Yes. I'm not drawing a distinction between physical stuff and idea stuff - I think that (dualistic) idea is incoherent as well. — Andrew M

Dualism isn't incoherent, it's just problematic.

What I think is incoherent is the idea that awareness of stuff somehow causes it to exist. — Andrew M

But that isn't what measuring devices are supposed to do in the Copenhagen interpretation is it? The stuff is there. It just doesnt have any location and so forth.

So the quantum idealist (if that's what they should be called) are realists in the sense you're using.

What I think is incoherent is the idea that awareness of stuff somehow causes it to exist. — Andrew M

Stuff?! ... There's stuff?! How come physicists haven't found it? :wink:

Sure, people might not be able to agree about a definition, but - unless you are a cranky eliminative materialist - there is something being disagreed about. "flufffwumps" - well, if I were to ask you what that was, you wouldn't even be able to point me to a literature of disagreement with which to get started. That's one difference between "consciousness" and "flufffwumps", and its a pretty significant one, and goes someway to saving the former from "meaninglessness" whilst leaving the latter as drivel. — jkg20

Ah, so the argument is that because consciousness isn't literally meaningless, it ought to be a contender for explanation? That's the bar you've set? Not, of course, that this in any way addresses the fact that it remains a case of appealing to the unexplained to explain the unexplained. Nor the fact that conciousness is as functionally useless as an explanation for QM as flufflwumps, regardless of the dexterousness of one's Googling. I suppose one looks for consolation anywhere one can get it, when everything else about a position is literal trash.

The role of observation in determining an outcome - not by 'interfering with' or physically causing an effect, but simply observing. It seems to implicate the mind of the observer. — Wayfarer

So in what way is this example any different than, say, that of a tree falling in a forest?

Because the word "observe" you use here really does mean something different, as SX pointed out. "observation from a mind determines the outcome" is not what's being said.

I underlined that phrase as to whether 'they exist in the same way' as ordinary objects, because I think it's important. And overall, I think it's fair to say that Heisenberg's attitude to the philosophy of physics favoured some form of idealist philosophy, as did some (but not all) of his peers. — Wayfarer

He did, yes. But here's the mistake in the quote -- there are more options than between Democritus and Plato. We don't have two choices, either Democritus or Plato, between which we must choose. There are more options. We are even free to create our own.

Also this still doesn't relate to a notion of "observer" as you are using the word. It's not just that there is a mind passively observing which causes an outcome, therefore Plato. Heisenberg had some idealist notions as did Bohr about the world. But that doesn't mean that QM automatically implies idealism, either. We don't have to bow before the masters and follow them in everything they believed. We are right to ask why they came to their conclusions.

Put it this way, I try to remain aware of my limitations, which are considerable — Wayfarer

That's not exactly answering my question.

Before we can reasonably infer what some bit of knowledge implies, we must first know that bit of knowledge. Yes or no?

The role of observation in determining an outcome - not by 'interfering with' or physically causing an effect, but simply observing. It seems to implicate the mind of the observer. — Wayfarer

Because the word "observe" you use here really does mean something different, as SX pointed out. "observation from a mind determines the outcome" is not what's being said. — Moliere

You can tell Wayfarer he is literally, factually wrong about this till you're blue in the face, and he'll still insist, against all reality, the the question of observation is 'ambigious'. Reality doesn't suit his preconceived notions, see. So he will flat out lie and fudge it instead. Some dishonest misquoting here, some fluff about Plato there, all par for the charlatan course.

The role of observation in determining an outcome - not by 'interfering with' or physically causing an effect, but simply observing. It seems to implicate the mind of the observer.

— Wayfarer

So in what way is this example any different than, say, that of a tree falling in a forest? — Moliere

The hypothetical question 'if a tree falls in the forest' is another way of posing the question and is often used to stimulate discussion on this very topic. It is a 'thought experiment' in philosophy, and again, not a question answerable by physics.

Wikipedia has this to say:

The Copenhagen interpretation is the oldest and probably still the most widely held interpretation of quantum mechanics.[4][5][6] Most generally it posits something in the act of observation which results in the collapse of the wave function. According to the von Neumann–Wigner interpretation the causative agent in this collapse is consciousness.[7] How this could happen is widely disputed. — Wikipedia

Which is indeed what is being disputed here. So - this Wikipedia article is wrong in stating that 'something in the act of observation results in the collapse of the wave function?' Perhaps, Wikipedia being a user-edited resource, someone here might correct it.

Regarding Many Worlds:

Hugh Everett's many-worlds interpretation attempts to solve the problem by suggesting there is only one wave function, the superposition of the entire universe, and it never collapses—so there is no measurement problem. Instead, the act of measurement is simply an interaction between quantum entities, e.g. observer, measuring instrument, electron/positron etc., which entangle to form a single larger entity, for instance living cat/happy scientist. Everett also attempted to demonstrate the way that in measurements the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics would appear; work later extended by Bryce DeWitt.

So when an MWI advocate says that:

A realist perspective is assumed because that is the way to construct a physical theory that is conceptually coherent. — Andrew M

...it ought to be said that this 'conceptual coherence' is maintained at the cost of accepting that:

... all possible alternate histories and futures are real, each representing an actual "world" (or "universe"). In layman's terms, the hypothesis states there is a very large—perhaps infinite —number of universes, and everything that could possibly have happened in our past, but did not, has occurred in the past of some other universe or universes.

...

We don't have to bow before the masters and follow them in everything they believed. We are right to ask why they came to their conclusions. — Moliere

But if you say flat-out, outright, that 'philosophical idealism is not relevant to the issues raised by quantum mechanics', then you'd be mistaken. And furthermore, it is not a resolved issue, and may never be. The 'copenhagen interpretation', which is not a philosophical school of thought, or scientific theory, but simply a collection of aphoristic observations, is one amongst various others. But it remains a vexed question (and I think will always be, fortunately.)

The second point is that what is at stake, again, is the notion of an independently-existing, real, physical entity, the 'point-particle' that acts as a 'building block of reality'. The reason this is a vexed question at all, is because of that. The question is, what is the nature of reality? That's why it's a philosophical issue.

There's the mistake in the quote — Moliere

There may be more choices, but Heisenberg chose 'Plato and Democritus' as representative of idealism and materialism, respectively. (Apparently there is considerably more detail in his book, On Physics and Philosophy, but I haven't read it. The article I am referring to is here.)

By the way - in doing a bit more reading on this issue, I have discovered yet another model, called QBism, Quantum Bayesianism. There's a Quantum Magazine interview with Christopher Fuchs on it here. I find this a congenial attitude:

In one of your papers, you mention that Erwin Schrödinger wrote about the Greek influence on our concept of reality, and that it’s a historical contingency that we speak about reality without including the subject — the person doing the speaking. Are you trying to break the spell of Greek thinking?
Schrödinger thought that the Greeks had a kind of hold over us — they saw that the only way to make progress in thinking about the world was to talk about it without the “knowing subject” in it. QBism goes against that strain by saying that quantum mechanics is not about how the world is without us; instead it’s precisely about us in the world. The subject matter of the theory is not the world or us but us-within-the-world, the interface between the two.

It’s so ingrained in us to think about the world without thinking of ourselves in it. It reminds me of Einstein questioning space and time — these features of the world that seemed so absolute that no one even thought to question them.

It’s said that in earlier civilizations, people didn’t quite know how to distinguish between objective and subjective. But once the idea of separating the two gained a toehold, we were told that we have to do this, and that science is about the objective. And now that it’s done, it’s hard to turn back. I think the biggest fear people have of QBism is precisely this: that it’s anthropocentric. The feeling is, we got over that with Copernicus, and this has got to be a step backwards. But I think if we really want a universe that’s rife with possibility with no ultimate limits on it, this is exactly where you’ve got to go.

How does QBism get you around those limits?

One way to look at it is that the laws of physics aren’t about the stuff “out there.” Rather, they are our best expressions, our most inclusive statements, of what our own limitations are.

So the point here is that this is a philosophy that explicitly accepts that 'the subject' has a role, is part of the landscape. Whereas, the whole conceit of a lot of science is that things are seen from a viewpoint of ultimate objectivity. So I think this is a promising development, from my perspective at least.

//ps// also a brief review by Peter Woit of one of the books mentioned a page back or so, Adam Becker's 'What is Real?' (hey, note the title, again), with some responses to the review by the author.

Oh look, when challanged about a concrete point - the meaning of observation - pivot entirely and bring in some last-minute Googled irrelvencies passed off as 'reading'. A master-class in having to never commit or defend a point. Should have posted another coat-of-arms picture again, just to further distract from your inability to actually say anything of relevance.

Hey, StreetlightX, as you're one of

a bunch of moderately clever apes on a small watery rock in the middle of nowhere — StreetlightX

Then I deem your contributions unworthy of further response. I'm sure you'll understand.

Of course I understand. Sophists don't like being called out on their bullshit. It's embarrassing to be shown up time and time again for your know-nothingisms. Speaking of, it's worth mentioning also that the idea that one has to buy into the MWI to maintain realism is also a falsehood, and yet another total fabrication on your part. Not of course that you actually put forward any arguments for the idea so much as it just spilled out of you as so much of your other trash.

Seriously. Explicit misquotations. Articles that misrepresent their subjects. Essays on Plato and Democritus that have nothing to do with the science. Obfuscations and lies about what 'observation' entails. Pictures of coats-of-arms. And now falsehoods about realism and MWI. Literally everything you say is either a lie or an irrelevancy, and you think you're taking some sort of high ground? Better to dodge than to have any substance I guess.

The hypothetical question 'if a tree falls in the forest' is another way of posing the question and is often used to stimulate discussion on this very topic. It is a 'thought experiment' in philosophy, and again, not a question answerable by physics. — Wayfarer

If it's the same, then what is the point in referencing QM? What does that add to the thought experiment?

But if you say flat-out, outright, that 'philosophical idealism is not relevant to the issues raised by quantum mechanics', then you'd be mistaken. — Wayfarer

As far as the arguments I see being offered I'd say that this is the appropriate conclusion. A conclusion which may be modified in light of more argument, but I see no good reason to believe that QM implies idealism. It seems to me to remain entirely open, and I suspect ultimately unresolvable by QM. I'll just note real quick here that this is a separate issue from the notion of "observer" in QM though.

There may be more choices, but Heisenberg chose 'Plato and Democritus' as representative of idealism and materialism, respectively — Wayfarer

And there are more options than idealism vs. materialism. Personally I don't believe either are the case. That's the error Heisenberg is making.

A master, a brilliant mind, but just as human as you or I. It's not like he's alone in making said error. I've made the exact same error before, and probably will again.

But surely you understand that there's more options? It's not like by disproving materialism we suddenly gain idealism, or vice-versa.

The second point is that what is at stake, again, is the notion of an independently-existing, real, physical entity, the 'point-particle' that acts as a 'building block of reality'. The reason this is a vexed question at all, is because of that. The question is, what is the nature of reality? That's why it's a philosophical issue. — Wayfarer

I don't think I'm disagreeing with any of this. I agree it is a philosophical issue. I agree that these points are debated by Bohr and Einstein.

Where I disagree is that the double slit experiment, and use of the word "observer", implies idealism. That's the specific misreading I'm getting at. It's OK to have misread. I certainly do, and have misread on this very topic. It's complicated after all, yeah?

On a second point unrelated to the misreading, I just don't see a good argument to believe that idealism is implied by QM. For what it's worth, I don't think physicalism is implied either. I simply do not think either are implied. But that's the other disagreement that requires some kind of commitment to the knowledge.

Which brings me to a very simple question I've asked --

In order to reasonably infer what some bit of knowledge implies, we must first know that bit of knowledge. yes or no?

I'm not being rhetorical here. I would answer "Yes". And I would even say we can acquire said knowledge sans-certification. But it seems to me that this is a sticking point between ourselves.

So the point here is that this is a philosophy that explicitly accepts that 'the subject' has a role, is part of the landscape. Whereas, the whole conceit of a lot of science is that things are seen from a viewpoint of ultimate objectivity — Wayfarer

Isn't this here specifically what concerns you?

You believe the subject has a role in the world. You also believe that certain widespread conceits of science eliminate said subject. So you prefer to present and express scientists who do not, by your view, express that conceit.

I don't have a problem with biases like this. Everyone has them. But it is a problem when said biases get in the way of understanding what's actually being said, such as the case of the observer being interpreted as a mind causing an outcome, because then we're no longer talking about knowledge.

That is important, isn't it? Not rhetorical. I'm looking for that common ground upon which disagreement can take place. You do care that some bit of knowledge is true, don't you? And must we actually understand some knowledge in order to reasonably infer implications from it?

Where I disagree is that the double slit experiment, and use of the word "observer", implies idealism. That's the specific misreading I'm getting at. It's OK to have misread. I certainly do, and have misread on this very topic. — Moliere

I think the Manjit Kumar book lies out in some detail why it could be considered 'idealist'. Leave out 'consciousness' and leave out 'idealism' - the fact is that in this case, looking at something - i.e. measuring it - has the effect of causing it to exist. That is what is said to be 'outrageous' about it. Bohr said, as I know that you know, 'if you are not shocked by quantum physics then you haven't understood it'. That is why it has remained such a large controversy, to this day. It's part of the 'culture wars' that are going on.

So the reason it can be considered idealist at all, is because it undermines the idea of a mind-independent object, an ultimately-existing particle. Hence many of those Wheeler quotes that were already mentioned. There are many, many more. Have you read about Bernard D'Espagnat? Richard Conn Henry?

That is important, isn't it? Not rhetorical. I'm looking for that common ground upon which disagreement can take place. You do care that some bit of knowledge is true, don't you? — Moliere

Of course. I think the issue that causes so much heat around this, is that it's a debate about 'what is real' - after all, that is what all the books we're discussing are called! And the de facto view of the secular intelligentsia is that this is a question for science. But the inconvenient truth is that the hardest of hard sciences, namely physics, has now torpedoed this beneath the waterline. That is the cause of all the sturm und drung that you're seeing here.

Yeah, can't have anything to do with your consistent dodging of questions, and your peddling of lies and falsehoods.

Have you read about Bernard D'Espagnat? Richard Conn Henry? — Wayfarer

I have not.

Two questions.

If invoking a tree falling in the woods is the same as invoking QM, why invoke QM to start a thought experiment on idealism?

In order for us to reasonably infer implications of some knowledge we must first know it. Is that true or false?

If invoking a tree falling in the woods is the same as invoking QM, why invoke QM to start a thought experiment on idealism? — Moliere

As is well known, one afternoon whilst walking in the woods in the 1920's, Einstein suddenly stopped and asked his friend Michele Besso, 'does the moon not continue to exist when nobody's looking at it?' And that's basically the same question as the above. So - why was Einstein compelled to ask such a question? (Incidentally, I believe it was asked rhetorically i.e. of course Einstein believed that the moon continues exist when not perceived. But the point is, he felt compelled to ask the question!)

In order for us to reasonably infer implications of some knowledge we must first know it. Is that true or false? — Moliere

Well, yes, but there are levels of understanding. When I said I wasn't a physics graduate, I'm acknowledging that I don't understand the mathematics behind quantum physics. And as it's a mathematical theory, then obviously that's a deficiency.

But on the other hand, there has been considerable commentary on this issue from the viewpoint of history and philosophy of science. I try to confine my comments to that perspective.

BTW - Richard Conn Henry is a professor of astrophysics at Johns Hopkins' University. His Nature opinion piece, which the OP references, was called The Mental Universe. D'Espagnat's Wikipedia entry is here.

As is well known, one afternoon whilst walking in the woods in the 1920's, Einstein suddenly stopped and asked his friend Michele Besso, 'does the moon not continue to exist when nobody's looking at it?' And that's basically the same question as the above. So - why was Einstein compelled to ask such a question? (Incidentally, I believe it was asked rhetorically i.e. of course Einstein believed that the moon continues exist when not perceived. But the point is, he was compelled to ask the question.) — Wayfarer

I feel like the answer is supposed to be "Because of quantum mechanics" -- but I'm not sure.

Well, yes, but there are levels of understanding. When I said I wasn't a physics graduate, I'm acknowledging that I don't understand the mathematics behind quantum physics. And as it's a mathematical theory, then obviously that's a deficiency.

But on the other hand, there has been considerable commentary on this issue from the viewpoint of history and philosophy of science. I try to confine my comments to that perspective. — Wayfarer

Sure, there are levels of understanding. I agree with that.

With QM especially, though, the formalism and the math are really important. There's more I could know, but I know the introductory stuff. And when I say I don't see where idealism enters as an implication to the theory it's this formalism that I'm talking about -- the stuff which scientists actually use and debate on how to interpret.

That's why I linked a pdf that at least introduced the formalism in the way of postulates of QM. I don't expect someone to understand them just by reading that paper -- it's just where I'm starting from in understanding this stuff.

Commentary is just secondary to this, from my perspective. It's what the commentary is about. And you can learn that part of QM without a degree -- it's open to you.


EDIT: Like, imagine someone who believed they understood Aristotle because they read Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle. Surely they know something of Aristotle, but wouldn't it make sense to also read Aristotle?

You folks have been busy ... Even accounting for time zone variation, I'm beginning to wonder when some of you may sleep. But mainly more and more of the same to ponder, all of which from every contributor bar none, albeit for different reasons, seems to be building the case for leaning toward idealism, although not quite there yet ... Anyway, carry on carrying on.

Not, of course, that this in any way addresses the fact that it remains a case of appealing to the unexplained to explain the unexplained. — StreetlightX

P1. Quantum mechanics is mysterious.
P2. Consciousness is mysterious.
C. The two have to be related somehow.

You can't argue with the logic!

Yeah, and it conveniently works both ways too - 'why consciousness?' 'because quantum!'. And intellectual con-men like Wayfarer will milk both to say whatever half-baked woo they think appropriate.

That doesn't necessarily commit to what the nature of this or that substance is - and so may accord with, say, a Berkelyean idealism in many respects. But conceptually, the stuff comes first, the awareness of that stuff second.

Berkeley denied the existence of substance - so whatever account you have of it cannot possibly accord with Berkelean idealism. You might need to revisit what you believe to be the difference between idealisms and realisms (and notice that there are several versions of both).

Berkeley denied the existence of substance — ProcastinationTomorrow

This is to me perhaps the most profound implication of idealism, that there is no such substrate producing any such substance. Apparently just untold possible 'emanations' from which to conceive a mindset-specific 'reality' that most meaningfully resonates with each unique finite locus of mind within any given consensus construct.

As far as I can tell, the heart of the dispute here is about the following statement:
A coherent interpretation of QM must require that the mathematical formalism quantify over actual or possible conscious observations.
Even if that were true - and I'm not suggesting for one moment that it is - one would not have established that idealism is true unless you had already established that QM is true. How, though, are you going to establish that QM is true unless you already have your coherent interpretation of it? Mathematical formalisms only get to be true or false under interpretations.
That might be why this particular discussion forum seems to be an exercise in tail-chasing.

Indeed, and there is a whole literature on the idea that one can use QM to explain consciousness (and by QM I mean QM interpreted non-idealistically). Which I presume you believe to be just as meaningless as trying to explain QM in terms of consciousness.

Guilty.

That said, I don't see any problem with saying that quantum processes might play certain roles in 'explaining consciousness'. Quantum electron tunneling, for instance, plays a part in explaining the act of cellular respiration, though only one part in a larger and multi-faceted story. Given the complexity of our neurology, I wouldn't be surprised if quantum processes also played defining roles in our being conscious, at least in some capacity. But 'because quantum!' is not, on its own, an explanation of anything. Similarly, 'because consciousness' would be an equally facile flag to rally anything under.

That said, I don't see any problem with saying that quantum processes might play certain roles in 'explaining consciousness'.

Now I'm confused. I thought your position was that the very term "consciousness" was drivel, by which I presume you meant "devoid of content". If it is devoid of content, there is nothing to explain, by QM or by anything else for that matter. Perhaps, though, you do not believe that the term is literally devoid of content.

No, I said it was meaningless as far as it playing a role in explaining anything about QM. It could be substituted for nonsensical words without loss because the specific features or manner in which consciousness would function as a mechanism is, and on all accounts remains, entirely unelucidated. It is a claim that literally cannot be made sense of, in other words. Language on holiday and all that.

Ah, okay, so you were just laying down a challenge to fill out the content of the term rather than stating point blank that the task could not be accomplished. That makes more sense.

I mean if you want to call meeting the literal bare minimum criteria for constituting an explanation in any field whatsoever a 'challenge', then yeah sure, lets go with that.

I'm still not so sure why you are apparently so closed-minded about the role of conscious observers in QM. Adrian Kent - by all accounts an exceptional QM theorist and practician - seems to be open to the possibility that there is fruitful terrain to be investigated. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.04804.pdf There are certain realist assumptions lying behind much of what he says, with which an idealist would take issue, but nevertheless here is a serious scientist taking seriously the idea that conscious observation (whatever that might be) might have experimentally observable effects on quantum systems. Just closing off any such line of investigation seems unscientific.

I've said my piece. If close-mindedness means rejecting equivocations, appeals to ignorance, and the falsities and fantasies of cranks like Wayfarer, then so be it. Would it be the case that such a rejection is unscientific, then I suggest you need a new definition of the scientific.

A coherent interpretation of QM must require that the mathematical formalism quantify over actual or possible conscious observations. — ProcastinationTomorrow

That's part of the disagreement I think. Though I'm sure there are other ways one could argue for idealism, too.

But also there's the bit about the word "observer" -- even if QM implies idealism is true, it wouldn't be because a mind set up an experimental apparatus to determine the outcome of an experiment because that's just not what "observer" means.

So, sure, I don't think there's a good argument to be had (yet) that states QM implies idealism.

But I also think it's a misunderstanding of what's being said to say that "observer" indicates a mind which determines outcomes by the mere act of observing and not interacting. That's just a wild misreading. The closest interpretation I see here that comes to saying that was the one I linked previously by Neumann which speculated that the wave-function collapses in consciousness. But to get to that point you still need to understand "observer" in the specific way being used in the theory.

Any argument which argues for idealism from QM should at least understand QM. That's the main point I'm trying to get at -- there's already enough unnecessary magical thinking surrounding QM as it is, we don't need to add more.

Secondarily, I don't see a good argument to conclude idealism from QM.

Even if that were true - and I'm not suggesting for one moment that it is - one would not have established that idealism is true unless you had already established that QM is true. How, though, are you going to establish that QM is true unless you already have your coherent interpretation of it? Mathematical formalisms only get to be true or false under interpretations. — ProcastinationTomorrow

I think there are parts of QM that are not disputed. While they include the formalism, they are not strictly formal mathematical entities -- we understand they are about electrons and photons and things like that which brings more to the matter than just the math.

Then there are interpretations of said undisputed. What is not disputed is still factual, so they can be true.

In that way I think we can determine QM is true without necessitating an interpretation, and then argue over whether this or that interpretation is true.