Red is a Conscious experience that exists in the Conscious Mind. — SteveKlinko

I will try another way. How do you know that 1) "Red is a Conscious experience that exists in the Conscious Mind" is true; but 2) "a Conscious experience that exist in the Physical world" and "a Physical experience that exists in the Conscious Mind" are false?

Thanks for your post. Read my reply above to another poster. What do you think? — TheMadFool

I'm agree. Basically, free will could be viewed in an operative sense as the ability of 1) wanting to do something and 2) multiple possibilities. 1) refers to desires and 2) to knowledge (perceived options) and reality (objective options).

According to the theory of evolution (TOE) traits that confer an advantage in the environment survive while those that are disadvantageous lead to extinction — TheMadFool

It is relevant in my view to emphasize the difference between individual and specie in the TOE.
Sometimes, there are genetic mutations in individuals, which sometimes is and advantage for these, sometime for the specie (or for both), another times is a (individual and/or specific) disadvantage, and sometime is not any of them. "Advantage" for individual and specie means "staying alive", "to survive". It is a "comparative" relation: the trait "A" is an advantage respect to B in the sense X (this case to staying alive).
However, these "advantageous" traits must be in addition genetically transmissible to be also specifically advantageous; if not, then these traits explain the success of individuals, but not species (the problem or phenomena for TOE).
Then, we can resume the TOE as "New species appear when, in individuals, they are produced genetic mutations that 1) are genetically transmissible by reproduction and 2) they fit traits that increase the individual success (the are individual advantages)".

Regarding free will: it is a mathematical or "abstract" concept to my (lack of objective determination or mechanism). If we would have "free will" then actions of people should not be predictable in absolute, so it would be scientifically intractable and hence biologic psychology would be impossible.

I would still need to know what the Conscious experience of Red is. What is the Red? — SteveKlinko

I think that you are in a kind of conceptual vortex. "Red" is a color...

these are just Neural Correlates of experiencing the color Red — SteveKlinko

You continue assuming that brain and mind are like two effects, that can "correlate" such as the increasing of educative and economical level. If you identify the two thing, we have not hard problem, only psychological problem. If you differentiate them, so conscience is "to know if you brain is or not lying you", that is, to differentiate reality from fiction, then the hard problem is the "transcendental" deduction problem. That is, following to Kant, we are conscience bears, but to be conscious and to know conscience are two different things. We can say that conscience is a condition of possibility of knowledge, in the sense that this requires a subject and its conscience to be produced. Then, we can not study conscience empirically because we presuppose it when try to know it.

Again, this just presupposes that logic is a property only of formal systems we construct — gurugeorge

"Logic" are these systems and by definition no other thing. "Reality" has not a logical structure but physical. You seem to be a rationalist like Hegel.

I have given it my best shot and have obviously failed to convince you. — SteveKlinko

I think that a constructive analysis of Hard Problem could be the following. It is not possible to differentiate a priori, for a given subject, if he is experiencing a dream or hallucination, or instead reality. Then, to know if something is a qualia (a mind state known as mind state; contrary to unconscious mind states, which are not qualia but just mind) is always a posteriori, by empirical evidence. For example, the trivial example of of rubbing your eyes or pinching yourself. A conscious experience is either a one stated as about reality or about fiction. Conscience is to differentiate mental and phsycal experiences. We can not know a priori if X is a physical red object or a mental red one. The problem 1) is about the mind, and 2) is about conscience. But conscience is by definition the ability to differentiate fiction and reality, so it scientific study could be not possible due to it is at the same time the instrument and the object of knowledge.

So, if you attach a camera to your PC, the PC has qualia? Do you really think so? — tom

You are which is seeing the PC, but not the opposite. It seem to me very trivial. That is, camera in the example is like human glasses: you extend, increase, etc., your vision through it, but the subject in the example is which is using the camera.

it assumes this Virtual Reality without explaining what it actually is — SteveKlinko

I think that the book permit us to know a lot of not evident features of mind. The synchronicity in groups, circuits, etc., of specialized neurons when firing is the basic "explanation": "what the Virtual reality is, the Hard Problem".
In the book you can encounter one of the most advanced theories of mind (role of calcium channels, 40 Hz of frequency in the synchronized fired, etc.). I consider that the explanations of mind must be in this form or another one with the same (psychological) method. It is a "hard" problem such as "life" one is: we still not be capable of replicating artificially. But there are not a priori reasons for its skepticism.

Reality's "real structure" can be consistent, complete, etc., — gurugeorge

How it is possible to prove logical properties in something that is not a logic (a formal language constructed by humans)? I view it as a complete nonsense.

The explanatory gap is jumped everyday by psychological researchers. I recommended you for example, "I of the vortex" if you want to know this "mysterious" problem of how brain is used for individuals to think.

I am agree in general. It is possible that qualias of another persons but also the our self are differentiated by actions, like when you say that you're wearing fur to know if you're dreaming. A priori, we do not know if we are dreaming or not. Even for subjective point of view, qualia must be "inferred" from actions (included verbal actions) so they are not directly accounted. This led us to an skeptic conclusion about the "immediateness" knowledge of conscience.

How does 2 happen when 1 happens? — SteveKlinko

It is in my view, the question is bad formulated. It is a scientific question the "how" the knife cuts the onion: it simply "cuts" it, separating it in different parts. If you want continue asking when you assume that 2 happens by 1 you only will obtain biological details: "How people think with the brain?" is responded "By circuits, cores, modules, for the different competences, faculties etc.". But even when we have not still an advanced theory of mind (neuroscience is very young) it does not mean that it is another problem that a psychological one.

you agree that there is a separate Mind World where Conscious experience exists then you must agree that there is a Hard Problem of Consciousness — SteveKlinko

I do not agree it. Mind world is part of the physical world, referred to certain abilities of individuals, and realized by brains. I am not a dualist, and the hard problem presupposes it, but not justify it.

When Kripke or Chalmers say "C-fibers can be firing without pain" at using "modal" arguments I am not able to conceive it as imaginable. In my view it is impossible to conceive. The inverse one (mind but not concrete human brain) is possible in the same way that you can cut onions with a knife or and laser sword (both are a "cutting instrument"; the analogy is that brain is the "thinking instrument").

Robots can be programmed to do all that without qualia — tom

If you program the robot for view colors, why do you think that it has not a "qualia" such as of humans for which evolution programmed them for that? For my it is an unwarranted assumption.
Brain was the evolutionary solution to the necessity of representing the world for individuals which need to move. Any reason justify that only the human brain, but any other, permit individuals to think. Why only humans are "knowledge-creating entities"?

Fish, lizards and robots don't have minds though. None of them possess qualia. — tom

They have qualia (except robots if they have not a "brain", even when it is not "cellular") due to the same (evolutionary) reasons that us: to perceive and predict the world and to our self.

Think about the Redness of Red. The more you think about Redness the more you can understand that it is not even something that exists in the Physical World. It exists in your Conscious Mind World. — SteveKlinko

The redness is a property of the some objects, which has the property of being view as red (at least for humans), so redness perception is which "exists" in the mind world. This is the "problem of universals". It is a nonsense to say: "My viewing of this tomato is red". Instead, we say "This tomato (as I view it) is red". As pragmatists philosopher have suggested, many (if not all) philosophical problems are originated by a confused use of language.

if we find that reality works in the way our mathematical model projected, then reality has that logical structure — gurugeorge

Reality has a "real" structure (for example, elementary waves-particles and forces) like logic has a "logical" one. You are mixing the structure of the model with the structure of the modeled. In your rationalist view, it would be possible, for example, to demonstrate that reality is or not consistent, complete, etc., which in my view is a nonsense.

You know it's true from psychological experiments on fish, lizards, and robots. I doubt it. — tom

Fish, lizards and robots all use some kind of "brain", in the sense of a material system for thinking. Mind happens without some form of brain is for my not conceivable.

The reality is that we don't know anything about how our own Conscious experience of Red happens — SteveKlinko

The hard problem introduce a new additional problem that in my view does not exist. When Red-Neurons are firing in X, the conscious experience of Red happen in X (X experiences a qualia). We know it due to psychological experiments. But qualia, like digestion, are nontransferable: they are referred to concrete individuals. You can not see what another person sees in the same way that you can not make the same digestion than him but your our digestion. Qualia is like time in relativity theory: it is referred to a reference systems, which experience it, but it is not absolute.
The question "How C-fibers permit subject to feel pain?" is answered "Through their fired when harm in he is perceived". And we can continue questioning: "Why it happens?", so to respond: "Because evolution selected this way of feeling pain in humans". Some people think that it is insufficient, but there is not more steps.

I'm agree in part. But "mind" does not "create" the brain. A "model" and the phenomena modeled are two thing completely different.

My lemma is this matter is: "Individuals think through the brain"

"Mind" is which we postulate to explain individual performance, for example:
- Why John is crying? (action)
- Because he feels pain (mind).
A very different question is:
- How he feels pain? (mind)
- Through the activation of C-Fibers in his brain. (brain)

The Hard Problem, as I understand it, claims that, in one hand, there is 1) a "descriptive" problem, often called the NCC (neural correlates of conscience) one; and 2) another "theoretic" one, which fits obtaining a theory about how these correlates "cause" experience or conscience.

In my opinion, this view fails directly insofar "Y" can not be simultaneously a "correlate" (relation between two effects) and a "cause" of X (relation between cause and effect). When two variables are correlated (show the same effects) is assumed that there is common factor (cause) acting in it. For example, hair loss and the decreasing of tall in humans could be correlated, due to aging in both cases.
Thus, the NCC is only "philosophical" problem insofar it says us what is the "matter" or the "substance" of conscience; the physical mechanism through we think. But it might be transformed into the NMC problem, that is: neural mechanism of conscience.

Brain can not the cause of mind in the same way that your intestinal procedure are not the cause of your digestion but (part of) its mechanism.

The issue I find relevant in this dichotomy is whether ALL knowledge is one of the two or a combination of both. — TheMadFool

I think that all knowledge can be:
1) Necessary a priori (axioms, A ->B = not-A v B, etc.): they do not require any more logical or empirical evidence.
2) Contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori (Pythagoras's Theorem): they require logical evidence (logical consequence)
3) Contingent a priori and a posteriori (E=mc2): they require empirical evidence (physical effect).
Then, all knowledge is a priori either contigent or necessary, and if contingent, then it can be shown either also contingent or necessary a posteriori.

Also there seems to be some form of deep connection between our conceptual models, especially math, and the real world outside. Does this count for anything? — TheMadFool

This connection is a modeling one: that is, math are used to quantify reality and then make our possible to infer testable predictions.

To sum, the knowledge can be divided at least into these four dimensions:
Temporal: "A priori/posteriori" (before/after)
Structural: "Analytic/synthetic" (components/totality)
Semantic: "Formal/empirical" (abstract/concrete)
Epistemic: "Necessary/contingent" (reason/evidence)

My old philosophy prof. offered a definition of a priori as follows: that which is universally and necessarily so. As opposed to a posteriori, that which is known empirically, from experience. I assume this is all well-known here. — tim wood

In my view (which can becomes different through the discussions insofar I clear my ideas), there are several interesting ways of define the "analytic/synthetic", "a priori/posteriori", "contingent/necessary","formal/empirical" and so.

Another way could be the following:
The mathematical and logical theorems, such as Pythagoras's Theorem, are contingent a priori, that is, before demonstrating it, it by definition could be "false". To prove its necessity (it is a logical consequence of premises), which always is a posteriori (step by step to the last one), we state its contingency a priori, and then we conclude -necessarily and a posterior- that it is impossible, so it is a theorem. If we are sure that it is necessary a priori, its demonstration is irrelevant, such as religious dogmas. The knowledge such as mathematical theorems is also "formal" (about abstract objects) as opposite to "empirical" (about concrete objects).
Thus, the empirical knowledge, such as physics equations like "E=mc^2", is also contingent a priori. That is, null hypothesis rejecting in experimental studies is the way of inferring the true of the law (a posteriori). However, contrary to mathematics theorems, physics laws do not become necessarily true when they are empirically confirmed a posteriori.
In the two cases, the theorems and physics laws are "synthetic" (the "integration" or final product of knowledge procedure; from the components to the totality), meanwhile definitions, rules, axioms, etc., are the "analytic" side (the inverse procedure; from the totality to its components).

I believe this means the Mechanism is the Cause. Of course this is all semantics. — SteveKlinko

It is not semantic in my opinion. Smoking causes cancer, but the mechanism of the cancer is other thing than to smoke.

Frege's view is that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" have different senses but refer to the same object. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. But he also said that it is an identity sentence, and "synthetic a posteriori". My view is that "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is not a true "identity", and it has two "analytic" senses (commented above; in kantian sense) neglected by Frege. Thus, Frege wrote the following (On sense and reference):

The reasons that seem to favour it are the following: a = a and a = b are obviously sentences of
different cognitive value: a = a holds a priori, and, following Kant, should be called
analytic, while sentences of the form a = b often contain valuable extensions of our
knowledge and cannot always be justified a priori.

He thought that "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is not "analytic" but "synthetic a posteriori". I arrive to the same conclusion than Frege (we must distinguish sense and reference, for concepts and sentences as a hole) but by other way (supposing that a=b is "analytic" so it is a "linguistic" or "conventional" equality sentence).

What does it mean to "think", or to "have experiences"? What is "consciousness"? — Harry Hindu

In my opinion, they are concepts that explain what happens with individuals. Mind is that we postulated for modelating how individuals make which they make. Brain activity is that we postulated for modelating how minds make which they make.

Seems to me a Biological Mechanism is a cause — SteveKlinko

In my view, the brain is not the cause of mind in the same way temperature is not an effect of the molecular movement but it physical mechanism (how hot happens at the most detailed and reliable level).
People think by using their brains, and objects become hot with the increasing of the movement in their molecules.
Causes are the "why" something happens and mechanism are the "how" one.
People think due to many different causes, but they seem to make it with a only one mechanism (neural synchrony), in the same way than an object can become hot due to many causes, but it seems to be always by the same mechanism (molecular movement).
That is, the individual "X", the mind state "M" of X, and the brain state "B" of M are not identical, so the relation between X and M corresponds to psychology, and of M and B one to biology.
If you think that between brain and mind there is a causality relation then you should must think that the cause of your onions cutting is the knife, and not the objective of making a salad.

I think that the use of "phenomena" in the question entails its physical -despite incomplete- modeling. That is, we can experience the phenomena because it is modeled within a existing theory. New theories permit us to observe new phenomena, which sometimes require another new theories (or extensions) to be more extensively accounted. But even when the physical account to a phenomena (such as black holes) is not complete, the knowledge of the existence of the phenomena it is possible only if there is a preexisting physical theory (about electromagnetic radiation, gravity, etc. that permit us at least to confirm its existence). A "non-physical" phenomena is in my view a contradiction in terms.
In my opinion, the non-physical refers to the knowledge that is not obtained by physics methods.That is, the referred to logic and mathematics, together the worlds of fantasy (mythology, films, literature, etc.). The non-physical is only a product of our imagination.
Then, the physical entails the non-physical only in a specific sense: physics uses mathematics objects to modeling reality.

Thank for your analysis. My claim is just that. The "Hesperus is Phosphorus" sentences are only apparent "identities", but actually they are identification assertions (fixation of a reference, extensional interpretation) and synonymy ones (fixation of sense, intentional interpretation).

If we're unable to use (1a) or (1b), we must take "Hesperus is Phosphorus" as (2). — Srap Tasmaner

Thank you for your exposition of my argument. However, I think that (1a') and (1b') have not equivalent to the a=a identities of Frege. They are with the form: 'a'=a and 'b'=b, so the properties of the equality relation are not the same.

Thanks
My interest is not to elude the philosophical problems but try to understand them. But in this matter I sincerely cannot see it.
In my view, it is possible another minds that they do not use brains, such as the I.A. or an hypothetical alien civilization with a very different biology, but I cannot see the philosophical problem of a mind operating with other things that human neurons.

In my opinion, brain is the biological mechanism (neuronal system) that permits individuals to have a mind. The relationship between them looks like instrumental. Brain is that with we think. "Causes" of the mind states are related with the conditions in which they are produced, modulated, etc. For example, an emotion can be caused by other mental state (e.g. a thought) and by physical one (e.g. a drug).

I think that 1) is not the cause of 2) but its biological mechanism.
Causes of Red experience are related with seeing a red objetc, to be alucinating with it, etc.

I'm still not clear what you're saying. — Srap Tasmaner

The method of substitution salva veritae is valid, for example, in mathematical equations (x-5= y+2; y=3-x; => x=3-x +2+5 => x=5). In natural languages identities, the principle of substitution is not valid when names are designating to themself. In "Hesperus is Phosphorus", a priori, we can not know which member plays the role of showing. In mathematics, both terms, a priori, designates the same reference ("x" and "y" designate numerical values).
If neither "a" nor "b" are showing in natural language indentities, but saying, then "a=b" => "a=a". But we do not use natural language identities to say non-informative tautologies but to make identifications between words (synonymy relation) and a word and an object (reference relation).

Is a valid and sound argument based on the transitivity of identity. — MetaphysicsNow

The natural languages equalities with the name-object form are symmetrical preserving the linguistic function (saying/showing). For example, "'Venus' is Hesperus" can be transformed into "Hesperus is 'Venus'" but not into "'Hesperus' is Venus". That is, there are natural languages equalities which are identification sentences, in which a name or defined description designates an object and the other one to itself.

Still not clear what mistake you think Frege is making though. — MetaphysicsNow

My problem with Frege is his that he account natural languages equalities by reducting them to formal ones, so the problem of saying/showing emerges when we think about concrete examples.

Hesperus = Venus
Venus = Phosphorus
Therefore Hesperus = Phosphorus — MetaphysicsNow

It is a valid argument on the assumption that 'Venus' in the first equality has the same linguistic function than in the second one.
We can think the first as the name of a planet and the second as the name of itself, so only in "Hesperus=Venus" we can say "Hesperus is the Evening Star", but not in "Venus=Hesperus".

1A) Hesperus is Phosphorus. — MetaphysicsNow

This is a mistake but I think that it does not invalidates my argument. The same analysis can be made:

(1) Hesperus is Phosporus
A) (name-name) Hesperus is (other name than, synonym with) Phosporus
B) (name-objetc) Hesperus is (the name of the planet) Phosporus

Statements such as "John is John" in your example, insofar I understand them, presuppose information without that it is not possible to make sense of it (for example, "John is stubborn", etc.), so they are only apparent identities.