the necessity required. So there is always the possibility that someone does not want to play the game, and this person's skepticism concerning the game itself, rather than the any specific rule, is still a valid "doubt", even though it remains unjustified.

This makes no sense. How can you apprehend something which cannot be conceptualized? Apprehend and conceptualize are synonyms. Both are akin to "grasping" something mentally. — Harry Hindu

You're clearly not trying, if it makes no sense to you. Have you ever "grasped" the idea that you do not understand something? That's what I mean. When someone speaks a foreign language for instance, you might apprehend that you do not understand what the person is saying.

Are not concepts natural things?? You seem to be making a special case for human minds, as if human minds are seperate from nature, when minds are just another causal relationship, like everything else. — Harry Hindu

In the ontology which I respect, concepts are artificial. Do you not respect the difference between natural and artificial? "Artificial" is commonly defined as produced by human act or effort rather than originating naturally.

What if it's interpreted wrong? Is it still a symbol? It seems more accurate, and less religious, to say effects represent/symbolize their causes. — Harry Hindu

I don't see any principle, other than 'what was intended by the author', whereby we'd distinguish a wrong interpretation from a right interpretation of a symbol. Therefore your claim that a natural effect symbolizes its cause (without an appeal to intention), is just as likely to be incorrect as correct. So it's a worthless assertion.

I don't understand. You apprehend both what? What is incompatible? — Harry Hindu

You asked me:

When you look at the world what do you see?

Is it concepts all the way down? — Harry Hindu

It is not concepts all the way down, I am dualist, so I see (apprehend with my mind), that there are aspects of the sensible world which cannot be conceptualized. That is the incompatibility between the intelligible and the sensible, which gives the need for dualism.

It don't see how fundamentally, symbols always represent something mental when you just said that concepts can represent natural things, unless you're saying that natural things are mental, but then that would make you an idealist/pansychist, not a dualist. — Harry Hindu

A concept is not a symbol. So a symbol can represent a concept which can represent a natural thing. But a symbol cannot represent a natural thing directly because it is required that a mind establishes the relation required in order that something can be a symbol. Therefore, it is necessary that a mind acts as a medium, between the symbol and the thing, in order that the symbol can be a symbol. This is what it means to be a "symbol" to be related to soemthing by a mind.

Do tree rings represent the age if the tree independent of someone looking at the tree rings? — Harry Hindu

No, that's nonsensical. A symbol must be interpreted to represent anything, and what it represents is a function of the interpretation.

Here's something to consider. There is an age old line of thought which holds that the entire sensible universe must be recreated at each moment of passing time. I believe this idea is prominent in Hinduism, but it can be derived from the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, and is consistent with the Thomistic notion of aeviternal, the type of temporality which angels have, being a sort of medium between God and the physical world. Angels account for the separate substance Forms, required as what maintains the continued existence of the sensible objects, the means of Providence. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-94-010-2800-4%2F1.pdf

When we consider the reality of human choice, free will, we see the need to reject the necessity assigned to the continuity which comprises the substance of our empirical reality. This continuity is what is expressed in Newton's first law, the inertia of mass. It is theorized, based on empirical observation, that the inertia of mass will continue, unabated, without the action of an external force to interrupt. We can see though, that in reality this continuity is not necessary, and therefore requires a cause itself. So if Newton's law is inverted, we see that the temporal continuity of mass requires an internal cause.

Now, our common conceptions of space are woefully inadequate because we do not dimensionalize space in an internal/external format. All space is given equal status in mathematics (the same rules hold, big or small), and there is no way to properly relate an internal force to an external force. As a result, we can see that the "strong interaction" force of quarks for example, is independent of distance. So we might conclude that the force could act equally over an infinitely short, or an infinitely long, distance.

The problem which is very evident, if we account for the need to assume that spatial existence recreates itself at each passing moment in time, is that the established relationship between space and time, which forms the convention, is not at all indicative of reality. If spatial existence is recreated at each moment, then we need to assume something like a Big Bang occurring at each passing moment of time. But it's not one Big Bang, but a separate Big Bang at each point in space, and all these points must be related through some underlying Forms (the angels). And this is completely inconsistent with the continuity of massive existence which empirical observation gives us.

If a proposition by its very nature is a hinge, then it's not doubtable. — Sam26

The reason why the hinge is not doubted, is because it is unreasonable to doubt it. It is unreasonable because of what fooloso4 says, so much hinges on it, not because it has a certain relation to reality. I don't think Wittgenstein discussed "reality". What would you even mean by that, other than so much (what we apprehend as reality) hinges on it?

I'm thinking of working up an article on 'scientific idealism'. — Wayfarer

I perceive a deep divide between idealism and materialism which was propagated by Hegel. He laid the grounds for unabashed idealism to swallow up western science, while at the very same time the Marxist interpretation produced a strong materialism.

When you look at the world what do you see?

Is it concepts all the way down? — Harry Hindu

No, I'm dualist, I apprehend both, with a fundamental incompatibility between the objects which I see, and the concepts which I understand.

Do objects and their behaviors symbolize mathematical concepts or do mathematical concepts symbolize objects and their behaviors? — Harry Hindu

It goes both ways. Some scientists try model the behaviour of natural things using concepts, but artificial things are representations of concepts. Fundamentally, symbols always represent something mental.

We are basically pigs. — god must be atheist

Reminds me of Pink Floyd Animals
"And any fool knows a dog needs a home
A shelter from pigs on the wing."

So when you look at reality you see numbers and mathematical function symbols, not objects and their processes? F=ma refers to a state of affairs that isn't just more math. — Harry Hindu

When I look around, I do not see force, nor does "f=ma" refer to a state of affairs, it is a universal, which is a generalization. Force is a concept. And I do not think we can adequately differentiate between mathematical concepts and non-mathematical. Is "large" a mathematical concept? Are shapes mathematical?

You are close to what I think is a key unsettled issue for such exegesis: are language games incommensurable with each other? — Banno

If they are distinct and different language games then they are incommensurable because commensurability would produce one game. This is why equivocation is a fallacy. The logical relationship between a word's use in one game, and its use in another game, cannot be established.

However, the inclination is to assume that language, in general, is one game. But this assumption requires commensurability between the various games, to produce the one game of language. It's like the question of what does "3" refer to. Does it refer to three distinct and different objects, or does it refer to one object, the number 3? It depends on how you use it. But how could these two different ways be commensurable?

Not all language-games or all uses are correct. If I teach a child how to use the word pencil, and later the child points to a cat, and says, pencil, then their use of the word is incorrect, even if it's used in a particular language-game. — Sam26

I would dispute this "correctness" is determined relative to a language-game. There is nothing to indicate that one language-game would produce a more correct use of a word than another. So the game you play, when teaching your child the word "pencil" is just as correct as the other game which uses "cat" instead.

If that is the case, then the following is untrue as well. We can arbitrarily make up language-games, and derive meaning from those games.

However, this is not to say that all language-games have the same force, or that we can arbitrarily make up any language-game and derive meaning from it. The same is true of use, I can't arbitrarily use words the way I want without the loss of meaning. — Sam26

The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. And, this must be viewed from outside our subjective view. It's viewed by looking at the community of language users, not one's personal interpretation. One's personal interpretation may or may not line up with the community, and this corresponds to the correct or incorrect interpretation. When I say correct and incorrect, I'm speaking generally, if it wasn't true generally, language would simply fall apart. — Sam26

This argument is untenable as well. There are no principles to determine what constitutes "playing the game correctly". It is a matter of your judgement, or my judgement, of whatever rules are apprehended as applicable. And this amounts to "one's personal interpretation". To step outside one's own personal interpretation, and get an objective view, or the view from "the community of language users" is impossible. So it really doesn't make any sense to assume such a thing as the correct or incorrect interpretation under these principles.

To make the judgement of correct interpretation, we would commonly refer to the intent of the speaker. But if dismiss this as a determining factor, and proceed toward a "game" system of modeling, there is no principle to determine the "correct" game, and its applicable rules.

So are you saying that the mathematical symbols don't refer to anything that isn't just more math? — Harry Hindu

That's what mathematicians claim, so I would think there is some truth to it. If there is anything more than math, being referred to, this is dependent on application.

What makes our universe more real than the others, or what makes us sure ours is the real one? — TiredThinker

That's the problem with describing reality in terms of possible worlds, we lose the premise whereby we distinguish what is actually the case, the real, from what is possible. There is no such thing as the real world in that description, because giving one world a special status would negate the premise which gives all possible worlds equal status as possible worlds.

This is similar to the is/ought gap. One might propose principles whereby we could designate what "is", but the two ways of mapping would remain fundamentally incompatible such that the two ways would not be on the same map.

Thanks. I don't agree with your rejection of platonic realism, however. As far as I know, Plato never placed dianoia - mathematical and discursive knowledge - at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge. It was higher than mere opinion, but didn't provide the same degree of certainty as noesis. — Wayfarer

What Plato placed at the top of the hierarchy is the study or knowledge of ideas and forms. But I do not think that "certainty" is the proper descriptive term for the higher levels of knowledge. Aristotle followed a similar division, and named the highest as intuition. You can see that there might be something amiss with describing this as certainty. The higher forms of knowledge lead us to higher levels of correctness, or good in Plato's world, but this is not really based in certainty.

Modern epistemology places too much emphasis on certainty, but certainty is just a form of certitude, which is an attitude. And this attitude is more properly associated with the lower levels of knowledge like opinion. We become certain of our opinions, but the true knowledge seeker always keeps an open mind.

Have you heard of Sabine Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math? She too agrees that mathematicism in physics, if we can call it that, is leading physics drastically astray, but that has nothing really to do with Platonism, as such. It is the consequence of speculative mathematics extended beyond the possibility of empirical validation. — Wayfarer

I haven't heard of that book, maybe I'll check it out when I get a chance. I believe the problem referred to is related to Platonism, because a misunderstood Platonic perspective is what validates the separation of logic (such as speculative mathematics) from empirical validation. When Forms are allowed completely separate existence, then a coherent logical structure need not be grounded in empirical fact. So we might construct an elaborate and very eloquent logical structure, which is even very useful for the purpose (good) that it serves, without having any real substance. That in itself is not bad, but amateur philosophers, and many common people will come to believe that it is saying something real and true about the universe, when in reality the whole structure is just designed to make predictions based on statistics, or something like that, and it's not saying anything real or true about the universe.

The aspect of platonism I focus on is the simple argument that 'number is real but incorporeal' and that recognising this shows the deficiencies of materialism, and also something fundamental about the nature of reason. How to think about the question is also important. I think there's huge confusion about the notion of platonic 'entities' and 'objects' and the nature of their existence. Most of that confusion comes from reification, which is treating numbers as actual objects when they're not 'objects' at all except for metaphorically. — Wayfarer

Recognizing the reality of the incorporeal is a very important step. The way I see it is that if anyone has any formal training in the discipline of philosophy, this recognition cannot be avoided. There are many self-professed philosophers who will not make the effort to properly train themselves, and will simply deny the reality of the incorporeal. For whatever reason, I don't know, they tend to deny the reality of what they have not educated themselves about. Perhaps it is simplicity sake, monism provides a nice simple approach to reality, and whatever aspects of reality it cannot explain, they can be ignored as unimportant to those materialistically minded people. But unless a person is ready to take on the task of informing oneself about the immaterial, having a personal reason to do so, some sort of interest, it seems unlikely that the deficiencies of materialism will ever become evident to such a person. It's like morality, unless a person has the attitude, the desire to be morally responsible, the person will never see the benefits of morality.

My response is to acknowledge that this timeline is empirically true, and that I concur with the evidence in respect of the timeline of human evolution. But I also point out - and this is the crucial point - that 'before' is itself a human construct. The mind furnishes the sequential order within which 'before' and 'since' exist. In itself the Universe has no sense of 'before' or 'since' or anything of the kind. — Wayfarer

This is well said, and I will extend this to point out that the whole concept of "the Universe" is just a human construct as well. So it makes no sense to argue from the premise that "the Universe existed before humanity evolved to see it". This is because, as "the Universe", is simply how we see things (as per Kant, phenomena). Therefore it assumes that our conception of "the Universe" correctly represents what existed before humanity, and this requires that temporal extrapolation which is doubtful.

This proposition, that "the Universe existed before humanity evolved to see it" is only justified if our conception of "the Universe" truly correlates with what existed before humanity, otherwise it's similar to the often quoted expression "have you stopped beating your wife", where you start by assuming something unjustified, likely a falsity, and say something about it. It's nonsensical.

Therefore, as philosophical skeptics, we ought to call into question, all the mathematical constructs, and the premises employed by the theories of physics, to determine their justification to assess our conception of "the Universe". And this is why platonic realism needs to be rejected. Platonic realism leads to the idea that mathematics provides us with eternal unchanging truths, and this supports the idea that "the Universe", as we conceive of it is a true conception, based in the eternal truths of mathematics. Then when the relationship between what is theorized about "the Universe" through mathematics, and what is actually observed empirically, becomes completely disjointed, (as in quantum mechanics wave/particle duality), platonic realism pushes us into this notion that mathematics (which is really a human construct), is the underlying fabric of the Universe which existed before humanity evolved to see it. This is because the underlying fabric or "substance" of the new conception of "the Universe" is no longer consistent with empirical observation. Therefore if "the Universe" is to represent something real, the mathematics must be real, because that's all that's there, mathematics with nothing empirically observable.

For this reason, it was refreshing to hear from CERN this week, that they may grudgingly have to admit that another previously unknown force may exist in nature. This may fit in with the long term concerns about our inability to detect something that should be everywhere - and in profusion - Dark Energy. — Gary Enfield

So, what's this new information?

The video which Tim suggested, does present such a distortion to preserve C by arguing, without evidence, that space is expanding - what more do I need to say? There is no proof that space is expanding. — Gary Enfield

The idea of spatial expansion is just an escape. When objects are observed to be moving faster than the speed of light, it is proposed that the substance which they exist in, is actually changing, so this doesn't qualify as "motion" in accepted usage. But what this does is introduce the concept of a changing or evolving substratum. And if the substratum, within which objects exist, is changing in this way, which is not accounted for in our normal modeling of motions, then this conventional modeling of motions is invalid. So what this assumption (spatial expansion) does is invalidate conventional models of motions.

If so, here's an exposition discrediting it - and if not, we can continue quarreling incessantly.

v=dsdtv=dsdt doesn't suffice herein - since it doesn't attain the velocity of a body on the fabric it's ensconced in, if the fabric migrates too. — Aryamoy Mitra

Yes, this is the problematic issue, the ideal that "the fabric migrates". Conventional modeling of motions does not account for the migration of the fabric. If it is true that the fabric is migrating then it is also true that conventional modeling of motions is incorrect, because the part of the motion which ought to be attributed to the migration of the fabric is unknown, and not accounted for.

I think you provide a very good argument. "Life" as we use the word, is defined by what we find here on earth. I've heard it said before that terrestrial life is carbon based, and there is speculation of the possibility of non-carbon life. But I don't think that this would qualify as "life" as we know life, and use the term.

The conclusion I think should be that the word "life" has a specific usage by us, to refer to certain forms of existence on this planet. And, if we hypothesize realistically about forms of existence in other parts of the universe, and desire to call them "life", then there must be something to indicate that such forms would be consistent in their physical constitution with the forms of life on earth, and this would indicate some sort of continuity in the form of a relation between here and there to account for that consistency. This is what we find here on earth, consistency and continuity between all life forms. When we find a form of existence, like a rock, which does not bear that continuity we do not call it "life". This principle ought to hold for discovery in other parts of the universe. If there is no continuity between the forms of existence on earth which we call "life", and the forms of existence discovered far away, there is no reason to call them "life", they need a different name.

So for example. when we speculate about physical existence in other parts of the universe, we establish a relationship between there and here through laws of physics, and we assume certain continuities to exist between there and here, such as electromagnetic activity, and fundamental atoms. Without this continuity of principles, forming a relationship between here and there, such speculation would be completely random and useless. Likewise, if we are to speculate about a specific type of existence which we find here on earth, as existing elsewhere in the universe, "life", it is completely useless and nonsensical to make such speculations without the assumption of some sort of relationship to establish a continuity between what is her and what is there, or else we are not really talking about "life" out there.

So you opted to suggest that I'm lying about the whole thing instead of just asking "Would you please provide some links?" — TonesInDeepFreeze

I still think you're lying. I don't believe there is any such thing as proof that "2+1" denotes the same object as "3" does. I think it's false, and I think you know it's false. But you're in denial, and you've come up with this proposition that the "method of models" provides a proof, as a ruse.

I seem to have this uncanny ability to sing in my head too. — Olivier5

If you had the ability to get a song out of your head I might be inclined to call that uncanny.

You tend to think irrationally or not at all. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I can't help it if your terminology is a little off the beaten path. You kept referring to a "method of models", and I couldn't even find that on google. Now I see you were really talking about model theory.

I took a look at your first reference. The book is directed at graduate students in mathematics, but it distinctly says in the preface that fundamental philosophical problems are not dealt with.

"Philosophical and foundational problems of mathematics are not systematically discussed within the constraints of this book, but are to some extent considered when appropriate."

I took at look at the second reference, and it does discuss "model theory", but I don't see how anything there can be used to prove that "2+1" denotes the same object as "3". The fact that mathematicians utilize that assumption does not prove that it is true.

I took a look at the third reference, and it tells me that in model theory the truth or falsity of a statement is understood to be dependent on the interpretation.

So, it appears to me, like you and I are both correct according to model theory. I interpret the statement "2+1" denotes the same thing as "3" as false, and you interpret it as true, and neither of us is wrong. We each interpret "2+1" differently and so, 'that "2+1" denotes the same thing as "3"' is false for me and true for you. Therefore we ought not even talk about whether it's true or false, because that's not something which could ever be determined. Is this conclusion correct? If so, then it clearly does not prove that "2+1" denotes the same object as "3".

I took a look at the fourth reference and it doesn't seem to be relevant.

I took a look at the fifth, and it just talks about structures as if they are objects, so it seems like this article simply assumes what you need to prove. By the way, most these articles you refer seem to have that problem. Your task is to prove that "2+1" refers to the same object which "3" refers to, not to show me instances where this is taken for granted. I already know, from your behaviour and the behaviour of others, that this is taken for granted. There is no need to prove that now.

And so I find the same problem with the sixth reference. It states right of the bat: "In this
course we develop mathematical logic using elementary set theory as given..."

What sort of proof is this, which takes what you are tasked with proving as a given? I think you are simply continuing with your fallacy of begging the question.

So reconsider what you said in the op now:

Silently hum a note in your mind. Now duplicate that same frequency aloud. I think some readings of the Private Language argument would say this activity is nonsense because there's no way to tell if the note you hum is the same as the note in your mind.. — frank

Let's start with the assumption that "there's no way to tell if the note you hum is the same as the note in your mind". Ask yourself is it necessary that the note you hum be the very same (numerical identity) as the note in your mind, in order for your humming to be significant, have meaning, or be a sensible activity. If the answer is no, as it clearly is, then the so-called private language argument has no bearing.

I find nothing about the "method of models" in my google search so I tend to think it is something you made up as a ruse, citing all these prerequisite subjects for understanding.

Under "Scientific Modelling" in Wikipedia I find this:

"Scientific modelling is a scientific activity, the aim of which is to make a particular part or feature of the world easier to understand, define, quantify, visualize, or simulate by referencing it to existing and usually commonly accepted knowledge."

Notice the explicit statement of "...to make a particular part or feature of the world easier to understand..". That's exactly what I said about the term "equal", it refers to a designated part, aspect, feature, or property of an object. Two distinct objects are said to be equal on the basis of modelling a part. The issue however, is how do you proceed from modelling a part, and concluding equality based on a model of that part, to making a conclusion about the whole?

I meant the same frequency. — frank

The problem is that it's not really "the same". Tones of the same frequency from two different instruments are not the same tone, for example, there are overtones and all sorts of other interference patterns. If you have a sound in your mind, from an instrument, and you try to match the pitch of that sound with your mouth, you are selecting a part of the sound, (the principal pitch) and trying to replicate it. If your goal is to produce that pitch you are not necessarily trying to replicate the sound exactly.

I don't see that. I think it attacks the British empiricist psychology of ideas and impressions: the narrative of a private construction of mind from sense-data. His argument seems to be that identity and similarity of the internals has no basis when asserted in private. I don't see any conflating of numerical identity with similarity. — bongo fury

The premise of the argument, is that one would take a sensation signify it as "S", and every time the same sensation occurs it is noted as "S". The problem is that reoccurring sensations are not the same sensation, each time it occurs, it is a new instance of a similar sensation, therefore it is distinct and in some sense different. To create the private language argument it is necessary to assume that the symbol "S" is supposed to denote the very same object each time it is employed. Then the issue is on what criteria is the use of the symbol validated. How does the user know that it is the very same object? But when we recognize that the symbol "S" is simply employed to signified a similar sensation, not the very same thing, and the criteria is completely subjective, and this is consistent with language use in general, then the so-called private language argument cannot be constructed.

So the issue pointed to by Wittgenstein is the judgement of similarity, it is not the issue of judgement of identity or sameness. He creates ambiguity by using the word "same" to refer to similar things, in the common way of usage known as qualitative identity, and allows the reader to create a private language argument through the assumption that "same" is being used in the sense of numerical identity. The latter would be a faulty interpretation. Then the question which follows ought to be, on what criteria do we judge similarity. If the judgement is base on private principles and there is no requirement for public input, then a private language is possible.

How do you know the early and later internals are the same? — frank

The resolution to this is issue is to realize that they are not ever "the same", but they are the same type. Unless one has absolute pitch it's just a tone (same type), and even with absolute pitch the two tones are not the same tone, but still the same type with a more precise definition or criteria for that type. The private language argument misleads us into thinking that we must recognize two things as being the same thing in order for such a recognition to be useful. But this is not the case, because we only need to recognize similarities, and hence types.

Thanks for the example --- not that I understand it.

Maybe the current crises in cosmology and physics vindicate Plato's original contention that matter itself is unintelligible. — Wayfarer

That's the way Aristotle designed his system of logic, from the premise that matter is unintelligible. Part of the physical reality is intelligible, form, and part is unintelligible, matter. It was evident that there are aspects of reality which cannot be understood because they appear to defy the three fundamental laws of logic. What Aristotle did was insist that we uphold the law of identity, and insist that we uphold the law of non-contradiction, but for that aspect of reality which appears unintelligible he allowed that the law of excluded middle to be violated under certain circumstance. So for example, in the case of future occurrences which have not yet been determined (the sea battle tomorrow for example), propositions concerning them are neither true nor false. And even after the event occurs, if it does, it is deemed incorrect to think that the proposition stating that it would occur was true prior to it occurring. In his Physics and Metaphysics, "matter" is assigned to this position of accounting for the real ontological existence of potential, that which may or may not be.

Any property? They're called bricks. Can you think of any reason why? And if your and my sevens are not the same, then I have some ones and fives I'll trade for your tens and twenties. — tim wood

I don't see your point. Your ones and fives, and my tens and twenties are physical objects like bricks. And each one of your ones is different from every other one of your ones, just like each brick is a different brick, despite the fact that they may all look the same to you. So why would you assume that there is some type of a one, which is the very same one as every other one, despite occurring in distinct situations?

Great, and where do those come from? Mind, now, nothing human here. — tim wood

They are proposed as Divine, therefore not from human minds.

And see if you can find one, any one, off by itself where no mind is to have it. — tim wood

If you read what I said, you'd understand it as saying that the separate Ideals, which are the property of a Divine Mind, are not found by human minds. Human minds are lacking in the perfection required for such Ideals.

And you're the guy who goes to the building supply store to purchase bricks. You're handed two bricks, one in each hand. You look at the one in your left hand and say, "That is one great brick!" And you look at the one in your right hand and say, "What the hell is that?!" There may be strange things in your philosophy - clearly there are - but nothing stranger than your philosophy. You can buy a brick, but not bricks. And I'm thinking that's a problem Plato would not have had. — tim wood

Clearly, despite the fact that I have two things both of which I call a brick, and I have a similar brick in my right hand to the one in my left hand, they are not both the same thing. The fact that the two things, called bricks, each have a different identity, is what the law of identity is meant to express. Do you agree with this?