Here's the irony...

You claimed both, that natural reason demands coherency, and that laypeople can indeed hold contradictory beliefs. So, either lay people do not use natural reason(which is contradictory to what you've already claimed) or natural reason does not demand coherency(which is also contradictory to what you've already claimed).

...you hold contradictory beliefs. — creativesoul

You demonstrate the point very clearly. Whether something appears to be contradictory or not depends on how you look at it, i.e. how you interpret, understand, explain, or describe that situation.

That was the point I made with your example "Smith cannot believe both, that he will get the job, and that someone else will get the job." The situation appears to be contradictory, therefore impossible. But if Smith looks at "the job" in a different way, there is no contradiction.

Likewise, the way you interpret what I've said leads you to think that I believe contradiction. That's good evidence that you've misinterpreted what was said, indicating that you ought to go back and reread what the person actually said

Only if there were an infinite number of words. There isnt, so your argument is invalid. — Harry Hindu

You seem to have forgotten about circularity. There is no need for an infinite amount of words, because an infinite regress can be supported by vicious circle. Any way, these things just demonstrate that your claim, that any word used in a definition, must itself be defined, is a false claim.

And yet you can't define reason without using the word consciousness. So either define consciousness or define reason without using the word. Does not reason entail using information to achieve some goal? Does a computer reason? If you're going to say no because the computer isn't conscious, then you'd be using circular reasoning. You'd need to define consciousness and why you think brains are conscious but not computers. — Harry Hindu

I really don't see your point Harry. Using my guide, the dictionary, I can define reason without using the word consciousness. "The intellectual faculty by which conclusions are drawn from premises", for example. The problem is that "intellectual faculty" tends to imply a conscious thinking being.

Is it your point to argue that a computer has an intellectual faculty, and therefore artificial reason is the same thing as natural reason? If so, you still don't get beyond the point I'm making, and that is that artificial reason is derived from natural reason, such that natural reason is prior to artificial reason. And therefore, to understand "reason" we need to understand natural reason as being the foundation for artificial reason.

What I did would qualify as an equivocation if and only if I used different definitions of falsehood. — TheMadFool

Here's what Wikipedia says:
"In logic, equivocation ('calling two different things by the same name') is an informal fallacy resulting from the use of a particular word/expression in multiple senses within an argument."
There is no requirement for definitions. All that is required is to use the word in "multiple senses", which you already admitted that you did. Now you ought to admit that what you did was a fallacy called equivocation.

The actual definition is important for sure but inconsistency is relationship in which propositions differ in truth value. — TheMadFool

No, I just went through, this. We do not need to judge propositions for truth value in order to determine that one is inconsistent with another, we can look for contradiction.

By the way, there are systems of logic (paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, and perhaps others) that tolerate, even encourage I suppose, inconsistencies and contradictions. Perhaps you should have a look at them. — TheMadFool

I know, that's what I've been talking about, it's the point of the thread. Some people believe that the nature of the physical world is such that contradiction, and other inconsistencies are required to accurately describe it. The question though, is if it is the right thing to do, to reject natural reason for this artificial form of reason, which has been manipulated to allow contradiction and incoherency, for the sake of corresponding with observations.

I just can't wrap my head around someone saying P and ~P and being true on both counts. Proposition X is something that I can't make heads or tails of: Ne caput nec pedes! — TheMadFool

I agree, I find this very difficult. What I tend to believe, is that the observations, which lead people toward these artificial forms of logic, are themselves faulty. So instead of reshaping logical principles, to correspond with observations, we ought to revisit these observations to determine the faults within them, and see what makes them inconsistent with natural reason.

To not stall this discussion, I'd like to suggest something. Please describe what the meaning of the most obvious inconsistency, the contradiction (p & ~p), would be in a system that tolerates inconsistencies, the kind you're suggesting here? — TheMadFool

The issue, as I see it, is that in some instances we cannot determine whether P, or not-P is what is the case (true). Natural reason tells us that it cannot be both (contradiction), nor can it be neither (excluded middle). If, after much examination, this continues to be the situation, we will be inclined to produce a principle to account for this situation, by violating either the law of non-contradiction, or the law of excluded middle.

There's a bit of irony here... — creativesoul

If there's irony there, it goes way over my head. Oh well, I've always had difficulty discussing anything with you anyway. Who cares?

My basic point(the reason I first posted) was that natural reason does not demand coherency. If that were true, it would not be possible for a normal average everyday layperson to hold contradictory beliefs. — creativesoul

This is not true, as I explained. Contradictory beliefs can be held by a person, so long as the contradiction is not evident to the person who holds the contradictory believes, This is due to the way that a person understands one's own beliefs, and relates them to each other.. A person may come to believe one thing at one time, and hold that belief, then come to believe a contradictory thing at a later time, and hold that belief as well. Unless the person uses reason to analyze and compare the two beliefs they will not recognize the contradiction. The person might continue through life applying the one principle in one type of situation, and the contradicting principle in another type of situation without even realizing that one's own behaviour is inconsistent.

The definition of truth/falsehood and the falsity implied by an inconsistency. These are two different things. — TheMadFool

Sure they are different things, but it amounts to equivocation, to use falsity in the two different ways in the same argument. So it's not that I am conflating two different things, you are equivocating.

When I say that an inconsistency in a group of propositions implies a falsehood, I don't mean that in the sense the inconsistency provides us with a definition of falsehood, as you seem to be thinking, and that that definition aids us in deciding there's a falsehood among the propositions. — TheMadFool

You do not seem to understand the problem. You cannot say that inconsistency implies falsehood, while maintaining consistency with our definition of "falsehood". It's not that you're redefining falsehood, but you're using it in a way which is unsupported by our definition. Therefore I reject that use as unacceptable, because what you are doing is known as equivocation.

What's actually going on is that, an inconsistent set of propositions, call this set X, entails a contradiction (p & ~p). How did we arrive at that contradiction? By assuming all propositions in the set X to be true? Ergo, reductio ad absurdum, at least one of the propositions in X must be false. The detection of a falsehood in X isn't based on some kind of definition of falsehood inconsistency provides us but is actually a reductio ad absurdum inference. — TheMadFool

OK, so this is what is at issue here. When we learn how to reason formally, with mathematics, deductive logic, etc., we learn that it is not necessary that the proposition be true. The natural tendency for a human being might be to only proceed from premises believed to be true, but we are trained to suppress that natural tendency, and proceed from premises regardless of the truth or falsity of the premises, we suspend judgement on that. This gives many advantages to the logical process. However, the detection of logical inconsistency cannot be claimed to be a detection of falsity, as you insist, because we have divorced the logical proceeding from the judgement of truth and falsity.

By that I meant the definition of truth and falsity has nothing to do with inconsistency which is what you're all about. By way of an explanation for what I mean, allow me an analogy. You must've played the game of chance, LUDO, as a young child. Suppose you and I are playing this game one-on-one. There are four colors to choose from and we're free to choose any one of them. However, once the colors are chosen, they're antagonistic in the sense, whatever color we choose, both can't occupy the same square. Definitions of truth and faleshood are like the colors we choose and inconsistency is the rule in the game where, whatever color we've chosen, they both can't occupy the same square. If I were now to inform a third party that a situation where two pieces were on the same square occurred but that it resulted in one of the pieces being returned to the starting position (inconsistency), the third party can come to the correct conclusion that the pieces involved were not of the same color (falsehood detected). As you can see, the third party's realization that the colors are not of the same color (inconsistency i.e. one is true and the other is a falsehood) doesn't depend on knowing which colors the two of us were playing with (which definition of true and false the two of us were employing). — TheMadFool

You are describing the logical process as if we must make a judgement as to truth or falsity before applying the logic. But this is not the case, as described above. We are actually trained to proceed without making any such judgement. That's why logicians use symbols which do not refer to anything, to learn the procedures, so that we can proceed with pure logic without the bias which judgements of true and false present to us, impeding our progress.

This is nonsense. If part of the definition of a mammal is that it is part of the group that we call animals, then animals needs to be defined in order to properly define mammals. The same goes for consciousness if you are going to say that reason is limited only to it. — Harry Hindu

That's your opinion, but I think it is very clear that it is incorrect. If we need each term defined as you say, there'd be an infinite regress of definitions, and no one would understand anything. In reality, at some point we get to a broad, vague term, and we do not request any further definition. So, for example, human being is defined as a mammal, and some might accept this, others might ask to define mammal. Mammal is defined as animal, and most would accept this as going far enough. But if we go further, we say it's a living being, and further, a living being is an existing thing. And what does it mean to exist? Ad infinitum.

So what is it about reason that makes it limited to consciousness? — Harry Hindu

As I said, it's defined that way, the more general term being used to define the more specific. Reason (the more specific) is defined as a feature of consciousness (the more general).

Smith cannot believe both, that he will get the job, and that someone else will get the job. — creativesoul

I agree, that's basically what I said, natural reason delivers us toward an either this or that sort of belief. So I don't really see your point.

But suppose that someone convinces Smith that the reality of "the job" is such that he might be sharing it with someone else. Then we must revise this statement, to allow that Smith might believe he will get the job, and someone else will also get the job.

Sorry, I don't see the relevance.

Well yeah, but there's a difference between holding beliefs that someone else recognizes as contradictory, and holding beliefs which you yourself recognize as contradictory. Only the latter would be an instance of accepting incoherency. I think we might be able to train ourselves to accept incoherency, but it's contrary to natural reason, so we'd probably need some very strong arguments to persuade us into doing this.

I've got one in my backyard. It's infinitely small though, so the guests have a hard time finding it, and the rooms are even harder to find because they're infinitely smaller, needless to say. So even after the guests find the infinitely small hotel with an infinity of rooms, they have to go through a special procedure to be able to fit into one of those rooms which are infinitely smaller than the infinitely small hotel.

Supposing the wiping was intentional. Is it a crime, or sign of corruption to wipe your phone? Imagine yourself in the position of a member on that team. Your phone contains a lot of personal information. Yet because of your line of business you realize that this information will likely be made public some day. Would you not strive to keep the amount of personal information on your phone to a minimum, and wipe it periodically if necessary? Is this a wrongful act in your mind, you of all people, the great defender of president Trump, and the right to personal freedom?

We've been through this before on other threads, but we could start with the difference between representing an infinite sequence, and representing each of the individuals within an infinite sequence. The first is possible to do, the second is not. Accordingly, we can represent the natural numbers as infinite, but we cannot represent the set of natural numbers because the natural numbers are infinite. Of course we've already seen that this is denied on this forum by the proponents of set theory

Apply this to Hilbert's Hotel. We can represent an infinity of rooms at the hotel, or an infinity of guests, but each room or each guest has its own identity as distinct from each other, to be a separate individual. So we cannot represent each individual room, or each individual guest, in the scenario because there is an infinite number of them, and that would be impossible. therefore we cannot represent the set of rooms at the hotel, or guests at the hotel.

The category mistake I referred to, involves conflating the description of the objects in the set "the natural numbers", and the actual members of the set. Allowing that a set is defined by it's descriptive terms, with defining a set by its actual members, because this produces the empty set, which is incoherent if a set is defined by its actual members A set without members is not a set, if a set is defined by its actual members. But if the set of natural numbers is not defined by its actual members, then it is simply an imaginary set, and not at all related to the real use of numbers.

The Mueller team was either stupid or corrupt or both, but either way, by applying Clintonian destruction of records, they’re going to get away with it. — NOS4A2

Right, forgetting your passcode is "stupid". But I don't think I know anyone who hasn't forgotten a passcode now and then. I guess we're all stupid. How about you NOS, ever forget a passcode?

Anyway, why is wiping your phone clear, before it was requested for examination, an example of corruption? I can see how wiping it after it was requested is corruption, but I think many people commonly wipe their phones.

What could be something, can be anything, that if you change its color to white it will get a whole different meaning ? — tommen

Try any colour, or black is the best. If you change black to white it gets a whole different meaning.

Seriously though, anything which has a particular colour as part of its essential nature takes on a different meaning if you change its colour. So the sky for example is blue, but if it goes to white, we go from a clear day to a cloudy day. And if the sky goes black, we go from day to night. Or, the grass is green. But if the grass goes to white there is a problem here, and if goes to black, it changes from living to dead.

There are many things you can think of, whose colour is essential to their nature, an orange is orange, the night is black, etc., and if you change the colour of one of these things, that will produce a whole different meaning, because it throws an element of incoherency at you. 'The night was an eerie shade of white.'

Well, put it in whatever context you wish but the fact that you're cutting off the very branch you're sitting on remains unchanged. — TheMadFool

Actually I see your descriptions as cutting off the branch your sitting on. You want to define truth in relation to correspondence, yet you keep insisting that falsehood can be demonstrated by inconsistency. This divorces falsehood from a lack of truth, associating it with inconsistency.

The concept of inconsistency has nothing to do with the definition of truth/falsity. — TheMadFool

Then why do you keep saying that falsehood can be determined by inconsistency? That is inconsistency within your argument. You claim that inconsistency has nothing to do with truth or falsity, then you proceed to argue that inconsistency demonstrates falsehood. So it is you who makes a step forward, by recognizing that truth and falsity have nothing to do with inconsistency, then you'll make a step backward right to the point of where you entered this discussion, and claim that inconsistency demonstrates falsehood.

Perhaps we need to separate "true" from "false" such that they are not the opposite or negation of each other. We could say that true is corresponding, and false is inconsistent. Then lack of, or deficiency, in correspondence does not mean false, even though corresponding means true, and consistency does not necessitate true, even though inconsistent necessitates false.

A contradiction is "bad" because, to give an analogy, it's like writing down a proposition on a blank piece of paper and then erasing it. If I say P and then follow it up by saying ~P and P = "God exists" then it amounts to this: God exists. It's as good as not saying anything at all. — TheMadFool

A proposition without context is meaningless. So the terms in your example, "God", and "exists" need to be defined. Otherwise saying "God exists" says nothing at all in the first place, so negating it changes nothing.

Inconsistency has nothing to do with the definition of falsehood. Allow me to explain (as best as I can). Imagine there are two definitions of truth and falsity: 1. Correspondence, 2. Pragmatic. Whether I use definition 1 or definition 2 doesn't matter for inconsistency is simply the situation in which you say something and then take back what you said. Refer to what I said about contradictions. — TheMadFool

Then inconsistency has nothing to do with falsehood, and your statement:

All in all, inconsistency checking ensures that there are no contradictions or falsehoods in your beliefs. — TheMadFool

is a misunderstanding.

You can raise your ratio by replying to multiple mentions in a single post. It might actually be a good practise because it helps keep the threads neat and tidy. It's also good advice to people like you Banno, who appear to attach importance to having a large number of comments. I hope you some day reach your goal of having infinite as your recorded number of comments.

Consistency is important for the reason that if an inconsistency is detected then, there's a hidden contradiction and that's bad, right. — TheMadFool

That is the point, to determine whether contradiction truly is bad. If reality is such, that contradiction is required to accurately describe it, then how can we say that contradiction is bad?

All in all, inconsistency checking ensures that there are no contradictions or falsehoods in your beliefs. — TheMadFool

Again, this is to define "falsehood" as inconsistency. But if reality is such that inconsistencies are the result of true descriptions of our natural world, how can you say that inconsistency represents falsehood?

It does not.

All sorts of people engage in reasoning despite having self-contradictory(incoherent )beliefs. Some refuse to even consider the self-contradiction even when the incompatible beliefs are picked out and compared/analyzed side by side. — creativesoul

Sure, but we label these people as unreasonable. This is the two different uses of "reason" I referred to already. There is "reason" which refers to when a person uses some thinking capacity to work out a problem, working from some sort of premises to a conclusion. Then there is "reason" which refers to conventional rules of logic, by which we would judge an individual's use of reason, as valid or not. On a judgement of not valid, we would say that the person's reason is unreasonable.

You appear to be saying that within an individual's own tendency to reason (and this is what I called natural reason), a person would allow the existence of contradiction. I disagree. I think that if the person recognizes the contradiction as such, the reasoning would not be accepted by the person. But I agree that such self-contradiction and incoherency does exist, though it is not recognized as such by the person who holds those beliefs. What appears to others as incoherency is actually rationalized within the mind of the person who holds those beliefs such that it does not appear as incoherent to that person.

I think it is an intuitive, innate tendency, to reject contradiction and incoherency, when recognized as such, as unintelligible. It may be the case, that if it is deemed necessary in order to understand the reality of our world, we might be educated, or habitualized, to allow such incoherency, as part of our training in formal logic, but I would not accept the proposal that the reverse is the case. That is, I would not accept that the natural tendency of a human being is to accept contradiction and incoherency, and it is only through training and education that we learn to reject this.

That's the odd bit. As per Cantor, infinite sets can differ in cardinality i.e. one can be "greater" than the other. The only instance of that I'm familiar with is the set of real numbers, a bigger infinity than the set of natural numbers. Hilbert's hotel, the way it's formulated, seems to restrict itself to the set of natural numbers. In other words, the infinite set that matters in Hilbert's hotel is basically the set of natural numbers and I don't remember ever coming across a claim that there's an operation we can perform on the naturals that can yield a greater infinity than it. — TheMadFool

I dismiss Cantor as misunderstanding. He misunderstands the nature of numbers, the application of numbers in counting, and the infinite possibility which we say counting gives us. So his theorem is a fine example of category error, in classifying an empty set as a countable set.

Hilbert's Hotel proposes an infinite set, the hotels, and an infinite subset, the guests at the hotel. The guests are not qualified by anything other than "at the hotel". So they cannot exist anywhere other than at the hotel, and they cannot come and go from the hotel as a guest would do at a normal hotel. That would be equivocation, referring to another meaning of "guest at a hotel" which is other than the meaning given to "guest" in Hilbert's Hotel.

That is why the example is so confusing, we tend to think that a guest at Hilbert's hotel would be the same as a guest at another hotel, a guest which could come and go as desired. But the guests at Hilbert's hotel do not have that freedom, because if a guest could come or go, the criteria of the description would not be fulfilled. So talking about a guest arriving at the hotel is nonsense. The hotel with infinite rooms and infinite guests is a description of a static scenario. To change that scenario, and talk about guests arriving at the hotel, we'd have to change the description. It simply makes no sense to talk about a hotel with infinite guests, and then suddenly there is more guests.

It would make a better thought experiment to ask what we'd have if one of the infinite guest decided to leave the hotel. How many guests would then be at the hotel? This would reveal that there is an inconsistency between finite numbers and proposed infinite numbers, which cannot be reconciled.

However, consistency/inconsistency doesn't depend on the actual truth of propositions. In fact this is why we use truth tables to identify them - every possibility is taken into account. Ergo, no theory or definition of truth is relevant to consistency/inconsistency. — TheMadFool

If this is the case, then why do we give consistency any esteem? According to the op, many would give greater esteem to consistency than to correspondence. This may be due to the fact that it is usually much more difficult to determine correspondence than it is to determine correspondence.

The second is fine; whatever reason there may be to fuss over the division between sense and observation is semantic, and doesn’t interfere too seriously with the technicalities. But if observation is suggested as having similar characteristics....being in the same category.....as cognition, we are met with an insurmountable technical inconsistency, for cognition makes explicit an understanding, but observation holds no such requirement, insofar as it is common enough to sense that for which there is no immediate recognition. In other words, cognition implies knowledge, mere observation does not. — Mww

Again, if we follow this route of investigation we might just fall into a pit of deceptive definitions, defining a term in such a way so as to support an already adopted epistemology. So we now have an issue with the definition of "understanding". For me, there is no problem defining "understanding" such that "observation" requires understanding. How could one remember, and observe, what has occurred without some sort of understanding of what has occurred. Animals understand, perhaps insects understand, but I don't think plants have any understanding. But plants don't even sense. So we might link sensation as necessarily correlated with understanding. But if we ask which is prior to other other, as a necessary condition for the other, I would say that some sort of understanding is required for sensation.

As I described in my last post, I think this comes down to an issue of "judgement" as the defining feature of these terms. Understanding requires some sort of "judgement". And sensation requires "judgement", as the judgement is used to filter the vast array of information available, such that the organism recognizes only the information which is "judged" as important or significant to it. If we ask, do plants make "judgements", I'd have to answer yes. Consider a seed. It will lie dormant for an extended period of time. Then, with the correct combination of environmental conditions, temperature, moisture, and light, it will germinate. Isn't this a case of "judgement"? We could almost say that it is a case of sensing without sense organs. Bear in mind, that a physicalist might argue that a thermostat senses the temperature. In philosophy, there is a tradition of shaping one's definitions to be consistent with one's metaphysics.

But I think I understand your groundwork: if there is an “unconscious” form of judgement at the one end of the cognitive sequence, which has been mentioned as imagination, and a “conscious” form of judgement at the other, which has been mentioned as judgement proper, then it follows that the outputs of these forms of judgement will have something in common between them. This may very well work, except for the realization that nothing in the unconscious mode can be anything but purely theoretical, from which follows necessarily that our observation, if categorized as proceeding from “unconscious” judgements, can also be nothing more than theoretical. But they are not, nor can they be, and still keep with the hope of empirical knowledge, as humans indulge themselves in it. — Mww

It's not that the observations themselves (as basic sensations) are theoretical, (because theory is only produced by a rational conscious mind), but what we say about the observations is theoretical. This is because we only have access to our observations through our rational mind, so as i described earlier, when we go to memorize something, we put it into words.

This displays the need to distinguish between the prior and the posterior in our definitions. Observation is prior to theory, because theory is built upon rational thinking employing human language, and observation is more primitive to that. However, within observation we can assume that there is something employed which is similar to theory, but we probably ought not call it "theory", because theory is posterior to observation, if we adhere to a strict definition of theory. Likewise, in my use of the term "judgement", we really ought not say that a seed makes a judgement. It provides more clarity to restrict that term to reasoned judgement of a conscious mind. But then we need a term to refer to what the seed is doing when it decides to germinate. if we do not create these terms, we have the ambiguity which allows the determinist to say that what the seed is doing, is the exact same thing as what the thermostat is doing.

One doesn’t theorize hearing a siren; he actually, truly, and with apodeictic certainty, hears a siren. — Mww

But this isn't really true, is it? The person might hear a sound, interpreted as a siren, like a recoding perhaps, and assume that it is an actual siren. It really does not make sense to say that hearing the siren is a real and actual hearing a siren, and not a theorized hearing a siren, because there is theory within the concept of "siren", and also the concept of "hearing". So how could hearing a siren possibly be anything other than a theorized hearing a siren?

No need for such derivation. It is quite obvious there is an unconscious aspect of human mental activity, right? I mean.....we are never aware of the output of sensation and the input to the brain, yet when we stub our left toe we never jerk our right foot. Might this be your “unconscious” judgement?/quote]

Yeah, I think that serves as a good example. So consider reflex actions for a moment, as an example. It really is inappropriate to say that there is a "judgement" involved with reflex actions. However, how could we describe such actions without some reference to a sort of preconditioned influence toward a decision to act?
— Mww

Perhaps. But we both accept that we know things. If nothing else, the best we could say is we both sometimes make exactly the same mistake. And if everybody makes exactly the same mistake, we might as well call such mistakes, knowledge. — Mww

This doesn't make a good epistemology though. it's nothing more than mob mentality. If everyone seems to be doing it, then it must be correct, "knowledge".

This is an unwarranted assertion. What is it about consciousness that makes reasoning limited to it? To answer this we need a proper definition of consciousness. — Harry Hindu

Well, I don't think so really. All we need is a proper definition of "reason". The more specific term is defined in relation to the more general, but a definition of the more general defining feature is usually not necessary. So for example, we might define "human being" through reference to the more general, "mammal". A definition of "mammal" may or may not be called for. We define "mammal" in reference to "animal", and a definition of "animal" may or may not be called for. Likewise, if we define "reason" in reference to consciousness, a definition of consciousness may or may not be required.

Hi jerseyFlight,
I'm going to apologize right now, in case it offends you, because I'm going to be curt with my reply on most the things you said. It seems like most your points are either repeating a question I've already addressed, or trending toward absurdity. There is however one point where we might have some agreement, so I'll start with that and see if we can find a way to advance.

It does not actually maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But that is a different point. We are here discussing the law of identity. — JerseyFlight

Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal. It is very similar, and closely related to the concept of matter, an ideal. We notice that despite the fact that the world is continually changing, there is consistency. The changes are not random, there is continuity of existence from one moment to the next, so Aristotle posited "matter" to account for this continuity. If the forms of things in the world are changing from one moment to the next, there must be something which dictates the possibility of change, this potential is attributed to matter. Why do some aspects of the world appear to persist while others do not? Whatever it is which answers the reason for this, it must be something substantial, and in modern terms it is expressed as mass or inertia. This concept is employed to answer the question of why do some forms change from one moment to the next, while others persist in time. You can see how "matter" is an ideal.

Likewise, you can see how the law of identity is an ideal. Suppose one were to describe the world (its form) at each moment in time. Each moment it would be a different form. However, we can name a particular aspect, and say that this aspect is not changing. So we might say that this aspect has identity, as a temporally extended thing. But this is just a projected ideal, because parts of this thing (accidentals) are changing, and we must overlook these changing parts in order to say that this thing is not changing. The point is, that we observe consistency, and see very clearly that some aspects of the world are not changing as time passes, but when we try to formalize this, state the form that is not changing, we cannot accurately represent this because there is always aspects of that thing, which the formalized statement refers to, which are changing. So these are said to be accidentals, but we still haven't accurately isolated the thing which is not changing, because we just disregard the accidentals. So Aristotle posited matter, and matter as an ideal, is supposed to account for those temporally extended, unchanging aspects of the world, which we give identity to as existing things.

Having said that, let me proceed to the rest of your points.

Best to begin at the beginning. As a matter of fact, if you had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel, only your mind to think, you could not arrive at an understanding or form of a chair. But chairs are real things, they exist independent of the human mind, this premise is the swift destruction of your position. This is true because all that you say about the chair and its form hinges on the actual existence of a chair, coupled with your sensory ability to detect it. If you remove this premise, if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is the substance of mind, remove this and there is nothing left. — JerseyFlight

This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with. So if such a mind created a form, and called it a chair, then just because it's not the same form of a chair that your mind would come up with, does not mean that it's not the form of a chair. What validates your understanding of "a chair" as better than this mind's understanding of "a chair". All you are doing is denying Descartes' "brain in a vat", as incapable of creating forms without sensing, but you have no principles to support such a denial.

The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being. When I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that perhaps he was just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach difference to identity. But the thing is, identity is actually saying this! Hegel is not making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it, surely you will not say that identity is different from itself? This would destroy identity. — JerseyFlight

This is an absurdity as well. We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has.

The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another? — JerseyFlight

There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity. Hegel's decision to represent the law of identity with three symbols is simply arbitrary. So this argument of Hegel's is against a straw man. And all that babble about difference and unity is just an irrelevant distraction. What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it. What the law talks about is identity, and it defines identity as a thing being the same as itself. This talk about unity and difference is irrelevant, having no real bearing on the issue.

At every turn you are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue it from itself, the only difference is that you are claiming that all your actions are still contained within the premise of the law. — JerseyFlight

Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation. I only pointed out that negation is relative to predication, not to the subject itself. So I pointed out how Hegel has gone beyond the premise, just like he does in talking about the three symbols, difference and unity. He brings in all sorts of irrelevancies, to cloud the issue, in a ploy of sophistry, instead of addressing the meaning of the proposition itself.

The point is not that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not different from itself, it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity of difference to distinguish itself. — JerseyFlight

Here you go, beyond the stated proposition. There is nothing within the law of identity which indicates that "different" is opposite to "same". And, as I already explained to you more than once, as "same" is used in the law of identity, "different" is necessarily included within same, and therefore cannot be opposite. A thing is different from how it was, from one minute to the next, therefore it is different from itself. Yet it maintains its identity as being the same as itself. Therefore being different from itself is included within being the same as itself, such that a thing is both different from itself, and the same as itself. It is very clear that different is not opposed to same, as "same" is used in the law of identity.

This is just an idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is changing, but more importantly, the subject itself is not separated from difference or unity. If it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not determine itself. — JerseyFlight

Yes, for sure, it is an idealistic formulation of reality, as explained at the beginning of the post. The problem though, is that we have no other way to account for the consistency and temporal continuity of existence, so we posit ideals such as "matter", and "identity", to fill that void in our understanding of reality.

It is not to oppose "different" with "same," as from the outside, it is merely to draw out what the premise already contains. — JerseyFlight

That's absurd. The premise says nothing about difference. I "draw out" the premise in the way that it was meant to be drawn out, to show that difference is included within the identity of the changing thing. You "draw out" the premise by defining different as opposed to same, with the intent of rejecting the premise. Obviously it is you who draws out the premise in the wrong direction, because opposing same and different is unnecessary. Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension.

It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it. — JerseyFlight

Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics. But we can define words in such a way so as to make any law or proposition appear as if it ought to be rejected. However, what is at issue here is the law itself, and the meaning of it. And we need to understand its meaning before determining whether we ought or ought not reject it, and then we may proceed to define words consistent with it, to uphold it, or inconsistent with it to uphold the intent to reject it. Defining words with the intent of proving a proposition wrong is a pointless exercise. Understanding the proposition so that you can decide whether it ought or ought not be proven wrong is something more meaningful.

If there is an infinite number of guests at the hotel already, then there are no more possible guests to arrive, because that would allow for the possibility of greater than infinite.

So how do you explain communication without a common understanding, or way of interpreting scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

Communication is a very complex subject and I'm not ready to try to explain how it works.

It seems to me that you can't sever the interpretation from the sensation - as if sensations just occur without the addition of its interpretation. The brain subconsciously interprets the sensory data and filters it before you even become aware of it in your conscious mind. The conscious part of the mind seems to be an extra layer of fault-tolerance - interpreting sensory data and interpreting it in a social context, like for communication. — Harry Hindu

Right we're in agreement here. That subconscious interpretation, which you say that the brain does, requires some sort of "judgement" is what I've been arguing. We cannot call it reasoning because reasoning is limited to conscious judgements. So i wonder what kind of principles are being applied in this subconscious interpretation.

Consistency ensures that, there exists a possible world in which all propositions for a given belief system, say X, are true. — TheMadFool

This is incorrect. Consistency says nothing about the truth of the beliefs. One could write fictitious propositions which are completely false, but consistent, about some "possible world". Consistency does not ensure that the belief system is true. What ensures truth is that the propositions correspond with the actual world. The issue is whether or not the true propositions, ones which describe the actual world, are consistent with each other, and capable of producing one consistent "possible world". Perhaps the actual world is composed of a multitude of possible worlds which are inconsistent with each other.

To reiterate, an inconsistent set of propositions implies one or more of them is/are false. — TheMadFool

If "true" is defined according to correspondence with the reality of the world, then another premise is required to produce this conclusion. That premise would be the proposition that the reality of the world cannot be described with inconsistent premises. How can we know whether this proposition is true or not.

The idea that there's a possibility that the universe could itself be inconsistent doesn't make sense for the reason that inconsistency implies the presence of a falsehood and unless you want to construct a belief system that includes falsehoods, no inconsistent set of proposition is acceptable. Do you want there to be falsehoods in your belief system about the universe? — TheMadFool

This is only the case if you remove correspondence as a defining feature of truth and falsity. If you do this, then any imaginary possible world which is consistent is a true world. Otherwise you equivocate with your use of "falsehood".

Isn't that what "defining the meaning of words" means? If not, then what is a "definition"? — Harry Hindu

Defining a word is to give a definition which will be adhered to within a logical argument or a similar use. This is a prescriptive venture. It prescribes how the word will be used and interpreted. What the dictionary gives us is a description of how words are generally used.

I'm not sure I get what you mean here. My point was that there has to be a common understanding of what some words mean if they are to be used for communicating. That common understanding could be a dictionary, or experience with a person using certain words in a certain way. Either way, it requires experience with a dictionary or a person using words, to understand their use of them. — Harry Hindu

Your use of "common understanding" doesn't make any sense to me. Individual people understand, and have an understanding. But the way I understand things is different from the way that you understand things. Yet we can communicate. So I think your proposition, that a "common understanding" (which appears incoherent to me) is required for communication, is false.

That's the thing - I don't see a distinction. Don't you have to first understand that what you are looking at or hearing is words, and not just some scribbles or sounds? Only after that can you then try to understand what those scribbles or sounds refer to. — Harry Hindu

I believe that this is intuitive. Everything we sense and observe, lightening, thunder, the ground, buildings, sky, words, is intuitively received as having significance or meaning. This is why I have requested a difference between sensation and observation. When we sense things, there is a huge magnitude of events happening all at the same time, and we instinctually prioritize the significance of the various things, and observe those assumed to have importance.

At each point, there is no difference in the type of understanding required to understand the difference between scribbles and words and to understand how those words are used. In the case of lightning and thunder, you have to understand that it is lightning and thunder that you see and hear, and then understand from that what the presence of lightning and thunder mean. — Harry Hindu

I think there is a big difference between conscious understanding, reasoning, and the unconscious, intuitive, assigning of importance to sensations.

So you say, which is fine. I would say cognition requires one to understand, and experience is that which he remembers as having been observed in particular, perceived in general. — Mww

OK, so I would place observation in the same category as cognition. There seems to be a grey area, a division lacking demarcation, which we often refer to habitually, between conscious reasoned thought (cognition), and unconscious brain activity. I'd say that this is derived from our habit of separating human beings from other animals, as equipped with a special type of mental capacity which the other animals do not have. Since we have established this division "man is a rational animal", we talk about mental capacities as if there is a divide between this and that type of activity. We wouldn't say that other animals engage in reasoning, cognition, or even observation. But to argue that other animals do, is to obscure that proposed division.

However, I believe that this way of dividing the different mental activities is not representative of reality. In reality, each of these activities crosses back and forth between that proposed divide, consisting of aspects of each, reasoned thought, and animalistic instinct, and this habit of dividing mental activities as if some are distinctly reasoned thought, and others are distinctly brute instincts is an incorrect representation. So if we look at a divide between conscious (chosen) and unconscious (instinctually driven) activities, (perhaps the biological division of voluntary and involuntary actions), we would see that human beings and other animals engage in both. And if we were to take just the conscious (voluntary) actions, we would see that a large part of the inclination toward such actions is based in the involuntary. so it's not a proper division. This would mean, that as much as we want to separate "reason" out, and place it as conditioned by itself only, there is a fundamental part of it which is firmly planted in natural instinct.

I suppose imagination, the unconscious faculty that transforms sensations into phenomena, could be thought as a form of judgement. But such transformation is still a consequence of perception rather than prior to it. — Mww

Based on what I wrote above, I have reason to question our understanding of judgement. We categorize judgement as a feature of conscious, reasoned decision, a product of cognition. However, it is quite clear from the example of seeing the multitude of things, that some type of decision, choice, or selection, is being made at the unconscious, involuntary level. How do we describe, or refer to this type of selection, or judgement, if the common use of all these words is conditioned by that traditional separation, to refer to the product of human reasoning alone? If it is actually the case that this type of activity, decision, choice, selection, or judgement, extends throughout all living activities to the most basic life forms, then we need to reassess the traditional division between a reasonable judgement and a non-reasonable judgement, to determine what constitutes a reasonable judgement.

Whichever items are mentioned in a list merely indicates a relative impression those objects made, whether from familiarity, some arbitrary characteristic...shiny, odd-shaped, whatever. — Mww

Right, so can we say that the impression which the objects make is relative to some type of "judgement" (using quotes to signify an idiosyncratic use of the word referring to an instinctual, unconscious form of decision) of importance or some other type of significance? That different people will notice different things is indicative of a fundamental individuality in such "judgements". Perhaps, this individuality, this difference, is a fundamental feature of such instinctual "judgement", and we only learn through conditioning, to make judgements which are consistent with what others would make in the same situation. So we, as human beings, produce an artificial ideal, "a judgement which is consistent with what others would choose", and call this "reason", despite the fact that it is reasonable, do to the underlying individuality, to make a judgement which is different from others.

I grant there will be a difference between the totality of the items and the items that make the list, but I don’t grant it as relating to a difference in sense vs. observation. — Mww

The use of terminology here is extremely vague, so I won't fuss over the proposed division between sense and observation. The point was to show that there must be some mechanism of choice or selection at this level. Consequently, there is "judgement", at the unconscious level. And any form of judgement must be grounded in some sense of importance or significance, so there must be a reason why some people would observe or notice some items, out of the vast multitude, and other people would notice other items.

Sensation is the affect the objects we have sensed have on us...a tickle, a sound, a taste, etc. These are all sensations which merely represent objects that physiologically affect our sense organs. — Mww

The problem here, is that we cannot proceed through the conscious mind, to determine the effect which sensation has on the unconscious part of our being. With the conscious mind, we get to the point of the affect which sensations have on the conscious mind. But much of the interaction between the objects sensed, and the sensing being is carried out at the unconscious level. so we cannot access that interaction through the conscious mind. Therefore we cannot make any conscious judgements concerning the unconscious "judgements" which are carried out at that level through this procedure. To limit "the affect the objects have" to the consciously apprehended affect, is a mistake. .

Perhaps. For me, everything in its place: sound sensation is hearing, tactile sensation is feeling, olfactory sensation is smelling.....sight sensation is seeing, and that which is seen is observed. We do not observe the smell of frying bacon, we do not taste B-flat, and we do not hear the sight of fast-moving clouds. — Mww

I don't believe that seeing something necessitates the conclusion that it has been observed. Observation requires that the person understands and remembers what has been seen. Did you see the example I provided above? Could you address this example, I'll reproduce it below, and explain to me how you maintain your principle of whatever has been seen has been observed?

If you scan the horizon with your eyes for a few seconds, and there are hundreds of different things out there, and you turn around, then I ask you what did you see, you could list off a view items. Whether you list off these items, or those items, is a big difference, because it indicates that what you have noticed, or "observed", is different from what you have "sensed". — Metaphysician Undercover

Judgement passed on sensation, rather than being mere observation, is empirical knowledge. Sensation upon which a judgement is not forthcoming, insofar as we must admit to an “I don’t know” about it, still manifests as an experience. Aesthetic judgements, on the other hand, those having to do with non-cognitive feelings, or the sublime, are just the opposite, insofar as, while possibly motivated by experience, are not themselves judgements of experience, thus knowledge with respect to them is given immediately. — Mww

My argument is that some form of judgement (unconscious judgement) must be passed on sensation prior to observation. This accounts for the fact that so much sense information is received, and only a portion of this is remembered as observation. Consider another example. You are assigned the task of observing something specific. Suppose someone wants to know when a certain thing changes, or something like that, which could happen at any moment. So you observe this particular thing, focus on it, and it alone, such that you are not paying any attention to the other things in your field of vision, even though you still see them. Other things could be happening in your field of vision, you see them, but you ignore them, because you are focused on observing something specific. What I think, is that when we look around in the world, certain things attract one's attention for some reason or another, and so those things are observed by the person, but the vast majority of things going on around the person do not get observed at all, despite being present to the senses.

Nevertheless, if one chooses to trust sensation over reason, he will be at a complete loss as to explaining what the sensation actually represents, unless he reasons about it, which puts him right back to trusting reason over sensation. — Mww

This would only be the case, if what you say about sensing and observation is true. But if it is true that there is a difference between sensation and observation, as I describe, then we have to account for that type of "judgement" or whatever it is, which induces us to observe only specific aspects of what we sense. This is not a conscious judgement, so it cannot be a judgement of reason. We could call it a sense of intuition, in the traditional sense of intuition, and one might trust this intuition over reason. Then the inclination to trust the laws of logic, and consequently trust reason, would be derived from a similar type of intuition.

Anyway, consider the situation where you have a belief system, T, that consists of the propositions, say X, Y, and Z. Suppose then that these 3 propositions are inconsistent in the sense that it's impossible for all three of them to be true at the same time. In other words the conjunction X & Y & Z evaluates to false i.e. the belief system T, as a whole, is false. — TheMadFool

If X&Y&Z are inconsistent with each other, this does not justify the claim that the belief system is false, unless falsity is determined as inconsistency, rather than as correspondence. That is the point of the op. Each proposition might state something true (corresponding) about the world, yet logic might tell us that those statements are inconsistent. The laws of consistency are not based in correspondence, so inconsistent does not mean false, in the sense of correspondence.

You conclude that X, Y, and Z, cannot all be true if inconsistent, but on what basis do you claim this? Perhaps your idea of what is consistent, and what is not consistent, does not provide a true representation of the world. Then being inconsistent does not necessarily mean false, because your rules of logic may not correspond with the reality of the world.

Well, it depends on how general you want to be. I had in mind things like causation, or gravity. You have certainly observed one object cause another object to move on more than one occasion. My point being that due to this consistency in experience (or observation if you prefer) we come to have certain expectations of how the world works. We then experience incoherency when these expectations are not met. — Pinprick

This type of generalization seems to be the common response here. But no one has told me, and I can't figure out, how it relates to coherency. I was defining coherency as consistency within logical structures, lack of contradiction between propositions, etc.. You seem to be saying that incoherency is when something isn't the way that you expect it to be, referring to inductive generalizations to support your expectations. So you are assigning "incoherency" to situations when things are inconsistent with the way you expect them to be. But this is really a lack of correspondence, it's not a lack of coherency, in the sense of "coherency" that I meant.

I think that this is a different issue. The notion that things ought to correspond with our expectations, the expectations having been produced from inductive generalizations, is somewhat different from the notion that such generalizations ought to be consistent with themselves. The latter is what I am talking about as "coherency". The difference becomes more evident if we replace "generalizations" with principles of procedure, application, or principles for moral conduct in the latter case. Then it becomes very clear how we can have incoherent, contradictory principles of procedure.

I’m not, but it’s because whatever difference there is between them seems to not make a difference. — Pinprick

Of course it makes a difference. If you scan the horizon with your eyes for a few seconds, and there are hundreds of different things out there, and you turn around, then I ask you what did you see, you could list off a view items. Whether you list off these items, or those items, is a big difference, because it indicates that what you have noticed, or "observed", is different from what you have "sensed". The only reason why you would say that it doesn't make a difference, is if you were trying to support the false premise that sensation and observation are the same thing.

This was to show that we are able to form expectations at a very young age, which implies the ability to learn about the environment presumably through “memorizing” observations. — Pinprick

OK, maybe there is a correlation between "expectations", which refers to an assumption of correspondence, as described above, and "coherency", defined as logical consistency. I really don't see it though, and the problem is this. Coherency might be at the base of expectation. Expectation, as a motivator for action might be naturally shaped, or conformed by coherency, in order to prevent us human beings from being inclined toward many different inconsistent actions. However, such coherency is pragmatic only, it prevents the human being from trying to do contrary or inconsistent things, things which would interfere with, or hinder each other. Now, what supports this need for coherency? What validates the assumption of interference? You'd say that it is those generalizations, and correspondence with them, but such generalizations are known to be faulty and unreliable. That's why a child must be educated, to dispel the expectations that the child has, at a very young age, replacing them with more true expectations.

This is meant to refer to those other two options. My point is just that if we are going to make an attempt at understanding something that seems to contradict our preconceived notions (natural reason), then we must alter those notions because we cannot change the actual phenomenon. — Pinprick

Sure, but "phenomenon", as referring to how the world appears to a person, through sensation, might not be a very good representation of how the world actually is. This problem is indicated by the difference between sensation and observation, and the example above. The aspects of the world which are noticed, or observed by us, are only a very small portion of what is sensed, and this small portion constitutes the phenomena. So if we want to learn about how the world actually is, we must apply some principles derived from something other than the phenomena.

I don't think natural reason demands the rejection of incoherent propositions. Incoherent propositions are rejected when proven incoherent. Therefore, it is the action of observing which forms the basis for the rejection of incoherent propositions. — Daniel

I don't agree with this. Propositions are proven to be incoherent by demonstrating inconsistency like contradiction. This is done through appeal to definition. There is no need to refer to observation for this proof, only a rule of non-contradiction is required. Proof that such a rule ought to be applied might require empirical demonstration, but that's a different issue.

If I say there is only one star in the universe, it is not natural reason which leads me to believe that there is more than one star in the universe; it is the act of experiencing and observing that there is more than one star in the universe which rejects the incoherent proposition. — Daniel

Incoherency, as I meant to define in the op, is a relationship between propositions, or the terms within a proposition. So there would be incoherency between these two propositions "there is one star in the universe", and "there is more than one star in the universe", but neither one is itself incoherent. Likewise, a self-contradicting proposition would demonstrate incoherency within itself. The act of observing numerous stars leads to the rejection of "there is one star in the universe", on the basis of a failure to correspond, not on the basis of incoherency.

I don't think that two different, observations about the same thing can be completely contradictory; they might disagree in certain aspects but never contradict each other (they are about the same thing). If they are observations about different things, then they cannot be contradictory, at all. — Daniel

Of course two observations of the same thing might contradict. One person might say, that object is small, and another might say that it is big.

Coherence is found in what we say, not in how things are. — Banno

Right, now the question is what validates the desire, or need for coherency in what we say about the world. Unless there is something in the world, which corresponds with "coherency", the world ought to be represented as incoherent, in order for us to have a true, corresponding representation of the world. Why would we demand coherency within our descriptions and representations of the world, when these are meant to correspond with the world, and there is no such thing as coherency in the world? What does "coherency" represent, which makes it so valuable, if it doesn't correspond with anything in the world?

If what we say about them is inconsistent, then we've said it wrong. — Banno

What makes it wrong, to say something inconsistent about the world, if "consistent" doesn't correspond with anything in the world?

The idea of coherency only exists if there are prior observations of the phenomena being observed currently. If you observe a completely novel experience, then you won’t know if your observation is coherent or not, as there is no baseline to judge it by. — Pinprick

I don't agree with this. I think that each experience is novel. I've never had two experiences the same before, though I've experienced deja vu, but I really can't even imagine the possibility of living through the same thing twice. I recognize deja vu as just a feeling, and not really having the same experience twice. With the nature of time and spatial existence being as it is, it seems completely impossible to have the same experience more than once. So quite clearly, coherency must be based in something other than prior observations of the same thing.

The idea of coherency might be derived from observations though. Maybe after many observations we start to derive a notion of what is and isn't possible, and coherency is based in this sort of inductive conclusion concerning possibilities.

If you have prior observations/experiences, then the default assumption is coherency (which also implicitly assumes determinism). The reason for this, I would assume, is because more often than not this assumption is correct. It’s an effective assumption to make while navigating the world and trying to understand it. — Pinprick

The problem I see here is that you do not seem to be differentiating between experience, and observation. Observation is to take note of what has been experienced, so it requires a task of memorizing. Imagine that something has just happened, you've experienced it. You think it's significant so you want to remember it, therefore you take mental notes, observations. It's very difficult to imagine the whole scenario of what occurred, and memorize this, so I tend to put things into words, and this helps me to remember. The strategy I use is to maintain coherency in my description, otherwise when i try to remember at a future time, I will be confused as to what really happened, because my own description won't make sense to me. Sometimes though, it might be difficult to be coherent, especially if the event was fast and it's difficult for me to follow exactly what happened. However, I will feel a need to remember what happened with a coherent description, and this might incline me toward making up some things, just to produce coherency, and help me understand the event which I am trying to remember, so that I can remember it. But then I'm not actually remembering what I experienced, because my observations are tainted by the make believe which I had to add, in order to understand what I saw.

If we observe something that contradicts our assumed coherency, then the logical thing to do is to try to develop a theory that explains both the incoherent and coherent observations. If that cannot be accomplished, then the only options left are to discard the observation as some illusion, determine that the novel observation plays by a different set of rules for some reason (which you would then go in to try and explain), or to repeat the observations if possible and hope you can gain some better insight into what exactly is going on.

The bottom line is that observations drive, or determine, reason. When the two clash, it is reason that must become flexible or malleable in order to accommodate our observations. — Pinprick

Why do you contradict yourself here? First you say that if consistency cannot be produced, the only thing to do is to discard the observation as illusion. Then you say when observation and reason clash, "it is reason that must become flexible" to accomodate observations.

Here's your test case. "It rained here yesterday." Now you have to show why it "is not reasonable in any way" to suppose that it will rain here again. — tim wood

Just as I said, to reasonably draw that conclusion we need another principle, a principle which supports the idea that what happened yesterday will happen today. This principle is not drawn from experience because we experience each day as different from every other day. And there is no implied infinite regress, just a need for that principle which would support the conclusion as a reasonable conclusion.

Inherent in? No. Consequential to, certainly, with respect to time. Judgement presupposes that which is to be judged, either a posteriori perception on the one hand, or a priori thought on the other. We can think and arrive at a judgement without perceiving, but we cannot perceive and arrive at a judgement without thinking. — Mww

I suppose we may be using "observation" in different ways. To me, observation implies judgement having been past on the acts of sensation, such that a decision as to what will be remembered out of all that has been sensed, has been made. The content of sensation is much more expansive than the content of observation, so something intermediate between sensation and observation must narrow the field. The complete magnitude of all that is sensed is not contained in observation. If this is not a form of judgement, which narrows sensation to observation, then what is it?

Reason is a prime human asset, along with the moral constitution. Reason conditioned by itself just means there is nothing else required for reason to function as that asset, other than the compendium of cognitive faculties incorporated within it. Things are required to reason about, of course, but not to function.

Reason doesn’t create itself, but it does create its own objects. Consciousness, the ego, the self....a myriad of representations that are nothing but objects of reason.

But it’s all speculative metaphysics, so......grain of salt here, dump truck full there. — Mww

Let's assume that what you say about reason here is true. Your claim that reason ought to be trusted over sensation was supported by this principle. But how does that make sense? Reason, being conditioned only by itself, would have the capacity to produce any sort of fantasy, any imaginary thing. But sensation is condition by nature, and is therefore grounded in some sort of reality. If this is a true portrayal of reason, why on earth should reason be more trustworthy than sensation?

Is not a dictionary a use of words within a certain context, like defining the meaning of words? — Harry Hindu

It is a use of words, but the dictionary does not define the meaning of words. It gives guidance, in the form of a general representation of how words are commonly used. So the dictionary definitions are similar to inductive conclusions, descriptions of how words are commonly used. But if we look at them as inductive conclusions, they are very faulty, not acceptable induction at all, by scientific standards.

What makes some scribble or sound useful for understanding, and others not useful for understanding? If we can use sounds to understand things that arent sounds, then why cant we use any sound, like sounds that arent spoken words, to understand something. For instance, hearing and seeing someone say "it's going to rain" vs hearing thunder and seeing lightning, both sounds and visuals provide you with the same understanding - that it is going to rain. Propositions are just a particular type of visual and sounds. — Harry Hindu

The so-called sounds and scribbles are used with intent, as symbols, and that means that they are associated with something else. We do use other things, like in your example. I didn't say that understanding is limited to the use of words. I was talking about a specific type of understanding, which I called "natural reason".

We trust reason over observation because reason is conditioned by itself, whereas observation is conditioned by Nature. — Mww

I don't quite understand the distinction here, perhaps you could expound. What do you mean with "conditioned by itself"? There is a reason why I used "natural reason", to establish reason as something natural rather than an illusionary concept of reason as something self-created.

Observation, being a strictly passive, unconscious mental activity, is not responsible for incoherency, such being the domain of judgement. — Mww

This seems sort of contradictory, a strictly passive activity. Don't you think that there is judgement inherent within observation? Observation consists of noticing some things as important or significant, but also disregarding others as insignificant or unimportant.

It follows that even if judgement, a product of reason, occasionally leads the thinking subject astray, it is rarely the case, and even if there is a case, it is reason alone that has the ability to rectify its own mistakes. — Mww

So I would say that there is judgement which is not a product of reason. Such judgements might or might not appear to be reasonable judgements, in a different sense of "reason", like a reasoned judgement might still appear to be unreasonable in that other sense, when the reasoning is judged as unsound.

Although, treating understanding as a fundamental human cognitive faculty, doesn’t really warrant scare quotes, Nietzsche’s “inverted goat’s feet”. No reason to be scared of it, or doubt its reality. — Mww

I'm not familiar with "scare quotes", I use the quotes to emphasize the word as referring to a thing, a concept, such as "reason" above. Another tradition might be to capitalize the word, Reason.

He is so convinced he has the correct psychology and that we really abstract without knowing it that he can't see that he created this feeling of abstraction is his mind through lust for a devourment of scholastic books. "Reason is a whore" said Luther (about Aristotle btw) — Gregory

If it is true that I "created" this, then my argument is proven.

If its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same. — JerseyFlight

In Aristotelian physics, temporal continuity is provided for by matter. Matter is the underlying thing which persists through change, as the form of the thing changes. Because the identity of the thing persists, despite changes to its form, we must associate identity with matter, not with form.

This premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind. — JerseyFlight

When did I say I was idealist? That is your straw man. And since I accept the existence of the material world, which is contrary to your notion of idealism, you now ought to see that it is a straw man. Or, perhaps I really am idealist, and your notion of idealism is a straw man. Choose your poison.

Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity. — JerseyFlight

We went through this already, perhaps in the other thread. "Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity. Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as the same thing. This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object.

Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated. To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter.

This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point. — JerseyFlight

Negation and transition are formal, identity is material. Do you recognize this distinction between form and matter in Aristotle?

Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided. — JerseyFlight

This very clearly demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law of identity. Identity is given to the object itself, and the object is represented in logic as the subject. All contraries are related to what is predicated of the subject, so it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity itself. Contradiction is in what is said about the object, but identity is within the object.

If the law of identity were itself contradictory, then you might demonstrate this. But it's not. So it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity, because the law of identity puts identity into the object itself, and contradiction is always within what is said about the object.

It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic, why the criteria of exactitude? — JerseyFlight

The need for "exactitude" is quite clear. Any difference is a difference, hence two distinct forms. Two similar forms are different forms, not one form.

What I don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your defense. — JerseyFlight

I did not preclude influence, that is your straw man. What I insist, is that perceptual information received from, or taken from, the chair, does not mean that the form of the chair in my mind, as an image, is even similar to, let alone the same form, as what inheres within the material chair.

That is the argument. There is a form in the material chair itself, directly related to the chair's identity, and there is a form "of" the chair in my mind, as an image. These two forms, though they might both be called "the form of the chair", are completely distinct. And only the form which inheres within the material chair is directly related to the identity of that object, because the form in my mind "of the chair", is what you called mediated.

Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no bearing on your formation of it? — JerseyFlight

The point is that these are two distinct forms, the form which inheres within the material chair, and the form of the chair which is in my mind.. We could only call them the same form, and thereby claim that the form in my mind is directly related to the identity of the chair, if there was such exactitude. There is not such exactitude, therefore the identity of the chair remains within the chair, and not in my mind.

I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories. — JerseyFlight

There is though, a duality of form. How else can you account for the form of the chair in your mind, as an image, and the fact that the material chair has a form itself, which makes it the particular thing that it is? For the reasons explained, we cannot say that these two forms are the same form. Therefore we ought to conclude that each perceived object has a duality of form, the form which is proper to the identity of the object, and the form that is proper to the mind which perceives it which we often call the "form of the object" .

And why not the necessity of the necessity, .., of the necessity?

The thing either is, or it is not. If subject to infinite regress, then not. But it is, so it cannot be subject to infinite regress and must therefore be understood in some different way. Perhaps your reading of reason and reasonable are both too reductive and restrictive. — tim wood

Sorry tim, I just can't understand what your saying. You asked me why I think it is unreasonable to think that because it happened in the past, the same thing will happen again in the future, and I gave you my answer. I don't see how infinite regress is relevant.

f all you meant was the past is not a guarantee of a particular future, that's easy enough. But to deny that reason can find any connection is ludicrous on its face. — tim wood

That is close to what I meant, but it doesn't quite get there. What i said is that it is not reasonable in any way, to think that what happened in the past guarantees that the same thing will happen in the future. You ought to quit trying to read some hidden agenda into what I write, then disagreeing with me based on that assumed hidden agenda.

But that's the problem - trying to separate it from the world. We typically understand things based on their effects on the rest of the world or the rest of the world's effect on it. — Harry Hindu

Sure, but we also typically separate one from the other, in the attempt to understand the mix, like separating the sugar from the water to understand the solution. It's often called analysis. So for example, we'd separate the cause from the effect, in an attempt to understand the event, which consists of both. I don't see how you characterize understanding through analysis as "the problem".

And understanding is about, or of, things, so trying to separate what some understanding is, from what it is about, or of, would be a misunderstanding of understanding. — Harry Hindu

I think this is nonsense. It makes complete sense to talk about "understanding" in a general sense, and determine characteristics which are proper to it, regardless of the particulars involved in an instance of understanding a particular thing.

And does understanding necessarily entail the use of propositions? Does a mother deer in the woods understand the odors and sounds that it smells and hears? Based on it's behavior, it obviously understands the distinction between the smell and sounds of its offspring and the smell and sounds of a wolf. It runs from wolves, and not from its offspring. — Harry Hindu

I don't see how any of this is relevant to the op.

Definitions in dictionaries are the consistent use of some scribble or sound. If you want to use them in a way that is inconsistent with their definition, then communicating would be difficult unless the other person has some prior experience with you using the scribble/sound in that way to know/understand/interpret in the same way that you are. In other words, communication entails the consistent understanding of what some scribble or sound points to in two or more minds. Without that, communication doesn't occur. — Harry Hindu

I think that if you took a serious look at the way words are actually used, you'd see that meaning is provided by the context of usage, not dictionaries.

Communication between two or more computers requires the consist use of protocols - the rules by which the computers communicate. If one isn't following the same set of rules communication doesn't happen. — Harry Hindu

You are removing yourself further and further from the subject of the op. The op concerned the use of words in human understanding. You took one step away from this to talk about the use of words in human communication. Now you've taken a step even further away, to talk about communication between computers.

Like I said, "The world isn't inconsistent outside of our minds", which means that the only place the inconsistencies exist in the world is in minds. Inconsistencies occur because propositions and understanding are about, or of things, and not the things themselves, and our belief that every instance in time can be the same as some prior instance. All instances are unique and any understanding of some present or future event can only be based on prior similar instances, never the same instance.

The world is consistent (deterministic), in that if ever the universe was re-started, it would evolve in exactly the same was as before, but each instance in time of the evolving universe is separate and distinct, however similar it may appear based on our present intention and experiences. — Harry Hindu

That's some assertion, but I don't believe it. And since you speak as if it's the absolute truth, we probably don't have much to discuss.

How do you conclude this? Now some instances of predicting the future based on the past are illogical. — Philosophim

I just explained it in the last post. Another principle, which states the necessity of similarity is required.

I don't understand this inclination to set words, or language-use, and observers, up on this special pedestal separate from the world that they represent. — Harry Hindu

It's called "human understanding", and it's separated off from the rest of the world, as a particular thing to try to understand in itself. The reason for separating it off, is not to put it on a pedestal, but to try and understand it. Since this is philosophy, human understanding is a common subject to separate off.

I have made a further distinction, to address the role of natural reason, in comparison to observation, within human understanding.

If we didn't observe (see and hear) propositions consistently between ourselves, how could we ever communicate? — Harry Hindu

From participation in this forum, it appears to me like there is not necessarily consistency between the way that different people interpret propositions. So I believe that communication is based in something other than consistency or coherency. I've seen people try to argue that communication requires coherency, and if you truly believe this you might present me with such an argument, but such arguments always seem to fail, so I believe that this is just an unsupported assumption.

I think, that as described above, coherency is something demanded by an individual's mind, for the sake of that thinking person's own thoughts, not something demanded by the person for the sake of communication.

The inconsistency lies in the mind of observers in the form of their different experiences with propositions and what they refer to. The world isn't inconsistent outside of our minds. — Harry Hindu

I don't see how you can say this, and respect your earlier premise that propositions, which are products of minds, are part of the world. If our minds are part of the world, then the inconsistencies within our minds are inconsistencies in the world.

Not reasonable in any way? Really? Not any way? You shall have to prove this, else how is anyone to suppose you're anything other than just crazy? — tim wood

It's not reasonable because a further premise is required. The conclusion that it will rain an hour after sunrise today, because it rained an hour after sunrise yesterday is not reasonable in any way, because a further premise is required to draw that conclusion logically. That's what I meant, 'it happened like this before, therefore it will happen like that again' is not reasonable in any way, because the further premise which states the necessity of similarity must be accounted for.

Propositions are merely a formality of dictionary words bundled through a simple manageable logic. They are a useful tool for the practice of formal philosophy. In and of themselves propositions represent nothing whatsoever just as mathematical symbols represent nothing beyond their own formalism. — magritte

Well, needless to say, I strongly disagree with this. A "symbol", by what it means to be a symbol, necessarily represents something. To say that there is a symbol which represents nothing is contradiction plain and simple. If it represents nothing it can't be called a symbol. So your assumption is not worth considering as contrary to natural reason, to begin with.

There are a few reasons for this. First coherency can allow a repeatability of positive results. Think about superstitions. I have a lucky rabbits foot, therefore lucky things will happen to me today. Maybe they did one day. And maybe you will have lucky results happen to you all day, or at least ascribe those "lucky" results to the foot. — Philosophim

The principle 'it happened like this before, therefore it will happen like that again', is not logical, nor reasonable in any way. It might appear like induction is built on this, but it isn't really. Induction is based in numerous repetitions.

So I don't quite understand the relationship between coherency and repeatability which you are trying to get at. Is coherency produced from repeatability, or does it, as you say allow repeatability? Repeatability, we can understand as being the necessary condition for a general principle, produced by induction.

The second is to avoid negative results. Lets say that I want to go paragliding but don't finish the training course because "My lucky rabbits foot will make it all work out." Perhaps it does. But you and I know that the rabbit foot had nothing to do with it, and his belief in the foot made him make a decision that could have been deadly. And of course, perhaps it doesn't work out at all.

It is a decision to be rational however, and if someone does not experience negative consequences from being irrational, or does not ascribe their negative experiences to being irrational, many people will choose the easier path of being emotional. In this case, they will reject reason for their "superior state" of emotional opinions and biases. — Philosophim

Now you are talking about repeatability, but I don't understand your assumed relationship between repeatability and coherency.

I think there's a bit of equivocation going on with the term "coherency" here. I take logical coherence as distinct from scientific coherence. If an argument is logically incoherent, it's truly incomprehensible. Logical statements that draw random conclusions and self contradictory statements would be examples. — Hanover

I don't see the distinction you're trying to make. A logically incoherent statement, or argument, does not render it incomprehensible. The parts of the statement or argument, when it is analyzed, must be themselves comprehensible in order to designate the statement as incoherent. The designation of "incoherent" requires that the parts be comprehensible. So we cannot assign "incomprehensible" in any absolute sense to the incoherent statement or argument.

For example, "the square circle" is not truly incomprehensible because "square" and "circle" are each comprehensible terms. In understanding them together though, the reality of one excludes the possibility of the other, such that a person's natural reason demanding for coherency produces the appearance of incomprehensibility. Without this demand for coherency, or perceived necessity of coherency, we might talk about square circles quite naturally, as if it is completely reasonable that an object would appear as a square from one perspective and as a circle from another perspective, like the well known duckrabbit.

The issue might be "perspective". Can one perspective, such as an individual's single mind, apprehend the same thing as both a square and a circle? Why does a mind demand that the reality of one excludes the possibility of the other? And if we say that it is potentially both, then we seem to replace "reality" with multiple possible worlds. But since the multiple worlds are just "possible", that reality is actually allowed to lurk in background, as simply undetermined.

...things look positively peachy... — Enai De A Lukal

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wvAnQqVJ3XQ

I’m not talking about the empty set issue or anything like that. I fully support the standard modern relations between “some”, “all”, and “none”. It is perfect correct in my view to take “some rectangles have equal length legs” as equivalent to “it is not the case that all rectangles have different length legs” or “it is not the case that no rectangles have equal length legs”. — Pfhorrest

The point is that you need to qualify these terms "some", "all", and "none", as you do in your example, with "rectangles". And, it makes sense to say "some rectangles", and "all rectangles", but it makes no sense to say "none", or "no rectangles". This is because "rectangle" requires a definition, and once defined, it is an object whose existence cannot be negated with "none". By defining rectangle you say "this is a rectangle". What sense could it make to turn around and say there are none of these things which I have just shown you? Such a claim could only be supported by showing the definition as self-contradicting.

I’m more going on about how “all rectangles have different length legs” fleshes out to “if something is a rectangle then it has different length legs”, and we can affirm or deny that conditional statement without asserting the existence, in any ordinary sense, of any rectangles at all: a disagreement about that conditional is a disagreement about what would count as a rectangle if any such things existed, not about what kind of things exist. — Pfhorrest

The problem here, is that if a rectangle is any sort of object at all, it is a mathematical object. So it exists by having an acceptable formula, or definition. So when you say "all rectangles have different length legs", you give existence to "rectangle", in this way. Therefore you cannot deny the existence of rectangles, as you desire, because you've already necessitate the existence of rectangles through your description of them.

This is an example of the deep corruption inherent within modern logical systems. The requirement, to indicate that a set is not an empty set, comes about from the acceptance of the possibility of the empty set. The concept of "the empty set" is actually self-contradictory, and therefore ought to be banished as logically impossible. Then there would be no need for the phrase "there exists some m...", (which is actually a very misleading and deceptive piece of sophistry), because the question of whether the thing described exists or not would be irrelevant, as should be the case in deductive logic.

Method 1 has other flaws: it is harder to line up the lower section of the sock so that it seats properly, and sometimes results in a misalignment that requires lots of twisting, and sometimes even that is not enough and you're forced to start all over; it also puts considerable strain on the sock and I suspect contributes to earlier sock-failure (especially if there is a noticeable transition between the top and bottom sections). — Srap Tasmaner

The alignment problem is the reason why method 1 is unacceptable. For those who refuse to accept that method 1 is unacceptable (some people just will not accept that their way is not the best way), there are socks with a very short, or non-existent ankle piece called ankle socks. Then method 1 becomes the only way.

The long term effects are not well known yet, and definitely something to be concerned about.

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/in-depth/coronavirus-long-term-effects/art-20490351

However, healthy practise like exercising and eating well, usually counts for something in that type of situation.

But I was speaking of critical race theory in particular, which largely rejects the idea that scholarship should be or could be “neutral” and “objective”. — NOS4A2

What's wrong with teaching that? It seems pretty obvious to me that scholarship can't be neutral or "objective". That's an idealist fantasy.

One way to look at energy is "matter in motion". — Philosophim

This is a good start, but energy is much more than this. Energy is transferable, from one material object to another. This is why there is a need for potential energy, to account for this transferal of energy.

He should have thrown in “pseudoscientific nonsense”, as well. — NOS4A2

One can frame all the social sciences as "pseudoscientifc", but that doesn't mean social sciences shouldn't be taught.

That is exactly what "critical race theory" is. — Derukugi

So how is educating people in critical race theory supposed to be anti-American.