I nominate this for consideration as the most ridiculous line ever posted to TPF. — tim wood

I don't understand your extraordinary concern with that statement. Clearly there are statements which from the theist perspective are correct, but are incorrect from the atheist perspective, such as "God exists". Likewise, to say that God is responsible for matter, inertia, and mass, is correct from the theist perspective, but incorrect from the atheist perspective. That is what BC referred to as "cultural relativism". So tell me please, what do you think is so ridiculous about the statement?

Actually I've had to explain this numerous times already. I strongly agree that .999...=1. What I vehemently deny is that the two are the same thing. After all this time, have you not yet grasped the difference between equality and identity, which I have been trying to explain to you? Or, are you like some of the others at this forum, who deny that there is such a difference, insisting that two equal things are necessarily the same thing.

It is wrong to attribute inertia to the field rather than to the particle. And, the Standard Model indicates that the causal relationship between the field and the particle is unknown. So it is more ridiculous to claim that the particle's inertia comes from outside the particle (what is known to be wrong), than it is to claim that it comes from the will of God (what may or may not be wrong).

Inertia, like gravity, comes from the outside. — Kenosha Kid

I nominate this for consideration as the most ridiculous line ever posted to TPF.

Matter is privation of the Good isn't it? — frank

I think a privation is always of the form, when a thing is less that perfect, so matter is a separate principle from privation. I believe it was the Manicheans and perhaps Gnostics who taught that matter is inherently evil. But I think Plotinus rejected this for a more Aristotelian perspective which holds that good, and privation are proper to the form of a thing, not its matter.

Its a principle essential to Neoplatonism and runs from Plato through Hegel to Schopenhauer. Even if you disagree with it, you cant deny its place in philosophy, right? — frank

I know Plato pretty well, and I don't see this negation of intelligible objects, ideas, in his work, not even in The Sophist. Nor do I see it in any Neo-Platonism. I think you are relying on faulty interpretation.

So I don't deny that it has a place in philosophy, I deny that it is in the place where you say it is.

Flog it then!

Note that Newton, to substantiate his theory, had to invent something he called absolute time -- time as a permanent unit of measurement, regardless of what happens. But how long a time where nothing happened would last? It is inconceivable. The idea of ​​absolute time contradicts itself. The time that is independent of what happens is the time that is independent of duration; so it's not time at all. Newton also had to invent absolute space, space without things inside; that is, space as pure measure. But if there is nothing within the space, there is also no measure. So, to arrive at a description of the behavior of nature that we consider realistic and within which we live, - - and we live within that Newtonian space-time to the point that whatever contradicts it seems unthinkable to us - -, Newton conceived two ideas that are absolutely self-contradictory. He recognized that these ideas are mere inventions, but he needed them in order to make the measurements. — bcccampello

The idea of absolute time here is not contradictory, it only appears contradictory from your perspective. That's the cultural relativism you refer to, coming into play. What you call "time that is independent of what happens...independent of duration", is really best described as time independent of measurement. The passage of time is measured by human beings through reference to physical change. But since we do not know what the passage of time actually is, we cannot say with absolute certainty that there is no other way to measure the passage of time. If there is another way, then we can conceive of time passing without physical change.

Aristotle distinguished two senses of "time". One is the tool of measurement, and this is the concept "time", and the other is the thing itself which is measured, and this is the actual passage of time. The modern perspective has slipped exclusively toward the former, producing a cultural perspective which excludes the latter. So it is only the cultural relativism which makes absolute time appear to be inconceivable. The apparent inconceivability is based in the idea that time is dependent on physical change, as the concept "time" is derived from change. However, if we look at the passage of time as a real thing going on in the world, we see that change is actually dependent on the passing of time, instead.

The idea of absolute space has a slightly different origin. I believe it's much older, predating any serious understanding of time. Human beings started measuring things a long time ago. But they found that things change and move as time passes, so the measurements do not stay the same. In their primitive attempt to understand change they realized that there must be empty space between things, to allow for things to move independently of each other. If there were no space between things, then the movement of one thing would cause another thing to move, which would cause another to move, etc., ad infinitum. In other words, what they realized is that it would be impossible for a thing to move if there was no empty space for it to move into, because this would require that everything moves when one thing moves. So the concept of empty space was posited long ago, as required to account for the movement of one thing relative to other things. Generally it is still the cultural perspective, but understanding the universe from the precepts of general relativity requires that we rescind this perspective, and it actually becomes very difficult to understand the movement of individual things under the precepts of general relativity, as indicated by quantum mechanics.

When Newton says that it is not the stone that moves towards the earth, but the earth that attracts that small piece of matter in the direct ratio of the masses and in the indirect ratio of the square of the distance, you ask yourself: "But what precisely is Earth attracting?" It is a stone. Is a stone nothing? The stone is something, it has its own properties. And if she didn't have them and if she were nothing, the earth would attract her in vain, because she wouldn't come at all. This means that the description of the world that takes place in Newton's mechanics assumes the existence of the various substances of the various beings that are affected by the law of gravity. It does not reason from these substances, but only from the mechanical relationships between them. But in order for mechanical relationships to exist, they must take place between things that exist, and things that exist have substances. — bcccampello

Yes, this is the ancient idea that the world is made up of independent things, the real existence of each thing, being supported by its own underlying substance. The next thing posited is that there is space between each thing, allowing that each thing can move independently of each other. Gravity throws a curve at this perspective, supporting that perspective in the sense that each thing has its own gravity, therefore independent substance, but also undermining the perspective with the fact that the gravity of one thing interacts with another thing, denying true spatial separation. It appears like gravity must act through a medium, not empty space.

When ancient physics said that the stone has a natural desire to rest in the bosom of the Earth, it said exactly what Galileo will say later: that when an object is not moved by another it remains at rest or in a uniform rectilinear motion. This impulse of rest or uniform rectilinear motion is inherent in the object -- with the proviso that Galileo said that uniform rectilinear motion is only a unit of measure and does not really exist. Aristotle, in ancient physics, said that when an object is not moved by another it remains at rest. Galileo adds in brackets: "or in a uniform rectilinear movement, which does not really exist" - that is, it remains at rest. Now, from the general point of view of the theory of universal gravitation, there is a mysterious force called gravity by which larger matter attracts smaller matter. But from the point of view of another physical law, which is the law of inertia, the impulse to rest is in the object itself. It cannot receive the rest impulse from outside, it can only receive the movement. Although the expression desiderium naturae - -desire of nature -- is a literary expression, it expresses precisely what the law of inertia says. — bcccampello

The concept of inertia is key to understanding the passage of time, and the Aristotelian concept of matter. This concept grants a continuity to the passage of time. What it says roughly, is that what has happened in the past, in a consistent manner, will continue in the future. You can see that this idea sits at the very base of inductive reasoning. Without this assumed continuity ("which does not really exist"), all inductive reasoning loses its validity. It doesn't really exist because it relies on the assumption of a continuous passage of time, which isn't properly supported. The continuity of the passage of time is only granted by the will of God, and so it is not necessary, but chosen freely by a free willing being. So this is the cultural perspective which gives rise to those various ideas, that what is described as inertia and temporal continuity, are the expressions of of a desire, or final cause inherent within the substance of the object. Actually, the very existence of the object is a representation of the will of God, the existence of objects being how God's will appears to us.

ts original absurdity, even if it leads to spectacular scientific consequences, will always be an error, an absurdity and always a sin of the spirit. If you remain attentive throughout the development of the study you are doing, attentive to the awareness of the original absurdity, and say: "This is just a game rule. We are going to postulate an absurd thing just to see what happens, and then we'll come back here", and if you do this, everything is fine, but most don't. — bcccampello

Again, this is the cultural relativism at play. It only appears as "an error" to you, because you do not believe in God. If you believed in God, it would appear as the correct description.

But is the Good absolute? If matter is a privation of the Good, doesnt that mean the Good can show up in a partial way? — frank

I do not think that Plotinus develops an adequate description of the relationship between matter and good. In any case, I don't think you can say that matter is a privation of the Good itself, it is a privation of a thing in relation to the Good. Objects are deprived, the Good is not.

Any object of thought stands against a backdrop of its negation. — frank

I don't agree with this. There is no necessity for the negation of an object of thought, I believe that's a faulty principle. This is why the Good is an absolute. The good is the object of thought, in the sense of a goal, what is wanted, desired. And to speak of its negation is nonsense, because as what is wanted, it is already nonexistent. The "backdrop" of a good is a privation, but privation cannot be understood as a negation. It really doesn't makes sense to speak of the negation of an object of thought.

Everyone wants to go up, and no one wants to go down. — unenlightened

This is a key part of the message in Plato's Republic. An individual will rise above the cave-dwellers, to see the light, which is the reality behind the illusory world that we all live in. The live-in world is just a reflection of reality. The key point is that the true philosopher will go back down to the cave-dwellers, descend into that hellish world in which they live, to teach them the truth. That is the key aspect of "the philosopher", the sacrificing of oneself for the purpose of enlightening the others. That is not a pleasant task, as the others do not like the truth about their "reality" to be revealed. See what happened to people like Socrates, and Jesus.

Perhaps you can name a victim from another race that produced riots and state funerals and massive corporate advertising campaigns. I can watch a video of a caucasian kid dying in nearly the exact same way as George Floyd. No riots, no international outcry, no renaming of buildings named after David Hume to his name, no protests. — NOS4A2

I agree that not every police officer is racist. But it ought to be the case that every police officer is not racist. And the general issue of police brutality and abuse of power is another problem, which can be understood as distinct from the problem of racism. The statistics show that both are problems, and they both tie in to the Defund movement. The two attitudes together, the one called racism, and the one which leads to an abuse of power, create a more complex problem. This is the problem we see when racists are in a position of having power, and enjoy abusing power. I try not to be sexist bit I think this problem is specifically associated with the male gender. It reminds of men who like to beat their dogs.

I was thinking the Symposium or Phaedo.. — frank

Phadoe is a bit abstract, and some people get turned off because it's so mythical. It might not seem very relevant.

For Plotinus the Good is associated with Nous, so why would he have to reconcile it with the One? — frank

It's an absolute, like One, and a good metaphysics needs to show the relationship between first principles.

If we read some Plato, can we pick your brain for guidance? — frank

I am very familiar with Plato, have read many dialogues numerous times. They are very interesting, and relevant topics for the modern world. I particularly like The Symposium as a good introduction to Plato's style.

Plotinus denies sentience, self-awareness or any other action to the One. Rather, if we insist on describing it further, we must call the One a sheer potentiality without which nothing could exist. So no, the one is not related to potential. — Gus Lamarch

You contradict yourself when you say that "a sheer potentiality...is not related to potential".

Why Aristotle provides better fundamental principles than Plotinus is because he maintains consistently the categorical separation between potential and actual. Plotinus, following more closely to Plato, displays confusion with respect to these categories. Notice that "Intellect" and "Soul" emanate from "One" but this is not an act of the One. So emanation is closer to the old Pythagorean idea of "participation", in which the thing participated in (the One) is necessarily passive, while the participants are active. Intellect participates in One. But Aristotle, refuted this theory of participation, with his cosmological argument, demonstrating that it is impossible for any potentiality to be eternal, therefore anything eternal must be actual. This is why the cosmological argument becomes the cornerstone for the Christians proof of God, as an active, actual, Being who creates because it is Good.

Plotinus accepts the Good as a principle of action, bit he cannot reconcile the Good with the One, which is supposed to be an absolute, and eternal potentiality. This leaves incompatibility within the first principles, because the emanation from the One is supposed to be passive like participation, yet he describes the activity inspired by the Good. This activity has no place in that scenario of emanation, which is a re-presentation of the theory of participation.

I do not think we can deduce racism as a cause of death from the mere fact of the skin-colors of those involved, especially with the myriad other important situational factors of any police interaction. — NOS4A2

Face it, the life of a black person is not esteemed in the same way that the life of a white person is. The ideology of equity is not upheld.

Plotinus uses "the One" and "the Good" interchangeably. — Gus Lamarch

I don't think that's quite right. "Good" is related to Act, and "One" is related to Potential.

That’s not to say that excessive force isn’t real, but while the delusional are off pretending, without evidence, that race figures into these split-second decisions, there are real things they could be teaching to mitigate that risk. Complying with police is the most obvious. — NOS4A2

I think the evidence has been presented to you already, as statistics. The delusional are those who refuse to accept the evidence. A white man is likely to get punched for what is called "resisting arrest", but very rarely would one get killed in such a situation. The killing, if it occurred, would be accidental. But a person of colour is much more likely to get killed for "resisting arrest" than a white person.

The evidence indicates that your so-called "split-second decisions", when an officer is dealing with an uncooperative individual, are not split-second decisions at all, but premeditated acts. Deal with a white person with a couple punches, deal with a black person with a couple slugs. Don't kid yourself, the police know how to forcibly restrain, without killing.

This is interesting... thinking in terms of an elite assemblage of people that technology casts into positions of status and power. Institutions are also assembled around and from technology, just like churches are assembled from Christianity. — JerseyFlight

I don't agree with your analogy. The people whom technology casts into positions of status and power are entrepreneurs, inventors, while the people that the Church gives power to are those who adhere to the structure of the religion. So we have two very distinct sources of power here. in one case the power is derived from being creative and original, while in the other the power is derived from adherence to the existing religious structure.

The existence of R. in antagonistic class societies may be traced to class oppression, unfair social relations, the poverty and rightless status of the masses, which breed despair and a sense of hopelessness thus turning people's hopes to supernatural forces. By giving people false bearings and placing the solution of the vital problems of being in the other world, R. strengthens and perpetuates man's dependence on external forces and dooms him to passiveness, holding down his creative potential. In the society of antagonistic
classes it diverts working people from active participation in the struggle for changing the world and impedes the formation of their class consciousness. Marx called R. "opium for the people". — JerseyFlight

This part may be somewhat consistent with "technology".

A scientific analysis of R. rests on the premise that it is a complex social phenomenon, a system of specific ideas,
feelings and religious rites, and in a class society also of institutions that bring together professional clergymen. — JerseyFlight

This I believe is not consistent with "technology".

And the point of inconsistency begins in the other part, with the phrase "holding down its creative potential". Technology, under a scientific analysis, is a creative potential, so if religion imposes restrictions on creativity, then it is fundamentally opposed to technology which acts to circumvent those restrictions.

The specifics of the inconsistency, are that the creativity which is supported by technology promotes a divisive power within the society. Through providing a multitude of various choices, technology promotes division within society, as indicated by the numerous different branches of science and engineering. On the other hand, religion promotes unity "a system", unified by bringing together professionals, as you describe.

You might see that the conditions described in the first quote above, the hopelessness and despair, are created by technology in its divisive capacity of creating haves and have nots. Religion proposes "supernatural forces", as the true source of equity amongst people. Whether this is a false bearing or not is debatable.

The essence of R., however, remains unchanged and its disappearance, as predetermined by the course of social development,
is inevitable..." — JerseyFlight

Religion might disappear if someone could propose a principle of equity which is not dependent on the super natural. Until then, the divisiveness created by technology will continue to fester and the need for religion will only grow..

There is a wide variety of reasons why an individual will resist arrest, starting with the situation when one perceives oneself to be innocent, and the arrest to be unjust. In no way does resisting arrest warrant being killed, irrespective of how stupid it may be.

If the question was, what kind of thing is religion, then we wouldn't proceed from a definition, because the object is to discuss then produce a definition. If we are asking, is X a religion, then we need a definition of religion before we can proceed in that judgement.

Hegel does not make fundamental mistakes. It's a mistake to assert otherwise. As JerseyFlight said elsewhere, sometimes a contradiction has to switch up your mind in order to get out of rigidness of thought. At least that's how I understood him — Gregory

Manufacturing a contradiction with an unwarranted definition is a mistake. And, contrary to your claim that creating this contradiction will "switch up your mind in order to get out of rigidness of thought" it is an attempt to force you into a rigidness of thought. A mistaken rigidness, of course.

You fill American’s heads with fear and nonsense about being killed by police for their skin color, when they are clearly being killed for resisting arrest. — NOS4A2

What are you saying!!? Do you think resisting arrest is sufficient reason to be killed?

My question is about how to abstract the One, without the deficiencies caused by our finitude. I came to the thinking that we could arrive at the conception of the One, through the division of concepts. - Ex: We would (?) describe (?) part (?) of the One by mathematics, another part by language, another by metaphysics, reason, emotion, etc ... - — Gus Lamarch

How could the One consist of parts in this way? Wouldn't this make it a multiplicity of distinct parts instead of being one? So for instance, doesn't the following statement describe a turning away from all such individualized parts?

"Our thought cannot grasp the One as long as any other image remains active in the soul. To this end, you must set free your soul from all outward things and turn wholly within yourself, with no more leaning to what lies outside, and lay your mind bare of ideal forms, as before of the objects of sense, and forget even yourself, and so come within sight of that One." — Gus Lamarch

Once we get beyond the idea of distinct things which we can talk about (ideal forms), only then can we approach the One. This is why the procedure takes us beyond finitude. as that which separate, individual forms are supposed to have.

My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be much harder to take in information. — JerseyFlight

This is a false assumption you make. You could explain what a chair is, to a person who has never sensed a chair, and that person could have a concept of a chair without sensing a chair.. Furthermore, the fact that architects, designers, and creators, produce conceptions prior to the material existence of the thing conceived, indicates that what appears to you as "self-evident", is actually a falsity.

In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the problem is that it negates itself. — JerseyFlight

Again, this is a falsity. The law of identity is a universal statement, a generality. It states that a thing is the same as itself. This applies to all things. It is not a statement about an object, it is a statement about all objects.

You are claiming that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity position. — JerseyFlight

I've already dealt with this objection. A thing is the same as itself, but it is also different from itself. It changes with the passage of time, therefore it is different from how it was. Your proposal, to oppose or negate, "same" with "different" is unjustified in this context. The thrust of your argument seems to be to say that "different" is the opposite of "same", but this is not true in the context of the law of identity. Clearly a thing is both the same as itself, and different from itself, so we have no premise to allow us to say that "same as itself" means "not different from itself". You are just adding this premise, that different is the opposite of same, to create a straw man.

"It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different." — JerseyFlight

See, Hegel demonstrates in this passage, that he sort of grasps what you are missing. Difference inheres within identity. To be the same is also to be different. Therefore it is a misrepresentation to represent difference as the negation of same, difference is a part of being the same.

Let me try another approach for you. I'm sure you are aware of the concept of "similar" What does it mean to you, if two things are said to be similar? To me, it means that some aspects of the things are the same, and some aspects are different. We cannot say that the two things are different, in an unqualified or absolute sense, because we need to account for why we are calling them "similar". So in some way, they appear to have aspects which are the same, yet also aspects which are different. This is why difference cannot be used to negate sameness, they are both distinct aspects of the same concept, "similar". They are not the opposites of each other though because the aspects which are same cannot be the aspect which are different. Therefore "same" and "different" represent two distinct categories within the concept "similar".

He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself. — JerseyFlight

As I've explained, many times now, this is a false assumption. When someone says that a thing is the same as itself, they are not saying that it is not different from itself. I am a thing, and I am the same as myself. But clearly I am different from the way I was last year, despite being the same person last year and this year. So when I say that I am the same person that I was last year, I am not saying that I am not different from how I was last year. Clearly I am different, yet the same. So it is just your unwarranted, and unjustified straw man, which represents being the same as being not different, this is not consistent with the law of identity.

You, as a matter of fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary symbol articulates nothing. — JerseyFlight

This again is false. Why can't I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself", just like Hegel says A=A represents "a thing is the same as itself"? The symbols used to represent a proposition can be arbitrary.

In order to bring the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity. — JerseyFlight

This is not true at all. "A thing is the same as itself" represents one idea which can be represented with one symbol, just like the single word "square" represents "equilateral rectangle". The fact that the idea represented by the symbol is a complex idea does not necessitate that the idea requires more than one symbol to represent it. This is not a matter of me trying to wiggle out of Hegel's criticism, it is simply the way that symbols and ideas relate to each other. One symbol may represent a vast complexity of ideas, structured and existing as one idea represented by that symbol. Take a word (one symbol) which is an acronym, like radar, for example. The one word stands for a whole complexity of ideas, represented as one idea, by that one word. So this whole talk about "different symbols which are taken together in unity" is irrelevant speculation. It's like arguing that each letter within a word must stand for something on its own. Hegel's claims here have no basis in reality, and his insertion of "difference" and "unity" into the concept of identity through an analysis of those symbols which he uses to represent the law of identity, is just unsupported speculation.

Imagine if I represented the law of identity with Z. Then I proceeded to argue that because the law of identity is represented with Z, and Z is the final letter in the alphabet, then there must be finality within the concept. You cannot draw a conclusion about the meaning of the concept represented, by doing a physical analysis of the symbols used to represent it. Plato demonstrated this with an extensive analysis of the sounds of many different words, in one of his dialogues. He tried to show how the sound of the word is correlated to the idea represented by the word. But he didn't get very far, and it was demonstrated that it's very unreliable to attempt to determine anything useful about what is represented by a symbol through a physical analysis of the symbol.

Try to articulate the law of identity without making use of unity and difference, you will not be able to do it. — JerseyFlight

This is blatantly false. "A thing is the same as itself" says nothing about difference or unity. How can you even make such a statement and try to maintain some semblance of honesty?

But Hegel, how did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms. — JerseyFlight

Sorry, but unity and difference do not enter into the law of identity, so these are Hegel's terms for identity, and clearly a straw man.

Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation. — JerseyFlight

The meaning is not derived from the symbolic formation, as you've represented, it is derived from the complex formation of ideas. It is pointless to attack the symbolic structure, rather than the structure of ideas.

Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing is not different from itself. — JerseyFlight

That two things are different doesn't mean that one is the opposite of the other, they might be different categories. Yes, identity is different from difference, but this does not mean that same is defined as "not different". Colour is different from sound, but this does not mean that colour is defined as "not sound". It is only when you define "same" as "not different", which is a definition not supported by the law of identity, that negation is produced. So, the negation is brought in from outside, with this faulty definition of "same" (as not different), a definition which is inconsistent with the way that "same" is used in the law of identity.

As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself." — JerseyFlight

Nice quote, this is a fine example. Notice, "everything is in its self-sameness different from itself". That's exactly what I've been saying, difference is included within identity, so that the thing is the same as itself and also different from itself. Now, Hegel claims that this is contradiction, but it is not contradictory. It is only contradictory if you define "same" as "not different". But nothing necessitates this definition. In fact it is very clear that this definition is unacceptable, because it would create contradiction in this way. Therefore it is quite evident that Hegel introduces this definition for the purpose of creating contradiction, so that he can refer to the law of identity as "self-contradictory". It is not though, Hegel creates that contradiction by defining "same" as "not-different", when same and different are actually different categories and cannot be directly related to each other in this way.

Hegel might even recognize that same and different belong to distinct categories, as he says " this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other". So he also ought to recognize that to bring same and different into the same category, so that they become contraries, is to make a category mistake.

The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way around this, logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future. — JerseyFlight

Hegel's argument is not semantics at all. It is a matter of analyzing the physical structure of the proposition, its symbols, and attempting to make a conclusion about the meaning from this physical analysis of the symbols. I'm sure you must recognize the fault here. One cannot take a word like "word", and analyze the constituent parts individually, "w", "o", "r", "d", and their relations to each other within that word expecting to determine something useful about the meaning. Nor can you do as Plato tried, and analyze the individual syllables within a word, expecting to determine the meaning this way. Likewise, you cannot represent a proposition with symbols, then expect to determine something meaningful about the proposition by analyzing the relations between those symbols.

As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded, or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent difference." — JerseyFlight

See Hegel understands the Aristotelian notion of identity. The category mistake he makes though, is to allow difference to move into the category of same, making these two opposite of each other, rather than categorically distinct. This category mistake is what allows the self-sameness which is different from itself to be called self-contradictory.

Actually, you have not. Try to find where you define it. It's not there. Also: — tim wood

Do you not know how to read Tim? I did not say that I offered you a definition, I offered you my preferred way of defining the term, and you rejected it. Therefore I did not proceed any further. Nor will I proceed any further.

I'm not interested even a little bit in your preferences. This is a question of what something is, or is not, and not at all what you would prefer it to be. — tim wood

This is completely wrong. You asked me for a definition. Clearly any word can be defined in a multiplicity of different ways. Obviously I'm going to provide you with my preferred way. Your idealist assumption concerning what is or is not the definition, is nonsense.

Communication: any message; the contents of any message. — tim wood

This definition is completely unacceptable to me. I consider communication to be the act of transmitting, not the contents of the transmission.

If they're hopeless, say so and offer your own. — tim wood

Yes I think your definition of communication is hopeless and we are going in the wrong direction, digressing instead of proceeding. I already offered you my preferred way of defining "language", but you rejected it and said that you are "not interested even a little bit in your preferences", so I think we have reached a hopeless situation.

This perspective begins from the premise that religions are culturally formed belief systems. — JerseyFlight

From this perspective, we can say God is a human creation, just like technology is a human creation. But I think what makes something a religion is the structure of the belief system, and I don't see that similarity between the structure of the belief systems relating to God, and the structure of the belief systems relating to technology. We sort of take technology for granted instead of being in awe of it, as you describe, and religions do not teach us to take God for granted, that's what faith is concerned with, things we cannot take for granted.. So what I see in the human relationship with technology is a lack of religion.

I don't see what you're getting at. If something becomes an indispensable part of a person's life, say a car, or a phone, why would you call that thing a religion, unless the person was worshipping it as an idol?

What does the summation of all good have to do with idolatry?

This would make technology a vastly superior religion to any religion that came before it. — JerseyFlight

I think 180 had the more appropriate word, idolatry. I guess you might be wanting to discuss whether the worship of idols qualifies as a religion? Or would you dispute that the worship of technology qualifies as idolatry? If the latter, consider that technology is artificial.

The best I can do is language as that in which and by which communication happens. Communication to language as message to media, cargo to cart. Or another way, if a message is received, then communication occurred, carried by some language. Outstretched arms and a smile, then, are communication, so too the forbidding aspect of a remote mountain peak, each in and by its own language.

Agree? Disagree? Provide your own? — tim wood

I don't really agree, because as I described, there are uses of symbols which are not properly communication. This would include as a memory aid, or as an aid in understanding, use in logic, etc.. And, I would prefer to define language as a type of thing rather than as a type of activity, because that is the way that the word is commonly used. This leaves me with defining language in relation to the symbols (spoken and written words) themselves, rather than in relation to what is being done with the symbols, communicating. Since more is being done with the symbols than just communicating, we cannot restrict our definition of language by relating it solely to communication, as you propose.

Your definition of language might be interesting; I'd like to see it. I'd provide mine, but I'm finding it not-so-easy to comprehensively define on short notice. You? — tim wood

I've discussed language considerably at this forum. Generally, there are two distinct approaches. The first would be to define language as communication, and this implies an underlying supposition that it is a type of relationship between individuals. The second is to define it as a use of symbols, and this allows a broader range of human activity to be included under that name. Either way is acceptable depending on one's purpose. But if we use the first approach, we see that the means by which people communicate is the use of symbols. Then one might employ a private language sort of argument to restrict "language" to a particular type of use of symbols, communication between individuals. And this sort of definition will impede our process by excluding all the other ways that symbols are used by an individual, as irrelevant to "language" as defined, thus hindering our understanding of language.

So, suppose we have a fundamental unity, an individual, which for the sake of being relevant to this thread is called the primary "One", the absolute. Then we want to relate language to this One. The one way of looking at language places language as external to the One, as how the One relates to others through communion. But this leaves the individual, as a unity, a one, incomprehensible. The other way of looking at language places language as internal to the One, as a fundamental feature of what makes the One one, a unity.

The two ways represent distinct formulations of the absolute. One way formulates the ideal as a collection all particulars, related to each other through communication, as a whole, One. But this leaves the particulars, the individuals participants within the whole, undefined as ineligible for the status of "one", because internal relations cannot be equated with external relations. The opposite way formulates the ideal, One as a fundamental indivisible element. The unity of this fundamental whole cannot be represented as a collection of parts in communion, or else we have an infinite regress of divisible parts. Therefore there are two distinct and incompatible formulations of the ideal One. The former says everything real is internal to the One, the latter says everything real is external to the One.

Language itself is all about bounds and boundaries as limits that establish first the possibility of meaning, and then the particular meaning. — tim wood

Obviously I disagree. Using language is a matter of establishing boundaries and limits for intended purposes, as is evident with definitions imposed for the purpose of logical proceedings. However, you are referring to "language itself", which means that you have proposed a separation between the act of using, for purpose and intention, and the thing being used, language. You have, therefore, implied a separation between the thing, language (words or symbols), and the associated meaning. And, it is evident that meaning is a feature of the usage, which is the establishing of boundaries, not the thing being used, the language itself.

Therefore your assumption that "language itself is all about bounds and boundaries as limits that establish first the possibility of meaning, and then the particular meaning" is very confused. The "possibility of meaning" is quite distinct from "the particular meaning". The possibility of meaning is provided for by "language itself" (symbols and words), and is boundless, as evident from the infinite possibilities of mathematical language, infinity. And, "the particular meaning" is established by the particular instances of use, the purpose or intention.

And what sense does it make to aver that language is boundless, but at the same time bounded in that it cannot even gesture towards something like the ineffable - apparently cannot even name it. "It makes no sense to talk about something as 'ineffable.'" — tim wood

This is not what I said. I said that it makes no sense to refer to something as ineffable, because this is hypocrisy, to insist that something can't be done, while actually doing it with the act of saying that it can't be done. See, language itself is not actually bounded, we create boundaries with our particular instances of use. And in this case we are creating a boundary which being violated by the very act which is supposed to be making the boundary (self-contradiction).

The paradox is not properly dealt with in this way though. It is only by assuming that "ineffable" as a word, or symbol, can only be used in a restricted way (has boundaries, or a set meaning), that allows me to say that if I use it in this particular way, it is hypocrisy (to go outside those boundaries). So there is a matter of uncertainty which is exposed, as to what is actually bounded, the use, or the thing being used.

Lefty-loosey, righty-tighty. When you find you've screwed yourself tight into something, just remember to try turning the other way to loosen up. — tim wood

Right, we now approach the opposite way. Since you have now designated that language is a thing, instead of my prior proposition, that language is a relationship, we see that language itself is what is bounded, and the use of language is unbounded. But it's all just a matter of how you define "language". Is it a thing, such as a symbol or word, or is it the use of words or symbols. Inverting these two will invert one's understanding of which is bounded and which is not bounded.

To my way of thinking, any move toward "herd immunity," by this administration, such as limiting somehow vaccine access in any way, or any other active or passive step in that direction, amounts to a declaration of war against the persons jointly and severally living in the US. — tim wood

I think what the president was talking about is "herd mentality", not "herd immunity". Herd mentality is what he believes is his best chance at getting reelected so he will promote this in any way he can.

The only solution I see for this question is one where we "transcend" the boundaries of language. But still, we would be conceptualizing a flawed idea, as we still would "Be". — Gus Lamarch

There are no boundaries intrinsic to language, it is inherently boundless. That language consists of boundaries is the notion which Wittgenstein reveals as false in his Philosophical Investigations. The evidence which serves as proof of this fact, is the language which we call mathematics. The concept of "infinite" allows us to apply that language (mathematics) to absolutely anything, boundlessly. The language itself clearly is not limited, and as Wittgenstein describes, boundaries are created for particular purposes.

It makes no sense to talk about something as "ineffable" because to label it as ineffable is already to say something about it. Therefore to talk about the ineffable is just a ridiculous form of hypocrisy, a self contradicting action of doing exactly what one says can't be done, merely by saying it.

There is however a paradox which arises if we apprehend language as a thing, and try to describe it with language. We thereby attempt to measure the boundless, and clearly this is a mistake, to attempt to measure the boundless, or use language to describe language. The way to avoid this paradox may be to recognize that language is not a thing, it is a relationship, and maintain a separation of categories between things and relationships, the former being inherently bounded, the latter being intrinsically boundless.

If we do this, we now have a very imposing problem. How can we understand relationships if we cannot talk about them? We talk about things, but we do not talk about relationships, because I have categorized a relationship as something other than a thing and I have categorized things as what we talk about. I haven't truly said that there is something (relationships) which cannot be talked about (they are ineffable), I have said that relationships are not things, and things are what we talk about. The question is, how do we apply language toward understanding relationships if it improper to say that we talk about relationships?

Why, then, do people so easily confuse metaphysical concepts related to the absolute? — Gus Lamarch

Clearly, "the absolute" is an ambiguous concept. Therefore the way that one relates to absolution is dependent on one's perspective. Notice that "absolution" means to be absolved, released from all guilt. But to be absolved requires that one first recognize one's sins. In Catholicism this is the process of confession and forgiveness.

In the op it appears like you seek to separate "the absolute" from any possible creative activity, rendering it complete distinct from the process of absolution. Then you propose an emanation, through which the perfect (absolute) gives birth to the less perfect, and you seek to absolve the perfect (absolute) from responsibility for this act of creating something less than perfect, by removing intention from this act. Then emanation is not a willing act of the perfect (absolute) from which things emanate, (the absolute being purely potential instead) but an act of the emanating things themselves, such that the imperfect things are responsible for their own imperfections, rather than the Creator being responsible for the imperfections. This circumvents the act of forgiveness, because the more perfect being, from which the less perfect emanates in a natural procession, is denied the capacity to produce something more perfect than itself, so that the imperfections are already given by an implied priority.

I aksed how can you use a word "properly" without knowing its definition? — TheMadFool

So does "proper" mean in a formal way to you? Using a suitable word for the situation does not require one to learn a definition, as we see by the way children learn how to use words. Young children do not learn definitions prior to going to school, yet they know how to use words.
Where would you draw the line, what constitutes "proper" use.

Nevertheless, it must possess the attribute of being truth preserving, otherwise it loses its raison d'être, right? — TheMadFool

I do not agree with this, and my concerns are very evident in the axioms of mathematics. They are not dreamed up for the purpose of being truth preserving. They are dreamed up for the purpose of solving a particular problem. So we see that such logic is based in pragmatics rather than 'truth preserving". This is the revelation made by Plato in "The Republic" where he says "the good" is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun is what makes visible objects visible. The good is the end, the purpose, final cause.

The very reason we need logic, whatever shape or form it may assume, is to have a system that handles propositions in such a way that, ceteris paribus, we arrive at other true propositions. — TheMadFool

So, I cast "logic" in a different light. The reason we use logic is to solve problems. And, logic being created by human beings, is actually shaped according to the problems it is designed to resolve. This goes beyond Plato, who says that intelligible principles are lit up by the good, to be more Aristotelian, saying that the intelligible principles are actually created, formed toward specific goals, or perceived goods. Logic is a means to an end. Clearly the means are shaped toward the end. If the end is not truth, but something else such as predictability (which has replaced truth in modern science), then we cannot say that the "raison d' etre" for logic is to preserve truth.

o me, once something is ineffable, knowledge is impossible because the basic requirement for a thing to count as knowledge is that it should be possible to render it as a proposition, something that can't be done with the ineffable. The unknown becomes a known only if we can construct the relevant meaningful proposition. — TheMadFool

But do you agree that language evolves? So something which could not be put into a proposition many years ago, such as the relation between protons and electrons in an atom, could at a later later time, be put into a proposition. It used to be common knowledge that there was nothing smaller than an atom, so we couldn't make a proposition concerning the parts of an atom, that would be ineffable. However, observations combined with logic produced new ideas concerning the parts of an atom, and along with that, new terms, such that this is no longer ineffable.

That said, I agree with you that we're most at risk of being led away from the truth when our experiences (observations ,etc.) can't be put into words. There's this natural drive to understand, to make sense of, our encounters with reality and it has the power to force us to take a stand even when the most rational option is to withhold judgement. Misunderstanding, dangerous misunderstanding, seems almost inevitable. — TheMadFool

This is why, when new theories get put into place, like theories about dark matter and dark energy for example, it takes a long period of trial before the theories can even be said to be proven.

I agree but this leads to Pyrrhonian Skepticism - a state of global uncertainty and extreme doubt. Are you proposing that as the only reasonable option? — TheMadFool

Different approaches are required depending in the state of knowledge at the particular time. It appears like at Pyrrho's time skepticism was called for. I think that we are moving into a similar time with the state of modern knowledge. Consider the examples you've provided in this thread. When things don't make sense, there's really no other approach but skepticism.

The problem is that by definition, contradictions result from a lack of reason/logic. — Harry Hindu

That's not true, look at the examples TheMadFool gave.

By the way, there are systems of logic (paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, and perhaps others) that tolerate, even encourage I suppose, inconsistencies and contradictions. Perhaps you should have a look at them. — TheMadFool

How can you use a word properly without knowing its definition? — TheMadFool

Have you ever watched how children learn to talk? They do not learn how to use words by learning definitions.

Just as a side note, I recall reading that logic is basically a set of rules that are truth preserving. It can't tell us which propositions are true in the sense it's a definition of truth which we can employ but it does tell us which propositions must be true in the sense of providing us candidate propositions for observational verification. — TheMadFool

The idea that logic is "truth preserving" is what I disagree with. If the logical system is created with the intent of preserving truth, like traditional deduction for example, then it might be capable of doing a reasonable job at that. Then there are logical systems like modal logic, and even mathematics which do not aim to preserve truth. But the point of the op, I think, is that perhaps logic cannot maintain truth. Maybe the world is so strangely complex that human beings are incapable of producing a logic which is guaranteed to maintain truth.

Fine but now we're getting involved with language, its limits - logic doesn't have a stake in the ineffable. — TheMadFool

I think that this is a mistaken perspective, and where logic applies to the ineffable is where we need to proceed with the most caution. This is what I tried to describe already. A person might observe something as ineffable. This means that the occurrence is fundamentally unintelligible. However, this person wants to understand what happened, wants to remember it in words, so the person then applies some sort of natural reason to determine which words are best suited for describing the event.

So logic does have a stake in the ineffable, otherwise knowledge could not proceed from unknown to known. We must allow that knowledge evolves, and progresses, such that some things which were ineffable when human language was young, can now be described. How else can these things come into the realm of being describable if not through the application of some logic?

Anyway, perhaps another example will do the job. You must know the double-slit experiment. The results of this experiment are that light is both a particle and a wave, two mutually contradictory physical states. Inconsistency as per logic but yet verifiable observationally. How do you resolve this problem? Do you think we should reexamine logical principles like inconsistency and treat our observations as real or do you think there's nothing wrong with logic and that oud observation is flawed? — TheMadFool

As I said, we ought to be skeptical of both the logic and the observations. The two go hand in hand. The logical systems (what I called artificial logic) are conformed to correspond with the observations if there is a desire to preserve truth. But the observations (descriptions) are conformed by the underlying natural reason, as described above. So, the observations may be faulty, and this would lead to the production of faulty logic therefore we must be skeptical of both.

Contradiction and inconsistency is a lack of reason, not a different type of reason. Computers can't compute contradictions. The produce errors if they try. — Harry Hindu

The problem is that some forms of reasoning allow for the existence of contradiction, as has been discussed on this thread. A computer can easily be programmed to produce contradictions, look at something like spell check.

So, equivocation is about definitions, "right"? — TheMadFool

No, it's about how one uses words. Notice, that "right" is only defined once in the example, yet it is also used in a way other than the defined way, just like your use of falsehood. It is the act of using the word in a way which is inconsistent with the definition which is called equivocation.

What I mean is that logic alone doesn't help us determine that a given empirical statement is true/not. — TheMadFool

Yes I agree, and that is why consistency does not define truth. But there are two distinct reasons why logic does not necessitate truth. The first is obvious to most people, and that is that logic requires content, the premises. And if the premises are false, the conclusion is unsound.

The second reason, which is not so evident to most people, is that logic consists of a system of rules for procedure or application. If these rules themselves are unsound, then even true premises could turn up false conclusions. Take mathematics for example, which has at the base of its rules, "axioms". The axioms may be derived completely from the imagination without any requirement that they correspond with any real features of the world. (Refer to discussions on infinity for example). I would say that if these axioms have no evidence of correspondence they are unsound. Unsound axioms produce what you called "fancy logic".

I don't want to say this but I get the impression that you're failing to make the connection between things "we cannot understand", things "unintelligible" and inconsistencies. Inconsistencies, when they occur, are precisely things "we cannot understand", things "unintelligible" because they amount to affirmation of something followed by the negation of the thing that was affirmed: Proposition P, formally expressed as (p & ~p). — TheMadFool

Sure there is a connection, but there is also a distinction. If we make a category of "things we cannot understand", call this "the unintelligible", then "inconsistencies" refers to one type of thing in this category. Another type of thing in this category, is what I referred to, things which we cannot adequately describe. Notice that "inconsistent" refers to the description, it requires a description. But I am talking about an observation which we haven't the capacity to describe properly, because for instance the person doesn't understand what was observed.

As I said in my earlier example, when a person does not understand what was observed, yet the person has the urge to describe it, aspects of what occurred might appear such that they can only be described with inconsistencies. The person basically has two choices. either describe what has occurred, using inconsistencies, or else manufacture aspects in the description of the event, to create consistency, but that may contain falsity. Of course a person might use a combination of these two as well.

Coming back to the issue, the choice then becomes one between accepting your observation as true and fault logic or stick with logic and question the validity of the observation. What would you do? — TheMadFool

As I said, the example is an inadequate hypothetical. To make what is in the box observable is to negate the premises of the hypothetical, thereby negating the relevance of it. If we could observe what is in the box, then there would be no question of what's in the box, and no fancy logic being applied to determine what's in the box, therefore no issue of whether to doubt the logic or the observation. Otherwise we must be skeptical of both.

Well, give us an instance of equivocation then. A tangible and concrete example would go a long way in clearing up matters.

P.S. Please don't use anything I said because that would be begging the question.

Note, this is a minor issue; you may choose to ignore it. — TheMadFool

I'm inclined to ignore, but since you don't seem to understand equivocation, maybe I can help. Here's an exaggerated example so it will be easy for you to follow. Say we come to a fork in the road, one road goes right and one goes left. I ask you which is the correct road to take. You say the right road is the correct road, because "right" means correct, therefore it's an obvious choice, the logical conclusion is to go right. That's an exaggerated example. Your equivocation with "falsehood" is much more subtle.

First, there are empirical statements, statements about our world. These, for sure, need to correspond with observations i.e. their truths are not determined by the application of logic; to the contrary, the need to be tested against observation. — TheMadFool

This is not such a simple issue. To judge whether a statement corresponds requires determining the meaning of the statement. And we cannot determine what the statement means without some sort of application of logic. Otherwise, the meaning of the statement is determined by its use, and if this statement is being used to refer to this thing, then it necessarily corresponds.

Schrodinger's cat being both dead and alive is a logical impossibility in first-order logic for, in the world at our scale, if a cat's alive then it can't be dead and vice versa. No empirical evidence at our scale supports Schrodinger's cat's state of being both dead and alive. According to you then, we have to accept that the claim about Schrodinger's cat amounts to an inconsistency and this was possible not because we did something fancy with logic but because we failed to make an observation corresponding to that statement.

Are we on the same page? — TheMadFool

No, I don't think we're on the same page. I can't quite figure out what you're trying to say with this example. You're saying there's an inconsistent state of affairs described by "Schodinger's cat". And, you think that some fancy logic produced this description. You contrast this with a failure to make a corresponding observation, and you imply that you believe one of these, and I believe the other.

I think what I would actually argue, is that we make observations which we cannot understand. They are not necessarily inconsistent observations, but unintelligible, for some reasons or others. So we create the fancy logic, which hides the fact that we are not understanding, and therefore do not have an adequate or meaningful description of what is being observed. (Consider what I said about corresponding statements above. Making a statement which corresponds with what is observed is not always a straight forward and simple task.) The inconsistency results from a failure to understand, and properly describe what is being observed. Then the fancy logic is applied to try and make the unintelligible appear to be intelligible.

Now suppose that it were possible to peek at Schrodinger's cat inside the box without breaking the experiment. You look inside, essentially making an observation, and find the poor cat is both dead and alive — TheMadFool

From the point of view which I just described, looking inside the box amounts to getting an adequate description of what is being observed, based in an understanding of the situation. At this point, the "fancy logic" which produces the cat scenario can no longer be applied. So the question about the cat is no longer meaningful, if you could get that required understanding.

The question that then arises is this: are you going to put your faith in first-order logic and treat your observation (cat both dead and alive) as null and void or are you going to believe what you saw and make plans to modify first-order logic to accommodate your observations? — TheMadFool

The problem with this example, is that the cat scenario is just a fictional scenario. It is produced by the fancy logic. You cannot expect to look and see the cat, because the scenario is not based in any true observations, it's a fiction. So your example is really nonsensical. You are taking a scenario which is completely fictional, and asking, what would we see, if looked at this part of the fictional story. I might just as well ask you, if I throw a box out the window with something in it, and it was falling, and you could peak inside it, what is in it? It's just a nonsensical question.

The point that I am making is that there is no difference between natural and artificial reasoning. Brains are physical objects, like computers, yet you attribute natural reasoning to brains and artificial reasoning to computers. Why? — Harry Hindu

If you read my posts, I attribute both, natural and artificial reason to human minds. Natural is the innate, intuitive sense which we are born with, while artificial is the learned type of reasoning, like mathematics and formal logic. Computers use different types of formal (artificial) logic, just like minds do, this is an extension of the human mind's use of artificial reasoning. Smith cannot believe both, that he will get the job, and that someone else will get the job. But I'm differentiating this, artificial reason, and natural natural reason.

The argument, for the difference between these is this. Natural reason does not allow inconsistency, like contradiction. Artificial reasoning may allow contradiction and inconsistency, like in TheMadFool's example above. Therefore there is a difference between the two.

..his life is a matter of public record... — NOS4A2

His tax returns?