It is possible for the meaning/use of the word to be different from what is suggested by the mental picture which is evoked when you hear or say the word. Thus, meaning is not a mental picture. This does not mean that anything goes; there are other constraints. Otherwise, elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance. Understand? — Luke

If the appropriate picture is not associated when hearing the word, this is not understanding, we call it misunderstanding. But speaking the word is completely different. As Wittgenstein demonstrates, the use of the word [and speaking the word is the use of the word, hearing is not using the word] is not constrained in this way. The problem you mention is brought up at 142. There is normal usage, and abnormal usage. "Normal" usage, as "prescribed" usage, prevents such problems.

What we understand is the meaning of the word(s), right? — Luke

I would prefer to say that what we understand is the use of the words. Do you agree with this?

If meaning is not a mental picture, then this applies equally to words spoken and words heard. Do you agree that Wittgenstein demonstrates that meaning is not a mental picture? — Luke

The problem is that speaking a word is using a word, hearing a word is not. To understand the meaning of a heard word is to understand its use, i.e. how it was used by the speaker. What Wittgenstein demonstrates is that there are no such constraints on the user of the word (speaker).

Meaning is use, and use is not a mental picture, it is an activity. So the fact that meaning is not a mental picture is self-evident from the premise that meaning is use. However, Wittgenstein has provided nothing as of yet, to demonstrate that understanding the meaning of a spoken word (understanding its use), is not a matter of associating the word with a mental picture. He proceeds to demonstrate at 141, how the application of words (use) may be carried out simply as a process, without any mental picture associated with the words, but I think it's questionable whether such use would be intelligible. It may be something like this: "elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance".

In your quoted passage, ("What is essential now is to see that the same thing may be in our minds when we hear the word and yet the application still be different."), what is important is to notice that "application" of the word, or use of the word, speaking it, is distinct from hearing the word. Otherwise you will not grasp what Wittgenstein is saying. What we call "understanding" the word, may very well be our capacity to associate it with the appropriate mental picture. However, application of the word, our use of it in speaking, need not be consistent with our "understanding" of it, and this produces "abnormal use". My point, is that unless such use (abnormal) is completely random, there must be another type of understanding to account for this use of the word (speaking), which is not consistent with the above "understanding", but is nevertheless not random. This will come up in the following sections when Wittgenstein discusses the difference between a systematic mistake, and a random mistake ("mistake" being the usage which is inconsistent with the normal).

Just to clarify my last point Luke, hearing a word and speaking a word are not the same thing, they are distinct processes. Wittgenstein's argument against the proposition that understanding a word is a matter of associating it with a mental picture-like thing, is based solely on the process of speaking words. We have no principle by which we can apply this conclusion toward the process of hearing words. So there is no argument against the proposition that understanding a spoken word (hearing a word) is a matter of associating it with a mental picture-like thing.

However, it should not be inferred from this that you can use a word to mean whatever you want. — Luke

I don't see why not. It's not that you use the word to mean something, because meaning and use are one and the same. If you use a word, the word has meaning by the fact that it was used. And the meaning is based on the way the word was used. So, you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word. There is absolutely nothing to force any particular use, nor has Wittgenstein described anything which would restrict the application of the word. Therefore I see no reason for the conclusion you have made.

"The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently."

If it is always possible to use the word differently from what is suggested, then what could restrict the number of different uses which a word could have, and why could you not use a word however you wanted, thereby forcing the pertinent meaning on the word by virtue of that use?

Again, understanding a spoken word does not necessarily consist of "associating it with a picture like thing" either, so I dispute your distinction between two types of understanding. — Luke

Well, this is the only form of understanding a spoken word which Wittgenstein has described, associating the word with a picture-like thing. He does refer to another process, but this is in describing application, using, or speaking words. So we have no reference to any other form of understanding a spoken word, only a reference to another type of process (understanding) involved in speaking words. What is pointed to is that there is one type of understanding involved with hearing words, and another type involved with speaking words.

This is the weakness of his argument. He starts with a proposition about understanding a word, either hearing or speaking it. This is the proposition of associating the word with a picture-like thing. He criticizes that proposition through reference to the process of speaking words, application. But he provides no evidence that such a criticism would be relevant to understanding in the sense of hearing a word. So all he has done is demonstrated a division between hearing words and speaking words, revealing that these are two distinct processes. This difference ought to be evident to anyone who has thought about it anyway. But, the claim that Wittgenstein has proven that understanding a spoken word is not a matter of associating it with a picture-like thing, is unsupported, for this reason, it requires the conflation of hearing and speaking, which Wittgenstein has actually driven a wedge between.

Thanks for clearing that up. Could you now explain your earlier distinction between ""understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking"? If speaking and choosing words are one and the same according to Wittgenstein, then why should there be two different types of understanding here? — Luke

Suppose you hear a spoken word, and understanding that word consists of associating it with a picture like thing (I will call it an "idea", perhaps). Now, speaking is using words, what Wittgenstein calls "application". If we simply reverse the process above, and say that choosing the appropriate word for use is simply a matter of applying that idea, to determine the appropriate word, we have the problem brought up at 139. As much as the idea associated with "cube" tends to force a certain use on me, I can still use the word to refer to a prism if I want. Therefore, as Wittgenstein concludes at 140, there must be another process, or other processes involved in choosing which words to use, distinct from the process of associating the word with ideas, which we often assume accounts for the "understanding" of the spoken word. That is why I referred to this other process whereby we choose words to be spoken as a distinct form of "understanding".

This reads nicely with Witty's setting up of the 'two-stages' of meaning in §139, only to then subsequently undo it. Note that he speaks, in §139, of multiple (two) ways of determining meaning: "On the other hand, isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict?" (my emphasis). In this light, §139 is an attempt to show that there is no two-stage process, but only the one. To conjure up a 'picture of a cube' is to already have an application of it in mind. It may not be the only application there is ("it was also possible for me to use it differently"), but this doesn't imply that there are two stages from meaning to application. Rather, the application is always-already inherent to the meaning. — StreetlightX

It ought to be mentioned that at 141-142 Wittgenstein distinguishes a normal way from an abnormal way of using words. The normal way is the more direct application of the picture [idea] to the word, and this leaves little doubt in the word selection process. This would be the person's habitualized idea/word association, implying a direct relationship between mental activity and word, by psychological necessity (not logical necessity). The abnormal way is the other process, or processes, which Wittgenstein has declared necessary by his argument at 139 to account for the reality of (more random) word selection, by which words are chosen by a means other than a direct application of ideas.

I am very critical of this classification, because I would class such a direct application of idea - word as abnormal, and the more complex selective process as normal. Witty's argument at 142, is that if the direct application were not the normal way, then our language games would lose their point. However, until this point, he has been arguing that the essence of language, and therefore language-games, is their vague, unbounded, ambiguous character. So to place the direct association of the idea to the word, as the "norm" here, is completely inconsistent. Though he might be using "norm" in a different way, implying at 142 that the "prescribed" way is the norm. The problem being that he has yet to establish any basis for a "prescribed" way, therefore the normal way must still be the vague and ambiguous, natural way to maintain consistency .

I think you could be conflating the use (or speaking) of words with choosing words. — Luke

Call it conflation if you like, but when a person speaks words, if the array of words which one speaks is not "forced" upon that person by a mental image or some such thing, then the person is "choosing words. So, by Wittgenstein' description, speaking words, and choosing words are one and the same thing, because the application is not "forced" on us. That is the point of 139. The mental image (picture) of a cube suggests a certain use of "cube" to me, but I might still use the word in a completely different way.

The use of words that Wittgenstein is talking about in these (and possibly all) sections of the book is a physical expression, not some mental decision making process. — Luke

He is clearly talking about the mental process here. He started by describing a mental picture-like thing, which would "force" our word usage. He has dismissed this as inaccurate, because it is possible to use a word in a way other than the way which would be forced by the picture-like thing. He has not dismissed the mental process, he has just dismissed the "forcing". So he will continue to discuss the mental process at 141 "Suppose, however, that not merely the picture of the cube, but also the method of projection comes before our mind?".

If I'm mistaken, then you are still welcome to explain where Wittgenstein is talking about choosing words (or understanding choosing) at 140. — Luke

It's very obvious, the footnote of 139 clearly describes choosing words, and the conclusion of 139 is a statement of choosing to use the word "cube" in a way other than that suggested by the picture. So he proceeds into 140 saying that it is not a case of the mental picture-like thing forcing a use on us. If you have truly read these sections, and paid attention to what I've explained, yet you still do not see that he is talking about choosing words (despite the fact that he explicitly talks about choosing words in the footnote), then I'm afraid I may not be able to help you further.

What's at stake is not 'one picture as opposed to a different picture', but different ways to understand the application of a picture. This lines up better with: "there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call “applying the picture of a cube”." In this light, to be held 'captive by a picture' is a shorthand for being captive by one way of applying a picture, and to not recognize the multiplicity of applications of a picture. — StreetlightX

At 139, the application of the picture is the act of selecting the word for use. The point being that the picture of a cube may occur in my mind every time I hear the word "cube", but we cannot say that a person applies the picture when saying the word "cube" (selecting the word "cube" for use), because I might "point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube". Hence the footnote about choosing the appropriate word, and the conclusion of 139: "The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently."

So, he proceeds onward at 140 to discuss the outcome of 139. The picture-like thing is what is supposed to come to mind when we hear the word, and as described at the beginning of 139, there may be many different ones associated with the same word, due to different uses of that word. Now the issue at the end of 139 is that I may choose to use the word in a completely different way, distinct from all these pictures derived from all these other uses. The conclusion therefore, expressed at 140, and expounded on at 141, is that the process whereby words are used (we speak and write), "the application", is something other than a case of applying a picture-like thing, or whatever it is which comes to your mind when you hear the word. Hence your quoted line "there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call 'applying the picture of a cube'". And the conclusion of 140 "What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different." [Application being one's use of the word, in the sense of "belief that the picture forced a particular application upon us".] So he proceeds at 141 to question this method of application, which I called choosing words, but Luke doesn't like that terminology.

His rejection of a mental picture "forcing" a particular meaning/use has nothing to do with choosing words. — Luke

Let me just see if I can understand your distorted opinion. Wittgenstein is talking about choosing words at 139. Then at 140, where he states the conclusion of his argument of 139, [i.e. that it is impossible that a picture-like thing in the mind forces a particular application, or use on us, because he has shown at 139 that it is possible to use the word in a way other than how the picture would incline one to use the word], he is no longer talking about choosing words.

Please enlighten my so I can understand where I am going wrong. If, in your opinion, he is no longer talking about choosing words here at 140, where he states the conclusion to his argument of 139 (in which he is talking about choosing words), what do you think he is talking about at 140?

140. Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should
like to express by saying: I should have thought the picture forced a
particular use on me? How could I think that? What did I think? Is
there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces
a particular application on us; so that my mistake lay in confusing one
picture with another?—For we might also be inclined to express
ourselves like this: we are at most under a psychological, not a logical,
compulsion. And now it looks quite as if we knew of two kinds of
case.
What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to
(reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one
we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to
call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture
forced a particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only
the one case and no other occurred to us. "There is another solution
as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared to call
a "solution"; to which I am prepared to apply such-and-such a picture,
such-and-such an analogy, and so on.
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our
minds when we hear the word and the application still be different.
Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not.

No, it's convoluted. Where is use described as choosing words? I know it's your presumption, but it's not part of the text. — Luke

Well, he introduces the topic of what it is to "understand a word" at 138, and proceeds to discuss the meaning of words, the use of words, and the choosing of words. Where's the problem? Why do you insist on excluding the bulk of 139 and 140 where he discusses the choosing of words, claiming it's only my presumption? Or do you think that he is putting the choosing of words into some category other than meaning and use? How could you think this when he explicitly talks about the picture-like thing in the mind, "forcing" upon us a particular use, when we might actually choose the word to mean something else? We have the three elements right here, clear as day in 140, choice, which leads to use, and therefore meaning

WIttgenstein doesn't talk in mentalistic terms of choosing words. He says only that use is extended in time. — Luke

OK, I give up. Where did you get this crazy idea from? Get back to me after you've actually read 139 and 140. The whole section, from here to 200, is full of "mentalistic terms", so I suggest you prepare yourself if you wish to continue.

In your latest post, you demonstrate that Wittgenstein discusses choosing between pictures at §139. That may be, but he does not discuss understanding choosing, which is something that only you have attempted to interject into the discussion. — Luke

So when you describe something, like Wittgenstein describes choosing words at 139 and 140, this is not a case of expressing an understanding of the thing being described? Give me a break.

As I said, there is no such distinction here, and you are grasping for straws to justify your strange assertion, instead of recognizing your misunderstanding of what was written. Go back and read it again, and get back to me when you have something constructive to say.

If meaning is use, and use is described as choosing words, then understanding meaning requires understanding choosing. That's very simple isn't it? And, it's why Wittgenstein discusses choosing words in this section concerning understanding meaning. But if you think that understanding the meaning of a spoken word upon hearing it, is something different from the understanding required to choose words to speak, then you'll recognize the distinction which I said Wittgenstein is blurring. Is Wittgenstein correct to blur this distinction, is it not based in anything real? What about the fact that you can understand spoken words in a flash, but it takes time to choose the words required to properly express what you want to say?

There is not such distinction and that's what I said. So obviously I am not introducing the distinction, you are. Because you do not want to face the subject Wittgenstein is discussing, that of choosing words, you have introduced an unwarranted separation between understanding meaning and understanding the choosing of words for use, in an attempt to ignore the latter. Meaning is use, and we use words by speaking and writing, and this implies choosing which words will be used. Wittgenstein, is talking about choosing words here. How could you possibly read through 139 and 140 without noticing this? .

139...
Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified", "proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio? ...because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on.
...
140. Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should like to express by saying: I should have thought the picture forced a particular use on me? How could I think that? What did I think? Is there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces a particular application on us; so that my mistake lay in confusing one picture with another?

It says "Plato was right". — Benkei

The mob rules. And democracy is the multi-headed monster.

Don't be silly, there's no such distinction. Meaning is use. Using a word is speaking. Understanding the meaning of a word is understanding speaking. Either we choose our words when we speak, we do not, or sometimes we do and sometimes we don't.

At 139 he is asking what comes before our mind when we understand a word. It doesn't seem like the use of the word comes before our mind, because we understand in a flash, and so it is impossible that we'd be understanding the entire use of the word, which is extended in time. It's perhaps a picture, or something picture-like which comes before our mind.

And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes
before our mind in an instant, fit a use"?
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?—
Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it be a picture?

He concludes that even if understanding a word consists of something picture-like coming to your mind when you hear or imagine that word, it is still possible to use the word in other ways which are not consistent with that (the picture-like thing, or whatever it is), which comes to your mind in association with the word.

So at 140 he proceeds to question this idea that whatever it is (picture-like thing) which comes to your mind in association with the word, "forces" a particular use of that word on you. There doesn't appear to be other picture-like things in the mind which could account for these other [random-like] uses, so he suggests that there must be other processes involved [in choosing a word for use].

What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to
(reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one
we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to
call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture
forced a particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only
the one case and no other occurred to us. "There is another solution
as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared to call
a "solution"; to which I am prepared to apply such-and-such a picture,
such-and-such an analogy, and so on.
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our
minds when we hear the word and the application still be different.
Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. — 140

More evidence of the confusion I am talking about. The section ends just as confused as it starts, and this is because of the ambiguity in his use of "understand". Distinctions are obscured rather than clarified.

He doesn't say anything about understanding "in the sense required to choose a word in speaking", so I don't see how he possily conflates the two senses of understanding you are complaining about. — Luke

This is what he said:

But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp
it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time![138]

As I said, I am concerned with how he uses "grasp it in a flash". To speak in a comprehensible way requires a skill of choosing which words are appropriate for the situation. This skill requires memory, and so this activity of grasping the meaning of a word, really is extended in time, through the use of memory. The description, of grasping the meaning of a word in a flash, is very poor, archaic, comparable to the idea of spontaneous generation of living beings. When an activity is hidden from the senses, and then the results of that activity appear to the senses, we cannot just assume that it happened in a flash.

Here is another possibility of what Wittgenstein is doing. It may be that he is trying to dispel the idea of "grasp it in a flash". Notice that "grasp it in a flash" is described as inconsistent with "meaning is use". It appears like what he might be saying in this section, is that what we grasp when we use a word (say or hear it), is something other than its meaning. Since we do not grasp the entirety of its use, it is impossible that we grasp it's meaning.

But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in this way?[139]

In this case, what we grasp when we understand a word, is some aspect of a word's meaning, a particular instance of use, but we do not actually grasp, or understand the meaning of the word, which would be the entirety of the word's usage. What bothers me is that when he goes on toward explaining the learning of a formal rule, he describes it in that same old way, grasping it in a flash, a notion which he seems to be saying that we ought to reject here, because what we grasp in a flash is only an instance of use, a very minute portion of the actual meaning.

I think Terra is referring to the very specific and unusual use of the word 'observation' that is employed in quantum mechanics to refer to what is sometimes called 'collapse of the wave function'. Under the 'decoherence' view, which I think is accepted by a majority of physicists, that refers to an extremely rapid interaction between the microscopic quantum system that is the subject of attention and the relatively enormous, macro system that is the scientific equipment used to record information about the micro system. The macro system usually includes a person looking at what is recorded by the equipment, but it doesn't have to. — andrewk

Each, the micro system and the macro system are constructed so as to interact. So the human involvement in the interaction is not restricted to whether or not there is a person looking, just like the human involvement with the robot who picks up the gun and shots someone is not restricted to whether or not the robot gets found out by the police.

I should add that not all physicists believe that decoherence fully explains 'wavefunction collapse', and some of those physicists believe that consciousness is involved, which gives an interpretation more similar to the everyday one. — andrewk

Consciousness is definitely involved, because the conditions of 'wavefunction collapse' are artificial. Human beings are messing around, experimenting in the creation of micro systems. These systems are far from natural, and scientists have little if any means to relate the information gathered from these experiments to anything natural, due to ontological deprivation.

Neither instruments nor apparatus are self-assembling and self-operating, they are constructed devices by definition. — Wayfarer

Right, if a robot picks up a gun a shoots someone, it's not the robot who committed the murder, but the person who programmed it to do that. Likewise, if a robot picks up a tape measure, and starts extending it beside "reproductive appendages", it is not the robot which is making the measurement. Anyone who thinks that the measurement is somehow more objective because of the involvement of the robot, is extremely naïve.

Observation is a noting of information. Interaction is a reciprocal action. It may be the case that all observations are interactions, but not all interactions are observations.

I'm positive that StreetlightX explained to you at least once before (I can't recall the thread, but I know I read it not too long ago) that observation/measurement in the sciences does not imply human observation or human actions. It simply refers to interaction with other things. — Terrapin Station

Things interacting with each other is not observation, by any stretch of the imagination. If it is accepted in philosophy of science, that things interacting with each other qualifies as observation, then I think science, which derives its reliability through strict rules of "observation", if it follows this philosophy, has a serious problem.

Alot of two-bit philosophy of science would be cleared up were people to call 'observation' in science by its proper name, measurement. — StreetlightX

This might solve the problem if philosophers would recognize that human beings use tools to make measurements, and tools do not make measurements on their own. If philosophers of science continue to assume that instruments make measurements, like some claim that instruments make observations, rather than the fact that human beings make measurements using instruments, then the so-called "two-bit philosophy of science" will continue unabated.

The point is that the meaning of a word is not "a Something" in the mind. I suggest you reread. — Luke

It's not "a something", because he appears to be dismissing "something" for "process". Nevertheless, what he is discussing is in the mind, but as I said earlier, his distinctions are confused so it's very difficult to say what he actually believes.

This implies that meaning/use is something other than a picture in your mind, which supports Wittgenstein's point. — Luke

I agree that Wittgenstein is saying meaning is something other than a picture in the mind. But in this section he is discussing mental processes, "understanding", and not saying specifically what meaning is, only indicating vaguely how the different mental processes of understanding might relate to meaning. The specific thing, or mental process being discussed is "understanding". And as I said, he doesn't properly differentiate between "understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking. These two are distinct mental processes, and though he speaks of these activities, he seems to conflate them into one sense of "understanding".

The principle issue which I see is his use of the expression "understand in a flash" (or however it's worded depending on translation). He lays out a preliminary way of using that expression here in this section, and then he will use it again in his discussion of what it means to grasp a formal rule, a mathematical principle for example, like counting. This later use I find to be inappropriate because it does not give proper credit to the role of memory in memorizing the application of the principle, assuming that a grasp of the principle come to the person in a flash. And with this description Wittgenstein puts himself into the category of mysticism, assuming that the principle is suddenly revealed to the person, instead of giving credit to the person's intellectual work of study and memorizing.

So I want to be very analytical of this section, where he first uses this expression, to "understand in a flash", attempting to understand why he uses this, and what misleads him toward such mysticism. It appears like he is not properly distinguishing between the different ways which we use "understand", conflating them in ambiguity.

What he says in boxed section (a) is that meaning is not a picture in the mind, which is the point (my emphasis): — Luke

He uses "picture" as an example, an illustration, it's more like a metaphor, we'd be better off with "picture-like". The point of your emphasized line is that there is not an "exact picture", there is something "picture-like", but not an exact picture. The rest of the quoted paragraph reads like this:

One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on.

The method of projection Wittgenstein is talking about is a way that a picture of a triangular prism could be transformed into a picture of a cube; or a way of viewing one as the other. It is not the mental process of judging appropriateness between a word and a picture. — Luke

Oh, I suggest you reread.

:

Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you
hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can
this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"?—Perhaps you
say: "It's quite simple;—if that picture occurs to me and I point to
a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the
word doesn't fit the picture."—But doesn't it fit? I have purposely
so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of
projection according to which the picture does fit after all.
The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but
it was possible for me to use it differently.

He's saying that if a picture of a cube occurs to my mind when I hear the word "cube", but I use the word "cube" while pointing to a triangular prism, then I use the word in a way other than what is indicated by the picture in my mind. But we still cannot really say that the use does not fit because we might find some reason to say that it does fit. Read through 140, and the following conclusion:

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not.

In other words, a picture-like cube might come to my mind every time I hear the word "cube", but I might still use the word "cube", in application, to refer to something different (the triangular prism) from what comes to my mind when I hear "cube". Then we'd have to say that these are different meanings.

Regardless, the fit Wittgenstein is referring to is one of resemblance or agreement between the picture the word evokes when you hear it and a particular use of the word. The fit is not, as you assert, one of appropriateness or suitability about "whether a word is "fit" to be used for a particular situation (ought to be spoken)". — Luke

If you ask whether the picture fits the use of the word, as Wittgenstein clearly does, ("In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word 'cube'?"), then you are asking about the appropriateness of the picture in relation to the word. It is the same sense of the word "fits" as I am talking about, a sense of appropriateness..

However, Wittgenstein has turned things around, because we commonly question (in our minds), whether a word is appropriate (fits) a picture, when we are thinking of what to say, but we rarely if ever, question (in our minds) whether the picture is appropriate (fits) the word, when we hear a word and understand it in a flash. Now check the footnote, he goes back the other way "I believe the right word in this case is . . . .". Here he is questioning whether the word is appropriate for the picture, and this is what is common. He is obscuring the difference between these two.

The issue is that there is an activity involved in judging appropriateness (fitness) in the relationship between the word and what the word is associated with (picture, in Wittgenstein's example). This is a mental process, what he calls a "projection". In the case of understanding in a flash when we hear spoken words, there is no such process, or projection, whereby we might consciously judge the appropriateness of the relation between the thing associated with the word, and the word. This is evident from the saying, we understand "in a flash". However, in most cases when we speak, there is such an activity, that sort of projection. But we judge whether our chosen words are appropriate for the picture we want to put across. We do not judge whether the picture evoked is appropriate (fits) because the appropriateness has already been established through habitualization.

Of course it's the same sense of "fit". He's asking if the word is fit as an appropriate descriptive term for the picture in mind.

Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"?

The only thing is that he has turned things around, to ask if the picture is fit for the word, instead of, if the word is fit for the picture. And this is how he is blurring the distinction between hearing and saying. If I hear a word, and I understand the word in a flash, and it is as if a picture comes to my mind, I never question whether the picture fits the word, because I have understood in a flash. There is no room for such doubt in the description of understanding in a flash. But when I am thinking about what to say, I will question whether the word fits the picture I am trying to describe. The point being that we question whether the word fits the picture (this is thinking about what to say), but we don't question whether the picture fits the word, because when we hear the word we understand it in a flash.

There is a distinction to be made between understanding the use of a word upon hearing it in a particular situation, and judging whether a word is "fit" to be used for a particular situation (ought to be spoken). Wittgenstein appears to be blurring this distinction. But it is an important distinction to uphold, because it is commonly the case that I may understand your use of a word "at a stroke", when you are speaking, but if I were the one speaking I would not have chosen that same word as you, because I wouldn't have, in choosing my words, judged that word as "fit" for the situation, I would have chosen different words.

Science reveals the way the world appears to us, and this is revealing (at least some aspects of) what it is in itself, since we are part of nature. — Janus

This is not true, and that's the problem which the op deals with. Science attempts to understand the world, as it appears to us, but it does not reveal the way that the world appears to us because it does not understand human experience. People who think that science is revealing what it is in itself, or even a part of what it is in itself, suffer from that delusion.

According to Wikipedia, "Canada is a country in the northern part of North America." It defines "country" in this way:

A country is a region that is identified as a distinct entity in political geography. A country may be an independent sovereign state or part of a larger state,[1] as a non-sovereign or formerly sovereign political division, or a geographic region associated with sets of previously independent or differently associated people with distinct political characteristics. Regardless of the physical geography, in the modern internationally accepted legal definition as defined by the League of Nations in 1937 and reaffirmed by the United Nations in 1945, a resident of a country is subject to the independent exercise[clarification needed] of legal jurisdiction.[citation needed] There is no hard and fast definition of what regions are countries and which are not. — Wikipedia

And this is how Wikipedia defines "political geography":

Political geography is concerned with the study of both the spatially uneven outcomes of political processes and the ways in which political processes are themselves affected by spatial structures. Conventionally, for the purposes of analysis, political geography adopts a three-scale structure with the study of the state at the centre, the study of international relations (or geopolitics) above it, and the study of localities below it. The primary concerns of the subdiscipline can be summarized as the inter-relationships between people, state, and territory. — Wikipedia

Go figure. But it might be easier to understand what God is

Right, that is a theory I posited is that, "what serves a purpose" is telling us "what is", and the confirmation is through accidental (contingent more accurately) language-game of math-derived science. — schopenhauer1

I don't see how "what serves a purpose" tells us "what is". What if all the patterns which human beings come up with are imaginary, fabrications, and the universe is just a program which rewards people for coming up with imaginative patterns? Coming up with an imaginative pattern serves the purpose, it produces the reward, the universe behaves according to the pattern created, so the person is rewarded by this. But this really doesn't tell us anything about "what is", and that is the system which hands out the rewards for the creation of imaginative patterns. The "universe" as we know it may have been created by evolving living creatures imagining patterns, and getting rewarded for this, by the system.

You mean the real estate? I see how inhabitants would own the real estate, but I don't see how the inhabitants would own the country. Real estate is owned, bought and sold, the country is not.

Such, then, are the differences of the arts with respect to the medium of imitation

What do you think is meant by "imitation" here? I have a hard time imagining "imitation" as we commonly use the word, being used to refer to the medium of the poetic arts. For example, suppose a person imitates another, as a joke, or form of comedy. How is the imitation a medium? Is it the medium between the comedian and the audience? If so, then why must the medium always be an imitation? Is there no room for creativity in Aristotle's account of poetry?

Canada comprises vast tracts of real estate... — Wayfarer

I wouldn't say "Canada comprises" real estate, because real estate is owned.

Everyone speaks English... — Coben

Mon dieu, tabarnouche!

The ontological point was that the systemically-defined, constraint-patterns are intelligible to humans. Sure we can say that anything that makes sense to us, makes sense to us because it could not be otherwise. But it can be said, it makes sense to us, because a humans evolved in a way where pattern-recognition, a part of the human capacity to survive, turned its capacity on the broader phenomena of the world itself, they could not help but find these patterns, originally used for general inferencing abilities in other contexts. — schopenhauer1

It seems we are talking about completely different ontological points. You are talking about the reason why patterns make sense to us, and I am talking about the reason why patterns exist. As I explained, we cannot say that patterns exist because natural things follow logical rules or because of constraints, or something like that. So I don't see how you can argue that natural things make sense to us because they are following logical rules, or because of constraints.

Let me start from your side. I agree that patterns make sense to us because we have evolved to recognize them, and that this means that recognizing patterns serves some evolutionary purpose which evolutionary theory designates as survival. But I still see a gap here between "recognizing patterns serves the purpose of survival", and "the patterns make sense to us because the natural things are following rules of constraint". We can only make conclusions in relation to your premise, that the patterns make sense to us because making sense of them serves us in relation to survival. How do we cross this gap (which is similar to an is/ought gap), to say something about the patterns themselves, when our premise says something about what serves a purpose? We need another premise which relates what is, to what serves a purpose.

Again, because we are playing language-games. Constraints in nature, cause there to be patterns. If we want to call it n-rule instead of strictly "rule" because it is not a human-created, top-down creation, then that is fine. We are just debating the meaning of how a term can be used then. — schopenhauer1

Constraints do not necessarily cause patterns. The constraints must be designed, or systematic to cause patterns. So you are overlooking the real cause of the patterns, which would be the design of the system of constraints, and you are assigning the cause of the patterns to the constraints themselves. So we are not just debating how a specific term, "rule", may be used, we are discussing how it is that a pattern may come to exist. Constraints may be completely random, there is no necessity in the concept of "constraint" which would require that constraints are ordered. So if it comes to be, that constraints are arranged in such a way as to create a pattern, we need to account for the reason why this has occurred. It doesn't suffice to say that the constraints are following a rule.

This makes no sense to me. The system is shaped by the constraints. This shaping by the constraints, is "following laws". This version of "following laws" does not need intentionality, simply actions that are constrained to create certain probable outcomes and patterns. — schopenhauer1

See, here you are talking about "shaping by the constraints". But the constraints can only cause the existence of a pattern if the constraints are themselves arranged in a particular way. It doesn't make sense to say that the constraints are "following laws" or that they arrange themselves in such a way so as to create a pattern.

So what if I am using it in a way that Wittgenstein is not? This is a different language game. What I am doing is explaining/describing how our pattern-recognition powers, like inferencing powers, were created by pattern-generating phenomena from constraints, that allowed us to see those very patterns that created the us. We perhaps could not help but be a creature that recognizes patterns. The other option of nature would be to strictly follow those patterns of behavior unreflectively, or non-recursively rather, which is more-or-less the instinctual abilities that other animals have rather than the inferencing/social learning/pattern-recognition pattern abilities that our species has, which very much can recognize patterns for use in a community. It just so happens that mathematically-derived empricism has refined our pattern-recognition and inferencing onto the world itself instead of a particular subset of other use-contexts and has given us results we would not have initially expected, through falsification and applications of prior maths/logic to new phenomena as far as explanatory and technical results. — schopenhauer1

It seems like I need to emphasize the fact that a constraint is not a law, or a rule. A constraint is a particular physical thing an obstacle or an object of restriction. In order that constraints might produce a pattern they must be arranged in such a way so as to do that. Recognizing that there are patterns, and that the patterns come about through constraints, and even describing the existence of those constraints in terms of laws or rules, does not address the reason why the constraints exist in such a way that allows them to be described by rules. The fact that the arrangement of constraints required to produce a pattern may be described by rules, does not mean that the arrangement of constraints required to produce that pattern is caused by rules.

In your quotes from 2019, you missed the conclusion. The necessity of logic, logical necessity is not rule based, it is language based, and "Importantly this involves construing the notion of language use more broadly than as rule-governed use...".

The problem with your interpretation is that you fail to respect the fact that the necessity of language is "necessity" in the sense of "needed for the purpose of...". And so the necessity of logic, being language based is a form of "needed for the purpose of" something. Now when we turn to the natural world, to observe the order and patterns which exist there, we cannot assume that they were created with intention, "for the purpose of" something.

So language, having a necessity in the sense of "for the purpose of..." is artificial, and logic obtains its necessity (logical necessity) from this (needed for a purpose). But this excludes the possibility of "natural languages" and renders Kuusela's interpretation a little off track. And despite the fact that Wittgenstein bases logical necessity in the necessity of language, "needed for the purpose of...", he makes no attempt to describe "needed for the purpose of" as a logical necessity. And so Kuusela's description which sees Wittgenstein as extending logical necessity downward into the necessity of language (needed for the purpose of) is misguided, mistaken.

One is on the very brink of a misunderstand if he thinks that what we were talking about in logic were an ideal language. Our logic, that is, the logic of language, is not logic in a vacuum. It does not exist on its own. It is not independent of the language-game and thus not some one, universal, invariant thing. — Fooloso4

Right, logical necessity does not exist in a vacuum. It is grounded in the necessity of language-games, "needed for the purpose of...". The misunderstanding which we are on the brink of, is the danger of turning things around such that the necessity of common language might become grounded in the necessity of logic.

The perfect order Wittgenstein refers to in §98 cannot be an illogical order. — Fooloso4

Of course this perfect order is not illogical, but neither is it logical, it is alogical, completely outside the realm of logic, just like "becoming" is outside the logical principles of "being and not being". The necessity of logic is derived from the necessity of language, "needed for the purpose of...". The "necessity" of "needed for the purpose of..." extends much further than the logical "necessity", it is a "necessity" having a much wider application, and broader meaning than logical "necessity", such that it includes things which cannot be said to be logical. Therefore the fundamental order which is found at the basis of "needed for the purpose of...", cannot be a logical order.

I've read 2019's post twice fully, and some parts three or four times now, and I've looked very carefully at what Wittgenstein says about logic. I've found nothing to support your claim that there is such a thing as "the logic of language". So there is actually much for you to say (despite your claim that there is nothing for you to say). You could attempt to justify that claim, or admit that you are mistaken, and proceed toward changing your opinion. If you read closely PI 81 and 98, you'll see that Wittgenstein believes that there is an order of perfection, which underlies all language use, but we cannot say that this order is a logical order because logic is based in an ideal, and this order is based in a perfection which is other than an ideal.

There are two distinct ways of "understanding" outlined in this section (138-142). If understanding a word is to associate something (like a picture) with the word, then we can either do this "in a flash", or we can go through a "process" whereby we would consciously choose which thing would be associated with which word. The former is said to be the normal case, and the latter is the abnormal (142). The abnormal case contains varying degrees of doubt, and if this doubt were normal, it would undermine the capacity of the language-games because in the abnormal case there is a higher probability of error.

Notice that in this section he conflates "understanding" in the sense of hearing a spoken word with "understanding" in the sense which is required for choosing a word to say. He talks about understanding a spoken word, yet deciding whether a word "fits" a particular situation is a matter of choosing the appropriate word to use in that situation. So the distinctions which he makes here are quite confused and difficult to understand because understanding a spoken word, and choosing the appropriate word to say, are very different, yet he places them together.

"But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it, we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!"

The "use" of a word must include both the hearing and saying of the word. But these are very distinct and cannot be classed together under the same name of "understanding" without equivocation. The "grasp in a flash", which may be appropriate for the hearing of a word, is not so appropriate for the decision as to whether the word is the right word to say in the situation, whether it "fits". Now Wittgenstein's distinction between the normal and the abnormal will get very confused. What he seems to be missing is that in hearing it is normal to understand in a flash, and these instances with little doubt are less likely to produce mistake, compared to instances with much doubt. But the converse is the case in speaking. In choosing our words to say, the normal case is to use a process of selection, and if the words to say come to our minds in a flash, this is abnormal, and much more likely to produce error.

Then I suggest you read it again, carefully , without your assumptions about what logic must be. — Fooloso4

My assumptions of what logic is, are derived from Wittgenstein's descriptions. So I see no point in dismissing these assumptions for your assumptions of what logic is, when yours are inconsistent with Wittgenstein, because the thread concerns what Wittgenstein thought. If we weren't discussing Wittgenstein's position in this thread, I might take you up on your suggestions of what logic consists of.

By rules, I mean a kind of set of patterns based on constraints. That is how I am intending to use it. Evolution, like all other phenomena, has constraints on its system and its elements. You have the constraints of time and place, the constraints of how DNA, genetics, and cellular biology works, constraints on behavior, constraints on survival in general. All these constraints prove to produce similar patterns of morphology, behavior, and survival-mechanisms in animals repeatedly over and over. — schopenhauer1

I really do not see how a constraint is a rule. That makes no sense to me. I agree with what you say about constraints, time and place are constraints, and all the physical features of genetics, DNA, etc. are constraints. These may all be classed as the particulars of the circumstances. But how do you construe the particulars of the circumstances as rules?

So I meant a kind of structuring logic based on the constraints of the system. — schopenhauer1

We can analyze the system using logic, and produce some laws which describe the actions of the system, but these laws are descriptive. They do not actually structure the system, so it's inappropriate to say that the system "follows" these laws. The laws describe the system, the system is not following the laws.

Oh c'mon, this rather uncharitable interpretation. Evolution mainly works through differential survival rates. And as explained above, these do indeed create a kind of structuring system- an informal logic of its own, if you will. Systems can produce patterns of action. These are language games again. I am not using logic in the "formal logic" sense nor even in the "general inferencing" sense, but more of the arrangement and structure of a system sense. The "logic" of how a human heart works, or the "logic" of evolutionary mechanism clearly means something different than, "he is practicing logic". — schopenhauer1

I can see how a system might produce patterns of action, and that we might understand these patterns through logic, but I do not see how you can say that there is any "informal logic" within the system, governing the actions of the system. To say that the system has "an informal logic of its own" which is creating the patterns of action, is to say that the system has a mind of its own, because only minds use logic to govern actions.

You might do as Fooloso4 appears inclined to do, and define "logic" in a way which is completely inconsistent with the way that Wittgenstein uses it, but in the context of this thread, what's the point in that?

Do you recognize the difference between something following rules, and rules being used to describe a thing? In the former case, the rules pre-exist the thing, and the thing "follows" the rules. In the latter case, the rules are produced to describe the thing, and therefore "follow" the thing. In the case of evolutionary theory, the rules describe the processes and therefore the rules follow the thing. The evolutionary processes are not following rules.

Your basic misunderstanding in this post is based on your conflating the logic of language with formal logic and reason. If you can get that straightened out then you should be able to see how misguided your post is. — Fooloso4

No, the issue is that if we assume that an animal must use logic, or reason, to do something like communicate, then we'll find that logic must pre-exist communication. And if we analyze why it is that we believe logic is required for such an activity, we'll find that logic is required for, and therefore must pre-exist the activities of all living beings. Then we'll need to believe in pan-psychism because it will appear like life comes about from matter using logic in its actions' .

If, as usual, you are convinced you are right, that Wittgenstein is mistaken rather than you being mistaken about what Wittgenstein is saying, then so be it. I am not going to try to convince you otherwise — Fooloso4

There is no such thing as "the logic of language". And Wittgenstein does not refer to any such thing, you are making this up, to support your misunderstanding. Did you read 2019's post, which is what I was replying to? Logic is an idealized use of language, it is a type of use, the use of language for a particular purpose, "...rule-governed use is merely one of several related notions of the use of language that Wittgenstein employs...". if you make "logic" refer to something which underlies all language use, then you are not maintaining consistency with Wittgenstein. You are using "logic" in a way which is outside of the boundaries which Wittgenstein has drawn for it.

Evolution also plays by certain rules, dictated by the necessity of survival for biological organisms. — schopenhauer1

I don't think so. Evolution does not follow any rules.

Presumably, he is not talking about logic in the formal sense, but a structuring that takes place in the development of language. — schopenhauer1

What are you saying, that evolutionary processes follow some sort of informal logic? Who would have been carrying out this logical thinking which took place in the early development of language?

Grammar is a logical order. It is not derived from language, it is integral to it. There can be no language that is not a logical language. — Fooloso4

I think we already went through this in the other thread and I demonstrated that this is a mistaken view. Logic requires language, but language does not require logic. Watch a baby learn to talk, that child is not using logic. The child learns to talk before the child learns to be logical. We reason with language, so language is required for reasoning. And we cannot reason without language. Language has given us the tool required for reasoning. How could that language which came into existence prior to reasoning be a logical language?

How can there be a language-game that is not logical? How would anyone know what anything means? All language-games are logical. It is not a question of which came first. Even the builder's language is logical. — Fooloso4

Why must one know logic to communicate? Many animals communicate without using logic. It's not a question of knowing what something means, because meaning is use in the Wittgensteinian context, so there is no necessity for "what" something means. It's a question of being able to communicate. Your assumption that a language game must be logical is unfounded, just like you assumption that to use language requires that we know "what" is meant. Knowing-how does not require knowing-what.

The structure or order is logical. What would an illogical order be if not disorder? — Fooloso4

Logic is a process carried out by human minds. There could, for example, be an order which the human mind, due to its limited capacity, could not understand. This order would not be logical, nor would it be disorder. The infinite order escapes the grasp of the human mind with its finite logic. Logic is based in definition, and therefore relies on definiteness, whereas order goes far beyond, to the indefinite, the infinite. So it is necessary to conclude that there is order which is not logical order.

Language has no single purpose, but it could not serve many of its purposes if it did not have a logical structure, that is, if what is said does not make sense. There is something arbitrary about language and something non-arbitrary about the grammar or logic of language. This does not mean that there is a fixed logical structure underlying language, but that all language-games have a structure. This is not an empirical claim but a logical one. — Fooloso4

This says nothing more than "if there is order in the universe, it must be a logical order". But this is the "classical account" that 2019 refers to, which Wittgenstein turns on its head. It must be turned on its head because it puts the horse before the cart. Clearly, logic is derived from, or comes from language. Therefore there is no such thing as logic prior to language, nor was there logic when the first language-games started to exist.. Furthermore, the structure or order which underlies natural language games, just like the structure and order which underlies the entire universe, cannot be attributed the property of "logical", because there was no such thing as logic when these things came into existence..

Natural languages are not as simple as ideal languages, nor are they governed by such fixed and precise rules.

...

Rather, the notion of rule-governed use is merely one of several related notions of the use of language that Wittgenstein employs"

...

The gain here is that it manages to clarify language without having to postulate abstract entities (e.g. ideal languages) to which our natural language must conform to get it right. Wittgenstein turns the classical account on its head. The classical account just ignored the way language is actually used and sought to find the ideal which would dictate proper usage. Wittgenstein takes into account the way we talk in order to show the logic behind it, its grammar, by comparing language with calculi or games according to fixed and exact rules.

..

Rather, clarification by means of ideal languages constitutes a particular method for resolving philosophical problems" — 2019

Schopenhauer1 appears to be trying to draw some sort of ontological conclusions from this Wittgensteinian perspective. If natural languages are not rule-based, and rules only emerge in our attempts to produce ideal languages, then where do the patterns (which Shop refers to), and order, which is found in natural languages, and in nature in general, come from? Can we conclude that the patterns and order which we observe as existing in the natural world, are not rule-based?

I am not asking for justification or certainty, but to look at the idea that there are facts that we derived from experience, that we can perceive of the world, but also indicates something characteristic about the world and not the mind's interpretation of it perhaps. In other words, ontology. — schopenhauer1

This is otherwise known as the tinted glass analogy. If the glass through which I look at the world is tinted, it will affect the way the world appears to me. Since all human beings have a similar composition we cannot avoid the problem by comparing with one another. Comparison actually shows significant difference, and confirms that the glass is tinted. The resolution is to just forget about understanding "the world", "ontology" and such, and focus directly on the glass itself. Until we completely understand the lens through which we view "the world" (and this for Wittgenstein is language), it is pointless to speculate about "the world", because we have no way of knowing what the lens adds, or takes away from 'the world".

Wittgenstein brings up a good point about the fact that we already assume a position by using certain tools and language-games. We have certain tendencies of human nature that can't really be disputed without going outside of common sense. Beyond this framework, there are the mutable language-games transforming our foundational common sense notions into the stuff of our projects and ways of life. Science is just one of these, used for a purpose in a community. Things in-themselves, can never exist then, so we can never make a statement about ontology, just human nature. — schopenhauer1

You need to respect the dual purpose of language which I described above. Language may be used for describing things and understanding "the world", but it is also used for communion. These two are distinct and not necessarily compatible. If the prior, principal, or fundamental use of language is communion, then the evolutionary forces which have shaped language to be useful for this purpose, may have rendered it not so useful for that other purpose. This very aspect of language, that it may be shaped by competing purposes, makes it extremely difficult to understand. For instance, it has the capacity to express any purpose, so that I can tell you my purpose, and you can tell me yours, thus communication is enabled, but also it may be shaped towards one particular purpose (describing 'the world' for example). Notice though, that under this description, shaping language for a particular purpose is unnatural in the sense of creating an artificial language.

It will still be the case, that the species shaped by evolution may have echoes of what is the case in reality. Perhaps it was the necessary qualities of human epistemology that lead to and are connected with understanding the necessary qualities of ontology that shaped it. — schopenhauer1

You display a huge problem here. You jump from "may have echoes of what is really the case", to 'the necessary qualities of ontology that shaped it". Do you recognize a problem with concluding necessity from a premise of probability? Suppose that the lens through which we apprehend "the world" consistently provides us with probabilities, and never provides us with necessities. Why would you start with an ontological premise of necessity, such as, there is necessarily something which shaped the lens? Since we cannot get beyond probability we must consider the possibility that the lens shaped itself. And until this is answered, there is the possibility that something extra-worldly shaped the lens, and so we have all sorts of possible ontologies like many-worlds and computer simulations etc.. We'd better just focus on the lens itself and not speculate about "the world" which you believe we are looking at through the lens.