It's quite simple. Zeno applies the principles of continuity toward simple observable motions, and shows that the observable motions are impossible, if understood using the principles of continuity. Therefore we can conclude that the principles of continuity are faulty for the purpose of understanding observable motions.

When where? — tim wood

You can look them up on line.

The process is a continuum. The result is something discrete. — Gregory

Right, that's exactly the point of Aristotle's demonstrations, the process, (what you call continuous), is incompatible with the result, (what you call discrete).

It shows there is a paradox in that every object is both finite and infinite at the same time, almost in the same respect. — Gregory

From the Aristotelian perspective, it's not that the object is both finite and infinite at the same time, but the object is both matter and form. The continuity is provided for by matter, while the form changes.

Actually Zeno's paradoxes prove that the "continuum" is a faulty idea.

It's not an infinite regress. It's just a gray canvas. Almost every bit of Aristotle is circular and a waste of time — Gregory

Did you read what I wrote? It's very clearly an infinite regress. The change between X and not-X is described as the state of Y. This requires something to explain the change between X and Y, call that state Z. This requires something to account for the change between X and Z, onward ad infinitum.

Change, "becoming," is incompatible with states of being.

Characterized by what, exactly? Does it not seem to you that it can have neither substance nor accidents? — tim wood

It's characterized by knowing, as Parmenides' truth, whatever is cannot not be, and whatever is not cannot be.

Or, if being is the possibility of being, then being isn't, until it is, but in that instant of becoming it becomes no longer being. — tim wood

This is exactly what is impossible, being cannot become, so it does not admit of possibility. That's Parmenides' principle, what is, is, and cannot be otherwise.

That's why Aristotle demonstrated that "becoming" is incompatible with being. Here is one of the ways he demonstrated this. If something is X at one moment in time, then changes to be not-X at a later moment, then there is a time in between when the thing is changing, becoming not-X. If we posit Y, to account for the change, then we could say that between X and not-X, the thing is Y. But now we have a time when the thing is changing from X to Y, and we need to account for it becoming Y. So we could say that between X and Y, it is Z. As you can see, there would be an infinite regress if we account for change, "becoming", with statements of "being", what the thing is.

This infinite regress is impossible because it would mean that there is an infinity of states of being between any two moments of time when something is changing. So to avoid the infinite regress we must admit that "becoming" is incompatible with "being". This means that when we talk about the physical world of change, becoming, and this is physics in general, we cannot use statements about what is, and what is not, 'truth and being', because this way of speaking is incompatible with change and becoming.

I realize this is a common interpretation of Aristotle, but the way. — Xtrix

If you realize that it is a common interpretation, then why ask me for passages? All you need to do is read his "Physics" to see that the theme of the book is change. He starts by saying that physicists take for granted that either some things, or all things are in motion, and he proceeds to the conditions of change (the causes), and then to talk about time and motion. Why would you interpret his "Physics" in any other way?

What Aristotle demonstrates is that the twofold usage of the word "being" is a category difference, one referring to a material particular, the other to an abstract universal. This is the distinction between primary substance (what we call an object) and secondary substance (what is a logical subject). In his "Metaphysics" he seeks to determine which of the two is prior, as Plato in his idealism has already argued for the priority of secondary substance.

What this writer is indicating is that there's a difference between the "becoming" world and the "motionless" world, and tries to say the former is "physics" (secondary) and the latter "metaphysics." — Xtrix

For Aristotle, the physical is the world of "becoming", change, and this is the subject of ancient Greek science, and Aristotle's "Physics". In a number of distinct places, he demonstrates that "being" and "becoming" are incompatible. Notice the difference between Aristotle's designation of an incompatibility between "being" and "becoming", and Hegel's allowing "being" to be subsumed within, as a feature of "becoming", in his dialectics of being.

So Aristotle introduced a temporal concept, "matter", in his "Physics" to account for this difference. The concept of "matter" is grounded in the temporality of potential. For Aristotle, matter, as potential, violates the law of excluded middle. Hegelian dialectical materialists, allow for violation of the law of non-contradiction.

The advent of the new conception of physics and science swept aside the Aristotelian concept of science - as it had to do, because this conception was based on a thoroughly outmoded method largely comprising armchair reflections on what things ought to do, without the rigorous observation that true science requires. — Wayfarer

Do you see this as a problem? I do. If there is no discipline in the way that things are described, i.e. no logical rules for how things ought to be described, then we allow for illogical descriptions. For an example of illogical descriptions consider quantum physics. Replacing "what things ought to do", based in sound principles of logic, as the foundation of science, with observational descriptions which have no solid rules as to how things ought to be described, leaves us with equivocal descriptions.

First and foremost the 'doctrine of scientific materialism', which holds that the only real, or ultimately real, entities in the Universe are those describable in terms analogous to mathematical physics. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think this is the heart of the problem. Mathematical terms are not descriptive terms. We allow absolute freedom in mathematical axioms (infinity for example), in order that the mathematics may be applicable to anything which we may encounter. But the mathematics is not applied directly to the things themselves, it is applied to our perceptions and descriptions of things, noted observations. We use mathematics to measure the features which are apprehended and noticed by us.

If we allow that mathematics may be applied as descriptions, we attempt to remove that medium between the freedom of mathematical axioms, and the reality of physical things. The medium cannot actually be removed though because it is the way that we see things. That it can be removed, is an illusion, a sort of deception. Since the medium is the description, which ought to be disciplined by logic, this illusion, that it can be removed, veils the need for a logical description. Now we have an attempt to apply the undisciplined absolute freedom of mathematical axioms directly to physical things as descriptions of those things, resulting in the deception of illogical descriptions.

I am the reader, judgement made.

Making a fool of yourself?

Have you got a point?

Regardless of the evidence which supports the postulate, it's still a postulate.

It's a postulate of Einstein's special theory of relativity, and that's a fact.

You're being ridiculous to argue otherwise.

That's irrelevant, we're talking about whether Einstein did or did not postulate that the speed of light is constant regardless of the relative speed of the object. The answer is yes he did.

There's no excuse for your ignorance on this - or for such an ignorant comment. — tim wood

You're a strange animal too.

And, the speed of light is not just a postulate. — tim wood

That the speed of light is the same, relative to any object, is an Einsteinian postulate. If you read his book "Relativity The Special And The General Theory", you'll see that he says we can "stipulate" this, to allow the motion of light to be brought into relativity theory.

I wonder if trees believe everything is bark. — Harry Hindu

It's actually dogs who believe that their bark is everything.

I didn't want to mention that as 180 and I disagree sharply on that, and I was enjoying being able to agree with him on something. — bert1

Eureka! I was enjoying the same feeling yesterday: uncanny agreement with 180 Proof! Sensing a trend?

What then of the postulate that the relative velocity of light with respect to an object is "constant"? If I'm travelling in a spaceship with a given velocity, the relative velocity of light with respect to my spaceship will be 300,000 km/h. If I were then to alter my velocity, doesn't the velocity of light have to change accordingly so as to ensure that the relative velocity stays at a constant 300,000 km/h?

What gives? — TheMadFool

Einstein's special relativity produces consistency between the premise that all motions are relative, as you describe, and the premise that the velocity of light is always the same. So, according to special relativity, all velocities are relative as you describe, except the velocity of light which is constant, (absolute, you might say). Then the theory puts forward principles for dealing with these (somewhat contradictory) premises.

t is vital first and foremost, then, that social creatures know the rules of their society. It is key to the well-being of both the individual and the collective. This knowledge is partly instinctual and partly learned. On the one hand, it is instinctual in that by understanding our own basic needs, desires, and emotions that we may understand the same of others. This allows individuals to empathize with others and act to help them in their time of need. It also helps them to know when their actions would hurt others. — iam1me

I think you may need to alter this principle a bit. What is evident, and therefore observationally important, is that the creatures act in a consistent manner, 'follow rules', not that they know the rules. Evidently, many people know the rules, but do not follow them. Also, in the case of other social creatures, like insects for example, it's hard to say that they have knowledge of the rules, they just sort of act in a particular way, without really following any specific rules.

Creatures like insects act in a way as if they know some rules, when they actually do not know those rules. And, intelligent creature like human beings often know the rules, but do not follow them. Therefore what we call "knowing the rules", and what we call "following rules", are completely distinct things with no necessary relation between them.

So you might want to change how you classify the instinctual/learned categories. I would say that we are generally inclined to act according to instinct. Then we learn to guide our actions in various ways which are not necessarily instinctual ways.

The second most important thing is for a society to be able to recognize and address individuals and sub-communities that have to some degree decided to act selfishly - compromising the well-being of others and of the larger society. — iam1me

Now, proceeding from the principles which I outlined above, we can ask, is to act selfishly an instinctual thing, or is it a learned thing. If creatures like humans are naturally social, then acting selfishly is not instinctual, and therefore must be learned. This might mean that the selfish people must be somehow misguided, and we could look for proper education to prevent this sort of individualistic behaviour. But if selfishness is an instinctual tendency, then we would need to learn how to direct this tendency to act selfishly, in good ways.

This requires not just knowing the rules of society, but understanding the relative importance of those rules and the weight of breaking them - and responding to them accordingly. — iam1me

I don't think that focusing on rules is the proper approach here. As mentioned above, many individuals are not inclined to follow the rules, even when they know them. These individuals might learn the law for the purpose of finding loopholes, and ways of avoiding punishment. Therefore in the case of individuals who are not inclined to follow rules, education in the rules is a step in the wrong direction.

This becomes all the more prevalent in more intelligent species - where the individuals are ever more capable of thinking by and for themselves. The more intelligent the individual, the more they will question the rules of their society and if those rules are really fair and beneficial to them as an individual. — iam1me

It appears to me, that you are classifying 'thinking for oneself' as a form of selfishness. Since all thinking is done by individuals, it appears like all thinking is selfishness. How could you describe 'thinking for another'? A person cannot really do another person's thinking, so 'thinking for another' is not a real scenario, therefore all thinking is 'thinking for oneself' and a form of selfishness. If thinking is an instinctual, and natural tendency of these "more intelligent species", then we ought to see that the members of such species' are naturally and instinctively selfish.

Sometimes human beings are defined as "rational animals", so according to this definition we are essentially selfish. Sometimes human beings are defined as "social animals", so according to this definition we are essentially not selfish. However, the latter definition "social" can be seen to refer to all animals, as social elements can be observed in all, whereas "rational" is what separates us, distinguishes us from the others. So "social" refers to a generalization, what all animals share together, while "rational" refers to a selfishness which separates and individuates people from other animals. And ultimately one's own unique thinking individuates one human being from another.

Now the rational, "intelligent" individual, being selfish, will question the rules as you say to decide whether or not to follow them. Notice that the animalistic instinct, the "social instinct", is to act by the rules, without even knowing the rules. It might be what is called "herd mentality", we just do what the others are doing, instinctually, because that is what we do, as social animals. The selfish person though, might use the rational mind, and intelligence, to question why am I just following the others, it might be better for me if I struck out on my own, and found my own thing to do.

Based upon all this I would argue there is, in fact, Objective Morality - and that it is rooted in our nature as intelligent social creatures. — iam1me

I don't know how you would reconcile these two distinct features, the social and the selfish, to justify an "Objective Morality". Any rational principle must come from a thinking individual, and is therefore inherently a selfish, subjective principle. And if you claim that the "Objective" morality is found in the animalistic "social" tendency, then we'd have to follow our animalistic instincts to be moral, instead of rational principles. How do you proposed to reconcile these two?

In addition to the broad evils of greed and selfishness, hate similarly harms society. This is especially the case for irrational hate - like hate for anyone different from you in belief, language, skin color, nation, etc. Such hate forms deep divides within society, infighting, and suffering. Hate is very difficult heal. Hate doesn't forgive, nor does it repent. Hate is largely irrational - going beyond mere justified anger, to a deep seated emotional state that becomes a part of the individual and the collective. Hate is a poison that directly conflicts with the establishment of a peaceful, unified society. — iam1me

I don't see how you can justify your claim that hate is irrational. When the rational, intelligent, and inherently selfish mind, apprehends something as ugly, vile, dastardly, or evil, it will hate that thing. So "hate" is inherent within rationality, kind of how the rational apprehends irrationality, as what it is opposed to. If you relegate Objective Morality to the irrational social tendencies of the animalistic herd mentality, you have no rational principles whereby you might justify "hate is irrational".

We agree for once. :cool: — 180 Proof

Wooo! Let's party! Must be that despicable coronavirus, brings people together.

Is Kants intuitions nominalistic though? Anyone — Gregory

The pure intuitions of space and time, as the basis for a priori knowledge, are ideals and therefore not consistent with nominalist principles. A posteriori intuitions, based in sense appearances, are consistent with nominalism. However, the pure intuitions are necessary in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to account for the form of the a posteriori sense intuitions. I believe a nominalist would have to reject the pure intuitions, as inconsistent with nominalism, but then propose another way to account for the form of a posteriori sense intuitions.

No. Metaphysics, again as I understand it, proposes criteria for discerning 'impossible worlds' (i.e. ways reality necessarily cannot be) from 'possible worlds' (i.e. ways reality can be) — 180 Proof

I think this is a very important point to understand. As such, metaphysics doesn't tell us what is the case, it tells us what is necessarily not the case. And this is the only way that a specific type of knowledge, called "certainty", is obtained, by determining what is impossible.

Compare this to scientific knowledge which is based in inductive rules derived from empirical observations. Indictive reasoning, telling us what is, in the form of an inductive rule, is based in probability. So metaphysics, by telling us what is impossible, gives us greater certainty than science which tells us what is likely the case. This is why scientism is bad philosophy, and metaphysics ought to be applied toward rejecting faulty science.

What can I say? When your interpretation of the work forces you into unconventional definitions of some key terms, like a prior and a posteriori, it's time to consider that your interpretation is a little off the mark.

You-all are pigs. But you want to be in the parlor. — tim wood

Animal Farm:
A Fairy Story.

If you refute any of the fundamental propositions of a theory, doesn't that effectively refute the theory?

Sure, I can dig it. The final cause of the activities of the internal aspect, is pure reason, and its purpose is either knowledge with respect to what is, or morality with respect to what ought to be. Damn!!! Yet another necessary dualism. — Mww

You're going the wrong direction with "pure reason", you're looking to the top instead of the bottom. The dilemma of moral philosophy, that a person will knowingly do wrong, indicates that the motivating factor for human activity does not come from reason. It comes from bottom up, not top down. All reason can do is attempt to directed the living activity, vitality, which is already active within.

Sensibility, as the capacity to sense is (temporally) prior to sensation. The pure intuitions, as constituent parts of sensibility, providing the capacity to give us objects, are therefore prior to sensation.

Compare this to the theory of recollection which Plato presented in the Meno. If knowing these ideas is always just a matter of remembering them, then we get an infinite regress temporally. We cannot account for them having ever come into existence, so Platonism considers them as eternal. But Plato exposed problems with this perspective, of eternal passive ideas. Aristotle provide a way to account for them as capacities; they come into existence and evolve as the potencies of living forms. But this makes them essentially material, giving us the tinted lens problem.

Emergency powers are never rescinded. — Galuchat

Of course they are rescinded. Where do you get such nonsense?

So you’re saying theories concerning knowledge in general, depends on knowledge of particulars. Makes me wonder....how can we claim knowledge of a thing before we have decided how it is possible to know anything at all? — Mww

Come on, you can't be serious? Knowledge is specific, to particular individuals. To say "we have knowledge" is a generalization. But to say that a group of individuals collectively has "a body of knowledge" is a sort of composition fallacy. Where would that knowledge exist, in the libraries?

So your question is like asking how can a person claim to see without knowing how it is possible to see. Living capacities don't work that way. They have developed over time, as features of the various beings, and these beings use those capacities without knowing how they work. Knowledge is a product of those capacities, so we claim to have knowledge without knowing how it is possible to have knowledge.

No, actually we don’t. We can just as well assume our sensory apparatus doesn’t distort our perceptions, work out a theory under those conditions, see if the conclusions make sense. If there is contradiction or inconsistency, it then becomes possible the apparatus does affect the perception; if there is no contradiction, and as a rule we are not confused by our sensations, we are justified in disclaiming the notion of an interfering lens. I have never ever looked at an apple and conceived from that observation, a grape. And even if my perception apparatus has distorted whatever that object actually is, to me it is a grape nonetheless. — Mww

Right, and this has already happened. It happened for the ancient Greeks (as Socrates displayed in sophism). In those days people didn't even know that the earth revolved around the sun. Things aren't as they appear. The senses don't "represent" things the way that they are. And, it has happened again in modern society. Contradiction and inconsistency are rampant. Principles of one field of study contradict and are inconsistent with those of another field, and even within a particular discipline there is contradiction. Look at quantum physics for example, or some advanced evolutionary biology. Therefore the notion of the "lens" is justified.

Kant knew about the "lens", read the passage you quoted for me from Guyer.

In this section, Kant at­ tempts to distinguish the contribution to cognition made by our receptive faculty of sensibility from that made solely by the objects that affect us (A21-2/B36), and argues that space and time are pure forms of all intuition contributed by our own faculty of sensibility, and therefore forms of which we can have a priori knowledge. — Mww

Kant knew that the senses don't represent things as they are, hence the phenomena/noumena division. What he didn't recognize is how deep the difference is. Why even call it a "representation"? Semiotics gives us insight into this difference. What living beings use is symbols rather than representations.
A symbol has significance due to associations, we say a symbol has meaning. Sometimes we might say that a symbol represents something, but it doesn't represent it by being similar to it, it represents it by corresponding to it. When a word is used to refer directly to an object, like a proper noun, the word doesn't "represent" in the sense of being a reflection of the thing. And a significant portion of word usage does not involve proper nouns, the word simply has significance, or meaning. Semiotics gives us the principles to look at all the functions of living beings as semiosis, processes using symbols. Why wouldn't sensibility be the same? The senses don't give us representations, they give us symbols, which are associated with aspects of the world which have significance to us, are meaningful to us. As evidence of this, consider all the features of the world which modern chemistry and physics have determined are real like molecules and atoms, which the senses don't show us.

Hence the value in a representational cognitive system. We already know the object in itself is not what the mind is working with anyway, and we already know the object in the aftermath of immediate perception is not itself lent to the mind, so it makes little difference if observations are lensed or not. Whatever gets to the mind is that which is cognized. — Mww

A representational cognitive system doesn't have value in the way that you claim it does. Consider your example of distinguishing an apple from a grape. Differentiation is not performed by representation. Imagine if you had a number of individual apples, and a number of individual grapes, and you were asked to determine which is which. You do not have an ideal representation of a grape, and of an apple, in your mind, to serve as paradigms by means of which you would make your judgement. In fact, this sort of judgement is not derived from representations at all. If it was, it would require the ideal paradigm for comparison. No such ideal exists This principle I learned from Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations".

We’re not looking for truth of anything, no theory grounded on empirical conditions can ever be graded by its truth, but only on the non-contradiction of itself. All observations are verified, right up until they are not. — Mww

I don't get this. Isn't truth exactly what we are looking for in an empirically grounded system? We want a theory which corresponds precisely with the empirical conditions. X theory corresponds precisely with a specific set of empirical conditions. The problem is that empirical conditions are unique, and particular to the subject. Furthermore, empirical conditions are necessarily of the past. Therefore such a theory would deal exclusively with how a subject might ideally represent the past. Succinctly, this is memory. But in knowledge, memories are applied. And, since the capacity for application must play a big role in establishing the systems for remembering, (the memory systems must be useful for application) we can no long say that the "ideal" system for remembering empirical conditions is a precise and exact representation. All empirical conditions are unique. This is because empirical conditions are always changing. So the ideal "representation" would be one which is applicable to a multitude of different conditions, therefore not actually a representation at all, but a useful form of association, significance.

Again, we get a glimpse of the importance of final cause, and the relevance of moral philosophy. Our goals, ends are a determining feature of application, and applicability is a determining feature of memory systems. Since applicability plays a determining role in how things are remembered, memories are not properly represented as representations, they are principles available for application just like concepts, which may or may not be used for representation.

You’re misreading the passage. Isolate sensibility is to separate it, and in effect use an erasure on it. It’s gone, extinguished. Separating off what understanding thinks is what extinguishes it. You’re thinking separating off means sensibility is left. But if nothing but empirical intuition remains, it cannot be sensibility that is left because sensibility does not give us empirical intuitions as representations. It gives us appearances as representations by means of the sensations objects impress upon us, which is merely part of the capacity for receiving impressions. — Mww

All intuitions are received from sensibility! I quoted that twice already for you. What is an empirical intuition other than a sense impression? I think you need to reread the passage.

.In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation,

First we separate sensibility from thinking through the means of concepts so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. The we detach from the latter (empirical intuition), everything which belongs to sensation. So Kant claims, we are left with space and time. Notice we are proceeding from the highest toward the most fundamental, removing the highest, thought with concepts (proper rational thought) first. Then we move to the next highest, intuitions derived from sensibility, and remove everything which is proper to sense. We are left with what is prior to sensation, pure intuition.

Then, from this empirical intuition remainder, is anything from sensation separated, which are those other representations, re: appearances, which are always empirical. Now, the empirical intuition has lost its empirical part, but is nonetheless intuition. So the final remainder is an intuition, but without anything belonging to it whatsoever. If a thing exists in some form, but has no content, it is nothing but a condition for that which was separated from it. It has become irreducible. What was taken was appearance, the empirical content from sensation, which in its turn came from the impression of objects, which in their turn, are actual real objects all given from sensibility, the capacity to receive objects. Therefore, for us, space and time as pure intuitions, are the necessary conditions of objects. — Mww

Wow, this is extremely confused. Interpret it my way, it's so much easier, and clearly how it was meant to be taken.

It also contradicts your claim that a priori means prior to, because there cannot be an intuition of an object antecedent to its impression on our senses. Just the opposite of what you’re claiming. — Mww

Actually a priori does mean prior to. This contradiction which is derived from your interpretation, is evidence that you are misinterpreting, not me. To make sense out of your interpretation you have to give a priori some strange definition. Switch to a proper interpretation and you no longer need to give a priori a strange definiti

The Latin phrases a priori ('from the earlier') and a posteriori ('from the later') are philosophical terms popularized by Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason... — Wikipedia

No, he does not. We do, in current parlance, because we disregard what he is trying to say under the constraint of his language, and disregarding exactly to whom he is aiming that language. We say derived from sensibility because nothing happens to our knowledge that doesn’t begin with sensibility, but that doesn’t mean we have knowledge because we have sensibility. Again...capacity vs faculty. — Mww

I'll quote it again. It's at the very beginning of Transcendental Aesthetic.

Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions...But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. — Kant

To be fair, this is also true of Trumpist bubbles, but the frequency of those are almost negligible as far as I can tell. — NOS4A2

Most Trumpists, other than yourself of course, keep to themselves because they know that to publicly support Trump requires blatant lying and a display of dishonesty. You seem to have no conscience.

Plotinus thought the highest Good to be pure potentiality. — Gregory

Potentiality, under the Aristotelian conception, which these people used, is matter. The highest good for Plotinus was the One, and this is a Form without matter.

The hierarchy of existence is due to the material of a thing. Matter is the potential for change. The more potential for change that a thing has, i.e. the more that it is describable as material, the less actual form it has because it cannot be prevented from continuously changing.

One theory is that the stock crash isn't about the virus at all. The market was in a huge bubble and if it wasn't the virus it would have been something else. Blowing 10,000 points out of the DOW was a much-needed pressure relief. In which case this might just be the start of the next leg up! Or maybe this is just the start of the great crash and the world economy's gone for good, and all the printing in the world won't help. Nobody knows. Could go either way. — fishfry

Right, the market was a huge bubble set to burst. The real drop was triggered by Russia's refusal to cooperate with OPEC, Friday March 6, which sent the price of oil into the basement. Planned event? Lots of money to be made. The price of oil has a huge overall significance in the market, and coinciding with corona fears the drop was amplified. Notice the usual rebound now, lots of waves yet to come. Sell high, buy low. Social distancing isn't so bad when you're sitting at home with the same portfolio and lots of cash in the pockets.

This massive corporate bailout though. I think there will be a lot of unintended consequences. You can't just keep subsidizing bad corporate behavior like this. It's far worse than the 2008 bailout. — fishfry

The problem might be foreign elements in the US markets. With the globalized economy, the factors with the greatest power to influence the markets have moved outside the country. Despite laws against inside trading, conspiracy, etc., much remains an honour system. If you cheat the market, you might get caught, therefore don't cheat the market. Foreigners might play by different rules, if I cheat the market, no one has the power to punish me. It would be a big problem if the US government was channelling huge amounts of money into bailouts, and that money was being siphoned off by foreigners who cheat the market.

In a theory of knowledge predicated on logical structure, but initiated by physical means, the transition between the two needs no technical account; it is sufficient that the transition occurs, and is sustained by observation. Think of that transition as the major premise in a propositional syllogism: if an object affects perception and from such affect is given an appearance that represents the affect, and if....(continue to minor premise). — Mww

Actually, this is precisely where scientism fails us. It assumes that if a premise or proposition is supported by observation, then it must be true. In reality though, the fact that the referred to "transition" is supported by observation is insufficient to support the truth of the proposition or premise produced, because the "observation" itself must be verified.

If you're not familiar with the tinted glass analogy, I will introduce it to you now. It was used in middle Christianity, by Aquinas for one, to argue for the immateriality of the mind. Perhaps it was derived from a Muslim source, or even Aristotle in a slightly different format. The argument is that in order for the mind to be able to know all material objects, there cannot be anything material within the mind, because this would taint the mind's perspective, like looking through a tinted glass.

The problem this brings up, is that we cannot simply assume that the mind is purely immaterial, and is not thus tainted, and that the human being has the capacity to know all material objects through its immaterial mind. We must allow for the possibility that our observations are made through a lens, and that the lens itself, is contributing to the observation, like a tinting on the glass. Therefore, we need a clear analysis and understanding of the means of observation (and this is sense, or sensibility, in the context of our discussion), before the observations themselves can be held as valid.

In conclusion then, we need to reject your major premise "if an object affects perception...", because we need to determine how perception is constituted, and how it is disposed to be affected by objects, before we can draw any conclusions from that premise.

So we don’t synthesize within sensation, we grant a physical/mental transition, a representation being the result, and get on with it. Representation understood to indicate a “change in the subjective state”. The pure intuitions are not there, no, but the time until they are is practically instantaneous. — Mww

To continue the analogy, I will refer to sensibility as "the lens" through which the internal mind observes the external sensible world. I'll agree then, that we do not synthesize with sensation, but sensibility contributes to the representation. I won't call this contribution a synthesis, but we must accept the reality of this contribution. Furthermore, our apprehension and understanding of the reality of sensible objects will always be tainted until we determine the features of this lens, and account for those features in our representations.

As an aside, the Transcendental Analytic is far FAR more controversial, ambiguous and obfuscated than the easy stuff occupying us here in this first, merely groundwork part of Elements, the Transcendental Aesthetic. — Mww

Of course this would be the case, the fundamental principles are laid out in the ground work. So if there is even a small or seemingly insignificant degree of inconsistency or ambiguity (an indication of uncertainty in the author) there in the ground work, it will be multiplied in what follows. This is why Aristotle serves as a good example. The groundwork, his physics and biology, each is consistent and unambiguous. The ambiguity and inconsistency enters in the more difficult subjects of ethics and metaphysics. But due to the clarity in the ground work these inconsistencies are easier to identify and isolate.

It being abundantly manifest that the external and internal are very distinct, it follows the operational parameters governing the expositions of them must also be. Interchange the terminology if you like, in that a capacity can be a faculty and vice versa, (Kant does this himself regarding sensibility, four times throughout the text) but what have you gained? — Mww

The external and internal are not "very distinct". This is a necessary principle I've brought to your attention already, but you do not appear to have apprehended it. And this points right to the topic of this thread. When you read this passage, the 'same' word exists within your mind (internal) as in the written medium (external). We might maintain the internal/external separation by saying one is a representation of the other, but which is which? Proponents of the scientism perspective will say that the mind makes a representation of the spoken word, but Platonists would say that the word is a representation of the idea. If we do not get this relationship right, we have a misunderstanding.

Suppose we start with a mind/body separation, as did the pre-Socratics; mind being internal, body being external. Now, we propose sensibility, or sensation as the medium between the two. But sensations come in different sorts. We feel pains, pleasures, emotions like desires and satiation, as well as tactile sensing, right in the body. We also sense external objects through senses like hearing and seeing. Now the human body is no longer the external, as external to the mind, but it is the medium of sensation which separates the external objects, and the internal mind.

So it appears like we cannot make sensibility a property of the internal mind, nor is it a property of the external object (the body). It must share both. However, if, when we talk about "sensibility" we may refer to it as a property of the immaterial mind, or we may refer to it as a property of the body, something external to the mind, then each of these two times the thing referred to as "sensibility" has a different relation to the mind. Then the respective role which sensibility plays in mental activity is completely different in each of these cases, because in one case it is external to the mind, and in the other case it is internal, as part of the mind.

Furthermore, we have the standard objection of naive monists against dualism, that the internal, as distinct from the external, cannot have interactions. What these monists fail to recognize is that Plato resolved this problem long ago, by positing passion, or spirit, as the medium between mind and body. However, this medium itself has a dual characterization. It may cooperate with the material body to act on the immaterial intellect, or it may cooperate with the immaterial intellect to act on the material body. Notice that in the one case the immaterial intellect is a passive recipient of activity, while in the other case it is the source of activity. This provides the basis for the Aristotelian division of passive and active intellect. Not only must the intellect be passive in receiving sense impressions, and whatever "feelings" it gets from the material body, it must also be active in causing bodily activities, thus actively causing change to the material world.

This is why moral philosophy becomes very relevant to epistemology. Reconsider "the lens" of observation now. The lens is the human body, which the immaterial intellect looks through, by means of sensibility. However, we now conceive of the immaterial intellect as also acting in the sensible world, through the means of the human body. From this perspective the body is a tool. So the same thing, which is the medium between the mind and the external world, is both, what affects our representations, as lens, and how we affect the world, as tool. Was that tool created for the purpose of scientific observation? Evolution theory would tell us no, it evolved according to survival, so it was created for the purpose of survival. But even this principle is doubtful, because we see such a vast array of life forms of all different shapes, sizes, colours, etc., this suggests that it is not simply survival which accounts for the bodily form.

In any case, "the lens" of sensibility can now be considered to be a tool, and as a tool, it is shaped and adapted for the purpose it is put to. And observation itself is subjective, depending on the purpose of the observation. This is why Plato, through the character of Socrates moved from the aesthetic principle of beauty in the "Symposium", to a more pragmatic principle, "the good", in the "Republic". Socrates' teacher in the Symposium, Diotima, supposedly taught him how to recognize beauty in human art and institutions. These things could only be beautiful because they partook in the Idea of Beauty, so Socrates was encouraged to find true beauty in the Idea of Beauty.

To me, it is indicated from the progression of Plato's dialogues that Socrates was not satisfied by this type of Idea, he literally could not find the Idea of Beauty, or any of the other Ideas he sought in the Plato's early dialogues. Then we might say he "saw the light", so that in the Republic, "the good" is said to make intelligible objects (Ideas), intelligible, just like the sun makes visible objects visible. This makes ideas and concepts, as they appear to human minds, relative. The way that they are understood by a human mind, is relative to the good which they are put toward. But this revelation completely changes one's perspective of on ideas and concepts. These things are created by the mind to be used as tools, for whatever purpose the mind gets up to, they are not at all representations of sensible objects. Further, it becomes apparent that all the artificial things in the world, and even the natural things (put there by the Creator), are simply representations of the Ideas. So the people in the cave see sensible objects as the real things when they are really just reflections of the Ideas.

Sensibility is the capacity for receiving impressions, it does not have a product of its own. Nothing will make any sense if it is not shown that we actually do perceive things, and how they relate, what their place is. Sets the stage, if you will. Sensibility the conception, merely denotes that we are able to perceive things as external to us, while the affect on us still belongs to the object. Sensation is the affect of an object of perception on “our faculty of representation”, of which sensibility is not a part.

Hopefully, this horse is now dead enough. — Mww

Well the horse is not dead at all, because this is what I absolutely dispute, and I'm trying to explain to you why I dispute it. Let me state it bluntly, there is no "faculty of representation". The immaterial aspect, what you call the internal, is active, doing things, creating ideas, etc.. These things which the internal mind is creating, ideas and such, are created for a purpose, implying that their existence is based in a final cause. As such, it is only when representation is desired, as the final cause, that the mind is creating representations. If "sensation" was created with the purpose of giving the mind representations, then we could say what you say. However, sensation was produced from the forces of evolution, so this feature was selected for on the basis of survival, or something like that, not on the capacity for providing a representation.

Intuition does not produce representation, intuition is a representation of a certain kind, produced by the human system. It follows then, that pure intuitions also do not produce representations, they are the conditions which must be met in order for there to be empirical representations. Appearance is just a name for a kind, along with the name conception, idea, and of course, intuition, the kind dependent on the cause and effect of each.

Space and time are called intuitions because they are representations of a kind that indicates a subjective state, just as they all do. Space and time are called pure intuitions because there is nothing in experience that belongs to them. Empirical intuitions, on the other hand, represents empirical predicates, because only empirical objects are perceived by us and become experiences. — Mww

The problem here is what I pointed to in my last post. Kant very clearly states that all intuitions are derived through sensibility. This includes pure intuitions. Therefore we cannot say that pure intuitions are devoid of experience. What Kant says is that they are devoid of sense experience. As I explained, the only logical way to interpret this is that the pure intuitions are prior to sensibility, taken by sensibility and given to the mind unaltered by sensation.

“....In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation,
so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form of ap­pearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available a priori...” — Mww

See, this is very consistent with what I said in the last passage. First we exclude what is proper to the mind, concepts etc.. Then we take empirical intuition and remove everything derived from sensation. So we are left with everything which is prior to sensation. Effectively, this is "the lens". The only problem is that Kant goes and posits space and time as the pure intuitions, the lens, and that is completely unwarranted. If we look from the Aristotelian perspective, the pure intuition would probably be matter. And Aristotelian matter, being what accounts for temporal continuity, inertia for example, and also having the character of potential, is a temporal concept. Form is spatial. But notice also, that when Kant talks about space and time, time is described as an internal intuition, and space is an external intuition. What could he mean by external intuition? "Space" might not be an a priori intuition at all, it might be a synthesized concept.

I wouldn’t, and I haven’t. I said there are situations where the notion of temporal sense is unwarranted, and that the a priori is just as much a logical relation from deductive inference as it is a relation in time. Furthermore, we need to keep in mind what we actually talking about here, and that is a theory of knowledge, in which the hypotheticals make clear we don’t give a hoot about the when of something, but only the use of it. Saying the premises of a syllogism are necessarily prior in time to the conclusion of it, it a trivial truth, and serves no purpose whatsoever. — Mww

Right, we're talking about a theory of knowledge which distinguishes a priori from a posteriori, and you're telling me "we don't give a hoot about the when of something". Tell me another one, President Trump.

Not what I said, and certainly not what I meant. The mind doesn’t receive intuitions, it creates them because objects are given to us, hence always a priori but with empirical cause. Pure intuitions created as the form of empirical intuitions. — Mww

I already quoted the passage where Kant clearly states: "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions...". This is where the ambiguity leads to inconsistency. So you are handing sensibility over to the mind, as if it is a property of the mind. But sense organs are clearly material aspects of the material body, and not part of the internal, immaterial mind. We sense through the means of material organs, and the distinction between the various sense capacities (sensibilities) is due to the difference in the material features.

To say anything is a property of humans does nothing to say it is thereby an impossible property of anything else. For humans, space and time are the necessary conditions of the possibility of objects, and thereby the possibility of experience. Keyword.....for humans. At best, we may allow other rational beings like us to be imbued with similar cognitive apparatus, but rational beings does not necessarily include “sensing animals” in general, but only certain kinds. — Mww

You can say that, but it doesn't really have any bearing. The pure intuitions are necessary conditions for human sensation, this means that they are prior to human sensation. If you want to say that other animals sense in a completely different way from the way that human beings sense, a way which doesn't require the pure intuitions, we could accept that as a possibility. However, evolutionary theory shows consistency between the various animals, and it really would not make sense to entertain the idea that human eyes are radically different from the eyes of other animals, to account for such a difference between human sensation and the sensation of other animals.

“.....But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element... — Mww

This is not what Kant is giving us though. He says all intuitions are derived from sensibility. And, it makes much more sense this way. How could the mind produce ideas, or any sort of thought, which is free from sense impressions. Remember earlier, I said something about meditation. If you've tried meditation, the idea might be to separate your mind from sense influence. But that's impossible, it can't be done. The closest we come perhaps is in sleep, dreaming, but this is more like the mind utilizing memories. So I think back to childhood and see if I can remember a time when I was thinking prior to sensing, but I don't think such a time existed. Therefore it appears impossible to me, that the faculty of cognition, the thinking mind itself, could add anything to one's knowledge, which is not influenced by sensation.

So there!!! PPPFFFTTTT!!! Defined, just as you demanded. Notice, if you will, the glaringly obvious lack of temporal and non-sense. This being independent of that removes time from their relation. — Mww

It looks to me like you failed.
"For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience...."
Notice, the temporal procession described here.

And doing a good job of it, too, I must say. — Mww

Thanks, I'm glad you appreciate the effort.

Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empiri­cally real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them. — Mww

We need to consider the meaning of "ideal". Space and time may be ideal for the purpose of representing material objects, but "ideal" is relative to the purpose. The purpose is defined by what is sought, the good. So Plato was moved to posit "the good", as the object itself. Therefore, depending on the nature of the object, (the good), space and time might not be ideal. So Kant hasn't really determined what sensibility contributes, he proposes space and time as the ideals for representation, but sensibility is probably not designed for the purpose of representation.

That's a significant percentage, are you sure it's that high? Many don't even suffer symptoms, and of those, most do not require hospitalization. But the hospitals can only handle a very small portion of the overall population at a time. What is there, one hospital with several hundred beds for every couple million people?

It's my understanding that if 1 in 5 requires care in a hospital, the hospitals can cope. — Benkei

Do you think that if 1 in every 5 people in the general population requires hospital care, all at the same time, the hospitals can cope? That is not a realistic number. What kind of a time span do you spread that projection over?

Many will agree with you that it's business as usual! But I don't know if that's sarcasm to you. Or just trolling. — ssu

It's neither sarcasm nor trolling. There's nothing new here. It is business as usual.

Price of gold is shooting up. That reflects the fact that the dollar is being destroyed. Mnuchin said the total bailouts are adding up to $6 trillion. There's no corresponding increase in productivity or actual wealth. The dollars in your pocket are simply worth less ... soon to be worthless. — fishfry

The price of gas is down and we can celebrate! There's no sports, we need to celebrate something. In this case we're all winners and we can all celebrate together.

Now, which politicians have that information first? — ssu

That information cannot be characterized as knowledge of an impending stock market crash. In hind sight you say it is, but predictions are excellent in hind sight. That the virus posed a huge threat was common knowledge, reported in the media. We went through this already with SARS, but that threat didn't materialize in the same way as this one. But this demonstrates that there is no necessary relation between the information and the crash. That some people were lulled into complacency, perhaps because we were so successful against SARS, doesn't nullify the fact that the threat posed by the novel coronavirus was public information well before the market crash.

Do you recognize that the real crash did not occur until the drop in oil prices? If you're looking for verifiable insider trading you should look to see who had information on the events which caused the oil price drop. There are verifiable events here, rather than the fears and suspicions involved with the virus. The virus is a red herring. The dip prior to the oil price drop, which is blamed on coronavirus, may have actually been caused by those people exiting, with inside information about the coming oil price drop.

And in the end it ought to be the voters who decide what to do, if nothing is done and it's just business as usual. Unfortunately these kind of things will just die out because there is much bigger news. And the real corruption will happen when giving those trillions away of the freshly created money. — ssu

It is just business as usual. Why fuss over it now?

But in the case of doctors deciding who gets access to medical equipment, a "trolley problem" only comes up when the same equipment could either treat one very sick person or several slightly less sick persons. — Echarmion

Don't underestimate the abundance of such cases. Recovery can be long and drawn out, or it can be relatively quick. If a person is on a slow path, not showing immediate signs of recovery, and the equipment is needed elsewhere, then there is the need for that decision you describe. The problem is that the need for a decision is a heavy burden which doesn't go away until the person on the slow path is either unplugged or starts to recover, or if there are no new cases of illness. So the people forced with making that decision will rapidly get calloused into the quick and easy decision...unplug and get it over with. Then comes the second level of callousness, decide not to even give a particular person the equipment in the first place. If you are that particular person, you wouldn't want a conflict of interest ('that one's ugly', 'that one's fat', or 'he was rude to me when he came in', or whatever).

You haven't resolved the ambiguity and inconsistency. You have an "impression" or "appearance" which is the effect of a sensible object on the capacity of sensation, sensibility, and also a "representation" which is a synthesized product of a faculty.

Objects here being real physical things, affected by objects indicates the kind of sensation corresponding to the mode of perception, the cause of sensations, in short, an impression. That which is received from an impression of an object is its effect, called an appearance. — Mww

As such, the resultant product of the faculty of representation are themselves representations, and in this preliminary stage, with an impression as a cause, is an intuition and this is accomplished by the imagination in its synthesis of appearance of an object in sensation with the arrangement of its matter in consciousness. — Mww

See, the faculty of representation produces a representation through synthesis, but the capacity of sensation produces an appearance only by being affected by objects. The pure intuitions, the a priori, are required to account for that synthesis which produces the representations. But how do we account for the synthesis within sensation, required to produce an appearance? The pure intuitions are not supposed to be there, within sensation, or are they?

The ambiguity arises from using Aristotle to qualify Kantian methodology, which just ain’t gonna work. — Mww

The ambiguity is because of the inconsistency and lack of clarity in Kant's work. That has nothing to do with Aristotle. However, Aristotle provides a good example of what consistency looks like.

This distinguishes a capacity from a faculty, the latter a rational, that is, other than a physical, function with a resultant product, the former merely the physical ability to do something from which all else follows. — Mww

Here's that same inconsistency again. You distinguish a rational function from a physical ability to do something, with reference to the "resultant product". However, there is a resultant product from the capacity to do something called "sensibility", or sensation. There is an appearance, just like the representation is the resultant product of the rational faculty.

There is no basis for the proposed difference between these two, it is an inconsistency. If there is something a priori, some sort of pure intuition, involved in producing rational representations, that same pure intuition must also be involved in producing the appearances of sensation. Otherwise we have no principle to account for the production of those appearances. By Kant's own transcendental aesthetic, the pure intuitions are prior to any sensible properties, and necessary a priori for sensibility. If these pure intuitions are part of the rational mind, then the rational mind must be prior to sensibility. But that's nonsense, so whatever it is which is called "pure intuitions" must be prior to the rational mind.

The “sort of intuition” does not indicate there are a multiplicity of sorts, but indicates the only sort of intuition there is, and the only sort of intuition there is, is empirical because it is by the impression of empirical objects that it is at all possible. — Mww

You are intentionally neglecting the "pure intuitions", space and time. All intuitions are given to the mind from sensibility, but not all intuitions are appearances. That's why pure intuitions are a different sort of intuition. The pure intuitions are a priori, and therefore prior to any appearances, as necessary for sensibility. Hence the 'transcendental' aesthetic.
"This pure form of sensibility may also itself be called pure intuition".
"The science of all principles of a priori sensibility I call transcendental aesthetic."
Do you apprehend these pure intuitions, space and time, as prior to, and necessary for sensation, and therefore existing in all instances of sensation, as the conditions for sensation, whether the being which is sensing is rational or not?

That the content of phenomena is susceptible to arrangement into a form because of certain relations of the characteristics of its content, is a valid observation given from judgement, in as much as we know from experience certain conditions about objects, that there is one by sensation of it, and what it is like by the form of it. If the content of phenomena is derived from the matter of objects through their sensations, then it follows that “that which effects that the content can be arranged”, cannot be sensation, so must be something subsequent to phenomena themselves, or, something common to both objects and their representations. — Mww

The matter of the object itself cannot be the matter of the appearance in sensation, or else there would be no separation between these two. They would be one and the same thing. So the content of phenomena, if it is supposed to be matter, cannot be derived from the objects of sensation. That content must come from something other than the objects.

What comes from the object is its form, that is the traditional way of understanding abstraction. If Kant wants to turn this around, and say that matter comes from the object, into the appearance, and this is the content of phenomena, then we need some principles to support this. That the sensibility is affected by the form of the object is already supported by the principles I described. The question for Kant then, is if the matter of the object is distinct from the matter of the appearance, as is necessary for the two to be distinct, then how can the appearance be in any way related to the object, unless it is through the means of some type of form?

That which is given to, or affects, perception is an object as such. That which is given to, or affects, the mind is not an object, so cannot properly be called one; it is, rather, a representation of the object that affects perception. — Mww

But Kant calls it an object, in the passage I quoted. "Objects are given to us by the means of sensibility...they are thought through the understanding..." If these appearances are not objects, then it's not objects which are given by sensibility. It's something else. Why say "objects" are given to us? Furthermore, if they are the content, or "matter" of the phenomenon, how can they be anything other than objects? Consisting of matter, they must be objects. Do you see the ambiguity here? Kant brings matter into the mind, but he has no source for that matter. It cannot be the matter of the object itself, so where does it come from? Can you say that the sensibility creates matter, or ought we not turn to the pure intuitions, as I do, and see that the matter of the appearance can only be provided for by the a priori, pure intuitions? But then the pure intuitions cannot be property of the mind.

There are only two ways for us to cognize anything, one is by sense perception, the other is by thought. It would be totally bizarre of Mother Nature to imbue us with two separate and distinct cognitive systems, one for cognizing objects present to our senses, and another to cognize objects not present to sense, but of which there is antecedent experience of when it was present to our sense, and, in addition, of which we are completely capable of presenting to ourselves in thought alone without it having ever been an experience at all. It is much more parsimonious, and logically consistent, that we as rational agents operate under the auspices of a singular system, albeit under the restrictions pursuant to the two types of cognition given by our very nature. — Mww

It is Kant who is trying to impose two distinct systems of cognition, the a priori and the a posteriori. If you think that such a proposal would be totally bizarre, as you say here, then reject Kant's system as totally bizarre. Do you not see that Kant's pure intuitions, space and time, and the a priori in general, are presented by Kant as a distinct form of cognition which does not require sense objects. Having two distinct forms of cognition is totally bizarre, and that's why the a priori, pure intuitions, ought to be rejected as misunderstanding. Whatever it is, which is active in the a priori sense, and is responsible for the existence of what Kant calls "pure intuitions", cannot be a type of cognition at all, because it is necessarily prior to cognition. The Aristotelian representation of this, as a pure form, "the soul" is extremely primitive, I agree, but it is far more accurate. instead of giving us a step forward, Kant gives us a step backward toward misunderstanding.

Obviously, the difference between the conditions for cognitions is only given from the faculty of representation, And then only that part of the faculty of representation that has appearance for its product. — Mww

This is not consistent with Kant. Appearance must be prior to representation, as that which is given to the faculty of representation, from sensibility. That's the problem I'm trying to point out to you. We need to account for the production of appearances. We cannot say that appearances are a product of the cognitive faculty of representation, because they are given to this faculty by sensibility, as the faculty's content, matter.

If we assume that the cognitive faculty has some pure intuitions, not requiring any sensibility, free from appearances, then how do these pure intuitions get into that cognitive faculty without being contaminated by appearances, when the cognitive faculty is described as a posteriori to the sensibility. How could a cognitive property, the property of pure intuitions, be prior to sensibility, in order that it be free from sense appearances, and therefore provide us with 'pure' a priori intuitions?

This must be the case, understanding is the faculty of thought, and phenomena are absolutely required for understanding. If we think, we must be using understanding and if we use understanding, there must be phenomena. That which the understanding thinks about must necessarily already exist for us in the faculty of representation from which it arises. And if it arises not from anything empirical, because the source of it is missing, it must arise a priori as already residing in the faculty of representation called intuition. — Mww

Right, except the a priori intuitions cannot be already residing in the faculty of understanding, because all intuitions are provided from sensibility. So how could these a priori intuitions, space and time, get into the cognitive faculty which gives us understanding? The faculty of understanding is a posteriori to sensibility, and receives all its content from sensibility. Yet there are a priori intuitions, pure and free from sensible content. How does the faculty of understanding receive a priori intuitions? They cannot be already residing in the faculty of representation (a cognitive faculty), because this faculty only receives intuitions from sensibility. Therefore, if the a priori pure intuitions are free from sensible content (appearances), they must be prior to sensibility.

Furthermore, if intuition arises a priori under one condition, there is no reason to suspect it does not so arise under any condition. — Mww

This is inconsistent with Kant again. "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility and it alone yields us intuitions...". In your own words, it would be extremely bizarre if one faculty of the mind was receiving a posteriori intuitions, and another part was creating a priori intuitions. It may be true that there is a part which retrieves memories, while another part receives current appearances, but it doesn't make sense to say that one part of the mind is creating 'pure' intuitions, because these would be completely random, free from all influence of sensibility. How could the mind even do that, isolate a part of itself, from any sensible content to produce pure intuitions?

It should be clear now that the notion of a priori is not temporally significant, but is merely a condition for a means for something. — Mww

Don't you recognize that a condition for something means that this thing which is the condition, is necessarily prior in time to the thing which it is a condition for? How can you even think that you might remove temporality from this concept?

The problem then becomes, even if forms of cognized objects reside a priori in intuition, says nothing about how they got there in the first place. Simply put, they are derived from experience, and thereby suffices as logical equivalent to the psychological principle of memory. Just as we can never remember that which was never known, so too can we never have empirical intuition of that which we’ve never experienced. — Mww

You ought to recognize this as contradictory as well. To say that the a priori is derived from experience begs the question of what type of "experience" might you be referring to. And to say that this is experience "which we've never experienced", is simple contradiction.

Lastly, the form of empirical intuition is not the form of empirical objects represented as phenomena. Intuition is given from objects of sense, so the form of intuition must be that which all objects have in common, or, which is the same thing, that which makes objects possible as perceptions, which in turn makes intuition itself possible. The number of intuitions is predicated on the number of perceptions, but the possibility of intuitions is directly related to the possibility of objects. For humans, space and time are the necessary conditions of the possibility of objects, and thereby the possibility of experience. Theoretical derivatives to follow, if interested. — Mww

Again, it makes no sense to say that the possibility of objects as perceptions, is a property of the human mind, because this makes it impossible for other sensing animals to sense objects as perceptions. So, if the pure intuitions, space and time, are necessary conditions for sensibility (possibility of sense experience), then these intuitions must exist in all sensing creatures, and even must have been produced prior to sensation itself. That is why it does not make sense to speak about this feature of living beings as a property of the mind, and it is better understood as a property of the soul which all living being have.

can show how temporal necessity for some a priori considerations is unwarranted. There may be conditions for temporal necessity, but withdrawing such necessity is not impossible. Remember, this is all with respect to human cognition alone, without reflection on all and everything that is or may be possible. — Mww

I agree that withdrawing temporality from a priori is a possibility, but it is not a logical possibility; it is illogical, because the defining terms of "a priori" will be contradicted in such an effort. If you think you can demonstrate otherwise go ahead and try. You would have to define "a priori" in some non temporal way, but this would be nonsense, just like defining cause and effect in a non temporal way.

Numbers are nothing but the schema of the category of quantity. If there are two things, each is already in its own part of time from its perspective, but they may very well coexist in the same time from mine. — Mww

Sure, two things might coexist, but that is not what we're talking about, we are talking about a priority of existence. To determine if one is prior to the other, we need to consider their origins. If they are both caused to come into existence at the exact same time, we can rule out coincidence as improbable, and conclude that they have the same cause. That cause is one thing, which is prior to the two. If we accept coincidence, then we still have two distinct things, and we need to look to the cause of those things, and avoid infinite regress.

But I judge the value of a theory only on how much sense it makes to me, so if I spent as much time and effort on Aristotle as I have on Kant, I might’ve had a different allegiance. — Mww

This is why I am trying to demonstrate to you how Kant's system makes very little sense.

Nice rant, commendations.

Those guys having been living it up with billions in profits that go straight to shareholders, and now they're asking for bailouts? — StreetlightX

So long as people are lining their pockets with unearned income, all's good. But when the flow stops, a bail out is needed to regenerate it.

There is no 'the economy' — StreetlightX

Excellent! That is so true. The economy is the modern God. But it's not the loving God of the New Testament, It's the vengeful, jealous God of the old testament, the God to be feared. Watch your step, or the economy will smite you. That's the religion which Jesus attacked.

The agriculture "industry", and how it relates to human health is a huge can of worms. That one will confront us someday, but not today, because the priority is not there. God (the economy) still rules, and protects it as an industry, and God is far more important than human health. Or...has that turn around already begun?

The worst possible thing will probably happen: things will go back to being just as they were before, after some time. — StreetlightX

I don't share your pessimism.

Still.....how are thoughts on the subject avoided, if the mind is directed toward the conclusion in memory with respect to it? How does the mind know it’s being directed to the conclusion that corresponds to the subject it is avoiding thinking about? — Mww

When something is put into memory, it is forgotten about. That seems contradictory, but what I mean is that it's put away for later access, so it leaves the conscious mind at that time (is forgotten by it), but can still be accessed later. Any random occurrence, or odd association might incline one to access the conclusion which lies waiting in the memory. The conclusion is remembered, because it has significance in the present circumstances, but the conditions which led to making that conclusion (thinking on that particular subject) need not be remembered. I think that we can find the essence of a symbol, or word here. It has meaning or significance, as a sort of conclusion, stashed away in the memory, but the actual conditions of why and what for, are not remembered. So the mind is directed toward particular words when determining what to say in a particular situation, without remembering the particularities of the situation in which the word was used, when it was remembered. Numerous instances of use are remembered when learning a word, so usage is remembered in a general sense.

This is why word meanings vary so much, and evolve, sometimes quite rapidly. Likewise, in the case of a conclusion, a person will be in a situation doing something, and realize, 'I have a principle (conclusion) which applies here'. They'll remember it, and use it, without ever thinking about the problem which first lead to the conclusion, so thinking on that subject is quickly forgotten.

Yeah, that was me using “sensible”, not Kant, who used “sensuous”, or external or empirical. A sensible intuition indicates an intuition given from sense data of real physical objects in space, thus not to be mistaken for an intuition that is sensible, that is to say, makes sense in itself. Intuition from sense, not intuition that makes sense. In the introduction to the “Doctrine of Elements” is found the definitions for terms used explicitly in his theory of knowledge, of which I may have taken some liberties. — Mww

Kant did use "sensibility". Here's a definition from the first page of "Transcendental Aesthetic"

The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts.

First, notice that sensibility is a passive, receptive thing. It is a capacity, like an Aristotelian potency, like "matter" is for Aristotle. As taken from Plato's Timaeus, matter is the receptacle. Second, notice that "objects" is used in two distinct ways. In the first sense, sensibility is the passive thing, affected by objects. In the second sense, sensibility gives us objects, as intuitions, therefore sensibility plays an active role as well. So "sensibility" has a dual personality, it receives from external objects, and it gives (internal) objects, as intuitions. This is the basis of the Kantian ambiguity. If he would have adhered to the Aristotelian categories of active and passive, he would have apprehended the need to divide sensibility into two distinct aspects. Instead of such an analysis, he has synthesized the two distinct aspects into one thing "sensibility". But there is no such thing as "sensibility", he just made it up as a means of putting an end to the analysis and starting a synthesis. In reality, he ought not have stopped the analysis here, because this made up thing, "sensibility", just causes ambiguity by allowing that one thing, sensation, is both passive and active, which is sort of contradictory if we do not distinguish a passive aspect from an active aspect of the thing.

In Aristotelian terms "form" refers to the active aspect of a thing, while "matter" refers to the passive aspect, which provides the potential for activity. So a little further on, Kant defines matter and form in relation to sense appearances:

That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance.

Can you see the problem here now which the ambiguity creates? An appearance is an object created by sensibility and given as intuition. As an object, it must consist of matter and form to be consistent with Aristotelian principles, yet here Kant assigns to it "matter" only. In the previous definition, of "sensibility" he has made the mind which receives the intuition, passive. But now he wants to reverse roles, making the mind active, such that instead of receiving objects it creates objects by ordering intuitions into relations. So the active role of sensibility, giving objects to the mind, he now retracts, and hands it over to the mind, as sensibility is only supposed to provide a passive aspect, matter. But now the sensation, the object given to the mind, has no form at all, and cannot correctly be called an object, it is completely dependent on the mind for its form. Therefore it cannot be actively "given" by sensation, it is actively created by the mind. But this turn around is what allows him to talk about pure intuitions, because there must be an active form in the mind to act on the matter of sensibility. But these pure intuitions are contradictory because he has already succinctly stated that intuitions can only come as objects, from sensibility.

By not differentiating the passive and active aspects of sensibility he has gotten himself into a pickle. He must allow that sensibility is passive, in order to receive the forms of sensible objects. But he cannot allow that sensibility passes these forms directly to the mind, because he needs to maintain a separation between the object as appearance, and the sensible object itself. So he says that sensation creates an object which is given to the mind. But sensibility cannot create the form of these objects because he has no a priori principle there, no pure intuition to act within sensibility.

Now he has the same active/passive problem again, at the level of mind, or intuition, so he posits a pure, "a priori", intuition to account for the activity of the mind in creating forms. But this is wrong because he's already said that all intuitions come only from sense. So this "a priori" or pure intuition which he posits must be something completely different from an intuition, or an object, or anything like that, it would be more like a pure actuality, pure activity. Furthermore, this pure actuality must really, also be present within sensibility, to account for the activity of creating the objects of sensation. which are given as intuitions.

Not in my philosophy. The effect of an object, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. Form, as intuition, is not yet a procedural presence. Sensation represents a physical effect; form is an a priori representation of the composition of the effect. The capacity for sensation is, therefore, dependent on our sense organs and something that effects them. In truth....theoretically....this designation, that the form as a priori, renders it as nothing other than the capacity for phenomena, and subsequently, the capacity for experience of objects. — Mww

You don't seem to be accounting for the distinction between the thing itself which is sensed, and the object which is the appearance. If you recognize that the object of sensibility which is given to the mind is the appearance, then we need to account for the cause of existence of this object. The cause is the sensibility itself, so we cannot say that the sensation is the effect of the thing being sensed, though the sensation is affected by it. The sensation is the effect of the sensibility (capacity to sense) when the sensibility is active. When the capacity to sense is active, objects, appearances, are produced. What activates the capacity is the internal, pure actuality, we might call it the a priori, rather than the external thing which is being sensed. the external thing does not activate the sensibility. This is evident from the fact that we can sleep, and not sense while we sleep, then wake up and start sensing.

A sense organ is a passive thing, a receptacle, which needs to be activated, to actually sense. Only when it is activated can it sense. It is activated from within. This is where scientism has lead us away from vitalism, in what I believe is a misguided direction. A sense organ is not simply a passive receptacle which receives outside activity. Yes, it has a passive element which receives outside activity, but whatever is received is 'interpreted' within the sense organ itself, and this means that it is judged or measured somehow, by an internal activity in the sense organ. So sensing is properly an activity itself, an activity of judging other activities. It's not well described as a reaction.

I think I see why you are so reluctant to accept the idea that the conscious mind can prevent thoughts. You do not really accept free will. You think that sensation is the effect of the sensible object, caused by that object. Therefore you believe that objects in the mind, intuitions, are caused by sensations, and the mind does not have the capacity to prevent these thoughts.

But still, you want an immaterial mind, so you posit an "a priori". But this creates inconsistency, because if the a prior exists within the mind, to influence and act on the intuitions, then why is it not at work in the sensibility as well, to influence and act on the sensations? And if we remove it from the sensibility, as Kant attempts to, we have no separation between the object received by sensibility and the object given to the mind from sensibility (the phenomenon/noumenon separation). The object given to the mind by sensation must have form as well as matter, and the form cannot be the same as the form of the external object sensed, or else we lose the separation. So the form must be given to that object of sensibility, by the active sensibility. But where does the sensibility get that form from? It can't come down from the pure intuition.

This is why the Aristotelian conceptualization, which is has the form (soul) acting at all levels, from bottom up, is more consistent and comprehensible. The form, as soul, is active in all the potencies of the soul, from self-nourishment, to self-movement, through sensation, and intellection. The soul creates the forms of existence of the material body, from the lowest organism to the highest organism. The forms of intuition, are just an extension of this activity of the soul creating forms. However, we have a distinction between the material form of a living body, and the immaterial form (final cause) by which the body is created. Even the lowest organism (maybe even a virus) acts on an immaterial form. The immaterial form which accounts for the activities of the soul is prior to any material form.

In this way, we have the pure immaterial form, the soul, acting from the bottom up, at all levels of living organisms, active in all the activities of living beings. There is no need for the "pure intuition", or "a priori" conceptions, which within the Kantian system appear to be imposed from the intellect downward onto the material sensations. The "pure intuition" is inherent within even the lowest organisms, and is therefore already inherent within the object given to the mind from sensation. Notice that "intuition" in a common sense of usage refers to what is instinctual, provided through hereditary means, so the most pure intuition can only be sourced from the most primitive life form. Though it is sourced from the lowest levels of life, it appears to us in the highest levels, as that knowledge which goes beyond empirical knowledge. But what this means is that it must really be prior to, before, all empirical knowledge, which takes us to the lowest forms of organisms. I recommend you consider what I said last post, that all forms of "prior" are grounded in, or reducible to, temporally prior.

I understand where this comes from, though, for Kant says, “...These (space and time) belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation...”. I rather think this conundrum is a manifestation of the necessary separation between what is given to us, and how we treat what is given to us. On the one hand, a thing is given to us because it is in space and time, which implies space and time are properties of objects, and on the other hand, a thing is given to us only if we can say it is in space and time, in which case space and time are merely subjective conditions for objects, and of course, subjective conditions are always a priori. In the former, space and time could be said to be rolled under the possibility of sensation, insofar as sensation only becomes possible when space and time adhere in the objects being sensed, but in the latter, space and time, being conditions for things of sense, do not need to be thought as properties of things of sense. The proof thereof, is quite facile, being a scant few uncharacteristically short paragraphs, and readily understandable. — Mww

So, these pure intuitions, space and time, as necessary conditions for sensation, must be prior (in time) to all sensation. This means that they must have existed within living beings before living beings could develop the capacity to sense, therefore a property of non sensing beings. Therefore we cannot posit these as properties of the mind, if a mind requires intellection, because intellection came after sensation. As prior to sensation, and active in sensation, they actively form the object produced by the sensibility. Then when the sensibility gives objects of intuition to the mind, the pure intuition, the a priori, is already inherent within those objects. This resolves the apparent contradiction above, where Kant says that only the sensibility can provide intuitions, yet the mind has pure intuitions, free from sensation, a priori. The pure intuitions are already inherent within, as required for, the empirical intuitions.

Close enough. The “forms of intuition”, however, are not proper to the activity of sensibility, for the very reason that the capacity for sensation is provided by the external matter, the environment. Also, there are only two “forms of intuition”, but there are as many intuitions as forms as there are arrangements of matter met with in perception.

Again....immediately upon perception, our knowledge of what we’ve been affected by is not available to us, but that we have been affected must have a validation in order for the eventual experience given from it to be called knowledge. The reasons are legion for why the unconscious part of our mind is necessarily ordered, and the fact Aristotle didn’t recognize them is why his metaphysics was subsumed under an advanced theory that does. His theory wasn’t wrong, per se, just incomplete. And there is nothing to say Kant’s theory is right, per se, no matter how complete it is. — Mww

So I think you're wrong here. The "forms of intuition", as space and time, the pure intuitions, as a priori, and a necessary condition for sensation, must be active within the activity of sensibility (sensation). This means they must be temporally prior to sensation as required for sensibility. Otherwise the inconsistency and contradiction appears.

This is why the Aristotelian metaphysics is actually more sound than the Kantian. Kant introduces ambiguity within the concept of "sensibility", making it appear like the sensibility gives objects of pure matter to the conscious mind. But this is impossible, these objects, as objects, must have form and the form must be derived from the act of the sensibility, sensation. Therefore the forms of intuition, space and time, as pure a priori intuitions, must be prior to sensation, and active within the activity of sensibility.

Prior to is a temporal relation, to be sure, but is generally understood as an empirical predicate. A logical temporal relation of the same kind is usually represented by “antecedent”. A priori is a logical distinction representing the relation between things, or, the ground of the origin of things, but not necessarily in a temporal sense. We have empirical objects given to us simultaneously with the a priori representations of them, after all. — Mww

This I also see as a mistake. You are assuming that the temporal necessity can be removed from "a priori", and this is impossible. You assume that there can be a logical type of "origin" which is not temporally prior. Removing the temporal order from prior, or "a priori", introduces contradiction into your logic, rendering the principles as unsound.

Here's an example, 1 is prior to 2. You could argue that it is logically prior, but not temporally prior, arguing that the concept of two is logically dependent on the concept of one, but there is no need for one to be temporally prior to two. But this is false because it is impossible that there could be two things, prior in time to there being one thing. The concept of "2" requires that there be two individual "ones".

Temporal priority can only be logical, if one accepts that time is not real. The time of this thing may be prior to the time of that thing, not because of time itself, but because of our understanding of things. — Mww

To assume that time is not real is to assume a falsity, rendering the principles which follow from this assumption as unsound. Again, you are showing that you do not believe in free will. Free will requires that there is a real difference between past and future, and therefore time is real.

So the issue here is that a priori thoughts have to be grounded in something.....
— Metaphysician Undercover

(Yes, they do. They are grounded in the faculty of understanding) — Mww

This is the falsity which Aristotle demonstrated with the cosmological argument. If the a priori is produced by understanding, it only exists in potential prior to being understood. Then it cannot play an active role in understanding.

Here is a big problem. You claim that Kantian metaphysics has supplanted Aristotelian as an "advanced theory", but all it really does is neglect sound Aristotelian arguments. This plunges us backward toward Pythagorean idealism, the deficiencies of which Plato had already demonstrated by analyzing the theory of participation. It was Plato's analysis of "participation", which revealed the nature of idealism, as the concept that things participate in the Idea. Kant's transcendental idealism brings us right back to this conception of passive, unchanging, eternal a priori, necessary Truths. This assigns activity to the things participating, and passivity to the Idea, or a priori Truth which is participated in. The passivity of the a priori Truth leaves it exposed to the Aristotelian refutation. So Neo-Platonists turned to an active Form, the One, from which emanates the Soul, then the Intellect. Kant undoes all this, foregoing the cosmological argument, and plunging us back to pre-Socratic times. That cannot be called an advancement.

(By classic Greek reckoning, perhaps. Enlightenment reckoning says a priori thoughts do not require matter, but the proofs for them do, re: mathematics. This is why forms are a priori; they have no matter but are applied to or justify our knowledge of matter) — Mww

But this is just a rehash of Pythagorean idealism, which was soundly refuted.

Us. Me. We. External to that which is represented by personal pronouns. I may experience my own blood but I think I’d be in serious trouble if I come to experience my own brain. And even if I could, I’m not about to experience the workings of it, except by means of philosophical musings. Imagine....a machine on my head, showing me what it looks like to enjoy a brisk swim in the lake. I don’t think so. The point being, there is no matter of basketball in my head when I represent one to myself upon perceiving or remembering it. — Mww

This is just an issue of how you would define "experience". Regardless, when you perceive a basketball, under Kantian principles there is a material aspect, the object given by the sensibility. And when you experience a memory of a basketball there must be a material aspect given by the memory. What Kant neglects is that these "objects" given to the mind, must also have a form as well as matter. Since he neglects it, he doesn't need to tell us where they get that form from. A careful analysis of his principles, as explained above, reveals that these objects must receive their forms from the a priori, or pure intuitions. Therefore these pure, a priori intuitions, cannot be property of the conscious mind.

Absolutely, we might. All the needs to be done is come up with a theory that allows its hypotheticals to overlap. Problem is, what is responsible for what, if they stumble all over themselves? How do they stay out of each other’s territories? A molecule cannot be confused with an atom, even if their fundamental physical constituency overlaps. In the same way, hypotheticals cannot be confused with each other even if their respective logical conditions overlap. Still, if individual things have individual jobs, I don’t see how boundaries for those things won’t be part of the bargain. — Mww

I don't agree that we "might", because these fundamental "things" turn out to be activities. Notice that you even implicitly agree to this principle by saying that the individual things have individual jobs, they are doing something, so they are activities. And activities cannot overlap each other without some sort of interference, that's what's called interaction. Now, boundaries are out of the question here because interaction is not per se, a boundary. But we describe interactions as the distinct activities either cooperating or interfering with each other. If we assume that there is such a thing as cooperation, then we must assume a further end, a common goal. Without that end, the interactions are just interferences. Therefore to have a theory in which the interactions of distinct activities are described as cooperating, instead of simply interfering with each other, we need to assume final cause.

Anyway......think I’ll let the rest of your post alone. Thing to keep in mind is, Kant knew Aristotle very well, being a professor of metaphysics and held the chair in logic. Kant’s major philosophical claim to fame is taking Aristotle where he either didn’t know he could go, or refused to go because he saw no reason to. Either way, Kant is based on Aristotle, for most intents and purposes. — Mww

Here's something to keep in mind. Long before Kant, Aristotle's "Physics" had been determined by the scientific community, as not worth the time to read. I assume his biology "De Anima", had gone the same way. His logic was maintained and taught, as valuable, but his metaphysics would be incomprehensible without the structure and principles laid out in his physics and biology. So I'm not as sure as you seem to be, that Kant had an adequate understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics. He doesn't address the cosmological argument, to either accept or reject it, which is the basis of Aristotelian ontology. Instead, he introduces ambiguous synthetic judgements which create the appearance that further analysis is not possible.