I concur ... What I enjoy and appreciate about this forum is that it compels and demands that one be exacting and eloquent in the expression of very nuanced ideas and speculations. Indeed, there are many excellent writers here to learn from in that regard, without having to slog through all that twitter speak that now often pervades such forums, social media, and the internet in general -- even sorry to say from some graduates of academia.

In the variation of Idealism I lean toward, Unitary Mind is the ontological primitive, so there can be no 'prior to' that state -- being trans-spatiotemporal there is no point of origin or causation, thus no emergence needed. I'm not quite yet sure what physicalism posits as the ontological primitive, but it surely isn't consciousness, hence having to explain its emergence. So that would seem to be a significant distinction. And doesn't even physicalism have to draw the line somewhere? Otherwise one is left with having to endlessly explain whatever exists, in terms of whatever existed before that, ad infinitum.

As for matter being a problem for Idealism, well that depends on how to interpret the experience of whatever it is one conceives matter to be. Unlike physicalism, Idealism does not consider it to be a mind-independent substance 'out there,' but rather the phenomenal image or appearance of some cognitive emanations/thought forms, akin to Plato's ideas/forms. To me, the problem for Idealism is to explain how Unitary Mind individuates, or 'dissociates' into a multiplicity of finite loci or iterations of mind, to which those 'emanations' come to appear as their experiential, phenomenal content -- such as how it feels to watch an exquisitely beautiful sunset. But whatever Idealism's explanation for that mystery, it seems it would have to be an entirely cognitive event, otherwise what could be the tangible substrate from which any apparently separate form could emanate. Buddhism's take on this seeming dilemma is that emptiness, or formlessness, is not other than form, but that's a whole other metaphysical/spiritual exploration and inquiry into non-duality.

Ok, fine, sit on the fence -- may be a wise choice. In my case, it may well be that metaphysical curiosity will kill this 'cat', so to speak. But then, in keeping with the QM theme that has sustained this thread, one could ask, as per Schrodinger, is the cat dead or alive? And what the hell, apparently I do have 9 lives ... albeit I may be working on my last one by now :wink:

Yes, I may well buy a ticket and venture along that intriguing track. Worth noting here that Kastrup draws the line at metabolic expressions, and does not go the route of panpsychism, wherein non-living expressions such as grains of sand, or thermostats, or meteorites, or electrons are considered to be having some sort of elementary conscious experience, never mind self-consciousness. And despite being a computer engineer, he also does not give credibility to the notion of conscious AI. He of course goes into a much more nuanced articulation of his reasons for this stance, which one can't really do justice to in a brief comment here.

Yes, I have delved into Schopenhauer, though not as deeply as one might. Since we're sharing links, you and others inclined toward Idealism may be interested in this take on multiplicity ... Plotinus and the Problem of Absolute Self-Consciousness

I don't see a good argument to conclude idealism from QM. — Moliere

I do have to concur that I'm not sure of any necessary relevance to tying in QM with Idealism, except insofar as any given theoretical physicist, playing metaphysicist, might consider that as a way to advance one's specific theory to make it congruent with metaphysics, insofar as possible.

If I may be excused here for copying my comment from another thread, I see no necessity for evoking QM, in a version of Idealism, as follows: In this variation of Idealism, Mind becomes an apparent plurality of individuated, 'dissociated' loci or iterations of itself, an essentially cognitive event. Meanwhile, there is still some ultimate state it is like to be the Unitary Mind, which its human self-expressions, normally focused in their veiled imaginal, phenomenal, experiential state, might at least approximate as a samadhi state awareness, wherein the maya-spell is dispelled, revealing a pure Awareness or Beingness or Knowingness, or some such descriptor for the nameless. I suppose this could also be equated with the triune attributes of Brahman, satchitananda, i.e. Being/Consciousness/Bliss. Beyond that we're headed into noumenon territory, where I must bow to the opening lines of the Tao Te Ching about the ineffability of the Eternal Tao.

Yes, in this version of Idealism, Mind becomes an apparent plurality of individuated, 'dissociated' loci or iterations of itself (mini-minds?), an essentially cognitive event. Meanwhile, there is still some ultimate state it is like to be the Unitary Mind, which its human self-expressions, normally focused in their veiled imaginal, phenomenal, experiential state, might at least approximate as a samadhi state awareness, wherein the maya-spell is dispelled, revealing a pure Awareness or Beingness or Knowingness, or some such descriptor for the nameless. I suppose this could also be equated with the triune attributes of Brahman, satchitananda, i.e. Being/Consciousness/Bliss. Beyond that we're headed into noumenon territory, where I must bow to the opening lines of the Tao Te Ching about the ineffability of the Eternal Tao.

This might be better suited to the BK thread, but I'll carry on here, so that it doesn't get lost in the shuffle ... I suppose one idealist interpretation might be that we as finite loci of 'Mind' are, by definition, 'deluded' with respect to whatever some now obfuscated, noumenal, apparently infinite Mind may be. And yet, what could that be other than such a Mind apparently dreaming up countless self-observing, finite points of view? I must concede that not I'm not quite sure what to make of this notion of a self-reflecting Mind individuating into countless recursive minds, or what its telos might be, other than for the sake of this relational experience.

To that point, this blog post may be of interest here ... Plotinus and the problem of absolute self-consciousness

@Kym ... Ok, now I recall the events you're referring to all those many years ago. Not sure that it's even relevant to the OP, and I could of course speak to it and offer my subjective secular and/or spiritual interpretation, but why not let TNH 'speak' in his own words about those events, in addressing Martin Luther King, as interpreted through his Buddhist tradition.

I'm not familiar with the case you're referring to, and so hesitate to comment. I may look into it, and get back to you, but in the meantime, here's a talk by him on his emptiness teachings, titled 'Emptiness is Not nothing' which seems pertinent ... if so inclined

This speaks of a very important disjuncture between 'academic' and 'lived' understandings — Kym

I couldn't agree more on that point, and which could also certainly apply to the 'Bernardo Kastrup' thread I started. I'm now enjoying this thread, which does make a nice compliment to that one, only without so much QM stuff (quibbling mindsets)

Berkeley denied the existence of substance — ProcastinationTomorrow

This is to me perhaps the most profound implication of idealism, that there is no such substrate producing any such substance. Apparently just untold possible 'emanations' from which to conceive a mindset-specific 'reality' that most meaningfully resonates with each unique finite locus of mind within any given consensus construct.

the apparent nihlism of it all seems so terrifying. — Kym

Curiously I don't feel any nihilism at all, at least not from that heartfelt Thich Nhat Hanh version, a truly compassionate master IMO, as I see it more as 'emptifullness.'

TNH also relates this story to speak to such misunderstandings of the Heart Sutra with the following allegory ...

The Zen master asked the novice monk:
“Tell me about your understanding of the Heart sutra.”

The novice monk joined his palms and replied:
“I have understood that the five skandhas are empty. There are no eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body or mind; there are no forms, sounds, smells, tastes, feelings, or objects of mind; the six consciousnesses do not exist, the eighteen realms of phenomena do not exist, the twelve links of dependent arising do not exist, and even wisdom and attainment do not exist.”

“Do you believe what it says?”

“Yes, I truly believe what it says.”

“Come closer to me,” the Zen master instructed the novice monk. When the novice monk drew near, the Zen master immediately used his thumb and index finger to pinch and twist the novice’s nose.
In great agony, the novice cried out “Teacher! You’re hurting me!” The Zen master looked at the novice. “Just now you said that the nose doesn’t exist. But if the nose doesn’t exist then what’s hurting?”

I have to admit it used to stick in my throat though — Kym

Possibly in need of some loving attention to the throat chakra? :smile:

He said, yes a material world does exist but it's SO different from how we perceive it that we more accurately should say we're living in an illusion. — Kym

Not sure what zen makes of the Heart Sutra, as its mention may just earn a whack from the master's keisaku and some more zazen in the zendō. However, it may still be applicable here ...

Avalokiteshvara
while practicing deeply with
the Insight that Brings Us to the Other Shore,
suddenly discovered that
all of the five Skandhas are equally empty,
and with this realisation
he overcame all Ill-being.

“Listen Sariputra,
this Body itself is Emptiness
and Emptiness itself is this Body.
This Body is not other than Emptiness
and Emptiness is not other than this Body.
The same is true of Feelings,
Perceptions, Mental Formations,
and Consciousness.

“Listen Sariputra,
all phenomena bear the mark of Emptiness;
their true nature is the nature of
no Birth no Death,
no Being no Non-being,
no Defilement no Purity,
no Increasing no Decreasing.

“That is why in Emptiness,
Body, Feelings, Perceptions,
Mental Formations and Consciousness
are not separate self entities ...

And so on and so forth ...

You folks have been busy ... Even accounting for time zone variation, I'm beginning to wonder when some of you may sleep. But mainly more and more of the same to ponder, all of which from every contributor bar none, albeit for different reasons, seems to be building the case for leaning toward idealism, although not quite there yet ... Anyway, carry on carrying on.

What I think is incoherent is the idea that awareness of stuff somehow causes it to exist. — Andrew M

Stuff?! ... There's stuff?! How come physicists haven't found it? :wink:

No doubt much of it may well be. But whatever portion of it may be the due to the viable attempts of those who are willing to risk going into unknown territory, as opposed to those who criticize and jeer and laugh at them while offering no attempt of their own, I will welcome and encourage.

Indeed, a google search of flufffwumps reveals zero results, while consciousness reveals 133,000,000 ... no contest.

Well I await with bated breath some alternate coherent explanation that will resolve it .. but I won't hold my breath waiting for yours.

It seems ever more apparent that given the absence of any consensus as to however or whatever consciousness may be, it's no wonder QM physicists can't rule it in ... and yet how can it be ruled out? As such, one wonders if they are destined to go ever deeper into a maze of quasi-interpretations with apparently no way out, missing some crucial unitary lead. From what I've gathered here, somehow I'm not optimistic.

Yes, it appears that we may be at a similar metaphysical crossroad :wink:

Yes, it seems we might just as well be discussing the fate of the Cheshire cat rather than Schrodinger's imaginal pussy, in regards to their respective reality 'out there' somewhere indeterminable.

Sigh ... Once again resorting to condescension here will not convince me of any superior understanding of the implications of quantum theory. Anyway, and I'll direct this to @Moliere as well, we've gone off on a tangent here from the intended point of the OP, which was to discuss idealism as an ontological alternative to physicalism and/or panpsychism, or any other model that others here may offer, in terms of their explanatory power with respect to conscious experience. Since QM apparently has no regard for such an explanation, and considers it irrelevant to its outcomes, I'm not even sure it's pertinent to the intended conversation. But carry on, if you feel that it is.

Where is the device in it? — StreetlightX

Until it is observed by a conscious agent, everywhere and nowhere, aka non-locality.

QM has nothing to say about what a device 'is' — StreetlightX

Huh? Quantum theory has nothing to say about what the device is in essence?! How else would a physicist explain what it is?

I'm curious what you mean by 'accounting for consciousness.' — frank

More specifcally, I'm asking about how to account for the 'hard problem of consciousness' insofar as physicalist models based on mind being an epiphenomenon of brain activity have so far been unable to adequately account for it, and therefore I'm inquiring into other possible ways to account for it, such as from the perspective of idealism, which posits consciousness, in the sense of a Mind-at-large, as the ontological primitive, and not as an emergent phenomenon. There could be other ways, such as Donald Hoffman's 'conscious realism', or some analogous VR-based models, digital informational models, etc.

Again, as long as the mindsets involved are coming at this from different and incongruent ontological premises, one that includes the primacy of consciousness, and one that excludes it, it seems that unless those premises can somehow be reconciled, then this debate will not be resolvable, no?

Yeah, I get that. The OP is really about accounting for conscious experience, and if and how idealism might account for it, which then became about how quantum theory might account for it, which apparently for some QM theorists is irrelevant and of no significant consequence. Kastrup and other idealists positing the primacy of consciousness happen to disagree with those theorists, but that's not likely to convince them otherwise, or vice versa. And thus I remain in a quandary, until some more convincing case can be made, whatever the ontological premise.

This sentence doesn't make any sense. — StreetlightX

How so? According to QM, is the device not comprised of nothing other than interacting quantum fluctuations in the zero-point field? What is rendering that process observable, if not a conscious agent?

Well I remain unconvinced ... Since the device itself is not other than a potential field of possibilities unless an observer is factored in, the idea that the device is 'observing' something seems entirely dependent upon the conscious agent that is observing it, making the whole system of wave-function collapse, measuring device and conscious agent inextricably entangled, in turn making the distinction between a self-observing system and a self-conscious system rather ambiguous. But we may never resolve this while we are coming at it from completely different and incongruent ontological premises. And so, alas, I'm not sure that I'm much further ahead in my search for a model that adequately explains one's conscious experience, or that much progress is going to made in this debate. But it has fostered some very interesting, entertaining and much appreciated discussion, input and feedback if nothing else.

Can you explain what Wheeler is referring to in this interview, when he speaks of "We by our choice of observing device ...", if not an inextricable connection between the device and the conscious entity that is using it as an extension of one's sensory capacity, since the device itself, being comprised of nothing but quantum interaction, must also be observer-dependent.

It can be there when no-one is looking at it because the concept is of the existing state itself. We are not required for it to be. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Again, the Idealist take on this is that there is an existing state in itself that remains in the absence of a finite locus of mind, and yet exists as an emanation of some some source that transcends that finite locus of mind, while at the same time not being separate from it. In other words, a model of a self-observing cosmos, as per Wheeler ...

Not to mention "There is no out there out there" ... Was that not Wheeler? Does this not implicitly bring into doubt the notion of a consciousness-independent cosmos?

You make a valid point that this quest for a coherent explanation for consciousness should not be reduced to solipsism. Kastrup, for those who may be inclined to read him, makes the case against solipsism in his model, which at least attempts to put that argument against idealism to rest.

The main motivation for coming up with alternative interpretations of the measurement problem is to avoid idealism and retain realism. — ProcastinationTomorrow

In other words, it's a convenient way to not have to factor in the inconvenience of a coherent accounting for consciousness?

I'm often left with the intuitive sense that the real illusion is the maya-spell that the dream of reality is not a dream.

Claiming that an apparatus constitutes an observer is the only ‘sophistry’ in play here. — Wayfarer

I'd even go so far as to say that panpsychism is in play

Perhaps it would be better, and perhaps it might put a stop to the endless swarm of psuedo-scientific troglodytes who, too thick to understand that langage is what we make of it, aim to milk grammar from the stone of science to substantiate their idealist fantasies without a care in the world for the actual science. — StreetlightX

Is it possibly your intention here to create polemic, rather than engage in respectful debate?

Still, I'm getting the impression that as long as there is an ongoing dismissing of a coherent explanation of consciousness as being of no significant consequence, there will be no end to the conundrum of multiple incongruent interpretations of QM precisely because the factoring in of such an explanation of consciousness is of paramount significance for arriving at a truly comprehensive theory.