My point was just simply, eyes are the medium which passes the perceived lights into the retina, the retina forms images from the lights, converts to electric signal, and passes the converted electric signals into the brain. I am not sure if eyes can see itself. I suppose it doesn't.

Austin is simply investigating Ayer's creation of the distinction in dismantling the whole framework of direct/indirect as well as "perception". — Antony Nickles

I find Austin and Ayer's account of the topic interesting and useful.  But I still feel the classic account of indirect perception which has been around from the time of Plato is more reasonable, even if Austin tried to dismiss the distinction of direct and indirect perception altogether, and even if there are still many folks who claim that direct realists' view on perception is correct.

As said, brain and eyes are not the main topic in the thread, but were brought in to show that the perception process is not direct. 

I would leave it at that, and move on to the next chapter of the book. I did read up on the delusion and illusion part in Austin last night, and also read the part where he discusses difference in usage of the words "looks" "seems" and "appears".  It was more like English semantic chapter rather than Philosophy, but was very useful.  I agreed with him on every point in the chapter.

I am going to prepare for pointing out some of the logical problems noticed in Austin's analysis on Delusion and Illusion in his book.

Eyes are the visual sense organ passing the lights into the brain. Of course eyes are not the perceiver, but it is part of the visual perceiving medium. The point was to explain the indirectness of perception.

Austin is explaining how looking, seeing, etc. work. If science wants to study what happens to the brain when these things are going on, then that is just a different interest, but these practices are not discrete functions or processes of the brain (though the brain does do other stuff). — Antony Nickles

It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions.

One problem I have with your obvious and unmistakeable example is routine biology. One usually uses her eyes to view mediums. So how does one view the medium of her own eyes, if not with her eyes? — NOS4A2

These videos explain how eyes work in our visual perception.

I don't wish to dissuade you, indeed there is no alternative, as you must begin where your thoughts are now. The material we are considering takes some digestion, especially as much of it is contrary to what is usually taken as granted in these fora. But from what you have written here you have been following Austin's account well, which is far more than can be said for others. — Banno

Thanks mate. :)

And here it is not at all clear what it would mean to see something without using one's eyes, or any other sense organ. So it's not clear what the direct/indirect distinction is doing in this case. Austin doesn't directly address such an argument, because no one, least of all Ayer, was so gormless as to present it. — Banno

The fact that Ayer and Austin both deal with the issues regarding direct and indirect perception implies, that they must have taken the distinction not lightly. Especially if you notice Austin starts his first and second page of the book with general account of indirect perception, which he notes has been the classic view on the perception how it works.

Some folks deny the distinctions and some say they don't understand what direct perception means. It is because perhaps all perceptions are indirect in nature, and they cannot find any examples of direct perception.

I myself, cannot quite understand how perception works directly, but I do understand how it works indirectly, i.e. via sense organs and sense-data.

When one says perception is direct, i.e. it is between him and the objects or the world, I cannot quite get the point. Because the question was not who is perceiving the object, or the world, or who is responsible for the perception of the objects and the world, but the question was, how perception works.

It is like saying, how does a car work?, the person says, I drive the car. It is between me and the car, nothing in between. It is an answer which is from someone who totally misunderstood what the question was about.

You mention bringing eyes as a visual perceptual organ is absurd, simple and gormless. I feel it is not a reasonable or fair claim either.

Eyes were pointed out as a visual perceptual sense organ as a medium of visual perception, because without your eyes, you will not have visual perception. Simple as that. Of course everyone knows that eyes are the visual sense organ, but they seem to totally forget that eyes are the medium for transferring the image of the external objects into the brain, which makes the visual perception possible in the brain.

The working of eyes for visual perception could be quite complex. It wouldn't be something so simple and definitely not irrelevant with the visual perception topic, so saying it is not worth even mentioning such a simple thing in the discussion of how visual perception works sounds wrong and indeed addlepated.

Of course neither Austin nor Ayer mentions anything about the workings of eyes in visual perception in all of their books. That does not mean that they thought it would be gormless to talk about the sense organs in the theory of perception, but maybe they didn't know anything about how eyes worked in a neurological and biological way to perceive images and transfers into the brain.

So in those terms, there is nothing to understand. A so-called "direct realist" account of perception is the same as the standard account given by science. — Banno

Neurologists and Psychologists would say it would be addlepated for anyone talking about visual perception without going through ins and outs of the workings on the eyes, but Austin and Ayer had been doing it linguistically and logically, hence there are bound to be some muddles on the way. Still it is a useful exercise in semantics at least, and finding out what the actual issues are in the topic.

No. But they might say that when you look at a cup, what you are seeing is the cup, and not some philosophical innovation such as sense data or qualia. That you are not a homunculus sitting inside a head, looking at the a screen projecting images of cups.

The reply to this will be that we understand from recent scientific developments that our brains actively construct a model of the cup. That's quite right. But it would be an error to think that what we see is this model - the homunculus again. Rather, constructing the model is our seeing the cup. — Banno

This is wrong. Because in neurological research, human perception can never see the exact "NOW". There is time lapse of your seeing the cup, and your brain processing the object as a cognition of a cup of about 0.05ms, which means you never see the cup direct. What you are seeing is a memory of the cup of 0.05ms past even if you may be telling yourself that is the live real perception you are having of the cup. It is a processed and stored image you were seeing.

The distinction between direct and indirect is stated on page 2:

The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.). — Fooloso4

Thanks for your quote. :pray: The fact that Austin starts with direct and indirect perception in his book implies that he took the issue not lightly?  Just guessing.  

Anyway, pointing out eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. It could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. If one reminds oneself that it is also part of the claim from phenomenologists such as Merlou-Ponty, who takes the physical body as a base of perception.

All neurologist and psychologists will never leave out eyes as a medium and sense organ for their account of visual perception. Berkeley has written a book on Visual Perception which exclusively explains how eyes work with the distant and close object for visual perception.

 Of course phenomenology would be off topic in this thread, so we won't go there deeper, but perception cannot be discussed without discussions of sense organs to some degree.

OK. All noted. Will get back with my response in due course as I am in the middle of doing other things :)

Austin's point here is that "direct" and "indirect" are a pair, linked by their opposition. Each derives it's meaning from the other, like "north" and "south", "up" and "down", "hot" and "cold". If you say that all perceptions are indirect, and imply that no perception is, or could be, direct, you deprive "direct" of any "meaning" and hence render "indirect" meaningless as well.

I don't accept that my eye is an intermediary, getting in the way of my perception. It would be simplistic to say that indirect perception is perception aided by something that is not (part of) me, but it is a start, and at least rules out the idea that my eye, which enables me to perceive at all, is somehow an intermediary in a process which could not happen without it. — Ludwig V

Indirect and direct are just words, which are adjectives to describe the noun, how it works. Perceptions are not by definition or essence linked to Direct or Indirect.

Ayer and Austin could have picked up other words to describe perception, but they are the words they used to describe perception.

The terms direct and indirect only get attached to perception when one is asked "how perception works". Because obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue, and the point we are discussing to describe the perception process is, by looking at all entities in the chain and their involvements in perception. We are not asking who is perceiving the tree in the garden, and what perception is made of, but how perception works.

To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. It had been mentioned particularly, because it is the most obvious and unmistakable example of the medium in visual perception by anyone, due to the fact that some folks in this thread seem to have problems in understanding why perceptions are indirect.

I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means. — Ludwig V

You can't understand what direct perception doesn't follow therefore indirect perception is not valid. It just proves perceptions are not direct, but they are indirect.

But if you ask how a rainbow is made, the rainbow will not be part of the explanation. The sunlight, and the raindrops involved are not the rainbow, but the rainbow is not an entity distinct from them either. This should not be surprising. If the analysandum is part of the analysis, you have a circularity. So looking to find a process or event that is the perception inside one's head is a mistake. — Ludwig V

Again, we are not asking what perception is made of, but how perception works.
When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works?

however people will rebut that it is the whole body and not just the brain so it’s direct in that this is how the human brain body processes the world, and you can’t get out of this as if from primary to secondary works of process integration. That’s just my guess. — schopenhauer1

Great point. :ok: But we are not asking who or what is responsible for perception, but how perception works.

As I see it, in Metaphysics, the Indirect Realism of Ayer is the more sensible approach. In Linguistic Idealism, the Direct Realism of Austin is the more sensible approach. As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind. — RussellA

Good point. We will see what the reading and discussions will reveal in due course.

It's interesting to watch ↪Corvus and ↪NOS4A2 attempting to fit the actual Austin in to the account that is so prevalent here, that indirect realism is about sensory apparatus, the way in which our eyes and brain process vision, and so direct realism must also be about sensory apparatus. Corvus in particular is finding that what Austin actually says does not match the common account of what an indirect realist should say. The hard part for them is going to be addressing the arguments Austin actually presents, and not re-dressing them so that they fit a preconfigured critique.
(Austin) is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two.
— Banno — Banno

I was wanting to keep interacting from my own thoughts only on the topic, but perhaps I must read the Austin, and even Ayer too if the thread is about what Austin actually said in "Sense and Sensibilia", rather than what problems direct realists and indirect realist have in their accounts on perception.

Austin and Ayer were very last in my reading list, but they are brought to the current reading list due to this thread.  My reading on them will be very slow due to my other readings going in tandem with them.  

From my quick reading of Austin last night, I agree that @Banno was right in his point that Austin seems to think there is no significance in differentiating direct and indirect words in perception.  He emphasises linguistic usage must be centred from ordinary people's usage, not philosophers'  In that sense, words like "material stuff", "direct or indirect '' don't make sense, because no one really uses these terms in daily life unless one is a philosopher.

However, he seems to acknowledge the case when "indirect" perception makes sense such as seeing objects using telescopes, binoculars and spectacles, which I have been using as an example for the indirect perception process.

Indeed I feel, there is no much significance in delving into the differentiation of direct and indirect perception because from my point of view, all perceptions are somehow indirect from the minimal perspective that for any human  perception, it will happen via proper and relevant sense organs i.e. the eye sights in visual perceptions, and ears for acoustic perceptions, and nose in case of smelling.  No one would use their nose to see a tree in the field, and no one would use their eyes to smell wine. And without the relevant sense organs and their proper functions, that particular sense perception would be impaired, if not impossible.

But if we agree on the fact that these sense organs are not the final perception location in the process, then they have to be the medium passing the sensed contents into the final location i.e. the brain.  Therefore all perceptions are indirect. And we are not even talking about sense-datum at this point.

I am still trying to understand the direct realist's account on perception.  In what aspect perception is to be understood as direct and real? Are they saying that what they sense from the external objects directly arrives in their brain without any medium in between?  Are they saying that what they sense and perceive from the external world are the true existence of the beings and the world with no possibility of being uncertain or inaccurate?

This point might not be the main topic of this thread as @Banno pointed out, so it could be ignored if that is the way the thread will proceed.

I will be reading the part where Austin discusses on "Delusion and Illusion".
 

Yes, I do appreciate your points too. After good argument sessions, I always feel I have learnt 10 times more than any lectures or readings.

As you may agree, philosophical arguments are not about brawls, but just your points laid out in several premises and evidences followed by your conclusions. And pointing out why you do or don't agree with your opponents points. :)

It might be best to simply follow along, as the book is attached to my post here. — Antony Nickles

I was just responding to the other members queries on the points. You got to give out your points as clearly as possible, if you had one, when asked, don't you? :)

Thanks for the link, but I have nice hardback copies of both Austin (1962) and Ayer's (1940) books. I was reading both of them today. Must admit Austin's writing style is super clear, and utterly logical.

Well we are not here for changing your views, but fair enough for your points. I have given out my views for your points.

I used to think every perception is indirect i.e. via sense-datum.  But Banno says that Austin claims there are perceptions which are not indirect.  So I presume he means that there are both direct and indirect perceptions depending on what they are.  I look forward to hearing what they are, and verify if it is a true claim, or not.

But take for instance, I am looking at an object on the grass in my back garden.  I am on the 2nd floor of my study room, and looking down at the grass through the window.  It is not that far away, about 30 ft distance.  The object looks grey and round in shape, and is unidentified at first. I was wondering what it could be, but cannot make out.

I was suspecting it would be either a leaf from the trees, or an empty plastic carton blown by the wind from the outside road, or it could even be the next door neighbour's cat droppings. I am not sure due to the fuzziness of the object and the distance.

I take out my old Pentax binoculars, and point to the object through the window, and focus for the object.  It is blurry and fuzzy at first, but soon it gets clearer, and appears as a super sharp image.  I can see the object now very well, and can tell it is a leaf possibly dropped from the trees in the garden.

The visual perception in this case was only possible via the aid of the binoculars.  For that, I would claim that the binocular was part of my sense organ.  The image was transferred to me via the lenses in the binoculars into my eyes and then into my brain somewhere in which was able to identify the image as a leaf, not an empty carton or the dreaded cat droppings.

In this case, if I say the whole perception was direct from the leaf on the grass to my cognition, I think I am not being fair or reasonable.  Even my eyes are not the recognitive judgemental place for the perception.  They were just a medium, which transferred the image in the binocular to my brain somewhere. 

I am sure the final place where the perceptual judgement took place where I identified the object as a leaf was somewhere in my brain, and the categorical concepts which activated my judgement of the identification of the leaf as a leaf from the trees. My perception in this case was indirect in many folds for sure.

I still don't know what kind of leaf it is, or from which trees (birch, poplar or acer) in the garden. For that, I will need to go out to the garden and walk into the grass, and stand right above the object and have a close peek.

Hence, my perception was incomplete, although having identified what the object was ( a leaf), I am still not sure what it might be, therefore I have no complete access to the object in the world in epistemic sense even after having a concentrated perceptual operation with high quality visual aid. Of course I am not denying the existence of the object on the grass, or saying that it might be a figment of my imagination. What I am saying is that, I have perceived the object on the grass, and with the visual aid which assisted in clearing the blurriness of the image of the object, initial identification seems successful, however, the full knowledge of the nature of the object is still vague at this stage of perception.

Consequently perceptions cannot be direct, but must be resolutely indirect, because all perceputal activities take place via sense organs minimally, sense-datum mostly and many other peripheral factors. (I still keep open-minded admitting for the non-indirect perception case offered by Austin.)

So we don't seem to agree on the topic, but not all do, and that is pretty normal in all discussions.

The “directness” describes the relationship between perceiver and perceived. By “direct” one means there is no causal intermediary between the perceiver and the rest of the world, that we aren’t viewing sense-data, neurons, shadows on a cave wall, but the things themselves. — NOS4A2

Yes, I would go with that.

Austin is certainly not making any such claim. Sometimes we see things that are real. It does not follow that everything we see is real. Sometimes we see things that are not real. It does not follow that everything we see is not real. So your "For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair" is a mischaracterisation. Nor is memory a simple process of storage. I suggest the brush you are using here is too broad. If for you "the realist's account on perception sounds too simple", you might consider that you have not represented their view accurately. — Banno

Wasn't Austin a direct realist? His argument was against sense-data theory in perception, claiming that when you perceive an external world object, you are perceiving it directly without any medium in between the perceiver and the object.

I was trying to point out some problems with the direct realist's account that you can perceive external world objects directly, and sense-datum is not involved.

The contents you perceive definitely get stored in your mind, if not in memory where else could it be?

Another problem I used to think that naive realists and direct realists (not sure they are the same people, but sounds similar to me) have with their claims, is that what they perceive is the true account of the real world, which is problematic (from the argument of illusion). You cannot ground certainty of the external world solely on the basis of what you perceive due to the imperfect human sense organs, and possibility of illusion with perception due to the way the objects' nature and property are, or the fluxing environmental condition of the perception etc.

I agree with Russell's Representative Realism, because it says what we perceive is sense-data not the objects direct. In the case of sense-data, the whole process of perception process gets coherently explained and understood. Because it is sense-data, the data which could be accurate or inaccurate, can be stored and retrieved, it coheres with the whole human cognitive process and paradigms.

And still he wasn't denying the external world as illusion. The world out there exists even when we don't perceive it. But due to nature of the world, and our perceptual sense organs, what we perceive is sense-data, not the objects themselves.

Anyhow, this thread is a good opportunity to take out the old classics "Sense and Sensibilia" and "Foundations of Empirical Knowledge", read, think, refute (if need be), and learn. cheers.

If we read on, perception is used as a straw man for any problems in the “aftermath of perception”, but “seeing” a table is to identify something as a table, which is judging whether something is a table, or, say, a bench (that we somehow mis-identify as a table) and not a matter “after” perception, but I’m getting ahead of the text. “…our senses are dumb… [they] do not tell us anything, true or false. — Antony Nickles

You need more than just identifying a table as a table in visual perception.  What if the object you were seeing was a look-alike table, but actually it is a chair? Upon folding out the folded down back underneath the table, it works as a chair?  Is it a chair or table?

In perception, there is far more going on than just identifying an object as an object i.e. reasoning, intuition, judgement and intentionality can get all involved, and for that they have to be sense data, which is the medium in the consciousness caused by the real object in the external world. Not the real objects themselves, because you cannot store the actual tables into your consciousness or memory. You would store the sense data of the table in your memory.

The realist's account on perception sounds too simple. Is there a point even asking what perception is?

Harsh on engineers. The engineer wouldn't say that the physicists knowledge of string theory was invalid because we cannot see or touch one-dimensional objects called strings. — RussellA

Wasn't it what Bob Ross and his supporters were claiming in his previous thread "Metaphysics as illegitimate source of knowledge"? I was sure they were the engineers transformed into the metaphysicians undercover. hmmm your short memories :rofl:

I don't agree. There is as much a chance of humans being able to feel, intuit or reason about some things-in-themselves as a cat will ever be able to feel, intuit or reason about Western Literature. — RussellA

From here, suppose it is up to personal opinion. Of course, if you are a dedicated esoteric magician, you could see thing-in-self God, human soul no problems, and the Kabbalistic Tree of Life would be your universe :D

True, — RussellA

True, — RussellA

We seem to be in agreement. :cool: :up:

A Metaphysician asks "what are numbers". An engineer asks "what does 130 plus 765 add up to". The engineer in designing a bridge doesn't need to know the metaphysical meaning of numbers. — RussellA

True, but the problem is the engineer would sometimes say, all metaphysical knowledge is invalid, because it deals with things that we cannot see or touch. At that moment, the engineer has forgotten that he has transformed himself into a metaphysician in undercover, and claiming metaphysical statements. Metaphysics is invalid form of knowledge is also a Metaphysical claim, which is contentious i.e. true or false depending on what we are talking about.

It would hardly be surprising that as we are also animals, there are some things that are unknown and unknowable to us also because of the physical limitations of our brains. — RussellA

So your interpretation seems to say that there is a thing-in-itself as legitimate existence out there, but the human brain cannot know it due to the limitation of what the brain can know. Fair enough.

My interpretation was similar in that, human perception cannot catch every properties of perceptual objects in one single sense data, hence there are always parts of the perceived object, unperceived.  That is thing-in-itself.  It is not known, but we know it exists.

On the next perception of the same object, the unperceived properties of the objects might be perceived, and the thing-in-itself gets clearer in its nature due to more meditation, by chance, or from different angle of perspectives etc.  And one day the thing-in-itself becomes totally known object (ideally) hopefully.  Some thing-in-itself objects are not likely ever to be perceived at all, but we can still feel, intuit or reason about them such as God, human soul and the universe.

Austin will show how Ayer has oversimplified, even misdiagnosed, the case for these abnormal instances, why we should reject 'sense-data' as a solution, and then that generalising to all perceptions is absurd — Banno

I feel that Ayer's sense data theory is more reasonable. If everything you perceive is real, and that is it, it sounds too simple, and it has no ground to explicate what happens after your perception with the perceived content.

When you look at the perceived content as sense data, you could say that the sense data is stored in your memory, which you could retrieve and manipulate i.e. imagine, analyse, remember, synthesise etc throughout time and time after the perception.

Perception is far more than just to say, what I see is "real", and that is it. The aftermath of perception is more complex, deep, rich and meaningful in human perception.

Without some sort of repository place for the perceived content i.e. sense data, everything ends abruptly, there is no more to be said.

For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair - that is real, which is too simple. How do they further explain on remembering, imagining, and intuiting, and analysing ...etc? A chair was a char. But you cannot know anything afterwards. Blank.

The brain can be equated with hardware and the mind can be equated with software — RussellA

Yes, I suppose the brain and mind's closest analogy would be computer processor and software. But again there are too many gaps between them to equate. Human brain and microchip cannot compare in complexity and also capacity. Same goes with the human mind and computer software.

As you say that software operations are conceptual, we say that the mind is conceptual, But this does not mean that either the hardware of the computer or brain of the human need to exist outside of time and space in order for the software of the computer or mind of the brain to be expressed. — RussellA

It is not to do with existence in time and space, but the complexity and capacity gaps, computers and human mind cannot be equated.

A Philosopher cannot work in a vacuum. A philosopher cannot philosophise if they have no topic to philosophise about, even if that topic is philosophy itself. — RussellA

Philosophy can be done in a dark room in vacuum I believe.  You go into the room, put on a light, shut the door, take out some of your favorite philosophy books, do some reading, meditating, reasoning, and write what you think about them. To me that is good enough philosophy for a casual reader. If you are a professional philosopher, perhaps you must also prepare the lecture notes.

 If you were a scientist, then it would be different. You must have a lab, and all the test equipment, the books, notes, and you would be doing experiments, observations and verifications. You must then try to come up with the conclusions for your experiments, and try to make up some theories.  

Kant should be looked at for his philosophy not as a historical figure
True, but as we can compare and contrast Plato and Kant in order to evaluate their respective positions, we can compare and contrast Kant's Transcendental Idealism with contemporary Indirect Realism in order to evaluate their respective similarities and differences.

I think that looking at Kant as a historical figure from the viewpoint of the 18th C may be interesting as a historical exercise, but I don't think it contributes to our philosophical knowledge and understanding. — RussellA

The most compelling point for Kant's TI are still, whether
1. Metaphysics is possible as a legitimate science or is it just an invalid form of knowledge.
2. Whether Thing-in-Itself is a true independent existence on its own separate from human cognition therefore unknowable, or whether it is part of human perception, which is possible to be known even if it may look unknowable at first.

These are the compelling points that have attracted different opinions and interpretations. All other points are, I still believe, separate issues and subjects of their own.

But in terms of realism, “directly” and “indirectly” describe the perceptual relationship between the man and everything he perceives, which includes the periscope, the air, the clouds, etc. It doesn’t describe the relationship between the man and the procession, the tea cup, or whatever the relationship between the subject and the object of a sentence may be. — NOS4A2

If we allow that, then I would be a bit concerned with a very likely possibility of the realist's claim that even illusions are real, because it is the object of their perception.

It would be a conceptual vacuum of course.

"For this reason alone there seems to be something badly wrong with the question, 'do we perceive things indirectly or not?'"(p. 17) — Banno

There are cases where the objects are not visible at all by bare eye sight. Consider a far away star too dim to be seen with bare eyes in the night sky.

But when you use a telescope (good quality), and see it, it becomes visible. There is a medium (a good quality telescope) between your eyes and the object (the faint star). So, we could say that we don't perceive things directly always?

And when one gets old, hearing gets poor. The folk would use a hearing aid. All the sounds the folk hears would come via the hearing aid. Does the folk then hear the sound directly or indirectly?

True, Kant didn't talk about the brain, but then neither did Plato talk about Kant. — RussellA

Plato couldn't talk about Kant obviously, as having not been born for almost another 2000 years, Kant wasn't around when Plato was alive :)

I find Kant's Critique of Pure Reason relevant and interesting precisely because it can be explained in today's terms. It is not a dead historical subject, but has insights as to contemporary problems of philosophy. — RussellA

Yes, I suppose you could look at any contemporary system or thoughts under the light of Kant's TI, and draw good philosophical criticisms or new theories out of them, and that is what all classical philosophy is about.  But as I said, it would be a topic of its own.

As a logic gate is a mechanical entity, reason is a biological entity. — RussellA

You wouldn't call or equate a lump of computer chips and memories as mind, reason or consciousness. :)
Of course the physical existence of the chips and memories are the body where the software defined logic and machine reasoning can be set, and happening. But they are at the software level, not hardware. Software operations are conceptual just like human mind.

There is a clear difference in software and hardware of any computer architecture. They work together but one is not the same as the other, and vice versa.

Philosophy cannot be carried out in a vacuum, by a philosopher sitting in a dark room shut off from the world with only their thoughts. The philosopher must take the world into account within their philosophising. — RussellA

Speculative philosophy can be done in a dark room full of vacuum for sure, because its tool is the concepts, logic and reasoning. :) Of course, philosophy can work on any topic or subjects, but they would be topics of themselves.

why do you suppose he devoted everything after A293/B350 to PURE reason, practically two thirds of the whole work, in Kemp Smith pg, 293 to pg.669, if reason and pure reason where so interchangeable.

I think the key is in pure, rather than reason. — Mww

Yes, this is actually excellent point. I haven't read CPR that far yet, but looked it up now. Indeed you are right. Thanks for pointing it out. :100:

Except for the quotes, a personal interpretation of the original view, whatever it’s worth. Still, if reason were limited to the senses, it’d be pretty hard to not only justify, but to even come up with, some modern scientific theories. — Mww

Sure. A good point. :up:

Not quite right, in that reason alone does not account for PURE reason, right there is the title of the book.
“…This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics (…) constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Reason….” — Mww

I have 4 different versions of CPR. They are ones translated by,
JMD Meiklejohn,
NK Smith,
Max Muller,
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood

None of them seems using "pure reason" in the PREFACE apart from the JMD MeikleJohn version. They all use "reason" to denote "pure reason".
So I am under impression "pure reason" and "reason" are being used as the same term in CPR.

I am making use of Daniel Bonevac's Video Kant's Categories.

Reason doesn't create logic, rather, what we reason has been determined by the prior logical structure of the brain — RussellA

A good video for the topic. Thanks. :up: However, I never said that reason creates logic. :D
When you say reason doesn't create logic (whoever said reason creates logic - NOT ME), it sounds like reason is some kind of a biological or living entity itself as a lump of substance. That would be Sci-Fi, not Philosophy.

Reason is a way our thoughts work. Logic has had many definitions since Aristotle's invention. In Kant, logic is the way reason works along with the Categories. Categorical items are not something that operate themselves. They are schema, i.e. form with the a priori concepts to be applied to the objects in the senses.  How does it work? It works according to the logic.

I was thinking about what reason would be in general terms, and also looked for its dictionary definition.  It is a rational basis for one's action and judgement.  It is a really abstract concept.  You cannot tell anything about reason without its content i.e. what it was about, i.e. some description on your motive for your action, or your argument or proposition on something.  Without this content, it doesn't make sense in talking about reason.  And of course you can talk about reason as a property of mind just like in CPR.

The brain must have a physical structure that is logically ordered in order to make logical sense of its experiences of the world. — RussellA

Kant is in effect saying that Chomsky's Innatism is a more sensible approach than Skinner's Behaviourism. — RussellA

Reason cannot be located in the brain. Again this is the hard problem on mind and body connection issue you brought up. Kant never said a word about the brain in all his works as far as I am aware. Maybe he did. I am not sure. I doubt it very much. He would have really nothing much to say about it even if he did. Talking about Brain and TI in the context of its location or connection would be a categorical mistake.

Chomsky's Enactivism sounds like a type of SocioBiology subject. I am sure it has nothing to do with Kant's transcendental Idealism. Neither Skinner's Behaviourism.

Cool. Will have a look at the video, and get back to you later in due course. :ok:

"To the things themselves" they said but those things were "phenomena", hence the name of the movement. This dualism was enabled by the influence of Kant on latter philosophy. Phenomena is not understood by the immediate sensations anyway, hence the mere fact that I know the moon is there when everybody closes their eyes — Gregory

From my books on Kant, they all seem to agree in saying that Kant's main point for writing CPR was to draw a boundary on the power of human reason i.e. reason can only operate within the limits of our senses. What is not entered in the sense are not legitimate objects of human knowledge making Metaphysics as invalid form of knowledge.

I don't agree with those views in the books, because Kant made clear himself, that he loves Metaphysics. Kant wanted to establish Metaphysics a subject which is different from Science in methodology and domain. Not invalid form of knowledge.

In doing so, he had to create the concept of the thing-in-itself as an object of an unknown world, and the upshot is the 2 different type world i.e. noumenon and phenomenon which looks like a typical dualism. But whether it was a real dualism as such would be subject for debate. My view is that it wasn't a dualism, but was just a way of drawing boundary between what human reason can do reliably, and not.

This sounds like Plato. Kant has a different "feel" to his work but that may be from the historical distance between them. Is it possible Kant was just a Platonist? — Gregory

I thought about Kant as a Platonic dualist too at one point, but as @Wayfarer pointed out, there are clear differences between Kant and Plato.  In Plato, the world of ideas was the real world.  The phenomenon world is a transit temporary and shadowy world. 

That view was coherently supportive of the Christianity doctrines and had been adopted by the apologists from the ancient through the medieval times and even today. Platonic realism is the universals are the part of the reality in the world of idea, which is the true universe.  I don't think Kant would have agreed on that.

To say that the our fields of perception alone give us phenomena i think is contrary to phenomenology, which Kant may have have been the first author of. Mentally we have, or for now have, a "frame" and we put all our sensations on this 2d frame in order to organize it. The phenomena of the window behind me is behind me, and the noumena could be anywhere. I even think sounds exist objectively. A reality outside of us — Gregory

I am not sure even Kant says you have a 2nd frame where your sense contents get transferred into for further organisation.   Anyway, Kant was not a Phenomenologist, and Phenomenology didn't exist when Kant was alive.

In Phenomenology, the content of perception appearing in your consciousness is all there is in perception.  You see your nose, and that is your nose.  There is no such thing as impression, ideas, or sense data of your nose.   But it doesn't end there.  Your perceived nose can trigger all other parts of your consciousness as experience. 

Your perception is also your experience with intentionality.  You know that your nose is part of your body, it can smell, it can have a bloody nose, it also supports your sunglasses if you wear one.  In that bracket of the nose in your consciousness, it has all the mental properties attached to it such as memory, imagination and belief in the nose.

So it is not that simple.  If you are interested more in Phenomenology you could read Husserl's book "Ideas", "Logical Investigation in 2 volumes", and even "Philosophy of Perception" by Merlou-Ponty, which are all meaty heavy going works by the main historical Phenomenologists.

Anyway, like you, some people seem to interpret Kant as a naive idealist who claims that you have objects in your mind, and that they are the real objects.  There are objects in the external world, which cause the senses to perceive the objects, but you don't know if they are the real, and there is the world of Thing-in-Themselves independent of your perception. 

That is the exact problem many people have been objecting to.  I think it is just an interpretation of Kant among many other different interpretations of him. But in reality, Kant never said that in his CPR or any other books he wrote.  He just said the existence of objects which look like they exist, but don't get caught by our senses are called Thing-in-Itself, and that is the way the world is, and how our perception works.  He doesn't push into the details of how they exist, why or what they really are.

Difficult to escape from a metaphorical use of language. I am using "science" is a figure of speech that includes the instruments of science. — RussellA

I am still saying that, just the red patch colour visual perception would be more meaningful than the scientific instrument reading of the red patch emission of 700nm to the most ordinary people. :)

Wholes have parts, which in turn have parts, which in turn have parts. But sooner or later one assumes there are parts which have no parts, ie, simples. In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard.(Wikipedia - Simple (philosophy)). It may be that fundamental forces and fundamental particles are simples, but science may discover it to be something else altogether. — RussellA

ChatGPT says that atoms can be viewed with the special technical setup in the lab with the powerful laser powered microscopes, but I don't subscribe to that.  There have been too many fabrications in science theories and allegations on what they have achieved, and what is possible by the new technologies and scientific discoveries, but soon found out to be hoax fabrications.  ChatGpt can be handy for quick reference of simple queries, but it tends to spew out meaningless and groundless stories at times too, so I don't take it seriously.

Unless I am in front of the microscope and seeing the atoms, I won't believe the allegations on the existence of atoms claimed by ChatGpt, some shady Sci-Fi forums or web sites.  Even if the supposed Atom images are seen in the microscope, how do you know they are atoms?  The concept atom was first made by the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus to denote the micro substance making up the universe.

There is no legitimate conceptual, definitional or essential connection between what is being seen in the microscope and the concept "atom" apart from pure random arbitrary fanciful imagination, yes?

It is shocking to see some people blindly believe and trust without questioning or reasoning whatever is thrown to their faces under the label of science , and then try to push that to the others. In that sense, science can be just like religions. It might be just symptoms of the popular science in general devoid of metaphysics.

Science can tell us things that intuition cannot, such as when we perceive a red object, such as a post-box, the object may have emitted a wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

Strictly speaking, wouldn't it be the instruments (invented and calibrated for their own convenience by humans) which tells the wave length of 700nm emission, rather than science? It would still be a mental idea when read by humans. The reading would be a contingent figure which has no meaning to the people in daily life. If the aliens made the instrument, it could be calibrated to read it as 10nm or 100 million nm.

n a sense, "atoms" are a convenient figure of speech for mereological simples, whatever they may be, but could be fundamental forces and fundamental particles existing in time and space. — RussellA

See, could be, not necessarily or for definite. "could be" sounds a negativity in disguise here. :)

What is crucial is a logical connection between the thing-in-itself in the world and the appearance in the mind, and this connection is what Kant understands as the Category of Cause. Kant's Category of Cause is what ensures that there is only one cup, even though the cup may exist in different forms, first as a set of atoms in three dimensional space in the world and then as a two-dimensional appearance in the mind.

Kant's Category of Cause is crucial to the viability of his Transcendental Idealism. — RussellA

I looked into this further, and it seems to me Kant's Category of Cause is a concept to be applied to the external world events as cause and effect.  It is not to do with perceptions or the mental principles of reasoning.

I still think the process of reasoning coming to judgements activated by intuitions, perceptions or thoughts is operated by Logic.   Could you please confirm your thoughts on this? Thanks.

Yeah sounds reasonable. :cool: :up:

but science tells me that what I am actually looking at is a set of atoms in a three-dimensional space. — RussellA

Not sure, if science has to be consulted for that assurance. Wouldn't common sense or intuition do?

And we don't really care about a set of atoms unless for some peculiar reason. To me atoms are just an abstract concept, that doesn't exist in the real world. Or if it did, it has nothing to do with me, or daily life.

I don't think Kant must have thought there were two cups when he was making a coffee for himself, and took out a cup from the cupboard.

There is a cup on his worktop, and that is it.  But there is a cup-in-itself according to his TI. So you might say Kant says that there are two cups?  That is absurd.

But this is where Kant's Transcendental Logic kicks in.  TL will say, no this is the only cup in the worktop, and that is it.  TL is supposed to correct when your reason goes astray, and have illusions or broken thinking on the perceptions.

With TL operational, you know that you have only one cup on the worktop, and there is no confusion in that. In Kant, Logic is not just A -> B, B -> C, therefore A -> C, like some other folks seem to believe.

Logic is the engine of how rationality, intuition, perception, understanding and judgement works.

For the idealist, the contents of what they visualise, believe, remember, imagine and think in their minds are also significant, as the object they see in real world. I think we must allow that, because it is the foundation and source of all arts and creativity in human nature.

Of course the realists only allow what they see in the real world as the only existence, disregarding the mental contents. But that is what the realists are.