You know you're allowed to create your own threads, right?

You might almost say that your running commentary is a measuring stick by means of which our discussion and assessment of the Philosophical Investigations gains a normative valence, and without this sort of measuring stick functioning as the background against which we engage in a common conversation the language-game of this group will spin off into the void and become meaningless.

If only there were some sort of aphorism where Wittgenstein lays out this line of thought. Of course, if there were, you should probably treat that section of the aphorism separately from the other part, because it seems like it would be important.

If you want it (free, legal, etc.): Latest edition (fourth)

I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is already part of a language game; and that hence the theory presented in §1 is incomplete.

The text at the point we are up to now is looking at another supposed basis for language, simples or atoms or whatever. Again, it is being shown that to name a simple is already to engage in a language game. And hence, again, the theory that language has its basis in simples is incomplete.

Having read ahead a bit, I would say that so it goes, until it is pointed out that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by articulating the rule, but shown in following the rule.

And this is why doing trumps saying, use trumps meaning. — Banno

I think this is a really great indication of where the text is headed though I have huge qualms with that last sentence. I guess we'll have to wait for the rule-following section to really dig into the matter.

Thanks John Doe, I prefer an explanation over StreelightX's derision. The last quote is actually 38 rather than 35. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, technically it's a note but as far as I understand it's supposed to connect up with 35. I double checked and it is definitely 35 in the Hacker/Schulte translation. Perhaps you're reading an older Anscombe edition?

Heh, I'm basically doing one subsection a night, and at this rate, it ought to take about two years or so lol. But hopefully not every section will demand commentary. — StreetlightX

This strikes me as the appropriate amount of time needed to read the PI. :razz:

But we determined that in Witty's usage, rules are not necessary for games. Likewise, to me "grammar" usually implies "rules which govern language use". You seem to be using this word to refer simply to "language use" in general, a broad sense without regard for rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that we have to take "The Concept of Grammar in Wittgenstein" as the sort of thing you could write a dissertation about, like "The Concept of Freedom in Hegel" or whatever. He's using grammar in his specific, idiosyncratic way. Attempting to grasp what he means by this term is really an attempt to get at the heart of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Querying his use of this concept should drive at least one aspect our questioning.

As far as where we're at in the text -- Wittgenstein has mentioned grammar three times: §20, §29, and §35. He will not mention it again until near the end of the meta-philosophy section, §122. So what can we learn?

§20: "The sentence is 'elliptical', not because it leaves out something that we mean when we utter it, but because it is shortened -- in comparison with a particular paradigm of grammar."

Misleading translation. He says: "im Vergleich mit einem bestimmten Vorbild unserer Grammatik."

Here, "bestimmten" has a connotation of correctness; Vorbild a picture or model put in front of us.

§29: "Perhaps someone will say, "two" can be ostensively defined only in this way: "The number is called 'two'. For the word "number" here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood."

Here, I take it he's merely making explicit what he has been doing in these opening sections -- starting to challenge what we might call the typical picture of what grammar is and how it functions.

§35: "Can I say "bububu" and mean "If it doesn't rain, I shall go for a walk?" -- It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the grammar of "to mean" does not resemble that of the expression "to imagine" and the like."

Continuing the dialectic of the challenge, we're beginning to see the difficulties inherent to conceiving 'meaning' as a mode of imagination or representation.

I'd be down for Riemann and Kant and would lead the discussion on Riemann if you'd have this ignorant schoolmaster's musings. I hope StreetlightX finds the time to lead the discussion on Kant. That would be a cool thread. — fdrake

That's the best way to do it in my humble opinion! Anyway, let's go for it. We can start whenever you feel ready. I think my position is that it's great if someone wants to use this thread as a place to read an essay so I'm happy to either lead or cede any discussion. :up:

What about Husserl? He's one of those thinkers on my "meant to get to" list. — Moliere

Well, if I had to offer advice I'd suggest either "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" or "Crisis of the European Sciences" as a great starting point.

I don't mean to derail the reading group, but having read the thread so far, I'd really like to know what people think Wittgenstein was trying to do by writing PI. It seems that a lot of posters are drawing conclusions as if they knew without first establishing why they've reached that conclusion. — Ciaran

I really think we should wait until §§89-133 to start worrying about trying to work this stuff out, because as you point out, any discussion we have of his grand intentions right now will be slowly gliding across the ice into the horizon. We've got to wait for the rough ground of actual text.

One thing we can begin to discuss once we hit §89 is why order the book the way he does - why start by going to work in his manner of doing things only to then double back and begin to discuss why he's doing philosophical work in the manner that he is. It's a fascinating structure unique to Wittgenstein. It would be like Being and Time starting with two chapters of formal ontology before getting into the introduction and then back again to formal ontology. (Here I agree with @StreetlightX that we have to read this as indicative of philosophical intention and not mere haphazardness.)

So what getting to §89 will do is allow us not just to discuss big themes but also to glance backwards at §§1-88 and try to understand those sections in light of new developments in the dialectic.

(As to why I - likely others - are obnoxiously posting big picture stuff without getting in the weeds it's just because I lack the time to be a more diligent poster at the moment and @StreetlightX is doing a bloody fantastic job delving into the material with a sharp intellect at a great pace.)

I don't know why you would characterize my reply to Terrapin as shouting, maybe because of the force of the comment, I'm not sure. In fact, I tried to inject a bit of humor into the comment. — Sam26

Can we chalk this up to internet miscommunication (or my just being a lousy writer)? Perhaps a better way of putting the point I was hoping to make - cribbing the Conant & Diamond position which I take you to be not terribly well disposed to - is that (I think) what L.W. is doing in §§1-88 is trying to show Terrapin how and why he is wrong (or if you like trying to show young L.W. how and why he is wrong), and I think this is different from presenting a theory which offers a position which we can then argue contra Terrapin. If Terrapin doesn't agree to enter into the dialectic and take it seriously then I think from the perspective of what's going on in §§1-88, L.W. can't really offer him anything else. L.W. isn't offering the sort of thing we can shout at Terrapin, the way that a property dualist and physicalist do philosophy in the sort of way where they can shout back and forth at each other.

EDIT

Haha, Wallows, I think you're on a bit of a reading group kick! Maybe you're in one of those halcyon philosophical zones where for three months you're suddenly working at a higher level and just want to read everything!?

Great to have you on board, Moliere! Honestly, a lot of reading groups seem to have popped up recently for big books so I'm trying to figure out how best we should navigate what I had in mind for this group. I think maybe the best will be to take a poll and set a 'syllabus' of sorts. I'm definitely deeply interested in Merleau-Ponty and Sartre who have both been brought up in this thread, though I worry interest may wain in the group if we do just another big canonical book since there are like half a dozen threads doing the same thing. So I'm thinking maybe some essays, lectures, and very short books? E.g. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Sellars, Deleuze, Riemann, Kant, Marx, Ranciere? (Do you have any interest in Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason?)

If you really want to understand what Kant is on about in the CPR the best way to study the work, in my experience, is to put the audiobook version on your phone and listen to it at 2.5 speed while you do your groceries.

Hah, well, considering I read the PI as a Critique of Pure Language, I'm not exactly concealing my 'Kantian aggression' here. But it's important not to get too caught up in things here - I simply meant a paraphrase of this: — StreetlightX

Ahh, I thought you meant that 'CPL' was one possible way of reading him, not that it was your primary way of looking at the work. In any case, I don't want to be a gadfly but I do think this stuff is important. You, Sam, et al. read L.W. in a very specific sort of way - let's call it a sort of 'anti-therapy' reading - and far as I can tell that colors how you have been discussing each aphorism. I see no inherent problem with this reading in 1-88 where he's laying the groundwork, though I think it will come to matter a lot later on. If it's alright with you - assuming you're interested in reasonable dissent, which can be entirely obnoxious sometimes on the web - I'll come back during the meta-philosophy discussion in 89-133 to hash out the underlying issues. Otherwise, if you wish to proceed with a strict interpretive lens, I'll leave off entirely.

Hmm, I can't say I really recognize this in Witty - how language structures meaning (which is in turn structured by our forms-of-life), yes, [...] I've already read Witty as a linguistic materalist par excellence. Maybe this will come out in the reading more as we go along. — StreetlightX

Whoa, that looks at first glance like an aggressively Kantian reading of Wittgenstein. You seem to be (as many do) simply replacing (1) transcendental unity of apperception = condition of the possibility of experience with (2) lebensform = condition of the possibility of experience (or meaning or whatever).

Not sure if you're writing quickly or have a genuine philosophical picture you want to defend by lebensform structures language structures meaning because this seems to be expressing precisely the sort of meaning is grounded in x picture L.W.'s project strikes me as - if nothing else - trying to teach us to avoid.

The post is, consequently, extra-weird because you're arguing against someone talking about how "language structures experience", i.e. invoking a particular sort of Kantian reading which you don't like because its content - not form - goes against your sort of Kantian reading. (i.e. Lebensform grounds linguistic structure grounds meaning rather than grounds "experience".)

I just flag this here because it's such a huge point and I'm not sure what you want to defend as your substantive commitments and how you find them expressed in L.W.

Experience might not be the right term, it's probably too broad. What I mean is how it makes possible different ways of seeing and acting within the world. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well experience enables language enables experience; action enables language enables action. I don't see how we're going to get a clean split here. We're obviously jumping the gun before we get to discussions of rule-following and forms of life but I think that there's no clean distinction to be made between language, action, meaning, experience, rationality, practical know-how, familiarity, intelligibility, etc. etc. (I think what you're doing here - slowly refining your views as L.W. forces them out of you - "It's experience...wait no, that's too broad, it's ways of seeing and acting, what no..." is what the book is aiming to get us to do as readers.)

In fact, I wonder what you will get out of reading the PI if you don't understand this central point. — Sam26

Isn't one of the chief aims of the PI to get this point across to people like Terrapin? It seems a little weird - with respect to the aims of the PI - to get frustrated with Terrapin for not understanding this point before engaging seriously with the PI. (Not that his refusal to engage with the point isn't frustrating. But it's frustrating because he refuses to take the point seriously and attempt to undergo the work required to fully grasp its significance -- not because he can't get anything out of the book if he hasn't already accepted this view.)

I tend to agree with Conant/Diamond here insofar as I take it that this is what Witty understands therapy to consist in and why the notion is so central to his meta-philosophy. You can't shout Terrapin into understanding this point, as you seem to be doing in your post. Nor can you force him to engage in the sort of philosophical therapy he needs to understand it so long as he refuses to work with L.W. qua therapist in order to fully realize the point through a sort of anerkennen (i.e. if he reads Wittgenstein as his buddy rather than as a philosophical diagnostician who needs to be allowed some pathos of distance in order to show the reader what he wants him to see).

My general feeling is that, for whatever reason, a lot of religious folks are being woke to philosophical thoughts and feelings then find this website in order to express themselves and discuss these thoughts. Yet they're filtering this philosophical itch through religion so the result is a weird mix of hyper-religious yet philosophically naive posts. They tend to make new topics - rather than discussing in existing topics - because they have no sense of how to enter into conversations they don't understand.

My fear with turning these sorts of people away or making them feel unwelcome is that they might fail to discover philosophy, which is a distinct sort of good (in my humble opinion). But then the site also has no obligation to cater to the weird and usually naive ramblings of a bunch of ultra-religious folks who manifestly know next to nothing about philosophy proper.

So I think it's reasonable to suggest it's within the purview of moderator control to exercise naked power and make a judgment call on this.

Haha, I disagree! Maybe we should read The Ignorant Schoolmaster. :wink:

Okay, well we're happy to exploit your labour power any time just let us know.

My plan is to get this going some time around the start of the new semester, so early January. Hopefully that will give you enough time?

Between now and then I am thinking that I might try to squeeze in my own notes / read a Sellars essay -- “Some Reflections on Language Games” -- for anyone who is interested (mostly as an extension of the Wittgenstein thread), so I'm sure I can stretch that out if you need more time to work on your Marx thread.

I can promise you that we won't read anything that you don't have full free and legal access to in PDF format.

Alright, looks like we should definitely do Riemann! I would definitely also be interested in reading The Structure of Behaviour because it's been an embarrassingly long time since I've read it carefully.

One thing we might want to do is simply take a vote or a little straw poll everytime we finish a work. We could just do the Riemann essay then see how people feel afterwards and what they want to move onto next (if not SB or the Kant essay).

For example, Street, you read a lot of interesting stuff that would be great to do in a group - judging from your reading lists - but those particular books aren't necessarily my thing. Maybe we'll see where you're at after those books? Joanna Seibt intrigues me but I can't find access to a legal PDF of that work which seems like a priority for this sort of reading group.

I guess I would also be interested in comparisons, either reading side-by-side or successively. E.g. (from the other thread) Wittgenstein and Sellars on the game of giving and asking for reasons and the question of how central it is to our linguistic practices.

What would be your approach to a topic like time or infinity? These subjects are so broad. with such varied perspectives. — Metaphysician Undercover

Same way any philosophy seminar functions. We look at the variety of important essays which contribute to the topic's history, or a single book with an expansive scope though highly particular pov, or we narrow down on some small aspect of the topic in question and look at the current debates.

I guess I'll wait and see where people's interests lie. But if we want to do a selection of shorter works like "On the Hypotheses which lie at the Bases of Geometry" and "Cezanne's Doubt" I think that's already the basis for a really interesting reading group, assuming we get enough participants.

Though PhP happens to be my favorite philosophy text so I'm always happy to read what people say about it.

I think that's a really great suggestion. If there's enough interest, we might consider covering a variety of essays which different people have been wanting to get around to and we can just organize the thread by reading a couple of essays in related thematic areas like Philosophy of Mathematics, Aesthetics, etc.

I think Merleau Ponty is interesting. I haven't seen his name mentioned on these forums for a long time. Let me know what you think about his works? — Wallows

What would interest you? For example, covering Phenomenology of Perception or an essay (e.g. Cezanne's Doubt)?

I really appreciate your interest, though it sounds like the purpose and objectives I have in mind -- serious reading aimed at improving our understanding of difficult material -- may be at odds with both your highly critical approach to texts and your uncertainty about committing to a text.

I'm open to any and all suggestions. My goal is just to do something interesting. For example, if someone wanted to take on "Time" or "Infinity", I would love that -- it would be an excuse to dig into a profoundly interesting topic.

I'm not sure that what I have suggested (e.g. Brandom on Sellars) is too complex! My feeling is that any topic in philosophy is approachable at any level; if we are doing weekly notes to set the tone (rather than anarchic free-for-all) then I think we can discuss even very complex topics in an approachable way. At least I hope.

Out of the four topics you mentioned I'm most interested in phenomenology.

Trying to define the myth of the given in earshot of any semi-qualified philosophy grad student or professor is usually occasion for a frustrating, long, and pointed confrontation.

Anyway, I don't want to derail the conversation but I do want to push back a tad on the notion that Sellars inherits or continues Wittgenstein's legacy in any significant way. *push*

I think, as a Wittgensteinian, the problems of people are mainly psychological or what we tell ourselves. — Wallows

I definitely agree, so long as we understand psychology in the deep sense of the term - the sense of the term that led Witty to love Schopenhauer and Dostoyevsky, engage seriously with Freud, etc. - as opposed to being a mere set of subjective preferences, tastes, and inclinations.

It's a matter of identifying with a new voice in your head and listening to it instead of the incessant critic or what others would call a demon. Socrates talked about listening to his daemon. — Wallows

Well, I suppose this is the "two-in-one" of thinking, the fact that I can carry on a dialogue in thought rather than being restricted to monologue. I think you're right about the ability and perhaps necessity of utilizing the capacity for thought in order to find one's self. Though beyond that I'm not sure what I think of this - would love to see you expand on the thought. My own feeling is that suicidal thoughts tend to be a much larger expression of how one lives a life - the way one copes within the local world one occupies - than a view one comes to through thought and internal dialogue. But I may be misreading you (or plain wrong)!

So, you don't think we can empathize with someone seriously and quaintly considering suicide? Only sympathize? — Wallows

The opposite, though these words are used in such myriad ways that it might not be worth it to go to the bother of attempting to use the terms.

Yea. It's in the works. But I grant, it doesn't work well in soundbites. But I am tempted. It'll have to do with degrees of certainty, though (none of which will be absolute). — javra

Well I look forward to reading! Make sure to cc my username if/when you get around to it.

No, my intuition has little if anything to do with it. Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness. — javra

Yeah - the problem with this is if we ask "How?" you're going to formulate the justification for this proposition in terms of precisely the sort of reasons everyone is haggling over in this thread. Though maybe you can do it? Would be lovely to see you pull it off. I defy you to justify this statement - "Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness" - with reasons that don't terminate either in your intuition or in a the formulation of a line of reasoning which can be addressed and debated by someone with a materialist perspective.

Well, parroting what I just wrote in another thread. "Best arguments against my identifying as a man born in a woman's body?" I don't know, buddy. That's the sort of thing you can discuss, but I think you're bound to go awry if you think logic, reason, deliberation or dialectic will provide anything beyond clarification of what are essentially non-logical, non-rational global questions of how you cope with the world and your place in it.

I know you're interested in Wittgenstein. I think there are some Wittgensteinian points to make here. If I wish to persuade you that your suicidal thoughts are a sort of error - to show the fly out of the bottle - it will depend greatly upon my becoming acquainted with you as a person and the sorts of reasons and motivations in virtue of which you're entertaining these thoughts. Philosophy as therapy. For a certain sort of person you might say: Go read Dostoevsky. For another: Get your doctor to prescribe lithium then see if you still want to debate the topic.

The strange thing about the general prohibition against suicide is that seeking help from loved ones or even a clinic (ie. exposing the problem) also feels taboo to a lot of people.

To be suicidal and seek help is to admit to being weak and the stigma of being weak (dependent) is looked down on in our individualist culture. — Nils Loc

Yeah, but I think the opposite is true here too. The strange thing about the general prohibition against suicide is that to seriously entertain suicide and not seek help is a tacit admission of weakness within the secular bourgeois order in a way that essentially mimics what existed in the previous religious order. Namely, you're interpreted as a mental health case who is currently failing to cope with your weakness; but it's okay, see the scientific professional and you can overcome your personal weaknesses! (So now it's a weakness of mental health - see a doctor! - instead of moral weakness - see a priest!).

Maybe, maybe not. I suggest postponing judgement on the matter. — Ying

I agree. There's no need for us to become judgemental Kants.

I already am. Now what? — Ying

Yeah but are you a real skeptic? I'm skeptical.

I have to admit that I'm having trouble interpreting the point of the idea you're trying to express here. I was only trying to offer you the mildest possible rebuke for the fact that the idea you were expressing -- 'Europeans are smarter and more educated, people should come to Europe if they want to learn about politics' -- reflects a particular sort of colonial mentality which still lingers in a lot of European cultures and which I suspect you would do well to examine critically.

Glad you like it -- I guess the UN figured out it's a human right to control f through a ton of philosophy texts.

Metaphysicians can't lead reading groups on Wittgenstein anyhow, it would blow their cover.

My suggestion is that if you have someone lead the managerial aspects then you're good to go. It's better to take an egalitarian approach to interpreting Wittgenstein.

Just look up Marie McGinn on library.memoryoftheworld.org

If you're looking for something simple and straight-forward why not just go with the relevant Routledge Guidebook?

Glad to hear the Tractatus suggestions worked out! I'm sorry I didn't participate in that group more. As far as the PI is concerned, honestly, I don't think there's a great companion that doesn't put an onerously heavy interpretative spin on the material. It's really a shame because there's such an abundance of great material on e.g. Being and Time. I think this might be due to scholarship on analytic philosophers generally tending to be a very boring affair.

There is a tendency, though, to break the PI up into chunks according to what Wittgenstein had in his notes / as the book gets sectioned off in The Big Typescript. So the "metaphilosophy" section, the "rule-following" section, etc. So one thing you might think about doing is reading the seminal works which correspond to these sections. For example, Stanley Cavell has a lot to say on the opening aphorisms (1-89). You could do Kripke versus McDowell on rule-following. Etc. But you would definitely need someone smarter than me to organize that sort of chaotic approach.

Yeah so this is something I've been wondering about for a long time, though. It strikes me as pretty bizarre that the current experts on Wittgenstein's primary topic of interest have so little interest in him. And I can't figure out if it's because there genuinely are a lot of highly problematic ideas in his writings that I fail to pick up on due to lack of specific expertise or - this being the default theory that all of us dismissive continental types are quick to grab hold of - it's just typical old pedantic formalists unable to engage with any living creature whose mind happens to be more creative than boiler-plate academic paper-writing. Of course, none of this would affect my deep admiration for L.W.

On Certainty is fantastic. Every time I came back to it, I'm blown away. The sensitivity with which Witty approaches language is just unmatched in it. — StreetlightX

I feel the same way but for whatever reason the book, which is taken very seriously by epistemologists, seems to be totally ignored by mainstream philosophy of language. I guess it's just not "technical" enough for those folks?

In Europe we have a higher average IQ and education, however Americans get to have a more reasonable, useful government. — DiegoT

sigh

Angry Americans should try and live in Europe, then they could appreciate more their advantages. — DiegoT

One certainly wonders whether it's necessary to move to Europe when Europe has had such an historical proclivity to move to us. :razz:

I suppose that I probably had two distinct metrics in mind when I used the word "success": (1) Students that manage to learn, have fun, grow, etc. while avoiding the pitfalls endemic to majoring in philosophy: becoming frustrated and depressed; isolated and lonely; failing courses and dropping out. (2) Students who navigate the undergrad experience in a way that 'creates capabilities' and leaves their options in tact: the successful acquisition skills that will be useful in jobs, law school, etc.; the sculpting of a CV and transcript that will enable graduates to retain a wide variety of options in terms of what they wish to pursue in terms of career, later professional study (law, business, medicine), or further graduate study in philosophy.

Of course, we can debate the hell out of what we mean by 'success' in the context of studying philosophy, though I don't think that should preclude us from making observations about what makes for successful students in terms of the common-sense use of the word.

I don't know. What do you think?

When you feel ready, you should definitely seek out Janette Dinishak and/or Daniel Guevara. Philosophy is like a lot of industries, I think, where being bold, confident, and self-certain is necessary to learn and progress no matter how smart and capable you are. Though it's also a fine balance where going overboard will lead you into that awful place no one wants: being a pretentious bore.

Other things that I wish I could do-over or would tell my younger self: Don't question too much! I know it sounds like funny advice for a philosophy major, but I've noticed successful students tend to stick to their topics of interest and their goals, which they pursue vigorously. If you get caught-up in a certain sort of self-doubt ("What the hell am I going to do with a philosophy degree?", "Shouldn't I double major?" "Ok, I need to double major, but what will my other subject be?", "Gosh, am I too myopically interested in Wittgenstein? But then who else should I study?", "Is this thesis topic at all interesting, does it reflect everything I wanted to get out of this dergree?"; etc. etc.) you'll end with all the downsides of a philosophy degree people warn you about. But it need not be so. In other words, study what you want to study, do a good job, and I promise things will work out. In my experience, those I knew with a 3.8+ gpa in philosophy did very well for themselves, and a lot better than people who studied subjects for the sake of the job market.

What else....oh, a big thing about writing papers - undergrad or grad, but especially early on - is that I suggest you avoid the temptation to satisfy your global philosophical concerns in some 8 page paper. This is the biggest problem I know of that has crushed people at school. Very smart people have a tendency to feel like they've come up with some great ideas about life and the universe that they want to share; or, for example, some big interpretation of Wittgenstein in general. The really successful people will get stumped by, say, Aphorisms 130-133 in the PI and write an entire paper about just those sections. If you think of your philosophical mind as a capacity to raise problems in small areas and passages where others largely fail to see problems - because they read too quickly or fail to adequately see the depth of the issues raised - then I promise you will (1) consistently get A's in your coursework, (2) learn a lot without exhausting yourself and burning out as though your whole view of the universe hinges on every paper, (3) have a fun time in class and build relationships with TAs and Professors who will find your work interesting.

(Sorry for all the long, sorta unsolicited advice.)

Alright, Tim, I'm no SJW or PC-Police and yet this still reads to me as a quintessential expression of the sort of profoundly dehumanizing racism one experiences regularly when one happens to be so unfortunate. I don't want to exchange angry charges of racism and 'you're misinterpreting me!', etc. but just want to tell you how this reads to someone with my personal experiences:

I have not blamed, merely presented — tim wood

No, you have associated Arabs with murderers. This is not morally free-standing, neutral rhetoric. Not knowing your "identity" or the one foisted on you, all I can say is you won't get this unless you're called everyday to justify, account for, or apologize for "belonging" to a group associated with some heinous activities. It's like...

that represents a community — tim wood

...associating black American with rapists and murderers then asking them to begin speaking out on behalf of the "community" which those bad apples represent. Who the heck are you to say this constitutes a "community" and that these guys "represent" that community? The claim itself is a racist maneuver, as is the sense that you get to calmly and logically decide what murderers I am and am not associated with on the basis of my "race". At the very least it represents a sort of racial insensitivity, an incapacity to understand the burden of having strong negative associations foisted on you by every stranger you meet for reasons of race, ethnicity, religion, etc.

the community itself, willy-nilly, is burdened and remains burdened until and unless it finds a way to throw off that burden. — tim wood

Well, yeah, because you're throwing racist claims out there that artificially prop up the notion that there's a community burdened by moral complicity with heinous crimes where no such community exists. Throwing off that burden will mean fighting racism, especially fighting the sort of surreptitious racism you're engaging in here.

Lots of communities have such burdens imposed. In the US, for example, of historic slavery and current racism. It becomes incumbent on us in the US and me individually and as much as possible and as soon as possible to repudiate and eliminate racism and substantively and finally address the historic issues of slavery. Germans labor with Nazism, with some success, in their passage of certain laws and certain efforts at retributive and rehabilitative justice. — tim wood

Yeah, but that's not what we're talking about here. What you're doing is the equivalent of associating Japanese-Americans with Pearl Harbor. When we concern ourselves with slavery we're not making blanket statements about race but rather about the nature and history of a practice, its moral ramifications in the present, and how to overcome the moral advantages and burdens that this has unfairly distributed to certain citizens.

You're not asking "What is it about the political practices in Saudi Arabia that enabled this tragedy to happen?" but calling on anyone associated with Arabs ethnically or religiously to assume responsibility for a particular government's brazen act of cruelty.

I am well-persuaded that most middle-easterners take their respective cultural practices personally and seriously. — tim wood

Quite the courtesy. (Again, the experience of racism: This reads as deeply condescending, and not in the sort of way that can be diffused by appeal to your "intentions".)