Where does it exist? — Corvus

As @mww wrote "For their place in transcendental philosophy, they are transcendentally deduced conceptions, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain things that appear to sensibility."

In a sense, muons are things-in-themselves, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain what is observed.

But of course, you know this is miles from Kant. — Astrophel

Yes. Kant, who died in 1804, was not aware of what is described today as Enactivism and Innatism. However Philosophers working today in 2023 should be aware of these concepts, and should take them into account when contemplating about non-propositional knowledge.

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This whole structred conception of evolution itself is just this, a phenomenological consturction, leading right into Kantisn thinking's hands, which is that the true source of rational thought is transcendence. — Astrophel

Transcendence has different meanings. It depends what you mean by transcendence. For Kant, "I call all knowledge transcendental if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects even before we experience them. (Wikipedia - Transcendence (philosophy). Kant does not explain how we can know objects before we experience them. Today, however, because of the concept of Innatism, we are able to explain how we can know objects before we experience them.

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Localizing the apodicticity of what we call causality in a brain's structure suggest that outside such that this the principle would not apply. — Astrophel

Why? Why should it follow that because the understanding of causality is innate within the brain the principle of causality would not apply outside the brain? The concept of Enactivism shows that an understanding of causality is innate within the brain precisely because the principle of causality applies outside the brain.

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Therefore, the brain is a construct of the brain. — Astrophel

It depends what the word "brain" is referring to. Yes, in the sense that the "brain" as a word in language is a construct of the brain as something that physically exists in the world.

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But how does brain generated anything produce a reality that is anything but brain generated somethings? — Astrophel

For the Idealist, reality only exists in a mind, meaning that the reality the mind perceives has been created by a mind. For the Indirect and Direct Realist, there is a reality outside the mind which the mind relates to. This reality outside the mind has not been generated by the mind, but how the mind relates to this reality is generated by the mind. For the Indirect Realist, the reality they perceive is a representation of the reality existing outside the mind. For the Direct Realist, the reality they perceive is the reality existing outside the mind.

There are different opinions as to the source of one's perceived reality.

In a sense, muons are things-in-themselves, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain what is observed. — RussellA

Does it leads to a conclusion that modern QM is basing some of their theories and hypotheses on Kant's Thing-in-Itself?

Does it leads to a conclusion that modern QM is basing some of their theories and hypotheses on Kant's Thing-in-Itself? — Corvus

Not necessarily, but it does show that good ideas are universal.

Not necessarily, but it does show that good ideas are universal. — RussellA

and timeless.

I can't see where we disagree, then. — Astrophel

Oh, we disagree over a wide range, which is fine.



But, with respect to that comment, I’ve been there myself. Pure reason’s intrinsic circularity has been obvious for millennia, and advances in neurological science has made it even worse.

The brain goes so far as to manifest itself as an immaterial something-or-other, imbues the seemingness of knowledge into it, but prevents the seemingness of knowledge for informing the immaterial something-or-other of what it is or where it came from. Like, brain says…..YOU are allowed to know whatever YOU think YOU know, in a progressive series, but YOU are not allowed to even think YOU know anything at all in a regressive series, which, of course, includes YOU.

The brain in its mighty magnificence gives its self-manifested subjectivity QM science, a progressive series. One of the tenets of QM science is the fact that observation disrupts the quantum domain by intruding into it, also progressive. A sidebar given by the brain in its mighty magnificence is the incredible density of the constituent parts of itself, informing its self-manifested subjectivity of its ~3b/mm3 synaptic clefts, which is the very domain of QM science….progressive. So eventually the self-manifested subjectivity goes so far as to invent a device for exploring the quantum domain of itself, progressive, searching for a YOU that has been allowed to know…..oh crap!!!!…..regressive.

Now the self-manifested subjectivity takes the chance of disrupting itself, in which case….was it ever there? The brain has tacitly allowed the extermination of its own avatar.

YIKES!!!!

Yes. Kant, who died in 1804, was not aware of what is described today as Enactivism and Innatism. However Philosophers working today in 2023 should be aware of these concepts, and should take them into account when contemplating about non-propositional knowledge. — RussellA

Heh, heh, I don't mean historically. I could equally say the post Heideggerian insights of Michel Henry are entirely missed by the positvism that seems to rule the thoughts of science oriented metaphysics. Henry died early this century.

Transcendence has different meanings. It depends what you mean by transcendence. For Kant, "I call all knowledge transcendental if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects even before we experience them. (Wikipedia - Transcendence (philosophy). Kant does not explain how we can know objects before we experience them. Today, however, because of the concept of Innatism, we are able to explain how we can know objects before we experience them. — RussellA

Sorry, you have to look at that "before" term very differently. He means logically prior, such that when one encounters an object, analysis reveals a structure that is invisible to observation, but is latent within it. In other words, before making, or, in order to make, experience possible at all, there has to be these structure in place just due to an analysis of what experience is.

Why? Why should it follow that because the understanding of causality is innate within the brain the principle of causality would not apply outside the brain? The concept of Enactivism shows that an understanding of causality is innate within the brain precisely because the principle of causality applies outside the brain. — RussellA

Because, to borrow Rorty's reasoning, the innateness is not out there, in the same way that propositions and their logical forms are not out there, in the tree, the chair or the compute mouse. Truth, moving into a strong but inevitable position, is not out there, among things. There are no numbers, no concepts out there. We do this.

It depends what the word "brain" is referring to. Yes, in the sense that the "brain" as a word in language is a construct of the brain as something that physically exists in the world. — RussellA

But to affirm what is not brain, you would have to step out of one. Otherwise, all of your brain references will be about other brain produced phenomena. All the "out thereness" would remain among the complexities of neuronal interface. Keeping in mind that this is NOT the position I represent at all. I am pointing out the impossibilities of such brain talk.

For the Idealist, reality only exists in a mind, meaning that the reality the mind perceives has been created by a mind. For the Indirect and Direct Realist, there is a reality outside the mind which the mind relates to. This reality outside the mind has not been generated by the mind, but how the mind relates to this reality is generated by the mind. For the Indirect Realist, the reality they perceive is a representation of the reality existing outside the mind. For the Direct Realist, the reality they perceive is the reality existing outside the mind.

There are different opinions as to the source of one's perceived reality. — RussellA

For the phenomenologist, reality is just reality, it is exactly s it appears, and when I say the tree is over there and it is not me and there is spatial separation that separates us, etc., all of this stays in place. Recall that Kant said just this. He just further said that when it comes to philosophy, we have to deal with transcendence and the presuppositions in ontology and epistemology have to be explored and this leads to a whole diffenent set of questions and ideas.

You know, Ryle knew this; they all did and do. Kant wasn't dismissed because he was essentially wrong. He was dismissed because he had been worn out, and after more that a century of post Kantianism, it was understood that there was simply nothing left to say. But analytic philosophy then took a course away from this into common sense (Moore holding his hands up declaring "here is a hand!") and positivism and took off, ignoring what Husserl and Heidegger and the French were doing with phenomenology, basically initiated by Kant. And the further it got away from this, the more science informed its grounding.

But, with respect to that comment, I’ve been there myself. Pure reason’s intrinsic circularity has been obvious for millennia, and advances in neurological science has made it even worse.

The brain goes so far as to manifest itself as an immaterial something-or-other, imbues the seemingness of knowledge into it, but prevents the seemingness of knowledge for informing the immaterial something-or-other of what it is or where it came from. Like, brain says…..YOU are allowed to know whatever YOU think YOU know, in a progressive series, but YOU are not allowed to even think YOU know anything at all in a regressive series, which, of course, includes YOU.

The brain in its mighty magnificence gives its self-manifested subjectivity QM science, a progressive series. One of the tenets of QM science is the fact that observation disrupts the quantum domain by intruding into it, also progressive. A sidebar given by the brain in its mighty magnificence is the incredible density of the constituent parts of itself, informing its self-manifested subjectivity of its ~3b/mm3 synaptic clefts, which is the very domain of QM science….progressive. So eventually the self-manifested subjectivity goes so far as to invent a device for exploring the quantum domain of itself, progressive, searching for a YOU that has been allowed to know…..oh crap!!!!…..regressive.

Now the self-manifested subjectivity takes the chance of disrupting itself, in which case….was it ever there? The brain has tacitly allowed the extermination of its own avatar. — Mww

Disrupting or liberating? Consider that these are the same. What you call QM disruption is reducible to "the question," the piety of thought. It precedes science, even the most disruptive, for it is the essence of disruption itself: the dialectical mechanism that allows no thesis to go unchallanged. Brain talk always ends up in refutation simply because the question it begs subtends everything conceivable. I have no doubt there is a brain/experience connectivity, and this needs some emphasis. But if some form of Cartesian doubt (the question!) always already insinuates itself between belief and its objects, one is left trying to find an Archimedean point, if you will, that is unmovable to thought at this level, and QM is not this, for it remains a concept embedded in a context of "regionalized thought" and one remains in the hermeneutic indeterminacy.

My position is this: Such indeterminacy is impossible to overcome, and Derrida makes this clear. But Rorty and his pragmatism (as well as others) make all of our language endeavors into pragmatic endeavors and philosophy is just this pragmatic reaching out into metaphsyics, where language terminates, which is impossible. But if you follow Husserl and post Husserlian thought (the French "turn" with Levinas, Michel Henry, Jean Luc Marion, et al), you are taken to the only logical extenson of hermeneutics and Cartesian doubt (this all encomapssing aporia!), which is to the things themselves, the revelatory appearance of the world in the wake of the most radicial reduction.

What makes this radical and opens the door to discovering philosophy's real purpose is that the phenomenological reduction is not simply a thesis; it is a method. An existential method, if you will, one that brings one into greater intimacy with existence by bracketing or suspending everything that is not, to put it roughly. Even Husserl didn't understand this.

Disruption is only a beginning.

In other words, before making, or, in order to make, experience possible at all, there has to be these structure in place just due to an analysis of what experience is. — Astrophel

Yes, in the same way that we are able to see the colour red and not the colour ultraviolet because the ability to see red is an innate part of the structure of the brain.

the innateness is not out there, — Astrophel

Yes, if the word "innate" is limited to sentient beings, then innateness does not exist in a world external to sentient beings. Causality may then be said to be intrinsic within a world external to sentient beings.

But to affirm what is not brain, you would have to step out of one. — Astrophel

Do you mean "brain" existing as a word in language or brain as a physical thing existing in a world outside language?

For the phenomenologist, reality is just reality, it is exactly s it appears, — Astrophel

Yes, when the Phenomenologist sees the colour red, they are interested in the colour red as it appears to them within the context of their other experiences. Their interest in not in making assumptions about a possible cause in an external world.

Kant wasn't dismissed because he was essentially wrong. He was dismissed because he had been worn out, — Astrophel

Yes, Kant started a conversation and new knowledge gained in the 200 years since his death doesn't make what he said any less relevant.

I just disagree that Kant was meaning 'thing-in-itself' in that manner: he states very clearly throughout CPR that we will never know anything about the things-in-themselves.

Transcendental arguments are not intended for empirical conditions, so, no, there wouldn’t be one. No need to argue for that which gives you a bloody nose, or a headache, or hurts your eyes if you look at it too long

Well, then, it appears as though Kant has no grounds to be an indirect realist. Why think there are real objects, then?

There isn’t a proof. Remember….we’re not even conscious of this part of the system as a whole. The transcendental argument sets the technical groundwork, nonetheless, as the first part of the work.

There should be. Kant gives a proof for everything he claims; except for his presupposition that there are real objects.

No. Like….how is it called a cup-in-itself.

I just made it up for distinguishing between the cup which is experienced vs. the cup as it is in-itself. Is that what you are asking?

it appears as though Kant has no grounds to be an indirect realist. — Bob Ross

I wonder. Say I get famous. In a hundred years, will they take what made me famous, look at it way differently than I meant for it, then call me something I wouldn’t call myself, because of the way they looked at what I said?

“…. the real—that which corresponds to sensation—….”. All sensations are given directly from perception which is given directly from the appearance of real things, so…..

Why would ever suggest Kant was an indirect realist? If anything, he would be an indirect epistemologist, in that all our empirical knowledge is only possible indirectly from representations of real objects.

Elsewhere, has invited the “mediate/immediate” distinction, as opposed to the direct/indirect. From a purely subjective perspective….what a guy thinks for himself and not what a philosopher thinks for everybody….the invite is a much better approach, and is used by Kant himself.
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Kant gives a proof for everything he claims — Bob Ross

Actually, he admits to not knowing how some things he posits work, re: imagination, even reason itself. He posits logical arguments, which are treated as internal proofs, but are never susceptible to objectively repeatable experiment, hence never empirically proven. He can’t prove there are representations, conceptions, cognitions and whatnot, but he can prove it’s logically valid that this or that happens when there are. It’s called theory, donchaknow. Or, speculative metaphysics.
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the cup which is experienced vs. the cup as it is in-itself — Bob Ross

I asked how a “cup-in-itself” got its name, and the correct answer is…..it doesn’t because there is no such thing as a cup as it is in-itself. No named thing is in-itself; no in-itself is ever named, and no case can be made for transcendental idealism, within its original view, that says otherwise.

The turn from Kantianism to modern phenomenology was a turning toward realism. It was for the world. Which is not to say it's not spiritual in any way. Mystcism has been a big part of German philosophy since the Romantic period

Logically, how can something reflect on itself? — RussellA

Reason can reflect on itself.

The turn from Kantianism to modern phenomenology was a turning toward realism. It was for the world. Which is not to say it's not spiritual in any way. Mystcism has been a big part of German philosophy since the Romantic period — Gregory

Why call it realism?

"To the things themselves" said the phenomenologists. For them experience was primary. Colors may be said to be in the mind but everything is. Color is "there" just as much as primary qualities. I think this is what they meant.

To the things themselves" said the phenomenologists. For them experience was primary. Colors may be said to be in the mind but everything is. Color is "there" just as much as primary qualities. I think this is what they meant. — Gregory

Well then, there is some sense in calling it realism, but generally this is not the way the term is used, which is not the affirmation of the reality of the totality of phenomena, but rather an affirmation of science's physicalism, of some sort or another. To the things themselves! This is Husserl, of course. if there is a single way to find favor of a view like this, which entirely rejects the popular metaphysics of science, it lies here: the can be witnessed only phenomena. Period. Any references to something that is not a phenomenon is a reference to something it is impossible to know, and thus, the existence of which is impossible to conceive, the very definition of bad metaphysics.

This of course runs counter to our education, which puts science in the privileged position of authority not to be second guessed. Philosophy is not, however, science.

Reason can reflect on itself. — Corvus

Dangling pronouns cause problems

The problem is the word "itself". We can replace the expression "reason can reflect on itself" by the expression "reason can reflect on reason". The question then becomes, what does the first use of the word "reason" refer to and what does the second use of the word "reason" refer to.

There is no problem if the first use refers to reason as a thought in the mind, and the second use refers to reason as a definition, such as "a logical thought about something".

However, there is a problem if both the first and second use refer to a thought in the mind. Reason cannot reflect on itself because of the problem of infinite regression. If I reflect it must be about something and if I reason it must be about something. "To reflect" can mean to think about something. I can reflect on something in the world such as a table. "To reason" means to think about something logically. I can reason about something I observe in the world such as a table, such as, why does it have four legs rather than two. The question is, can I reason about the something that is reasoning about something. The problem is, that if reason could reflect on itself, then if I reason about something, and this something is reasoning about something, then one ends up with an infinite loop.

IE, reason as a thought can reflect on reason as a definition, but reason as a thought cannot reflect on reason as the same thought.

Dangling pronouns cause problems — RussellA

The whole part of CPR is about reason reflecting on itself via critical thinking. :roll:

The whole part of CPR is about reason reflecting on itself via critical thinking. — Corvus

Impossible.

Reason can reflect on objects of reason. An object of reason can include the definition of reason as "a logical thought about something", but an object of reason cannot include what is doing the reasoning, which would be a logical impossibility.

The object of reason can also include such things as God, the soul, freedom, immortality, virtue, happiness, causality and morality.

As Kant was a Rationalist, he held the epistemological view that "regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge". It is not the case that reason in itself is able to provide new knowledge, but rather, reason enables new knowledge to be discovered.

Reason is an a priori structure within the mind, and together with the Categories, give logical structure to objects of empirical experience and thereby plays a Discursive role in making sense of phenomenal experiences.

Reason in the CPR looks outwards to objects of reason not inwards to itself, which would be a logical impossibility.

Impossible. — RussellA

The answer appears to have emanated from the situation of someone who misread, or haven't read CPR at all.

Reason in the CPR looks outwards to objects of reason not inwards to itself, which would be a logical impossibility. — RussellA

CPR is the critic on Pure Reason, explaining how it works with all those objects, and its limitations too. The only way that can be done is by Reason reflecting on itself.

The only way that can be done is by Reason reflecting on itself. — Corvus

How?

Keep reading CPR. The answer is in it.

Keep reading CPR. The answer is in it. — Corvus

Of its 785 pages, can you narrow it down a bit?

Of its 785 pages, can you narrow it down a bit? — RussellA

I am afraid not. But here is a hint. Reason's main capability is reflection. Reason deals with objects and propositions which entered your perception. Never on the external objects direct.

When reason is trying to find out on the nature of reason, the only way is by reflecting itself. There is no other way.

A. OF REASON IN GENERAL.” , A299/B355.
B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.
C. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.

For science the world is contingent while for philosophy the thing in itself is necessary, only by being in-itself can it make the contingent share in its necessity by application of universal laws. Fitche comes to mind

And let us be clear about this. The whole point of CPR was to explicate how human reason works, and what limitations it has. It is not about God, the soul, freedom, immortality, virtue, happiness, causality and morality, although they were recruited to assist the exegesis.

For science the world is contingent while for philosophy the thing in itself is necessary, only by being in-itself can it make the contingent share in its necessity by application of universal laws. Fitche comes to mind — Gregory

Share in its necessity. But this which is shared is, for Kant, found in logical necessity, not in the full reality of what we experience. One problem with Kant is the same for Descartes who gave a privileged place to thought with the cogito, I think, but inferred from this being, I am. Rationalism always ends up making an abstraction out of being, Kant's TUA being no more than a formal definition of a unifying synthesis. It is patently absurd, as if our existence were reducible to this.

Are you a reductionalist? What Kant said is similar Malebranche, Rosmini, and many others. The world is yet is not. It's contingent. But the nous in our minds is in the structure of matter and how it interacts with itself. The source of reason is experienced in our knowledge of the world we live in. The world becomes necessary by our interactions with it. If I jump or fall from the Eiffel Tower, it's at that moment necessary that I fall and die if there is nothing to caught me. Yet it's contingent because the tower could have never been made and myself not there to die by it. Contingency and necessity are dualities that stand as thesis/antithesis. Experience is their sum. The universe is Nature and we are in its unity