It's no joke. Jesus taught love your neighbour, even if your neighbour happens to be your enemy. That's why one of the primary principles of Catholicism is forgiveness, and confession follows from forgiveness.

Please try reading before you reply. The notice is information - not the presupposition. As information it may lead to some presupposition, but is not the "source" of it. — tim wood

If you had read my entire post before replying, you would have seen that my objection to calling this a "presupposition", is that it is formed posterior to receiving the information. Therefore it cannot be a presupposition which one would hold when approaching the information. By what premise would you call a supposition which one forms after having assessing the proposed information, a presupposition?

When you ride the train to work, is it the train you ride or the schedule? You can tell the difference, yes? And does it arrive before it arrives? Maybe your trains are different from ours, but ours only arrive when they arrive, not before or after. Please read for comprehension. Before the train gets there, it is your presupposition that the train will get there. If, after the train has arrived, you wish to say the train got there, you're free to do so. And if you want to call that a post-supposition, again, you're free to do so, although I don't see how it would be coherent to do so. — tim wood

You didn't address the issue. How would you distinguish a presupposition from a plain old supposition?

If you've been brought up with good Christian values, you will of course, love your enemies.

That out of the way, consider the fact that life as a brain in a vat is indiscernible from life as an actual human being. If so, it follows, from 2. identity of indiscernibles, that life as a brain in a vat is identical to life as an actual human being in the sense that they're the exact same thing. — TheMadFool

Unless you describe life as an actual human being as being a brain in the vat, then the two are not the same thing. We generally describe life as an actual human being as something other than being a brain in a vat, so we do not have this problem. It's only a problem if you think that life as a human being is nothing other than being a brain in a vat.

Presuppositions are not things, you are the source of your own, — tim wood

If you were the source of your own presuppositions, how could there be any historical continuity? Contrary to what we have observed, that there is a strong degree of continuity of presuppositions from one person to the next, within a culture or society, each person's presuppositions would be as distinct from each other's, if each person was the source of one's own. As distinct as the position we each have in the world.

Example: you take commuter rail to work every day. You receive notice of a change of schedule. — tim wood

See, in your example, the source of the presupposition is the notice that the person got. The person is not the source of one's own presupposition. The issue I have with your use of "presupposition", is how would one distinguish between a presupposition, and a plain old supposition?

But before you waste your time on presuppositions, I know from previous posts of yours that you a) have opinions about them, b) you don't anything about them, and c) you have disdained doing any research on them, being persuaded you know it all already. Until and unless you do a little research, you're a waste of time on this topic. — tim wood

Of course, I have presuppositions about presuppositions. Don't we all? How could doing research into the nature of presuppositions change one's presuppositions about presuppositions? If one were to dismiss one's presuppositions on the basis of one's research, then the new suppositions would not be presuppositions, they would be post-suppositions. The suppositions which emanate from the research would be posterior to the research, not prior to the research, so how could such suppositions be rightly called "presuppositions"? The presuppositions which the person had prior to doing the research would remain as the presuppositions one had prior to doing the research, therefore the research could not affect one's presuppositions. Only if we conflate presuppositions with post-suppositions do we have a situation where presuppositions might change. But then it's incorrect to call these changing suppositions "presuppositions".

So let's consider your example. The person has a presupposition that the train will be on time. Following the notice of a schedule change, the presupposition must be dismissed, and replaced with a post-supposition. Therefore the supposition, that the train will be there at the new time, is not a presupposition at all, it is a post-supposition.

Stop being an idiot. Why is carbon dioxide stable? Because one carbon atom and two oxygen atoms collectively form a lower energy state than the same three atoms wandering around by themselves. — apokrisis

It's you who is being an idiot, talking about things like "atoms wandering around by themselves". I was comparing one type of molecule to another, we never mentioned independent atoms. The reason why one type of molecule is more stable than another is due to the nature of the chemical bonding . It makes no sense to say that one type of bond is a lower or higher "energy state" than another. It's simply the case that the electron arrangement of one molecule renders that molecule as more precariously balanced than the electron arrangement of another molecule. These are known as different "energy levels". And, using "energy" in this way borders on nonsensical due to the contradictory nature of wave/particle duality. In reality, "energy level" refers to the misunderstood phenomenon of discrete quantized units of energy which are supposed to exist within a continuous wave field.

So out of spite, you will spread your arms, step off the cliff, and thus demonstrate your contempt for the constraints of gravity? — apokrisis

Many people have done that. I'm not one of them. I don't tend to act out of spite, but many people do. And you cannot dismiss the actions of others, as impossible actions, just because they seem unreasonable to you. That's a problem with ethics, we cannot simply say that such and such actions are unreasonable, therefore no one will do them. In fact, that's a principle part of ethics, trying to get people not to do unreasonable things.

We are the end-point. Our world has already been shaped by a succession of increasingly specified constraints that start at the brute physical level, work their way up through biology, sociology and culture, and right on through in terms of our community, our family history, every other aspect of our world that is shaping out habits of thought. — apokrisis

You are ignoring, and denying observable facts. People do unreasonable things, things outside all the familiar, cultural, biological, and whatever other terms of constraint which you use in your description. There are human acts which are outside the constraints of any type of habit, just like there are so-called random genetic mutations. And that's why these acts are seen as unreasonable, in all senses of the word. Because of the reality of these unconstrained acts, we cannot look at the individual human being as the end point, the individual must be apprehended as the beginning point. The nature of free will forces this conclusion upon us. And so, in all respectable forms of ethics, the interest of the individual is higher than the interest of the society, culture, or state, because this is necessary in order to establish consistency with reality, and agreement from the freely choosing individuals. Without consent, all your constraints are for naught.

Thermodynamics constrains what we can do. The ethical question then becomes, is there some good reason to resist the general tug of its flow? What kind of reason would that be? — apokrisis

Banno already elucidated this point. Some people, when someone tells them what they must do, will go and do the opposite, just to spite. So if thermodynamics is supposed to constrain what we can do, some people will do the opposite, just out of spite. That is your reason, "spite". It's fundamental to the nature of freedom, to prove that your proposed constraints cannot actually constrain.

It is you who misrepresents. You propose "thermodynamics constrains" as some sort of fact, instead of proposing thermodynamics as a theory which tells us something about constraints. Then you proceed to argue that thermodynamics is not "telling" us something, it is actually constraining us. So your mistake is that you refuse to recognize that when free minded people are told about constraints (thermodynamics in this case), they will figure out a way to demonstrate that such proposed constraints cannot actually constrain them.

What you ought to respect is that when people learn about constraints, and produce such theories, they are actually looking for a way to get outside of those boundaries, to enjoy freedom. That is how people "use" such theories. So we learn about the existing constraints for the purpose of finding loop holes and ways around those constraints, toward freedom from constraints, freedom being what we desire. And the desire for freedom validates the "spite" referred to above.

All your Wikipedia quote tells me is that if a chemical "system" (whatever that is supposed to be) is reacting with its environment, it is unstable. And, there is a proposed "thermodynamic stability" in which the system has a thermodynamic equilibrium with its environment.

It gives no indication as to what distinguishes a system from its environment, something I assume is an arbitrary determination. And it makes no mention of your proposed "collective entropy budget". So you really haven't provided anything to dissuade me from the belief that you're making shit up.

In your proposed scenario where "atoms form molecular arrangements", is a molecule supposed to be a system? Is a group of molecules supposed to be a system. But we were talking about the chemical make up of the earth's atmosphere. Since the atmosphere is constantly interacting with solar forces and the massive surface, how can it even make sense to you, to think about the atmosphere in such terms?

And I find this hinted at in the above. To flesh it out, it has to do with the axioms and presuppositions that people have held, and to be sure, hold, because people do have axioms and presuppositions in their thinking. And to push this investigation as deep as possible. This an historical science of assembling facts about people's thinking. Which in a substantial way is what Streetlight's link above is about: the meaning of being to an ancient Greek, and how that differs from modern thinking on the same topic. — tim wood

It's easy to talk about such "presuppositions", but the question is really what these things are. What exactly are you referring to with this? Are these supposed presuppositions numbers? Are they intuitions of space and time, are they some sort of bedrock beliefs? See, metaphysicians are prone to assuming the existence of such presuppositions, and talking about them as if they are some sort of real things which can be talked about. But any attempt to describe what they actually are is pure speculation. So, such discussion winds up being an attempt to justify the claimed existence of such presuppositions through the means of pointing to proposed examples. But an example given here and now, cannot replicate what was thought at a prior time.. Therefore you really cannot call this a matter of "assembling facts about people's thinking". It's a matter of speculating about people's thinking. No degree of studying the axioms and principles which people apply can give us the facts about people's thinking.

You are making shit up because you don't even seem to have even a schoolboy grounding in molecular chemistry.

The first thing they teach you is why atoms form molecular arrangements that minimise their collective entropy budget. It literally explains everything. — apokrisis

I wasn't making shit up, I asked you a couple simple questions which you did not answer. Do you consider one type of molecule to be more entropific than another? If so, why?

I took chemistry in high school and they never taught us anything about a "collective entropy budget". It really seems like it's you who is making shit up.

Suppose there was a thermodynamic analysis that was able to tell us what we will in fact do. Suppose we do the calculations, and they show that we will indeed vote for Trump.

Now that we have this analysis, what is it that rules out our going against it? Can't we take that into consideration, and then vote for against Trump anyway? — Banno

That's right. Some people, when you tell them what they will do, will automatically do the opposite just to spite you. So if it happens to be the case that you come to know what a person will do, then you had better not tell that person, or they might go and do the opposite. What kind of predictive capacity is that, when you happen to know what will happen, but you cannot say it out loud because that might, or might not, cause the opposite to occur? To speak your knowledge out loud would negate its status as knowledge.

greed, but temporal existence seems neither strictly an ontological nor metaphysical predicate. If time, then time-when, or age, or lots of things, and then we're well out of "most general." — tim wood

Why do you think it must be "most general"? If to be is to be a particular, then what defines being is what differentiates a being from others, not the things that it has in common with others. Therefore "being" would be defined by particularity, not "most general".

That is, to be and to be present in time seem not quite the same thing. — tim wood

Sure, to exist and to be present are not exactly the same thing. But this was your mistake, in the op when you assumed existence to be a predicate. You said: "So we can say of something that exists, that it is." By allowing only the present tense of "to be", you've reduced being, to being at the present, by excluding the past and future. So in your emphasis on the present, with "is", you've forced temporality into the concept. By your use of "is", you exclude "has been", or "will be", from the concept, as non essential aspects, reducing the generality with temporal restrictions only, making being a temporal concept. Therefore it is your presentation which has made "being" a temporal concept.

Further, we have the distinction which wayfarer points to of different persons, It "is", he/she "is", and I "am", which gives the first person a unique form. Wayfarer may be inclined to dwell on that first person perspective because it gives one a unique, and perhaps the only true representation of what it means to be present in time. It may do this by giving a true perspective of simultaneity, and removing the need to relate one thing to another as described in relativity theory, because the internal parts of a person are already united in being.

I think you ought to notice though, that to be is a verb, and therefore signifies an activity, not a thing. The reason why it is considered by people like you, to be a predicate, is that the logic of our grammar necessitates that if there is an activity, there must be something engaged in that activity. So before you even proceed down this road, you ought to be wary that this is a logic which is based in dualism. If "I am" means that there is a subject and predicate, referring to a thing, and the activity which the thing is engaged in, then we have a dualist separation, and dualist premise, from the outset.

That is the issue with making "being" a verb, a predicate. It's a dualist premise and therefore you cannot escape dualism. Another approach is to make "being" a noun. In this sense we talk about beings, and what it mean to be a thing called "a being", rather than what it means to be. I warn you though, that this approach is very confusing and fraught with ambiguity because we begin with no separation or distinction between what is passive and what is active. "Being", referring to a noun "a being", might refer to a thing which "is" (meaning engaged in activity, and changing), or it might refer to an inertial state. .

"Ontology" is a word often used here and elsewhere. What does it mean? This from online, "Branch of metaphysics concerned with identifying, in the most general terms, the kinds of things that actually exist." The more I think about this definition the less I understand it. And implied is that it is a species of, metaphysics. These are often referred to as sciences, but that doesn't seem right: what would they be sciences of? — tim wood

I don't think it's right to say that metaphysics is a science. It is a branch of philosophy, and science is also a branch of philosophy. So they are two distinct branches.

So we can say of something that exists, that it is. — tim wood

Would you agree, that to say that something "is", is to say that it is present in time? Something which was yesterday, but no longer is, right now, we cannot say "is". And something which may come to be tomorrow, but is not right now, we cannot say "is".

Ontology seems self-limited, then, to the proposition that being is - and no more than that can be said. And metaphysics, pending a good definition for a "general" feature, seems about in the same circumstance. That is, that they're both empty - almost empty - concepts. At least as defined above. Is that the final word? — tim wood

Well, if you think that being present in time is an empty concept, then I think you haven't yet tried to figure out what it means.

Once photosynthesis had evolved, and bacteria had “poisoned” the atmosphere with sufficient oxygen, and so long as the climate generally favoured liquid water, then the conditions for life were very steady state — apokrisis

Poisoned the atmosphere? I'm sure you must realize that oxygen as an interceptor of harmful UV, was necessary for the development of "higher" life forms. Why would you call this act which prepared the atmosphere for evolution to proceed, an act of poisoning the atmosphere?

Not to mention we are stuck with the trapped waste in terms of CO2. — apokrisis

A moment ago you said oxygen in the atmosphere is poison, now it's CO2 which is "waste"? What is waste, or poison, and what is a necessary condition for living, is just a matter of perspective, depending on what type of life form we're talking about.

So the story is that life will entropify as fast as it can. — apokrisis

But entropy is just an arbitrary designation, dependent entirely on one's perspective. Is O2 more entropified than CO2? What about O3? "Entropy" is completely perspective dependent.

Life is arranged to maximise long run entropy production. — apokrisis

The long term outcomes of exponential entropy production have now come into view. What is now “good” will be whatever counts as a shift to a long-run sustainable balance within environmental limits. — apokrisis

There appears to be inconsistency between these two. If life is supposed to, or ought to, maximize entropy production, then how is establishing a "long-run sustainable balance" consistent with this? If the end goal is entropy, then the quicker we get there the better. Adding "long run" to this goal, as if we ought to delay achieving the goal for as long as possible, is saying that the real goal is to slow entropy, and that contradicts the originally stated goal which is to maximize entropy..

Here's an analogy. We could say that life is arranged so as to maximize death. Billions of creatures come into existence only to die. So we say the goal of life is to die (maximize entropy). Then we notice that some cultures of living things, or particular species, trend toward long term sustenance, and this requires a sort of balance within their environment. So to maintain consistency with evolutionary theory we might claim long term "survival" is the goal. But now we have a clear contradiction between the originally stated goal, to die, and the later stated goal to live as long as possible (long-run sustainable balance).

The inconsistency, or contradiction, between the two, life is arranged to die (maximize entropy), and, the "good" is to create a balance so as to delay death (delay entropy production) for as long as possible, creates the need to assess the validity of each. One, or the other, must be wrong. I suggest that both are wrong, because to describe the "good" in such dichotomous terms is a mistake. The two are the defining extremes of life, death and survival, but living is the real activity occurring in between. The virtuous activity of living, is to seek neither of the two extremes, death nor survival, as the good, but something completely different. So you appear to be misguided, barking up the wrong tree.

I am not assuming anything about the duration of time or the finite or infinite nature of the universe. — TiredThinker

You referred to an "immortal being", which implies living forever, and therefore everlasting time.

Apparently he had done everything and seen everything. — TiredThinker

There is a problem with the principle of plenitude, which states that given an infinite amount of time, every possibility will be actualized. If there are infinite possibilities, it's impossible to actualize them all. So the principle of plenitude hits its nemesis when we assume infinite possibilities.

In other words, we cannot assume both infinite time and infinite possibilities because infinite time necessitates that all possibilities have been actualized (principle of plenitude), while infinite possibilities implies that it is impossible to actualize all possibilities.

We harm this planet and each other and we can't contribute nearly enough to justify the harm. — TiredThinker

How can you justify this judgement? On what principles do you think that the changes we make to the planet, in our ever so short life spans, are harms rather than benefits?

Here's one way of looking at it. To leave the planet unchanged after one's life is to neither harm nor benefit the planet. So to benefit the planet is not to leave the planet unchanged. The bigger the change that a person makes, the more potential there is for there to be great harm, or great benefit. On what principles would you distinguish a beneficial change from a harmful change?

So nothing stops the US curling up within the comfort of its own North American empire and saying the world can go f*** itself. The inbuilt advantages are so many that even really bad political leaders can't actually sink the ship. — apokrisis

Doubtful! Trump with his 'Me First' campaign, doesn't know the meaning of partnership, and tells everyone tp go f*** yourself..
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53683569

Perhaps you also believe Saddam Hussein had WMDs — Asif

This was not claimed by the media, it was claimed by one specific US government agency..

It's funny folks believe chynah and other states are corrupt and issue disinformation but never there own just because the word democracy is bandied about. — Asif

Sorry to disillusion you Asif, but I'm not one of those "folks" you refer to here. I'll tell you though, you seem to have a misunderstanding of the relationship between the various elements of media, and the government, in a democratic state. Do you assume that they work together, as one entity, with the same goal?

The US elite are just as corrupt and worse than the chinese elite. — Asif

You started talking about falsity in the media concerning Covid-19. I implied that the government corroborates the media. You haven't established the required relationship between the "wealthy elite" who gained from this, and the government, to support your claims.

As I said, there is a multitude of different, competing media sources reporting roughly the same thing. I could add to that, the fact that the various levels of government are taking very extreme measures. Why would I believe that all these different institutions, and organizations are conspiring to give poor peons like me such radically false information? How does the government profit by shutting down business practices and paying billions in aid? Or do you think that the media has been able to mislead the governments as well?

Im saying STOP believing. — MAYAEL

I am to my very core, a skeptic. But I will never stop believing that it's a mistake to step in front of a fast moving fright train. If you think you might convince me otherwise, you're welcome to try. In the meantime, I do not want to propagate a deadly virus, so you can perform your acts of persuasion from a safe distance.

That's probably because you tried to argue that the word "value" has only one meaning, — Luke

Another example of pathetic interpretation.

I'm done with your twisting of the discussion. — Luke

It's not me who never learned how to read philosophy.

So when you tell me that hardly anyone dies from Corona virus, while a multitude of different competing media sources are telling me the very opposite, I'm supposed to believe you instead?

The free world is losing it’s meal ticket. The elites are watching their power wane. No more free rides. — NOS4A2

Oh right, the USA has given the world so much. The extended war against communism demonstrates the exact opposite, the USA has been a taker, not a giver. That's why it has so many enemies in the world today. Oh sorry NOS4A2, I neglect your qualification of " the world" with "free". It appears like you believe that there is a specific, small class of people in the world, who are allowed to be "free", at the expense of the rest, who are oppressed. Oh how the USA still clings to the ideology of slavery.

And let's not forget how there are literally dozens of other things that kill 10 times as many people annually — MAYAEL

Let's see. Covid-19 has been killing people in America for about five months now, despite extreme cautionary measures of periods of shut down and physical distancing laws. Care to list a dozen or two of those dozens of other things which have a 10 times higher annual death rate?

These are the same meaning of the word "animal", with a definition such as: "a living organism that feeds on organic matter, typically having specialized sense organs and nervous system and able to respond rapidly to stimuli." — Luke

In this discussion, all we've done is digressed, from the meaning of "number" to the meaning of "value", to the meaning of "meaning". I now think I see why it's so difficult for us to agree on anything, or make any progress in discussion, and all we do is digress.. We have a very deep difference in how we relate to what a word means.

If I'm talking about that animal lying on the floor over there, I believe that "animal" refers to the dog I am talking about, and that reference gives meaning to the use of "animal" in that context. You seem to think that when I am talking about that animal, there is some abstract idea, defined as you described above, which exists as an intermediary between the word, and my use of the word, constituting "the meaning" of the word. This is exactly what you've been arguing with numerals, that there is an abstract idea, "a number", which constitutes "the meaning" of the numeral, and is intermediate between the numeral and its usage. I thought you supported Wittgenstein, who dismissed all that Platonic idealism as nonsense.

Let's consider what really exists between the word "animal" and the way that I use it. I have had some education, and have developed some habits of usage, and I might refer to a dictionary or other sources like Wikipedia now and then. There is no specific definition, such as the one you offered, which constitutes "the meaning" of the word for me, which I reference every time I use that word. Sure, you might argue that every time I use the word "animal", it is consistent with your proposed definition, therefore your proposed definition is "the meaning" which the word has when I use it, but that is not a valid conclusion. That a thing is consistent with a description does not necessitate the conclusion that it is the described thing because the identity of the particular is within the particular itself (law of identity), and cannot be represented through universal terms which refer to more than one thing. Therefore the identity of the particular cannot be concluded necessarily through reference to the universal, or more general. The meaning of any particular instance of usage of symbols is specific to that particular instance, and cannot be expressed in universal terms. We must refer to the material substance of what is referred to in that particular instance of use, to determine the true meaning.

I believe that this attitude which you have toward meaning is the reason why you have such a hard time discussing these philosophical issues with me, and continually misinterpret me. You see my use of certain words, and instead of referring to the context of my usage, to derive the meaning of those words, you refer to some "idea" of "the meaning" of the word, which you have for that word, and this provides for you, the wrong interpretation, or meaning. Then you take this incorrect meaning (faulty interpretation) based in some supposed idea of "the meaning" of that word, instead of the meaning meant by me, revealed by the context of my usage, and insist that I've contradicted myself.

This implies the same meaning of word "value" across all "types of values". — Luke

That's nonsense, meaning is relative to context, usage. For example, there are different types of animals. When I talk about this animal here, my cat, "animal" has a completely different meaning from when I talk about that animal over there, my dog. The fact that all the things called "animal" can be classed together in one group, as animals, does not mean that whenever someone refers to one of those animals, "animal" has the same meaning. I am talking about this animal here now, my cat, do you see how the meaning of "animal" is completely different from when I am talking about that animal over there, my dog.

We can say the same thing about "value". There is a reason, or reasons why we categorize something as a value, just like there are reasons why we categorize something as an animal. I suggested, that a "value" is related to a scale, But this does not mean that when I talk about the value of a dollar, or the value of zero degrees Celsius, "value" has the same meaning. That would be ridiculous. The meaning is determined by the scale being referred to, just like the meaning of "animal" in my example, is determined by the creature being referred to.

I never suggested that it did. I said there are all different types of values. Obviously, each different type entails a different meaning for the word.

What basis is there for claiming that there is a meaning for "value" which refers to something completely independent from all other types of value, such that it cannot be called a type of value?

It's as though I am talking about the bank of a river and you keep telling me that I must be talking about a financial institution. — Luke

I don't see the analogy. You appear to be avoiding the points I made.

And the sense conditioned by the knowledge at the time, so when Thales says the world is made of water, or Heraclitus fire, these are appropriate for their respective times and purposes, and to be understood in their contexts. — tim wood

The modern version of Heraclitus' fire, is the people who claim that the world is made of energy. Then there are those who claim it is all waves, which is similar to Thales' water, or the Pythagorean ether. It seems like history repeats itself. Isn't that what philosophy is, to observe the repetitions in history?

There is a meaning of the word "value" which is a synonym for "number". — Luke

Sure there is, and that's your vicious circle, which I just pointed out. Define "value" as number, and define "number" as value. Claim that they are synonyms and live in your little bubble withou having a clue as to what a value or a number is. If you read my reply to jorndoe, a week or so back, I explained how a value is defined by a scale. The number just indicates a position relative to the scale.

I'm not talking about a type of value, as in the values that people hold or in what people value. — Luke

This is incorrect. Any specified value is defined by a specific scale. So there are many different types of value, all relative to different scales. Therefore any value is a type of value and the type is determined by the scale. There is no such thing as a value which is independent from a scale of evaluation, and the scale determines the type of value. So unless you are talking about "value" in the most general sense, which you clearly are not, because you've been rejecting my talk of "value" in the most general sense, you are necessarily talking about a type of value. Therefore your claim that you are not talking about a type of value is false. You very clearly are talking about a type of value.

It's just another word for a number, or the number represented by an algebraic term. — Luke

I already explained how the idea of "number" on its own, as a supposed medium between a numeral and things to be counted, does not make sense. When we count things, we apply the numerals right to the things being counted, in the process of counting. If you want to ground the existence of "number", in some type of value, then we need to refer to the evaluation scale to see what type of value it is. I already suggested that it is a quantitative value. Do you agree?

assume you saw the phrase "mathematical object" in the Wikipedia article on value and now you want to argue over the meaning of "objects". — Luke

Clearly our disagreement is not in the meaning of "objects", but in the meaning of "value". You want to disassociate quantitative value from all other sorts of value, claiming that mathematical values are something completely distinct and unrelated to any other type of value. But values do not exist in that way, They exist in hierarchical structures, one type of value receiving its worth from another, like a family tree, until the whole structure is grounded in a material desire or want. Aristotle explained this in his Nichomachean Ethics, one end is for the sake of another end, which is for the sake of another, until there is a grounding. Unless you recognize that values are tied together in this way and it is unrealistic, and a misunderstanding, to separate one type of value (quantitative value) from all others, we will always disagree.

A mathematical object is an abstract concept arising in mathematics." — Luke

Sure, but this does not settle our disagreement concerning the relationship between "value" and "abstract concept". You seem to think that value is a predicate of an abstract concept. I see a concept as grounded in a value, and emergent from that value. Therefore from my perspective the value that a concept expresses is prior to the concept itself. And if there is a new value derived from a concept, it is produced through application of the concept. This means that the value which "mathematical objects", or 'abstract concepts arising in mathematics' is grounded in cannot be a quantitative value at all, because "quantitative value is an abstract concept emergent from the application of arithmetic. Quantitative value has been produced from the application of mathematical concepts, and the sort of "value" which is responsible for the creation of mathematical concepts, and therefore underlying mathematical concepts, is a different type.

Mathematical concepts provide us with quantitative value, but they are produced from another type of value. So we cannot understand mathematical concepts simply through reference to quantitative value because this is circular. To escape this vicious circle which you have been trapped in for weeks now, you need to allow your inquiry to accept the values which lie behind an individual subject's application of abstract concepts, to be relevant in the creation of these concepts. In other words, you need to free yourself from your self-imposed restrictions on "value".

Theological fatalism claims that god's Omniscience entails a necessity for the specific action that god knows will happen in the future, now a friend I was debating this with, claims that god's knowledge is independent of the universe, and therefore does not entail determinism, which I find illogical and faulty,
but I want to ask is there a way for god to know the future without ultimately causing determinism? — Augustusea

St Augustine has a lot of thought written on this subject. I don't think that it is fair to say that god's knowledge is independent of the universe, because God's will is responsible for the existence of the universe.

Suppose that the future is determined, either by god or by physics.

Does that tell you what it is that you will do next? Does that help you decide wether to have an egg or cornflakes for breakfast? — Banno

I think it tells you that you do not need to decide. Relax, don't waste your time trying to decide, you'll eat what you'll eat without even needing to decide, it's already fated. If you die of starvation don't blame me, that's already determined.

They are different meanings of the word "value", as demonstrated by the Wikipedia article I posted. If you can't accept this, then I wish you well. — Luke

My reply to your Wikipedia quote:

This is what I object to. In no way can a value be an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

That was four days ago. And, it's what I've been arguing for weeks. Did it take you this long to figure out that I really. mean what I say?

A value is a number. Do you acknowledge that? — Luke

No! That's exactly what I've been arguing against for this entire thread. How can you not see that that is what I am arguing against, after all this time? There is a specific type of value, a quantitative value, which people have assigned the word "number" to. You have been working hard to disassociate "quantitative value" from all other forms of value, with the intention of claiming that quantitative value is grounded in an object called "a number", rather than the human subject. That argument disguises the true subjective nature of "a value" by making it appear to be an object called "a number".

Given your two claims above, it looks like you now accept that the “abstract feature” of a value/number exists between the symbol and what the symbol refers to. — Luke

I don't at all claim that there is nothing between the symbol and what it represents, that would be ludicrous, and that's why it's ridiculous and extremely frustrating that you would misrepresent what I said, in this way. Of course there is obviously a medium, which is a thinking human being, between the symbol and what it represents, as it is necessary that someone applies the symbol. But a thinking human being is better known as a subject, and is obviously not well represented as an object called "a number".

Your interpretation has taken what I've said about human thinkers applying numerals, and you have misrepresented as an instance of "value" and misrepresented a "value" as a number. So you have made a double misrepresentation.

That's the problem with this sort of Platonism, it takes the human activity of thinking, which is the medium between the numerals and what they refer to, and replaces that with Platonic ideals, "numbers". From this premise you can completely overlook all the mistakes within the principles of mathematics, insisting that there cannot be mistakes because mathematics is objective, the numerals refer directly to mathematical objects, numbers. Therefore it's impossible that there is mistaken value here because that sort of value is based in objects, "numbers", so it is objective. In reality there is the human thinking between the numeral and what it refers to, not an object called "a number", hence mistake is possible within mathematical principles. And that sort of Platonic realism is itself a mistake.

First you claim that there is no intermediary between symbols and objects, but now you claim that there are both numbers and sets between them? Make up your mind. — Luke

You obviously have not understood what I said. Oh well, I'm tired of repeating the same thing over and over, only to have it interpreted in some odd way such that you perceive contradiction. I've already pointed to this problem which you have, and it would be appreciated if you could work on correcting it.

I simply meant that numbers can also be predicated of numerals and numbers themselves. — Luke

As I said last post, i don't see how a number could be predicated of a numeral. The symbol, and what the symbol mean, are two distinct things. You could only predicate a number of a numeral if the number was somehow a quality or property of the symbol.

Exactly my point. So you need to review your claim that “ there is no need to posit "a number" as existing between the symbol "1", and what the symbol refers to”. “4” refers to neither the symbol nor the objects themselves, but instead to an abstract feature/grouping of those objects: a number. — Luke

A group of objects is not an abstract feature. Patterns are real, ontological. The value we give to the group "4", is an abstract feature, but it's a value, therefore a form of quality, not an object.. If you allow the grouping to be arbitrary, mathematics gets lost to randomness. This is why there must be a real ontological difference between two groups of two (2+2), and one group of four (4). Otherwise there would be no reason to refer to the one situation as "2+2", and the other as "4".

Then you must concede that there exists an intermediary between a symbol (numeral) and an object: a value. A value is a number.

No, I just explain why this is not the case. Why just go and assert it anyway?
— Luke

Numerals represent numbers which are predicated of objects. — Luke

Hold on here, you're jumping ahead of yourself. An object is one, so you cannot predicate any number other than one of an object. If you have a group or set of objects you can count them, assign a quantity or number to that group or set, but take notice that number, or quantity is actually predicated of the group or set, not of the objects themselves.

But a numeral or a number can also be an object. We can speak of three numerals or four numbers, for example. — Luke

Clearly a numeral is an object, as a symbol. But I do not see how a number can be an object. Number, or quantity is something predicated of a group or set of objects, so how can a number itself be an object?

Both expressions have a value of 4. A child could tell you that. — Luke

This is the ambiguity you tried to introduce earlier. The expression isn't what has the value, it's what the expression refers to that has the value. The numeral "4" does not have the value, of 4, Whatever it is that we refer to with "4", in application, is what is judged to have that value. So "4" is used to refer to that group of objects which is judged to have the value of 4.

You still need to explain how you can count objects without first being able to count numbers. — Luke

We went through this already. 1 refers to one object, add another and it's "2" objects, another, and it's "3" objects. It's how I learned to count, I don't know how you learned to count. Memorizing an order of symbols, 1,2,3,4, etc. is not learning how to count anything, just like learning to recite the alphabet is not learning how to spell anything.

We do say that reciting the numbers in order is counting, but when we learn how to do this it's definitely not a matter of learning how to count numbers, because at that age we are not told that there are abstract numbers, Platonic ideas which the numerals refer to. It's just learning how to count, and this is a distinct meaning of "count" from counting something, which is to determine an amount. Clearly, when we learn how to recite the numerals in order, i.e., learn how to count in this sense of the word "count", we are not told that we are counting (determining the amount of) some abstract ideas called "numbers". This would only confuse the child. In my experience, I learned how to count objects, and recite the symbols, long before I learned that there was supposed to be numbers which the numerals refer to. That would have confused me immensely. It still does.

Different numerals can represent the same number (or value), such as "4" and "IV" — Luke

I have no problem with saying that a numeral represents a value. That is how we establish equality, by giving different things the same value. I do have a problem with saying that a value is an object. Value is something which is predicated. And if we say that value is a predication of the symbol instead of the subject or object which the symbol represents, that is a category mistake. So anytime we say that a numeral represents a value, this is a simplification, and we ought to understand that the value only exists in application. It's like when we state logical expressions using symbols,.to make an example of how to use such symbols. The symbols only have a "value" if they represent something, and the logic is being applied.

Also, different expressions can represent the same number (or value), such as "2x2" and "1+3". — Luke

So in this instance, when "2+2" is applied, and "3+1" is applied, there is an equality between the value of the objects represented by both. Without those objects, which only exist in application, when the numbers actually refer to something, "2+2" and "3+1" are just symbols which cannot be said to have any particular value, or refer to any particular value.

This indicates "a number as existing between the symbol(s)...and what the symbol(s) refer to". — Luke

No such "number" is indicated. "2+2=3+1" is just an expression of symbols, demonstrating how to use mathematical symbols, just like we make demonstrations in other forms of logic, in which the symbols refer to nothing. It is an expression of "form}, which demonstrates how to proceed with the logic. There is nothing referred to by the symbols because the logic is not being applied. It is simply a representation of form. To imagine that there is an object called "a number" referred to by "2", or "3", or another type of mathematical object referred to by "2+2", or "3+1" is just an imaginary fiction, which might be useful for the purpose of teaching, but it is a fiction nevertheless.

What do you mean? He'd blame Democrats for having increased the death rate, by dying?

So "1" is not a number? — Luke

The point is that there is no need to posit "a number" as existing between the symbol "1", and what the symbol refers to in a particular application of mathematics. This is unnecessary obfuscation, like positing "an idea" as existing between my car, and my usage of "car" to refer to it. To posit such an ideal object as existing between the symbol, and what the symbol refers to in application, is a misrepresentation of what is really the case. There is some thinking which occurs as a medium between my use of the word, and the object referred to, but it's incorrect to say that there is a thing, called "an idea" which exists there.

Who is claiming that "1" is an object? — Luke

From your Wikipedia post above:

In general, a mathematical value may be any definite mathematical object. In elementary mathematics, this is most often a number – for example, a real number such as π or an integer such as 42.

— The value of a variable or a constant is any number or other mathematical object assigned to it.
— The value of a mathematical expression is the result of the computation described by this expression when the variables and constants in it are assigned values.
— The value of a function, given the value(s) assigned to its argument(s), is the value assumed by the function for these argument values.

Once it is established through an axiom, that a number is an object (mathematical object), it becomes a thing which can be counted. In reality, counting numbers is nonsense, as I explained, it's just arbitrary play with symbols.

There are numerous ways multidimensional time has been approach. From physics it's a different approach as from metaphysics, but each way helps us to deal with the apparent vagueness of the present "now", assumed by special relativity. From the metaphysical approach, we have principles based in human experience, leading us toward a form of presentism. But experience demonstrates that we actually observe motion, "becoming" at the present, so the present cannot be a crisp moment, or point in time because motion requires time. This is the vagueness of the present described by Peirce, and employed as a fundamental premise in special relativity.

Therefore if time is represented as a continuity with points dividing one part from another, this is not a proper representation because the notion of a point of separation is derived from the crisp division between past and future at the present. When we allow that time is passing at the present we can go in two principal ways. We can maintain that the first representation is correct, and claim that the separation cannot be made cleanly because human capacities don't allow us to do so, therefore "the present" is just an arbitrary period of time on the time line. Vagueness cannot be ruled out of this period of time. The more complex way is to represent the past and future as the line of being as one dimension of time, then show activity as occurring at a particular "vague point" on this line, with its own micro-scaled time to account for becoming. The difficulty is to establish the proper relation between the macro-scaled timeline of being, and the micro-scaled time of becoming, such that true understanding might be enabled. This requires determining precisely the activity which occurs at the present in the micro-scale, separating it from the activity of the macro-scale, such that this activity might be related to the activity of the macro-scale time line, as a distinct form of activity.