There was no law being enforced, the man killed was an innocent runner. It's not a crime to run.

They're not vigilantes. Arbery was a regular runner, training I believe, he was obviously targeted for some reason.

Nice post Rania, I'm happy to welcome you here on the forum.

t's an artful construction to refer to "the Obama administration" in this way. In one sense, everything the intelligence community did during Obama's Presidency can be attributed to "the Obama Administration." However, this doesn't imply Obama was directing the activities. — Relativist

However, within the Trump administration, anyone disloyal to the president is fired. So, this creates the illusion that all government agencies are directly working for the president, even when normal presidents don't generally behave in this unusual way.

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Guys! The president called me a warrior! — NOS4A2

OMG, the Russians have been given credit! Or is that a disguised request for future activity? Good luck with that.

This disease is dangerous for some of those that get it...but it's hardly the black death.This lock down looks like a massive over reaction, Sweden seems to indicate that. — Chester

You do realize that the reason why the death toll remains so low is that the distancing measures have curbed the spread of the disease, don't you?

find with the western tradition it stems from attempts to understand existence through reason, hence the development of philosophy. This is not to diminish mysticism in the Christian church, but there is a seperation between this and reason/philosophy/science. Such that Christian mysticism seems to have been discarded by the later. I find the Eastern traditions far more of use. — Punshhh

I agree that Christian mysticism, in any organized form, is pretty much gone, and I believe it is because of the reasons I described. The mysticism is centered around matter, and the discipline of physics has produced the illusion that matter is understood. That this is not the case has recently become increasingly evident in quantum physics. I think that the dead ends which modern physics has come up against, have produced a renewed interest in mysticism. There is no organized tradition of mysticism in the west, so many people turn toward eastern traditions, because they provide some sort of structured training.

In the east, the tradition might be an effort to maintain with consistency over millennia of time, a similar practise. In the west, we have a rapidly evolving educational structure so the tradition of mysticism has been to revisit the past. This is to look back at ancient texts, and find principles which persist through time. I wouldn't call this an intellectualizing, it's more of a simple memory preserved through written material, which is carried forward as the principles remembered are still applicable today. It's a preservation timeless principles, but these principles are themselves mysterious.

Plato lived in a time where writing was much younger than it is today. He looked back to myths which were perhaps a thousand or two, maybe even more years old at that time. This was prior to the time that these people had writing. He tells us about how the stories were carried down from one generation to the next in the form of verse, songs and poetry. These myths contained mystical knowledge, moral lessons and information about the gods. I believe the information was put to print around the time of Hesiod and Homer, and this is roughly the same time that the Old Testament of the Bible was put to print. It also contains stories previously told in oral tradition.

The mystic tradition in the west seems to have always been a communal practise involving words. If you've ever gone to church there's a lot of hymns and psalms, things recited without most the people, especially the young, even truly understanding what is being said. It's as if getting together in a group, and chanting the same thing (Gregorian chants for instance) is somehow meaningful, even if they do not know the meaning. I'm not familiar with eastern practises, but I imagine there is a communal practise of getting together, maybe some chanting, and inspirational words, but maybe the words spoken have not developed to the same level of intellectual meaning that we find in the west. But even in the west, the meaning of the words is a matter of interpretation, and this is one thing which might separate mysticism from intellectualism.

So my mysticism is fashioned around the Hindu traditions. In which rather like what you describe in reference to Plato, material is a tool of expression and that the mystical path is concerned with a refinement of that expression specifically through the vehicle of the human body and mind. Any purposes in this, in relation to that body, or the wider world are (I noticed you referred to the purpose of matter) not important as they are a deep mystery, other than the natural processes of the personal development of the mystic. — Punshhh

I see an issue here with the question, "why?". What Plato assumed, or claimed, is that people have a fundamental curiosity, "wonder", and this is at the root of philosophy. So we can't simply dismiss the importance of "why?". If you commune with nature, as you say, you'll see that other animals possess this curiosity as well, they are often inclined to check things out. So there are some things which are a deep mystery, like matter, but it is natural for us to be curious. Now when you say that something is or is not important, this is relative to a person's individual perspective. All people have different character and traits, and when a person has the philosophical perspective of wonder, delving into a deep mystery might be the most important thing to that person. Of course we cannot say that it is wrong for the person to see great importance here, because it is not immoral or anything like that.

I’m somewhat baffled. Namely, if this was your stance all along, why all the fuss in relation to what I’ve been saying. Such as your accusation of “complete illogicality” in reference to hearing a bird’s chirp within the timespan of the experienced present - prior to this experience becoming a memory of what once was and, hence, the experienced past. — javra

I guess it depends on how long the bird's chirp is. I find that the beginning of the chirp is out of the experience of the present, by the time I am hearing the end of the chirp. That's why I argued that. The reason why I called it "illogical" (I apologize if that was a little harsh), is that we proceed in logic, from accepted premises. In measuring time it is accepted that there is a point which separates before from after. Therefore it is illogical to say that the entire bird's chirp is at one time, the present which divides past from future, because this would be saying it is simultaneous. So that would require a definition of "present" which is unconventional. On second thoughts though, I realize that there probably isn't such a thing as a conventional definition of "present". But that's another reason why time is mystical.

There is no such thing as a duration-less sound – to be even clearer, no such thing as the experience of a duration-less sound. — javra

Right, that's my point. In the sensible world, there is nothing sensed that is without duration. So to perceive anything as a sensed thing, or even for physical "things" to have any real existence, requires what I called a sort of memory, what Whitehead called "prehension", to connect the past with the present constructing the existence of the objects of sensation, which according to experience (empirical observation) have temporal extension.

How is the concept of a duration-devoid present wherein sound is experienced not "completely illogical"? — javra

I'm not talking about a duration devoid present. I am talking about how experience exists. I believe that understanding what I am describing, necessitates a twofold understanding of time, a two dimensional time. Time has "length", what we call temporal extension. But since the intellectualized "present" is used to divide one part of this extension from another, past from future, as a point in time (your duration-less present), yet the present necessarily has duration, as you describe, we must allow for this duration at the present, by giving time width, what I call the "breadth" of time. You can search this idea online, but it's difficult to find much information on it because it's mystical, and physicists who experiment with multidimensional time use a completely different approach with different presumptions.

By academia I refer to the Western academic tradition (WAC), as taught in Western Universities and derived from Greek and Latin historical sources. I accept that other schools can be included in academia, but I am not referring to them, only what I have just pointed out. I am not aware of any mystical training in these traditions, other than some reference to it in theology. If you can suggest any, I would be interested. — Punshhh

We need to consider the word "tradition" here. The academic tradition in the western world is a tradition of change. Knowledge is changing and evolving at an increasing pace. So what you call "academia is changing. I agree that the trend is away from mystical training in all universities, and I do not know modern theology, but I would think that there is very little mystical training as it has been outcast in modern western society. However, it has played a large role in academia in earlier times.

We could start with Plato's numerous recitals of ancient myths concerning the immortal soul. Phaedo, is a very good example, but in many instances he stirs up the imagination through recanting ancient myths about the soul. You might argue that this is not, strictly speaking mystical training, but it is training based in mysticism. Remember, Plato insists in the cave analogy, that after seeing the light the philosopher will be impelled to teach others, to lead them from the cave. His method of teaching is the written word. The fact that it is in words, and what you called intellectualized makes it no less mystical. The point is that the mystic, Plato in this case, went beyond any existing limits of knowledge, delved into the mystical world, and things were revealed to him so he sought ways to tell others. His most reliable way was through ancient myths. It is the need to communicate with others which produces the intellectualization you refer to.

Plato's Timaeus is very mystical. When I first read it I couldn't even understand it, but at the same time it was very childish. It was full of mythology and didn't seem to make sense. Then I found out that this writing was highly respected in Neo-Platonism and early Christianity, so I had to read it a couple more times to start understanding. Neo-Platonism is recognized as mysticism, and provided tenets for early Christianity. St-Augustine went through Neo-Platonist training. The interesting thing with the Timaeus for me, is that Plato brought the independent, immaterial Forms, out of the world of mysticism, and gave them intelligible existence. But to do this he had to posit a receptacle for the Forms in the sensible world, and this was called "matter".

So he brought the soul, mind, Forms, and being, out of the mystical realm, into the intelligible, and left "matter" there in the mystical, as a replacement. Aristotle went on to define "matter" as potential, what may or may not be, making it an exception to the law of excluded middle, and therefore inherently unintelligible. So at the time of Neo-Platonism there were numerous different mystical sects such as Manichaeism, with significantly different approaches to matter. Matter, being associated with the body, and original sin, was sometimes believed to be inherently evil. In the western tradition, mysticism is involved with how we approach matter. The soul, intellect, and Forms, are taken for granted as immaterial existence. This is expressed by Descartes with "I think therefore I am". But matter was not taken for granted, and as unintelligible, it was mystical. That is expressed by Descartes' doubt of the physical world, and Berkeley. That was the western tradition, but Newton changed this with his laws of motion. He assigned a fundamental and essential property to matter, inertia. Doing this gave "matter" intelligibility, and brought it out of the mystical, such that the conceptual development could explode in growth, into energy etc.. But it pretty much put an end to western mysticism. It created the appearance that the mysterious and unintelligible aspect of the universe, matter, which was only approachable through mysticism, was suddenly known and understood. Now there was no need for mysticism in the western world.

As an alternative to this analysis of a human, I come to it from a different direction, in which there is a being, a being, expressed through an organism who through the good fortune (or not) of recent evolutionary development has developed the ability for intellectual thought. That prior to this development there was a mind, a being, an experience. This can be observed in animals and plants around us.

Also I come to it from an appreciation of life as an animating force. Animating rather like the way idealism describes the world. But rather than viewing it from the perspective of the individual human, I view the whole biosphere as one individual and each human is a part of it. This biosphere being an expression of a being via material. — Punshhh

This is similar to Aristotle's "On The Soul". This work demonstrates that the soul is necessarily prior to the body of the living being. Plato's Timaeus also claims that the immaterial Form is prior to the material existence of any material object. In western mysticism, such as Neo-Platonism, we attempt to put ourselves into that position, as a soul, prior to having a material body, and get a glimpse of that relationship between the soul and the material body. The immaterial soul, having been logically demonstrated as necessary is taken for granted. Since the existence of matter is not necessary, as the immaterial is, matter becomes incomprehensible. So there are numerous mystical approaches. But from this perspective, all the separation between us, division, disunity, individuation, all pain and suffering, is a consequence of the existence of matter, and we might wonder what is matter, or what is the purpose of matter.

As one example, my presently hearing a bird’s chirp (to be clear about temporal extension, for a bird’s chirp has duration) occurs in the present – from the beginning of the chirp to its end; my memory of a bird’s chirp (even if one I recently heard) references an aspect of the past; and any prediction, for example, of when I might hear another bird’s chirp is an aspect of the future. — javra

But how is that not completely illogical? The bird's chirp has temporal extension, so you hear the beginning of it before you hear the end of it. At any given time while the bird is chirping, you are hearing that part of the chirp, not the part before, or the part after, so it cannot be all simultaneously at the present. Think of a piece of music, a melody. You hear a note, then the next note and the next, and so on. You do not hear it all at the same time. And, the reason why you recognize it as a piece of music (just like the way that you recognize the bird chirp as a bird chirp), is that you are relating the parts that have already gone past, through the use of some form of memory and system of association, to the part at the present.

Yes, you guys are over-sensitive to whatever phrases the media sensationalizes for you, and utterly forgetful or blind to anything else he says. I am not. — NOS4A2

The problem is that he really doesn't say anything else, other than the ridiculous statements which get sensationalized by the media. That's all they have to go on, one ridiculous statement after the other. You, in an attempt to rationalize these ridiculous statements, refer to things which he hasn't said, as if he had said them, insisting this is what he meant, while cherry picking through some ultra obscure information, trying to defend him. But we all know that president Trump does not have the inclination, nor the attentional capacity to read through reams of documents like you do. And this is why his statements which are probably meant to reference these sophisticated affairs which you refer to, are so far off base and utterly ridiculous.

To butt in slightly, there are experiential knowns. If one experiences X – though knowledge that X is as one experiences it might require more than brute experience – one’s experience of X, as experience, with be a factual given. And, hence, will be a known. — javra

This is clearly not true, due to the nature of time. And that's why I brought up the importance of time. As each moment passes the world changes, some say that the world is born anew at each moment. So having experienced something does not necessitate that it is known, because it must be remembered. This is the problem Whitehead encounter in his process philosophy, which he tried to solve by positing what he called "prehension". He found that in experience, events of the past must be somehow related to events of the present, not simultaneously but one after the other, and this is necessary to account for identity. So he assumed something called prehension.
https://www.pdcnet.org/8525737F005826D7/file/C125737F0061E26EC125756D005F66BE/$FILE/ipq_1979_0019_0003_0003_0013.pdf

Nevertheless, that I visually experience seeing a tree while so visually experiencing seeing a tree will, of itself, be a known fact to me. — javra

You are not accounting for the fleeting nature of time. The visual experience of "seeing at tree" requires an extended period of time. Remember, a period of time can be as short as a Planck length, and you cannot see a tree in such a short time. So the visual experience of seeing a tree requires an extended period of time. Some sort of memory, or "prehension", must tie those short periods of time together, connecting the past with the present in order for such an experience to be created.

I, for example, experientially know that I am – hence that I hold the property of being – without in any way conceptualizing myself to be a thing) all that is required is a tacit awareness of acting and reacting relative to that which one experiences as other – which endows one with direct experiential knowledge of being un-other, or what we term a self, in relation to other. In this sense, a cat has experiential knowledge of being, even though it cannot articulate this experiential knowledge via concepts that it linguistically expresses to itself or others. Its experience of being other than, for example, the mouse it is after or the dog it is standing in relation to will be all that is required for the experiential knowledge of one's own being to occur. — javra

You're missing the point. To know that you hold the property of being requires that you conceptualize the property of being. Otherwise you would not know what the property of being is, and you couldn't know that you hold the property of being for this very reason. We can say that we know something without actually knowing it, so you can say that you know that you have the property of being, and that's a fine statement, but unless you know what the property of being is, your statement is false.


I am very critical of your use of these two words, intellectualisation, and academia.

You describe mysticism as an exercise of the human intellect, but then you want to separate this from metaphysics, by saying that metaphysics is an intellectualization. In reality, mysticism and metaphysics are both forms of exercising the human intellect, and so your distinction based on intellectualization is unwarranted.

Furthermore, you class science and philosophy as academia, and then you want to separate mysticism from this. But "academia" refers to any institution of education or training, so mysticism cannot be separated from academia. In western universities we have a separation between science and arts. Though it is not often taught as such, mysticism would be one of the arts. It would be a branch of philosophy, the one that we call metaphysics.

See, you deceptively use words like "intellectualisation", and "academia" in an attempt to separate mysticism from philosophy, but no such separation is warranted. You just create an illusion of separation, with the way that you use those words. And to what avail? As metaphysicians and mystics, we ought to work together, in unity, having the same goals. What is the point of such divisiveness insinuating that one, metaphysics, or mysticism, doesn't qualify to be associated with the other?

Yes, but that is a label, just like the label, this thing, this cat is a being. One is referring to a property and the other is referring to a thing. Although when I say my cat has being, I am not using either label because I am using a language in which there is only being, the material and things are constructs made out of the tool of material. — Punshhh

I've read this numerous times and it still makes no sense. Your using a language in which there is only being? Everything you say means being? I don't understand, it appears like you're skirting the issue, trying to claim that it cannot be spoken about, or something like that.

This may be the crux of the issue, the knowing you describe as acceptable is the result of intellectualisation. A knowing via rational thought, Aristotelian. This kind of knowing is entirely an abstraction of the results of experience. — Punshhh

This is your disturbing, derogatory use of "intellectualisation". Look, as human beings we are all intellectual creatures. You cannot remove the intellectuality out of the human experience, to say that you are following this practise, mysticism, in which you will not use your intellect at all, so that there will be no form of intellectualization. That's nonsensical, if you could remove your intellect you would no longer be a human being.

Your position is no different from the materialist who assumes that the world would be exactly as perceived, without a perceiver. That's nonsense. And so is your attempt to remove intellectualization from your thinking. Instead, we are much better off to distinguish different types of thinking and training, as I described above. But metaphysics doesn't get classed with science, just like visual arts doesn't get classed with science. And mysticism gets classed in philosophy, right there with metaphysics. To say that one involves intellectualisation and the other does not, just doesn't make sense.

The knowing I refer to is an innate knowing of experience, this does not require intellectualisation, although intellectualisation can be employed in its contemplation. Memory and association both occur in my cat, just as they do in me (absent my intellualisation). I know this because we are both mammals, closely related. The difference being that the memory and association probably occur unconsciously in the cat, whereas I tend to ignore this in me and follow the route of intellectual reference to memory and association. — Punshhh

If you recognize this, what you say here, then why would you have said that your cat knows its being in the same way that you know your being?

Namely the metaphysics requires an intellectual result, or product to determine the course of progress, whereas mysticism rejects this in a preference for natural, or spiritual processes to determine the course of progress. — Punshhh

Again, I don't see the need for the separation here. The intellectual result ought to be natural and spiritual. If the intellect wavers from this, then these intellectual principles are not true, that's what I tried to explain last post. There are many types of human character, and some will introduce intellectual principles which are not true. That's what we need to be wary of. If your metaphysician friend offers to you, as a proposition, a rational principle which is not consistent with what you apprehend as natural and spiritual, then you are obliged to reject it. This is how we judge metaphysics. I'm sure you would do the same with your mystic course, if the trainer led you on a path which was inconsistent with what is natural and spiritual to you, you would choose another trainer.

This is not exhaustive, Things can be known and conveyed about existence by other means. This means is through being a part of nature and communing with nature. When I commune with my cat, this is what I am doing. All one is required to do to see this is to contemplate the idea that life is a direct expression of being and that everything else is a construct provided for the expression and development of life/being. If you spend a few hours in a quiet natural setting you will have a glimpse at some point of this, provided you can spot it. If you then spend many hours, or years training yourself to be able to commune with nature and forego intellectualisation, you will find it easier, indeed natural. — Punshhh

Yes, I completely agree with this, with one exception. I would actually call this a form of intellectualisation. In fact it is probably the highest form of intellectual activity. Communing with nature brings the intellect in line with it's proper position, as subservient. So it has to be an intellectual activity, a submission of the intellect. The intellect must submit. The reality of this gives reason not to separate mysticism from intellectualisation, because that submission is an intellectual act. Allowing that it is a form of intellectualisation. gives it it's proper position as the highest form of intellectualisation. Disassociating it from the intellect denigrates it in the eyes of many.

I presume you are referring to theology here. Spiritualuality is unfortunately nebulous in the way it is treated by academia, like mysticism. There may be as many different types of spirituality as there are people who say they are spiritual.

You do realise presumably that on the assumption of spirituality, there is a flip of authority here, as metaphysics takes a back seat and mysticism a front seat. For example, the kind of knowing I am using becomes the primary form and intellectualisation becomes a frail attempt to explain the perfect, or pristine by a limited, embryonic mind, emerging from nature. — Punshhh

As I said, I don't agree with your separation of mysticism and spiritualism from metaphysics. I think it's misguided. I do agree with your sentiments, because I do have a mystical perspective, (calling it metaphysical), but I don't agree with the way that you divide up the different types of knowledge.

My cat has being (a being)... — Punshhh

I see here two distinct meanings of "being". To say my cat "has being" is to use "being" to refer to a property attributed to your cat. To say my cat is "a being" is to make "being" refer to a type of thing, and classify your cat as one of those things. We need to untangle these two distinct meanings in order to avoid the confusion of equivocation. Would you accept that "being" as a property, in the sense of "my cat has being", signifies something conceptual? It is a quality which you perceive that your cat has, and so when you claim your cat has being, this statement is a reflection of your mental judgement that your cat has this property of "being". We might proceed further to enquire what constitutes "being", and this would be to define that concept. On the other hand if you say "my cat is a being", then "being" signifies a category of things, a type of thing, and we might proceed to enquire as to what qualities distinguish this type of thing from others. In this case as well, you might judge your cat as fulfilling the conditions for being called "a being", so "being" signifies something conceptual in this sense as well. The difference is that In the first case, "being" signifies a particular quality, and using the term requires judgement that the thing referred to has that quality, while the second case doesn't require immediate judgement of particular qualities. It is a less restricted sense, requiring a simple judgement of a thing, that it might be classed as a being, without necessarily citing the particular quality or qualities which constitute that class of things called "beings".

There is as well, possibly, a third sense which may be implied by your statement, this is the sense of "my cat has a being". If this is what you mean, I find it very ambiguous and confusing. It's as if you would be saying that your cat has particular property, and this property is itself a being. How could this be the case? Your cat is itself a being, so how could it have another being, which is other than itself in order to say "my cat has a being"?.

My cat has being (a being), she knows/is her being equally as I am and know my being. She doesn't require intellectualisation to be. Therefore neither do I, so in expelling my intellectualisation of being (putting it to one side), I can experience my being absent conceptualisation. — Punshhh

Here, you are using "know" in a very strange way. You are saying that if someone or something, such as you or your cat, experiences something, then they know that thing. So you claim that you, and your cat, each knows its respective property of being, simply by experiencing that being. But that's not consistent with any acceptable use of "knowing". Simply experiencing something is not sufficient to produce knowledge of that thing, other factors are involved. Knowledge requires memory and some sort of association, as well as experience. And, we remember particular events particular instances, while being is something general. So we do not remember being, it is an abstraction, requiring intellection. Therefore, in as much as your cat may have knowledge through memory and association, it doesn't remember being, because being is something abstract, and it, like you, remembers particular things.

How are you going to address that which is beyond intellectual understanding, other than through mysticism? — Punshhh

We address these things through metaphysics. But as I said, metaphysics is the same as mysticism.

The distinction is simple, metaphysics is the study of what the intellect can say about existence and is couched in the history and dictates of academia etc. — Punshhh

I reject this distinction, because I see no reason for creating such a divide between metaphysics and mysticism. Metaphysics will expose the limits of what can be said about being and existence, but it does this by demonstrating the vast portion of reality which we have not the means to talk about. We call this "the unknown". We can't say anything about it (describe it) because it's unknown, but we could also call it "the mysterious", both refer to the same vast portion of reality.

Language is a social construct. What we can or cannot say about existence is determined by our language. And this is a reflection of our knowledge, both intellectual abstract knowledge, and other knowledge. So when we cannot say something about something, this is a reflection of a deficiency in our cultural knowledge. We simply do not have the knowledge required to say that. Maybe the subject was taboo, we never had the need, or we could not develop the knowledge. But since languages and knowledge evolve, and progress, this situation can be rectified. So by outlining the limitations of language and knowledge, metaphysics will expose the areas where what needs to be said cannot be said, i.e. exposing the unknown, the mystical.

Mysticism rejects this initially and enquires into the same through other means namely life and experience. The intellect is necessary to do this, but only in the interpretation and understanding of it. Also in the contemplation of it, but not in the intellectualisation used in academia. — Punshhh

The path you describe as mysticism is the very same path as the metaphysician's. The metaphysician must reject all former knowledge, as a skeptic, and start from the bottom, to understand from the perspective of life and experience. But what we might do, as metaphysicians, is inspect fundamental epistemological principles, from that perspective of life and experience, to see where these principles might create illusions which hide the truly mysterious, or unknown aspects of reality through a false knowledge. So whereas the simple mystic, which you describe, might be interested in being expose to the mystical, the metaphysician might be interested in exposing the mystical to others. This is the duty of the philosopher, as described in Plato's cave allegory. After being exposed to the true reality, the philosopher has a duty to go back into the cave in an attempt to lead the others to see the light. Even in your description of mysticism, you refer to a guide. The guide is like Plato' philosopher, the metaphysician.

Yes, I accept this, although I think it necessary to define what mysticism is and how it differs from philosophy and visa versa. So as not to confuse metaphysics and mysticism. — Punshhh

I think such a division is counterproductive. The type of person which one culture calls a metaphysician, another culture might call a mystic. Of course distinct cultures are going to have distinct approaches to the same subject matter, but if each person is studying the same subject matter, then they are doing the same thing in their own way, as determined by their respective cultural background. We ought not shun the other person just because they have a different way of doing the same thing. Having a different way indicates a different knowledge base, and when the subject is the unknown, or the mysterious, seeing a different way is beneficial for obtaining insight.

I think the key here is the phrase, spacetime, as far as I am concerned space and time are two sides of the same coin, both necessary parts of extension. Matter, material and it's attendant time, is an innate product of this extension and cannot exist, or be regarded as existing absent the time involved in that extension until the duration of it has ended. This is what Einstein told us, is it not. — Punshhh

I distinctly did not mention "space" as a subject of mysticism. This is because space is an empirical concept, it is supported by sense observation, and the resulting conceptual structure is geometry which is not a mystical study. Time however, cannot be placed into this category so the union of space and time in "spacetime" is one of those epistemological principles mentioned above, creating an illusion which hides the truly mysterious and unknown nature of time itself behind false knowledge.

The assumption that there is some kind of the spiritual, for want of a better word, in the world we find ourselves in. If one were to work on the possibility, or conviction that the world we find ourselves in is nothing more than a place of material as described by science, then mysticism become irrelevant. — Punshhh

The spiritual is self-evident. That's fundamental, a first principle in philosophy, basic philosophy101. Those who deny this are undisciplined. They claim a philosophy which is actually unphilosophical. So if this is what is necessary for mysticism, we're both on the same track. And if this is the type of ground rule which your talking about, then I can accept that.

You say being is the starting point and is of interest and then limit it in your view of it as a concept and therefore subject to time. This seems to not see the baby in the bath water. — Punshhh

I don't see your point here. Being is a concept. If you are thinking of something other than a concept, you are not thinking about "being", but "a being". And any concept is limited by the way it is understood. But that's a big issue, because the way that we understand a concept is tempered by our education and cultural background, and the conditions for understanding extend into intuition and innate factors. So I might understand "being" in a way completely different from you, and this fact makes Platonism (within which a concept is supposed to have independent existence) very doubtful.

To me, this elucidates a very important distinction between empirical knowledge and mystical knowledge. In the empirical sciences we observe physical things, and describe these objects according to the limits of the thing, as observed. In mystical knowledge we are describing limits which inhere within the knower. These limits are mysterious, because we do not directly observe them, and we cannot truthfully say that they are a product of the culture. So for example, my education, and my culture, contribute to the limits of my understanding of "being", but I go beyond this in my imagination and speculation, producing new, original limits, which are distinct from those that others impress upon me. Since the nature of these limits, how they get created or where they come from, is very mysterious, the study of these is properly mysticism.

Mysticism delves beyond the intellectual, or mind derived understanding of being, self and "I". — Punshhh

Right, because "understanding" implies limits already produced, so to approach the process which creates the understanding, and this is the truly mysterious, we must delve beyond the understanding itself. This type of knowledge cannot be properly called understanding.

You do acknowledge here that there is at least the notion of being as something beyond the temporality of concepts. You then reduce it to a meaningless aspect of the physical world. — Punshhh

I don't understand this criticism. By "temporal concept" I mean a concept based in time. And I don't understand time to be an aspect of the physical world, it's more like something which makes the physical world possible. As such time is therefore mysterious, and a subject of mysticism. It's existence is not evident through any senses and so it is not revealed to, and cannot be a subject of empirical science. In this way time is very similar to matter. We never sense matter itself, only various configurations of matter, the configuration rather than the matter is what is sensed Both time and matter are taken for granted by empirical science, but since they cannot be in anyway sensed, they are beyond empirical science's capacity of study, being limited to things observed. That's why the nature of these things falls into the category of mysterious, and it is only mysticism which can properly apprehend them. Life, the soul, falls into this category as well. All three, soul, time, and matter are aspects of being, and are subjects of mysticism. It wouldn't be correct to reduce mysticism to the study of one or the other, because one cannot be properly apprehended without apprehending its relation to the others.

What I have been doing here is suggesting some ground rules from which to explore the issue. Just like the philosophical foundations, or ground rules which are required for a discussion of metaphysics for example. These ground rules are necessary so as to be discussing genuine mysticism as practiced down the ages by people who take the discipline seriously. Rather than skirting around the edges which people tend to do who have not studied the discipline, just like with metaphysics. — Punshhh

I don't see the distinction between metaphysics and mysticism. Metaphysics deals with the very same subject matter as mysticism. If anything, one might be a form of the other, like metaphysics might be a form of mysticism, or vise versa. But since we can go either way with this, metaphysics is a form of mysticism, or mysticism is a form of metaphysics, this induces the probability that they are actually both just different words for the same thing. As such, I can see that it would be an extremely arduous task to establish proper ground rules, or any principles which would be used to recognize a "genuine mysticism". However, in metaphysics it is not difficult to distinguish the different degrees of seriousness which people assign to the discipline. The serious devotees are identifiable by the quality of the discussion.

This falls into what I described a minute ago as skirting around the edges of the issue while not adhering to the ground rules. I hadn't gotten around to any ground rules regarding being, or self, or "I" — Punshhh

There's very good reason for skirting the edges when approaching a subject , and this is to avoid narrowing it down too soon. It's very easy to get distracted by one particular aspect of a thing, and focus on that aspect, as if it is the only important aspect, or the essence of the thing, or something like that. Then you don't get the whole big picture, zooming in quickly to focus on one particular part. So the skirting is necessary to determine the required scope of the enquiry, prior to laying down any ground rules. Circumscribing the whole of the subject is an act of unification whereas singling out a particular part without first establishing a strong unity, would be divisive. Notice, a form of synthesis is prior to analysis, because we need to establish what it is which is to be analyzed.

I think that in the case of mysticism it might be a very good idea to keep skirting for a long time. The subject matter, by its very nature, is not immediately evident, hidden, mysterious, so we need to take our time in finding the things which belong in this category. What I find is that there is an element of the mysterious which permeates all knowledge, of all things, so there is a need to apply some mystical principles in all of our practises, making allowance for the unknown. Mysticism is what protects us and saves us from things like superstition and paranoia in our endeavours, which are a fear of the mysterious.

I know that this last point could become a point of contention here and I do accept that mysticism does become concerned with matter and time. But only really at a more advanced level and we would need to have established the ground rules of discussion before reaching a point where this can be adequately expressed. — Punshhh

As you can see, I'm not big on ground rules of discussion. I think ground rules may be a little bit counterproductive to the mystical process. By limiting the subject through application of ground rules, we might sort of create an understanding, thereby negating the mysteriousness which is actually supposed to be the subject. Understanding is created by dispelling the mysteriousness. So I think we really need to relax the rules, allowing freedom of discussion, until we develop a better idea of what we are talking about.

Trump knows something. — NOS4A2

I think he knows that he hates Obama. At least we know he does.

So, prayers and enegies if you can, — ArguingWAristotleTiff

You have mine.

Rather that physical material is a tool for the expression and development of being and that being is of more interest. — Punshhh

I agree, "being" is the starting point, the point of interest. But for me, "being" leads straight to temporality. It's a temporal concept, and there's no avoiding this. Sure you might prefer your type of mystic approach, go to the guide and say lead me, but the guide will inevitably lead you down that winding path toward temporality, because there is nowhere else to go with this interest in "being".

In English we have a term, "happening", which means occurring, as events. And "being" in modern, western lingo, is sometimes replaced by "happening". Notice that "being" might signify a static unchanging existence, while "happening" signifies activity. Happening is similar to the ancient concept of "becoming", which is often contrasted with "being". "Being" signifies something staying the same as time passes (the suffix "ing" indicates that time is passing), while "becoming" signifies something which is changing while time is passing. Time is the underlying theme. So I approach "being" from a western background, seeing the world as happening, and wondering what is happening. From this empirical, scientific background, there is no "being" for me, being is some sort of mystical ideal, what you've called a platitude.

So there is this mystical concept, "being", which doesn't really relate to anything real in the world, in the way that I understand the world, as consisting of events, happenings. But let's say you and I have both had an interest in this mystical concept, "being", so we've delved into it. You appear to have opted to enroll in some sort of formal mystical training, with a guide, while I have taken the philosophical approach, which is to look into as many different philosophies as possible, approaching the subject from many different directions, and in a sense to be self-guided because I can choose my directions of approach. So I'll refer back to your opening post in this thread:

Part of the reason for coming to sites like this was for me to try to integrate some of this with the philosophical tradition, but this has not been easy, not withstanding my belief that they are not incompatible. I find the philosophy quite rigid. — Punshhh

I think you express the wrong attitude toward the philosophical approach here. The opposite of what you say about the rigidity of the philosophical approach, is actually closer to the truth. In the philosophical tradition there is a vast array of different approaches to the same issue, being. As you know, philosophers do not agree. The problem with the philosophical approach though, is that there is far too much variance, so unless you go to an organized school, a university or something, and have professors, as guides, who point toward the appropriate material, you might get lost, overwhelmed by the vast material, perhaps wasting a lifetime getting nowhere. So you have chosen a guide instead, but the guide gives you that rigidity of a singular approach, the way that the guide knows. Unless you recognize when you have gotten as far as that guide can take you, and you move along to another guide, in the same way that we switch professors and courses in university, you will not get as far as you might want to get.

Quite, confirmation, or reaching a perceived goal is a side issue. But rather a growth, or progression along a path is what is important, rather like the growing of an oak tree. The acorn cannot jump from acorn to mature tree in one step without growing through all the millions of smal steps in between. — Punshhh

Notice how you describe your progression as a type of growth, which is a becoming, rather than a being. This is an odd tendency. We want to refer to ourselves as beings, human beings, such that the self has a temporal extension as the unchanging "I", yet when we describe ourselves we describe a changing, growing creature.

The natural inclination appears to be to relate to ourselves as beings, something which is, like Descartes said, "I am". However scientific endeavors demonstrate that what we are is changing, growing, evolving things. By what means would I say that I am the same "being" that I was twenty years ago? So science provides no place for the "I", the self. The perception is that expressed by ancient Greece as "becoming". Plato and Aristotle demonstrated and incompatibility between being and becoming, so the concept of "matter" was proposed to reconcile them, to bridge the gap.

I think that the concept of matter provided the basis for a revolution in western mysticism. In pre-Socratic times mysticism consisted of ancient myths concerning the relationship between the gods and the world, as well as the relationship between souls and bodies. These relationships were not well understood, and the myths were very sketchy. After Aristotle the main focus of western mysticism became the nature of matter, whether it's real, whether its inherently evil, etc.. Matter is a central concept in the western world, but there are two very distinct ways of looking at matter. The scientific approach takes matter for granted. The mystical approach does not attribute any necessity to matter.

It is the case that the practitioner is living in our world simultaneously to this, but this is the focus and in this time is of little importance other than its role in the animation of events. — Punshhh

I see this as the key point, and the reason why time becomes so important. We apprehend ourselves immediately as "a being" because we have memories which provide the base for an "I" or "self", extended in time. However, we also have to relate to what you call here "the animation of events". And this is a very practical issue, which opens up all the questions of freedom, constraint, and agency. We simply cannot deal adequately with any practical issues without having the required understanding of the role of time in the animation of events. The extent of the requirement varies by degree, depending on the subject. But to ourselves, as beings, time only appears as a particular extension, or dimension, of existence. The temporal extension of the self provides the testimony for this. So there are two seemingly incompatible notions of time at play here. One plays a role in my static identity as "I", and the other plays a role in the animation of events.

If it works, it works. — Hanover

It's a deadly virus, highly contagious, with no cure or vaccine. Nothing works except isolation.

You can choose the opinion that a particular choice was made out of love, you can choose the opinion the same choice was made out of fear. Both answers are equally logically valid.

The logic being the rule that an opinion must be chosen. To be forced to say a choice was made out of love provides an invalid opinion. — Syamsu

The rule "an opinion must be chosen", does not provide the premises required to make a logical determination of why any particular opinion was chosen rather than some other. So we do not have the principles here to understand how we proceed from numerous possibilities to one choice.

And because people want agency to be factual, is why understanding of free will is underdeveloped. — Syamsu

This could very well be true. That is why I am very critical of false representation of free will.

This is just trolling. — bert1

Seems Banno is inclined to ignore that critical word "Constructive", in the title of the thread.

Do you admit then the logic that agency of a choice, can only be identified with a chosen opinion? — Syamsu

I would argue the opposite of this. You cannot work from a chosen decision, backward through free choice, to understand the choosing of any particular possibility. This is because free choice by it's very nature of being free, will not provide the necessity required for the logic. For example, suppose there is a number of possibilities and one is actualized. Working backward from the actualized possibility, you ask what caused that possibility to be actualized and not another instead. If that cause is a free will, you cannot determine this with logic, because there is no necessary relationship between the effect, being the actualized possibility, and the cause, being the free will. Through a process of elimination you might find that there is no other possible cause, and after excluding everything else you might conclude it must be free will. Because of this lack of necessity between the effect and the cause (because the will is free), the motivation of the agent cannot be determined in this way, if the will is in fact free.

Or are you surreptiously trying to hide objectified agency in complexity? — Syamsu

I really don't know what you mean by "objectified agency". If you are talking about the sort of agency which is supposed to be associated with free will, I don't know how this could ever be described as "objectified agency" without contradiction.

I accept that time is involved in these processes to quite a fundamental degree. I want to draw you back the what I am aiming for which is a relation between, in a sense different apparatus in a person's psyche, or being. The easiest way to explain this is if one considers that we have a soul, this soul is (for arguments sake) pure and divine. It does though have life, a past, a present and future and it is myself, but ordinarily I am somehow not aware of it, or at least can't distinguish it from the limited self. The orientation is to achieve an alignment of the person of the limited self and the person of the soul, such that the goals, desires, understanding and motivations of both is one and the same. The soul though being perfect cannot change, so the limited self being imperfect will change to become perfect. — Punshhh

OK, but I'm having difficulty grasping what you mean by "pure and divine", "perfect". I've been told before, that if I want to better myself, I need to apprehend this (let's call it an ideal), because I won't be able to truly judge better from worse, without some sort of scale which would be based in the ideal, the notion of perfection. But I don't completely apprehend that need. Can't I just judge one thing as better than another thing, in relation to a third thing? So the one thing is closer to the third thing than the other thing, and therefore better. This would make the third thing the best, of all those three things, without the necessity of being perfect. Now I need to question what makes this third thing the best, and I can't just relate it to a fourth thing, and a fifth thing ad infinitum, so maybe I really do need an ideal to ground the notion of "better".

To put your perfect soul, in relation to the temporal terms which I used, I would say that the perfection, or ideal, which I am looking for, is the perfect division between past and future. This would be the perfect and unchanging 'now', the eternal present. All change, and activity which has already occurred is in the past, and all possible change, which hasn't yet occurred is in the future. At the perfect 'now', as the division between what has occurred, and what has not occurred, there cannot be any change, just the pure and divine division between past and future. That is where we find the soul, at this dimensionless point which divides future from past.

But that seems all wrong. In reality, all change and activity occurs precisely at the present. The past, as what's already occurred is fixed, static and unchanging, while the future is full of static possibilities which do not change until time passes to bring them forward, and fixed in the past. This leaves the present as an imperfect division, because it is that time when things are changing, and perfection is defined in terms of unchangingness. Shouldn't we place the soul, as existing at the present, within this category of being imperfect? Now my ideal, my principle, or scale for judging better and worse, is grounded in imperfection rather than perfection. My ideal is an ideal of imperfection. My goal can be described as moving away from imperfection, rather than moving toward perfection. But if I'm moving away from imperfection aren't I necessarily moving toward perfection? Even if I have absolutely no idea of what perfection is, having only been shown imperfections, by knowing that I am moving away from imperfection, I know that I am moving toward perfection. But I've really just made a circle. Again, how do I know that change is associated with imperfection? I only got that idea because people have said that changeless is associated with perfection, so I associated change with imperfection. What if change itself is really the ideal, perfection?

I'm not hiding anything, I'm describing it how it presents itself to me. You are wanting to describe it in a simplistic way, which is plainly a false representation. If we have to make a false description of the thing in order to apply "stark basic logic" to it, such that nothing about that thing will be hidden, what good is that? We just end up with false conclusions about something which is really hidden.

You cannot just say "very" complex. You have to precisely define the complexity with a number. — Syamsu

I find that a very strange way to look at logic. Are you saying that all logic is reducible to mathematics, and that all free will choices are made by applying mathematics? I find that unacceptable.

The point was, that the "simplest choice", is by it's very nature not simple at all, but very complex. The mind, through the force of habit, in an attempt to facilitate the process of decision making, works to reduce the complex problem into a simple problem. To avoid this process of reduction in your representation of decision making is to make a false representation.

I want to stress the word orientation, because as I use these ideas in contemplation, I find the concept of changing myself through the fine tuning of my orientation easier to countenance. Firstly because I am not changing myself, but turning something in me, fine tuning a relation. — Punshhh

I think that the orientation referred to here is a matter of finding one's temporal perspective. There is a "turning" which is required because common empirical knowledge is derived from the past, so we tend to be always facing the past in our epistemological perspectives; yet to move forward in time in the most efficient and effective way requires that we turn and face the future itself. This is not easy because the future, as completely nonexistent in the empirical sense, looms as an abyss from that epistemological perspective. The future is therefore the source of all fear and fright.

It is much easier to live within the epistemological bubble that we have created, which draws on our empirical experience of the past, applying some mathematical principles of inversion, directing this knowledge toward the future, in prediction, than it is to turn around and face the reality of the future, and the fact that what has not yet been determined cannot be predicted with certainty, and this is the deficiency of that epistemological perspective. Facing that uncertainty which inheres within the future, due to it's very nature, is what we avoid, because of fear. Hence we are not inclined to turn around, and we accept the epistemological illusion and live in the epistemological bubble.

This turning of the person, towards the future, to apprehend the future as substantially distinct from the past, necessitates a division within the properties of the person. The self is commonly represented as being at the present, and now we need to distinguish properties related to the future (immaterial) from properties related to the past (material). This makes dualist principles inescapable as the true grounding principles for any acceptable epistemology. We might call this turning of the soul, to face the true nature of the future, a revelation, because it reveals to us the necessity of dualist epistemology in any attempt to understand the nature of reality. So from the metaphysical perspective, dualist sympathy is commonly associated with such a turning of one's orientation.

You mean other people?

Oh yeah, this vibes powerfully with my decades-old Gnostic-interpretation of Freddy's eternally recurring 'self-overcoming' as the highest form (Sophia-as-Dionysus) of the will to power. — 180 Proof

The fight of, with, or subjugation of the limited self, resulting in the true self emerging like the pheonix from the ashes. — Punshhh

I see a discrepancy here between these two statements, a sort of inconsistency. I've always thought of the mystical experience as an experience where the importance of the self rises to the forefront. But I've often heard it described as an overcoming of the self, a negating or losing of the self; the self being apprehended as unimportant. You can see how the two perspectives are somewhat opposed.

So I'm more inclined toward Punshhh's description here, of "the true self emerging", where there's a sort of divided self. The past self, the limited, subjugated self, must always be left as inferior in relation to the new and improved self going forward from that moment in time. Even the very simple act of merely recognizing this, produces an improved self.

This is the nature of being, as living at the present. In a sense, what has happened in the past has made me who and what I am. This is the limited self, that I have been determined by my past to be what I am today, and there is no question of me being otherwise. The past self is absolutely restricted. However, going forward from this point in time, I am free to make my choices and improve upon myself, no matter how desperate my situation is, such that the person I will be in the future will be a product of my own choices, and so I am capable of giving myself a better life simply by making the choices which make me a better person.

Fundamentally, should it be understood that 1. there is single possibility in a choice, and that the choice consists of making this possibility the present, or not, or,

2. does a choice consist of having alternative futures available, either of which can be made the present. — Syamsu

I think you need a sort of combination of 1&2, with 2 being the essential aspect. Clearly, from our experience, there is a multitude of possibilities available at any moment in time (2). This is what makes decisions difficult, it is not just a matter of this or not this, but the need to decide from a multitude of choices. However, we also need to accept that since time passes with the characteristic of only one possibility being actualized, we are conditioned to direct the choice itself, toward a single, desired, possibility (1). In common practise we do not generally have plans A, B, C, D, etc., in mind.

So with the free will, what we try to do is restrict the multitude of possible futures, producing one, desirable, present. There can only be one present which comes to pass, so it is always just one of the many possibilities which is actualized, but the free will wants to ensure that the most appropriate of the multitude of possibilities, is the one which is actualized.

The choices are layered in complexity because the further ahead into the future we look, the greater the magnitude of possibilities is. So in longer term projections it might actually be practical to keep plans A, B, C, etc.. If there is a number of possibilities for the next moment in time, then at each moment further into the future we look, the number of possibilities increases exponentially. So for example, there are many more possibilities for what you might be doing tomorrow at this time, than there are possibilities for what you might be doing five minutes from now. Then if something which is required for plan A tomorrow, doesn't pan out this afternoon, you might have to shift to plan B for tomorrow.

Light hits my eyes, the message is relayed to my occipital cortex, several layers of inference calculation take place, a message gets sent to other parts of the brain dealing with modelling, sensation, interoception etc. Each infers a likely cause of the input by way of selecting an output to send on. Eventually some behaviour results, alters the environment and the process starts again. Where's the mystery there? — Isaac

That's a whole lot of inferring going on, which you claim is required for, and as such, is necessarily prior to conscious experience. But only conscious minds infer. So how is this possible? How can you describe simple sensation as a process involving multiple instances of inferring, when inferring is a process of reasoning carried out by a mind?

It is also a fact that Flynn has been trying to withdraw his guilty plea citing government vindictiveness. — NOS4A2

The poor boy was coerced into pleading guilty...justice in the U.S.A.

I suggest reading St Augustine "On Free Choice of the Will".

f Logic is what makes languages and speech possible (transcendental), then speaking any language would show and reflect it (Logic). This is what I think he meant in the Tractatus by "propositions show the logical form of reality". — Pussycat

Logic isn't what makes language possible for Wittgenstein. Perhaps he thought this when he first started to write the Tractatus, but I think he than came to recognize that logic follows from language use, as a particular type of usage. That's why he describes language in the quote you provided, as a family of structures, without formal unity. Logic is only one of the family members, one of the structures of language, there are others which we cannot call "logical".

Of course we can apply the Wittgensteinian principle I quoted above, and say that this is an unwarranted restriction of the definition of "logic", that my usage of "logic" here circumscribes a region which is not the completion of what logic really is, and claim that anything done for a reason is done logically. But then we might find "logic" within all the activities of all living things. This is the route that semiotics takes, following Peirce, and this tends to lead us into panpsychism.

So the question is how do we define "logic". If we allow that the term refers to reasoning which is other than formal logic, then we have to allow that all sorts of reasoning, thinking, and even other activities are "logical". Then we face the problem of invalid conclusions, and unreasonable thinking. Such thinking would still have to be "logical" under this extended definition, but in relation to formal logic the conclusions would be invalid, and illogical. This presents us with the appearance of a contradiction of illogical logic. But it isn't really a contradiction, because it only seems so, due to the two distinct uses of "logic", therefore that apparent contradiction is the result of equivocation. But I think it is clear from what Wittgenstein says In PI, how he defines "following a rule", that he wants to restrict "logic" to conventional forms, thereby denying such private logic (private rule following) as a form of logic.

. For how can you get from something that has no form - propositions - to something that has (form) - Logic? The solution was to abandon "form" altogether: — Pussycat

Clearly this is not a solution. The fact is that there is such a thing as formal logic. So we cannot abandon "form" altogether, in our description of language, because formality clearly enters into language use and becomes a significant part of it. So we cannot just abandon "form", and pretend that it is not there, and this is not what Wittgenstein suggested. It's more like he suggested that we put "form" in its proper place, and do not attribute to it more than what is due. I would say that he suggested that form is emergent. What you call "a threat to logic" is just the recognition of the limitations of logic, the recognition that logic is not ideal; as an emergent thing, a product of evolution, logic is limited or restricted by something larger than it. This is not a threat to logic, it is just an apprehension and understanding of the reality of what formal logic actually is.

Logic is still being reflected in language, sometimes having form, while other times, huh, not so much; having or not having form has nothing to do with it. — Pussycat

I think that this is inconsistent with PI. The family relations described cannot be said to be logical under Wittgenstein's terms. He describes a clear division between following a rule, which is the outward expression of behaving as one ought to behave, according to the rule, and the inward (family) relations of meaning which are the constituent features of language. We cannot say that these inner relations are logical because they are not rule-following relations according to Wittgenstein's terminology. Would you agree that "logic" in any sense requires some sort of rule-following?

This is where I do not agree with Wittgenstein. I think that rule-following, clearly must be brought into the internal relations, as is obvious form the observations of personal reflection. To follow a rule is to hold a principle within one's mind, which one adheres to, not to be capable of being judged as following a rule by external observation (as Wittgenstein's terminology). This is because we follow rules in thinking, whether these rules are private or not, and the private ones cannot be observed. So Wittgenstein is mistaken in his description of what it means to follow a rule, and his consequent restriction of "logic" to formal logic is also mistaken, based in this mistaken principle.

This allows for the truth of what you say, that some sort of "logic" (rule-following) is reflected in language in general, which is not necessarily formal. But this opens the can of worms, of where this rule-following activity is derived from. In saying that it underlies language, we disqualify emergence as the source of rule-following and now we are faced with the question of where does it come from. Wittgenstein has disavowed idealism by inserting a false representation of rule-following to support this disavowal. If we remove this false representation, to allow that some type of rule-following (logic) underlies all language use, as you suggest, we are thrust back toward idealism to support this underlying logic. Maintaining the disavowal leads us toward panpsychism.

Also, if there is no agreement in neither definitions nor judgments, as it so happens, then this would mean that logic would have to be abolished. — Pussycat

There is no need to abolish logic, only the need to see that it is not perfect or ideal. Notice the analogy with measuring. So long as we get consistency in the results, it serves the purpose. So logic is nothing other than another way of using language, if it serves the purpose, we keep doing it in a similar way, and there is consistency in the results, just like measuring. But there is nothing to indicate the logic being used, (or the system for measuring), provides the perfect or ideal way of doing things.

Yes, but in my humble opinion, I wanted to keep things as general as possible. A knife's credibility, taking into account its purpose, is all about the results we get when using it. If it cuts well then it gains credibility points, no? — TheMadFool

That's an odd use for "credible" you've got there.

Make me jealous. All we get is a rotten polar vortex.

Crank up the AC?

What of the protection of minorities? What you have there is the tyranny of the majority, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or rampant populism. — unenlightened

Yeah that's a bit of a problem, the 51% oppress the other 49, and take measures to ensure that they never surpass the threshold of 50%. It could become slavery.

If warm weather matters, it's definitely getting hotter every day here. It's been in the 70s and maybe hit the 80s. That's F, not C. — Hanover

If that were C, the virus would be dead. So would you.

The methods of mysticism are new but they lack credibility unless you want to take the mystics' words on it. — TheMadFool

I would call a method credible when it is known to produce desired results. — TheMadFool

These two are distinctly contradictory. If credibility is obtained through reaching desired results, then just as the thing desired is something personal, than so is credibility. So you would have no choice but to take the person's word for it because only that person knows what is desired and whether the method fulfils that desire.

I suggest however, that it is the second statement which is wrong. Credibility is produced from proof, logical demonstration, and justification. It cannot be a matter of producing the desired results, or else people would always be fudging the evidence, making deceptive demonstrations for the sake of producing the desired results, and this is the very opposite of credible. This is why credibility is based in a judgement of truth, rather than desired results, which is personal.

Nice summary, do you study, or practice? — Punshhh

Stab a baby in the leg with a knife and see if it ‘understands’ pain. According to what you said I guess not because it can’t articulate it with words. — I like sushi

Everyone has mystical experiences: living is a mystical experience. The question of this thread appears to be the distinct types of approach we which we make to mystical experience. Some people, it seems, have been trained to suppress their own mystical experience, denying its reality, until they get to the point where they haven't the means to relate to it anymore. So they grow up lacking this unique aspect of emotional development, they cannot relate to the mystical reality of their own being. Then you'll find them in places such as this forum, insisting that mystical experience is something we cannot relate to. Others however, will learn to recognize their own mystical experience, and seek to better understand it. This will drive them toward associating with people who have the same object, where they can discuss and learn about mystical things.

Meanwhile, the people who have successfully suppressed the mystical from their lives will see those discussing the mystical as speaking nonsense, insisting that they're talking about something which cannot be talked about. It's a sort of taboo. It's not that we cannot talk about it, it's that they have been trained not to talk about it and therefore have not developed the means for talking about it.

agree with this, but philosophy percolates through social science that again most people ignore, and from there into think tanks, and so to political rhetoric and media headlines. — unenlightened

This is not philosophy which percolates here, it's a lack of philosophy, a deprivation. But since a deprived philosophy is still apprehended and classified as one's "philosophy", just like a person's immorality is classified as one's "morality", we refer to this deprivation as "philosophy" even though we look down at it in disagreement as a lacking. So we judge an immoral person as having a "morality", though it's recognized as a deprived morality, and It's better called "immorality". Therefore, the deprived philosophy ought to have a better name like "unphilosophy" or something like that.

Why did you translate "propositions show the logical form of reality" into "logic shows the form of reality", it's not the same. But anyway, I doubt that later Wittgenstein changed his views on what Logic is than the tractarian one. — Pussycat

It's not that he changed his views on what Logic is, it's that he changed his views on reality, recognizing that there is no such thing as the logical form of reality.