Comments

  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    But I think offensiveness is a common trait among human beings.NOS4A2

    Commonly known as uncouth and generally frowned upon as meaning deprived in cultural values; not a positive characteristic. Sometimes the word barbarian is a better choice.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    What properties of an explanation are missing from "neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts"?Isaac

    I think the difficult thing is intention and anticipation of the future, doing something for a purpose. How does "neuron-firing" account for the capacity to predict and manipulate the future? The neuron-firing would have to have the capacity to direct itself toward desired ends, which is the same problem which all materialism and physicalism encounters.
  • Some Remarks on Bedrock Beliefs
    If I open a door, this action, shows that I believe there is a door there.Sam26

    You can say that this type of action requires "belief", but is that really true? Perhaps it's better to say that there is something categorically similar to belief involved with these actions, which are not necessarily "belief" as we normally use the word.

    We see that plants respond to sunlight. Would you say that this means that the plant believes that the sun is there? If not, then how does this differ from your door example?
  • Universal Basic Income - UBI
    There are bosses, fellow workers, and underlings who fall into that category.Frank Apisa

    OK, but when we pay the bosses to disappear they might want more money than the underlings we pay to disappear. Can we make the bosses take a cut in pay, or do they disappear with a large salary?
  • Universal Basic Income - UBI
    The notion of unearned income is fundamentally flawed because income is never unearned.NOS4A2

    "Earn" is one of those ambiguous words with many different meanings. Equivocation between those distinct meanings may make your statement true. But then the labourer might earn a wage in one sense of the word, the investor might earn a profit in another sense of the word, and even the thief might earn, in the sense of deserve the money stolen in retribution. Anyway, you should see that "income is never unearned" requires equivocation between distinct senses of "earn". And if you restrict "earn" to legal ventures, and "income" to legally sourced money, you have a useless statement which cannot even be called a tautology because it doesn't represent any reality.
  • 50th year since Ludwig Wittgenstein’s death
    The coherence is not logical?? What then? The relations between members of the family, are they internal or external?Pussycat

    According to Wittgenstein in Philosophical investigations, a word has a family of meanings. Think of your family, the relations are external to any family member, but internal to the family as a whole. But what comprises the "whole" of your family? At some point, you need to apply some boundaries to produce that unit. But are these boundaries more than just arbitrary? The boundaries are applied for a particular purpose. When you apply the boundaries to create the unit, then the relations outside of this unit become external to that whole.

    According to Wittgenstein, "propositions show the logical form of reality", this is what I'm looking at here, whether it is so.Pussycat

    Propositions are only a very small part of language use. Most language use is not a matter of making propositions. That the limits of logic are the limits of language, and that logic shows the form of reality, is the mistake which Wittgenstein made in the Tractatus, which he tried to rectify in PI.

    When a word is assigned a definition in a proposition, for the purpose of a logical procedure, that definition doesn't necessarily encompass the full extent of the normal usage of that word. Because of this, the thing referred to in the proposition, by that word, may not be the same as the thing referred to by that word in common usage. This could introduce mistake into the logical process. Therefore there is a mistake in the assumption that "propositions show the logical form of reality".

    3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communica-
    tion; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one
    has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an
    appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate,
    but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of
    what you were claiming to describe."
    It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
    about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
    You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
    can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
    games. — Philosophical Investigations
    Metaphysician Undercover
  • Trust

    Isn't data what they deal with, so ultimately you don't trust them, right? Your trust is misplaced. What you said is like saying I trust the thief to supply me with goods, but I don't trust that it won't be stolen goods. You really cannot trust that supply of goods, if it's wrongfully sourced, it's dishonest and not trustworthy, even though it might be reliable in that aspect.
  • Trust
    Yes, companies can maintain privacy on certain issues and can mislead and manipulate us, but the 'rules of the game' are largely transparent and the playing field in full view.Baden

    This bring us around to the human influence. It's human beings who interpret the rules, know their extent, and plan strategies. The untrustworthy person looks for loopholes, and new activities, places to take advantage of others, where the rules don't yet extend.

    So, yes, they might fuck around a bit with our data but they won't deliberately give us the wrong result when we search for a cake recipe. In other words, the contours of the trust landscape are well-defined.Baden

    I don't agree with this. It's been very obvious with advancement in technology that the rules tend to follow well behind the advancements. And so, people are taken advantage of, and then rules are created to prevent this from happening again. The "contours of the trust landscape" can only be mapped after they are navigated, and we have to look at what type of people might navigate this landscape. The untrustworthy see a lot to gain from navigating this landscape, and they are the ones who are inspired to navigate it.
  • 50th year since Ludwig Wittgenstein’s death
    I don't understand what you mean by 'coherence' as that is applied to language.Pussycat

    It's a family affair. There's coherence within the family. God only knows what kind of glue coheres the family. It's definitely not anything logical. So I think you're looking in the wrong direction, thinking you can determine something logical by looking at a particular group of people's use of language.
  • Coronavirus
    Governments are pushing legislation that impedes on citizens' constitutional rights for a virus that barely ranks above the common flu.Tzeentch

    You don't have a constitutional right to things which are designated as dangerous, whether or not you believe in that designation.

    One theory that interests me is that global banking was on the verge of collapse just before this pandemic...but I'm not in a position to know whether that is true.Chester

    The stock market was in a bubble. Russia and Saudi Arabia were intent on bursting that bubble by pulling the bottom out of the oil market. But global banking is something different. .
  • Trust
    Companies are even more predictable than the weather as long as you know what feeds the bottom line.Baden

    Then you're saying a company is an inanimate thing. Knowing it makes it trustworthy. The weather is predictable if you know "the bottom line". The problem with human influence is that what feeds "the bottom line" might change, but with the weather it always stays the same. The question then is how much of this is publicly disclosed, or to what extent can the company hide the exact nature of what it feeds on. A company must be endowed with some capacity for privacy to provide competitive equity.
  • 50th year since Ludwig Wittgenstein’s death
    3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communica-
    tion; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one
    has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an
    appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate,
    but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of
    what you were claiming to describe."
    It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
    about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
    You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
    can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
    games.
    — Philosophical Investigations
  • Trust
    It seems to me, that because we are trustworthy, we can only deal with Mr thing in a trustworthy manner. If we are not trustworthy from Mr Thing's POV, then we are not trustworthy. I think that means that we cannot even try to change the person against their will. Cannot, that is, without changing ourselves in the other direction, and becoming untrustworthy.

    But people can change, at least.
    unenlightened

    OK, I'd agree that we really can't try to change someone against their will. Usually we'll determine how they've broken the law, and lock them up or some other punishment, hoping that they might learn a lesson and change their ways. So people can change, and we actually might get a person to change one's own will. Then the changing of the person from being untrustworthy to being trustworthy would not be against their will, they would want to be trustworthy. I don't think punishment is the right way to go about this, because it's not a matter of breaking the person's will, it's a matter of changing the person's will. I think we need to ask what makes people into nice, trustworthy people.

    But that's going off track of the point I was getting at. What I was saying is that when we're dealing with untrustworthy inanimate things like the weather, we can always provide safe guards to protect us from the parts we don't trust. But when we're dealing with untrustworthy human beings, they're always going to find ways around the safeguards, so our only recourse is to make sure that we're not dealing with those dishonest people, to begin with. These are two distinct approaches for dealing with things which we cannot trust. Which category does a company like Google fall into? Is it like an inanimate thing, and if we establish the proper protection we'd be protected from any untrustworthiness within it, or is it like a human person, such that the only way to really protect ourselves is to excluded all untrustworthiness from within it?
  • Trust

    Each thing I employ to deal with the unreliability might require a further back up, so I think that going down the road of distrust points us toward the skeptic's infinite regress. So, let's turn this thing around, and put an end to the infinite regress by inserting something trustworthy.

    In the case of the rain, there are many things I can trust, my coat, my roof, etc., which will assure me that the infinite regress of not knowing is ended, allowing me to sleep in peace, knowing that I can beat the uncertainty of the weather. In the case of the untrustworthy person though, I am dealing with an intelligent being. The intelligent being can change its ways, so I have to be very wary that the person may always try to outsmart me (the door's locked, the window's open), coming up with new forms of behaviour which I am not prepared for, and which are also dishonest. So unlike the weather, dealing with the untrustworthy person is not a case of coming up with something reliable, which would put an end to the infinite regress of unreliability, because it's always possible that the person (being dishonest in the first place) may find a way around it. Therefore it appears like the only way to properly deal with the untrustworthy person is to actually change the person, conversion. Would you agree? And do you think that this is even possible?.
  • Is 'information' a thing?
    Information can be entirely meaningless, utterly devoid of significance, sheer gibberish - it would nonetheless be information. The OP is no doubt trying to milk semantics from information. But it's a mostly dead end.StreetlightX

    Turning back to information, semantics doesn't matter for the mathematical theory of information, but it is what motivates its applications.SophistiCat

    I'd say it's very doubtful that a useful definition of "information" could be formulated which would not require that information has meaning, necessarily. If it were possible that some information had no meaning, then it would be necessary to have a principle to distinguish the information which has meaning from that which does not, or else any meaning derived from any information might be false because that information might not really have any meaning. Therefore it is much more likely that the definitions of information which are actually employed assume that all information has meaning.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)

    Sorry, I haven't a clue as to what the distinction is that you're trying to make between mistaken election, and mistake in an election. I guess your undisclosed assumptions have gone way over my twelve-year-old's capacity to read your mind.
  • Trust

    But if you are saying you trust things more than people, then you yourself are using the same term and making a comparison in the same terms.unenlightened

    It's the same word, but used in a different way, therefore having different meaning. I'm not saying that I trust things more than I trust people, I'm saying that these two instances give "trust" a completely different meaning. If you pretend that the meaning is the same, it's equivocation, as Hanover mentioned. This creates a problem in the sense that the reader needs to be able to determine which way the word is used every time it is used, in order to understand what the author is saying, but if the author blurs the distinction (creating ambiguity) by crossing back and forth, it's likely the reader will never be able to understand what has been written.

    It is not a mistake to make a comparison between the distinct uses of the word, looking for the reasons why there are distinct uses, and trying to establish boundaries so that equivocation can be avoided.in future use. It is an exercise in clarification which is necessary for understanding. That's what Plato demonstrated with his dialectics.

    This requires determining what is actually meant in particular instances of use, to identify the exact nature of the difference. So for example, when I say that I do not trust the weather, I'm really saying that my ability to understand what might happen is insufficient to make a judgement. But when I say that I do not trust my neighbour, I'm really saying that my ability to understand is sufficient to make a judgement. Do you see how these two are opposed? One is produced from having insufficient knowledge, the other is produced from having sufficient knowledge. Whether or not to trust a physical thing is directly related to one's degree of knowledge of that thing, the better the knowledge and understanding of the thing, the more the trust of the thing. But in judging whether to trust a human being, there is no such direct relationship, knowing and understanding the person may just as well lead to a judgement of untrustworthy, as it may lead to a judgement of trustworthy. And increasing one's knowledge of the person will not take away that untrustworthiness. Therefore a judgement of "trust" directed at a physical object is substantiated by, as a direct representation of one's own knowledge. But a judgement of "trust" directed at a human being is substantiated by, and meant to be a representation of the actions of that person.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    I think it's useful for folks not Americans to remind themselves that in the US there are no "mistaken" elections.tim wood

    That's quite the assertion. Was there, or was there not, foreign interference? If yes, then the election was incorrectly done, i.e. mistaken. Also, I seem to remember some issues in Florida in 2000 which raise the possibility that that one was a mistaken election as well. How many others are there that we just don't know about?
  • Trust
    Or is there another difference? Every day the sun rises, and the postman delivers. I can imagine a theory or two of physics and psychology/biology that would lead me to have more confidence in the sun than the postman. But as to it not meaning the same thing to say I trust them both, I don't see it.unenlightened

    I see a big difference. I see inanimate things as fundamentally reliable, and living things as fundamentally unreliable. If the temperature goes down the water will freeze. But just when you get to know the postman he might quit the job and be replaced by someone else. The reliability of human beings is attributable to the social structures, and these have very little temporal extension. The water has been freezing, and the sun has been rising for billions of years. The postman has only been coming for a few hundred, and that phase will likely be done soon.

    We should apply reason to know the difference. i.e. that habit is not always borne of conscious reasoning is not a justification for not applying conscious reasoning to it, and when we do, we see habit is largely a matter of trust and largely within our control.Baden

    I don't see that in my habits, I see the exact opposite. The habits seem to be largely outside my control. I can control the habit if I put conscious effort into it, but as soon as I'm not putting that conscious effort into it, i.e. forget to, the habit takes over for that moment. That it is within my control is an illusion, because it seems to be within my control, while I am actively controlling it, but the habit will find a way to take control back when I let down my guard for some reason. The ability to control a habit cannot be taken for granted. Depending on the type of habit some are easier to control than others.

    There's no fundamental dichotomy there.Baden

    I wouldn't call it a dichotomy, just fundamentally different forms of trust, as I explained to unenlightened. The trust I have of the physical world, is based in the assumption that it's behaviour is, as you say "fixed". The trust I have for a living being is based in the assumption that it's behaviour is not fixed. So for example, if something about the physical world appeared a little bit unfixed, or unpredictable, like the weather, I'd say that I don't trust the weather. But the weather is actually a whole lot more predictable and fixed, than the actions of the most trustworthy human being. So it is through a completely different set of criteria that we judge the trustworthiness of aspects of the physical world, from the ones that we use to judge the trustworthiness of living beings. That is why I say that "trust" has a different meaning in each of these cases.

    In the final case above, the instantiation of habit (fixed behaviour) occurs as a reflection of and in response to the physical world's fixed nature and that's not something that normally needs to be questioned. But habit can and does appear at every level in different ways. Also, further to the above, we can get our wires crossed and either grant trust on an irrational presumption or withhold it on an irrational expectation. And so we move from the descriptive to the normative. Why should we trust X? And the (easier): Why should we not trust X?Baden

    I think you misuse "habit" here. A habit is what a living being has, and it is not appropriate to speak of the physical world as having habits. Doing this will likely confused the two distinct types of "trust" referred to above. We cannot say that our trust in the reliability of the physical world is due to the "habits" of that world, because this would imply that the physical world might use conscious effort to change its habits, just like human beings, and that doesn't really make any sense. So we need to distinguish trusting a living creature because we know its habits (recognizing that this is fundamentally unreliable), from trusting the physical world due to it's fixedness (recognizing this as fundamentally reliable). We ought not use the same word "habit" here.

    However, the supposed "fixed nature" of the physical world is still something which needs to be questioned. This is because there are many aspects of the physical world which do not appear to be completely fixed, like the example of the weather for instance. Furthermore there is the question of how living things come into existence, which seem to have a fundamental unreliability about them, and only seem to become reliable through the existence of habits. So it looks like there may not be a clear boundary between which aspects of the world need to be judged as trustworthy by the one set of criteria, and which aspects ought to be judged by the other criteria for trust.

    For a lot of people, the answer seems to be "strength" and I think that's the wrong answer, not only because strength is often confused with stubbornness, arrogance, fecklessness, aggressiveness etc. but because we need our political leaders to work for us and "strength" is the domain of warriors not servants. We need something more inclusive. Any ideas?Baden

    Here, I think we can draw an analogy between trusting the physical world, and trusting human beings. There are many different aspects of the physical world, and some are much more trustworthy than others. The sun coming up tomorrow is very trustworthy, but the weather isn't so trustworthy. We could say the same of human beings, a human being is trustworthy in some aspects, but not in others. The problem with human beings though, is that the aspect which is trustworthy in one is not in another, and there's a whole lot of different characteristics which we might judge for trustworthiness. So I might trust one person for one thing, another for another thing, and so on, depending on each person's character, but finding no one who is completely, and overall trustworthy in an absolute way. Therefore it doesn't make sense to talk about trust for a person in an absolute sense, we need to qualify it, saying I trust the person in this or that particular way.

    "Strength" doesn't seem to be a very good qualification. I trust the person's strength? What would that give me in terms of reliability? Maybe it'd good for protection, but for some reason strong doesn't seem to be a good indicator of reliable behaviour.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    Well, if you get to call a mistake in journalism fake news..tim wood

    I’m sure you’ll think of something.NOS4A2

    A mistaken election gives us a "fake president".
  • Trust
    I could see a taxonomy of trusts identifying negative and positive aspects to trust in each embedded context to which a form of trust applies, but I suppose the simple answer to the conundrum is that we should selectively, critically, and appropriately apply trust/mistrust. Selectively, in that we eschew a naive mistrust of everything and accept that trust is sometimes both good and necessary. Critically, in that when we do apply mistrust, we do so in accordance with reason. Our mistrust should be warranted. And appropriately, in that we apply mistrust of the right degree, of the right scope, and at the right level.Baden

    Why must we dichotomize things in such a way that we look for the degree of trust or mistrust in every relation we have with the world? I would place both trust and mistrust as reasoned approaches, like you do here, but the majority of interactions which we have are habitual of nature, and therefore fall outside the classification of a reasoned approach, and cannot be described as either trusting or mistrusting.

    So I see a problem with this approach, because if we look with hindsight, at our actions, (and it must be hindsight, because looking ahead would be reasoning about possible actions), and try to determine what was the reason for doing this or that, was it trust or mistrust, it turns out to be very difficult to determine such reasons. That I believe is due to the force of habit. Habit makes us go ahead and do things without reason. And when we assign a reason for these habitual acts, in hindsight, it's just a matter of rationalizing, which does not give us the true reason, being the force of habit. Therefore there is a large variety of actions and interactions which cannot be classed in the two opposing categories of trusting and mistrusting, because they are better described as habitual actions rather than reasoned actions.

    To relate all this to the philosophical tradition, Hume's scepticism declares that there is no reason to expect the world to continue in the orderly causal way that it has in the past; but we trust that it will.unenlightened

    Why call this "trust" though? Does it make sense to you to say that you trust the inanimate world? Yes it does, but shouldn't we distinguish two fundamentally different forms of "trust" then? Surely, if I say I trust that the sun will come up tomorrow morning, it doesn't mean the same thing as when I say that I trust you to deliver what we agreed upon. To begin with, we could look at statistics and probability, and see that there's a significant difference between the two. Then if I look deeper I can see that the way I relate to the reliability of the sun coming up, and the way that I relate to the reliability of you carrying out your side of the deal, is not even similar.

    I don't even consider it a real possibility that the inanimate world could behave in a way contrary to my understanding of it, yet in my understanding of human beings, it appears like they need to be cultured in a particular way in order that I can even begin to understand their behaviour. I see very little reliability in the behaviour of other animals for example. It's just cultured human beings and some domesticated creatures, who display even a minimal degree of reliability. What I find is that the inanimate realm appears to be fundamentally reliable, while the animate realm appears as fundamentally unreliable. Human beings demonstrate some degree of reliability so we assign "trust" to them. But this is in comparison to the fundamentally unreliable behaviour of other living creatures. If I compare this to the reliability of the inanimate world, it doesn't even come close to the qualifications of "trust" in that sense.
  • Is 'information' a thing?
    The bag of rocks doesn't convey the fact that it's a bag of rocks and not a strawberry pie? Then how do you know it's not a strawberry pie?ZzzoneiroCosm

    I might take a look, and make the judgement that it suits what I understand by "bag of rocks", and not what I understand as "strawberry pie". So I would claim that it's a bag of rocks.
  • "1" does not refer to anything.
    I know. It's a tragedy that requires competent philosophical guidance. Thanks for being there when we need you! :scream:jgill

    No, few people listen to any philosophers, and that's a tragedy in itself. So we have a double tragedy, philosophical guidance is needed, but it's not heeded. My existence is irrelevant.
  • Is 'information' a thing?
    …but no one seems to understand what its authors are on about.StreetlightX

    Lack of information!
  • Is 'information' a thing?
    You are informing me of something, but you are wrong. What you offer as information is disinformation. But being wrong does not change the number of words you have written, any more than calling what I have written 'subjective' changes the information I have given.unenlightened

    The point is that you have assumed the capacity to judge between information and disinformation with your assertion that "information increases as order decreases". The truth or falsity of this assertion depends on this capacity. If you cannot validate that capacity your claim is unjustified. Perhaps what you have interpreted as information is really disinformation, then the opposite of your assertion is what is really the case.
  • Is 'information' a thing?
    Information increases as order decreases.unenlightened

    This is completely subjective, because what constitutes "information" is dependent on the defining terms. If the arrangement is set up with the intent to deceive, then what you are reading as "information" is really disinformation. And the whole concept of "information", under this precept becomes completely unsupported because of the possibility that you are wrongly interpreting what is there.
  • "1" does not refer to anything.
    Mathematics evolved over millennia and foundations are fairly recent.jgill

    You ought to recognize this as contradictory. The foundations are what something is built upon, and therefore cannot be something recent when the thing has been around for millennia. So this statement implies that you misunderstand what the foundations of mathematics really are, interpreting something recent as the foundations, when this really cannot be "the foundations" which must refer to what the thing is built on. Take a look at Banno's op, there is a reference to "counting", I suggest you'll find the foundations of mathematics here. But counting has two very distinct purposes, one is to determine a number of things, quantity, and the other is to determine an order of things, priority.

    Because of these distinct purposes, we have ambiguity and the potential for equivocation right at the basic, most fundamental principles of mathematics. So "number one" refers to an individual, a particular, as distinct from others, for the purpose of counting, but it also refers to the first in terms of priority. With the introduction of zero, and negative integers, "one" has lost its status as the first, so we need other principles to understand the concept of priority. Where are these principles of priority? It appears like modern mathematics gives us no principles of order, having given priority (importance) to quantity at the cost of sacrificing order. The result, modern mathematics is a disorderly mess.
  • Trust
    As we look at money, which is a social construct around trust, need, necessity for the cogs of society to work etc.Christoffer

    It would be questionable whether money is constructed around trust or distrust, if you take that approach, but more likely that is completely the wrong approach, and it was developed simply as a memory aid, an IOU; being written on paper, or in the form of coins, we don't forget, get confused, or disagree.

    But they are indeed different versions of the same concept and the concept is the core we need to discuss.Christoffer

    This is what I disagree with. The different ways of describing "trust" exposed by unenlightened and I, are not different versions of the same concept, I think they are completely different ways of understanding the same word. Have you read Plato's Republic, where they discuss the meaning of "just"? Those were not different versions of the same concept being discussed, they were different ways of understanding the same word,

    Exactly, but I think that's the thing here, trust is need, is a necessity, is a contract.Christoffer

    "Trust is need"? How so?

    Can we trust them to do their best to be moral against their customers? Yes.Christoffer

    I don't buy this. A company consults lawyers to determine what they are allowed to do, and what they ought not do. You don't generally see a bunch of ethicists or moralists sitting around the boardroom, but you will find lawyers. In determining what the company must do, and what it must not do, the lawyers only have the laws to consult. If a new way to make money is presented, which is not illegal, but some moralists might think it is immoral, the lawyers can give the CEO no reason not to proceed with this new way. If the CEO says they ought not proceed because the procedure might be immoral (notice there's never any firm determination in this situation, just the thought that it might be immoral), the board will likely get the CEO fired.

    So the core is the trust of a child that relaxes completely into the arms of an adult, with no consideration of negative consequences - being crushed or being dropped.unenlightened

    That's not really trust though, it's comfort. As they say, innocence is bliss. The adult loves and cares for the child, and would not bounce it off the floor, but the child doesn't know any of this, only instinctually feeling the safety of the warm embrace, which it has come to recognize as comfort. I don't think we can say that recognizing a situation as comfortable is the same as having trust.

    We used to believe in the freedom of the web, until the pedophiles spoilt it for us.unenlightened

    I don't know about that, I think the abusers were lurking all along, we were just innocent and naïve, comfortable like the child in the adult's arms, until the child gets into the arms of the wrong adult. The illusion is shattered.

    We all understand that thou shalt not lie.Hanover

    No we don't. That is not one of the ten commandments. And there are various arguments from ethicists concerning when it is and is not acceptable to lie. As unenlightened pointed out we are accustomed to having the rulers lie to us. That this is an acceptable principle is documented as far back as Plato's noble lie, and probably extends beyond written history, as old as communication itself. So we cannot categorically exclude lying, from our arsenal of virtuous acts.
  • Heidegger and idealism
    I think I touched on that here: "There is also an element of sorge that connotes something almost like 'anxiety,' which relates to Heidegger's conception of dasein as always looking ahead of itself." So no, not complete separation.Wolfman

    If I remember correctly, there is a relationship between anxiety and authenticity. Doesn't anxiety divide into two distinct forms, one authentic, the other inauthentic?
  • Is 'information' a thing?
    We can reduce everything to two fundamentals, matter, atoms, or particles (however you want to call them), and the relations which these have with each other. A monist will say that these two together are "information". But this perspective misses an important "fundamental", and that is the cause of these fundamental things existing in these specific relations.
  • "1" does not refer to anything.
    I'll take that under consideration since you obviously have an in-depth knowledge of the subject.jgill

    Yeah, I think we've met on some other threads with similar subjects. Now I think you're beginning to catch on. It's just a matter of analyzing the axioms, in order to understand what they actually mean. I would recommend this as a revealing practise for any philosopher. Mathematicians on the other hand seem to be disinterested, being more inclined to take the axioms for granted as if they are some sort of eternal truths.
  • Trust
    I don't want to get into a mere terminological dispute, but trust is not a firm belief.unenlightened

    You and I have a different understanding of what constitutes "trust". You are willing to say that if you are carrying out a business transaction with a person, a complete stranger, and you put that person into a position where they might take advantage of you, you necessarily trust that person, or else you would not put the person in that position. I want to restrict "trust" to a higher level, reserving it only for use in cases of proven reliability.

    So in the case of doing business with a complete stranger, I would not give that person trust. But this would not prevent me from doing business with the person though. If the person provided services which I needed I would do business with them even if I did not trust them. I would proceed with the requisite caution though, not paying in advance, etc.. The person might still take advantage of me though, in ways that I'm unprepared for (giving me inferior product or service, for example). And, the only way that I can rationalize doing business with this person whom I do not particularly trust, and might take advantage of me, is through the hope that they will not do that.

    The person is a complete stranger, and I definitely would not say that I trust the person. You, on the other hand would say that you trust the person. I don't think it's the case that you would trust the person, and I would not trust the person, I think that you are using the word "trust" more freely than I. I think we both would have a similar attitude toward the transaction, knowing that the other person might take advantage, yet proceeding anyway, and this would justify a degree of doubt, in either one of us, yet you would say that you trust the other person, and I would not.

    But by trust I really mean the absence of doubt, not even wondering if there is a sniper somewhere across the road.unenlightened

    According to what you've posted, doesn't this contradict your actual use of "trust"? You would "trust" a complete stranger, to do business with that person. How can you say that there is an absence of doubt in that situation? "Absence of doubt" is more consistent with my definition of "trust", "firm belief", and this is what you rejected.
  • Heidegger and idealism
    First you asked, "why did he have to call it care?" (emphasis mine), which is something different than needing to "understand what 'care' means," as you're saying now, MU. We can understand what care means without having to know why he called it care.Wolfman

    Perhaps, if we could understand what he means by "care", we would understand why he would have called it that. I agree with you that there is not a necessary relationship here, it is one of probability, and I'm willing to take that chance, because I think the probability is relatively high.

    I can also know what a capybara is without knowing the etymology of the word (I don't). In any case, both of your questions are answered now.Wolfman

    There 's a big difference here. "Care" already has a common use. To choose that word to refer to something else, something we can't seem to describe, while intending complete separation from the common meaning in the reader's mind, would not be a reasonable thing to do. If Heidegger was at all reasonable, we ought to assume that he intended at least some association with the common use.
  • Heidegger and idealism
    I think getting hung up on the terminology itself is besides the point, because Heidegger just needs to call it something to, as you say, "avoid mediation through given terms or concepts."Wolfman

    Actually I think it's very important to understand the terminology. "Care" is a descriptive term, and it is used to describe aspects of temporality. So to understand how Heidegger describes temporality we need to understand what "care" means. It wouldn't make sense to just say "care" refers to temporality, because that's not really the case, "care" describes temporality, so we need to understand what "care" means as a descriptive term, in order to understand temporality.
  • Trust
    So what level of trust is enough for a functioning society? Do you trust scientists? Do you trust hospitals? Do you trust your mechanic not to tamper with the breaks? The building blocks around trust are many more than "if there's a chance of abuse, there will be abuse".Christoffer

    I don't look at this as a matter of trust. I do business with a lot of different people, many of whom I don't particularly trust, the question of whether I trust them or not just doesn't come up in my mind. The situation is more like one of need. I need the service they offer, so I do business with them without thinking about whether or not I ought to trust them. You, and unenlightened, might argue that the fact I do choose to do business with them implies that I trust them. I don't think that way, and I know that I do business with a few whom I particularly don't trust. I just need to be more wary of these people.

    We can't get rid of the risk of abuse without losing freedom, so we can only minimize it. Repercussions to companies conducting such abuse, risk of closure, legal actions etc. Alongside that the risk of the business losing the trust of the customers which is a major part of having a business running. Risking that trust is not a good business strategy and doing so requires extreme measures that could be even riskier.Christoffer

    So I would look at the Google issue more as a question of need. If they offer a service which is needed, then we use it, whether or not we trust them. But doing business with someone whom you do not particularly trust means that you need to be wary. We could assume, that just like doing business with anyone else, the company would want to give us honest service to maintain a reputation, but such assumptions are what leave us vulnerable.

    Do you guys not walk down streets or buy stuff in shops? Of course you all do. So at every point you put your trust in others.unenlightened

    I think you are giving trust too much credit here. As I say above, the motivation to shop, or to do any sort of business is a person's wants and needs. Because I do business with someone, doesn't necessarily mean that I trust that person. You might call this 'putting my trust in others', and that's an apt expression, because I am relying on the other person to fulfill their side of the deal, and provide for me, but I don't think trust even enters my mind in most cases, despite that expression. I just take it for granted that the person will do what is supposed to be done, and if they do not, I'm disappointed. It seems to me, like trust only enters my mind if I see some reason for distrust. Then I'll question whether I ought to trust the person or not. But lack of distrust does not necessarily imply trust. If you look up "trust" in The Oxford, you'll see it defined as "a firm belief in the reliability...". In my habitual day to day interactions with people, I tend to be more in the middle with my attitude toward these people, having neither a firm belief in the reliability of the person, nor a firm belief in the person's unreliability. I would hope, and I do expect, that the person will fulfill their end of the bargain, but I cannot say that I generally have a firm belief that they will. It's far too often that I've been disappointed. I can say truthfully, that I wouldn't make a judgement as to whether I trust or distrust a person until I got to know them reasonably well.

    I switch the light on trusting that it has been wired up so it doesn't give me a shock or set fire to the house. We need to trust. therefore we need to be honest.unenlightened

    I still think you're giving trust too much credit. There are very many things which we need, and trust is not one of them. Trust is a luxury, which is extremely beneficial to have, but you seem to take it for granted. You switch a light on, and you think that you would only do this if you trust the person who did the wiring. But I don't think that's accurate, you most likely don't even know the person. How can you claim to trust someone you don't even know? I think you are switching "habit" for "firm belief". You switch the light on because it is your habit, not because you have a firm belief in the reliability of whoever it was who did the wiring.

    I'm saying we all depend for our lives on the decency of strangers and neighbours.unenlightened

    I completely agree with this, but I think you are misrepresenting our interdependence as a matter of trust. We need to interact, but we can interact without trust, basing such actions in hope instead, for example. We need, and depend on certain things, and we can live with the hope that we will get them, without actually trusting that we will. Trust being a firm belief, hope being a less than firm belief. However, it seems very obvious that if a society could replace hope with trust, it would be much more pleasant and stress-free place to live, because we wouldn't always be looking over our shoulders. So it would be very good to try and keep levels of trust as high as possible. In the case of a corporate entity having respect for moral standards, good luck with that. I think hope is the best I can do here.
  • Trust
    In essence, the larger the corporation, the heavier the fall. If financial well-being is their concern, a major blow to trust would be a major blow to financial well-being. The more a company relies on trust in their business, the worse the consequences of trust abuse.Christoffer

    The problem though is that we can do things which are untrustworthy without losing the trust of the others. That is called deception, and so long as the deception goes unexposed the trust remains, and the person being deceived is taken advantage of. This is an issue of morality.

    We don't really know exactly which situations will lead to people secretly doing untrustworthy things, and we can't predict the future anyway, so we can't predict what type of untrustworthy things people might start doing, and therefore we cannot be on guard for those things, to expose them if they occur. If they do occur, people will have been taken advantage of, (and not just a small number, due to the type of business Google is) and it will be too late to prevent these people from being taken advantage of. Haven't we already learned that lesson with Facebook?

    That's why we always have to review these companies, that's why it's so important with things like whistleblowers, protection of them, and company practice transparency.Christoffer

    The whistleblowing is after the fact. What good is closing the barn door when the horse is long gone? Sure you might punish some perpetrators, but that doesn't prevent the harm from being done.

    There isn't much gain to abuse such a marking system for their searches and they would be praised for battling the post-truth era problems of information.Christoffer

    You can say this, but generally speaking, if abuse is possible people will find a way to make a gain from it. That's how it earns its name "abuse", people using it for bad purposes. And they wouldn't do it if there was no gain to be made.
  • "1" does not refer to anything.
    That is why, in my first reply on this thread I described two very distinct ways of using "1", to expose the ambiguity in mathematical terms, hoping to reveal the fact that ambiguity and equivocation are abundant in mathematics: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/404312
  • "1" does not refer to anything.
    You can talk about infinities all you want to. But you cannot produce one. For you to produce something that would go on forever, you yourself would have to live forever to do it. That's the whole point.h060tu

    All you need to do is define "infinity" in such a way that you can produce them, and voila, you can produce infinities. It's a very simple trick which the mathemagicians do with their axioms. However, we need to respect the fact that when they talk about infinities they are not talking about the same thing as you, when you talk about infinity.
  • Trust
    Customers want to trust a company and the company needs the customer's trust. Failure to comply results in failure of the business.Christoffer

    This is not really true. A company may work hard to gain the trust of customers, but once they receive it they have the customers by the balls. And since the company's priority is always its financial well-being there is no good reason why the company would not abuse that trust.

    Anarchy depends upon it absolutely.unenlightened

    Anarchy depends on trust of the government?
  • Heidegger and idealism
    Care is used by Heidegger in a purely ontologically existential manner and has nothing to do with caring, or worrying, as we would say in English. Care doesn’t refer to experiences because it’s a completely formal structure. It is devoid of any experiential content.Wolfman

    If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"?

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