To me this is a default view that some of the more recent philosophers have successfully challenged. Our so-called 'rigorous logical principles' are perhaps reducible to making the right sounds and simply conforming to norms that are mostly tacit. — jjAmEs

The problem is that it doesn't work that way around. As I said, in any situation there are numerous possibilities which are acceptable to serve the purpose, so there is not such thing as "the right sounds", there are numerous acceptable possibilities. Therefore rigorous logical principles cannot be reduced to "the right sounds". However, the inverse is possible, "the right sounds" can be reduced to rigorous logical principles. In other words, rigorous logical principles are what makes "the right sounds" a coherent concept, but "the right sounds" is arbitrary, subject to any intention, without rigorous logical principles.

The quote is explicit about what's in the box cancelling out. — jjAmEs

I covered this already. If there is nothing in the box, then communication and language is pure deception. If you still do not see that this leads us down a path of nonsensical interpretation, look at it this way:

Wittgenstein's premise clearly states "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'." If there is nothing in the box, then the premise of the example, which states that everyone has a box with something in it, is contradicted. We'd have to start over with a new premise, everyone has a box, and claims that there is something in it, when there may not be something in it. But that's a completely different scenario from the one presented, everyone has a box with something in it. Therefore we cannot "cancel out" what's in the box, as irrelevant, without significantly changing the scenario of Wittgenstein's example, in a way which contradicts the described situation.

But upon close examination the whole idea of the inside opposed to an outside comes apart. — jjAmEs

Again, you have things backwards. Upon close examination, the idea that "the whole idea of the inside opposed to an outside comes apart" comes apart. It is only when an undisciplined mind reads such examples without adhering to rigorous principles of logic, that the illusion you see is created. I think that the illusion is created to demonstrate that language can be used to deceive, as a possibility, and so "the right sounds" may involve contradiction when that is the intent.

We'd then expect an infinite age. — jorndoe

This doesn't really follow logically from 'it could be any age'. If something could be any age, it is a definite, specific age, but that age is unknown. That's what's implied when you say that the universe is "an age". But this is inconsistent with "infinite age", which is not any particular age at all.

Consequently, your dismissal of "sufficient reason" is unsupported.

The "present" is only important based on context, like if a person likes living in the present. — christian2017

I think you have this backward. The present is what gives context. Without the present there is no context to time. You might like to think that you could point to any random point in time, to give temporal context, but it would be you, living in the present doing that. Take away beings living in the present, and there would be absolutely no temporal context whatsoever.

magine, for the moment, that we have a clock that's keeping time for the universe. — TheMadFool

Isn't this redundant? Isn't the universe itself a clock keeping time for itself?

From our vantage point, the universe began 13.8 billion years ago; this beginning can be thought of as 12 midnight (0000 hours military time) by that clock. It is not impossible to imagine winding back this universe clock to another time like 11 PM or 6 PM before 12 midnight (when the Big Bang is supposed to have occurred). — TheMadFool

If you could wind that clock back, then it wouldn't actually be keeping time for the universe, would it? If you wind back your clock, then the time it gives is no longer true, if it had the true time before. But winding it back doesn't affect when it started keeping time.

The gist of the commments in this thread is that a time before the alleged beginning (the Big Bang) is incoherent. — TheMadFool

As I explained in the post which left you speechless, 'time before the beginning' is only as incoherent as 'the future' is incoherent, when it is claimed that the future is a part of time. At the so-called "beginning", there was no past, and only a future. But that future then, existed just as much as the future now exists. So, if the future is construed as a part of time, then it is fully coherent to say that there was time before the beginning, a wide open future.

These 3 divisions of time are inseparable in that the future becomes the present and the present becomes the past and none of them make sense if considered to the exclusion of the other two. Since the Big Bang was, at some point in time, a present (now), there must be a time before it, the past, just as it had a future which we're currently experiencing. — TheMadFool

When you consider that the present marks the division between past and future, you'll see that it marks the end of one, and the beginning of the other. It doesn't make sense to talk about future and past without a present, but it does makes sense to talk about a future without a past, and a past without a future. Before a person is born, they have a future with no past, and when a person dies they have a past but no future. So, we can talk about the future, or the past, in exclusion of the other, but we cannot talk about the present without implying both future and past.

I frequently practiced social distancing and wore masks on the reg. — Merkwurdichliebe

What were you up to, robbing banks and holing up?

How would you ever know that what you see is different than what someone else is if you are both using the same word to refer to a particular color experience? — Harry Hindu

We know that they are different, by what I said above. You are not in my mind experiencing what I see, and I am not in your mind experiencing what you see. So, by that principle, which is called the law of identity, I know that what you see is not the same, and therefore, is different from what I see.

It's quite simple really, if we adhere to fundamental principles like the law of identity.

If you claim to have different color experience, how do you know that you don't have different auditory experiences? — Harry Hindu

To the contrary, we know that they are different. by the same fundamental principle.

How would you learn to communicate and make the right sounds if you didn't have an accurate experience of someone else speaking? It must be that we do experience the world similarly so that we all make the same sounds with our mouths, or scribbles on a screen, when speaking or writing. — Harry Hindu

Communicating doesn't consist of making "the right sounds", it consists of understanding. The fact is that in every different situation there are many different words, or sounds, which could be used for the specific purpose, so there is no such thing as "the right sound".

Don't get me wrong, I'm not ruling out similarity, as playing an essential role. I am just trying to induce the proper distinction between "similar" which implies different, from "same" which implies not different. In this way we won't be inclined to say that similar things are the same, and we'll have some rigorous logical principles to approach the issue..

The point remains: something is being interpreted. We all agree. I'm not denying that there are conflicting interpretations -- in fact the history of how these interpretations evolved is the point of this discussion, in part. — Xtrix

Yes, this is what I was saying, something is being interpreted, and this is what you have named "phusis". As I explained there are two distinct descriptions of this thing, one under the terms of "being", the other under the terms of "becoming". If these two distinct descriptions were consistent with each other, like "half empty" and "half full" are consistent with each other, there would be no problem. But Plato and Aristotle demonstrated that these two descriptions are not consistent with each other. Whatever it is which is described as "being" cannot be the same thing which is described as "becoming". So, Aristotle proposed that this one thing, "phusis", has two distinct aspects which he called matter and form, to account for these two distinct descriptions.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes. — Xtrix

Right, these are the two distinct aspects. Stability relates to being, and instability relates to becoming. Under the Aristotelian divisions, the matter persists, as what is stable, unchanging, in spite of the changes involved with generation and corruption. The form of the thing is what actually changes. So regardless of what type of object it is that we are looking at, we can identify these two aspects of the object, the aspect which is described in terms of being, stability, which is the matter, and the aspect which is described in terms of becoming, instability, which is the form.

This suggests that your interpretation of W is a bad reading. — jjAmEs

I don't see how you make this conclusion. What I said is supported. We each have something different in our boxes which we call a "beetle". The "language-game" might be entirely external, as Wittgenstein implies, but this does not indicate that it's not the case that what's important is what's in the box. What's external is just a game, what's internal is what's important.

As I said, they are the same independent of the difference of being in different spatial-temporal locations. — Harry Hindu

In other words they are not the same, they are different. Shall we proceed with the true premise, that they are not the same, they are different?

You see the word, "Wittgenstein" the same as I do, just from a different location in space. We are looking at the same thing - the word on the screen. Our experiences are about the same thing. If not then we're not talking about the same thing when we talk. — Harry Hindu

We might be seeing the same thing, but each of our respective experiencing of that is different. And that's what we're talking about, what's inside each of our minds, and that is different. My experiences involved with that word are different from yours.

I said that we both experience the same color when the same wavelength of light interacts with our eyes. — Harry Hindu

I don't agree with this. I disagree with people about the colour of things quite frequently. Sometimes I see as a green what others see as a blue, or I see as a purple what others see as a pink, etc.. We clearly do not see the same colour when the same wavelengths interact with our eyes. What colour it is, is a judgement made, based on training and habit, which varies from one to the other.

Why do philosophers seem to shun this notion of "aboutness". Our minds have this defining property of being about the world, while at the same time being part of the world. It seems to me that minds inherently understand aboutness - that sounds are about what is making the sound, not the thing itself - that pee and poo is about the health of another organism, that the sound of grass and brush rustling is about something moving in the brush, etc. So it seems to me that the "private" language is really a shared language of the world communicating with minds about it's state-of-affairs. It even informs you when someone is using language as opposed to not. How can you learn a language if you don't already understand the concept of communication, or aboutness prior to learning a language? The type of brain and sensory organs one has seems to be the difference in the complexity of this "private" language. — Harry Hindu

This, I can't see as relevant to what we're talking about. But I really don't understand any point being made here, if there is a point being made here, so maybe that's why. We were talking about whether what's in my mind is the same as what's in your mind. And I really don't see how they could be the same or else I would know what you are thinking.

Leaves you speechless?

Clearly there's an 'upward causation' of the material form of the brain to cognitive ability. That much is clear from myriad of injury and drug studies, and the like. But what of 'downward causation' - the cases where injured brains re-route all of their activities to compensate for damage to a particular area? — Wayfarer

The upward/downward distinction in causation is a little misleading. The problem with an appeal to downward causation is that the capacity for such causation is only provided for by complex organized structures. Then we need to account for the existence of such organized structures, and so we can only turn to upward causation. The route of downward causation is really a dead end, just leading us back to upward causation, because we cannot account for the way that downward causation could spontaneously appear when upward causation reaches some critical degree of organization.

Therefore I believe that we really ought to look for what appears to us as downward causation, existing inherently within upward causation. In other words, it's a distinct form of upward causation which gives the appearance of downward causation in its physical manifestations.

What drives that, other than something purpose-directed, and therefore teleological, in some sense? And where does 'downward causation' begin? Who says it doesn't begin in the very simplest forms of organic life? — Wayfarer

Yes, this is the issue here, the source of teleological, purpose-directed activity. It cannot be a downward causation, because it's evident in even the simplest life forms, while downward causation requires complex forms. So downward causation is a bit of a materialist ruse, requiring complex material structures, but not capable of accounting for the purpose-directed activity required to create those organized structures. This is why we need to turn to what might be called the immanency of such purpose-directed activity, what is inherent within such material existence, as the source of that type of activity.

This reversal, inversion, is the "reflection" referred to in Plato's cave analogy. Once we flip everything around, from the way that it appears to us cave-dwellers (as downward causation), and place "the good" in its proper location, as the initial cause (final cause, from the perspective of ending the regressive chain of efficient causation), then we see that the immaterial, at the very bottom, is the base, or foundation, for all material existence, through upward causation.

The problem with an infinite past is that the present then becomes impossible for it requires infinite time to have gone by and that is an impossibility. Infinity can't be completed for it is, by definition, something that has no end and the end, if the past is infinite, is now, the present. So, the past can't be infinite. — TheMadFool

This is why it is better to look at time starting from the perspective of the present. We can see that as time passes, the past is coming into existence, it is growing. So the present is the beginning of the past, which is determined existence, and in the same sort of way, it is the ending of the future, which is indeterminate.

Further, if we adopt the principle, that time only has real existence as it passes, then past time is the only real time. This means that the future, properly speaking, is outside of time. And in this way it makes sense to speak of things outside of time.

Now, we can project this principle hypothetically, counterfactually backwards in time. So for example, we can hypothesize about "this time yesterday", when it was the present, before today had any real temporal existence. We can also hypothesize about free will, whether someone had done that, instead of this, removing the real choice which was made, through the assumption that the future has no real existence. You'll see that the person's choices are necessarily constrained by the actuality of the past time. So the actuality of past time puts constraints on future possibilities.

Let's project this point all the way backwards, to a hypothetical point when there is absolutely no past time, and only future. This would mean that there is absolutely no constraint on the possibilities for the future at this time. However, since there is no past at this time, there is nothing acting and therefore nothing to choose, or to bring about any possibility into existence, in any way. So this is problematic, implying that there is either no such first point in time, or there is something outside of time, which can act. That there is no first point can be dismissed for the reason you gave. So we must conclude that something acts from outside of time.

This is not incomprehensible because the premises of the description place the future as outside of time. So what we are left with is the conclusion that there is something acting in the future. What this means, is that as time passes, there is something in the future, from our perspective (the present), which is acting to determine how things will be as the past comes into existence at the present. This activity, these actions are not observable from our perspective, because our perspective is at the present, and these action are in the future in relation to us. Then we can see that all the things we observe at the present, which appear to be determined by the past (constituting natural laws), are really determined by these activities in the future. These activities we have no capacity to interact with, or interfere with, because they are outside our grasp (the present), being in the future. We look at them as fixed natural laws, making the appearance of past existence consistent, but this is really just a reflection of the consistency in these activities which are occurring outside of time, in the future.

Your beetle is not my beetle and they are separate. However we are looking at the exact same beetle - the color black, the shape of the letter W, the sound of the letter W, are all the same for each of us, or else how would we be able to communicate? — Harry Hindu

Sorry Harry, but there is a law of identity for a reason. The fact that your beetle is not my beetle, and that they are separate, is sufficient to prove that they are not the exact same beetle. Your claim that they are is utter nonsense.

the color black, the shape of the letter W, the sound of the letter W, are all the same for each of us, or else how would we be able to communicate? If I said, "beetle" and you hear, "bottle", then how are we going to ever be able to communicate our beetles? — Harry Hindu

Clearly these things are not the same, yet we are able to communicate. Therefore communication is not prerequisite on them being the same.

Even if you experience purple when I experience blue, we both experience those colors consistently when there is a particular wavelength of light interacting with our eyes. Because the experience (the effect) is consistent with the cause, we would both never know what that our inner experience is different, but we would both be talking about the same thing - that particular wavelength of light, just as if we spoke different languages, we use different symbols to refer to the same thing. — Harry Hindu

Colour does not consist of "a particular wavelength of light", it's far more complex than that, so we can't even start on this analogy.

If we didn't have similar beetles, we would never understand what we are talking about. — Harry Hindu

As I said, "similar" does not mean "the same", it means different. Your post is just a big contradiction. You start out by saying that our beetles must be "the same" in order for their to be communication, and you end up by saying that they must be similar (different) in order for there to be communication. Which do you really believe is the case, must they be the same, or different?

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc. — Xtrix

I don't see where this comes from, nor what you mean by it. Can you explain? What do you mean by restricting being?

"Heraclitus, to whom one ascribes the doctrine of becoming, in start contrast to Parmenides, in truth says the same as Parmenides. — Xtrix

As I said, I think Plato demonstrated the difference between them. And, I think that to claim that they both said the same thing is to misunderstand what they said.

don't see this particular issue as a problem, no. There are many ways of interpreting things. The wave-particle business you mentioned is a good example. So's the proverbial glass being "half-empty" and "half-full." Is either a "problem"? Well maybe, but what's not an issue is that something is being interpreted. — Xtrix

Having contradictory interpretations is not the same as "half-empty"/ "half-full", as these two are not contradictory. Do you see the difference, between interpretations which are different, yet consistent with each other, and interpretations which contradict each other? It is the latter which I see as a problem, the former is not a problem.

They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless. — Xtrix

What about your thesis that all philosophy is saying the same thing? How can any philosophers disagree?

Amazing, you do not engage but just claim; you make it up as you go along without any understanding of what you're talking about. — tim wood

LOL. That coming from the person who incessantly insisted that Zeno's "Achilles and the Tortoise" paradox consisted of Achilles making stops, despite the fact that I explained numerous times that Zeno stipulated constant motion.

It is - you are - extremely vexing and annoying, which is too bad because you seem smart. All yours, and out. — tim wood

Things are not always as they seem, but sometimes they are. I know that being shown one's own mistakes, when it's not done in a careful and considerate way (and even if it is sometimes), can be a very annoying thing. I'll take this as a learning experience and try to work harder on finding that careful and considerate way.

I could show you mine, but if it were photoshopped it wouldn't really be mine.

"Meaning" is philosophical BS. Until philosophical pinheads can explain why using the wrong vowel in a noun entirely changes the meaning of a statement voiced in Russian, but why anyone speaking conventional US English in a Chinese laundry will easily understand, "No tickee, no shirtee,," the entire subject of "semantics" will remain a useless, padded foil for intellectual pinheads who are incapable of addressing any serious subject. — Greylorn Ell

Someone is having a difficult time in isolation.

According to you continuous motion is impossible, based on your understanding of Zeno, which you endorse. — tim wood

Right, continuous motion is impossible, and Zeno demonstrated that to me.

Being asked how you resolve manifold problems associated with your claim, you completely evade the question. One more time only: — tim wood

The only problems I see are the problems which physicists have because they fail to respect the reality demonstrated by Zeno, that continuous motion is impossible. I'm not a physicist, so these are not my problems. But I've told you how to resolve them, dismiss the notion that motion is continuous.

Give an account for what motion is, such that it is impossible for it to be continuous. — tim wood

Motion is change of place. Change of place involves a beginning place and an ending place. A continuous thing is unbroken by any beginning or endings. Therefore it is impossible that motion is continuous.

The sign functions independently of what's in the box. — jjAmEs

No it doesn't, obviously, because then the sign wouldn't refer to anything. If we're telling everyone that there is something in the box named "beetle", and we really don't have anything in the box, then language is just a huge deception. In order that it's not deception there must be something in the box, and the sign refers to that thing. Therefore the sign does not function independently of what's in the box unless you characterize language as deception.

f it's not continuous, what is it? Non-continuous? Discontinuous? — tim wood

Yes, I'd say some form of "discontinuous". The physicists haven't figured that out yet, perhaps discrete intervals as QM suggests. Take a look at Achilles, the human runner, for example. Each time the forward foot hits the ground in the act of running, there is a slow down as the leg absorbs the impact, and an acceleration when that foot becomes the rear foot, and pushes off. You might not see this alternation when you're watching the runner, but you feel it when you're running. Running is not a constant continuous motion. The forward foot cannot be hitting the ground at the same time the rear foot is pushing off

Is the object in motion actually at all times under acceleration? (And there is the concept of continuous acceleration - the derivatives of speed - they cannot be continuous either.) How does it work? — tim wood

Acceleration is a very difficult problem which no one has come anywhere near to figuring out. If something is at rest, and then it is in motion, there must be a very short period of time when the acceleration is infinite. Do you see this? Going from 0 speed to any speed requires infinite acceleration.
You might think that it's not a real problem because rest is not a real concept in relativity based physics, but the problem is there nevertheless, any time a force is applied to an object. There is a very short period of time when the behaviour of the object cannot be known.

And to be sure, if the motion from A to B cannot be continuous, then certainly the motion from A halfway to B cannot be either - or for any other distance. It would appear that any motion at all cannot be continuous. I think you have a problem here - how will you resolve it? — tim wood

It's not a problem for me, just a brute fact of reality, no motion is continuous. It just appears like some motions are continuous, and people like to represent motion as continuous because it's easier than trying to deal with the reality of various forces being applied to every object at every passing moment of time, especially when we have very little, if any, information about these forces. Instead, we take continuity for granted, as Newton's first law. But that's just a convenient falsity. And now that physicists have started dealing with extremely short periods of time, that falsity has manifested as quantum uncertainty. That's the "short period of time when the behaviour of the object cannot be known", referred to above. So it is a problem for physicists, but I'm not one of them.

Actually, MU, words are just visual scribbles and sounds. The hearing or seeing the word, "beetle" would be just as "internal" as any other experience of some visual or sound. If we all have different "beetles", then how we hear and see any word would be different for each of us as well. How would we be able to communicate if we actually do have different beetles in each of our boxes? It must be that we all have similar beetles if we are able to communicate. — Harry Hindu

Let me remind you that similar does not mean the same, it means different with similarities. So even if we have similar things under the title "beetle", they are not the same, and contrary to your claim, they actually are different.

It seems to me that we all have the same beetle in our boxes if we understand when someone is using language and when they aren't. — Harry Hindu

Above you said "similar". Now you say "the same". Which do you really believe? Clearly, under the terms of Wittgenstein's example, the thing in my box is not the same thing which is in your box.

Let's refine this. Two things. Are we to say that according to MU continuous motion is impossible? And that it is not possible to assign numbers that are arbitrarily small that each represent a unique point in the progress of that motion (if you do not like this way of expressing infinite divisibility, provide your own version). — tim wood

That's right, such would not be a proper representation of how motion really exists.

And Zeno demonstrated this to me, regardless of whether Zeno demonstrated it to you, or to anyone else, for that matter, he still demonstrated it to me.

The main idea is that thought is external-social-alien and not internal-private-familiar. Or (at least) that thought or mind is more like the first and less like the second than we tend to suppose. Wittgenstein's beetle is a powerful indicator of this, but the idea goes back further. — jjAmEs

Huh? I take Wittgenstein's "beetle" as an indication of the exact opposite to what you say. The only thing external, social, is the word "beetle". The important thing, what matters, is what's in the box, and this is internal, private.

The utter incompetence of the federal government, no longer possible to deny without one coming off as a total miscreant, must instead be excused by shifting blame downwards. It's simply the new narrative that's at work right now, which NOS is dutifully relaying. — StreetlightX

Let's see, Trump started with blaming all the other countries, and foreigners, for America's problems, when he was first elected. Now he's blaming all the internal actors. states and municipalities. If things don't straighten themselves out quickly, America may never be great again. Oh, I almost forgot, he's supposed to be the leader of the country, and the one assigned with the task of straightening things out. Maybe his good buddy Putin will give some assistance. But Putin does nothing for nothing, and the actual cost would remain a secret.

Zeno doesn't say stops, but that's what he means; that's all he can mean. — tim wood

OK boss. Zeno says that each runner runs with a constant speed, yet he means that one is stopping and starting. That's a great interpretation you're giving me. No wonder we disagree

But consider this edited quote of yours: is this what you're saying? That without regard to anything of Zeno's that continuous constant motion, infinitely divisible (again, not to be confused with infinitely divided), is wrong? — tim wood

Yes, Zeno demonstrated that.

No. As Heidegger points out, and quite rightly, Heraclitus and Parmenides are saying the same thing. They're both discussing being. "Being and becoming" is the first "restriction" discussed in his Introduction to Metaphysics, in fact. — Xtrix

If this is really what Heidegger says, I think he is wrong. Hegel also tried to make them into the same thing, by saying that becoming consists of being and not being, in his dialectics of being. He employs a system of negation to characterize becoming. But I think this is wrong as well, and maybe Heidegger's principles are Hegelian.

Plato demonstrated the appearance of incompatibility between Heraclitus' becoming, and Parmenides' being, and Aristotle showed conclusively that this is the case with a number of arguments, one I presented already in this thread. Apprehension of these arguments leads one away from accepting any postulates which stipulate that being and becoming are one and the same thing.

Again I return to the question of phusis. It's here that we find clues to the Greek conception of being. Parmenides and Heraclitus are interested in exactly this question. — Xtrix

It may be the case, that Parmenides describes "phusis" with "being", and Heraclitus describes "phusis" with "becoming", but this does not mean that being and becoming are one and the same thing. In this case, being and becoming are distinct concepts being employed to describe the same thing. If these two concepts are incompatible, then there is a problem.

So for example, if one person describes a substance as solid, and another person describes the same substance as liquid, this does not indicate that "solid" and "liquid" have the same meaning. It indicates a problem in 'the description' of the substance, because the two descriptions incompatible. Likewise, if one person describes the transmission of a certain quantity of energy as a wave, and another person describes it as a particle, these two are incompatible and there is clearly a problem with the description of the transmission of this energy.

To argue being is distinct from becoming and pit these two thinkers against one another may be something we learn from philosophy books and in most school rooms, but it's just a mistake- in my view. — Xtrix

I don't agree with this at all. When the same thing is described in incompatible ways, this means that 'the description' of this thing is contradictory. Neither the one, nor the other, is self-contradictory, but the two contradict each other. Maybe you do not see this as a problem, but I do, as I think it makes it impossible to understand the thing being described. Therefore, I believe that this problem of contradiction needs to be exposed, as Socrates and Plato did, and addressed in a rational manner, as Aristotle did, before we can proceed toward an understanding of the thing which is being described in contradictory ways.

The US, however, was ranked first in preparedness out of 195 countries. — NOS4A2

I guess this means that they're really bad at implementing their preparedness.

Since each state and local government are responsible for their emergency response, each local and state government have at least a large share of the blame in how they react to this crisis. — NOS4A2

Oh you sound like you're regurgitating Trump's nonsense. We're not giving any of the states any of the emergency supplies out of the federal stockpile, because this is federal supplies and none of the states have a right to any of it.

This is why when Trump mentioned that they were considering quarantining New York, Cuomo said it would be a federal declaration of war, and he’s right. New York is out of the jurisdiction of the federal government, and as such, so is its response to the crisis. So if you want to look for people to blame, look no further than state and municipal governments. — NOS4A2

Isn't that a great leader? All you States and municipalities fend for yourself, that's not my responsibility, I'm the leader of the nation, and this is not a national crisis, it's a local crisis. What a load of crap.

Now to study the morphing of this understanding in the time between Parmenides and Aristotle is especially fascinating. — Xtrix

The idea of "being" as presented by the Eleatics, is heavily influenced by Pythagorean idealism. I believe Pythagoras and Parmenides were both in the southern Italy area of Greece. This idea of "being" can be contrasted with the "becoming" of Heraclitus.

What would be interesting would be to see how both "becoming" and "being" get unified into the one Latin concept of "existence". I believe it its done through the Aristotelian matter and form, but this would be a complex research project.

But in reality, as Zeno well knows, Achilleus passes the tortoise PDQ. — tim wood

Right, that's the point I was making. In reality Achilles will pass the tortoise, therefore the notion of continuous, constant motion, infinitely divisible, as presented in the paradox is faulty.

It's for us, then, to find the mistake, which is the assumption that there is a discreet moment, & etc, as described just above. — tim wood

The discrete moments you described consist of stops. There is no such thing in Zeno's presentation, there is constant, continuous motion, with infinitely divisible time and distance. So your interpretation is very clearly wrong. I suggest you read up on that paradox and get a clear understanding of it before you make any further attempts to discuss it.

Far out! I guess the beer ran out.

Hopefully COVID-19 can work as an exercise to learn from. — jorndoe

Yeah, consider this the trial run (only a few million lives at stake, a small percentage), the drill, getting us prepared for when germ warfare really kicks in. Genetic manipulation is a scary thing. And, there are people who think that to kill everyone, and have the world to oneself (king of the world, ruler of no one), would be a great thing.

Are you able to comment from your experience what the ancient Greek understanding was with respect to what we translate as being, or to be? My limited experience is that they don't use the word. They have it, to be sure, but unless it qualifies or answers something particular about what or how something is, they leave it implied or they use some other more concrete or descriptive verb. Almost as if being in the general sense was not something for them, possibly because it usually was not in question. I never find in the Greek sentences of the form X is Y, except as some special qualification. (Doesn't mean they aren't there; I just have not noticed any, and for several reasons I would.) — tim wood

If you want to understand the ancient Greek meaning of "Being", read Parmenides, and the other Eleatics, among whom Zeno was one.

The translation is enough. You have referred, for example, to infinite divisibility. It's by no means clear to me that Zeno or any other Greek had anything at all like any modern understanding of the concept of infinity - keeping in mind they were hard pressed to write large numbers or do calculations. You said Zeno stipulated divisibility of space. News to me that he did. He implied very reasonably that given a distance, you could think in terms of lesser distances within that distance. — tim wood

I don't see how this is relevant. You insist that we speak in Zeno's terms, now you want to talk about how Zeno's terms relate to modern conceptions. It's you who is insisting we leave modern conceptions out of this, so be consistent, and leave it out.

. Achilleus manifestly in all cases completes the course and beats the tortoise. — tim wood

Huh? Clearly you haven't followed Zeno's example! Achilles can't beat the tortoise, according to the terms of the example. Since you keep saying things which aren't there, talking about stops, pauses, and now the assumption that Achilles beats the tortoise, it's obviously you who's reading into it, what's not there.

The flaw is in the idea that he takes a distinct increment of time at each point on the course, meaning that there is a discreet constant interval of time during which he is at that and only that point. — tim wood

What you are describing here is a stop. An "interval of time during which he is at that and only that point". We went through this already, there is no such stop, or pause, described in the example by Zeno.

It is stipulated that each runner runs at a constant speed. Achilles runs faster than the tortoise, but the tortoise has a head start. The tortoise is already ahead, and moving forward when Achilles is moving forward. Achilles has to get to the tortoise's starting point before passing the tortoise, and this takes some time. In that period of time, the tortoise moves ahead. Now Achilles has to get to that point where the tortoise has moved ahead to. But in the time that it takes him to get there, the tortoise has moved further ahead again. This will continue indefinitely (infinitely) and Achilles will never surpass the tortoise.

See, there is no stopping at any of the points, both the tortoise and Achilles are moving at a constant speed, Achilles faster than the tortoise. However, the period of time that it takes for Achilles to get to where the tortoise was, during which time the tortoise moves further ahead, becomes shorter and shorter and shorter. So long as there is that short period of time, the tortoise will always get further ahead. And, there will always be that short period of time, because there will always be a short space that the tortoise is ahead of Achilles and according to the stipulation of Achilles' constant speed, it will require a period of time for him to cover that space and get to where the tortoise was.

And you have ignored the question of the tortoise. If Achilleus can't proceed, how can the tortoise? — tim wood

I ignored the question of the tortoise because I couldn't see what the question was. Now I see that it's not relevant, and seems to be based in your misunderstanding of "stops". Both Achilles and the tortoise are moving at constant speeds, there is no stops, or pauses, and it is not the case that Achilles can't proceed. Achilles always proceeds (constant), just like the tortoise always proceeds, but Achilles cannot catch up to the tortoise, for the reason explained above, as presented by Zeno.

No matter how you phrase it, you cannot make prediction into explanation.

What's interesting about QM is that a satisfying intuitive grasp is not necessary to use the theory. — jjAmEs

That principle, "use", provides the basis for the difference between prediction and explanation. Prediction is designed for use, in general, it is pragmatic. And there are no inherent restrictions on how prediction might be used. Explanation is designed for understanding. Well, you might say that to be used for understanding is itself a particular type of use, so explanation is designed for use as well as prediction, it is designed for use in understanding. But what we do is narrow the field of "use", restrict it, by imposing understanding, as the particular purpose, what is desired as final end. And when we use prediction in this way, as a means of explanation, with the goal of understanding, we recognize that although predictions may be useful for understanding, by themselves they are not sufficient.

To me there's something like a spectrum that runs from pious theory to worldly practice. — jjAmEs

So I wouldn't describe it as a spectrum, because a spectrum is differing degrees of the same quality, whereas prediction and explanation are distinct qualities. Prediction might be used for a wide range of purposes, including explanation. It is inherently useful. But when prediction is used for explanation it only constitutes a part of an explanation because prediction alone is insufficient to produce understanding. Therefore it's not a matter of a spectrum because we need to determine that other part explanation which is distinctly different from prediction.

At the end of this this, we'll realize that a box of masks and a pair of goggles was all we ever needed. — Hanover

Uh huh, and you keep those on twenty four hours a day, seven days a week until there's no more infected people in the world?

When is something explained? We are often satisfied with prediction and control. — jjAmEs

Prediction is not explanation at all. People have been predicting that the sun will come up tomorrow, for a very long time now, most of that time without any real explanation of why it should. The prediction is based on the fact that it's been that way in the past and there is no reason to think that it will change, it's not based on an understanding of the event.

But some people are satisfied with prediction, as explanation, and this is evident in the attitude that some have toward quantum physics. They think that because physicists can predict certain behaviours, they therefore understand the phenomena which they are predicting.

I can't see us as ultimately separate and distinct. To me the self as a concept depends on a community, and the reverse. To be human is to be social, to be one among others. — jjAmEs

I am not talking about the self as a concept, I am talking about individual, thinking human beings, like you and I.

Pay attention to the language! — tim wood

Zeno was Greek, and a long time ago. I don't even understand modern Greek. If you want someone to explain it in Zeno's language you'll have to find someone else, sorry about that.

That is, if at every point of division Achilleus paused for the same increment of time. — tim wood

There is no pause in Achilles' running. That's not part of the scenario. You are just adding things in, making things up, which constitutes a bad interpretation, a faulty reading of the example.

The question was/is, how do you account for the tortoise? And that's just one of many. Given the tortoise has a head-start of any increment at all, how does Achilleus even get off the starting line? What is the distance to the first point that the tortoise got to? And so forth. — tim wood

The length of the tortoise's head start is irrelevant. The result is the same. In the time it takes Achilles to reach the point where the tortoise started from, the tortoise has moved further ahead. So, the tortoise still has a head start, and so on, ad infinitum.

It might help if you made clear just what your point is. — tim wood

I stated very clearly what my point is:

Actually Zeno's paradoxes prove that the "continuum" is a faulty idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could not understand the point and requested an explanation. Now I've provided that. If you still do not understand, study Zeno's examples more closely, eventually you ought to apprehend what the examples demonstrate.

Here's the fault. You apparently imagine that Achilleus gets where he is going because, you suppose, space is not infinitely divisible and continuous, whatever these mean - as if the divisibility or continuity of space had any relevance. Suppose it isn't and suppose it's relevant. — tim wood

Of course the divisibility of space is relevant, it's stipulated by Zeno in his presentation. If there were no divisions there would be no presentation of the problem. The problem is presented as a problem of spatial divisions in relation to temporal divisions, the distance in space covered in a specified period of time. So the problem is a problem involved with dividing space and time into increments. It would be rather ridiculous to say that the divisibility of space is not relevant.

Suppose it isn't and suppose it's relevant. You would acknowledge, I trust, that even being just finitely divisible there are still a lot of divisions, so many that it would take Achilleus a very long time to reach his destination. — tim wood

This is what is irrelevant. If it takes Achilles a "very long time" to win the race, he still wins the race. The point of Zeno's presentation is that under the assumption that we can keep dividing space and time to shorter and shorter increments, infinitely, Achilles can never win the race.

Further, the tortoise covers the same distance without difficulty, which under your argument he should have at least as much difficulty doing as Achilleus. How do you account for the tortoise? — tim wood

Again, this is irrelevant. The degree of "difficulty" is not a factor in Zeno's presentation. What is presented is that it is impossible for Achilles to catch up to the tortoise, not that it is difficult for him to do that.

2) notwithstanding how divisible the way is or is not, we do routinely get where we're going. . — tim wood

Exactly, that's why representing space and time as infinitely divisible is a faulty representation. As Zeno demonstrated, if space and time actually were infinitely divisible it would be impossible to do what is routinely done.

centrist US presidential candidate Joe Biden has already been termed “China’s choice for president” by the conservative National Review." — StreetlightX

Who is going to choose the next US president, China or Russia? Sad, but let those two fight it out amongst themselves.

I'm confused now. Who allegedly invented the coronavirus, was it the Chinese or the Russians?

Just what do you imagine "principles of continuity to be"? — tim wood

Infinite divisibility is a principle of continuity.

f Achilleus stops at every point for any length of time, then he can't get where he's going. It's continuousness that gets him there. But that's obvious, so what do you mean? — tim wood

I see you haven't really read, or at least have not understood Zeno's paradoxes. Zeno did not say that Achilles "stops at every point". Achilles must simply run the distance between the points. Since it takes him a period of time to run the distance from where he is, to where the tortoise is at that time, the tortoise has proceeded to a further place during that period of time which it takes him to get there. Now Achilles must run to that place, and the tortoise moves along to a further place in that period of time, so Achilles must run to that place, ad infinitum.

The fault here is in the assumption that space and time are continuous and infinitely divisible. This produces the illusion that there is always a smaller space to be run, consequently a smaller amount of time required to run that space, allowing the tortoise to always stay ahead. It is basically a more complex version of the dichotomy paradox, which maybe we ought to address first because it's simpler, and therefore easier to get a clearer understanding of the problem. When space is considered to be continuous, and therefore infinitely divisible, one must move through an infinity of spaces before one can move through any space at all.

t’s real but not ultimate. Ultimately we're not outside of or apart from reality. Philosophy is concerned with reality as lived, not simply with objective analysis. Wittgenstein said 'We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.' — Wayfarer

The problem though, is that you've described the universe as a product of the human brain:

Where I would question Penrose, is in respect of his argument that the Universe pre-exists human consciousness. You see, this fantastically complex organ that we have - the brain - is actually an incredibly sophisticated simulator. The whole universe, including the ancient past, billions of years before h. Sapiens came along - is projected by this simulator. It is senseless to ask how or in what way the universe exists ‘outside of’ or ‘apart from’ that simulated act — because we’re never outside of it. — Wayfarer

Now, since my brain is distinct from your brain, and my thoughts are distinct from your thoughts, then my universe must be distinct from your universe. Therefore, ultimately reality is particular and unique to each of us. So the real mistake is in the idea that we are all a part of one universe, because ultimately we each have our own distinct reality, and our own distinct universe. That is the necessary conclusion from your premise that the universe is a simulation produced by the human brain.

I agree that we tend to ignore the backdrop of a functioning language, and this is precisely because it functions so well when we aren't doing philosophy. — jjAmEs

Language is an important part of the picture, because it is through language that we bridge the separation, attempting to unite our separate universes. The fact that we can build these bridges, communication and communion, indicates that the separation, though it is ultimate, is not absolute. Ultimately, we are separate and distinct, but the very same thing which separates us, the medium, we can manipulate and use as a tool to unite us. That is, if we are willing.

But what I was really trying to get at is that you can't make mind into an object. You can't get outside it. You can't, as it were, consider reason 'from the outside', because to consider reason requires the use of reason. So theories about the nature of mind founder in some fundamental way, because we can't make mind an object. Whereas, theories about objects of various kinds have a left-hand side and right-hand side, we don't stand in that relationship with the mind, as it's not other to us. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is a very good point. We understand physical objects through their spatial properties, but the mind, and it's intelligible 'objects' (if we choose to call these 'objects') cannot be understood through spatial properties. Such 'objects' are not spatial objects. However, once we learn, and understand this fundamental fact, we can look at these properties of the mind, and describe them in other terms, temporal terms, rather than spatial. As you suggest, Kant gives us some insight here, saying that time is an internal intuition, will space is external. But the important temporal concept, of causation, specifically final cause, free will, and intentional actions, is where we really need to focus, if we want to make mind into an object for analysis.

We deal with the world through the objective stance, through making objects of things and working out how objects interact, which is fundamental to scientific method. But the 'nature of mind' is not amongst the objects of science; rationality is what makes science possible in the first place. Whereas, we foolishly believe that science 'explains' reason in terms of adaptation. See the problem? This is basically very much like Husserl's criticism of naturalism, if I understand it correctly. — Wayfarer

We could start with Plato's famous analogy. The "good" is what illuminates the intelligible objects, making them intelligible, just like the sun illuminates visible objects, making them visible. "Good" here is well understood in Aristotelian terms of final cause, purpose, "that for the sake of which". The "good" is what initiates a human action. Accordingly, the intelligible objects become intelligible to us when they are seen to serve a purpose. And, they are intelligible only to the extent that they do serve a purpose. This renders the beauty and eloquence of pure mathematics as unintelligible, just like the beauty of pure fine art is unintelligible, as pure form with no content. There is beauty there, but pure beauty, beauty without purpose or meaning makes no sense to the intellect and is fundamentally unintelligible.

You might see the foundation for pragmaticism here, but pragmaticism fails because it provides no approach to the good itself. Under pragmaticism everything might be valued according to its utility, but there are no principles to judge the goods themselves, to establish a hierarchy of goods. So pragmaticism falls short. Aristotle addresses this in his Nichomachean Ethics.

The important point is the role of the mind in establishing temporal sequence - on any scale. — Wayfarer

This would be the key principle, the importance of the temporal sequence. The passage of time is fundamental in its role as shaping the thoughts, activities, and forms of all living beings. Once we recognize that we are active, living beings, rather than passive observing beings, scientism, which assumes the reality of passive, empirical observation, implodes, because observation is actually nothing other than a purpose driven activity. And the "purpose", being final cause or intention, is hidden from view, it's unobservable. So the most important aspect of reality, the part with priority, is unobservable.

Therefore we need to start all over, with a logical analysis of the source of activity, "the good", in order to understand all the non-spatial structures which human minds have created in their efforts to facilitate their spatial activities. From the proper temporal sequence we see Plato's cave allegory clearly. The community structures of the sensible world are a reflection of the non-spatial cause. And we extend this principle to the entire sensible world, it is a reflection of the non-spatial cause.

But there’s a deep cognitive or perceptual mistake going on in our minds. This is that we instinctively and reflexively divide the Universe into ‘self and other’. — Wayfarer

Why do you say that this is a mistake? Don't you think that there is a real separation between you and I, and that my thinking is distinct from your thinking?

But where or what is that backdrop, if not in the brain-mind of h. sapiens? — Wayfarer

What does this mean, the "mind of h. sapiens"? Surely my mind is distinct from your mind, just as my thinking is distinct from your thinking. How could there possibly a collective "mind of h. sapiens"?