I understand reality to comprise all that is each in itself. — tim wood

All that is "each in itself"? What the heck does that mean?

Things in reality are real, but not all real things are in reality. — tim wood

OK, so "real things" names a bigger category than "things in reality". If therefore, there are real things, which are not part of reality, what are they a part of? Where do they exist, and by what premise do you say that they are real things?

Examples: ideas, seven, the meanings of words. — tim wood

Let's take a look at some of these things then, to see where they exist if they're not part of reality. It appears like you are talking about things which are in minds. If these things exist within minds, yet they are not in reality, am I correct to conclude that you believe that minds are not part of reality? What is a mind a part of, if it is not a part of reality? Do you think it is some sort of falsity, or fiction to say that people have minds, and minds have ideas, because all these things are not in reality?

Let me try this. Suppose, for WHATEVER reason, that a pen glued to a table means something to an aboriginal culture. To you it is two things, or three if you include the glue. But to them it's one. So how many forms does it objectively have??? — Gregory

The point is that human intelligence is deficient.

"Thing" is a word used by humans to demarcate objects of being. Further, the word 'thing" is itself insufficient to encompass the reality of being, this is why you must use other words to demarcate the nature of being. — JerseyFlight

You are trying to give "being" a meaning which is not consistent with the meaning that it has in its status when opposed to not-being, or nothing, in Hegel's logic. We need to adhere to the meaning of "being" as used in Hegel's dialectics to avoid equivocation. "Being" refers to the abstraction, the human determination. I already explained to you the incompatibility between the world of becoming, and the logical determinations of what is and what is not, being and not-being. Now you want to talk about "the reality of being" as if being is really becoming, but all this does is confuse the issue, making it difficult to distinguish the incompatible categories which were disclosed by the ancient Greeks.

The kind of identity you are talking about is precisely the idealist identity, the mysticism, that Hegel disposes of. Further, all that you are distinguishing here, does require, as your articulating presence proves, a human to make the distinction. This is because the abstract formation that you are putting forth is not the object, it is a characterization of the object invented by humans. — JerseyFlight

Yes, you continue to assert that Hegel demonstrated "identity" to be faulty, or contradictory, but you have yet to produce the argument. The argument you have here does nothing. Just because the abstract formation I put forward, describing the identity of the object, is not the object itself, does not mean that there is not an object, with its own identity. So long as I maintain the separation between what is said about the object's identity, and the object's real identity, there is no problem. That is, until you deny that there are any real objects.

Now I agree that objects exist beyond words, but what you are trying to do is equate essence as being synonymous with your concept of identity. But essence and identity are not the same. — JerseyFlight

No, clearly I am not trying to do this. I have said that an object's identity consists of both its matter and its form. I never said anything about "essence", another confusing word with multiple meanings, just like "being". Again, I request that you read clearly what I say, and do not try to distract in this way, by saying that I am talking about something I haven't even mentioned.

It is agreed that matter exists beyond concepts. It is not agreed that your concept of identity explains or contains the essence of matter. It is too narrow and one-sided to even come close to accomplishing this purpose, enter now Hegel's dialectic. — JerseyFlight

No,no,no, this is totally confused. Essence is formal, and matter is a completely distinct category from form, so it doesn't even make sense to talk about the essence of matter. Furthermore, we haven't discussed matter enough to have any agreement as to whether it is more than conceptual.

Once again, we are beyond identity, which states, A = A, are you saying this is false? Hegel's point is that identity never makes it to reality precisely because it never makes it to -A, which is actually the concrete reality of what occurs in being, the essence of being. — JerseyFlight

I don't know what you're talking about. The law of identity is represented as A=A. There is no need to reference -A. Of course A would never make it to -A, that would violate the law of identity. The relation of A to -A is what is called "becoming". It is not being! And you cannot represent it as "the essence of being". That is an incorrect interpretation of Hegel. It is a movement, a becoming. If you think that becoming is being, in Hegel's dialectics, you are simply wrong. Read the Stanford article I referred for you. Being is the abstraction, there is no such thing as the the concrete being. This is why identity doesn't make sense to Hegel. There are no individual beings in the concrete reality, only the process of becoming, Therefore identity, which is what Aristotle gives to individual things, beings, makes no sense. Individual things are what a mind distinguishes in the act of individuation, but in reality the thing vanishes into not that thing as fast as time passes, so identity makes no sense.

The real trick to your sophistry, and every last ounce of your philosophical leverage, is achieved by trying to smuggle in a loaded premise; you are trying to say that identity embodies negation, but the concrete problem is that it has no negativity in it, the formation is entirely positive! — JerseyFlight

You are completely neglecting predication. The subject is A. What is predicated of A, may be negated. and this represents change to the thing. Clearly, identity embodies negation when the object which is being represented as A, changes yet maintains its identity as A. What may be predicated of A at one time is negated and cannot be predicated at another time. There is no need for A=-A, for identity to embody negation. You are just making this unwarranted claim without considering the nature of predication.

This is undeniable, A = A does not say, A = -A, and this proves you are distorting and twisting the position, no doubt, because you know you cannot get the content you need for essence from the empty tautology of identity. — JerseyFlight

Why do you keep bringing up "essence" as if it has some relevance? As I said last post, stick to what I have written, and please try not to read your straw man presuppositions into what I write. Essence is something completely different from identity. I have no desire to discuss essence here. So unless you can show how essence is relevant, just leave that term alone. But please, don't pretend that it's my desire to discuss essence.

Where your mysticism arises is that you are trying to claim that your concept is the most basic representation of reality, thus attempting to fuse it with the highest philosophical authority. — JerseyFlight

Did I ever claim that? Stick to what is written! Please.

One more thing can be mentioned here. When you make use of this concept in discourse, you most assuredly do not, and will not, use the form you are here trying to assert for reasons of posture, A = -A. Instead you will assert the positive image against the negation. On all fronts then you are defeated and exposed as a practical negator of the position you espouse. — JerseyFlight

Burn the straw man! When did I say A=-A? The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself, and this is sometimes represented as A=A. As time passes, the thing which remains the same as itself, represented as A, changes. So the properties we predicate of A, may be negated, while A remains A. Therefore negation is contained within identity. How you can possibly interpret this as me saying A=-A baffles me. Your capacity to produce straw men is simply amazing.

It's relevant because form becomes dependent on how cohesive "two" things are to each other. — Gregory

Two things are two things, and therefore two distinct forms, it makes no difference how cohesive the things are. This is why Aristotle placed identity in the thing itself, rather than in the way we describe the thing. We might describe the same scenario, the solar system for example, as one thing, or as a group of distinct things, depending on the purpose. The truth of the matter though, whether it is one thing or a group of things, is a feature of the thing itself (or things), regardless of what humans believe.

You say a metaphysical "spook" (not to be derogatory) was replaced by something else. Was the prime matter replaced too? This line of questioning tends to show that there is something arbitrary about Aristotle's system — Gregory

I don't know what you mean by "spook" here, but placing identity within the thing itself ("a thing is the same as itself") was actually meant to remove the arbitrariness from identity, a step toward objectivity, by denying the arbitrariness of the sophist's claims of identity, that a thing's identity is what we associate with the thing.

If the avenue is infinite, any possibility can fly thru it in any way. — Gregory

Wait a minute. How could an avenue be infinite. It is one path, one way, out of many possible ways. There might be an infinite number of possible avenues, but an avenue is a definite thing. You go through it in the way that it is, and no other way.

If I cut an apple ( ) in half, is it now two forms or still one? I do want an answer to this MU. — Gregory

Of course two. How could you say one, when by your very description you have made one thing into two? But I don't see how this is relevant.

Indeed. Ideas are certainly real. But not real in any material sense. Not any part of what is usually meant by material reality. Sez I. — tim wood

If you reduce reality to what is material, you've got a big problem. Sez I.

So what did you think of the argument I presented as to why pure potentiality as the prime first reality of our universe is impossible? Did you follow the argument? Have you found faults in it? Consider your analogy of an avenue, path, or way. Do you see the need for someone to select the path? If so wouldn't this decision maker be some type of actuality which would more appropriately be called "the prime first reality"?

dentity is exactly dependent on a human being drawing a distinction, this takes place in every instance of identity. There is great confusion in your speech, what you mean to say is that being is not dependent on someone drawing a distinction. This is accurate, the other is not. — JerseyFlight

We are talking about "identity" as defined by the law of identity, not some peculiar non-philosophical, idiosyncratic notion of identity which you happen to hold. Look, "a thing is the same as itself" does not indicate the requirement for a human being to name the thing, point to the thing, or otherwise notice the existence of the thing. Here's what Stanford Encyclopedia says on identity:

Numerical identity is our topic. As noted, it is at the centre of several philosophical debates, but to many seems in itself wholly unproblematic, for it is just that relation everything has to itself and nothing else – and what could be less problematic than that?

Can you understand that? The relation a thing has to itself, and nothing else. This means no human beings drawing distinctions, or anything like that is required for a thing to have an identity.

You are indeed making a distinction, you just sophistically claim not to be "talking" about it. Further, one cannot distinguish without the aid of difference, and to determine a difference is to make a distinction. Do you qualify "identity" by the concretion of the "thing" or do you qualify the "thing" by the abstraction of identity? (The problem here is that we can already see the answer). — JerseyFlight

So all this is irrelevant. Identity, as defined by the law of identity, has nothing to do with human distinctions.

When you say, "the law of identity puts the thing within the thing itself," this is false, it is also ignorance. — JerseyFlight

Straw man! Gee Jersey, I'm beginning to think that your straw manning is associated with a lack of reading skill rather than intentional. I wrote that the law of identity "puts the identity of the thing within the thing itself", and you quote it as "the law of identity puts the thing within the thing itself". Please, slow down and relax in your reading. Think about what the person has actually said, not what you expect the person to be saying.

Identity is a formal premise that states A = A, — JerseyFlight

This is not identity, it is a representation of the law of identity. Do you understand the difference? The law of gravity is not gravity.

I already anticipated your reply: 'Now I know you will insist and demand that you have the right to pack being (with all its difference) into the concept of identity, or to interpret the concept through being, but the concept itself will not permit it, which is proven the very instance you make a distinction between identity and difference.' — JerseyFlight

This is what i mean about your reading skills. Please, read what the person actually writes, rather than anticipating what the person will write, and automatically assuming that the person has written what you thought would be written. Until you grasp the concept of "identity" as dictated by the law of identity, and rid yourself of that other vernacular, there is no point in discussing how this concept relates to other concepts.

When you speak of being and becoming you are mistaken, being is becoming, the way you try to artificially divide being from "itself," to use your own term, merely displays more confusion and ignorance on your part. — JerseyFlight

It's becoming overwhelmingly clear that you are not familiar with Hegel's dialectics. As a staring point, let me refer you to the Stanford Encyclopedia again.

But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content. The only difference between them is “something merely meant” (EL Remark to §87), namely, that Being is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be absence. The third concept of the logic—which is used to illustrate the speculative moment—unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive result of—or the conclusion that we can draw from—the opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence (Being) and then taken as absence (Nothing), or taken as absence (Nothing) and then taken as presence (Being). To Become is to go from Being to Nothing or from Nothing to Being, or is, as Hegel puts it, “the immediate vanishing of the one in the other” (SL-M 83; cf. SL-dG 60). The contradiction between Being and Nothing thus is not a reductio ad absurdum, or does not lead to the rejection of both concepts and hence to nothingness—as Hegel had said Plato’s dialectics does (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5)—but leads to a positive result, namely, to the introduction of a new concept—the synthesis—which unifies the two, earlier, opposed concepts. — Stanford Encyclopedia, Hegel's Dialectics, 2

See, "Becoming" consists of both Being, and its defining opposite, Nothing, unified in synthesis, as I tried to tell you earlier, when we first engaged. So it is false to say as you do here, that "being is becoming".

For you are trying to say that the law of identity contains both being and becoming within itself because the term "thing" encompasses the movement of being (this is a loaded premise not a proof). What you fail to see is that you are no longer talking about identity but have gone beyond it! A = A contains nothing but the assertion that the image is equal to the image. IN THE REALITY OF BEING THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A = A. You have been arguing this all the while, ignorant of the ramifications it has on identity. This is why you give supremacy to the "thing" and not the abstract tautology! What identity means to say is that A is the beginning of -A, but it never gets there, it repeats the image of itself, thereby distorting reality. — JerseyFlight

None of this makes any sense. It just demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of what I said, and of what Hegel said.

"In the form of the proposition, therefore, in which identity is expressed, there lies more than simple, abstract identity; in it, there lies this pure movement of reflection in which the other appears only as illusory being, as an immediate vanishing; A is is a beginning that hints at something different to which an advance is to be made; but this different something does not materialize; A is—A; the difference is only a vanishing; the movement returns into itself." Hegel — JerseyFlight

Good quote. See, the "movement" referred to here is an instance of "becoming". The "being", an abstraction, is represented as A, which cannot be understood without reference to not-A. Are you beginning to see the difference between "Being" and "Becoming"?

Now let's see if we can make some progress here. You want to assign "identity" to the abstraction, the "Being", which is called A. But the law of identity disallows this, saying that the identity of a thing is in the thing itself. But under Hegelian dialectics, the thing itself is a movement, a becoming, and there is no basis to assume a thing. So we now have no "thing" to assign identity to, only "Becoming". Do you apprehend this dilemma? There is no "thing" in the thing itself, only a becoming, so nothing in this world of becoming can have any identity.

You might be inclined to dismiss the philosophical definition of "identity" and go back to your vernacular form of "identity", but then what could ground truth?

I see your argument. Now my response is that there are two "things", pure potentiality and the avenue for it to become actual. You might want to think of it as if pure potentiality was the Confucian "Heaven" and the avenue is the Daost "Way". I almost think of it in physical terms. Potentiality flows or maybe even falls into actuality. Or maybe I've read too much Heidegger :) lol — Gregory

The problem I see here is that the way, avenue, or falling, is a path which must be chosen, that is why Plato's "good" becomes a first principle. Potentiality could be actualized in a vast multiplicity of ways, that is the nature of contingency. The way cannot be predetermined or else this would negate the nature of contingency, because then there would only be one way. So whatever it is, the way, or path, must be chosen from a vast multitude of possibilities. Consider falling, like sky diving. As you are falling you have time to consider what is coming up, your landing place. Therefore you have choices as to your path.

You apparently have a substance-based metaphysics. So is pure actuality for you the perfect Platonic form, God, or the Trinity? I don't see what else it could be but one of those three. I could be wrong. I could be wrong about all of this — Gregory

Yes, I think some people understand God as a pure actuality. The point is that in Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, "form" is what is active, actual. So in Christian theology Forms are actualities which are independent from matter, acting on matter to make matter what it is (as the particular objects which exist). Matter provides the potential for existence of things. So there is a realm of these immaterial Forms starting from God, similar to Neo-Platonist emanation, without Plotinus' designation that the One is pure potential, having been substituted with the more consistent pure actuality.

You mean these are the same? No difference needs to be drawn in order to make a distinction, which would indeed imply, as Hegel says, going beyond the principle of identity? — JerseyFlight

I am not talking about making a distinction, I am talking about a difference which exists whether or not any one distinguishes it. That's why I said that the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself", puts the identity of the thing within the thing itself. Therefore identity is not dependent on someone drawing a distinction.

Human beings make such distinctions through reference to the form of the thing. But the human capacity to abstract the form through sensation is deficient, as we abstract what is called essentials, and miss the accidentals. The accidentals however are an important part of a thing's identity. Therefore the identity of a thing cannot be dependent on human distinction.

How can you contain identity and difference in the same instance of identity? — JerseyFlight

This is quite simple, as I've explained to you a couple times already. A thing has it's own identity. A thing changes as time passes. Therefore a thing's identity contains difference. This is made comprehensible by Aristotle's hylomorphic physics. A thing is a composition of matter and form, therefore it's identity consists of both its matter and form. When a thing changes, its form is what changes, while the underlying matter remains the same. Therefore there is both difference (changing form with the passing of time) , and sameness (continuous existence of the same matter) within the same identity.

Further, how can you identify something as being the same which is itself beyond the "inert imagine" that identity strives to cast? — JerseyFlight

I am unfamiliar with your term "inert image". But since inertia is a sort of substitute term for "matter", and "image" is something created in the mind, it appears like you have created some sort of contradictory notion here. What is imaged within the mind is forms. Matter itself cannot be imaged. So any attempt to cast an image of matter as an "inert image" of identity, would be an attempt to do the impossible, like trying to image a square circle.

Of course, you should have worked through all these questions and many more doing post-doctoral work on Hegel? — JerseyFlight

Who said anything about having done postdoctoral work on Hegel? I'm beginning to see you as a master of the straw man. Just look at the false representation of Aristotle's "identity" which you have proposed. A masterful straw man!

Yes, that is part of Hegel's discovery, identity and difference are part of being, but Hegel did not stop there, but of course, you already know this, so I don't have to tell you. — JerseyFlight

I would disagree with you here. Hegel recognized the distinction between the logical determinations of being/not-being, and the real physical world of becoming, just like Kant distinguished phenomena from noumena. And, within his dialectics, as I said earlier, being/not-being is subsumed by becoming. Therefore, since identity is handed to the thing itself, we cannot say that identity and difference are a part of being, they are a part of becoming. We could only make such a claim If we blur the distinction between becoming and being, as some philosophers like Heidegger are prone to do.

More importantly, you have refuted the very principle you claim to champion without even realizing it. Change is not the same as sameness, identity is not the same as difference. This means identity cannot contain difference in order to be equal to itself, must not presuppose it in order to make itself intelligible. — JerseyFlight

Common JerseyFlight, you demonstrate seriously flawed logic here. That something is not the same as another thing (change is not the same as sameness, or identity is not the same as difference), does not indicate that one cannot be contained within the other. There is nothing here to indicate that one might be a category which contains the other two. Identity might be a category which contains both sameness and difference, like temperature is a category which contains both hot and cold.

This means identity cannot contain difference in order to be equal to itself, must not presuppose it in order to make itself intelligible. — JerseyFlight

It is not "identity" which is the same as itself, it is the thing which is the same as itself. And being the same as itself means that it has an identity, and it cannot be other than it is. This is what the law of identity says. And if we allow it to be violated, allow that a thing is other than it is, we allow that the world is unintelligible to us, because one thing could be an infinity of different things, all at the same time, and there would be no reality or truth to what is existing at any given time.

If a thing is identical to itself, which I take to be the proper formation of the concept, then the "self" you point to at the moment of identification, vanishes in the next instance. — JerseyFlight

This is not true, and there is a very important ontological principle underlying this, understanding which is a key point to understanding the law of identity. A thing, or an object, what you refer to here as a "self", necessarily has temporal extension. Without temporal extension there is no thing (nothing). Temporal extension is therefore a defining feature of "self", it is essential to any "self". Therefore the fact that the self which is pointed to at one moment is always in some way different from the self which is pointed to at the next instant, cannot be used to negate the identity of the self. This would be to deny the empirical evidence that the self continues despite changes to its form, merely for the sake of placing the identity of the thing within the form of the thing. But the empirical observations demonstrate that the self remains the self despite such changes to its form. Therefore we must conclude the opposite, that the identity of the self, as that which remains the same, is proper to the matter of the self, and the identity of the self does not vanish with each moment of changing form, while the differences of the self are proper to its form.

Sorry my poor fellow, but you must choose, you cannot have it both ways, either take being as it goes beyond Aristotelian logic, or live your life in the error of a tautology. Do you start with being or do you start with identity? It seems to me the evidence is clear; for you identity is and must be secondary to being, very hard to see how this doesn't cause problems for your view of identity? — JerseyFlight

Again, you appear to be conflating being with becoming. I suggest you go back to reading Hegel's logic with the intent of making a firm distinction between his use of "becoming" and "being", prior to continuing on this venture of making a fool of yourself.

What is most striking is that you seem to think you can simply class identity with difference without going beyond the claim of identity itself. — JerseyFlight

Excuse me master of the straw man, I have not classed identity with difference. I have classed difference with same, in the category of identity. So quit with the straw man and address the issue. If you have a difficulty with this category "identity", then bring it out.

Yours is merely an attempt to retain the abstraction of identity against the reality which negates it. — JerseyFlight

Again, you display a complete ignorance of Aristotle's "identity". As the law of identity states, a thing's identity is proper to itself, and itself alone. Identity cannot be an abstraction. That is the purpose of the law of identity, to prevent sophists from asserting that a thing's identity is a human abstraction, and proceeding to produce absurd conclusions from this premise. The human abstraction is deficient, failing in abstracting accidentals. And accidentals are essential to a things identity, but not essential to the abstraction. Therefore identity cannot be classed as abstraction. As you continue with your masterful straw man.

Metaphysician Undercover, you need to go under the covers and brush up on your Hegel. — JerseyFlight

Ha ha ha, and now you continue with you comedic entertainment. I'm sorry JerseyFlight, but I don't know why hypocrisy is so amusing to me, I must have a twisted sense of humour. But this is quite the statement coming from someone who cannot even distinguish between Hegel's use of "being" and "becoming".

And further, it is untrue that Aristotle proved that the actual is prior to the potential. I've read his arguments via Aquinas, who wrote them more clearly. I find them faulty to be honest — Gregory

Let me state a simplified form of the argument, and you tell me where you believe the fault lies. The potential for a thing precedes its actual existence. But the potential for any particular thing requires something actual to actualize that specific thing rather than something else. This is contingency, the potential thing cannot come into actual existence without the required cause, which is something actual. If there ever was a time when there was infinite, or "pure" potential, then by the terms of that description it is impossible that there would be any actuality at that time. Without any actuality, this "pure" potential would never produce anything actual, therefore there would always be pure potential without ever being anything actual. What we observe however, is that there is actual existence. Therefore it is impossible that there ever was "pure", or infinite potential, and potential cannot be prior to actual in time.

No doubt you are upset that you got called out, — JerseyFlight

You're very good at misjudging people. You've demonstrated this masterfully.

Why do you feel the need to make such judgements?
"I know for a fact that you are speaking out of your backside."
"What you have asserted merely manifests your blatant ignorance."
On and on, while asserting things like, "I am not merely posturing here" without providing anything to justify you assertions. You're a very strange sort of hypocrite.

Hegel does not merely assert what you call a "tautology," he draws out the contradiction from the very being of identity itself. — JerseyFlight

OK hypocrite, maybe you might present this claimed contradiction, since you're so certain of it.. As I explained already, in the Aristotelian conception of "identity", change and therefore difference, is inherent within a thing's identity, due to the fact that any identifiable thing has temporal extension, and a thing changes as time passes. Therefore difference is an aspect of the same thing, and there is no contradiction in saying that the same thing has differences, due to a thing's temporal extension. Since matter is the underlying aspect a thing which remains the same as time passes, while the thing's form is changing, sameness is assigned to the matter of the thing.

Can you show me where he assigns "sameness" and "identity" (difference through dichotomy) to the evolving object? This is very strange indeed. — JerseyFlight

It's called the law of identity, stupid. "A thing is the same as itself". Do you not comprehend that a thing necessarily has temporal extension, and also that a thing changes as time passes? Therefore we can conclude that change and difference are inherent within the identity of the thing, as an aspect of its sameness. There is no contradiction here, just a feature of temporal existence being accounted for.

Metaphysician heal thyself!! lol — fishfry

Thanks fishfry, but I feel that JF has already heeled me.

(The only reason I am not quoting Hegel directly is because I have zero respect for intellectuals like yourself, masters at posturing, masters at playing the superiority card, simply because you are good at articulating yourself. It makes me feel like I am merely giving you more ammunition to bully people.) — JerseyFlight

OK, so instead of actually discussing the philosophical issues, because that would be too "intellectual" for you, you'd prefer to just hurl insults. Greatt! I'm game.

I don't want to have any more interaction with you.. — JerseyFlight

Fuck off then, you ass hole!

...I admit it is unorthodox that I am not quoting Hegel, but I have my reasons... — JerseyFlight

Yes, your reasons are that you are just a smart ass piece of shit, who'd rather engage with petty insults than address the issues, because you haven't even approached the issues, let alone apprehended, or comprehended any of them. I hope you were sincere when you said you don't want any more interaction with me. You can be assured that I'll test you on that, ass hole.

Hegel simply has a different solution to the apparent incompatibility between being and becoming demonstrated by the ancients, from the one proposed by Aristotle.

The incompatibility is laid out by Aristotle in a way like this. If the world is describable completely in terms of what is, and what is not, then we cannot grasp change because at one moment the world is like A, and the next moment it is like B, and we need to be able to understand what happened in between, which is the change itself. If we can say how the world was in between, as C, then we still have to deal with the change between A and C, and C and B. Of course this produces the appearance of an infinite regress, as we always need to posit another determination of how the world is and is not, as the medium between any two different states, to account for the change. And, since this proposed medium state is always a different state, we still need to account for the change in between the one state and the other, ad infinitum. Therefore we need to allow a separation between the world as described by the logical dichotomy of being and not-being, and change itself, as becoming.

So In recognizing that becoming is completely incompatible with the logical dichotomy of being and not-being, Aristotle proposed a distinct category called "potential". As distinct, it can neither be described in terms of being nor not-being, and is a violation of the law of excluded middle. The concept of potential is validated, substantiated or justified, by Aristotle with reference to future events which are still undecided. Such events cannot be assigned any value of truth or falsity. In his Physics, the concept of "matter" substantiates the real existence of potential, allowing for what may or may not be, in the future, i.e. the potential for change.

We can see that Hegel takes a different approach in his dialectics. Under his principles, the logical dichotomy of being and not-being is subsumed within becoming, instead of the Aristotelian approach of separating the two as incompatible. Negation is a process of becoming which envelopes both being and not being. So instead of separating becoming, and matter (as logically unintelligible aspects of the world), from that dichotomy of being and not-being, and insisting that the supposed dichotomy is incomplete because it leaves matter and becoming in violation of the law of excluded middle, Hegel places the dichotomous terms of being and not being together, in a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Now the concepts of matter and becoming violate the law of non-contradiction.

How did you retain Aristotle's position on Identity after Hegel clearly demonstrated that it collapsed in on itself, precisely because, to speak of Identity, one must presuppose that Identity is not Difference, which is itself a violation of the principle? (As I'm sure you know, dialectics comprehends contradiction emerging from being itself). I would love to hear your refutation? And as you well know, having done "post-graduate" work on Hegel, this is only one small portion of his argument against Aristotle's position. — JerseyFlight

I see no such demonstration of a collapse, just a straw man collapsing. Hegel specifically avoids Aristotelian terms like "potential, and "matter", leaving the reader to make any comparisons to Aristotelian conceptual structures on one's own, so there is really no such demonstration. Your presupposed concept of "identity" is unfounded, demonstrating a misunderstanding of Aristotelian identity.. If a thing is only the same as itself, there is no problem with the conjoined premise that it is different from everything else, and even different from what it was, itself at a different time. Sameness is assigned directly to the thing itself, allowing difference to be a feature of sameness, instead of being dichotomously separated, such that the same thing is changing. This is simply the way we speak about an identified thing, it can change and be different from one minute to the next, while it maintains the status of being the same thing. "Sameness" and "identity" therefore is assigned to the evolving object, and difference is not excluded dichotomously from sameness. Since this is the way we speak about an identified object, as remaining the same object despite changes to it. it is dialectically correct, and Hegel's proposed dialectical argument is unwarranted.

And your premise, that "dialectics comprehends contradiction emerging from being itself", is just an expression of Hegelian biased dialectics, grounded in the false premise displayed above. In reality, "being" like "not-being" is a logical assignment, a human determination, so these are what emerge from becoming. These logical principles are designed to establish an artificial separation from becoming, in an attempt to understand becoming. The need for this separation is grounded in strong metaphysical principles. The Hegelian proposal, to throw these ideals of being and not-being back into the obscure, mysterious, and vague realm of becoming, instead of crystalizing the separation in understanding, just renders the world of material existence as unintelligible. . .

My guess is that people respect you on this board... — JerseyFlight

Is that supposed to be a joke?

Admit that you have never studied 1) Hegel or 2) Dialectics. — JerseyFlight

Ha ha, make my day, tell me another funny one. Try telling that to the professor of my post-graduate course on Hegel's Dialectics of Being. Of course, he didn't like my interpretation of Hegel either, just like you seem to be insulted by what I said about Hegel. Hmm, that's interesting. Hegelians seem to be very funny that way. There's a certain clique, defending a way that one is 'supposed' to interpret Hegel, and if you slip outside of those needless and unjustified boundaries, I guess you are headed toward a Marxist interpretation or something. And this is flatly wrong.

Actually there is significant ambiguity in Plotinus concerning this issue. Aristotle through his cosmological argument had already demonstrated that anything eternal must be actual or else there would be no actual existence now. And, he defined "form" as actual, so Neo-Platonic Forms are actual.

Plotinus defined "One" as potentiality, but then he was forced to say that One had absolutely no movement, and so there was a problem which followed, as to how the One could engender the Intellect, and all else which follows, if the One consisted purely of potential. The One, is in some sense "the cause" of existence, and Aristotle's demonstration was that such a cause is necessarily actual. So Plotinus compared this cause to a type of "seeing".

...and it must be the second of all existence, for it is that
which sees The One on which alone it leans while the First has no
need whatever of it. The offspring of the prior to Divine Mind can be
no other than that Mind itself and thus is the loftiest being in the
universe, all else following upon it- the soul, for example, being an
utterance and act of the Intellectual-Principle as that is an utterance
and act of The One. — Plotinus, Fifth Ennead, First Tractate, ch.6

Notice that he is forced here to refer to the "act" of the One.

First, there is the One. Which is pure potentiality — Gregory

I think the "One" is purely actual, the primary actuality from which everything else emanates, like the Christian "God".

Metaphysician Undercover has posted numerous times on this issue. He should chime in. — jgill

I kind of got bored of the subject, so I moved on.

He thinks 2 + 2 and 4 are two things. — fishfry

This is a fine example of the boredom. If someone cannot see that 2+2 is something different from 4, and continues to deny this after months of discussion, I feel helpless to help that person. Clearly 2+2 are different symbols than 4. And, if "2+2" really represented the same thing as "4", we would be inclined just to use "4=4" instead of "2+2=4", because it's so much simpler. But obviously "2+2" is not commonly used to represent the same thing that "4" is used to represent, because the "+" in 2+2 has a special meaning which is not represented in "4"..

Hegel is the gateway to dialectic. — JerseyFlight

Actually Plato provides a much more useful dialect than Hegel. After reading Plato and Aristotle, you'll be able to see where Hegel goes wrong in his dialectics, leading people like dialectical materialists into a violation of the law of non-contradiction.

But If you’re trying to separate these uncontrollable constants from controllable entropy in order to find true existence, it’s a noble goal but in truth we live separate conceptually but not actually from these things. — Manbabyzeus

The point was that making such a distinction is necessary in order to distinguish between what is possible and what is impossible. Otherwise you'll be insisting like NOS4A2 seemed to assert, to be able to do the impossible, and persistently trying harder when your attempts to do the impossible fail. This is what NOS suggested one ought to do, and contrary to what Nos seems to think, this is not necessarily good for one's moral character.

If you set the separation from the universal constants aside your essentially describing stoicism. I also think pondering time excessively is not only bad for your mental health but also an exercise in futility. — Manbabyzeus

This is a perfect example. If it is impossible to understand the nature of time, then pondering time excessively is an exercise in futility, (just like NOS4A2's, choosing one's own morality, if it's impossible to do so), and this would be bad for one's mental health.

I really like your thinking here. Nicely said. I will just say, though, that inspiration is followed by a choice, some sort of follow-through, which begins and ends in the individual. Man becomes inspired. He is the genesis of his inspiration, and all subsequent follow-through. He is not the passive object and I cannot speak about him as such. — NOS4A2

I agree that the human being is the active agent, and the source of action is within, and this justifies the notion of "free" will as the source of activity. However, to maintain the notion of "free" here, we must allow a separation between that which inspires the person to act, and that which causes the person to act. Otherwise the human being would be constantly acting according to ones inspirations, directly, and there would be no capacity to choose. So there are two distinct features here which must be accounted for. One is being an active agent, and the other is being able to choose one's actions. The latter is more difficult to understand because it is a matter of preventing oneself from acting on impulse, in order to choose the best course of action, and this is will power. So the free will is only free by means of preventing action, such that a desired action can be chosen. This is how the agent is acting rather than reacting.

The problem is to place both of these features as completely within the individual, because they are incompatible. One is active the other a negation of activity. If the active principle is within, then the person is active, and cannot have the capacity to prevent oneself from acting. If the principle of prevention or negation is within the individual, then the source of action must be exterior, allowing the person to choose the appropriate source of activity (efficient causes) deemed necessary toward a desired goal.

For the sake of discussion, let's suppose that the person, following some mystical discipline or something like that, might come to understand a unity of both, within oneself. Within oneself there is some sort of unity between activity and its negation. Where do you think "inspiration" would fit within this scheme? I would think that inspiration might very well be that unity itself. If the person has the capacity to direct all of one's energy towards activities required for a desired goal, and at the same time prevent all unwanted activity, as unproductive toward that goal, then we can say that the person is ambitious and inspired, focusing one's attention toward that goal..

Now we come to morality. How can we judge this goal itself, which the ambitious, or inspired person holds, as good or bad? I'm sure you see what I mean. A person might just as well be inspired toward doing bad as toward doing good. Of course this ambitious person thinks the goal is a good goal, and so is inspired toward that goal, but how are we going to judge whether it really is a good goal or not? The person has the complete disposition required to be a very inspired actor, and we might believe that this is very good, but how might the person know how to discern the good goal from the bad goal? If the goal is really a bad goal, then being very inspired and motivated toward that goal is not a good thing.

I don’t believe a person just picks and chooses a morality, as if from a menu, just that he can come to believe in certain moral principles by his own volition, by weighing the pros, the cons, the value and justice of certain moral principles, and that the sum of his moral principles can be called a “morality”. I would say this is a choice, a matter of choosing. — NOS4A2

OK, how do you think that a person would make this choice? Suppose that we have a very ambitious person who wants to act, and make a difference in the world. That person is presented with many different moral principles, some inconsistent, incompatible, and even contradicting each other. The person is very conscientious, and wants to be guided only by the highest of moral principles. Where would the person turn to find the highest moral principles, to ensure that one's acting in the world was in fact good, and not really bad actions being mistaken for good?

Basically, these three scenarios are indiscernible and this'll be true no matter what you do to wriggle out of the situation. — TheMadFool

No they are not the same, by the very fact that they are described with three very distinct descriptions. If you cannot see the difference between these three distinct descriptions, I'm tired of explaining it to you.

You were arguing that a person moving an object in their room was actually time affecting matter and space (determinism). — Manbabyzeus

No, what I said is that time is a necessary condition for moving an object. A person cannot move an object unless time passes. Because of this fact, there are those, (determinists), who argue that it is just the passing of time which necessitates that the object moves, not a person's will.

You used this to say that a person can’t be sure if they have the agency to proactively change their given situation. — Manbabyzeus

Right, the determinist argument can be convincing, but whether it is believable or not depends on one's perspective as to what the passing of time actually is.

Then you said a person actually does have at least some control over certain things and can actually affect their situation. — Manbabyzeus

Yes, the way I understand the passing of time, this is what I believe is the case, a person has some control over some things..

But If determinism is a reality, there is no free will. It’s not that it’s a grey area, it’s one or the other, determinism simply can’t exist with free actors. — Manbabyzeus

But determinism is only true if the passing of time is as the determinist believes it is. However, regardless of what one believes about what the passing of time really is, the passing of time is still a necessary condition for a person to move an object. And, it is obviously not something which the human will has control over. So no matter how free my will is, time still passes, and I cannot change that. Furthermore, there are many things which happen as time passes which I have not the capacity to change.

So there's really no question of either determinism or not determinism, only a question of which things I can and cannot change. The determinist argument is just an invalid conclusion derived from the apprehension that some things cannot be changed. In relation to the question of which things can and cannot be changed, many of these things I might not be sure about. You can call this a grey area if you like.

Do you mean things like weathering, chemical reactions, momentum? Or do you mean the framework of the human mind, as being the factor that’s determined? I fell like all animals already intuitively do this. — Manbabyzeus

Yes, momentum might be an applicable term. When something has momentum, it tends to continue in the way it has been, such is the nature of inertia as well. So a massive object like the earth moving, is determined by the passing of time, to keep moving in the same way. But this is not to say that all things with mass, inertia, or momentum, are determined. My body has mass, and momentum, but I believe that my free will has the capacity to alter that momentum. Therefore, I believe that not all things with momentum are necessarily determined. It appears to me, that larger things, and things with more momentum are more difficult for the human will to interfere with.

Sure, one must change his conduct to align with his morality. If one has difficulty doing so he has to try harder. If he doesn’t, then yes he becomes a hypocrite. Will power is often difficult to muster, especially for people who do not believe in it. — NOS4A2

Trying harder is not necessarily the answer. Often this just leads to frustration and the person might become of a worse moral disposition than before. There are many factors involved with trying to change one's morality, and learning to have realistic goals might be one of the first. However, inspiration (and this is directly related to will power), might be the most important of all. As you say, some do not even believe in will power. If a person doesn't believe in will power, how could one even be inspired to try to change one's morality? So the question here might be what provides the prerequisite inspiration for a person to actually change one's morality. It's easy for a person to look at oneself and say I have some bad habits, I should get rid of these, but what inspires a person to actually carry out the work required to drop those habits. It's not like the person gets paid for that work, so the motivation must come from something else.

I was just saying that you or I can decide to move something from one place to another, altering our situation, changing the world. — NOS4A2

Yes, and I was pointing out, that just because a person decides to move something from one place to another, this does not mean that the person can actually do it. That's the problem with your view of morality. You seem to think that a person can just pick and choose one's morality, as if one's current moral disposition has no bearing on what type of moral principles the person has the capacity to uphold.

However, it's still possible that X is one of us, a brain in a vat being fed false information or an actual human being having a hallucinatory episode. — TheMadFool

No, the brain in the vat premise implies that this is not possible. For us to be brains in vats, it is implied that someone created this situation. It is impossible that the person who created it was just hallucinating or else there would not be us, as brains in vats. You can understand this situation with dreams. It is possible that I am in a dream right now, but it is impossible that I am in someone else's dream.

I don't think we can for the reason that there must exist, as Metaphysician Undercover posited, a being, call it X, that gets its hands on the information that can help it make the distinction but if X is anything like us the information must pass through a set-up of sensory apparatuses and then we're back to square one - this being could be just another one of us being fed false information of it could be an actual human being suffering from hallucinations. — TheMadFool

It's not a matter of this person getting hands on the information, it's a matter of this person necessarily all ready knowing the difference (having the information) as prerequisite for the brain in vat scenario, being the intentional creator of the conditions. So you need to ask whether it's possible for the brain in vat scenario to exist without a creator. But the description, as brain in vat, implies that there is a creator. You could go to some other description, like "simulation hypothesis", but that also implies a creator.

I think it would be very difficult to come up with a compatible theory, which did not require a creator to create the proposed scenario. And if your scenario requires a creator, the creator has the necessary information. Also take notice that this information need not pass through sensory apparatus. When we create something, the idea for that thing, the plan, exists prior to the physical existence of that thing. So the creator dreams up the idea, figures out how to put the plan into action, and then does so, without ever having sensed the thing which is being created. An omniscient being (one which cannot be mistaken) can set up a time delayed scenario, leave the scene, and have all the information to know about what is going on in that scenario without ever sensing it.

The premise of your proposal is wrong. The brain in a vat scenario implies necessarily a 'person' who constructed the brain in a vat. This 'person' would discern the difference. So it is impossible that the two are indiscernible.

Then why is it relevant to Descartes' demon and brain in a vat thought experiments? You'd have to say that these thought experiments are completely meaningless if the sensory apparatus that conveys info/data is, as you say, "not relevant". In fact the sensory apparatus, that it can be manipulated, is the cornerstone of these arguments/thought experiments. — TheMadFool

This might be the cornerstone of Descartes argument, but not Leibniz' principle. The identity of indiscernibles is a logical principle, not dependent on sensory apparatus. You are just conflating two distinct things in an incorrect way.

I think you’re balancing two mutually exclusive ideas. — Manbabyzeus

How are "some things I can change" and "some things I cannot change" mutually exclusive? They would only be mutually exclusive if I had said that the same things were both changeable and not changeable. But clearly I was talking about the need to be able to distinguish between what is changeable and what is not.

I believe you can choose your own morality. One can be convinced of the value of certain moral principles, the danger of others, and can alter his beliefs thereby. People convert all the time, for instance, at least when given the freedom to do so. — NOS4A2

Altering one's beliefs is not sufficient for changing one's behaviour, as my examples demonstrate. There is the further matter of one's disposition and will power. If an individual does not already have the moral disposition which allows one to adhere firmly to one's beliefs, and not give in to temptation, then altering one's beliefs is an ineffective procedure. The person would just become more and more hypocritical, believing that resisting certain actions is the good and right thing to do, but still lacking the necessary will power to abstain.

And I do not believe in the determinist position. Unless the determinist can point to something else in the world making the decisions, it cannot be said that anything else in the universe is making the decisions. No “force of nature” outside of myself makes me move something from one place to another. The decisions and actions begin and end in the self and nowhere else. — NOS4A2

Do you agree that things were happening, things were moving, prior in time to the existence of living beings capable of making decisions. If so, then you ought to see that it is not necessary for a "decision" to be made in order for something to move from one place to another.

I’m not amoral. I just don’t feel the need to adopt any one morality without first choosing to do so. There certainly is such a thing as guidance counselling. But it’s just advice, not some prescription on how to best live one’s life. — NOS4A2

I don't really believe that one can choose one's own morality. Your morality is a product of your genetics and upbringing, as is your "self". If you are dissatisfied with yourself, you can choose to make changes to yourself, but if you think that you can "choose" whatever morality you want, your mistaken, because there are many limiting factors on what is possible. Evidence of this is that it is very hard to break a bad habit.

Furthermore, one would have to study moral philosophy, to determine various different moral precepts, in order to choose between them. Otherwise one's choice of "a morality" would just be a random selection of what appeals to that person at the moment, and the next moment there would be a selection of a different morality according to the situation, etc.. Of course you can see that this cannot be called "a morality", because a morality is supposed to give you a set of consistent principles according to which you would judge the correct action in a given situation, rather than being a whole lot of distinct and inconsistent "moralities" which you could select from according to what you desire in a particular situation. The latter does not provide one with any rigorous principles of guidance, allowing a person to choose principles (which would be make believe principles if one did not study moral philosophy), and therefore cannot be called "a morality".

The fact that I can move something from one place to another proves I can alter my situation. — NOS4A2

This is not quite true. To be true, the statement requires a deficient definition of "my situation" which gives the "situation" an undefined temporal extension. Notice that to change "my situation" requires that what is referred to as "my situation", extends from the way it is now to the changed condition, such that they are both referred to by "my situation". When you give "my situation" such an unwarranted temporal extension you prevent the law of non-contradiction from being applicable, because "my situation" may have the attributes of both before and after.

So you need to respect the fact that to move something from one place to another requires a passage of time. And when you see that the passage of time is a necessary condition for moving something, then you cannot validly conclude that you have altered your situation, because it may have been the passing of time, not you, which has caused the change. This is the determinist's argument, that free will is just an illusion. You believe that you are making changes, but it's really just the forces of nature with the passing of time which makes the changes.

Therefore, we must separate things which are determined, and caused by the passing of time, from things which are caused by the human free will, in order to get a proper understanding of how we can actually change things, and thereby derive conclusions about what is possible for me to do, and what is impossible for me to do. Hence "choosing a morality" requires understanding metaphysical principles.

There are quite a few examples of cases where people knowingly do what they believe to be bad for themselves, such as addictions, habits, and even simple instances of over indulgence, like eating.

As Socrates and Plato pointed out, this presents a dilemma for the moralist because producing moral people cannot be a simple matter of teaching morals. So this principle, that we knowingly do what is bad, provides the substance for Plato's attack on the sophists. The sophists held as a principle, that virtue is a form of knowledge. This validated the idea that virtue could be taught, and justified those sophists charging large sums of money to teach virtue. Socrates apprehended, probably through intuition, that these principles being taught by the sophists were faulty, and attacked this form of sophistry as being a type of scam. So he tried to uncovered exactly how the principles were faulty.

Plato latched onto this principle, that we knowingly do what is bad, as direct proof that virtue cannot be a form of knowledge, thereby undermining the premise of the sophists. You'll find that St. Augustine provides a much more thorough discussion of this dilemma. It has repercussions on one's understanding of free will, and the parallel dilemma of how a man's will can be free, yet God is omniscient.

Firstly, what would the structure of such a being look like? — TheMadFool

This is not relevant. Leibniz does not qualify "indiscernible" with "to us", or with reference to any other type of being with specific capacities for discerning. So we must acknowledge that "indiscernible" was being used without any such qualification, and therefore interpret it in an absolute sense, as it was used.

Neither you or I can tell another how to seek his own well-being, for how to live one’s life is best left for him to decide. — NOS4A2

If this were true then there'd be no such thing as guidance counselling, and no such thing as the study of morality. Are you amoral?

That is why one must be at liberty to choose his own fate. If that means adopting a collectivist mindset, that’s fine, but without first the freedom to decide on his own he is little more than a slave. — NOS4A2

And there is no truth to this either. One cannot choose one's own fate because there are very many things which are beyond one's control. Therefore each one of us must learn to have the proper respect for all those things which are beyond one's control.

Do you recognize for example, that you were born into a very particular place in this world, and no matter how hard you try to "find the strength and courage to alter your situation", this situation cannot be altered? It makes no difference how much freedom and liberty you afford yourself, the situation you are in right now, being defined by what has come to pass, cannot be altered.

The point of a good morality is to encourage the individual to seek one's own well-being. Morality definitely must start with the individual. But "individual freedom and liberty" might not be an appropriate value to be assigned high priority. We observe that a good community is much more conducive to the individual's well-being than is freedom and liberty. So a good morality would inspire an individual toward producing a good community, rather than direct the individual toward freedom and liberty.

We cannot discern X implies that X cannot be done. — TheMadFool

This is incorrect, because a being with superior capacities might be able to do X. One cannot conclude from one's own inability to do something, that it is impossible to do that something. "You can't do it" represents your relation with the object. "I can't do it" represents my relation with the object. "We can't do it" represents our relation with the object. "It can't be done" represents the object in an absolute way, in relation to everything else.

Ever read the Bible? Jesus had a reply for those hand washing fanatics.

Why did you feel the need to become disrespectful in the first place — turkeyMan

This is not my job, it's my pastime.

I wash my hands as much as anyone does in the restaurant business. — turkeyMan

Oh cry me a river. Your boss made you wash your hands, so you quit the job because you thought that working in a grocery store would be easier (washing your hands less) than your work in the restaurant

Before you insult me again i can promise you i've accomplished far more with my life than you have with yours — turkeyMan

Yes, I'd say you've quite possibly washed your hands more times than I've ever done in my entire life, though I may be twice your age.

That's a contradiction. I think you need to give another look at the issue. — TheMadFool

Huh? The fact that I cannot discern the difference between two things, does not necessitate the conclusion that the difference is indiscernible.

Do you recognize the difference between "I cannot do X", and "X cannot be done"?

Yes, and I perform my duties with care and respect. Is that idea foreign to you as well?

The necessity to avoid having people get sick is of great concern within the food industry. It always has been, as long as food supply has been an industry. There are all sorts of safety measures designed to kill bacteria and keep the food bacteria free. When bacteria manages to infiltrate, and propagate within the food supply, it is a very serious concern. I do not see why a harmful virus would be any less of a concern than a harmful bacteria. If this attitude of taking measures to avoid having people get sick is totally foreign to you, then it's probably good that you managed to get yourself a different job.

No argument here, other than "love" doesn't quite capture agape. — tim wood

In any translation I've heard of, Jesus taught love, not agape. So I think it's really the other way around, "agape" doesn't quite capture "love".

I understand the Corona virus is a real virus and it is killing a significant amount of People, however when the boxes come off the truck they are thrown into the aisles onto the floor. After that the items are very often placed on the floor. The coronavirus lives on surfaces including the floor. The virus can last up to 3 days before dying when it is on a surface. The next day old Ladies come in and pull merchandise off the shelves and bring it home and eat the merchandise. — turkeyMan

The merchandise being thrown on the floor is packaged isn't it? You say it's in boxes. So the old ladies are not actually eating what has touched the floor. That being said, I've seen a number of videos showing how to clean your groceries after receiving them from the store.

Firstly, this world and this life we're living are such that we can't discern whether we're actual human beings or brains in vats. Call the experience of this world X. — TheMadFool

The fact that you or I, both of us, or a whole bunch of people, cannot discern one thing from another thing, does not necessitate the conclusion that the two are indiscernible. Being indiscernible, which means that it is impossible to discern, is not relative to the human capacity for discerning.

Hmm. No difference to me. I suppose. I presuppose. I'll accept correction on this. I suppose the Smiths are coming over for dinner. I presuppose the Smiths are coming over for dinner. One sounds better. I presuppose there are people called Smith - I may have very good reason to presuppose this. — tim wood

I would say that a presupposition is a supposition which stands as a sort of premise from which logic would follow. So in your example, a person could presuppose that the Smiths are coming over for dinner, and proceed logically from this toward the conclusion that there are people called Smith. Notice that you cannot proceed in the same way from the other direction. If you presuppose that there are people called Smith, you cannot proceed logically from this toward a conclusion that the Smiths are coming from dinner.

The point is that to do any thinking, you've got to presuppose something, in fact a whole lot of somethings. That simple. — tim wood

I hate to have to be the one to bring your attention to this, but this statement is very clearly false. A presupposition, like any other type of supposition, is produced from thinking, so it is impossible that presuppositions are prior to thinking in any absolute sense. It may be the case that presuppositions are necessary for logical thinking, but there is very clearly forms of thinking which are not logical thinking. Therefore, since presuppositions are created from thinking, but presuppositions are required for logical thinking, we can say that the type of thinking which is responsible for the existence of presuppositions, is not necessarily logical thinking..