What do you mean?

In many countries there is a legal principle known as "aiding and abetting", which holds those who assist in a crime as accountable.

So the driver of the getaway car is not guilty of robbing the bank, even though the driver was going to get a share of the loot?

using coherent terms like physical and non-physical is necessary, for either the will is born out of a prior state of actuality and therefore physicality, or it is born out of a prior state of potential and non-locality...and its freedom is entirely dependent upon whether it is born of actuality (actualized potentiality) or potentiality (unactualized potentiality). — TheGreatArcanum

If the will has any power at all it must be an actuality. So why not simplify all this to say that it is a non-physical actuality?

If it is the case that facts are things we ought to believe, then the OP argument works. The reason I’ve given that it is the case that we ought to believe facts is that it’s absurd to deny it, because you continually invite the question, “Well ought we believe that?” — AJJ

But it's not absurd to deny that facts are what we ought to believe, as the example of the noble lie demonstrates. It is arguable that in some cases it's for the person's own good to believe a lie. If that's the case, then it's not the facts which ought to be believed. We ought to believe what is good for us to believe, regardless of the facts.

As to the noble lie, it might be the case that the lie is beneficial, in which case we ought to believe that it’s beneficial. However, that doesn’t mean we ought to believe the lie if we know it to be one. — AJJ

This is what's absurd. It's not the lie itself which is beneficial it's the belief in the lie which is beneficial. The lie would be useless if no one believed it. If the people know that it is a lie, then they will not believe it, regardless of whether they ought to believe it or not.

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ

I agree that there could be no objective values without facts, but we cannot derive "if there are no objective values then there are no facts" from this. That would be some sort of inversion fallacy. "If there are no facts, then there are no objective values" is not convertible to "if there are not objective values then there are no facts".

It is probably the case that objective values are dependent on facts, and that's why I agree with that, but as the others point out, facts are not dependent on objective values. We do not say that X is a fact because it is what we ought to believe, we say that we ought to believe X because it is a fact. This leaves the issue of why we ought to believe facts as unanswered, and unaddressed, so we cannot conclude that because there are facts there are objective values.

Your bridge example is a practical illustration of why it is we ought to believe facts, but I’m simply saying we ought to believe facts because they’re true, because it’s absurd to say otherwise. In practice the things we believe may or may not actually be facts, but I’m talking abstractly - that it is abstractly the case that we ought to believe facts. — AJJ

Saying that it is absurd to say otherwise does not resolve the issue. We need to say something about "ought" which demonstrates that we ought to believe facts. "Ought" refers to what is good, so we need to show that it is always good to believe facts to make the inductive conclusion, and the consequent proposition, that it is good to believe facts. There is still a problem with this approach though, and that is that what is good, therefore what we ought to do, goes far beyond believing facts. There are many things which we ought to do which cannot be described as "believing facts". So it is a mistake to define "ought" in this way, which limits it to believing facts.

You've hit upon an important issue here, what is commonly referred to as the noble lie. This is introduced in Plato's Republic. The noble lie is an instance of the rulers lying to the ruled, for their own good. If we accept the noble lie as a valid moral principle, then we deny the inductive principle that we ought to believe facts. Many would argue that the particular noble lie expressed by Plato is wrong, but it may be argued still, that sometimes it is better for a person not to know the truth. And this indicates that "ought" goes beyond "truth".

Or under the veneer of this culture is there a monstrous subculture? — tim wood

Yes, anarchists.

I agree that the doctrine derived from the need to reconcile Jesus' divinity within the context of monotheism. — Relativist

I think the rational basis of the Trinity is actually derived from Plato's tripartite soul, and this happened to fit well with the Church dogma, that held Jesus as Son of God. From Wikipedia I notice that the Nicene creed, which established Jesus as Son of God had to be later amended to add the third part, Holy Spirit.

St. Augustine's "On the Trinity" is consistent with Plato's tripartite soul. He speaks of the three parts of the intellect, memory, reason, and will. The intellect, as one thing, is composed of these three parts.

these processes are controlling the body; if it is not true that the will can set the brain in motion, all of your wills and the words and actions that result from them happen by necessity or by chance and not by your own volition. and if there is an observer, that observer is just watching the will and the effects which follow from it as a passive observer and not an active agent. and when the brain ‘makes you stop thinking,’ you have no say in the manner, because you don’t have a will if it cannot start or stop brain processes. you are not the active agent of your thoughts by the passive watcher of them. this can be disproven in a few seconds through some phenomenological observation. it’s one of the most absurd positions ever held, and even more absurd that it’s considered to be rational by educated people. — TheGreatArcanum

It's not necessary that the will "set the brain in motion", all it needs to do is affect, or change the motions which are already there.

I explained already. I never said there were no other functions, but I certainly implied that there are no other functions worth mentioning regards to human purpose - the requirements of sustenance, shelter, sociable interaction, and reproduction. — I like sushi

You were not talking about human purpose though, you were talking about the purpose of the brain. I don't see how you can make this jump now, to the purpose of a human being, What would the purpose of a human being even be?

Note: I was being generous in my reply. I don’t generally talk about bodily organs having a “purpose”. Fro me a thing is made for a purpose; such as a knife, hammer or wheel. We could talk about the ‘purpose’ of red blood cells being to transport oxygen and carbon-dioxide, but given we’re looking for clarity of language within philosophical discourse I prefer to say “function”. I have nothing more to say on the matter; take it or leave it. — I like sushi

Then I suggest you made an error when you tried to state what the purpose of the brain is.

don't forget that brain processes can be set into motion by the will; so to say that the will is contingent upon brain processes is a contradiction. — TheGreatArcanum

I think that the brain is always active so I don't really agree with this idea of setting brain processes into motion.

Are you asking about this out of curiosity or trying to suggest I know nothing about brain function? The OP is referring to “purpose” not “function” - that is why I replied in the manner I replied. — I like sushi

I was trying to correct you. You said "the function of the brain is to process sensible data". When I suggested that the brain has other functions, you insisted "there is no other function". But clearly the brain has other functions, or other purposes (however you want to word it), like the example in my last post.

There is a sort of paradox involved with the idea of describing language. When we describe something we state, using language, how the thing appears to be. We do not alter the thing described, we leave it untouched, just described. We go around it with our words, so to speak. But if language is the thing we want to describe, and we must use language to describe things, it is impossible to leave language untouched in the act of describing language, because we would need to use language in describing itself. So a proper description of language is impossible. Language is the tool which we use to describe things, so if a hammer is the tool which we use to hit things, then trying to describe language is like trying to hit the hammer with the hammer.

Wittgenstein has devised an ingenious way around this paradox, by seeking to describe the activity which language is involved in, rather than trying to describe language itself. The activity is called language-games. So the language-games take the place of language, as something which can be described, the activity which the tool is used for. He is describing what we are doing with language (playing games) rather than trying to describe what language is (which is impossible due to the paradox). The problem now, at this point in the text, is that he wants to treat distinct language-games as distinct objects, to be compared, instead of adhering to the principle, that what is being described is the activity which language is being used for. We ought to maintain Wittgenstein's principle, that different language-games are just different ways of carrying out the same type of activity, i.e. the sort of activity which language is used for. However, he wants to set them off as distinct objects which can be arranged or ordered. So he now falls into the trap of the paradox, setting up language-games (as distinct objects, like distinct languages) to be compared and described individually, rather than describing language-games as the activity which language is used for.

Agreement is reached without ever being expressed. — unenlightened

The point though is that the words must be expressed before they can be agreed on, so agreement follow language.

In terms of “purpose” - external - there is no other function. If the brain didn’t process input from the outside world it would be no different to a rock. — I like sushi

What about the other functions of the brain though? For example, doesn't the brain also have the function of controlling other parts of the body?

First sentence is fine. but how can the suggestion be made until we have agreed that 'name' and 'suggestion' mean what we agree they do? — unenlightened

I don't see the problem. People make noises without any agreement as to what the noise means.

The distinction between a tree and a shrub, for instance, is pretty well established to the extent that you and I can argue about it with some hope of arriving at a resolution that is not based on our reaching an agreement but on our learning the agreement that has already been made by generations of yore. — unenlightened

I'm talking about how that agreement made by generations of yore came into existence. The spoken word must be prior to the agreement as to what the word means. Therefore it is impossible that language is built on agreement.

This pair of remarks are one of a few handful in this section, I think, where Witty actually goes about spelling out - making explicit - why he keeps insisting on the 'descriptive' nature of his investigations, and why there is no 'explanation' in them. They are best approached, imo, as methodological pointers. — StreetlightX

The method described is inconsistent with "no need for explanation". To arrange things, give them an order (132) for the purpose of clarity, is to "explain".

As stated at 132, there are many possible orders, arrangements which could be made in the act of comparing the language-games, perhaps orders could be established for purposes other than clarity. Wittgenstein has chosen "clarity" as the purpose for the ordering, and so he has chosen to explanation.

I don't agree with that. And the reason is that naming is essentially random. So prior to the existence of language any particular part of the reality which surrounds us could be called by any name whatsoever. Things do not have names until after there is agreement that this will be the thing's name. And this agreement can only be produced by someone suggesting names for things. Therefore the existence of the name is prior to the existence of the agreement that this name names this thing. So in relation to things spoken about with language, agreement is posterior to the language which speaks of the things, that agreement being dependent on the language which speaks of them. This must also be true in the case of stating a thesis. Agreement concerning the things spoken of in the thesis can only occur after the thesis is stated.

This leaves the response of "I knew that already", in a precarious position. Suppose someone states, for the first time ever, the most extremely obvious hypothesis, and everyone agrees, thinking "I knew that already". How did you already know that? It's impossible that someone told it to you already. And it's not likely that everyone who says "I knew that already" had already thought up that very hypothesis, or someone else would have already stated it. So this only leaves something like Plato's theory of recollection. But that's absurd to think that we already know everything before being taught it, and learning is just recollecting what we've already known - forever, I suppose. What does it mean to be struck with something which is so agreeable to you, it's as if you already knew it, yet it's never been taught to you before, and it's just being apprehended by your mind now? We can't truthfully say "I knew that already", because that particular thing is just being demonstrated now. But it's so consistent with everything else which we already know, and therefore so agreeable, that it's as if we already knew it.

The function of the brain is to process sensible data; the empirical evidence for this is quote overwhelming I feel - it is factual. — I like sushi

That is one function of the brain. What about its other functions?

Actually Luke, I was having a very relevant and interesting conversation with Pomophobe, and the term was not used that way until you interrupted, changing the subject, with a complete straw man accusation of contradiction. Now you insist on continuing your digression into some sort of ad hom nonsense. Why did you interrupt in the first place if you had no interest in the subject being discussed?

I only introduced "foreground" because it was necessary to counter your claim of contradiction.

Is it not obvious to you though, that a thesis must be stated before it can be agreed to? So this statement of yours makes no sense: "we would all agree, and thus no thesis or theses to advance". You are saying that there is no point in advancing the thesis which everyone will agree with. That's like saying that there is no point in carrying out the activity which I am certain to have success at. How does that make sense to you?

The idea in PI 128 is a kind of ideal, i.e., if we were able to apply Wittgenstein's methods (it's not method by the way), then clarity would be achieved. There would be no debating the obvious, we would all agree, and thus no thesis or theses to advance. — Sam26

Wouldn't the thesis (which stated the obvious) have to be advanced before we could agree on it?

The problem according PI 129 is that what's hidden is what's before our eyes, it's something so familiar that we tend to ignore or miss it because of its "simplicity," or again, its "familiarity." It seems as though the answer to our question or confusion lies in the open, which means according Wittgenstein, that we fail to be struck by it. However, once seen anew, it becomes "striking" and "powerful." — Sam26

Perhaps the strikingly obvious thing is that a thesis must be advanced before it can be agreed on.

I don't know since I have no idea what these terms mean. I've asked you to explain what you mean by 'foreground' and 'background' in my last two posts. — Luke

"Background" was Pomophobe's term so it probably really only makes sense in the context of that discussion. I think I understood what was meant, maybe I didn't. But you're trying to pull that term out of its context, and oppose it to "foreground". Maybe you think that might help you to understand it, but it might just create confusion if it was never used as an opposition to "foreground". I think it was used more like the context, or environment, within which something exists.

So the foreground is expressed opinions and the background is unexpressed opinions, right? — Luke

No, I do not think you can correlate these two divisions precisely in this way. There is a foreground and a background, also there are expressed opinions and unexpressed opinions, and the two correlate roughly, but not precisely or exactly. So the background enters into expressed opinions, in things like philosophy and metaphysics, and in creative acts unexpressed opinions enter into the foreground, so there is overlap.

The appearance of contradiction which you refer to only occurs when you attempt to precisely correlate divisions of distinct categories. This is the deficiency of inductive reasoning, when we correlate distinct categories to state a rule, the exception to the rule creates the appearance of contradiction. For example, you attempted to precisely correlate the division between expressed and unexpressed opinions, with the division between agreement and disagreement, so that all unexpressed opinions would disagree, and all expressed opinions would agree. But it is clearly evident that some expressed opinions disagree and also some unexpressed opinions might agree. However, it may still be the case that expressed opinions agree to a large extent, and unexpressed opinions disagree to a large extent, so there would still be a correlation to be made, but not an exact or precise correlation. Since I claimed a correlation of sorts, and you interpreted that this correlation ought to be an exact or precise correlation, when I was really speaking in terms of rough boundaries, you apprehended a contradiction. How would you suggest a boundary between the foreground and background be drawn?

If you're interested, maybe read the complete intercourse between pomophobe and I. Pomophobe referred to a "background or framework that we are always already in". If "the background" is like the context, within which language exists, then this context is thoughts and opinions, some expressed, some not. If you think about the nature of opinions which have never before been expressed, I think you should see that they would mostly disagree with one another.

If you cannot see this, then I don't think there's much that I can do to help you to see it, because I cannot show you unexpressed opinions, you can only find them for yourself. It is possible that you are not the creative type, and so you derive your opinions from others, and therefore are unfamiliar with opinions which have never been expressed before. To "agree" means that the opinion is similar to another, but what makes an opinion "original" is its difference from all others.

To change my words from "we should see that disagreement is the background of unexpressed opinions" to "all unexpressed opinions are a disagreement", is not to demonstrate a contradiction but to exemplify a straw man. "Background" implies that there is also a "foreground", so your representation of the background as "all" is unjustified. I distinctly said that we must consider the possibility of both agreement and disagreement within the realm of unexpressed opinions.

It's this remark which I was replying to:
Kippo said: "Biological determinism is certainly true to an extent...".
I think there's a problem with saying that something is true to an extent.

I suggested that when the causes for a certain type of behaviour are seen to be biological, for the most part, like habits, yet there are exception to the rule, then biological determinism is ruled out by those exceptions. And "true to an extent" doesn't make sense. But I just said "determinism" is ruled out, so you jumped in on my mistake, and said it's not, because there could be other determinist causes which are responsible, that are not biological. I meant to say biological determinism is ruled out.

Your disagreement is evidence that the background of unexpressed opinions is comprised of disagreement. If it were comprised of agreement, then when the time came to express yourself you would express agreement. You did not.

You're focusing too much on the unobservable. I also said they can just be unobserved. You were claiming determinism is falsified by observing a behavioral pattern to be broken. You're wrong, because we may simply be unaware of all the factors that collectively cause the behavior, some of which are less frequent. — Relativist

No, I was not claiming that determinism is falsified in this way, I was claiming that "biological determinism" is falsified in this way. Biological determinism is dependent on what is known to biology, so you can't just claim that the cause of the behaviour is something unknown to biology because that is self-refuting to biological determinism. Either the cause of the behaviour is something known to biology or it is not. If it is not, then biological determinism is falsified.

In other words:
We ought to consider that unexpressed opinions can be either an agreement or a disagreement.
If we do this, we should see that all unexpressed opinions are a disagreement.

Yeah, that follows. — Luke

The conclusion is not supposed to follow logically, it is supposed to be an observation which will be made if you look at things the way I said. Your disagreement is evidence that what I say is true.

This is a delicate issue. I see the value of the approach that starts within an individual brain/mind and works outward, and it's good for many purposes. But I think it might get in the way of contemplating language. In short, it's tempting but artificial. The background or framework that we are always already in seems to include an elusive sense of The World that is not theoretical. We are just always already in a world of objects that we can talk about, and our primary relationship to these objects is messing with them. And perhaps language in primarily about coordinating our messing with these objects. We don't stare at tools. We use them. And they exist differently for our use than they do for our staring. In short I'm saying that we apply this Heideggerian insight to language and get some of what I find anyway in Wittgenstein. — pomophobe

The problem I see with this perspective is that tools (therefore language if it is a tool) are themselves artificial. So if we describe our relationship with the world, as "messing" with it, we also need to account for the creation of the tools by which we mess with it. Therefore there is something amiss with the following statement of yours: "We are just always already in a world of objects that we can talk about, and our primary relationship to these objects is messing with them". Notice that you say we are already in a world of objects "that we can talk about". The reality is that we cannot talk about anything until we have "language" to use for that purpose.

I suggest that to understand the nature of language we need to remove the presupposition that language exists, because the existence of language is contingent. Resist the temptation to take it for granted, and consider the conditions which produce its existence.

I will grant to you, as a starting point, that prior to language, there was a world which living things were messing with, for the sake of agreement, because we need agreement for a starting point. The question of whether or not these words, "world" and "messing with" are truly adequate, I'll put aside for now so we can have a starting point. But I cannot agree with your proposition that this was a world of objects. That there are objects prior to the language which refers to objects is a critical point which some philosophers have cast doubt on. Is it the act of identifying and naming something which individuates that thing from its environment, as "an object", or do objects already have existence separate from their environment prior to being apprehended as such? I think Heidegger and phenomenology in general, supports the former, that an "object" is artificial in this sense, it is created by the act which individuates and identifies it as such.

If it is the case, that objects are artificial in this way, then all objects are themselves, in this sense created, and they may themselves be tools. Therefore the fundamental agreements of language are the agreements concerned with which aspects of the world that we are messing with, are individuated and identified as objects. Once we agree what it is that is the object we are referring to, then we can work on agreement concerning what can be said about the object. From this perspective, prior to identifying and naming things as objects, animals without language would not have apprehend the world which they are messing with as consisting of objects.

IMV the correspondence theory of truth, despite all its problems in the ether of speculation, is part of this automatic framework. It's so automatic that even its critics tend to use it as they criticize it. 'The correspondence theory of truth is wrong ---doesn't correspond to truth.' — pomophobe

Consider correspondence in a slightly different way now. We would commonly think that correspondence is creating and arranging our words to correspond with the world. However, we were already messing with the world before we even created language. In this act of messing with the world, there is always the element of arranging the world to correspond with "what we want". With the advent of words, "what we want" may become truth, having our words correspond to the world. Then we might mess with the world with the intent of producing truth, or correspondence. So correspondence might be just as much involved with arranging the world to correspond with our words, as it is arranging our words to correspond with the world. Furthermore, since our "messing with the world" to produce what we want goes much deeper, extending far before the existence of language as a tool for this purpose, it is very likely that correspondence is more of an aspect of us arranging the world to match our words rather than vise versa.

For me it's the other way around. The automatic and therefore elusive background is genuine. The hammer in the hand that's being employed has a different kind of being than the hammer that's being stared at and described in terms of its density and shape. In the same way we use language automatically even as we construct artificial theories about what we are doing. — pomophobe

We agree that the background provides what we call the "automatic", but where we disagree is whether the true and natural automatic reaction is to agree or disagree. I believe that the true automatic reaction is disagreement, like Luke's above, and what is evident anytime we dig down to the fundamentals of ontology, is disagreement. At the fundamental level, metaphysics, there is nothing but disagreement until we decide on principles of agreement. And agreement must be cultured and trained into us through discipline.

For me we don't even consciously assume this background. 'Assumption' is artificial here. The child learns to talk before she learns to talk about her talk philosophically. The stuff closest to us is to close for us to me without straining to notice it. Recall that a more mundane example of the background is just the ability to speak English --along with the largely unfathomed and perhaps unfathomable depths of all this means. — pomophobe

But the background must be prior to language, as what provides for the existence of language. And when we dig down through language, and see that it consists of all sorts of different language-games and vague concepts, as Wittgenstein describes, we find that the background is one of disagreement.

When we look at what is close to us we see all sorts of agreement. We might falsely conclude, and therefore assume that the background is a background of agreement. But when we step back to look at the wider picture we see a vast array of different language-games, and recognize that agreement only exists within particular, individual language-games, and the true background, which is the background of all language, is a background of difference, disagreement.

From my point of view, your ability to say 'it's just not there' depends precisely on its being there. You are intelligibly telling me that I am wrong about our shared world, that this background is a mirage or a superstition --- does not correspond to the way things really are. I'm claiming that we talk and act (without consciously assuming it) as if we share a world and can both understand and be understood. When we try to sort this out carefully, we find it hard to tell a consistent story. Our know-how won't fit inside our know-that. Our conscious models tend to run aground, hence the endless debates in philosophy, while the rest of the world just uses this framework that philosophers stubbornly insist on squeezing into a little system of knowing-that.

Words like 'truth' and 'know' are so easy to use when we aren't playing philosophy. They are the hammer driving a nail in a concrete situation. Pluck them out and just stare at them and a debate about these mundane things will rage for centuries. Yet within this same debate they'll be used in the ordinary-primary-easy way without anyone remembering that they don't yet know what they 'really' mean. If the joke wasn't misleading, we might say that what they 'really' mean is whatever philosophers don't mean by them, or when they use them without their thinking caps on. — pomophobe

I mostly agree with all of this, but only because I agreed above to the proposition of "a world". But now you've added "shared" to say it's a shared world, and I don't really agree with your use of that term. Notice though, that what you are talking about is "endless debates", and this is more descriptive of a background of disagreement rather than a background of agreement. The fact that we produce agreements for particular purposes, at a particular places and times, and this allows us to talk and act as if we share a world, indicates that for these purposes we share a world. Of course this is the way things "really are", but what good does it do to assert that? Both "agreement" and "disagreement" must be shared, so saying that the background is "shared" does nothing to support the position that the background is one of agreement rather than one of disagreement.

I understand that approach too. It's a good model when dealing with certain issues. Certainly our collisions with others and objects shape our individual models of or perspectives on the world toward consensus. But we've been doing this a long time! Our species has been designed by the training you mentioned on the genetic level. So I'd say goodbye blank slate and goodbye isolated ego. Yes I can look at an individual human, but that's like looking at a wolf and ignoring to what degree the wolf is a 'cell' in the pack. So the individual wolf is real, but our thinking of the wolf is shallow when we ignore the pack (and then its environment, etc.) With humans the situation is seemingly even more extreme. — pomophobe

It appears to me, like what you are saying here is that there is no need to analyze the foundation, the bottom, the basis of language, because it's been there for so long that we must already know it. So you look at the forest, and you know the forest like the back of your hand, but you haven't got a clue what a tree is. Nor do you have the inclination to understand what a tree is, because you assume that you must already know all about trees to be able to know the forest.

IMV, the complete absence of a shared background between people wouldn't even be called disagreement. They wouldn't have anything to disagree about. It seems to me that sharing in the same reality and at least one language is presupposed in an argument. How can I disagree with Snorf from a trans-human dimension when he says

Dalk fadlka454df acdmlk(%df dfokmsdfbl)#$kmdsfv mldkfvmlkdfvmdfvlkdfvm )(*342 — Snorf

And what would I disagree about? When humans disagree, it's not usually an idle question. How best to do things and what should be done in the first place come to mind. — pomophobe

You are framing "disagreement" in a very particular, and I would say peculiar way, as if disagreement only exists if it is expressed. But disagreement is to hold a difference of opinion, just like agreement is to hold a similar opinion. We ought to consider the possibility that each of these may exist without the respective opinions being expressed in language. If we do this, we should see that disagreement is the background of unexpressed opinions, while language and communication are the means by which agreement emerges.

So let's hypothesize that at a time prior to human language, there were animals who were thinking, and therefore had some sort of opinions, but those opinions were generally in disagreement. There is an issue with your expression of "sharing in the same reality", because one's reality cannot be otherwise from what is present within one's mind. If we want to make a generalization concerning "the reality", then the reality is that each of these animals has a different reality. It is only when human beings come to communicate, and agree, that there becomes such a thing as "the reality".

I have a vague sense of agreeing with you, but for me you have turned the page here in a way that I can't follow. In the context that I take for our background, the background is ours. We are on the same stage in front of the same cardboard scenery, hence the metaphor. What you say above reminds me of 'war is god' and other important insights (that conflict/chaos is the mother of order, etc.) — pomophobe

So this opinion, "the background is ours" is where the mistake lies. "Our background", is artificial, created through language and agreement. This background of commonality is the mistaken assumption which we must dispense. It is that faulty requirement Wittgenstein refers to. We tend to assume that this underlying agreement, this common background, "must" exist in order for language to work. But in reality, it's just not there, and that assumption just leads us to different forms of Platonism where the fundamental agreement, and commonality of opinion, precedes human existence. In reality human beings work with language to create an environment of agreement ("the world") from a background of disagreement. The real background consists of isolated individuals with differing cognitions (disagreement), from which agreement is cultured through training etc..

No it doesn't. The behavior may be due to a complex set of factors that are unobserved or unobservable. — Relativist

But that's just invoking magic, claiming unobservable causes.

As an extreme example, consider a deterministic account of a human choice: it is determined by the prior beliefs (short and long term), desires, dispositions, transient urges .... — Relativist

This is not a good example of unobservable causes, because these causes are observable, to the person acting. They are not properly unobservable. And when they are properly observed these things are understood to influence actions (affect them) but not cause them.

I understand your concerns. Still, I read Wittgenstein as pointing to a mostly unnoticed background that makes such disagreements possible/intelligible. Were it not for this background, the debate could not continue. It looks to me that knowledge-how is deeper and prior to the knowledge-that which would like to assimilate it but can't. — pomophobe

I see what you saying, but stating it as "the background which makes disagreement possible", is only an inversion of "the background which makes agreement possible". The latter recognizes that agreement is not automatic. The problem being that disagreement is prior to agreement because agreement requires some sort of understanding, which is gained, whereas disagreement (lack of agreement) does not. So disagreement (lack of agreement) precedes agreement which is something which comes into existence in a temporal order, from a lack of agreement. There is no background required for disagreement, it is simple difference.

We see that agreement is necessary for knowledge-that. And, we see that distinct people can know how to do the same thing (produce the end result) in different ways. They therefore disagree. So agreement is not necessary for knowledge-how, and as you say, and knowledge-how is prior to knowledge-that. If you were to ask, what good is agreement, for what purpose do we agree, someone might say that it is required for Knowledge-that. But how is knowledge-that better than knowledge-how? And if this can't be shown what's the point to agreeing? Then unless we agree simply for agreement sake, agreement cannot be automatic.

Look at 129, what you call "the background", is probably what he refers to as the most simple and familiar. it is the one thing which is always there, yet unnoticed because it is the background. The background is disagreement. It is always there, everywhere, in the background. But what drives us is agreement so most disagreement goes unnoticed. Then it appears like agreement is the background and disagreement springs from agreement. That is, until it strikes you that the real background is disagreement, difference, and this is what is most striking and powerful.

The real world doesn't work in words, and definitions. — Kippo

But you were talking about what is "true". And truth concerns how the words and definitions correspond with the real world. So words and definitions are just as important to truth as is "the real world". To say that biological determinism is "true to an extent" is really meaningless, because it's like saying that the words vaguely correspond with reality. And what this means is that there appears to be some semblance of correspondence, but when it comes right down to the specifics, correspondence is just not there, and the semblance of correspondence is just an illusion.

Biological determism is the domain of science. It has nothing to do with free will, which is logically compatible with biological knowledge — Kippo

Let me get this straight. Free will is compatible with biological knowledge. Then there is something called "biological determinism" which has nothing to do with free will. But since determinism is not compatible with free will, I conclude that biological determinism is not compatible with biological knowledge, which is compatible with free will. Why adopt the position of biological determinism, which grasps for some semblance of correspondence, but is really not compatible biological knowledge?

FWIW, this reminds me of phenomenology. The stuff that is usually too close for us to notice is uncontroversial, but only after someone manages to see it and point it out. And maybe it can only be pointed out a little bit here and there. ('Form of life' is something like 'by means of a faculty.') — pomophobe

There's still a problem here. Some people are near-sighted, some people are far-sighted, some see both well, and some don't see at all. When someone sees something, and points it out to another who does not see it, this does not necessarily make the other person agree that it is there. When an individual has deficient eyesight, you cannot make the person see something by pointing to it. And that person will only agree that the thing is there, if there is trust in the one pointing it out. You might say religion is built on this trust (faith), for every person who sees God there are multitudes who do not, but they agree, and follow on trust or faith.

That's why 128 is simply false. Pointing out to a person, something which you understand, and the other person does not understand, and even presenting it in many different ways, will not necessarily incline the other person to agree. This is very evident here at TPF. The underlying attitude which is conducive to agreement is something completely different.

Biological determism is certainly true to an extent - there is no controversy there - only disagreement as to how much culture and randomness affect behaviour. — Kippo

There's a big problem with saying that biological determinism is true to an extent, whether or not you think there is no controversy here. When there is exceptions to a rule, this is evidence that the rule does not capture an understanding of what is going on, even if you might say that the rule is "true to an extent". Exceptions render the rule meaningless, and "true to an extent", really indicates that the rule is false.

If a creature is observed to act in a certain way, due to habit, then we might make a rule concerning that activity. One might call this "biological determinism". But when the creature displays the capacity to break the habit, then the claim of "determinism" is falsified. So there's really no such thing as "biological determinism", or 'soft determinism", those terms are smoke and mirror illusions which veil misunderstanding and false rules, whereas "freewill" represents something substantial, the capacity to break out of habits.

Well, I'll state the obvious, 128 falsifies itself. It's a philosophical thesis which cannot be agreed with.

What 128 actually says is that the only thing philosophy can do is to state the obvious. Since it's obvious, no one will debate it. He's simply wrong though, as skepticism demonstrates. So we cannot look at 128 as anything other than a false thesis.

Most people don't believe in determinism or that biology explains and predicts everything we will do, — jamesfive

Biology: the study of living organisms.

It's very clearly false, this assumption that biology explains and predicts everything we will do. Sorry jamesfive, but if you want to defend determinism you'll have to do better than that.

Something still needs to be said about the possibility of debate, as well as agreement. — StreetlightX

Actually, a lot more needs to be said about debate and agreement. Wittgenstein falls short here. By 133 he is talking about "clarity" as if clarity is the sole cause of understanding, and the resolution to all philosophical problems. However, "agreement", the attitude required for agreement,, how agreement is derived through discourse, and its relation to understanding, is completely neglected by Wittgenstein here.

It's as if he takes it for granted that a clear description will automatically produce agreement. A philosophical theses must be a description, and if it's a clear description, it will be agreed upon. He may revisit this issue later. For example, it's clearly a duck, therefore not a rabbit, and the clarity of the description ought to lead necessarily to agreement. Even"'clarity" does not seem to be capable of resolving philosophical problems because a clear description cannot change a person's attitude.

I think 128 is meant to be paradoxical. The only thing which cannot be debated is tautology, allowing freedom for skepticism. But tautology is to say the very same thing in two different ways, and this is literally impossible. It's actually contradiction when taken literally. So tautology has no foothold against the skeptic. Therefore, the thesis, or proposition which everyone agrees with, (the tautology), is in fact impossible so the philosopher ought not even attempt this. There is no point to the philosopher even putting forward a thesis (assuming that agreement is a goal of philosophy).

In any case, take 128 as a pretext to what follows. What is hidden from us (129) is the differences between language-games (130). We make translations, for example, and state tautologies, assuming to say the very same thing twice, but this assumption obscures the fact that we are not actually saying the very same thing with the two distinct sayings, due to the differences between language-games.

I believe this is a very important indication of Wittgenstein's distinction between what is and what must be. A philosopher might say that the translation (the copy) must say the very same thing as the original, or else there would be misunderstanding. This is what he referred to as the "requirement" in relation to logic. It must be this way or else the result is absurdity. But it's merely a prejudice toward what it means to understand that forces this requirement on us. Understanding does not require exactness, sameness, what is required is to serve the purpose.

It's a Platonist assumption that two distinct sentences symbolize one and the same idea. But when we take the original and the copy for "what is", they are very clearly physically different from each other. And, the meaning of each is understood through language-games which are different from each other. So we must get rid of this Platonist prejudice which inclines us to think that two distinct statements "must" say the very same thing in order for logic to exist, and for human beings to communicate and understand each other.

Perhaps we have been inclined to misread Wittgenstein's "must" as "ought". He seems to use "must" to refer to some logical conclusion which is forced on us by prejudice and presupposition. So we look at mathematics, logic, and language, with the attitude that they "must" be this way, in order to do the work that they do. But this "must" is forced by a prejudice concerning what they are actually doing. And this prejudice may itself be a misunderstanding. So Wittgenstein is saying that we ought to release this prejudice which makes us look at language, logic, and mathematics through the lens of what they must be, to look at them as they actually are.

Language is limited by purpose, because it is subjugated by purpose, is it not? I think maybe this is the essence of the shift that he has made at this point in the text. Earlier, the concept of game was described as inherently unbounded. Wittgenstein wanted to describe all concepts as essentially unbounded, yet boundaries could be created for a specific purpose. Now, he seems to be positioning purpose, and consequently the boundaries associated with purpose, as immanent within the order which is necessary for meaning. So purpose, and the boundaries which come with it, are necessary for meaning. Now the unbounded really has no place in language.

This is the logical consequence of his premise "meaning is use". This premise forces purpose as a logical necessity. "Use" implies purpose, as there is never a use without a purpose. So if meaning is use, the limitations and boundaries associated with particular purposes are necessary for any meaning. The only way I can think of to avoid this would be to associate meaning with something other than use, something limitless, without an end. This would free language from the limits of the particular purposes of sentient beings.

There's a lot to be said on this subject because it strikes to the deepest level of ontology.

This is the sort of thing it's worth doing philosophy over--"Thinking hard" about what it is that you sense. — Terrapin Station

I think maybe it's the passing of time that I sense. What do you think?

To me, the inconsistency which comes into play at 127 is obvious. But I see the switch at 127 as necessary because the position held before this is untenable, and that is best displayed at 98.

This is where I part company with Wittgenstein. — Sam26

Why does Sam26 part company with Wittgenstein at this point, while I see the opposite, this is where Wittgenstein becomes more reasonable? I find that he becomes more reasonable, in the sense that he recognizes that things get ordered towards a particular goal, but I do not necessarily agree with his stated goal of philosophy, "clarity".