the weirdness of your difficulty is becoming unsettling... — unenlightened

Are you starting to see why you shouldn't have been so quick to trust me? And I've been subjected to many institutions of enforcement.

The way to the station is one thing, but I do not ask a random stranger to operate on my hernia, or govern the country. the weirdness of your difficulty is becoming unsettling... — unenlightened

I just don't see how years of training at medical school makes a person trustworthy. I really don't think you are even talking about trust here. You are judging whether a particular person is fit for a specific job (has the adequate training), not whether the person is trustworthy. The problem is that the person you judge to be fit for the job might still be untrustworthy. Judging whether a person has been subjected to the appropriate institutions of enforcement required to learn how to carry out a specific job is not the same judgement as judging whether the person is trustworthy, because those institutions are incapable of enforcing trustworthiness. The dishonest are capable of hiding their dishonesty, and that's how they deceive us.

But is it just a difference in matters? Why do scientific facts obtain so well? You can say that it is similar to how a carpenter creates a masterpiece furniture, but is that the same? A man-made object created by someone, or a social convention, can be arbitrarily changed, and is contingent, varied. Any decision on it would be the freedom of the carpenter, or the architect. Perhaps the language of the woordworker is real in that community, but they are contingent conventions. This is not so with the science language game. There are constraints that nature is imposing, making the findings a necessity. It is nature forcing our hand. It moves away from contingency and hits on necessity. Wittgenstein's "forms of life" and "use" may not fit this scenario of science. You, in a really superficial way, can make an argument that humans are interested in pursuing scientific ideas, so in that sense is "for us", but the evidence gets more refined over time, more precise, more accurate, and leads to powerful results. — schopenhauer1

I don't see how you can say "use" does not fit scientific language games. The reality of the world is inherent within "use", as what is used. So "for us" implies two things, the "for" implies purpose, usefulness, and therefore the reality of use, and the "us" implies a communion of people. These are the two underlying features of language games, the communion of people, and the purposes of those people making use of the reality of the world.

The "real" universe is simply taken for granted, as is often the case in philosophy, but it's a reality of use. Perhaps even the Kantian position that we have no access toward understanding the noumenal world is also taken for granted. What is available to us for study and description, is the way that we use the world. And this is most evident in language. But language is complex, because not only is it comprised of the reality of people using the world, it is also comprised of the reality of the communion of people. These are distinct "realities" understood by distinct principles, and it would be extremely difficult to analyze language in such a way as to separate the manifestations of each, within language. They are well intertwined.

Right, but Wittgenstein does investigate what "how things are for us" means, because "us" implies a communion which is closely related to communication, and this is one of his principal interests.

As I said already, either there is a "how things are for us" which is prior to language and necessary for the existence of language, or "how things are for us" is something which emerges from language. Which position do you think Wittgenstein supports?

No, the opposite; no one is entitled to anyone's trust. — unenlightened

I still don't understand. You are willing to trust anyone, yet no one is entitled to that trust. On what basis do you give your trust? If trust is some thing that you just randomly give to anyone at anytime, for no apparent reason, how is it of any value?

Yes, in so far as one trusts, which may be as far as one can throw or some other extent, there can be no conditions. If I set a condition: - 'I'll trust you to respond thoughtfully, but if you don't, I'll kill you', then I don't trust you to respond thoughtfully, do I? — unenlightened

Isn't this exactly what enforcement says? It says that I do not trust that others will be trustworthy, so I want to enact measure to ensure that they will be. Isn't the desire for enforcement, and institutions to create trust just a manifestation of distrust?

But can some empirical facts be different in regards to being part of the language game? Is there something science is showing us? Certainly we recognize patterns of nature. We contingently hit upon the Westernized formal science we have now. But is that just a language game we hit upon or something else? What are facts to Wittgenstein? Are there social facts vs. scientific facts, or is it all the same kind of conventionalism all the way down? — schopenhauer1

Have you read "On Certainty"? We can say "it is certain" about some things, and I suppose that this is as close as Wittgenstein gets to saying what a fact is. These are things which it would be unreasonable to doubt.

The point I was addressing is the noumenal-phenomenal distinction, the distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they are for us. According to Kant, the categories of the understanding are universal. Whatever distinction you are making between things as they appear to you and how they are for us is another issue. — Fooloso4

OK, now suppose we take this Kantian position, and attempt to justify this notion you put forward about "how things are for us". This would require that something would have to appear the same to you, me, and everyone else included in "us". Then we could say that there is such a thing as how this thing appears to "us". So why is it that different people use different words to describe the very same situation? Or is it the case that since my perspective is different from yours, it really isn't the very same situation? There is no such thing as "how things are for us", and Wittgenstein points to this with his description of language-games.

I do not have any idea how you got from anything I said that he takes for us for granted. The relationship between us and language is that language is our language. It does not exist independently of us. — Fooloso4

The issue is, as I described to Schop, how one gets from how things appear to me, to how things are "for us". This is a metaphysical issue, so being concerned with how things are "for us", is metaphysics. And Wittgenstein makes no attempt to skip the metaphysics to make it an epistemological issue.

Can you explain what you mean by "directed by purpose" vs. the "for us"? — schopenhauer1

We all act for purposes, this is will and intention. My acts are not your acts, nor are my intentions your intentions. To say that there is something "for us" implies a common intention between us. Where does this notion of a common purpose come from?

I did not say anything about a principle. I do not recall anywhere where he discusses the distinction. If you can cite where he does then perhaps we can discuss it. — Fooloso4

You imply that Wittgenstein takes "for us" for granted. He does not, he recognizes a relationship between the existence of "for us" and the existence of language, and investigates this. Though it may not be classical metaphysics, this is metaphysics.

So yes, Wittgenstein, does seem to have a metaphysical stance of the "for us". But what happens when the "for us" bumps against patterns of nature that seem indicate the "not for us"? — schopenhauer1

Well, there is the bigger issue of how is the "for us" even a real perspective, when everything I apprehend is "for me". Language-games appear to me, to create the "for us". But maybe it's the case that there must already be such a thing as "for-us" in order for a language-game to even come into existence. If it's the former which is the case, then language-games are completely directed by purpose. If it's the latter which is the case, then the underlying "for us" is what directs the language-games rather than the "for me" (purpose).

But isn't the principle of "as they are for us" rather than "as they are for me" for example, a metaphysical principle?

Many believe that wanton killing is not a good thing. Killing is a serious action which needs to be only carried out for a good reason, and this needs to be respected. The good reason might be to eat the thing which has been killed. So when you feel the urge to kill your enemies you might need to justify this activity. That they are your enemies does not justify killing them, but eating them might.

How unusual, a contributor to TPF who hides behind terms as if they were a costume.

Is this an ontology? Yes and no. Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. This is not the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. It is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the question of how things are in themselves, but rather with what we say and do. The essence of something, what it is to be what is it, means it's place in our form of life. It is in that sense not fixed and unchanging. — Fooloso4

Why do you say that this is "not metaphysical"? To make a distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us", is to make a metaphysical assumption. If the point of interest is "as they are for us", this makes the assumption no less metaphysical.

I don't think "paranoid" is a designator at all, because it refers to a property rather than an object.

No. I'm saying that trust cannot be earned. I trust you already. It's not something you are entitled to because you are righteous. — unenlightened

I assume then, that "trust" is an attitude which you have toward me, and others as well. Would you say that you are born to be trusting, so it is instinctual that you tend to trust people, and you might learn at a young age that if a person failed your trust, you might revoke it? If so, do you think it is possible that someone else, someone like me might have been born with the instinct to be untrusting, and with that attitude I would learn at a young age that people would have to pass my tests of trustworthiness before I would trust them?

What if it's not an instinct at all, but something we learn at a very young age? Do you think it is possible that the experiences we gain at an extremely young age would shape our attitudes of trust? Suppose we're born with a sort of blank slate in respect to trust, and our young experiences form an attitude which makes us either naturally trust people, or naturally mistrust people. But these would be the extremes, the attitude to trust everyone, like yours, and the attitude to distrust everyone, like mine. In reality, I think most of us would actually fall in between somewhere.

So when we meet someone, on first impression one might either trust or not trust that person, due to the combination of some features of the person having been noticed, and the early age conditioning. In this case, we would not tend to naturally trust everyone, nor naturally distrust everyone, there would be features about the person which would trigger a natural trust or distrust toward the person, depending on the early age experiences.

It's not something you are entitled to because you are righteous. — unenlightened

I'm really having difficulty understanding this attitude. Are you saying that all people are entitled to your trust whether or not they are righteous? Are you saying that you place no conditions on your trust? I can see how trust itself might be construed as being unconditional, like love is sometimes supposed to be, but I cannot see how you could just naturally give anyone you meet unconditional trust. So you could give some people unconditional trust, like you could give some people unconditional love, if this is what trust is meant to be, without conditions, but how could you give this to anyone, or everyone you meet?

Then we could work to make politicians great again.

Wittgenstein seems to be fascinated by mathematics and numbers. It appears like he sees that numbers work, but he doesn't understand how numbers work, so he's trying to get to the bottom of this. His approach to understanding numbers is to assume that they are a form of language, and address them as such.

He has exposed a gap between common, every day concepts like "game", which are vague and essentially without boundary, and the more precise logical concepts of logic and mathematics. So at 81 the question of what it means to be "operating a calculus according to definite rules" is posed. But this question puts us on the brink of misunderstanding, that is if we proceed with the wrong answer we fall into misunderstanding. After some background information is laid out the "difficulty" with mathematics is broached again at 125:

125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction
by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but
to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics
that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
(And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.)...

Now we can see clearly, at 135, that the meaning of a proposition is being compared to the meaning of numbers, a mathematical statement or equation for example. In the section which follows, we will see that Wittgenstein extends the vague, boundlessness of common language, through logical propositions, right into mathematics. This is expressed in the possibility of following the rule in a different way. There is an analogy of a machine. It always operates in the same way, just like people following the rules of mathematics, but the possibility is still there, that something could break or go wrong (a person could follow the rule in a different way).

The misunderstanding, mentioned at 81, which we were on the brink of, and must be avoided is if we proceed to understand rule following in the opposite way. This would be an attempt to extend the "definite rules" which appear to underlie mathematics, into logical propositions, and language use in general, to conclude that language use must consist of following definite rules. The underlying thing in language is the vague boundlessness, and this must be understood from its existence in common language, to underlie logical propositions, and even mathematics itself, which appears to consist only of definite rules. To proceed the other way, to understand the definite rules which mathematics appears to be composed of, as underlying all language use, is to misunderstand. The rules come into existence only for specific purposes.

Well, how do you make an abstract descriptor as "paranoia" into a, in a sense, a vivid designator for all Ralphs that posses the attribute of being "paranoid" manifest in his de re statement that his neighbor is a spy? — Wallows

But paranoia is a property of a thing (person)), it's not a name of the thing. How is Ralph's statement "my neighbour is a spy" evidence that he is paranoid?

It appears like you are trying to make the attribute "paranoia" necessary, as if it were the thing's name, and then treat it as if it were a non-essential attribute of the thing, in your counterfactuals. You can't have both. Either the thing is designated as "paranoid" and we seek the properties of "paranoid", or the thing is designated as "Ralph", and we seek the properties of Ralph (one might be paranoia).

I think I get it. "The drum is empty of liquid", and "the drum is full of vapour", are two distinct focal concepts, referring to the same thing. I think my point was that before we can proceed in an ontological discussion we need to establish our starting point. What are we talking about, liquid or gas? From one perspective the drum is empty, and from the other it is full. I think AJJ was tying to mix them up, is and ought.

Yes, but, doesn't that make it a de facto a de re attitude? — Wallows

Now how do you make it into a counterfactual de re attitude?

As I explained, Ralph cannot validly conclude that his neighbour is a spy, whether he suffers delusions or not is irrelevant. Logic doesn't work that way, it's backward. He must start with the designation, the neighbour is a spy, and proceed logically from there. But that proposition is supported by evidence, not a logical conclusion, and Ralph's mental state is relevant in his judgement of evidence.

No. Trust cannot be earned. You may have turned down 40 pieces of silver to betray me, but what about 60? — unenlightened

I don't understand this attitude. Are you saying that if I was close to you for years, a good friend for many years, and I never did anything to incline you to distrust me, I would never earn your trust? Are you paranoid or what?

But to enforce a standard is not to create trust at all, it is to declare whatought to be trustworthy. It's like having a law against shop-lifting; it doesn't make every customer trustworthy, but sets out what being a trustworthy customer consists of. — unenlightened

OK, I see that such a standard is set to demonstrate what being trustworthy consists of. We might model ourselves to the standard to become trustworthy people, or judge people in reference to the standard in order to determine whether or not they are trustworthy. Where is the need for enforcement? It appears to me like enforcement would have a negative affect. It would force the untrustworthy to behave according to the standard against their will, making them appear to be trustworthy, so that we might judge them as trustworthy, when they really are not. Then they would take advantage of us in other ways where the enforcement didn't reach. Dishonest people may obey the laws, but find the loopholes.

Similarly, t.here is a rule that you cannot print your own money. And that establishes legal tender as something that ought to be trustworthy, and obligates governments to act to maintain it so. That there may be forgers as that there may be shoplifters and dishonest politicians is not in question, we need it to be the case that there ought not be. — unenlightened

It is not the rule which establishes what ought to be, we determine what we believe ought to be, and then we make the rule to represent this. So it was determined that legal tender ought to be trustworthy and then the rule, that you cannot print your own, was produced to support this. The rule follows what we believe ought to be, not vise versa.

Either it is the case, or it is not the case that there ought not be forgers, shoplifters, or dishonest politicians, but making laws to represent one's opinion concerning this, will not change the truth concerning it. Neither will enforcing the laws change whether there ought or ought not be forgers shoplifters, or dishonest politicians.

What I think you are talking about is changing people's opinions about what ought to be. You want people to believe that politicians ought to be trustworthy for example. To do this, I think you need to get people to look at facts, not to make laws for enforcement.

Suppose Ralph believes there is a spy, but has not determined the person who is a spy, so he says "there is a spy", this is de dicto. If Ralph believes his neighbour is a spy, and says "John is a spy", this is de re. The two are not incompatible, the neighbour may be a spy, and the de dcito instance may be true even if Ralph suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.

Now, this all seems to imply in my mind, that it boils down to essentialism, such that de re: "Because Ralph is a schizophrenic because he believes his neighbor is a spy." Whereas de dicto: "Nobody is a spy because Ralph falsely believes his neighbor is a spy due to his (essentialist?) quality of being a schizophrenic." — Wallows

I think you misunderstand the nature of de dicto. Ralph thinks there is an object which fulfills the conditions of being " a spy", and therefore is a spy. Perhaps what is confusing you is the fact that you cannot proceed logically from the de dicto to confirm the de re. The "therefore is a spy" does not follow. In other words, Ralph may produce an endless list of the properties of "a spy", and the object (the neighbour) may match every property, but this cannot produce the logical conclusion that the neighbour is a spy, because Ralph needs a further premise which says that every object with such and such properties is a spy. But Ralph's list of properties of a spy does not necessitate that any object with those properties is a spy. So despite the de dicto (Ralph believes there is a spy), and the fact that the neighbour fulfills all Ralph's criteria of "a spy", Ralph cannot validly produce the de re conclusion that the neighbour is a spy. That's the nature of human judgement, it's fallible.

The substantive issue to me is that no metaphysical debate can rely on classical (binary) logic, because set membership (properties) of 'focal concepts' is contextually transient. — fresco

I haven't been able to figure out what you mean by "focal concept". Care to explain?

The difference is that there is no enforcement of any standard. In the UK it used to be managed by peer pressure — unenlightened

Trust is earned, it cannot be enforced. When it is lost, we suffer the consequences. But trust will not be regained through enforcement. That ship has sailed. This thread is depressing.

My point was language-games have a base in "real" causes (patterns of evolutionary necessity) and in turn, lead to language-games like math-informed empirical investigation in general, which, though contingently constructed, has "hit upon" an understanding of the very patterns of nature, which has constructed the human (amongst other patterns of nature, ones harnessed for complex technologies and predictive accuracy of investigation into natural phenomena). — schopenhauer1

The problem here being that, as I described in my other post, we have no principle whereby we can say that a language-game is a "real" object. Remember the question of 65 what is a language-game, and the following inability to say what exactly what a game is. Then we enter the paradox of trying to describe language with language. This is what is causing him the philosophical problems. In the Tractatus he found reality in representation, but he later noticed this was incorrect. Here he searches into concepts, ideas, but rejects Platonism and finds that language-games are based in human purpose.

Now language-games may be described in terms of learning social conventions, and the natural tendencies required to learn these conventions, but if we want to name "the real cause", we cannot get beyond purpose. Purpose is what holds the various features together into some kind of unity, which Wittgenstein calls a game. But here we reach the paradox I refer to earlier, with trying to describe language using language itself. To produce a true bounded object, a game with clear and consistent rules, we must specify the purpose. And as soon as we specify a particular purpose, we make an error in our description of language, because language is not bounded to be directed toward one particular purpose, it is unbounded so as to be adaptable to any purpose.

Language-games are 'real' through and through... — StreetlightX

I don't think we can say that a language-game is real. Remember the section starting at 65, where he asks what is a language-game, and consequently what is a game. We go into an unbounded, vague, conceptual realm where it would be impossible to separate one language game from another, to give one or another real separate existence, as they are dependent on a specific purpose, and purposes are general, vague and overlapping. And now, he has implied that there is no such thing as language as a whole, as a unity of all language-games in the language-game. So I really don't think we can say that a language-game is something real.

Wittgenstein reduces logical necessity to a form of "needed for a particular purpose". This is the pragmatist standard, conception is based in purpose. The problem is that Wittgenstein does take this position happily, or even willingly, it's a philosophical problem which worries him. He seems to have an underlying disposition to reject this pragmatism as deficient. So he attempts to get to the bottom of it, and find something real which supports it. From the days of the Tractatus, to now in the Investigations, he seeks a way out of the pragmatist mess. He seems to believe that there must be some underlying reality, which would give a necessity to logic, a necessity other than purpose. In the Tractattus he considered fundamental elements (materialism), and in this book he considers fundamental Ideas (Platonic realism), but neither of these is acceptable. So he is stuck in this pragmatist base where "logically necessary" simply means necessary for the purpose of this particular logic.

At this point there is nothing here to indicate that he is nominalist. He has found no basis for the assumption that social conventions are based in anything "real". They are part of the language-games. The only thing we might assume as a basis for convention is a commonality of purpose but we haven't gotten an indication of this yet.

185. Let us return to our example (143). Now—judged by the
usual criteria—the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers.
Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and
get him to the point of writing down series of the form down the series of natural numbers. — Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000.

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000 —
and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done!" — He doesn't understand.

We say: "You were meant to add tn>o\ look how you began the series!"
— He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was
meant to do it." —— Or suppose he pointed to the series and said:
"But I went on in the same way." — It would now be no use to say:
"But can't you see . . . . ?" — and repeat the old examples and explanations.
— In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this
person to understand our order with our explanations as we should
understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000
and so on."

Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person
naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking
in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to
finger-tip. — Philosophical investigations

The point here being that in order to carry out the rule of the social convention, one must be able to understand that rule. To understand the rule requires that the person sees things (with the mind) in the same way as the others. This seeing things in the same way is instinctual, it's what "comes natural" to the person. So now we have this underlying instinct, or intuition, which is necessary for, and underpins the social conventions.

Perhaps these complexities, or what I call "patterns", are part of a bigger picture of explanation. Language-games may be true (pace Wittgenstein), but some language-games are based in a realism of necessary pattern-recognition that is necessary by way of evolutionary necessity. Animals that do not recognize patterns, would not survive. Thus there is a realism underlying the conventionalism or nominalism of Wttgenstein's project — schopenhauer1

Necessary, in the sense of required for the purpose of (in this case survival), is associated with usefulness. And usefulness is the supporting principle of pragmatist metaphysics. I see no way to make any form of pragmatism consistent with any form of realism, due to the gap between them, commonly cited as the is/ought gap. You are clearly jumping this gap, when you claim that the existence of things which exist for various purposes (language-games), support some sort of realism. Until the purpose itself is shown to have real existence, the things which exist for that purpose cannot be said to have real existence.

Therefore, in Wittgenstein's thought exercise of understanding language-games as objects to be compared, we are not dealing with real objects according to any form of realism. Language-games are activities, so Wittgenstein has taken a "process" premise, and he hasn't given any principles whereby objects have real existence.

Where are the objective facts which indicate to me that I ought to stop writing?

He's practically destroying the office in plain sight. — Wayfarer

He has destroyed it, or at least caused irreparable damage. It was the will of the people - so it seems.

It's a shame that it's not just funny. But it isn't. — Wayfarer

Remember, Trump's run for presidency started out as a big joke, pure entertainment. But the American people value bad entertainment far higher than good governance. There's a slow, slow train coming, up around the bend.

You seem to have difficulty accepting the truth. Is that evidence against your own premise?

Let's go back to the op:

Any claim that there are no facts (nothing that we ought to believe) can be met with the questions, “Is that a fact? Ought we to believe that?” and so on to infinity. — AJJ

How would you deal with an ontology like pragmatism? Assume a process ontology which declares that there is no such thing as facts because all of reality is in motion and relative. You ought to believe such and such because it is a useful principle. So, for instance, science doesn't deal with facts, it operates with principles which are useful for prediction, therefore they ought to be believed.. And, 2+2=4 is not a fact, it is a useful principle, therefore it ought to be believed. There is no point to your question "is that a fact?", because you must establish first that the idea of "a fact" is an acceptable idea, within this belief structure which already rejects the idea of "facts" as useless.

This is because a local-to-local comparison of grammar does not generalise: local-to-local comparisons - which must always involve examples of language-in-use - shed mutual light on each other (ie. with respect to the specificity of the language-games involved, along with their grammar, and according to the forms-of-life which grant them relevancy), but they don’t ever (can’t ever, according to Witty) amount to (or lead to) a ‘theory of language’ as a whole. — StreetlightX

If language consists of distinct objects, separate language-games, and there can be no such thing as a theory of language as a whole, then it appears like the Philosophical Investigations' whole enterprise, which was to describe "language" (remember #7 ... I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game"), seems to be self-refuting. There is no such thing as "language".

It appears to me like he has proposed two completely different ways to describe language, which are distinctly incompatible with each other. One description is as a bunch of distinct objects, language-games, and the other, the various actions which comprise language as a whole. At this point in the text, he is clearly rejecting the latter in favour of the distinct language-games. But now we have no principle whereby we might unify distinct language-games to say that there is such a thing as "language".

I will stress that going forward from this point we must reject the inclination to think that there is such a thing as "language", because it is firmly denied. And to follow Wittgenstein's intention we must adhere to this principle that there is no such thing as "language". The description is of distinct language-games without a unifying principle.

Last thing: If you say that someone can know the truth yet still do wrong, then I’d say they’re justifying that wrong to themselves with something they believe is true, but is actually a lie. — AJJ

That's clearly not the case, because the person would believe contradictory things as true, I ought to do this (being the real truth), and I ought not do this (being the rationalized justification for doing wrong).. The person would believe both of these as true at the same time.

It seems to be pointless discussing this with you, but if you've read some Plato, you might recognize that this is the issue that Socrates had with some sophists. These sophists claimed to teach virtue. They put forth the principle "virtue is knowledge", and charged lots of money to teach virtue. By questioning whether virtue was the type of thing which could be taught, Socrates discovered a hole, a gap between knowing ethical principles, and behaving accordingly. He discovered a defect in the principle "virtue is knowledge", because knowing what one ought to do does not necessitate the person to do it.

This gap becomes very evident when we consider immoral people, who study the law to find loopholes so that they can get away with their immoral tendencies. I wouldn't say that these people believe that the law is the truth, and they justify disobeying the law with something else which they believe as the truth, or that they believe what they are doing is supported by truth, and the law is not, they simply do not believe in truth. There are people who just do not believe in truth (president Trump for example), and this belief is well grounded in science based ontology like model-dependent realism.

There is no point to insisting that these people believe it is true that there is no truth, because this just demonstrates that you misunderstand the nature of belief. Belief is based in faith and confidence, and believing that something is true is a type of belief. It is to add an extra layer of confidence to a specified belief, to attribute truth to it. So you have two distinct beliefs, the belief in X, and the belief that X is true. To say that this is redundancy is to demonstrate a misunderstanding of the nature of belief. To believe in something (such as I believe in myself) does not necessarily imply that one thinks the thing believed in is true.

know it is true that I should help you when you’re having a heart attack, therefore I help you. Like I’ve said, goodness and truth - or how we perceive them - are the basis for our actions. — AJJ

However, as I said, there are many instances when someone knows what ought to be done, but does not do it. For example, knowingly breaking the law, it happens all the time. So it's completely false to say "I know what I ought to do therefore I do it". It must be something other than knowing what ought to be done which inspires one to do what ought to be done. This was covered in some depth by Augustine.

Again, you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying. — AJJ

Actually, I've considered what you've said, and demonstrated it as false, reread the above if you still do not understand that.

But whatever. I’d like to ask this important question again: Where does our inspiration to be moral come from, if not from our understanding of what is moral? — AJJ

I don't think anyone knows the answer to that question, that's why there is philosophy, to seek the answers to questions like that. But it's very clear that the inspiration to be moral does not come from understanding what moral is, just watch a child learning. We only come to understand what moral is, a long time after learning how to be moral, if ever.

No, because it’s not true that we should be sedentary. — AJJ

But you haven't explained how knowing that it is true that one ought to do something leads to the person actually doing something.

I’ve been saying that we judge our actions in relation to the truth, or our perception of it. — AJJ

And I do not agree with that, for good reasons, as I explained.

To believe that good will (or might) come from something is to believe you know the truth about what good is, otherwise how would you have any idea that good will come from something? It doesn’t seem to me that what you’ve said there challenges this. — AJJ

This is ridiculous. You are reducing confidence to a belief in truth, when in reality the confidence which is required to proceed with an action has nothing to do with the apprehension of truth. If an action worked for me in the past, I will proceed with it again. I may even develop a habit. I am proceeding with the action to bring about what I perceive as a good, not because I believe that I know the truth about what good is.

To have faith in something is to have faith that it is true. To have confidence in something is to have confidence that it is true. This isn’t pedantry, it’s pointing out the obvious. — AJJ

Again, this is ridiculous. If you want to reduce the faith and confidence which is required for the actions of an animal such as a human being, to a matter of believing that something is true, then that's your own business. But if you are inclined toward understand the truth about what motivates animals to act, and what produces the faith and courage required for such acts, you would be wise to dismiss this premise as faulty.

We can only be moral if we first know the truth about what is moral. — AJJ

We teach children to act properly when they are far too young to understand the "truth about what is moral". Only at a much later age, if they study philosophy, will they come to understand about what it is to be moral. So it is very clearly untrue that we must understand the truth about what is moral, before we can be moral. In reality we learn to act morally long before we understand the truth about what it means to be moral. In fact, philosophers today continue to debate about the truth of what it means to be moral, and if they are respectable philosophers they recognize that the truth about what it is to be moral has not yet been uncovered.

understand our actions are based on our beliefs. I understand you as saying that this means it can be the case that we ought to believe certain lies. I’m saying that it isn’t that we ought to believe the lies, but that we ought to act in the way the lie facilitates. My example illustrated this; you’re just being a pedant. — AJJ

As I explained, your example failed, and I still don't think that what you claim is possible. Our actions are tailored to our beliefs, the actions are designed to bring about what is believed. I really do not see how it is possible to change the belief and expect that the different belief would bring about the same action. You seem to believe that this could be done, but your example did not show it.

We ought to believe what is true, since believing what is true leads to doing good anyway, unless you can give an example where this wouldn’t be the case, where believing the truth would lead to doing wrong. — AJJ

I gave you my example, one could believe what is true, and still be sedentary. Therefore believing what is true does not necessarily lead to doing good actions. Doing wrong is irrelevant because one could not do what is good without doing wrong, simply by being inactive. Being inactive is neither doing good nor doing wrong.

We act when we believe it is true that good will come of the action. We appeal to the truth. — AJJ

This is false, and I went through it already. When I proceed with a project, a plan, I believe that there is a high probability that I will be successful, and that good will come from the procedure. When I start the procedure I do not believe that it is true that good will come from the action because I have respect for the fact that failure is possible, there could be an accident, and harm could come from the procedure instead.

If you really believe that you ought to believe the truth, you should have respect for this. When judging whether or not to proceed with an action, we often consult truths to aid us in the judgement, but there is no truth to whether or not the action will be successful, prior to carrying out the action, and to believe that there is is to believe a falsity.

Your third sentence there contradicts the second; to believe that good will come from an action is to think you know the truth about what is good. — AJJ

There's no contradiction. Do you recognize the difference between saying "X is probably the case", and "it is true that X is the case". When I believe that my action will be successful, and I have the confidence to proceed, I do not believe "it is true that my action will be successful", I believe "my action will probably be successful".

It is you who is being pedantic, trying to restrict the use of "believe" to truth. So you claim "I believe I will be successful" means "I believe it is true that I will be successful". But believing does not necessarily imply truth, as your pedantic ways suggest. It sometimes means to have faith and confidence, and this is the case when we believe in the success of our actions. When we believe in our actions, we have faith in our ability to judge, and confidence that the good will come from the action. Truth is not relevant here.

Say we know it is true that we ought to be kind to others. This necessitates that we be kind to others, otherwise we would not be abiding by the truth. — AJJ

Do you not see the unwarranted jump which you are making here? You are jumping from knowing or believing the truth to "abiding by the truth". Knowing the truth does not make one abide by the truth. People often know what they ought to do, yet act in a contrary way, like when they knowingly break the law. This is what I've been trying to tell you, knowing the truth does not inspire one to act well, it is something else which inspires morality. And this is why the inspiration to be moral must take priority over the inspiration to know the truth

If I’m lied to and told there is no erupting volcano but I need to leave the area for some other innocuous reason, then I won’t panic and run over people. But neither will I panic and run over people if I’ve learned that this is something I shouldn’t do anyway. The ought resides in the action/non-action, not in believing the lie. — AJJ

The point I made though, is that the action comes about as a result of the belief. If the reason for leaving is innocuous, then you will not see the need to leave, and you will not necessarily leave. So the example doesn't bring to the discussion what you want it to bring.

And I was saying that bad things cannot come from truth, but they obviously can from lies. — AJJ

As I said, this is irrelevant if not actually false, because what is important is bringing about good things. Bad things may come about, at any time or place, and knowing the truth cannot prevent them, just like inaction cannot prevent bad things. So unless you establish a relationship between "good" (which is what inspires one to act) and "true", then whether or not bad things can come about from knowing the truth is completely irrelevant to preventing bad things, or bringing about good things.

And all the time you’re doing this you are appealing to the truth; the truth of what is good, and whether or not good will come of a certain belief or an action. Why do we appeal to these truths if it is not good to do so, if it’s not the case that we ought to? — AJJ

This is not the case. We act when we believe good will come from the action. In no way am I claiming that we act when we think that we know the truth about what is good. This is what I said about actions being based in the probability of success, not in the certainty of truth or falsity.

just don’t think you’ve thought about this. Of course knowing the truth necessitates action. The only way it wouldn’t would be if it were true that we should never take any actions. — AJJ

Ugly fallacious logic. It is not true that we should never take any actions. Therefore we should take action now.

You need to explain how knowing the truth necessitates action.

Again, you just haven’t thought about this. — AJJ

It would be possible to take the same actions without believing the lie, so believing the lie isn’t strictly necessary. — AJJ

I don't recognize how this would be possible. Actions are determined as necessary in relation to particular ends. The end is the belief, of what is required. So, we have a belief of what is needed and we tailor our actions toward that belief. We can consider different possible actions for fulfilling the same belief. However, the action, as required for the belief, is contingent on the belief. So it really doesn't seem possible to come up with the same action without the same belief as to what is required. If we change the belief, the contingent actions will change accordingly. How do you suggest that we could change the belief of what is required, and still come up with the same action as being required for the new belief.

Is it even possible for bad things to come from believing the truth? — AJJ

I'm not talking about where bad things come from, I'm talking about where good things come from. So this question is irrelevant. If good things are the things which are desired, as needed, then we ought to tailor our beliefs such that they naturally bring about good things. If, in the process of judging a particular belief, the possibility that it might bring about something bad comes up, then we need to consider this. But we start from a good, what is needed, and until believing the truth is demonstrated as something needed, or good, truth has no relevance.

What is true is good. I’ve already said you can form the same bottomless pit with “good”. Is it good to believe true things? No? Well is it good to believe that?. And so on. Eventually you’re forced to say yes, because it’s good to believe true things, and we ought to do things that are good. — AJJ

You don't seem to be grasping the principle. Truth is good and good is truth, is a bottomless pit, because it's circular. To avoid the circle (bottomless pit) we need to ground something. So we ground "good" in action, activity. Activities are things which bring about real change in the world. "Truth" does not do the same thing, it doesn't bring about any activities, or change in the world. The person knowing what is good will be inspired to act, to bring about the good, while the person knowing the truth would be sedentary without a sense of what is good. It's good to believe X, because X belief inspires one to act, and this creates change which is believed to be good. But we cannot say this about "truth". Knowing the truth does not necessitate any particular actions. So we cannot say that it's good to know the truth until we can say what good the truth brings about. However, we can say that a certain belief is good, because it brings about good actions, regardless of whether or not it is true.

We always judge our beliefs in relation to the truth, it’s impossible to do otherwise. By saying, “I’m taking this action not because I’m certain it’s true, but because good will come of it”, you’re actually saying, “I’m taking this action because I believe it is true that good will come of it, and we ought to believe true things.” — AJJ

This is not true at all. Our beliefs regarding actions are based in probability. We proceed when there is a high probability of success, not when we are certain that it is true that there will be success.

He revealed the US doing truly awful, immoral things as we "brought Democracy" to the world. If you're outraged about Assange's alleged "spying" but unaware of the war crimes he revealed, you should educate yourself about the particulars. Your outrage is misplaced. — fishfry

There's nothing new here, U.S. government agencies have always been doing truly awful things as they attempt to bring democracy to the world, from the blatantly illegal (Iran-contra for example), to the utterly disgusting (Vietnam for example). The WikiLeaks revelations are status quo. If we're not already outraged at all these terrible things which US government agencies do in the name of bringing democracy to the world, why would you think that we should be outraged at what they want to do to Assange?

Why would you think that we would single out this one instance of U.S. government agencies unfairly treating one individual (Assange), and direct outrage at the government for this act? Do you not recognize that in all the "truly awful, immoral things" which the US does, the American people are implicit? That's the nature of the beast (democracy) the government fulfills the will of the people. If Assange has revealed crimes, they are the crimes of the American people, and criminals get mad at those who turn them in.

I can't make out what you are trying to say. If a certain belief leads to good actions, then why can't we conclude that we ought to hold that belief?

You insist that we ought to believe the truth, but why? Unless there is a good which comes from believing the truth, which is better than the good which comes from believing the lie, then this claim is unfounded. Do you have a principle whereby it is demonstrated that believing the truth is always better than believing a lie?

I don't see the bottomless pit. The bottom is what is good. You want to make the bottom the truth. Clearly these two are not equivalent, so why do you give supremacy to truth over good? I give supremacy to good because human beings are active beings, involved in doing things, activity is the natural tendency for the human being and to be sedentary is unhealthy. Therefore I assume that beliefs are for the sake of these activities which we engage in, and the beliefs which we ought to hold are the ones which are conducive to good actions. If a true belief is conducive to good actions then it is one that we ought to hold. If it is not, then there is no reason to hold it. And if a false belief is conducive to good actions, then it ought to be held.

A belief needs to be judged in relation to something in order to determine whether or not we ought to hold it. Being fallible human beings, with fallible minds, we have no guarantee that what we think is the truth is really the truth, so we cannot judge our beliefs in relation to the truth. Therefore we need to judge whether or not we ought to hold this or that belief in relation to something other than the truth. I think that we ought to judge the beliefs in relation to the actions which they bring about, whether they bring about good or bad activities.

What do you mean?