I agree that words and sentences can be vague. But maybe due to lack of supplied or accuracy of the information. With more detailed information and accuracy in writing in the supplied sentences, maybe it could deliver clearer meanings. Not sure, if it is to do with the natural inadequacy of language in general, or fault of the writers.

It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves, beyond sensible intuition - of whcih we can know nothing. Not that they aren't related... Just that we can't actually know anything of them. Or be certain they exist.. only infer. But as usual, im looking to be set straight, not offering an actual take. — AmadeusD

I understood Noumena is the placeholder for Thing-in-itslef, and Thing-in-itself is for the abstract existences which appear in our minds without the matching objects in the empirical world such as God, Souls, Freedom etc.

It gets all strange, if you place the ordinary objects like cups or trees into Noumena, and say they are Thing-in-itself, which are unknowable and cannot be talked about.

Here is one that my students found amusing. This actually happened. I was running a few minutes late to my class. One of the double doors to the classroom building was not working. It has a sign on it: "Not working. Use other door" and an arrow pointing to the other door. I explained that I was late because I could not figure out whether the arrow was pointing to door that was broken or if the sign was on the door that was broken. — Fooloso4

Good point. Must admit sentences we see in daily life can be vague at many times.
Would it have been clearer, if it said "This door is not working. Use the other door."?

Where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of noumena? — RussellA

Solid ground for infallible knowledge is about the objects in the empirical world. Noumena is for the A priori perceptions which have no objects in the world of appearance. Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world.

The symbols used for logic are not imprecise, scientists are not guessing when they use symbols for chemical compounds etc. — jkop

Without the contents, the logic symbols would mean nothing meaningful at all. It would only mean something with the contents.

The chemical compounds symbols are not symbols as such, but they are type of abbreviations or codified words.

I don't know of a good reason to exclude words from symbols. Do you? — jkop

Words are read, and understood by its meaning alone. There is no room for guessing or imagining just by reading alone (although people do them but there must be extra information such as situation or the source of the words come from). Words says what they mean, and no more. Otherwise, words cannot be used in Logic or Science.

Symbols are visual perception only, and their meanings are not precise. One has to imagine, guess or relate to the real world objects, activities or lives in order to get the meanings. Symbols are also for aiding religious meditations for the enlightenments or deciphering the divine and esoteric messages from them.

I would say they are totally different form of carrying and delivering meanings, and also for the purpose too.

For a simple example, can a poetry be written in symbols? No.
Can symbols write a History of Philosophy? No.
What words do, symbols can't. What symbols do, words can. (Words are more powerful, versatile and flexible with its capability making up sentences, and forming logical arguments, propositions ...etc)

"Matter" and "red" are words in language and concepts in the mind. As I perceive a red postbox in the world, I can also perceive solid matter in the world. — RussellA

There seem to be some problems here.
1. You are talking about only the things in your mind. It will not give you any further knowledge on the external world itself. You say you are seeing the red postbox, but it is in your mind, and it doesn't exist in the world. So it is not an empirical knowledge, but it is your belief in your mind, which you admit that it doesn't exist in the world.

2. There is also high possibility of illusion and hallucination on the perception and also talking about, because you believe that they are not the reality in the empirical world, but they are caused by the reality of the empirical world. Is the reality always accurate? Are the causation always consistent and accurate without errors? Is the content of the perception accurate?

3. These are not what Kant thinks how perception works. He was seeking to establish a solid ground for infallible knowledge. He would be seriously worried to see someone looking at things not existing in the world, and keeps talking about them as if they do exist in the world, and at the same time saying they don't exist in the world.

The word as vehicle theory. Whereabouts on the word itself is the meaning? — NOS4A2

The point of words is to convey the meanings they contain. Every words has their meanings. If you said a word with no meaning, then it wouldn't mean anything, and no one would understand what it meant (including yourself), hence it is not a word, is it?

Symbols are the pictorial entities, and they are supposed to carry meanings too, but in totally different forms and ways.

No, words are symbols, which is more than the marks, sounds, gestures etc. of which they're made. — jkop

Words are not symbols. Words are container of meanings.

For Kant, matter existing in the world is noumena, and as noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about — RussellA

It sounds gross self-contradictory to say "matter existing in the world is noumena", and then keeps going on "noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about". You cannot say X exists in the world, if you don't know what X is, can you?

I can talk about "matter" as unknown causes are named after known appearances — RussellA

How can "matter" be talked about as "unknown causes"? Do you mean they are the same? How so?

However, we cannot know the matter of the Eiffel Tower from Sensible Intuition, as it is noumena. — RussellA

So how were you able to talk about "the matter of the Eiffel Tower", if you couldn't know it? Is it possible to know what "the matter" means?

Oh fudge, I'll reply. And if Hitler happened to be a vegetarian, then it would be a worthwhile thing to keep in mind that all vegetarians worldwide share Hitler's mindset.

Again, I find a glaring logical flaw in this kind of association ... rewritten as some of your posts have so far been once replied to. — javra

Not sure where you got that syllogism from, but it sounds meaningless, irrelevant and unintelligent. :)
I am only replying to you because you have been keep replying to me.
I have already made my points on the OP a while back, and the rest is just my replies to the questions from the interested posters.
No need to reply to me, if you see no points or cannot follow my points.

If they have meanings, where would the meaning be located? Or how how do we explain where the meaning is? — NOS4A2

I am not into linguistics, so my ideas on it would be that of a total layman's. I would think that in the primitive times when there was no language as such, people would see some events such as rain, and then whenever they see the rain, they would shout out "rang rang rang" or something like that. And then they would come to a word "rain" eventually for an example.

So, I would reckon, words are the entities which are very much embedded with some situations, events or object perceptions into the naming etc in daily lives of the people which gave the solid meanings to the words.

Even now, many words seem to be being manufactured in the similar way (from the real life situations) or copied and modified from the existing words into the new words.

If you read Wittgenstein, I am sure he would have a proper and philosophical way to describe about it.

Touche. Your logic as to fortune tellers and such is truly out-standing. — javra

I recall reading in the esoteric forums sometime ago, that they believe everything under the sun is connected to each other even to all the celestial objects. So their motto is, "As above, so below". That's how they read the stars' movements to predict the future and people's fortunes.
That was not logic at all. That was something I read, and your point reminded me of it. :)

Thanks, but I’m talking about words. — NOS4A2

I know, hence the suggestion :nerd:

This misses the entire point. Modal logic is founded upon metaphysics. These being two separate entities: modal logic as one specialized subset of metaphysics at large. — javra

This seems to be tangent from the OP anyway. We are not interested in which subject is founded by which.

As to everything being interconnected in one way or another, I should think so. Even utterly disparate possible worlds will be interconnected by one's awareness of them, if nothing else. This doesn't prevent us from distinguishing rocks from their molecules and from their environment, though - as one example. — javra

That sounds like a perspective which is associated with the fortune tellers' world view.
In Modal Realism, all possible worlds are separate entities, to which no other worlds have access.

Here's a reference:

Modal metaphysics concerns the metaphysical underpinning of our modal statements. — javra

From some perspectives, everything is connected or related to everything. But from some other perspectives, they are all separate entities especially in terms of the origin of the subjects etc.
If that was not the case, then what is the point of having different branches of the subjects? Why not just call them all under one name?

Firstly, you claimed before that non-existence is logically possible but metaphysically impossible. Now you seem to be saying that it’s logically impossible. — Michael

Non-existence is possible in a possible world where nothing exists.
Non-existence is impossible metaphysically. Please bear in mind they are different worlds.

Secondly, that something is true isn’t that it is necessarily true. P ⊨ □P is invalid. — Michael

Something which is true in a world, can be not true in another world.

You might as well argue that because the word “metaphysical” is an English word then the existence of the English language is a metaphysical (and logical) necessity. This is very obviously wrong. — Michael

You must be a modal realist to accept the points. We are using English for the discussion, so surely the semantic will affect the logic of the arguments. This is called "Use-Condition" of arguments. Nothing to do with English is a metaphysical necessity.

So because intelligent life with an appropriately expressive language is required to “do” metaphysics then the existence of intelligent life with an appropriately expressive language is a metaphysical necessity?

I disagree. — Michael

The word "metaphysically" originated from metaphysics. Therefore the fact that you used the word necessitates its existence. It is a logical truth. :)

What do you mean by “doing” metaphysics? — Michael

The moment that you uttered the statement "X is impossible metaphysically", you were doing metaphysics. If metaphysics didn't exist at all, what does metaphysically mean?

You’re saying that the existence of metaphysics is a metaphysical necessity?

I don’t even know what this means. Are you arguing for Platonism? — Michael

hmmm was not thinking about Platonism as such.
But logically, how can do you Metaphysics, if Metaphysics didn't exist?
How could you even say or think of something metaphysically, if Metaphysics didn't exist?

Then it must be that for at least one object X it is metaphysically impossible that at some time T that object no longer exists. — Michael

Yes

Therefore it’s metaphysically possible for there to be a world in which nothing exists. — Michael

A world where nothing exists (not even Metaphysics) is impossible metaphysically, because without Metaphysics, Metaphysics is impossible.

Are you saying that if some object X exists then it is metaphysically impossible that at some future time T object X no longer exists (unless some new object Y takes its place)? — Michael

In this case we are talking about an object X(not a world), and it is possible for X to become non-existence through time T metaphysically. (X must not be Metaphysics itself)

So you’re saying it’s metaphysically impossible for something to be destroyed? — Michael

It depends on what "destroying" means. In physical perspective, it is possible to destroy any physical entities. But non-physical entities cannot be destroyed in physical sense. And non-physical entities have no capability destroying anything in physical sense.

But if destroying means to degrade or make something useless, then some bad language can destroy someone's motivation for doing something, and in that sense, yeah it can destroy the non-physical state. But in that sense the existence are still intact, not having been destroyed. But this would be totally different perspective which is psychological and linguistic, nothing to do with Logic or Metaphysics.

I’m not saying that they’d be destroyed in a physical way. If they’re spirits then they’d be destroyed in a spiritual way. If they’re magic then they’d be destroyed in a magical way. Either way they’d be destroyed leaving nothing left. — Michael

It would still say "Well prove how spirits could be destroyed in a spiritual way." or "By its nature, spirits have no capability or property for destroying." Therefore nothing is destroyed.

Well, Metaphysical enquiry would say, sorry mate, you cannot destroy non-physical existence in physical way. They are all intact. They are still there.

Is it metaphysically possible for something that exists to be destroyed? — Michael

It would be possible in the conceptual perspective of the destruction and changes of existences.

It is possible to make the hypothetical claim that nothing exists. But you are doing this from the standpoint of existence. i.e. your hypothetical-logical claim of non-existence exists. You cannot hypothesize away existence just by averring the hegemony of logic. The claim is existentially-bound. — Pantagruel

Your point sound confused in the methodology. Hypothesises are the methods for the scientific enquiries. Metaphysics and Logic do not adopt hypothesis as their methodology.

So to claim that a possibility emerging from modal logic is not, by its very origin, a metaphysical possibility is to me odd. But so be it, on my part at least. But so be it, on my part at least. — javra

Modal Logic is a branch of Logic, not Metaphysics. But logically speaking, if there was nothing existing at all, then Metaphysics wouldn't exist either. Logically it is possible, but from Metaphysical point of view, it is impossible.

Thanks for the video posting, you. Cute. — javra

:cool: :pray:

I mean pictorial or verbal units known colloquially as “words”. I’m not sure of the technical term. — NOS4A2

For example, Chinese words are based on the pictorials of the worldly objects, but they still have meanings, and it is the meanings they communicate on, not the pictorials.

If you are talking about the pictorial symbols with meanings, then they wouldn't be words, but would be sigils.

Is it metaphysically possible for nothing physical to exist? — Michael

It is possible that nothing physical to exist metaphysically such as mind, spirit, concepts ...etc.

Laws of thought which facilitate all logic exist as well. Do you then agree that the concept of "a possible world of nothingness" is not logically possible ... this in addition to not being metaphysically possible as well? — javra

In Modal Logic it is possible to have a possible world that nothing exists. Obviously you must be a modal realist to accept the points. If you are an anti-modalist, then that is fair enough.

then why would nothingness (i.e., a world of no existence) not be metaphysically possible? (As in the possibility of there being nothing rather than something.) — javra

Because Metaphysics is all about existence. If there were no existence, Metaphysics wouldn't exist, and wouldn't have existed at all. That would be impossible for Metaphysics for its own existence.

In honesty, I happen to uphold that nothingness is a logical impossibility due to unavoidable contradictions and reifications. But this is contrary to this affirmation: — javra

Without the basic semantic rigour, all science and philosophy would lose their footings for debates, even metaphysics.

So to further in my playing the devil's advocate here, were a world of no existence to be logically possible, then why would nothingness (i.e., a world of no existence) not be metaphysically possible? (As in the possibility of there being nothing rather than something.) — javra

If someone comes along with a concept called "a fullness of emptiness", and insist it has meanings, then we stop and wonder what it is about before even opening the metaphysics or logic books.

So the "ontological entity" where specified would be nothingness of itself. — javra

Yeah that is the exact part where the contradiction arises, which voids the metaphysical ground of "a world with nothingness".

The basic question is this: are words more than their symbols? — NOS4A2

Should you not have put down "meanings" rather than "symbols'?
Symbols? - sounds like pictorial entity. Words are made of the alphabets, and has meanings, not symbols.

Metaphysician can also be taken to mean a perspective, paradigm or worldview within which we make use of and interpret the meaning of such concepts as existence and logic. — Joshs

It would be the sense of metaphysical metaphors rather than the traditional metaphysics as a subject.

Isn't the idea of nothingness a purely metaphysical construct? Hence, a world of nothingness would then be a possible metaphysical construct — javra

But because of the concept "a world" implying the ontological entity, "a world of nothingness" would be contradiction in metaphysics.