But what about 'quantum time'? If the mathematics that describe change in the quantum world are different from the mathematics of change in the physical world then are there not two (space)times? Quantum time and physical time? Are the mathematics of quantum change sufficiently different from relativity to justify the idea that quantum particles live in a different spacetime? — EnPassant

This is a problem which Kenosha Kid did not seem to want to acknowledge in the other thread. I presented it as a need for two distinct concepts of space. You present it as a need for two distinct concepts of spacetime. Kenosha seems to think that the problem can be resolved by allowing for time reversal, but that's naivety.

But if you truly understood the significance of the present, then you would not turn to any authority whatsoever, but being intelligent, actively conscious, you would be able to adjust yourself constantly to the movement of life. — J. Krishnamurti

So is this the key to ending chaos and suffering, to truly understand the significance of the present?

I think that the significance of the present is as the division between past and future. But when Moses asked God who are you, in Exodus, God said "I am that I am" (depending on translation). This indicates that there is a sort of "being" involved with the present. I wonder if these two notions of present are compatible, being at the present in the sense of "I am", and the present as a division between future and past.

:smile:

I have to say one things I've noticed in all of the 'freedom at all costs' apologetic replies...

... 'existential crisis' has really been dumbed down in the past few years.

'Give me convenience even if it gives them death'. — Mayor of Simpleton

It's an interesting experiment, how so many people will give up moral responsibility at the drop of a hat, for the sake of insignificant pleasure. It seems like if one individual person does not follow the rules, for the sake of "freedom", then the next will see this transgression as an excuse not to follow the rules, quickly producing a cascade, until a large portion of society falls into that hole. Monkey see monkey do.

Decoherence usually is. — Kenosha Kid

"Decoherence" is fundamentally flawed. It assumes coherence as the natural, observer independent condition of existence. But coherence is the property of a "system". Such a system is either completely artificial, or an arbitrary designation, or a combination of these two. In both cases, it's a human construct. Therefore coherence is a manufactured condition, either as a physically constructed system, or as an arbitrarily applied theoretical ideal. It is self-contradictory to conceive of coherence as the independent state of existence, when it is clearly a manufactured condition.

The frame invariance of relativity suggests that the temporal and spatial aspects of this process should be interchangeable... — Kenosha Kid

This is the problem I explained to you earlier. Proceeding from spatial location A to location B is reversible, and the reverse may be represented as proceeding from B to A. Going from time 1 to time 2 is not reversible. Therefore it is inaccurate to represent the temporal and spatial aspects of a process as interchangeable. I believe that's why there is a distinction between space-like and time-like in the conventional application of relativity theory. You seem to disregard this convention with your science fiction.

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, the question is whether a simple machine can self-evolve into a complex machine without the help from any external intelligence. A machine is defined as an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task. Such machines would be deterministic, without free-will and without consciousness. — RussellA

I really do not think that such a machine could "self-evolve" in a deterministic world. I think "evolve" is incompatible with determinism. Doesn't the theory of evolution require undetermined mutations?

Time dependent vector fields - like force fields that fluctuate - show symmetry occasionally. Here is an elementary and casual discussion of the subject. — jgill

That's an interesting article John. It shows how one might predict the movement of an object through a force field using a vector field. I think what Kenosha Kid is arguing is that a particle predicts its own end point by receiving information backwards in time from that end. The existence of the particle between emission and absorption can then be represented as a determinable symmetry between the need to be emitted and the need to be absorbed. But this requires a direct relation (ideal reversibility) between emission and absorption.

Certain mathematical formulae or processes in physics show a symmetry in the time variable. How this relates to "going back in time" is a reasonable question. — jgill

There is a problem with the use of equations in modern mathematics which you know I've discussed in other thread. Mathematicians tend to treat the two sides of the equation as signifying the very same thing, some ideal (eternal Platonist) mathematical object. However, if you look at an equation such as 2+2=4 (the example in the other thread), you'll see that the + represents an operation which is absent from the other side of the equation. An operation is a time dependent process. Therefore, to properly interpret the meaning of that equation we need to recognize that we have established equality between a time dependent operation on the left, and a time independent quantity on the right. This indicates that the effects of time have been dismissed from the expression of equivalence (the equation) as irrelevant, inessential, or accidental.

The mathematical equation according to modern axioms, is constructed without regard for the effects of time. What is represented is mathematical objects (eternal Platonist), and the difference between different operations (temporal processes) is dispensed as a difference which makes no difference. So when mathematics is applied in physics, it is inevitable that there will be symmetry in the time variable. The evidence is abundant, as Kenosha Kid attests, above. The very axioms which mathematicians employ, the premises for the mathematical proceedings, have already dismissed the effects of time as irrelevant. Consequently, the conclusions drawn will show that the effects of time are irrelevant, therefore temporal processes are represented as reversible.

A good example of the problem involved with ignoring the temporality of mathematical operations is the difference between the conventions employed in the two operations (processes) called multiplication and division. In multiplication we start with a definite quantity, and increase that quantity. This produces a well defined fundamental unit and the product cannot be outside the boundaries of that defined unit. There is no remainder as there may be in division. In division however, we allow the unit to be divided indefinitely, producing repeating decimals and irrational numbers. Therefore the conventions of division annihilate the fundamental unit, there cannot be a fundamental unit according to those conventions. Now we can make two opposing principles or axioms, one for multiplication, that we must start with a fundamental unit, and one for division, that there is no fundamental unit, as the unit is infinitely divisible.

The difference between multiplication and division, that they cannot be inversions of each other under current conventions, becomes very evident in wave theory, such as that employed in music. The octave serves as the fundamental unit, and we can create harmonies through either multiplication or division. But there is a problem in division which creates inconsistency, dissonance, in the tones created by division, with the tones created by multiplication. So there are two conventional ways of dividing the octave, just temperament, and equal temperament, each based in different principles designed to mitigated the difference between division and multiplication. The principal issue is that the initial choice for the fundamental unit, the octave, is arbitrary. Having an arbitrary unit as the fundamental unit, manifests in the reality of division being not a direct inversion of multiplication. This problem is foundational to the Fourier uncertainty, and it will not be resolved until we determine a fundamental unit which is not arbitrary, and adhere to the principle that the unit cannot be divided. Only then could we have a true ideal which would allow multiplication and division to be inversions of each other.

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light anywhere between 640nm and 680nm is shone on a receptor of a machine, the machine can respond with the single output "red".
IE, a machine is able to give a single response covering a range of observations. — RussellA

Yeah but who decides how the machine is to be programmed? And who decides what light to shine? Your described "deterministic world" is not really a deterministic world, because it requires people making such decisions.

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light is shone on a receptor of machine A, and the frequency of the light is different to what has been observed by the machine before, the machine gives it a name - such as Frequency660, where the second part of the name is the frequency of the light in nm. When this name, Frequency660, is passed to machine B, machine B emits light of the same frequency contained within the second part of the name.
IE, if one machine creates a name, a different machine will be able to relate to that name. — RussellA

What you describe here is clearly not a deterministic world.

Yeah, that's really not how empiricism works. You can't look at a red car and state that your strongly held belief that all cars are red is empirical. If you want to know whether the elementary process of QED are reversible or not, you can't look at thermodynamics and say, "Well, that's irreversible, therefore everything is!" That's just backward thinking. — Kenosha Kid

We are not talking about whether this or that specific process is reversible, we are talking about whether time is reversible. It is an empirical fact that time is not reversible, this is made evident by the second law of thermodynamics. It never has reversed, and there is absolutely no reason to believe that it ever will, this would violate that law. Though it makes good science fiction to talk about a reversal of time, it is literally backward thinking.

Now, all elementary processes of QED known to human beings, are temporal processes. And, time is not reversible. Therefore no elementary process of QED known to human beings is reversible. If there are some processes which are non temporal then they are unknown to human beings, and to portray them as a plain reversal of a temporal process is simple naivety. It doesn't even make sense to talk about non temporal things as processes.

If you want to look at some aspects of QED as being not describable as temporal processes, then you need to get beyond this simple idea that a non temporal thing is a straight reversal of a temporal process. Once you remove the constraints of "temporal process", which means to follow the direction of time, then you open a whole new realm of possibility in thinking, and there is really no reason to restrict your thinking to a simple reversal. In fact, it makes no sense to think that something outside the constraints of time would mimic a process constrained by time, but do it in reverse. That would be like assuming that if something was not constrained by gravity, it would act in a way opposite to gravity. What reason is there to think in this way?

t's not deductive, it's inductive. — Kenosha Kid

Look again, the argument is deductive. P1.Time is not reversible. P2. All the known processes of QED are processes in time. Therefore no processes of QED are reversible. P1 is inductive, that's why I say it is an empirical principle, it's based in experience, observation. But the argument that no process of QED is reversible is deductive. Do you see the logic? All processes are temporal, they are features of the passing of time, that's the nature of what a "process" is. Time is not reversible, and this is evident from the second law of thermodynamics, therefore all these things which we call processes, which are features of the passing of time, are not reversible.

Yes, to think that the collective professor-hood of world physics didn't think to come and check what you personally find intuitively plausible before constructing their curricula. What an oversight! — Isaac

It's not a matter of intuitive plausibility, it's a matter of empirical evidence.

Then don't describe it as empirical. What it is is a strongly held belief. — Kenosha Kid

Obviously, it's a strongly held belief because it is empirical. Empirical means based in observation and experience rather than theory. Clearly, the strength in the belief that time is unidirectional is provided for by experience and observation, and therefore it is empirical. The idea that time is reversible is provided for by theory (such as the special theory of relativity) and is therefore non-empirical.

And yet you just said we don't need empirical evidence because a claim is sufficient. — Kenosha Kid

That's not what I said. I said deductive logic is sufficient. And, the premises of the deductive argument are validated by empirical evidence. The idea that time is unidirectional is not simply a claim, it is a proposition strongly supported by empirical evidence.

Fine. If all you have is an insistence to the contrary, your response is ridiculously pointless. — Kenosha Kid

What is pointless, is for someone like you, to come into a philosophy forum, and argue determinism based on premises derived from science fiction, produced from the fringes of relativity theory, enabled by the deficiencies of the faulty boundaries of that theory. We can argue whatever we want, if we take our premises from science fiction.

As I tried to tell you days ago, your efforts would be much more productively spent if you sought the medium within which the waves exist, so that you can establish a relationship between that medium and material (massive) existence. The Michelson-Morley experiments demonstrate that this relationship is completely unknown to us. Rather than pretending that there is no such medium, and going off into the opportunities for science fiction created by that misunderstanding, we need to put effort toward understanding the nature of that medium.

And this is sufficient. If the mathematical entity -- the wavefunction -- is doing its job in yielding accurate predictions of statistical outcomes, it corresponds to something real. It doesn't need to be the case that the epistemic object we deal with be identical to the ontic thing it represents. That's true generally in mathematical physics. — Kenosha Kid

This might be true, but it provides no directional guidance for interpretation. Statistical evidence and mathematics provide for prediction, Theory provides a description of what occurs. Now, there is a gap between these two which is bridged with interpretation. So, as an example, I can map the position of sunrise day after day for years, and develop predictive capacity, (like Thales predicted the solar eclipse), then I can relate this predictive capacity to my theory (which may be science fiction) that a giant dragon carries the sun in its mouth from sunset to release it again on the eastern horizon at sunrise, at the predicted spot. The deficiencies of my interpretation are exposed as 'how does the dragon act so mechanistically to find the exact point of release every day?'. Your science fiction interpretation demonstrates the inverse problem. You assign mechanistic reliability to something which is understood as stochastic.

I've heard it argued that privacy is a modern concept. A couple hundred years ago there was no such thing.

I see an object emitting a wavelength of 640nm, and say "I see a red object". I see an object emitting a wavelength of 680nm, and say "I see a red object". Whether "I" have free will or not, my statement "I see a red object" is necessarily semantically indeterminate, in that I could be referring to any wavelength between 640 and 680nm. — RussellA

You're missing the point. The word "red" could only come to describe both of these objects if there is freedom of choice in usage. If there was no choice, "red" could only be used to refer to one or the other. That you can define "red" as between 640 and 680 doesn't make the use of the word determinate, because we cannot determine with our eyes, precisely whether the colour falls in that range, so people could not abide by definitions, then they'd rely on free choice to decide . Besides, your definition doesn't include combinations of wavelengths, so it's just an unrealistic definition.

Any person, with or without free-will, would fail in any attempt to discover an absolute and fixed meaning of any word using the dictionary, for example , in searching for the meaning of "object" . — RussellA

I don't see how this is relevant. If words and meaning are created and used by free willing minds, then a non-free willing being probably wouldn't even know how to relate to words. It might be something like a plant, or a rock, hearing words. How does a comparison like this make any sort of sense?

Argument four
Consider a group of people with or without free-will... — RussellA

Again, how does it make any sense to class these two together? A non-free willing being would be so much different from a free willing being, that if one of them created words, the other would not even know how to relate to a word.

The word as description falls into the same problem as using a dictionary. The word as reference falls into a different problem. — RussellA

Don't you see that the non-free willing being would have none of these problems, being problems of choice? There couldn't even be any creating of new words because that would require choice.

And yet no one has devised an experiment to show that photon emission/absorption is unidirectional, or motion is unidirectional, or matter/antimatter pair creation/annihilation is unidirectional, and these constitute almost all of the elementary phenomena studied by the most empirically-tested theory ever: quantum electrodynamics. — Kenosha Kid

These are all temporal processes. Time is empirically proven as unidirectional. By simple deduction therefore, these processes are unidirectional. There is no experiment required, that's the beauty of deduction. What more do you want, an experiment which tries to run time backward, and finds out that this is impossible? Good luck with that.

Copenhagen and common sense are at odds with this, which might explain why the pioneers of quantum mechanics had the issues they did. — Kenosha Kid

It's a little more than just common sense. That time is unidirectional is the most fundamental and important empirical principle which we have. Knowledge of the truth of this principle influences everything we do, every day of our lives. The future is different from the past. The former consists of possibilities, which we can influence the outcome of, toward things we want, and away from things we don't want, while the latter consists of facts which cannot be changed. When something bad happens to you, you cannot change that, it has happened, but if you apprehend something bad that could happen in the future, you can take steps to avoid it.

Sure, one can argue determinism by arguing that there is no difference between future and past, that both consist of fixed facts, like the past, but that's a childish argument. And even children learn very quickly the difference between future and past. If your argument for determinism is simply a denial of the obvious difference between future and past, then this thread is ridiculously pointless.

Meanwhile Dirac was doing it right and seeing reversibility in more accurate equations. — Kenosha Kid

OK, you really seem to believe the proposition that time is reversible, and applying this proposition in physics is "doing it right". I sincerely hope that you do not really have a PhD in physics if this is an indication of what is being taught in physics these days.

Neither in relativity nor relativistic quantum mechanics is there a preferred direction of time. Histories of particle motions constitute worldlines in 4D, with no intrinsic arrow. — Kenosha Kid

That's exactly why these theories are deficient, they are not consistent with empirical observation. Empirical observation provides us with a unidirectional time. Those theories do not give us a principle to account for the reason why time is unidirectional, thus allowing you to work with a reversible time. Therefore the theories are deficient with respect to empirical observation, in that sense.

We can say that the second law of thermodynamics provides a principle to account for the direction of time, and this is what makes ideals such as Aristotle's eternal circular motion, and perpetual motion machines impossible, in reality. And as you said, the Copenhagen interpretation allows for a loss of information, making it consistent with that law. I believe that Bohm proposes that the entire universe be considered as one whole, to deal with this problem. But special and general relativity do not provide adequate principles to deal with the entire universe as one whole, as is evident from concepts like dark matter and dark energy, so the need for hidden variables appears.

You propose a simple ideal, the notion that time is reversible, and create from this ideal, the notion of an equality between emission and absorption, which is dependent on the notion that a future moment is invertible with a past moment. Of course this ideal has no bearing on the reality which we know, within which there is a substantial difference between past and future. The whole idea reminds me of people with less than high school education, proposing ideas for perpetual motion machines, without any respect for conservation of energy and the second law of thermodynamics. The fact that this idea is coming from someone who claims to have a PhD in this field just baffles me. Shame on you! I want to repeat what Timmy said to me ,"what school taught you that?"

Actually the empirical evidence proves that time and space are interchangeable, i.e. those dimensions in one frame of reference get mixed together in another frame of reference. Look up the Lorentz transformations. — Kenosha Kid

The Lorentz transformations provide mathematical principles for reconciling different frames of reference. They provide no empirical evidence that time and space are interchangeable. They might be applied under the assumption that time and space are interchangeable, but such application leads to the problems I mentioned above, which is evidence that this assumption is wrong.

Interesting. It sounds a bit similar to the OP, in so far as the physical requirements of the existence of the material world in the future dictate the possible causes in the past. Coherence is very much a wavefunction feature. — Kenosha Kid

Not quite. "Causes in the past" are epistemic determinations. This is the way that we as intelligent beings represent a line of temporal continuity. We say that Q happened at an earlier time, and cause R at a later time. But this is not a true representation of reality, being simply a representation of our apprehension of temporal continuity. In reality, whatever comes to be at t1, as Q, is caused by something in the future of t1, and whatever comes to be at t2, as R is caused by something in the future of t2. The only true causes are always in the future. and being in the future, they have not material, or physical existence. We know them as the immaterial cause of material existence (immaterial Forms, God).

See my above response to Wayfarer. A wavefunction can *always* be written as a linear combination of states from any basis set. This is the expansion postulate of QM. — Kenosha Kid

Sure, just like a quantity of H2O can be expressed as a combination of ice and liquid, but that's an admission that you cannot distinguish the boundary which you claim to be able to determine with those principles. When the precise boundary between H2O as liquid, and H2O as solid cannot be exactly established and appears to be vague, we can express the states along that vague boundary as a combination of both, some of the water is frozen, some is liquid. But such an expression just indicates that the boundary cannot be determined, and the method of expression is an acceptance of this. When we cannot apply the law of excluded middle we say that somehow it is a combination of both.

In perturbation theory and path integral formalisms of relativistic QM, such as quantum electrodynamics, one specifies initial and final states, as per the form of the Dirac equation which is power 2 in space and time (momentum and energy). This is what is meant by a path or trajectory.

If we do this with final position states for all positions on the back screen, we reconstruct the wavefunction defined over all of those points. The wavefunction and the Green's function are highly related. — Kenosha Kid

The so-called states you talk about here, are not actual states, they are probabilistic. This is the difference I've been telling you about, between a description and a statement of probabilities. And a reconstruction of the wavefunction over all the points produces a map of probabilities, not a description of an actual trajectory.

Furthermore, the precepts of special relativity, which as you say puts time and space on an equal footing, make it difficult (if not impossible) in some instances, to distinguish temporal aspects from spatial aspects. The problem being that there is a real difference between a spatial separation and a temporal separation, because by the nature of time, a temporal separation is not invertible, while a spatial separation is. The separation between time1 and time2 cannot be treated in the same way as the separation between spatial point A and point B, because the empirical evidence demonstrates that things only move from time 1 to time 2, and the opposite is impossible. If you put time and space on equal footing, and allow for reversal of time in your theory, you have allowed a principle which is inconsistent with empirical evidence.

There is a way around this temporal reality which might help you with the transactional interpretation. In metaphysics and theology there are principles which allow that a power, or active force, (normally represented as final cause), might act prior to the passing of time. This is how a free willing being can change the way that material existence will be, from one moment to the next.

So for example, if the passing of time is determined by us through reference to physical change, then there also must be a cause of physical change itself, which is necessarily prior to the passing of time. As each moment of time passes the material world will exist, or be, in a particular way at that moment. The power, or force, which causes the material world to be as it is, at each moment as time passes at the present, must be prior to the passing of time at the present, and therefore a cause which is in the future.

These descriptions aren't incompatible. Any wavefunction can be written as a superposition of Eigenstates of any measurement operator. If my electron collapses to an exact position state, for instance, and an electron in the screen is a wave-packet spread around that position, either the latter has to be scattered away from that position or the former is blocked from being found there. — Kenosha Kid

When one of them excludes the possibility of the other, this means that the two are incompatible. We can represent two of them as mathematically equivalent if we want, like ice is the solid state of liquid water, and the two might be mathematically equivalent, but that it is in the form of ice excludes the possibility that it is liquid water, because the two are incompatible, meaning that it would be contradictory if it is both liquid and ice at the same time.

This isn't addressed to you per se, just for general clarity: the concrete principle adhered to is the expansion postulate of QM, which states that the wavefunction is always a linear admixture of one or more Eigenstates of a given operator. After measurement, this is equal to a single Eigenstate of the measurement operator.

QM does not maintain two different types of electron: one wave-like, one particle-like, and swap between them. It is always a wave. That wave can be a position Eigenstate or not. I think I've already addressed this once before.

The particle-like behaviour evident in measurement is not that the electron ceases to be a wave at all, but that the wave somehow reduces to a single Eigenstate of the measurement operator. — Kenosha Kid

Ok, I'm fine with this. Now, if the electron "is always a wave", can you explain the principles which allow you to refer to the electron as a particle with a trajectory. Here's an example of such speak from the op:

Not according to the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics, which holds that the actual trajectories a particle takes are not just determined by the retarded wavefunction going from time t to t', but also the advanced wavefunction going from time t' to t. (Advanced wavefunctions come up in standard QED as well, to yield the electron self-energy). In this interpretation, the complex conjugate is essentially a message from the future. The electron takes the real trajectories it does in part because it has information about where it's going or, from another viewpoint, where it's conjugate came from. — Kenosha Kid

We would make such a demand of the cathode: for an electron to be emitted at point (r,t) there must be an electron at (r,t). It is only sensible that we do so for the hole the electron will occupy. (It's worth convincing yourself that this hole also has a history. For every electron that vacates position r to occupy position r', it leaves behind a hole and goes to where the hole previously was, describing an electron hole that vacates position r' to occupy position r. We do not need to consider it the same hole throughout, but there must be some conservation of hole-ness.) — Kenosha Kid

The true boundary conditions of any particle are its birth and death: where and when it was created, and where and when it will be destroyed. These are facts of each particle. This is the full time-dependent wavefunction of the electron which is, relativistically speaking, equivalent to a static 4D wave. Unlike in the QM of the Copenhagen interpretation, the conjugate solution (from death to birth) is also a solution when these boundary conditions are applied. This solution eliminates almost all of the trajectories possible (and expected) in Copenhagen QM. And this is just the single-particle picture. — Kenosha Kid

As we expand the picture to include more bodies in the universe, especially the rest of the electronic field, more and more remaining trajectories are removed by things like scattering and Pauli's exclusion principle. — Kenosha Kid

If not, we're left with a solution that looks like a hugely constrained version of the many-worlds interpretation. I name this the not-many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. — Kenosha Kid

I understand "trajectory" as the path of a body or object moving through space, a common example is a projectile. Of course this descriptive term is inconsistent with the way that energy is known to be transmitted by waves. So the challenge to you is to explain how you manage to reduce the wave transmission of energy to a trajectory. You clearly affirm that the energy is a wave, yet you propose that the energy is projected with a trajectory rather than a wave transmission.

Please pay particular attention to your description of scattering, in which you describe an electron as existing at a particular position, and leaving a hole at that position. You know that having a determinate position, and having a determinate momentum are mutually exclusive descriptions of the electron. So how would you reconcile these two incompatible descriptions of the electron, one in which it has a momentum as a wave packet, and the other within which it has a position with the capacity to leave that position creating a hole there?

In relation to quantum trajectory theory, here's an article (I haven't had time to read completely read it yet) which might interest you, if the link works: https://doi.org/10.3390/e20050353
entropy 2018, 20(5), 353

Anyway, here's a line from the conclusion of that article:

Furthermore in the case of atoms the claim that these are “particle trajectories” has been re-examined recently by Flack and Hiley [47] who have concluded that the flow lines, as we shall now call them, are not the trajectories of single atoms but an average momentum flow, the measurements being taken over many individual particle events. In fact they have shown that they represent an average of the ensemble of actual individual stochastic Feynman paths.

As Heisenberg said 'We have to remember that what we observe is not nature herself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.' — Wayfarer

This is similar to Kant's phenomena/noumena distinction. Sensing the world (observing) is not a simple passive arrangement where the sentient being receives what is out there. It is an interaction with the world.

Disgusting, MU. Whatever happened to you that instead of a reasonable courtesy and the good sense to learn you seem invariably to default to a dogmatic whackdoodleism whose first characteristics are denial of reality and denial of fact in favour of the world as MU thinks it is. What school taught you that? — tim wood

Oh get real Timmy. What the fuck do you know about reality? Obviously I went to the school of MU. Ever heard of it? I approached this thread with a desire to discuss, and learn. But Kenosha Kid would not oblige me, and immediately went on the defensive, refusing to discuss the fundamentals of QM, saying that this is outside QM.

I generaly find Kenosha's posts a model of clarity. I often don't agree with them but not because I think they're 'waffle'. — Wayfarer

Yes, Kenosha is very clear and descriptive, as I said in my first post in the thread. Nevertheless, there is waffling back and forth as to whether KK believes that the electron is best described as a particle or as a wave. Let me show you. The following two quotes are from the op where we can see quite clearly that KK's intent is to reduce the electron to a particle with deterministic existence, and nothing more

Not according to the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics, which holds that the actual trajectories a particle takes are not just determined by the retarded wavefunction going from time t to t', but also the advanced wavefunction going from time t' to t. (Advanced wavefunctions come up in standard QED as well, to yield the electron self-energy). In this interpretation, the complex conjugate is essentially a message from the future. The electron takes the real trajectories it does in part because it has information about where it's going or, from another viewpoint, where it's conjugate came from. — Kenosha Kid

The true boundary conditions of any particle are its birth and death: where and when it was created, and where and when it will be destroyed. These are facts of each particle. This is the full time-dependent wavefunction of the electron which is, relativistically speaking, equivalent to a static 4D wave. — Kenosha Kid

But when questioned, KK admits that the so-called particle is really a "wave-packet", or "plane waves", in what follows.

A good basis set that puts wavelike and particle-like extremes on equal footing is the stroboscopic wave-packet representation, on which I wrote my master's thesis. All of the above still holds: we simply replace Pauli exclusion of two electrons being in one kind of state (position) with that of two electrons being in another kind of state (stroboscopic wave-packet). The exclusion principle holds across all such bases (e.g. you cannot have two like-spin electron plane waves with the same momentum, which is what I had in mind for the states k, j', k" and k"', though these could be position, orbital, Bloch, Wannier or stroboscopic states or anything else you might consider, it makes no difference to the argument). — Kenosha Kid

And in the following reply to Harry H, KK is clear in the claim that electrons are waves.

If you want to know more about why individual electrons are waves, you can Google it. — Kenosha Kid

But then Kenosha goes right back to the op hypothesis that electrons are particles:

The new-ish bits are that a) one cannot draw conclusions about where a particle may be found at a given time by considering only that particle at the time, and b) that the birth and death of a particle are its true boundary conditions. Those might be considered novel or controversial. — Kenosha Kid

When a particle moves from event (r,t) to (r',t'), it still does so by every possible path (Feynman's sum over histories). If you sum up every possible r' at t' and normalise, you recover the wavefunction at t'. — Kenosha Kid

The OP holds that the complex wavefunction is an ontic description -- or fair approximation to such -- of how particles propagate through space and time as we represent them. — Kenosha Kid

In the following, you'll find Kenosha describe three different interpretations of QM, two in which the electron is waves, and one in which it is a particle:

This is evident in the various interpretations of QM. in Copenhagen, the electron is a complex wave, the field acts linearly, there is one measurement outcome and spontaneous collapse. In MWI, the electron is a complex wave, the field acts linearly, there are an infinity of outcomes and the wave evolves forward in time deterministically. In Bohm, the electron is a real, classical particle, the field is nonlinear, there is one outcome, and the particle evolves forward in time deterministically. In transactional QM without my edits, the electron is a complex wave, the field is linear, there is one outcome, the wave evolves forward and backward in time but probabilistically. — Kenosha Kid

Remember, Kenosha's thesis that the electron is deterministic, requires that it is a particle, like the Bohm interpretation above. But whenever pressured on the question of whether the electron really is a particle or a wave, Kenosha always returns with, it's a wave, as below:

The measurement problem is that the wavefunction that describes the electron can be in a superposition of observables, but when we measure it it's always in one. It is always a wave. Even if we managed to measure its position to arbitrary accuracy, it would be a wave in momentum space still. (Likewise if we measure it's momentum exactly it's a wave in space. This is the uncertainty principle.) — Kenosha Kid

So it appears to me, like Kenosha Kid is trying to make the argument that the electron is a deterministic particle, when Kenosha has actually learned from many years of study, that the electron is a wave, and is really not so deterministic.

The measurement problem is that the wavefunction that describes the electron can be in a superposition of observables, but when we measure it it's always in one. It is always a wave. Even if we managed to measure its position to arbitrary accuracy, it would be a wave in momentum space still. (Likewise if we measure it's momentum exactly it's a wave in space. This is the uncertainty principle.) — Kenosha Kid

Do you recognize the difference between a mathematical statement of probability, and a description? If so, let's move away from the idea that the wavefunction describes anything. Furthermore, when we make predictions (and a prediction is not a description) concerning events, using probabilities, we refer to the possibility of those events either occurring or not occurring. When an event may or may not occur, as is the case with a prediction, it is apprehended as not determined. Since the wavefunction is a statement of probability concerning a future event, the probability of detecting a particle, it refers to something which is not determined. With what part of this do you disagree?

But your explanation presumes that there is an electron as a discrete existing particle that exists independently of being measured. — Wayfarer

Kenosha Kid likes to waffle. When it suits Kenosha's purpose, the electron is a particle. When it suits Kenosha's purpose, the electron is a wave. But Kenosha adheres to no concrete principles to distinguish between when the electron is observable as a particle, and when it is observable as a wave. Kenosha Kid will call it a particle, or a wave, depending on what is required at that point in the discussion.

Told!

By the way, why do you present this stuff on a philosophy forum when you are completely uninterested in philosophical discussion of it? Why leave your peers? Have you been rejected?

I disagree with your analysis and do not see it as consistent with QM. — Kenosha Kid

This assessment, that my objection to your theory is not consistent with QM, is simply a product of your misinterpretation of QM. Clearly, wavefunctions represent waves, not particles as you insist from your interpretation. I suggest that you are interpreting QM from the perspective of quantum field theory and this way of approaching QM inclines you to apprehend these waves as being particles. But there is nothing inherent within quantum mechanics itself which would incline one to believe that a quantum of energy exists as a particle rather than as waves. Clearly the wavefunction does represents waves. So to interpret it as representing particles is a misinterpretation. This is made more evident from the fact that the relation between the wavefunction and the particle is one of probability.

So here's an example to elucidate this point. Let's say that I employ some fancy mathematics to determine the probability of you replying to this post. I cannot truthfully claim that this mathematics represents your reply (which doesn't even exist right now), because it represents the probability of your reply. You ought to consider a similar relation of probability between the wavefunction and the particle.

I already showed you how your thesis, which is a turning away from the vast array of evidence that energy is transmitted as waves, towards a theory which treats this transmission as a movement of particles, is a turn in the wrong direction.

There are mathematical theories, axiomatic systems as it were, that fit perfectly with some, possibly all, aspects of reality which, in my humble opinion, bespeaks that reality itself is mathematical. — TheMadFool

Actually, they fit together with the way that reality is perceived by us. And our perceptions of reality are produced by our living systems, just like our mathematical theories are. So I'd say that it's not a coincidence that they fit together, but it's clearly not evidence that reality itself is mathematical. Can we say that living beings live in an environment and they have specific needs? Wouldn't you think that the systems which they produce, such as their capacity to move, their capacity to perceive, and even conscious theories, are designed so as to fulfill some needs, rather than as a representation of reality?

a mathematician's abstract theory may turn out to be just the thing we need to make sense of reality. — TheMadFool

But when we think that the mathematician's theory is making sense of reality and it actually is not, we are fools. How would we know whether it is or not?

In short, math is not just a map, it's proven itself, on many occasions, to be the territory itself. — TheMadFool

In an idealist ontology, where our perceptions of reality are reality, mathematics might seem to be the territory itself.

I will never reveal such a thing, because it is not understood by anyone. But I can often tell when a theory takes us in the wrong direction.

Trump is the kind of guy who went down to the crossroads and sold his soul to the Devil in exchange for some extraordinary political talents. — Hippyhead

He sold his soul to some Russian oligarchs, and they got him elected. He has no political talents. And contrary to what you say, that's not so smart.

In case you haven't noticed, TPF is full of them. So you may feel right at home here with your far fetched idealism.

Premise 1 - language is created by humans
Premise 2 - humans have free will
Conclusion - humans cannot create a determinate language
IE, I agree with the conclusion - but it doesn't follow from its premises as given. — RussellA

Sure, the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, but that's because you haven't provided the appropriate premises. The problem is that you haven't provided the proper description, or definition of free will, and how it is related to language, to show why any language produced by free willing beings will be indeterminate.

The inverted form of the argument, which shows that only determinate beings could create a determinate language, is better to show that a free willing being (which is excluded by "determinate being") cannot create a determinate language.

Let's assume that a determinate language is one in which there is only one precise way to say anything that needs to be said, and only one precise interpretation of anything said. Doesn't this exclude the possibility of any choice in word selection, or word interpretation? If you want to say something, you have to say it this way. If you hear something, you necessarily interpret it in this way. You have no choice in these matters. Therefore a free willing being, by the nature of having free will, and the capacity to choose such things, could not have a determinate language.

For Plato, an extrinsic teleology, where the materials composing a body whilst necessary may not be sufficient for the body to act in a certain way. What is needed is an external Form of the Good in order to give the body purpose and reason (ie, the self-evident) — RussellA

I don't think that this is an external Form. The good is what the person apprehends with one's own intellect, as what is needed, required. Therefore the good is something internal to each of us.

For Aristotle, an intrinsic teleology, rejecting an external intelligence or god, where nature itself is the principle cause of change (ie, the pragmatic) — RussellA

So I think that Aristotle is consistent with Plato on this matter. However, I believe that Aristotle lays down the principles to distinguish an apparent good from a real good. Here, we might have an internal/external division, or what we call subjective/objective good. Morality involves establishing consistency between the apparent good (what the subject believes is good), and the real good (what is objectively good).

Like the flock of sparrows sitting on your fence, the peanut gallery has no interest in the true nature of space and time. The truth about reality is just too far removed from what they believe about reality, so they are unprepared to even set their bearings in the right direction.

I have done quite a few investigations into linear fractional transformations, and one feature that makes them important is they transform Circles into Circles, where the capital C is in recognition of the fact that a straight line is simply a circle with infinite radius. This has to do with the Riemann sphere. — jgill

A circle with an infinite radius is an incoherency. This is exactly the problem I am talking about, the faulty attempts by mathematicians to make circles compatible with straight lines. It necessarily results in incoherency.

The logical thing to do when faced with this glaring incompatibility is to address the nature of reality, and attempt to determine the reason for that incompatibility, rather than to attempt to veil it, or cover it up with such incoherent principles. It's no secret that mathematical axioms may contain incoherency. If the incoherency is veiled, and the axioms are useful, they will be accepted by convention. To bridge a gap of incompatibility, such as the relation between the non-dimensional point, and the dimensional line, we can use whatever means is proposed by mathematicians, and proves useful to that end, but unless the real nature of that divide is understood, there is no truth provided by the application of the axioms.

We have learnt over thousands of years of application, to measure distances between objects with straight lines and 3 dimensional representations. However, we've come to conceptualize force, which is the driver of motion, as based in torque, and this is rotational. Naturally, we fall back onto the only means of measuring which we have, the three dimensional straight lines which we know and love, employing things like vectors to represent rotational force. So the incompatibility rears its ugly head. Why do we insist on developing all sorts of convoluted and complex mathematical axioms designed to bridge this gap of incompatibility between the measuring technique (straight lines). and the actual reality (curved force), instead of dismissing that 3d measuring technique altogether, as inadequate, and delving into the true reality of curved existence?

The first principle of the curved space is "the point", which represents the center of the circle. We often even imagine a point as a tiny sphere. But the point is non-dimensional, so a spherical representation is unjustified. The second principle, is that if we model a three dimensional space as surrounding that point equally, we have irrational ratios (incoherency), known as pi and the square root of two. So the first logical conclusion is that equality in the dimensions of space is a false premise, irrational. We cannot represent space as having equal dimensions. Therefore a rotational force such as torque, cannot act equally in each of the dimensions which it is represented as acting in. Such a representation is an ideal, based in the necessary spatial equality of eternal circular motion (Aristotle), which is not a reality. The reality of such circular motion was dismissed when the orbits of the planets were discovered to be ellipses

So let's say that a force, which is derived from a non-dimensional point, must have a start. And, that start must be directional, it cannot be equal in all directions. The start cannot be equal in all directions because this is denied by irrationality. (Of course one might argue that reality is irrational, but that's pointless, and contrary to the vast evidence we have of our capacity to understand reality.) So we ought to dismiss the irrational approach of spatial equality surrounding a point, and start with the premise that a force emerging from a non-dimensional point is necessarily directional. The direction is not a straight line though, perhaps like a spheroid without symmetry because it necessarily has a starting direction.

It appears the rest of your post goes into the hyperreals, where others on TPF have greater competence. — jgill

Thanks for the heads-up, but obviously I don't accept the reals as an acceptable solution to the incompatibility described above, so the hyperreals are completely irrelevant to me. Therefore i would not adhere to any such principles. I approach infinitesimals from the metaphysical perspective of the problem in establishing a relationship between spatial extension and temporal continuity, like Peirce, not from the perspective of how mathematicians attempt to deal with this problem. The mathematical approach, of reducing rotational principles to straight line 3d representations, I reject as incoherent, just like your claim that a straight line is a circle with infinite radius.

But the next time I watched he seemed to get serious (at least as serious as he can get) when he said that he may need to leave the country if he loses. — Erik

Of course he's serious. Otherwise he'll spend the rest of his life fighting to stay out of jail, if not spending a significant part of that time in jail. Being the coward that he is, when the chips are down, he'll run. We know that he'll never take responsibility for his crimes.

Language (syntax and semantics) as a human creation is inherently indeterminate, in that it is not possible to create a determinate language, as illustrated by Gödel's incompleteness theorems in mathematics and Bertrand Russell's failed project of Logism which attempted to create an analytic framework for language.
IE, any language is indeterminate, regardless of whether its creators have free will or not. — RussellA

I think you are misinterpreting the evidence. The reason why it is impossible to create a determinate language is that language is inherently something created by free willing beings. Free willing beings like Godel, and Russell can imagine what a determinate language might be like, and show how it is impossible for an actual language to be like this, but this does not get to the reason of why it is impossible for an actual language to be like that. And the reason why it is impossible for an actual language to be like that, is as I explained, that there is freedom inherent in its creation due to free will.

IE, for someone who believes in axiom one (defined as a statement so evident or well-established that it is assumed to be true ), it follows that they accept that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, meaning that the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated does not affect their belief in a cause. — RussellA

The problem though, is that many axioms are accepted on the basis of utility (pragmatism), not on the basis of being self-evident. This relates to Plato's "the good". This makes the belief itself the cause , as in teleology, but many do not believe that beliefs are causes.

As intriguing as complex representations in physics, for me, is how linear operators are so effective. One would think nature to be complicated and non-linear; linearity is a very stringent condition, while simplifying the math. — jgill

i think what is at issue here is the geometrical shape of a fundamental unit of space. If we propose a fundamental unit of space, as an infinitesimal, then the shape of the infinitesimal will influence the way that we conceive of the possibility of motion through space. Notice that the two fundamental representations of 2d (and consequently 3d) space, the square and the circle, are fundamentally incompatible. Straight lines can never be reconciled with curved lines. The two representations will not merge, and incompatibility is demonstrated every time we try. Though we have developed many ways to work around this issue, when we get to infinitesimals the difference becomes significant.

Consider the difference between representing an area of 2 dimensional "space" with cubes, and with circles. The cubes can be placed side by side, and all the "space" will be covered. This does not work with circles. Side by side circles will not cover the "space". So now we need to overlap the circles, and the process of representation becomes very complex. Is there a fundamental circumference size, or do they vary? If we assume that all fundamental, infinitesimal circles (spheres in reality), are the exact same size, then there is the complicating factor of position their centers, (points). The relationship between centers must be represented, and now we tend to fall back on the square representation.

But if we want to maintain the status of "fundamental unit" assigned to the infinitesimal circles, we cannot undermine this assignment by relating the circles to each other with squares, because that places the square representation as more fundamental than the circle. Therefore we need to disassociate "the point" from the dimensional representations (lines, squares, cubes), the point being non-dimension in essence anyway, and reconstruct a representation of 'real space' using curved lines, which is completely independent from, and not influenced by that faulty dimensional representation.

This would create fundamental circles, but then we still need to determine what type of relationship one point has to another, and this is where the real difficulty lies. The curved lines would represent the essence of space, but the relationship between non-dimensional points would represent the essence of time, being prior to space and therefore non-dimensional.

it's a wave after all so Fourier's methods must apply? — Olivier5

Kenosha seems undecided on this. On the one hand Kenosha seems to insist that the wave function represents real waves. On the other, Kenosha asserts that the wavefunction is the representation of a particle. Someone, other than me, ought to tell Kenosha Kid that particles and waves have completely different spatial-temporal representations. And, the point which Kenosha refuses to acknowledge is that there is an incompatibility between the two representations which renders them as incommensurable.

The obvious problem is that the medium ('ether') of the electromagnetic waves has not been identified. Therefore the real properties of the waves cannot be observed or determined. Instead, these waves are represented by ideals such as sine waves. However, since these waves are not ideals, but real physical entities, with real spatial-temporal constraints, there is a degree of uncertainty in application. So until the real medium is identified, and the real waves are studied, the incompatibility between the two distinct spatial-temporal representations will remain.

Likely then that NOS is spreading Russian misinformation. — Baden

Speak the obvious.

IE, a metaphysically deterministic humanoid without free will can be programmed to avoid any logical problem of semantic indeterminism. — RussellA

But this does not address the issue. The issue is that what causes language to be semantically indeterminate is that the creators of language have freewill. The point I made is that if people did not have free will, there would be no choice on how to interpret meaning, nor choice as to which words to use, consequently no semantic indeterminism.

Our system of knowledge is based on axioms. Axiom One could be that we live in a deterministic world where all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes. Axiom Two could be that we live in an indeterministic world where no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is probabilistic. Being axioms, no relationship between an earlier event and a later event needs to be logically proved.

IE, the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be proved, does not exclude axiom one, ie, that there are causes. — RussellA

I don't see the point. Aren't the two axioms contradictory, so we'd have to disallow accepting both, on the basis of the law of non-contradiction? Or are you suggesting that we reject the law of non-contradiction as an unacceptable axiom?

Name a law of nature that isn't mathematical and then we can talk. Plus, the fundamental sciences - chemistry and physics - are completely mathematized. If the ingredients are mathematical, then everything that uses these ingredients must, as of necessity, be mathematical, right? — TheMadFool

Human beings represent the laws of nature with mathematics and this means that these representations are mathematical. But this does not mean that the thing represented is mathematical. Do you see the difference between the representation (mathematical), and the thing represented? Some people refer to this as the difference between the map and the territory.

Here's another example. We represent the world, things in the world, and different aspects of reality with language. This does not mean that the world has the features of language, making the world linguistic. Mathematics is a type of language. Why do you think that the thing represented with this language has the features of that language, making it mathematical?.

We know that the universe is governed by laws, mathematical ones at that. — TheMadFool

This is doubtful. The universe is orderly, and we represent that order with mathematics. But as we know, human representations are fallible, so we cannot say that the thing represented is the same as the representation. To say that what causes order in the universe is mathematics, is simply to assume a Pythagorean or Platonist idealism without understanding the separation between the cause of order and the human representation of order.

Many, including myself, believe that indeterminism is nothing but a semantic problem about the meanings of words. However, others believe, such as Professor David Taylor, that if indeterminism is semantic then one falls into an infinite regress, meaning that SI requires MI, in that there is something indeterminate about the world itself. — RussellA

I think I'd be with Taylor here.. Isn't semantic indeterminism dependent on free will? The reason why SI exists is that we are free to use words how we please. If we had no free will, we'd have no choice in word selection, and there'd be no SI. Therefore if free will is dependent of metaphysical indeterminism, SI is also dependent on MI.

However, metaphysical determinism and semantic indeterminism are linked by the arrow of time, in that one can have both metaphysical determinism, a cause necessarily determines an effect, and semantic indeterminism, given an effect the cause cannot necessarily be determined. — RussellA

You seem to be missing something here. Yes, a cause necessarily determines an effect, by definition, but what if something happens which is uncaused? So metaphysical determinism requires a stronger premise, it requires that everything is caused. Now, something might appear as if it is uncaused, and we can choose to believe one of two options, that it has a cause which cannot be determined, or it has no cause. In essence, aren't the two the same? To determine something as the cause, is to apprehend a logical relationship. If it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, doesn't this mean that there is no cause?

From my reading, although Plato was interested in logic, and did discuss sentence analysis, truth and fallacies, logical puzzles in Euthydemus and the difference between valid and invalid arguments, logic as a fully systemized discipline only began with Aristotle. Plato approached the World of Forms not through logic but through intuition, where knowledge of the Forms cannot be gained through sensory experience but through the mind. Forms transcend time and space, timeless and unchanging. Plato was a Dualist, where the soul before being localised by the body was directly connected to the World of Forms. After the soul had been confined by the body, it retained a dim recollection of the Forms. IE, for Plato, the mind approaches the World of Forms not through logic but through a dim memory of them. — RussellA

I guess I was somewhat free with my use of "logic", a little bit of semantic indeterminism there. Maybe I should have said reason, or even intellect. All these, as well as intuition, are aspects of mind.

What Plato did not provide, is a good distinction between soul and mind. You seem to know Plato pretty well, and I think you'll find that mind and soul are sometimes used almost interchangeably, as referring to the immaterial aspect of the dualism which is the human being. This is where Aristotle excelled, and surpassed Plato, by providing a proper distinction in his biology, "On the Soul". Aristotle actually defines "soul", as "the primary actuality of a body having life potentially in it", and then proceeds to discuss the different powers of the soul, self-nurishing, self moving, sensation, and intellection. So all living things have a soul, and the soul has different powers according to the material body of the living being, and the mind is now understood as a property of the soul which is realized through the material body..

This is important because it provides a division between the forms which the mind apprehends, and the Forms which are independent and prior to the body. This allows that the mind actually creates its forms. And there is no need for the theory of recollection, which doesn't work so well, because the Forms which actually transcend space and time, the category where the soul is placed, are therefore not the same forms as those which the mind apprehends. The soul is directly related to the independent Forms, but the forms apprehended by the intellect are dependent of the mind, which is dependent on the body. So the material body is a sort of medium between the independent Forms, and the forms apprehended by the mind. This accounts for the reality that human ideas are often mistaken.

I'd say more likely he's going to announce "a miracle!"