Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (352)
What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)
Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373).
Is this an ontology? Yes and no. Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. This is not the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. It is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the question of how things are in themselves, but rather with what we say and do. The essence of something, what it is to be what is it, means it's place in our form of life. It is in that sense not fixed and unchanging. — Fooloso4
Why do you say that this is "not metaphysical"? To make a distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us", is to make a metaphysical assumption. If the point of interest is "as they are for us", this makes the assumption no less metaphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is, he is not making the distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us" nor investigating that distinction. — Fooloso4
But isn't the principle of "as they are for us" rather than "as they are for me" for example, a metaphysical principle? — Metaphysician Undercover
So yes, Wittgenstein, does seem to have a metaphysical stance of the "for us". But what happens when the "for us" bumps against patterns of nature that seem indicate the "not for us"? — schopenhauer1
But what happens when the "for us" bumps against patterns of nature that seem indicate the "not for us"? — schopenhauer1
It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts ...
Man has to awaken to wonder - and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.
Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.
I did not say anything about a principle. I do not recall anywhere where he discusses the distinction. If you can cite where he does then perhaps we can discuss it. — Fooloso4
Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language (PG, 12)
How can one be skeptical of what goes on beyond humans if other humans are part of the epistimological language game that one plays in their own mind? How can someone be skeptical of the world but not other humans when other humans are part of that world?Speculative Realism tries to counter the epistemological turn that they see in represented by Kant's transcendental philosophy. One of the main ideas is science cannot help but prove something is going on beyond humans, that humans can roughly grasp what is the case, and that it is showing something that is beyond human conception, though human conception is always a factor in understanding this ontology. — schopenhauer1
Well, there is the bigger issue of how is the "for us" even a real perspective, when everything I apprehend is "for me". Language-games appear to me, to create the "for us". But maybe it's the case that there must already be such a thing as "for-us" in order for a language-game to even come into existence. If it's the former which is the case, then language-games are completely directed by purpose. If it's the latter which is the case, then the underlying "for us" is what directs the language-games rather than the "for me" (purpose). — Metaphysician Undercover
Recognition of patterns of nature does not indicate something "not for us". It is, after all, "us" who have become aware of it. — Fooloso4
Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.
It would make more sense to say that science cannot help but try to prove something is going on beyond the mind. It isnt logically consistent to be skeptical of the ontology of the world but take the ontology of other humans as a given. — Harry Hindu
I do not have any idea how you got from anything I said that he takes for us for granted. The relationship between us and language is that language is our language. It does not exist independently of us. — Fooloso4
Can you explain what you mean by "directed by purpose" vs. the "for us"? — schopenhauer1
Is this an ontology? Yes and no. Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. This is not the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. It is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the question of how things are in themselves, but rather with what we say and do. The essence of something, what it is to be what is it, means it's place in our form of life. It is in that sense not fixed and unchanging. — Fooloso4
We all act for purposes, this is will and intention. My acts are not your acts, nor are my intentions your intentions. To say that there is something "for us" implies a common intention between us. Where does this notion of a common purpose come from? — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is, as I described to Schop, how one gets from how things appear to me, to how things are "for us". — Metaphysician Undercover
But can some empirical facts be different in regards to being part of the language game? Is there something science is showing us? Certainly we recognize patterns of nature. We contingently hit upon the Westernized formal science we have now. But is that just a language game we hit upon or something else? What are facts to Wittgenstein? Are there social facts vs. scientific facts, or is it all the same kind of conventionalism all the way down? — schopenhauer1
The point I was addressing is the noumenal-phenomenal distinction, the distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they are for us. According to Kant, the categories of the understanding are universal. Whatever distinction you are making between things as they appear to you and how they are for us is another issue. — Fooloso4
Recognition of patterns of nature does not indicate something "not for us". It is, after all, "us" who have become aware of it.
— Fooloso4
But then what are these "learn new facts". — schopenhauer1
But what are these scientific "facts" that are presenting to us, as opposed to "social facts" of conventions and ways of doing things? — schopenhauer1
Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.
What do you think that means? — schopenhauer1
But can some empirical facts be different in regards to being part of the language game? — schopenhauer1
Is there something science is showing us? — schopenhauer1
But is that just a language game we hit upon or something else? — schopenhauer1
What are facts to Wittgenstein? — schopenhauer1
Are there social facts vs. scientific facts, or is it all the same kind of conventionalism all the way down? — schopenhauer1
OK, now suppose we take this Kantian position, and attempt to justify this notion you put forward about "how things are for us". — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is, he [Wittgenstein] is not making the distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us" nor investigating that distinction. — Fooloso4
Where are language games played - out in the world, or on one's mind? Is the internet posts and the forum out in the world or in your mind? — Harry Hindu
The behavior of sub-atomic particles is not a social fact. The behavior of people is not a fact of particle physics. There are conventions in both but they are not of the same kind because they deal with very different matters, that is to say, very different facts. Perhaps someday there will be a unified theory that accounts for both, but for now they are very different.
Some may argue that facts are conventions, but as far as I can see, Wittgenstein does not. — Fooloso4
Physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover. — Bertrand Russell
Why do scientific facts obtain so well? — schopenhauer1
191. Well, if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it – is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. — But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? — With this question you are already going round in a circle. — On Certainty
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